healing and education of the mind

3

The 3rd International Conference of The Institute of Mind Humanities

: Healing and Education of Mind : History and Methodology

: 2013. 2. 15() ~ 16()

:

:

: (NRF)

International ConferenceThe Institute of Mind Humanities

Wonkwang University

I. Conference Title

: Healing and Education of Mind : History and Methodology

II. Time and Place

1) Date: February 15th(Fri.) ~ 16th(Sat.), 2013

2) Location: Soongsan Memorial Building

Wonkwang University, Iksan, Korea

III. Organization and Sponsorship

1) Host: The Institute of Mind Humanities, Wonkwang University

2) Sponsorship: National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF)

2 15()

10:30~10:50

10:50~11:00 (, )

11:00~11:50 , U.

(, )

11:50~13:00

13:00~13:50 (, )

13:50~14:40 , , J. (, )

14:40~15:00

15:00~15:50 ( )

15:50~16:40 , ? :

( )

16:40~17:00

17:00~17:50 :

( )

18:00~19:30

2 16()

10:00~10:50 Sri Aurobindo ( )

10:50~11:40 ( )

11:40~11:50

February 15th (Fri.) Program

Time Schedule Presenters

10:30~10:50 Registration

10:50~11:00 Opening Address

Han, Nae Chang(Director,

The Institute of Mind Humanities)

11:00~11:50 The Role of Morality in Mindfulness TrainingKrgeloh, Christian U. (Auckland University

of Technology New Zealand)

11:50~13:00 Lunch

13:00~13:50 The Spiritual Foundation of Moral EducationWong, Ping Ho

(The Hong Kong Institute of Education)

13:50~14:40 Mindfulness, Meditation and Free AssociationRosen, Helen J.

(The Won Institute of Graduate Studies)

14:40~15:00 Break

15:00~15:50 Embodied Mind Model of HealingRhee, Young E

(Kangwon National Univ. Humanities Therapy Project)

15:50~16:40 How Can We Find a Peace of Mind Departing from Anger? : Dynamics of anger and peace of mind

Kim, Kyung Ho (Chonnam National Univ.

Institute of Honam Studies)

16:40~17:00 Break

17:00~17:50 The Humanities Therapeutic Approach to Yeatss Later Poetry : The Acceptance and Overcoming of Ageing

Yu, Keon Sang (Kangwon National Univ.

Humanities Therapy Project)

18:00~19:30 Dinner

February 16th (Sat.) Program

Time Schedule Presenters

10:00~10:50 The Structure of Mind and Mind Education in Sri Aurobindo's Thought

Jung, Hyejung (Wonkwang Uni.


10:50~11:40 Understanding of Mind in Buddhism and Mindfulness in Daily Life

Jang, Jin Young(Wonkwang Uni.


11:40~11:50 Closing

The Role of Morality in Mindfulness Training / Krgeloh, Christian U. 1 [] / , U. 20

The Spiritual Foundation of Moral Education / Wong, Ping Ho 33 [] / 62

Mindfulness, Meditation and Free Association / Rosen, Helen J. 65 [] , / , J. 80

Embodied Mind Model of Healing / Rhee, Young E 93 [] / 104

, ? : / 107 [Abstract] How Can We Find a Peace of Mind Departing from Anger? : Dynamics of anger and peace of mind / Kim, Kyung Ho 134

The Humanities Therapeutic Approach to Yeatss Later Poetry : The Acceptance and Overcoming of Ageing / Yu, Keon Sang 137 [] : / 150

Sri Aurobindo / 153 [Abstract] The Structure of Mind and Mind Education in Sri Aurobindo's Thought / Jung, Hyejung 176

/ 187 [Abstract] Understanding of Mind in Buddhism and Mindfulness in Daily Life / Jang, Jin Young 212

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1

The Role of Morality in Mindfulness Training

Krgeloh, Christian U. *1)(Ph. D, Department of Psychology,

Auckland University of Technology New Zealand)

AbstractThe present paper gives an outline of the role morality plays in mindfulness

training. Three of the most commonly used mindfulness-based psychological

interventions are mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), mindfulness-based

cognitive therapy (MBCT) and action and commitment therapy (ACT). The first

two were directly inspired by Buddhist teachings, and all of these so-called

mindfulness-based interventions (MBI) have been receiving much attention in the

recent psychological literature.

Much research has established the effectiveness of MBIs, but the mechanism

of their beneficial health effects still needs to be investigated in more detail.

Many of these MBIs are delivered as a package containing a variety of

exercises, and the search for a core common ingredient is meant to inform the

theoretical links between mindfulness practice and psychological wellbeing.

Because of the roots of mindfulness in religious traditions, such as Buddhism,

comparisons are also frequently made with religions, especially also because

religions contain a much wider range of practices including devotional,

traditional and cultural than MBIs, which have been deliberately designed to be

secular.

* , .

Healing and Education of Mind : History and Methodology

- 2 -

One issue of contention in the recent academic literature is the role that

morality plays in mindfulness training. Some scholars argued that restricting

MBIs to mindfulness and meditation practices has led to too much of a reduction

compared to Buddhist traditions, which also place emphasis on developing

morality and wisdom. The present paper discusses the validity of these arguments

and speculates to what extent morality might play an important role in Western

MBIs even if it is not explicitly or formally instructed.

Psychology as a scientific discipline is secular, but because of its application

in all domains of life, it is inevitably confronted with religious practices,

behaviors and traditions. Religions no doubt play a powerful role in the

maintenance of peoples psychological wellbeing, such as in its resources to

provide coping mechanisms during times of stress. Religious coping has thus

been described as serving multiple functions, including generating a framework

for problem-focused coping or providing access to emotional and instrumental

support from a religious community (Krgeloh, 2011; Krgeloh, Chai, Shepherd,

& Billington, 2012). On many occasions, psychology limits its treatment of

religious practices purely to description of behaviors, which appears to be the

preference in a science that intends to remain objective (Schoenfeld, 1993). If

this approach is followed, psychology continues to be secular and avoids any

direct engagement with the metaphysical assumptions that underlie religious

traditions.

In recent years, mindfulness practices and programs for psychological

intervention have started to enjoy a surge of popularity (Williams & Kabat-Zinn,

2011). As part of so-called third wave therapies (Hayes, 2004), mindfulness exercises

have been practiced systematically to produce various psychological benefits. While

such programs maintain a secular flavor, they are largely adapted from Buddhist

traditions (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Walsh & Shapiro, 2006). There is now ample empirical


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evidence that demonstrates that mindfulness practice is generally associated with

positive psychological outcomes as well as other health benefits (Eberth and

Sedlmeier, in press; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004), but the precise

mechanisms by which this happens still need to be explored. During the process of

secularization of mindfulness practice, many religious practices were discarded, and the

question now is whether what remains is indeed the core active ingredient of

mindfulness practice, or whether too much has been removed. One such element

relates to moral practice. Rules of conduct and morality are integral to any kind of

religious practice, while psychology is descriptive as opposed to being prescriptive.

The present article outlines discussions in the academic literature about the

similarity between the mindfulness practices in Buddhist traditions as opposed to

MBIs. Core to this discussion is the definition of mindfulness per se, as some

scholars have recently expressed concern that the practice of MBIs has become

too incongruent with that of Buddhist traditions. The present paper discusses the

validity of these arguments and speculates to what extent morality might play an

important role in Western MBIs even if it is not explicitly or formally instructed,

nor formally included in its theoretical definitions of mindfulness.

