IntroCLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTDPROJECT TITLE: MANUFACTURING PLANT NO 2PROJECT NO.: PJ-21113DOCUMENT NO.: R-216Rev No-0TITLE: HAZOP OF HYDROGENATION REACTOR SSR-216Basis for Hazop study1HAZOP studdy is done based on approved Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) & approved facility layout. In addition to this HAZOP, study to be done considering specifc product manufacturing since facility will be used for multi purpose application.2Equipment layout3Men Material Movement layout4Hazardous area classification layout5HVAC classiifcation layout6Safety Shower & Fire Exit layout7Fire Hydrant layout8Gas Detection system layout9P&ID No: G-01-4-16, Rev-2Study Node1Reactor2Line3Operating instructionsGuide word1No2Less3More4Reverse5Other thanSeverity1No2Low3Moderate4High5High HighParameters1Flow2TemperaturePH3Pressure4LevelVortexAgitationCross/reverse flowPressure rise /restriction/chokeBack pressure in vent lineFlashing/cooling/freezingphaseSequence5ContaminationTime6Relief7Electrical8CorrosionConsequence1Process hazard (financial, quality of product)2Safety Hazards (Life & health)Safeguard measures1Prevent based on the design2Detect by giving early warning3MitigateRecommendations1Low priority2Medium priority3High priorityPoints to be considered during node identification1Normal operation2Routine start-up3Routine shutdown4Emergency shutdown5Commissioning

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SSR216CLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTDPROJECT TITLE: MANUFACTURING PLANT NO 2PROJECT NO.: PJ-21113DOCUMENT NO.: R-216Rev No-0TITLE: HAZOP OF HYDROGENATION REACTOR SSR-216Sr.NoStudy NodeParameterGuideword(Deviation)Severity (Based on set point)Possible Cause(s)Consequence/RisksSafeguards/Control measuresAction PlanAction ByAction Assingend toRemark/ comments1ReactorTemperatureMore temperature in reactorHighDue to reaction exotherm (addition of hydrogen)Pressurization & Loss of strength due to high temp.high & high high temperature alarmClose the On/OFF vlave on hydrogen lineHydrogen ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSDiscussed and agreed during HAZOP Dated 12 & 13 May 2014Cooling water On/OFF valve to be provided on inlet & outlet through external coil after and before manifold.Separate cooling water line with On/OFF valve to be provided on inlet & outlet of external coil. will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL to incorporate in P&ID and DCSPressurizationRupture disk followed by pressure safety valve- 2 NosRupture disc will burst followed by opening of saftey valveEquipmentDue to uncontrolled heatingPressurizationExteranally separate cooling coil on shell & Internal coilopen the cooling utility vavle on external/Internal coilField operatorNFIL Operating procedurePressurizationhigh & high high temperature alarmClose the steam control& ON/OFF valveSteam control & ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSDue to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valvePressurizationInternal coiling coil with Liquid Nitrogen or cooling water (Manual control)start the cooling water/ liquid Nitrogen through internal coilField operatorNFIL Operating procedureMalfunctioning of Temperature indicatorPressurizationTwo nos of temperature transmittersCalibration & maintenance SOPHOD / Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureFailure of Hydrogen ON/OFF valvePressurizationhigh & high high pressure alarm and Manual isolation valveClose the manual isolation valveField operatorNFIL Operating procedureFailure of steam control valve or ON/OFF valvePressurizationhigh & high high temperature alarmClose the ON/OFF or Steam control valveSteam control & ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSFailure of Hot water ON/OFF valvePressurizationhigh & high high temperature alarmClose the manual isolation valveField operatorNFIL Operating procedure2TemperatureLess temperature in reactorLowDue to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valveReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Two nos of temperature transmitters providedClose the manual isolation valveField operatorNFIL Operating procedureDiscussed and agreed during HAZOP Dated 12 & 13 May 2014Due to failuar of Liquid Nitrogen manual valveReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Two nos of temperature transmitters providedChange the manual valveField operatorNFIL Operating procedureHydrogen supply cutoffReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Pressure transmitter provided with low pressure alarmOperator to investigateField operatorNFIL Operating procedureMalfunctioning of Temperature indicatorReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Two nos of temperature transmitters providedCalibration & maintenance SOPHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureNO/REVERSE/OTHER