hearing transcript - 15 september 2003 morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 15 September 2003 Morning

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Hearing Transcripts

1 Monday, 15th September 2003

2 (10.35 am)3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

4 Yes, Mr Dingemans.5 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, this is the commencement of stage 26 of your Inquiry. We have been delayed for a few minutes7 by some technical hitches but they have now been8 overcome.9 In addition to those appearing before you in10 stage 1, my learned friend Mr Jonathan Sumption QC,11 Phillip Sales, Mr David Lloyd Jones QC and12 Mr James Maxwell Scott appear for the Government and13 individual witnesses. Otherwise the representation is14 as it was before.15 Stage 1 of the Inquiry commenced on16 11th August 2003, some five days after the funeral of

17 Dr Kelly. Over some 15 days of evidence, concluding on18 4th September 2003, your Lordship heard from in excess19 of 65 witnesses. Your Lordship has also seen thousands20 of pages of documents, most of which have been referred21 to, however briefly, in stage 1 of the proceedings. The22 transcripts of the oral evidence given and the23 documentary evidence adduced in stage 1 of the24 proceedings have been made available on the Inquiry25 website.

11 So far as it is possible to predict and manage these2 matters, it is intended that stage 2 of the Inquiry will

3 hear evidence and submissions over four days this week4 and four days next week. It is therefore intended that5 the hearing will be concluded by 25th September 2003.6 In this statement I intend to outline why it is7 necessary to have stage 2, the outline issues already8 raised by the evidence and the witnesses to be heard in9 stage 2. To the extent that everyone is inwardly10 groaning at the thought of listening to me talk at11 length, I can say that no more than one hour has been12 allocated for this opening statement and I am conscious13 that I have used 3 minutes of it already and we have14 lost 8 minutes for the technical hitches.15 The reasons for stage 2.

16 There are two principal reasons for stage 2 and both17 are equally important. First, although your Lordship18 heard from many witnesses in stage 1 there are areas of19 the evidence which need to be tidied up. This may be20 because the witness was not available in stage 1 of the21 proceedings, it may be because it has not yet proved22 possible to determine why a certain event has occurred23 or it may be because there are some inconsistencies in24 the evidence already heard which need to be addressed.25 The second reason is that your Lordship, having

21 heard the evidence at stage 1 of the proceedings, has

2 been able to identify in private letters to the persons3 concerned some possible criticisms which might be made


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4 of them. You have asked those persons to state, in5 private letters, whether they accept or reject the6 possible criticisms. This process has also enabled the7 institutions responsible for the individuals involved to8 identify what possible criticisms might be made of them.9 Stage 2 of the proceedings provides an opportunity

10 for those individuals, if they wish, to give further11 oral evidence and to make oral and written submissions.12 Further, the represented parties, the Government, the13 BBC, the family and counsel for individual witnesses may14 want to cross-examine witnesses for other parties. This15 may be in order to elicit evidence which might enable16 them to answer possible criticisms of the party whom17 they represent or to suggest further possible criticisms18 of those other witnesses, so that your Lordship might be19 persuaded to criticise those witnesses. But20 your Lordship has already made it clear that21 cross-examination will be confined to issues which you22 think are relevant to the matters which fall to be

23 considered under your terms of reference.24 It should be apparent, therefore, that persons25 giving evidence in stage 2 may be giving evidence for

31 a number of different reasons. They may have been2 unavailable at stage 1 of the proceedings. It may have3 been identified from evidence at stage 1 of the4 proceedings that they could give relevant evidence.5 They may be giving further evidence to clarify any6 consistencies. They may be giving evidence to show7 a possible criticism is not well founded. They may be8 giving evidence because another party wants to

9 cross-examine them in order to elicit relevant evidence10 or to advance a possible criticism. They may be giving11 evidence as a result of a combination of a number of12 these reasons.13 These facts underline the point made by14 your Lordship on 4th September at the conclusion of15 stage 1 of the proceedings, namely that speculation16 about whether certain persons may or may not be the17 subject of criticism from their appearance or18 nonappearance at stage 2 of the Inquiry may be19 ill-founded.20 It is intended, therefore, that stage 2 of21 the Inquiry will enable your Lordship to have a full an

22 understanding as possible of the relevant evidence and23 to enable each party to have a full and fair opportunity24 to adduce relevant evidence and to make submissions.25 The issues.