The rise of mindfulness-based psychological interventions

The actual term mindfulness has only recently been used frequently in the

psychological literature, although related and overlapping psychological processes

or phenomena have always been part of psychological therapies to some extent.

These include the psychodynamic techniques, such as free association and

interpretation, transference and countertransference, as well as cognitive-behavioral

tools, including decentering and deautomization (Martin, 1997). Within the various

psychological paradigms, therefore, concepts and processes similar to mindfulness

have been integrated into psychological theory, but the recent popularity of the

concept in psychology has led to attempts to define the concept more broadly,

which has been a challenging task. A definition of mindfulness that is one of the


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most commonly cited in the psychological literature has been provided by

Kabat-Zinn (1994): paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the

present moment, and non-judgmentally (p. 4). More detail and a wider range of

aspects has been given by Bishop et al. (2004), who see mindfulness as a

process of regulating attention in order to bring a quality of nonelaborative

awareness to current experience and a quality of relating to ones experience

within an orientation of curiosity, experiential openness, and acceptance. We

further see mindfulness as a process of gaining insight into the nature of ones

mind and the adoption of a de-centered perspectiveon thoughts and feelings so

that they can be experienced in terms of their subjectivity (versus their necessary

validity) and transient nature (versus their permanence) (p.234).

Three widely used MBIs include acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT;

Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR,

Kabat-Zinn, 1990), and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) (Segal,

Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). The latter two have been specifically designed as

therapies for particular psychological health issues, namely coping with chronic

pain and stress, and relapse from depression, respectively. Meditation is a central

intervention tool in MBSR and MBCT, while ACT uses a variety of mindfulness

exercises within its therapeutic framework, which may or may not include

meditation.

MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) was developed by Jon Kabat-Zinn and is now

offered in many places around the world. Participants in this program typically

get together in evening groups for 8 to 10 weeks, as well as one full-day

workshop half way through the program. During the weekly sessions, the

instructors introduce participants to various meditation and mindfulness techniques,

such as mindfulness meditation, Hatha yoga, breathing exercises, body scan

exercises, as well as mindful walking and eating. As the program progresses,

participants are gradually taught how to apply these techniques to their everyday

lives. This is reinforced through the use of homework tasks, such as a diary, as

well as the expectation to practice mindfulness techniques daily for around

45min.


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MBCT was designed as a therapy for patients who have previously

recovered from depression but who are still vulnerable to relapse (Segal et al.,

2002). The goal here, therefore, is more explicitly on changing the ways in

which participants respond to their own cognitions. Through mindfulness

exercises, clients learn to change the habit in which they typically process

cognitions, in order to prevent re-emergence of depression when they are faced

with new challenging situations. Instead of focusing too much on the literal

content of their thoughts, clients are taught to observe them in a non-judgmental

manner. This way, they will come to understand that thoughts are impermanent

and transient, and more importantly that the actual content of the thoughts is not

always accurate. Many clients with depression engage in forms of negative

self-talk, which start a downward spiral of a depressive episode. With MBCT,

however, clients learn that they do not need to identify themselves with these

thoughts and react to them blindly, but instead learn to observe them

non-judgmentally. A person having the thought I am useless, for example, thus

becomes aware that I am having a thought that I am useless. MBCT uses a

similarly structured program to MBSR. But because of its focus on depression, it

includes more exercises on cognitions, such as observation of the associations

between mood and worried thoughts (Evans, Ferrando, Findler, Stowell, Smart, &

Haglin, 2008).

In contrast to MBSR and MBCT, ACT uses mindfulness techniques within

its broader therapeutic framework, and thus there is not the same kind of

structured program for mindfulness practice. One of the main therapeutic goals of

ACT is acceptance of negative thoughts and feelings (Hayes, 2004). As with the

other MBIs, clients are taught to accept the occurrence of negative thoughts and

simply be aware of them first instead of reacting to them immediately. A variety

of breathing and meditation exercises can be used, but often the habit of

acceptance is fostered through regular conversations with the therapist. In one

simple exercise, for example, the therapist presents the client with a series of

cards with written sentences of examples of negative self-talk statements (Spiegler

& Guevrement, 2010). The client is eventually understands the analogy between


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the sentences and his/her thoughts. In other words, just as one can distance

oneself from the meaning of written sentences by perceiving them as a series of

letters, so can thoughts be regarded simply as a series of words. This exercise of

teaching different ways of perceiving is thus intended to reinforce the realization

that one does not need to react blindly to the literal content of thoughts.

To what extent MBIs are effective is yet to be formally established (st,

2008; Spiegler & Guevrement, 2010). In a meta-analysis, Hayes, Luoma, Bond,

Masuda, and Lillis (2006) showed that ACT appears to provide results that are

clinically significant and superior to treatment as usual, although other evidence

only points to equivalence with other psychological interventions (Powers, Zum

Vrde Sive Vrding, & Emmelkamp, 2009). More research has been conducted

about the effectiveness of MBSR, but also there, more research is needed (Baer,

2003; Grossman et al., 2004). MBSR has been shown to produce positive and

clinically significant results for a range of problems, including chronic pain

(Kabat-Zinn, 1982), coping with cancer symptoms (Grossman et al., 2004; Smith,

Richardson, Hoffman, & Pilkington, 2005), as well as wellbeing, depression and

anxiety in female patients with fibromyalgia (Grossman, Tiefenthaler-Gilmer,

Raysz, & Kesper, 2007). In nonclinical situations, MBSR has been used as a tool

for relationship improvement in couples (Carson, Carson, Gil, & Baucom, 2004)

and to help nurses cope with their stressful workloads (Mackenzie, Poulin, &

Seidman-Carlson, 2006). Studies investigating the effectiveness of MBIs often

struggle with methodological limitations, such as small sample sizes, attrition, or

lack adequate control or comparison groups (Baer, 2003).

Which elements exactly are responsible for the positive effects of the

mindfulness practice taught in MBIs still needs to be investigated (Lau &

McMain, 2005). According to Kabat-Zinn (2003), the effectiveness of MBSR is

not simply due to relaxation, but due to the development of meta-cognitive skills.

Clients learn to maintain a non-judgmental attitude towards their sensations and

simply observe them as they occur in the present moment. This definition of

mindfulness as non-judgmental awareness, however, has been a point of

contention in recent academic debates. Dreyfus (2011), for example, argued that,


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unlike MBIs, Buddhist practice attempts to achieve cognitive transformation rather

than simply self-acceptance. Mindfulness in Buddhism is thus different, as it

contains evaluative, discriminative, and introspective components, such as when

assessing ones spiritual progress or judging whether ones behavior is in line

with moral guidelines and precepts. In the Buddhist Pali canon, mindfulness is

described as only one part of the noble eightfold path to overcoming suffering,

which includes right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right

livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration (Rahula, 1974).

To what extent secular psychological therapies have limited the conceptualization

of mindfulness too much, particularly in respect to morality, will be the topic of

the following sections.

Is the concept of mindfulness in psychology different from that of Buddhism?