THAN Are not applicable3PressureMore pressure in reactorHigh HighDue to reaction exotherm (addition of hydrogen)PressurizationHigh & high high pressure alarm & On/OFF Valve on hydrogen lineClose the On/OFF vlave on hydrogen lineHydrogen ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL to incorporate in DCSExcess RM or catalyst additionPressurizationRupture disk followed by pressure safety valve- 2 NosEquipmentExplosionSeparate section for hydrogenation with three side RCC Wall and one weak wall and roofFireDCP flodding system, Fire hydrant networkoperater to follow on site emergency planField OperatorNFIL Operating procedureHighFailure of steam control valve or ON/OFF valvePressurizationhigh & high high pressure alarmClose the ON/OFF or Steam control valveSteam control & ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSHighFailure of Hot water ON/OFF valvePressurizationhigh & high high pressure alarmClose the manual isolation valveField operatorNFIL Operating procedureClose the On/OFF vlave on hydrogen lineHydrogen ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSHighFailuar of cooling mediaPressurizationHigh & high high pressure alarmClose the hot water ON/OFF or Steam control valveSteam control & ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSClose the On/OFF vlave on hydrogen lineHydrogen ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCSSPCPL To Incorporate in DCSHighMalfunctioning of Pressure indicatorPressurizationTwo nos of pressure transmitters providedCalibration & maintenance SOPHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureHighFailuar of Hydrogen PRVPressurizationSafety valve in hydrogen lineEquipmentHighFailuar of instrument airOperation of instrumentation valveAlarm is providedOperator to investigateHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureON/OFF & Control Valve on LPS line is of fail to close typeInbuild action by valveSPCPL to check valve specificationValve on Hydrogen line is fail to close typeInbuild action by valveSPCPL to check valve specificationValve on cold utility supply, return lines are of fail to open typeInbuild action by valveSPCPL to check valve specification4PressureLess pressure in reactorLowDue to excessive coolingReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Two nos of temperature transmitters providedOperator to investigateField operatorNFIL Operating procedureHydrogen supply cutoffReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Pressure transmitter provided with low pressure alarmOperator to investigateField operatorNFIL Operating procedureMalfunctioning of Pressure indicatorReaction will slowdown (Assumed)Two nos of pressure transmitters providedCalibration & maintenance SOPHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureReverseLowEmptying of Hydrogen cylinderReactant material can go in to Hydrogen lineNRV providedEquipmentNO/OTHER THAN Are not applicable5ContaminationLess/MoreHighInternal coil leakage during operationUtility leakage inside the reactorClose the manual isolation valveclose the isolation valveField operatorPressurizationHigh & high high pressure alarmClose H2 line ON/OFF valveField operator & DCSRunaway reaction due to utility content ingraceHigh temperature & High pressure alarm through DCS & Safety Relief valve/Rupture DiskEquipment pressure testing before batchHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureflow of reaction mass towards utilityPressure transmitter to be provided on cooling water return line, close hydrogen On/OFF valve and utility inlet outlet valve through DCSFild operator to close manual isolation valve on internal coil utility line, SOP to address total shutdown procedureSPCPL to add pressure transmitter in P&ID. NFIL operating procedureLowSeal leakageBatch contaminationSelect suitable material which is compatibleHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureModerateImproper opening of valves, or valve passing of utilitiesloss of utilitydouble manual valve is provided at both inlet & outletFollow the SOP while applying utilityField operatorNFIL Operating procedureProcess material addition, manualProcess dependentProcess dependent, HAZOP to be carry out as per process requirement by NFIL6H2 venting (Relief)Less/MoreHighDue to pressurization or to release pressure at the end of batchHydrogen will be present & may catch fireVent of the reactor is passed through water pot & vent of the same to open atm along with the steam purgingFollow the venting SOPHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureFrom PSV vent in case of high pressureHydrogen will be present & may catch fireVent routed to safe location. No electrical installation nearbyFacilityTo be confirmed during PSSRHighChocking of vent lineVenting will get affectedVent valve to open slowelyFollow the venting