41 It appears from the evidence that has been heard in2 stage 1 that your Lordship may wish to consider, in3 particular, some or all of the following issues:4 1. How was the dossier of 24th September 20025 prepared and who was responsible for drafting it?6 2. What part did Dr Kelly play in the preparation7 of the dossier?

8 3. What knowledge did Dr Kelly have of the contents9 of the dossier and of earlier drafts of the dossier?


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10 4. Were the Prime Minister and Mr Alastair Campbell11 and other officials in No. 10 Downing Street responsible12 for intelligence being set out in the dossier which was13 incorrect or misleading or to which improper emphasis14 was given?15 5. What was said by Dr Kelly to Mr Gilligan on

16 22nd May 2003?17 6. Whether or not Mr Gilligan accurately reported18 what was said by Dr Kelly to him in his broadcasts on19 29th May and in his Mail on Sunday article on20 1st June 2003.21 7. Whether or not the matters reported by22 Mr Gilligan on 29th May and in his Mail on Sunday23 article on 1st June were in fact true. It is for this24 reason that your Lordship has heard evidence and will25 hear further evidence about the September 2002 dossier.

51 8. The response and complaints made by the

2 Government to the BBC relating to the broadcast on3 29th May 2003.4 9. The BBC reaction to those complaints.5 10. The decisions and the steps taken by the6 Ministry of Defence and the Government after Dr Kelly7 informed his line manager in the Ministry of Defence8 that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan on 22nd May.9 11. The circumstances in which a press statement10 was released by the Ministry of Defence on 8th July 200311 and the question and answer material that came to be12 deployed in support of it. This also involves13 identifying what Dr Kelly was told about this process14 and determining whether or not he agreed to it.

15 12. Whether or not there was an attempt in16 Government dealings with the media to downplay17 Dr Kelly's importance as a civil servant and his role in18 the production of the dossier which did not reflect the19 reality and which was designed to assist in the dispute20 with the BBC. In this respect, your Lordship has21 already been assisted by journalists, including Mr Blitz22 and Mr Baldwin, who said they were briefed by Whitehall23 sources in the time leading up or after the publication24 of Dr Kelly's name but who, for proper reasons, refused25 to identify the persons involved in that briefing.

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1 13. The circumstances leading up to Dr Kelly's2 giving of evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee and3 the Intelligence and Security Committee and the hearings4 before those Committees.5 14. How Dr Kelly died, and is it clear that6 Dr Kelly died by his own hand?7 15. If Dr Kelly died by his own hand, the matters8 which, so far as it is possible to tell these things,9 were likely to have led him to take his own life. This10 is of course judged with the benefit of hindsight and11 expert psychiatric evidence which was not available to12 the parties at the time. Professor Hawton has already13 made it clear that those in contact with and who had

14 dealings with Dr Kelly at the time could not reasonably15 have foreseen that Dr Kelly might take his own life.


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16 After the private letters were sent out on behalf of17 your Lordship, I have had extensive discussions with the18 other parties in an attempt to agree a timetable for19 stage 2 of the Inquiry. It was a particularly relaxing20 week.21 However, I can now give your Lordship the proposed

22 timetable. As has already been published on the Inquiry23 website, witnesses today include Mr Cragg and24 Air Marshall Sir Joe French, both from the Defence25 Intelligence Service, an individual from the Security

71 Services, Mr Scott Dr Kelly's line manager from2 Porton Down, and Mr Greg Dyke from the BBC. They will3 all be examined today by counsel to the Inquiry, meaning4 either myself or my learned friend Mr Knox.5 On Tuesday 16th September evidence will be given by6 Detective Constable Coe and Mr Hunt, the pathologist.7 They will be examined by counsel to the Inquiry.