Gethin (2011) listed four types of attitudes that one could hold about MBIs:

Firstly, these recent developments are a distortion of traditional Buddhism and no

longer align with the Buddhist goals of salvation, namely the elimination of

greed, anger and delusion. Secondly, MBIs are just another way to spread the

dharma to more people. Thirdly, the core teachings of Buddhism are maintained

in MBIs, and only the unnecessary historical and cultural appendages of

Buddhism have been removed. Lastly, MBIs combine Western psychological

science with Buddhist practices to create an approach that is superior to

traditional Buddhism.

MBIs are deliberately non-religious, as they have been designed to appeal to

a wide range of people of different religious and cultural backgrounds. Cullen

(2011) wonders to what extent MBIs might even become some kind of new,

American Dharma (p.190), namely one that has distanced itself from Buddhism

and is thus some form of universal dharma (Cullen, 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 2011).

Future developments will show to what extent MBIs will eventually become their


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own Buddhist lineage, but one must not forget the fact that participants in MBIs

often develop an interest in mindfulness practice for health benefits or as part of

psychological intervention, while practitioners of Buddhist traditions typically have

a lesser focus on immediate health benefits (Krgeloh, 2012)

The motivations of people to develop and deliver MBIs and people to

participate in them are likely to be related to the way in which mindfulness itself

is conceptualized. Mindfulness may thus have been defined and practiced in ways

that are starting to deviate substantially from traditional Buddhism, as has been

the criticism in recent academic debates. The English term mindfulness appears to

have had its origins in the translation work of Rhys Davids during the late

19thcentury(Gethin,2011).TheoriginalmeaningofthePaliwordsati is memory, but the

word gradually gained additional meanings in Buddhist scriptures (Bodhi, 2011),

which eventually lead to the decision to translate into English as mindfulness.

Memory and mindfulness is certainly somewhat intertwined, as Buddhist

practitioners are encouraged to bring to mind the teachings of the dharma in

every single action. In the classical text The Questions of King Milinda, the

Buddhist monk Ngasena answers the questions of the Indo-Greek king Menander

I. Here, Ngasena describes mindfulness as a lack of drifting of the mind.

However, in addition to focusing ones thought within the present moment,

Ngasena also emphasizes the role of ethical components in mindfulness, such as

when discriminating between wholesome and unwholesome mental states. It is for

that reason that Dreyfus (2011) argues that mindfulness in the Buddhist sense is

different from Kabat-Zinns (1994) definition of non-judgmental awareness, as

mindfulness according to Ngasena contains elements of evaluation, discrimination,

and introspection. Dreyfus argues that the emphasis of MBIs on self-acceptance

and a non-judgmental attitude may be beneficial for psychological interventions,

especially for people with ruminative and depressive thought patterns. However,

within Buddhism, this constitutes only a small part of everyday practice. Instead,

Buddhism is more concerned with cognitive transformation than self-acceptance,

and therefore the kind of mindfulness that Buddhism promotes is better described

as wise mindfulness (Dreyfus, 2011).


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An evaluative component of mental states is also implicit in the Pali canon,

where distinctions are made between wholesome and unwholesome mental states.

The noble eightfold path includes sammsati (right/wholesome/complete

mindfulness) as one of eight elements of the path towards the end of suffering

(Kang & Whittingham, 2010), with the complete list being: right understanding,

right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right

mindfulness, and right concentration (Rahula, 1974). The first two factors

constitute the practice of praj (wisdom), the subsequent three la (ethical

conduct), and the last three are part of samdhi (concentration). In Buddhist

practice, all three factors are dynamically related. Ethical conduct, for example, is

the basis for mindfulness, but ethical conduct also relies on mindfulness to recall

which wholesome behaviors are to be encouraged (Kang & Whittingham, 2010).

Similarly, wisdom is necessary to understand the need for ethical conduct and

concentration. Again, this implies that the practitioner cannot be completely

non-judgmental, but must evaluate and appraise his or her mental states (Bodhi,

2011).

The reason for the association of mindfulness with non-judgmental

awareness in MBIs may be related to the use of the expression bare attention.

The German-born Theravada monk Nyanaponika typically referred to bare

attentionthe fleeting moment of awareness before one conceptualizes and

identifies an objectin his teachings of mindfulness (Bodhi, 2011). Other scholars

or teachers continued the disseminations of Buddhist teachings to the West with

the understanding of mindfulness as bare attention as well as with references to

non-judgmental awareness (Gethin, 2011). However, to what extent bare attention

is a part of mindfulness or whether it can be equated to it, is contentious among

Buddhist scholars. Bodhi (2011) argues that bare attention has its use as teaching

instructions for cultivating mindfulness, but that it is not valid as a theoretical

account, for the above-mentioned reasons that mindfulness in Buddhism involves

evaluation of wholesome and unwholesome mental states.

How does the Western secular conceptualization of mindfulness compare


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with that of different Buddhist schools of thought?

The above discussion has started to highlight some differences between the

Western secular conceptualization of mindfulness and that of Buddhism. However,

since Buddhism is far from being a uniform body of teaching, the

above-mentioned differences may just as much be a reflection of differences of

various traditions within Buddhism. The mindfulness promoted in MBIs, therefore,

may thus be more similar to certain types of Buddhism and less so with others.

Within the same above-mentioned special issue of the journal Contemporary

Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Dunne (2011) provides a response to

some of the arguments that the Western and Buddhist conceptualizations of

mindfulness were different. According to Dunne (2011), Dreyfus (2011)

interpretation that mindfulness must contain an evaluative component is based on

the Abhidhamma, a part of the Pali Canon from around 100 B.C.E. A strand of

the Mahmudr tradition, in contrast, which started to emerge from the seventh

century C.E., more accurately matches the approach to mindfulness that is

presented by todays MBIs. The particular feature that Dunne (2011) describes is

a type of practice that transcends subject-object duality, which was articulated in

Mahmudr traditions but not in the Abhidhamma. The latter can be described as

a form of constructivism, where certain cognitions, such as the faulty belief in a

permanent ego, must be eliminated, and other qualities must be developed. The

Mahmudr tradition, in contrast, teaches that all cognitive patterns hinder the

emergence of ones innate Buddha nature. In other words, the qualities that a

Buddha embodies are not acquired through learning, but by unlearning, such as

discarding cognitions that discriminate between space, time, and identity.

The meditation instructions in the Mahmudr tradition emphasize abiding in

the present moment and returning ones mind to its natural state, namely a state

of non-conceptual awareness. The meditator concentrates on his or her breath, but

also gradually enters into a state without any explicit focus. All cognitions are

believed to involve effort, and must be abandoned to reveal a state of calm

awareness without evaluation and judgment. These meditation instructions are


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obviously highly congruent with Kabat-Zinns (1994) definition of mindfulness

that makes reference to non-judgmental awareness. Dunne (2011) is aware that

one must not confuse practical meditation instructions with theoretical discussions

and definitions of mindfulness, and he does to fall into this trap. Instead, he

continues his discussion of the implications of meditation instructions on the

development of a state of mindfulness. The need for a discriminating process to

monitor progress in ones practice is the reason that Dreyfus (2011) presents

against the conceptualization of mindfulness as pure non-judgmental awareness. It

appears like a paradox that a beginner engaging in practices of non-judgmental

awareness must recall the instructions regularly not to evaluate and also evaluate

to what extent his or her state of mind is consistent with these instructions.