SOPField operatorReverse flow of water in to the reactorLocat water pot at 5 mtr or mezzanine level inside the hydrogenation area, provision of local level indicator and pressure gaugeSPCPL to incorporate in layout and P&ID, NFIL to encorporate in SOPSPCPL & NFILHighNo water in venting potH2 will vent directly to atm without weting may cause fireU loop given to venting pot for water hold up at all the timeFollow the venting SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureHighNo steam purging in ventH2 will vent directly to atm without weting may cause fireSteam and water provided as a weting media and vent to be located at safe location, no electrical installation nearbyFollow the venting SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureFloor washingFollow the unloading SOPField operator6Flow of flameReverseHighExternal fire and venting simultaneouslyExplosionFlame arrester is provided on PSV vent, & release to safe locationCalibration & maintenance SOPHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedure7Utility failureOther thanHighPump or utility unit triprise or decrease of temperaturePressure indication & alarm given in DCS (On utility header)Change over and check the utility pump & unitField operatorNFIL Operating procedure8Leakage of gasesOther thanHighleakage from flangeUnsafe working environmentHydrogen & Oxygen Gas detection system is providedAction to be taken as per SOPHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureElephant trunk is provided out let of which is directly connected to scrubberAction to be taken as per SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureTounge & Groove flanges providedEquipment9Sharp edges inside the equipmentOther thanHighDesign flaw or improper manufacturingPersonal injury during equipment entryJoint inspection by NFIL & TPIPoint to be noted during inspectionTPI / NFILTPI / NFIL10Bottom valve LeakageOther thanHighChockingHuman hazard, loss of materialBlind falnge provided after valveFollow the operational SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureValve passingHuman hazard, loss of materialBlind falnge provided after valveFollow the operational SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedure11Electrical/Static electricityNoHighDiscontinuty or damage of earthingCause fire & may lead to explosionDouble earting provided on both body and motorFollow the operational SOPCheck list by field operator signed by HODNFIL Operating procedureThese procedures are existing for loading and unloading and to be used for reactor charging12Electrical/Static electricityNoHignJumper not providedCause fire & may lead to explosionJumper provided in flange jointFollow the operational SOPCheck list by field operator signed by HODNFIL Operating procedure13ElectricalNoHighPower failure at MCC or PCCProcess dependentOn/OFF indications provided in DCSOperator to investigateHOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedureProcess dependent, HAZOP to be carry out as per process requirement by NFIL14Agitator RPMMoreModerateMalfunctioning of VFDReaction rate may increaseRPM indicator provided, Local push button for stop is providedFollow the operational SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureLessLowMalfunctioning of VFDReaction rate may decreaseRPM indicator providedFollow the operational SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureNoLowDecoupling of agitator, Jaming of agitator, no power supplyReaction rate may decreaseAt no load & overlaod, motor will trip & alarm, On/OFF indication provided on DCSOperator to investigateField operatorNFIL Operating procedureOthersLowMalfunctioning during the operationAjitator jam or damage, excessive vibration, Spark, abnormal soundLocal push button station to stop the motorSwitch off the motorField operatorNFIL Operating procedureOthersHighDCS operator strat the motorHuman hazardOnly local push button station is provided to start the motorFollow the operational SOPField operatorNFIL Operating procedureRemote will have only stop commandNo auto startDCS controlNFIL Operating procedureReverseLowWrong connectonsReaction will get affectedBefore starting, connections to be checked.HOD/Shift inchargeNFIL Operating procedure15LevelNo,More,less,other thanProcess dependentManual errorProcess dependentFollow the operational SOPField operatorHAZOP to be carry out as per process requirement by NFIL16CorrosionMoreProcess dependentUse of non compatible process materialLeakagesFollow the operational SOPHOD/Shift inchargeHAZOP to be carry out as per process requirement by NFILTeam membersSPCPLNameSignNFILNameSign1Mr. Mahendra Sarvankar1Mr. T Bhaskar2Mr. Suhas Kadam2Mr. Subba Reddy3Mr. Chaitanya Chabukswar3Mr. Sanjeev Sheth4Mr. Shamkant SuryavanshiNote: * - Indicates Part Participants

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