8 Mr Howard will give evidence. He will be examined9 by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the10 Kelly family and the BBC and counsel for the Inquiry.11 Evidence will be give by Dr Shuttleworth of DSTL,12 who will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry.13 Miss Wilson, a press officer employed by the Ministry of14 Defence, will also give evidence. She will be examined15 by counsel for the Inquiry and cross-examined by counsel16 for the family and counsel for the BBC.17 On Wednesday 17th September evidence will be given18 by Mr Wilding and Mr Sammes, computer experts who19 will give evidence about Mr Gilligan's Sharp organiser.20 They will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry.

21 Mr Gilligan will be examined by his own counsel,22 cross-examined by counsel for the family, counsel for23 the Government and counsel for the Inquiry.24 Mr Sambrook will be examined by his own counsel,25 cross-examined by counsel for the Government and counsel

81 for the Inquiry.2 On 18th September, Thursday this week, Mr Hatfield,3 Ms Teare and Sir Kevin Tebbit will all give evidence.4 They will be examined by their own counsel and5 cross-examined by counsel for the family and by counsel6 for the Inquiry. That will conclude the evidence for

7 the first week.8 On Monday 22nd September the Secretary of State for9 Defence, Mr Hoon, will give evidence. He will be10 examined by his own counsel and cross-examined by11 counsel for the family, counsel for the BBC and by12 counsel for the Inquiry.13 Mr Hughes, the Secretary to the Inquiry, will14 produce further documents which have been made available15 to the Inquiry.16 Mr Campbell will be examined by his own counsel,17 cross-examined by counsel for the BBC, counsel for the18 family and counsel for the Inquiry.19 On 23rd September Mr Tom Kelly will be examined by

20 his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the21 family and by counsel for the Inquiry.


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22 Mr Godric Smith will be examined by counsel for23 the Inquiry.24 Mr Scarlett will be examined by his own counsel,25 cross-examined by counsel for the BBC and by counsel for

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1 the Inquiry.2 Mr Page, Assistant Chief Constable, who has already3 given evidence, will be examined by counsel for4 the Inquiry; and Mr Gavyn Davies will be examined by his5 own counsel.6 On 24th September Mr Davies will be cross-examined7 by counsel for the Government and the Inquiry.8 Mr Lamb will be examined by his own counsel and9 cross-examined by counsel for the family.10 Dr Wells will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry11 and cross-examined by counsel for the family.12 Wing Commander Clarke and Mr Harrison will be13 examined by counsel for the Inquiry.

14 Closing submissions will be made by counsel for the15 family on 23rd September. On 24th September closing16 submissions will be made by counsel for the Government,17 counsel for the BBC and counsel for individual18 witnesses. I will also make closing submissions.19 Your Lordship and others may be relieved to hear20 there is a limit of one hour for each counsel for the21 represented parties and a shorter period of time for22 counsel for individual witnesses. Those submissions23 will be televised, as is this submission, in accordance24 with your Lordship's earlier ruling on televising of25 proceedings.

101 There is therefore a considerable amount of evidence2 to be called and submissions to be made and it is3 proposed to do this within 8 court days. There may be4 circumstances which disrupt the timetable set out above.5 As part of the timetable, time limits have been agreed6 with counsel for the cross-examination of witnesses; and7 your Lordship is aware of those time limits. Witnesses8 ought to be aware that time for cross-examination may be9 extended if your Lordship forms the view that they are,10 to use a cricketing analogy, playing for lunch and not11 providing speedy and accurate answers.12 A final point is this: the aim of the Inquiry is to

13 urgently conduct an investigation into the circumstances14 surrounding the death of Dr Kelly. While stage 2 is15 necessary for the reasons which have been set out16 earlier, it is hoped that these proceedings will17 continue to attempt to be fair, courteous, but still18 designed to elicit the truth. It is partly by our19 dealings with each other, whatever the circumstances may20 be, that we define ourselves.21 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Dingemans. You are22 certainly within your time limit. Hopefully that will23 continue in the next 8 days.24 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I think we need a short break.25 LORD HUTTON: Very well.