Dunne (2011) argues that this kind of monitoring process still involves cognitive

effort and thus falls short of the ultimate goal of non-dual practice, namely the

natural and non-conceptual state of the mind. In contrast to monitoring and

effortful mindfulness, the non-dual state is best described as an effortless

mindfulness, which thus resembles the definitions typically used in the literature

of MIBs.

Dunne (2011) limited the scope of his discussion to links the Mahmudr

tradition, and admitted that his arguments were only of exploratory nature. Links

to additional Buddhist theoretical frameworks would strengthen his line of

arguments that the Western secular conceptualization of mindfulness has more

similarities with those of later emerging schools of Buddhism than traditional

Buddhism. In regard to non-dual practice and thinking, Mdhyamaka philosophy

and the teachings of Ngrjuna around emptiness (should immediately come to

mind. Emptiness follows from the concept of causality in Buddhism, since every

event is thought to be causally related to another and thus lacks its own

self-nature (Cooper, 2002). The concept of emptiness must nevertheless not be

interpreted as nihilistic (Abe, 1975). While everything is empty, this is not meant

as a contrast to form, as emptiness itself is empty, and the distinction between

emptiness and form is transcended. To distinguish between the two uses of

emptiness (emptiness as contrasted with form versus emptiness that transcends


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this contrast), Mdhyamaka philosophy speaks in the latter case of true emptiness

(). The term wondrous being () then refers to being that is dynamically indistinguishable from emptiness.

The relevance of the concept of emptiness to mindfulness practice emerges

when trying to integrate seemingly contradictory notions: on one hand, a

definition of mindfulness as non-judgmental and non-discriminating awareness, and

on the other, the inevitable necessity to participate in a world that presents itself

as phenomena and thus requires discriminations and categorizations. As Abe

(1975) states, the Buddhist idea of Emptiness can be properly realised not

conceptually, but only holistically, subjectively, or existentially through the

realisation of ones existence as a self-contradictory oneness of being and

non-being (p.188). Awakening to the concept of true emptiness that transcends

an opposition of concepts, such as good and evil, provides new mystical insights

and a mechanism for Buddhist salvation. As a result of the view that the Buddha

nature is inherent in all of us, practitioners in Mahyna traditions are typically

instructed to discard delusions in order to reveal their original and

non-discriminating mind, which is thought to function naturally without cognitive

effort, attachment, and distortions, and which is thus often referred to as no

thought in chn Buddhism (Allen, 2010; Yampolsky, 1967). Similar to Dunnes

(2011) description of effortless mindfulness, mindfulness that is thought to result

from the awakening to ones Buddha nature is said to operate in the background,

even when the working mind is occupied with daily tasks that require

discriminations, categorizations, and judgments (Zhu, 2005).

Conclusion: What is the role of morality in Western mindfulness training?

As discussed so far in the present article, there is no straightforward answer

to the question to what extent the emphasis on non-judgmental awareness during

the conceptualization of mindfulness in MBIs has deviated from that of Buddhist


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traditions. The arguments presented above against the non-judgmental nature of

mindfulness (e.g. Dreyfus, 2011) appear to be relevant in the context of an

non-enlightened practitioner monitoring his or her progress in mindfulness

training, but less so when non-judgmental awareness is used in the sense of the

non-dual concept of no thought in thought. As discussed, one needs to be

cautious not to confuse instructions of mindfulness practice with mindfulness per

se, as well as whether a definition of mindfulness is intended to describe the

state of mind of someone who has perfected his or her practice or whether it

encompasses the mind of the many more who have not reached that point.

It is clear that MBIs do not place the same explicit emphasis on the

development of praj (wisdom) and la (ethical conduct) as Buddhist traditions.

That does not necessarily imply that they are totally absent. Similarly, not every

tradition actively practices loving-kindness meditation, but this does not imply that

only followers of those traditions develop the relevant qualities. Maex (2011)

noted that participants in eight-week mindfulness programs naturally developed

more compassion for animals, and Cullen (2011) even argued that intention to

cause harm and mindfulness simply cannot occur simultaneously. One thus needs

to be careful not to confuse elements of mindfulness with outcomes of

mindfulness practice. Brown and Ryan (2004), for example, argue that a

definition of mindfulness does not need to make explicit references to acceptance,

as this follows directly from giving full attention to the present moment, as

opposed to re-directing attention to alter, avoid or escape a certain situation.

Proponents of MBIs have nevertheless acknowledged the importance of

ethical conduct (Kabat-Zinn, 2011). The reason that ethical conduct is not given

much formal emphasis in MBIs is the secular nature of such programs. As

Cullen (2011) described, a secular program cannot prescribe a single set of

ethical guidelines in order to avoid contradictions with belief systems of

participants from the often very diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. There

is no doubt that participants in such programs will bring with them their own

personal ethical rules of conduct, and ethics in MBIs thus inevitably relates back

to personal responsibility. As Kabat-Zinn (2011) describes it, MBIs contain an


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ethical foundation in a natural way, as embodied by the instructors who follow

professional codes of conduct and function as a role model throughout the whole

program. Because of the relatively short history of MBI programs and the lack

of an ongoing sense of community beyond the delivery of mindfulness courses,

graduates from such programs are frequently encouraged to seek support for their

practice from local Buddhist groups (Cullen, 2011). It is thus likely that a

significant proportion of those will gradually adopt Buddhist values and precepts.

The role of morality is thus by no means completely absent, and it is likely

going to play some kind of role in mindfulness training, irrespective of the

background of the participant and despite the fact that it is not emphasized

explicitly in MBIs.

To summarize, the present article provided an exploratory discussion of the

links between mindfulness as defined by recent secular and generally Western

psychological theory and practice with that defined in Buddhism. Certainly,

Buddhism has a long history and therefore does not present with a uniform body

of teaching (Dunne, 2011). Over its approximately 2,500 years of existence,

Buddhism has produced a wide range of schools of thoughts with diverse

discourses on and practices of mindfulness and meditation. Most of the criticism

of Western psychological conceptualizations of mindfulness appears to have

emerged when making comparisons with scholastic Buddhist ideas. As illustrated

above, when comparing MBIs with so-called non-dual schools, such as

Mahmudr, Mdhyamaka, or chn Buddhism, differences appear much less

dramatic.

Language is inherently limited as a medium to transmit and discuss the

teachings of the Buddha, which obviously extends to the present discussion. Just

as meditation instructions must not be equated with mindfulness (Dreyfus, 2011),

philosophical discourse can also only point to a certain limited range of cognitive

and phenomenological aspects of mindfulness. The present discussion highlighted

that the conceptualization of mindfulness in Western MBIs does not sit outside

the diversity of conceptualizations of mindfulness within Buddhism itself. Where

MBIs do differ from all forms of Buddhism is its lack of explicit emphasis on


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morality, although this does not necessarily imply a complete absence of a role

of morality in the mindfulness training of MBIs. As mentioned earlier,

compassion may equally be argued to follow directly and naturally from

mindfulness and might not necessarily need to be an explicit component of

mindfulness training. The role of ethical conduct may be similar (Cullen, 2011),

especially since most people have generally been exposed to at least one kind of

ethical system through the socialization process since childhood. Future research

might even explore to what extent certain specific forms of ethical conduct are

more the outcome of mindfulness training than the requirement for it. An

important question for future research is also whether the diverse manners of

teaching instructions actually make a practical difference on the development and

experience of mindfulness (Dorjee, 2010)


- 16 -

Acknowledgments

This paper is directly based on and adapted from an article that has been submitted

to the journal [Won-Buddhist Thought & Religious Culture]. However, the present article provides a more explicit focus on the role of morality in

mindfulness training. The original idea of this paper was inspired by comments

received from the audience at an invited talk at the Institute of Mind Humanities,

Wonkwang University, and the Won-Buddhist Headquarters in Iksan, South Korea, in

June 2012. I would like to thank the audience for their thoughtful feedback.

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- 20 -

1

, U. *1)

. ( MBSR), ( MBCT) ( ACT) . . ( MBI) .

MBI , . MBI (MBIs) , . MBIs , , .

. MBIs .

* , .

- 21 -

MBI .

, , , . , . , . (Schoenfeld, 1993). , .

, (Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011). 3 , . (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Walsh & Shapiro, 2006). (Eberth and Sedlmeier, in press; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004), . , , . . .

MBIs


- 22 -

. MBIs . . , MBIs , .

, . , , , , (Martin, 1997). . . - (1994): : , , . (p. 4). . , . . (p.234).

MBI (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), (MBSR) (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), (MBCT) (Segal, Willians, & Teasdale, 2002) . ,

- 23 -

. MBSR MBCT ACT .

MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) - . 8-10 . , , , , (), () . , . 45 .

MBCT (Segal et al., 2002). . , . . , . . MBCT , , . , . MBCT MBSR . .

MBSR, MBCT ACT , . ACT (Hayes,


- 24 -

2004). MBIs . . . , . (Spiegler & Guevrement, 2010). . , , . , . MBI . Meta-Analysis( ) , , , (2006) ACT . . MBSR . MBSR , , . MBSR . MBIs , , . MBIs (Law & McMain, 2005). - MBSR Meta-Cognitive Skill ( ) . . . , MBIs .

- 25 -

. (), (), (), (),(), (), (), () (Rahula, 1974). ? .

?

(2011) MBI . , , , . , MBI . , MBI , . , MBI .

MBIs . (2011) ? . , (Cullen, 2011; Kabat-Zinn). MBIs , , MBI (Krgeloh, 2012).

MBIs . , . mindfulness 19


- 26 -

(Gethin, 2011). sati memory(). (Bodhi, 2011). , mindfulness . Memory() Mindfulness() . , - 1 . . , , . , , (2011) - . MBIs . . , . (Dreyfus, 2011).

, . () (sammmsati, : , , ) (Kang & Whittingham, 2010) (), (), (), (), (), (), (). , , (samdhi). . , , (Kang & Whittingham, 2010). . ,

- 27 -

(Bodhi, 2011).

MBIs (bare attention) . (Bodhi, 2011). (Gethine, 2011). . Bodhi(2011) , . , , .

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. . MBIs .

Contemporary Buddhism (): An Interdisciplinary Journal ( ), (Dunne, 2011) . , (2011) 100 . 7 MBIs


- 28 -

. . . . . , .

, . . . . - . , . .

. , . (2011) , (non-dual) . () () MBIs .

(2011) , .

- 29 -

. () . (Cooper, 2002). (nyat) (Abe, 1975). () () . . ( ) () . () . . ( , . (1975) , , (p.188). , . , . , , (no thought) . () , .

: ?

, MBIs


- 30 -

. , . , .

MBIs . . . . (2011) 8 . (2011) . . (2004) , .

MBIs (Kabat-Zinn, 2011). . . . MBIs . - . MBIs .

- 31 -

MBIs . . , , MBIs .

, . . 2500 . . , MBIs , , , () .

. . , . MBIs . MBIs , MBIs . , , . . , .

. , .

- 33 -

2

The Spiritual Foundation of Moral Education *2)

WONG Ping Ho *3)(Ph. D, Centre for Religious and Spirituality Education

The Hong Kong Institute of Education)

1

Moral education, like so many things in life, is a contested concept. I do not pretend

to be able to put forward a view of moral education that is incontestable. A point

to be made below is that there comes a point in the discussion of moral issues where

no more logical justification is possible or even desirable. Therefore in this paper

I can only aim at presenting my position, hopefully in an intelligible way, and invite

the readers to judge if they can recognize the sense of the points made, and to

challenge those points if they find them do not make sense.

My starting point is that moral education should aim at helping pupils to be moral

individuals. This immediately raises at least two questions. The first is why I should

say helping pupils to be moral individuals instead of helping pupils to become moral

individuals. The second is whether the whole statement is merely a tautology. Let

us address the latter question first.

* Paper presented at the 2013 International Conference of The Institute of Mind Humanities: Healing and Moral Education of Mind, held at Wonkwang University, Iksan City, Jeonbuk, Republic of Korea, 15-16 February, 2013.

* , .


- 34 -

My contention is that moral individuals do not merely act morally, if by moral

actions1)we mean those actions that are in line with the behavioural norms of a

certain culture. The Chinese sage Confucius said, If a man is not humane, what can

he do with the rituals? (Confucius, 1997, p.58) Here humane is the translation

for the Chinese term ren, which has been variously translated as benevolence, love,

agape, altruism, kindness, charity, compassion, magnanimity, perfect virtue,

goodness, human-heartedness, and humanity in English. (Hall & Ames, 1987,

p.112) Rituals is the translation for li, which refers to a code of propriety.

(Confucius, 1997, p.20) Confucius was of the opinion that simply going through the

motions according to the code of propriety without being animated by the spirit that

informed the construction of the code in the first place is unsatisfactory. In a similar

vein, but in the context of law, and putting forward a starker contrast, Roger Scruton

distinguished between law-abidingness and legalism:

We distinguish law-abiding people, who have the spirit of the law, and

wish to be guided by it in a humane and reasonable way, from legalistic

people, who use the letter of the law, as Shylock used it, to their own

advantage, and hold others to an impossible standard of rule-guidedness, so

as to defy the spirit on which a law-abiding community depends. (Scruton,

1997, p.5)

Although li (propriety), law and morality are not the same thing, the notion of code

of propriety could comfortably be replaced by moral code, and the above statement

by Confucius would stand equally well, if not better. Behaviour that is in line with

the prevailing moral code but is not inspired by the proper moral sentiment, leaves

something to be desired, to say the least. Therefore a proper moral education should

not aim at producing individuals that abide by the prevailing moral norms, but should

instead aim at cultivating moral individuals, in the sense that the actions of these

individuals are inspired by a moral consciousness.

1) For the purposes of this paper, I use the terms moral and ethical interchangeably.

The Spiritual Foundation of Moral Education

- 35 -

This bring us back then to the first question of why I should say that moral education

should aim at helping pupils to be, rather than to become, moral individuals. My

consideration is, as mentioned again below, that human beings are in a sense innately

moral, so it is not exactly the case of initially amoral individuals being educated

to become moral. It is rather that this innate morality needs to be protected and further

nurtured, extended and deepened, so that its potential can be more fully realized. If

anyway the word become is an intuitively apt expression in this context, then perhaps

the statement should be elaborated a bit to read moral education should aim at helping

pupils to become morally-cultivated individuals. But then in the absence of further

elaboration, this sounds dangerously similar to the tautological, question-begging

statement that moral education should aim at helping pupils to become

morally-educated individuals.