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1 (10.55 am)2 (Short Break)3 (10.56 am)4 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Dingemans.5 MR DINGEMANS: Before Mr Cragg is introduced, can I correct6 an error in dates that I made in my opening submission?

7 Closing submissions will be made by counsel for the8 family on 24th September and it is on 25th September9 that final closing submissions will be made by the other10 parties.11 MR ANTHONY JOHN CRAGG (called)12 Examined by MR DINGEMANS13 Q. Sorry, Mr Cragg. Could you give his Lordship your full14 name?15 A. My Lord, my name is Anthony John Cragg.16 Q. What is your former occupation?17 A. I am presently a retired civil servant.18 In September 2002 I was Deputy Chief of Defence19 Intelligence, having taken up the post

20 in September 1999. I retired in January 2003.21 Q. What was your task as Deputy Chief of Defence22 Intelligence?23 A. My principal task was to manage the work of the Defence24 Intelligence Analysis Staff, which was responsible for25 producing military intelligence assessments for the

121 chiefs of staff and also to contribute to the central2 Government intelligence analysis arrangements under the3 Joint Intelligence Committee.4 Q. So were you a member of the Joint Intelligence5 Committee?

6 A. I was.7 Q. And did you deal with weapons of mass destruction and8 the study of weapons of mass destruction?9 A. The Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff did under my10 supervision, yes.11 Q. Who did that in Defence Intelligence?12 A. It was spread over all three of the directorates of the13 DIAS, if I can call it DIAS.14 Q. DIAS standing for?15 A. Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff. There were three16 directorates, one dealing with regional affairs which17 are a geographically based organisation; one18 a generically based organisation, looking at issues such

19 as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism,20 proliferation, export control, the grey arms market and21 such like; and thirdly, the technical and scientific22 staff who looked at weapons performance and23 characteristics.24 Q. What was your understanding of Dr Kelly's position25 within the Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff?

131 A. He was not a member of the Defence Intelligence Staff or2 of my organisation.3 Q. Did he, as far as you were aware, contribute to any4 discussions?

5 A. Personally I was unaware of this happening. But I have6 discovered as a consequence of this Inquiry that he was


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7 in contact, from time to time, with members of my staff.8 Q. And which members were those?9 A. I think normally on the scientific and technical side.10 I have no particular evidence of widespread discussions11 with other parts of the organisation.12 LORD HUTTON: Mr Cragg, can I just ask you: Dr Bryan Jones

13 who gave evidence, he was in the technical and14 scientific side.15 A. He was, my Lord, yes.16 LORD HUTTON: There was a director of that particular17 section, was there?18 A. Yes, my Lord. Shall I go into a little detail on this?19 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I think that would be helpful. If you20 could just explain Dr Jones' position as it were in the21 hierarchy.22 A. Yes, certainly my Lord. Dr Jones supervised the23 nuclear, chemical and biological weapons section in the24 scientific and technical organisation. His superior was25 the director of scientific and technical studies, who

141 covered the entire organisation in which Dr Jones2 worked, including other functions such as the study of3 missiles, both aerodynamic and ballistic, enabling4 technologies and technical intelligence on equipment of5 interest to the Army, Navy and Air Force. So it is6 a very widespread organisation, my Lord.7 MR DINGEMANS: We have heard evidence that the8 Prime Minister announced a dossier would be published on9 3rd September. You were a member of the Joint10 Intelligence Committee. What was the first meeting11 after that announcement on 3rd September?