The crux of the matter of course lies in what morally-cultivated individuals are.

As hinted above, such individuals are inspired by a certain moral consciousness, which

is labelled as ren by Confucius. For the sake of ease of expression, one of its English

translations human-heartedness will be used in the rest of this paper. Is it possible

to capture the essence of human-heartedness in a neat formulation? While, as

recorded in the Analects, each time Confucius mentioned human-heartedness, he said

something different to elucidate its myriad aspects, the following characterization of

an individual of human-heartedness is particularly relevant for our purposes: one who,

wishing to establish himself, helps others to establish themselves and who, wishing

to gain perception, helps others to gain perception. (Confucius, 1997, p.85) In a

similar vein, when a disciple asked for a single word that one could practise throughout

ones life, Confucius responded with the word shu (like-hearted considerateness), with

the following elaboration: What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose on others.

(Confucius, 1997, p.156) These two statements are easily recognizable as two different

formulations of the same basic principle in ethics called the Golden Rule, upheld in

diverse cultural traditions in history. As Hans Kng observed in the Declaration

Toward a Global Ethic he prepared for Parliament of the Worlds Religions:


- 36 -

There is a principle which is found and has persisted in many religious and ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of years: What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others. Or in positive terms: What you wish done to yourself, do to others! This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations, and religions. (Kng, 1993, p.7; italics in the original)

This is in effect a principle that guides the way we take others into consideration

when we act in the world. As emphasised above, when one acts according to the

Golden Rule, one should ideally be motivated by the moral sentiment inspiring the

principle rather than simply be following the moral exhortation of the literal principle.

Where does this moral sentiment come from?

2

The fact that we do not live alone by ourselves requires that we take others into

consideration when we each live our own life. The question is: How do others figure

in our consideration, and in what ways is this consideration likely to proceed? As

a starting point, we can be certain that what we do will affect our own well-being

as well as others well-being. Similarly, what others do will affect our well-being.

To greatly simplify matters, we could imagine the following possibilities:

1. On all occasions one aims to maximise ones well-being through whatever means

that are appropriate. Sometimes this might involve promoting other peoples

well-being; on other occasions this might involve harming other people. However,

any such good or harm done to other people is incidental to ones pursuit of ones

well-being.

2. One considers both ones well-being and others well-being. The latter is

considered for the others sake, not as a means for promoting ones own well-being.


- 37 -

One attempts to strike a balance between the two, and this might entail ones

well-being not being maximised.

These oversimplified formulations both gloss over and beg a host of questions.

We will raise two and consider only one. Firstly, in reality others are a diverse

lot, each with their own concrete interests. Even if the second possibility applies,

often it is not a matter of striking a balance between the interests of two, but between

those of a number of parties. Whose interests are to be given priority and why? These

are knotty problems. Given the limited scope of the paper, I can but leave this question

and its associated problems aside and consider another question, one that I consider

to be more fundamental: what does ones well-being consist in? Both possibilities

presented above assume that others well-being cannot be an intrinsic part of ones

well-being. What I mean by this further possibility that others well-being is intrinsic

to ones well well-being is something stronger than the case of ones well-being being

intertwined with that of others. In the latter case, ones well-being is ultimately

dependent on others well-being. We might be better off in the short-term by pursuing

our immediate well-being at the expense of others, but our long-term, overall well-being

will be compromised. However, this still means that others well-being is only

instrumental to the achievement of mine, and is strictly speaking not intrinsic to my

well-being. But then what exactly does others well-being being intrinsic to my own

well-being mean? Is it possible? Here I am on the verge of being lost for words.

The best approximation would be to say that I am happy when others well-being

is enhanced. Such a psychologised description cannot be faulted, but it runs the risk

of trivialising any altruistic act by interpreting it as instrumental, in that it invites the

suspicion that I seek to promote others well-being only so as to make myself feel

good, which is an instance of possibility 1 above. In the face of such suspicions

of self-serving altruism, which, it must be admitted, are very often justified, I can

offer no logical argument to convincingly show that such a psychologised description

does not completely convey the sense in which others well-being is intrinsic to my

own. Such an inability may be due to the inherent limitations of language, which

forces things into a linear cause-effect structure, or, more fundamentally, to the


- 38 -

inevitable operation of the Kantian a priori category of cause and effect through which,

in conjunction with other categories, human thinking is made possible. Or such an

inability shows that there is actually no sense in which others well-being is intrinsic

to my own, on top of either the sense that they are intertwined or the sense indicated

by the psychologised, hedonistic description. I do not think this is the case, and

I believe that it at least makes sense to say that others well-being is intrinsic to ones

own. Why do I believe so if it is not and cannot be logically proved? I believe

so because I can recognise2) its sense.3) Similarly, to communicate the sense of

this statement that I recognise, what I can do is appeal to readers own judgment and

hope that they may similarly recognise its sense, possibly with the assistance of all

sorts of rhetorical device if I were a good communicator.

Now it must be emphasised that the fact I recognise that the statement others

well-being is intrinsic to ones own makes sense, does not necessarily entail that I

think it is actually possible that others well-being is intrinsic to ones own, even less

that I agree, or actually feel or perceive, that others well-being is, at least on

some occasions, intrinsic to my own, or in other words, that I recognise the statements

truth. However, I tend to believe that recognising the sense, rather than non-sense,

of such a statement as the one we are discussing does facilitate the recognition of

its truth.4) And no matter whether one simply recognises the sense of the statement,

2) No word seems to be completely satisfactory to convey the sense in which the sense (sorry for the clumsiness of expression), not to mention the truth, of the statement in question is grasped. Now I have just used the word grasped in the last sentence. In the text I also use recognize, feel and perceive, although feel may easily lead to the misunderstanding that it is just a matter of feeling. Such a difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, in finding the right word, is part and parcel of the difficulty in discussing spiritual issues.

3) This explains why, given that I have raised the possibility that others well-being is intrinsic to ones own, I did not consider the symmetrical possibility that others suffering is intrinsic to ones well-being at least being applicable to some people, which should be similar in terms of logical admissibility (or inadmissibility) to the former possibility. I did not consider the latter possibility, because, besides the repulsiveness of such a suggestion (which should not carry weight in a discussion of its possibility), I cannot recognise its sense.

4) I recognise that this is a bold speculation which is by no means well thought through. Since this is not


- 39 -

or also recognises the possibility and even the truth of the state of affairs referred

to, it is ultimately not a matter of logical proof, but a matter of an immediate grasping

of, or rather, of being grasped by, a certain understanding.

There is the further difficulty of ascertaining what it means to say that the statement

others well-being is intrinsic to ones own is true. It may mean that it is an objective

fact that everyones well-being is intrinsic to everyone elses well-being. As such,

the assertion is problematic because some, if not most, people would deny that others

well-being is intrinsic to their well-being. Is it possible that the statement is true after

all, only that these people mistake what truly constitutes their well-being and therefore

delude themselves into thinking that sometimes they need to pursue their well-being

at the expense of others and act accordingly? If so, the statement others well-being

is intrinsic to ones own being is at once descriptive and prescriptive. It is descriptive

in that it claims, in a sense analogous to that of a physical law, that others well-being

is intrinsic to ones true well-being, implying that if others are hurt, our well-being

will be jeopardised. It is prescriptive in that it then follows that we should not delude

ourselves and should recognise what our true well-being consists in, and pursue our

and others well-being one and at the same time. Once one recognises what constitutes

ones true well-being (is this recognition what is meant by enlightenment?), one would

see the truth of the statement others well-being is intrinsic to ones own and act

the place to pursue the point, I can only remark on it briefly. In most cases, the fact that we can make sense of a statement only provides the prerequisite condition for it then to be considered true or false, but in no way increases its likelihood of being true. For example, we can make sense of the statement that 2 + 2 = 5, but that does not make the statement more likely to be true. However, I have a hunch (which might turn out to be both groundless and wrong) that the statement others well-being is intrinsic to our own belongs to a different class of statements. Such statements have the characteristic that they are likely to be true provided they can be made sense of, probably because of an element of reflexivity involved. (That begs the notion of truth applicable in their cases.) Somehow Anselms ontological argument for the existence of God also comes into my mind at this point. Probably it exemplifies yet another class of interesting statements, which might prove to be in some way related to the class just mentioned.


- 40 -

accordingly, of ones own accord.5) But having said all this, the basic question still

haunts us: what constitutes ones true well-being6)?

3

By engaging in the discussion in the previous section, I do not really intend to argue

that it is indeed the case that others well-being is intrinsic to ones own. In fact,

if the previous discussion has indeed worked, it should have shown that any such proof

by argument is impossible, and the question about our true well-being cannot be given

a convincing verbal answer. Instead, the previous discussion is meant to serve as

an illustration of the characteristics of that which is spiritual, in the sense(s) in which

I use the term. What then are these characteristics?

First, the spiritual7) is concerned with that which is ultimate, for example, ones

true well-being. It is the starting point of reasoning. And often it is the end-point

of reasoning, the kind of reasoning which attempts to progressively uncover the ground

of ones beliefs. It is thus where the leap of faith occurs and is the leap of faith

itself. (Although the word leap easily suggests that a person makes a leap of faith,

in fact often it may be difficult to decide whether it is more appropriate to say that

one makes a leap of faith or that the leap of faith occurs. And as indicated below,

it is a characteristic of the spiritual that distinctions between subject and object, agent

and experiencer, action and happening, get blurred.) Being the end-point (or the starting

point) of reasoning, the basis of our beliefs cannot further be verbally justified,8) but

5) Dont take the language too literally. It is equally acceptable to reverse the order of the two clauses and say that when one sees the truth of the statement others well-being is intrinsic to ones own, one would recognise what constitutes ones true well- being.

6) I am aware that language such as true versus false needs and true well-being is liable to abuse, leading to oppressive practices. I believe that ultimately ones true well-being can only be recognised by oneself, but the issue is complicated.

7) I am a bit uneasy about using the term the spiritual, rather than, say, that which is spiritual or spirituality to denote what I am discussing, but it seems to be the best term I can think of for my immediate purposes, and I hope it can do its job without leading to awkward language or nonsensical statements. That which is spiritual and spirituality will also be used when I feel the sense and the context so demand.


- 41 -

can only be seen, and I would describe this seeing as spiritual seeing. In Wittgensteins

words, such fundamental truths make themselves manifest. As Monk puts it, the

Wittegenstein of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was concerned

to distinguish what can be said from what has to be shown. For him,

the truths of logic were of a piece with those of ethics, aesthetics and religion,

in that it was fruitless to attempt to put them into words: one would only

see them, and, having seen them one was forced to remain silent about them.

For Wittgenstein, mysticism and logic were as one. There are, indeed, things

that cannot be put into words, he writes. They make themselves manifest.

They are what is mystical. (Monk, 1996, p.568; italics in the original)

There are difficulties with such a stand, although to the person who takes it, this

is a stand he sees he must take. A first difficulty with this stand is that someone

can always take it as a retreat from reason, an easy way out, just as Russell thought

that this mysticism was no more than a misguided intellectual defeatism..that what

he [Wittgenstein] likes best in mysticism is its power to make him stop thinking.

(Monk, 1996, p.568) And this is of course related to a second, more primary difficulty,

which is that an appeal to direct seeing does not guarantee that others are also able

to see what one sees, in spite of ones effort at showing. However, it may be in

the nature of things that such is the case, and to deny this may not be wise. Returning

to Russells objection to stopping thinking, we might note that there may indeed be

situations in which one should stop thinking, and in which indeed it would be a sign

of defective virtue to raise further questions:

..it would be a mistake, a moral as well as philosophical mistake, to

infer that anything whatever can be reasonably and justly put in question..It

is one of the marks of the virtues of just generosity that those who possess

it are not only disposed to find in someones need in such circumstances

8) Just as not all statements in a mathematical system can be proved within the system itself, as proved by Gdel.


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a sufficient reason for going to her or his aid, but will also be unable to

conceive of such a reason as requiring or being open to further justification.

To offer or even to request such a justification is itself a sign of defective

virtue. (MacIntyre, 1999, 158)9)

As Bernard Williams might have put it, this is a case of an agent having one thought

too many. (Williams, 1981, p.18) Williamss view, expressed in a paper entitled

Persons, character, and morality, is that things that give enough substance in a mans

life to compel his allegiance to life itself (p.18), are prior to abstract moral reasoning,

in the sense that the former both limit and help to define the latter.

Now it must be stressed at this point that this direct seeing does not mean that

reason is not involved, although it is difficult, if at all possible, to distinguish clearly

between moral perception and moral sentiment, and many people would contrast moral

sentiment with reason and say that it is prior to all reflection. For example, for

Rousseau, who felt that compassion (or pity) was the quality from which all the

social virtues flow,

compassion is prior to all reflection; it is not learned from tradition or

custom but is a natural sentiment. Despite all their morality, he writes,

men would never have been any better than monster if nature had not given

them pity to support reason (Todorov, 1997, p.292).

In even stronger terms, Bauman asserts that It is the primal and primary brute

fact of moral impulse, moral responsibility, moral intimacy that supplies the stuff from

which the morality of human cohabitation is made, and therefore morality is and

is bound to remain irrational (cited in Junge, 2001, p.109). And in China, Mencius

held that man is born with the four beginnings of the four constant virtues (Fung,

1997, p.145), namely, the feeling of commiseration which is the beginning of

9) MacIntyres treatment of this point is in fact more nuanced than what this extract might suggest. Please refer to p.157-p.159 of MacIntyre (1999) for the context in which this point is made.


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human-heartedness; the feeling of shame and dislike which is the beginning of

righteousness; the feeling of modesty and yielding which is the beginning of propriety;

and the feeling of right and wrong which is the beginning of wisdom. People are

advised to fully develop these four beginnings into the four constant virtues.

Indeed the crucial importance of the emotions is highlighted by recent

psychophysiological research which shows that impairment of the emotional regulation

system in the brain jeopardises ones decision-making ability despite normal functioning

of what we would normally consider to be the faculties of reasoning, including a

normal social-knowledge base,..preserved higher-order neuropsychological functions

such as conventional memory, language, basic attention, basic working memory and

basic reasoning in the sense of logical manipulations of information. (Damasio, 1994,

p.51) An intact emotional regulation system is required for ones observing social

convention, behaving ethically, and making decisions advantageous to ones survival

and progress (p.17). However, such facts can precisely be interpreted as showing

that reasoning is far from a case of the logical manipulation of ideas, with emotion,

as a potential source of interference, to be shut out of the process as much as possible.

Rather, emotion is an integral part of healthy reason.

Granted that what has been said about the crucial participation of emotion in reason

is correct, it might be observed that I have shifted the focus of discussion from direct

seeing, and more narrowly, moral perception, to emotion, and the legitimate query

arises as to the relevance of the latter to the former, and whether I have lost track

of the argument. I admit that moral perception cannot be reduced to emotion. But

I wish to suggest that moral perception, and more generally, direct seeing, involve

the perception of value, which very probably is related to emotional functioning,

although it is not the place to explore the possibly subtle involvement of emotion in

value perception. I would even venture to suggest that what philosophers such as

MacIntyre call practical reasoning, often involves direct seeing in the making of

judgments, and is intrinsically bound up with the perception of value.


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Still the references to emotion, and further back, to the views of Rousseau and

Mencius about the innateness of moral feelings, may give the impression that I am

stressing the innate aspect of direct seeing, including moral perception, and therefore

downplaying the significance of knowledge and reasoning. The reference to MacIntyre

provides an apposite entry point for me to set the record straight. In fact I believe

that in most cases direct seeing is the outcome of experience, and in particular

dedicated practice. In MacIntyres (1999) own words:

To judge someone good in some role or at discharging some function within

some socially established practice is to judge that agent good insofar as there

are goods internal to that activity that are genuine goods, goods that are to

be valued as ends worth pursuing for their own sake, if they are to be pursued

at all. Whether there are and what they are is characteristically and generally

something to be learned only by being initiated into this or that particular

activity. (p.66; emphasis added)

It is clear that the learning referred to in the last quoted sentence does not mean

learning to state whether there are goods internal to a certain activity and what they

are, but rather becoming able to see for oneself whether there are such goods and

what they are through actually engaging in that activity. This applies also to the serious

practice of thinking. Thus, with regard to the statement a couple of pages back that

the spiritual is the end-point of reasoning, there is a second sense in which the spiritual

is the end-point of reasoning, which is that at the end of learning and thinking, a

new perception arises. In this regard, Woods (2001) interesting discussion on Hegel

on the heart is worth quoting at some length:

Hegel claims that, after a sufficient process of development, a lower and

more abstract aspect of mind betrays the presence in it, even to experience,

of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation.....we may find the very

highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment..The higher ideas

such as God and morality cannot only be thought; they can also be felt and,


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indeed, must be felt..So, higher level operations, defined by their relation

to more encompassing wholes, can penetrate into the lower levels of sensations

and feelings. When they do so, they render the heart intuitive. There develops

a feeling intelligence in which our higher operations are concentrated. It

is ultimately necessary to speak from an intuitive grasp of the subject-matter

in any field. For Hegel, this demands that a man should have his heart

and soul, in short, his whole mind or spirit, in the subject matter..

(p.134-p.135)

Despite the rather obscure language, this is of course nothing mysterious in itself.

A commonplace analogue to the lofty examples of ethics and religion can be found

in the practice of reading. After learning the individual letters of the alphabet and

much serious practice at reading, we are able to perceive a word directly as the word

rather than deducing what the word is from the string of letters individually recognised.

Then if we are really good readers, we may even grasp the meaning of a sentence

at once without actually becoming aware of the individual words. This is presumably

a widespread phenomenon that is at work in many diverse areas. For example, the

mathematician Devlin (2000) describes, based on insider experience, in the following

terms what a trained mathematician perceives when he or she reads mathematics:

When a mathematician looks at a page of mathematical symbols, she does

not see the symbols, any more than a trained musician sees the musical

notes on a sheet of music. The trained musicians eyes read straight through

the musical symbols to the sounds they represent. Similarly, a trained

mathematician reads straight through the mathematical symbols to the patterns

they represent. (p.77)

The following description is even more interesting, to me as a non-mathematician:

To me, then, learning new mathematics is like constructing a mental house

in my mind; understanding that new mathematics is like becoming familiar


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with the interior of my mental house; and working on a mathematical problem

is like arranging the furniture. Thinking mathematics is like living in the

house. As a mathematician, I create a symbolic world in my mind and then

enter that world. (p.124; italics in the original)

The symbolic house is very difficult to build in the first place, and that requires

intense concentration. However, if people could only get beyond the plans and enter

the house, they would find it as easy to wander around that mathematical house as

an ordinary house. (p.125) He sees the place and its beauty, which someone who

is not a mathematician is unable to see. Devlin cites another famous mathematician,

Paul Erds: Its like asking why Beethovens Ninth Symphony is beautiful. If you

dont see why, someone cant tell you. I know numbers are beautiful. (Erds, cited

in Devlin, 2000, p.135) Discoveries are made when, for example, something new

is seen in an unsuspected corner of the mathematical house. But then sometimes another

type of difficulty arises, that of conveying what is seen, through translating it into

a proof in the language of mathematical symbols. This may prove to be no easy

task.

There is the possibility that through the practice of ethical virtues and maybe

facilitated also by the philosophical quest, one would perceive the good, in a way

analogous to a mathematician perceiving some mathematical truth after the struggle

to construct the mathematical house. Suppose someone does so perceive the good,

I would suppose he or she would have great, if not impossible, difficulty in

communicating what the good that he or she perceives consists in, a difficulty

immeasurably greater than the one a mathematician faces when he or she has to translate

a perception of mathematical truth into a formal proof.

There are a number of problems with this account, and I would briefly mention

a couple. First, it may be queried that while I would definitely describe the perception

of the (ethical) good as spiritual, yet certainly I would not say the same for the holistic

perception of a word? But my argument has been based on extending the operational


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principles of the latter to the former. If the latter cannot be said to consist in a spiritual

perception, then neither can the former. My probably not very satisfactory rejoinder

is that spirituality is not an all-or-none matter. A very dilute form of spirituality is

present in our everyday existence, evidenced not least by our ability to understand

each other. The mundane activity of holistic word perception is very weakly spiritual.

I am aware that this is a very risky speculation, likely to trivialise the concept of

the spiritual to such an extent as to render it meaningless. I nevertheless put it forward

with some trepidation because I can see sense in it.

Second, the crucial element in my discussion is perception. The talk about seeing

and moral perception is derived from the psychological phenomenon of sensory

perception. The psychological model of perception indicates some serious potential

problems with the seeing of the truth of ethics, aesthetics and religion. In everyday

life misperceptions are common. Often there are alternative perceptions that are equally

plausible. And it is often possible to find a more satisfactory perception than the

existing one. Does ambiguity also apply to seeing in Wittgensteins sense? For

example, Hick (1988), who also relied on the model of perception but in the very

different context of an exploration of religious pluralism, remarked that every religious

interpretation is underdetermined, because there is insufficient available consistent

evidence to allow a definitive interpretation of the world. Just as a perceiver in the

case of

healing and education of the mind

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