12 A. The first meeting, I think, must have been on Wednesday,13 4th September.14 Q. Was the Prime Minister's announcement discussed?15 A. Not to my recollection. Having checked the minutes of16 the JIC on that date, there is no reference that I can17 find to a discussion or mention of the dossier or of the18 whole question raised by the Prime Minister.19 Q. There were other issues discussed?20 A. There were indeed. There was a related issue. That was21 the study of the first draft of a paper on Iraqi WMD22 capability.23 Q. Can I take you to a document, which is CAB/17/3. This24 is a draft of the JIC assessment of 5th September, which

25 was this:

151 "Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons,2 including its CBW weapons. Intelligence also indicates3 that from forward-deployed storage sites, chemical and4 biological munitions could be with military units and5 ready for firing within 45 minutes."6 Is that what you were referring to? That, so far as7 we are aware, was dated 5th September but no doubt8 people may have known about it beforehand?9 A. Yes. That would not have been discussed at the10 4th September meeting, for obvious reasons. As

11 I recall, it would have contributed to the discussion at12 the JIC or the first serious draft of the report on


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13 11th September.14 Q. So what was your personal involvement with the dossier15 between 4th September and the next meeting on16 11th September?17 A. I was not present at the meeting on 11th September.18 I did, however, study the first serious draft, as I call

19 it, of the dossier which appeared on 11th September20 I think pretty well contemporaneously with the JIC21 meeting.22 LORD HUTTON: When you say you were not present at23 11th September, was the Chief of Defence Intelligence24 present at that meeting, as far as you know?25 A. He was, my Lord, yes.

161 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see.2 MR DINGEMANS: Before we get to 10th or 11th September, did3 you have any personal involvement in the dossier or in4 the arrangements for the drafting of the dossier?

5 A. Not personally. The first draft I saw at JIC level was6 on 11th September.7 Q. Were members of your staff involved in drafting the8 dossier in this period, between 4th and 11th September?9 A. Yes. There was a meeting chaired by the Cabinet Office10 assessment staff at which members of my staff were11 present. That was, I think, on 9th September.12 Q. Is the Cabinet Office assessment staff separate from the13 JIC?14 A. No, it serves the JIC.15 Q. So it reports up to the JIC?16 A. Indeed. It is, if you like, the engine room of the JIC17 in the sense that it takes responsibility for preparing

18 most draft assessments for the JIC.19 Q. And there were members of your staff on that Assessment20 Committee, drafting the dossier for the 10th/11th?21 A. Yes. I believe, although I was not present and I have22 not had the opportunity to study this in detail, that23 the substance of the detail on 9th September was24 concerned more with the overall size and shape of the25 draft rather than with detailed drafting.

171 Q. You did not attend the meeting on 9th September?2 A. No, I did not. No.3 Q. Can I take you to DOS/2/2? If we look at the

4 top right-hand corner you will see5 "10th/11th September 2002". This is the first draft of6 the dossier you saw, is that right?7 A. I think it must be, although since I returned to look at8 papers from my retirement I have seen many versions.9 Q. Can I take you to DOS/2/37, which is page 36 of the10 document. We can see in the top of the page it says11 this:12 "Within the last month intelligence has suggested13 that the Iraqi military would be able to use their14 chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an15 order to do so."16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So that is what you have available, probably, for the18 JIC meeting on 11th September. But you have told us you


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19 were not there.20 A. I was not.21 Q. Did you see the minutes relating to that?22 A. Yes, I looked at them ex post facto.23 Q. And were you also, no doubt, told of the discussions24 which had happened on 11th September?

25 A. Yes, I was.

181 Q. From those sources, are you able to say whether the2 dossier was discussed?3 A. I think it is difficult for me to say -- I am sorry4 about this, but --5 Q. You were not there?6 A. No, no. My suspicion -- sorry, my feeling is that it7 was discussed in general terms, because at that time, to8 my recollection, the actual draft itself had not been9 circulated. There had been a, on the previous day10 I think, note circulated by the JIC Chairman which

11 covered some of the main areas he wanted to deal with in12 existing extant intelligence.13 Q. Did you then deal with members of the Defence14 Intelligence Service after the meeting on 11th September15 in relation to the dossier?16 A. Yes, I did, in the sense that there was a further draft17 circulated on 16th September.18 Q. Can I take you to DOS/2/58, which I think should be that19 draft.20 A. Hmm, hmm.21 Q. You can see "16th September".22 A. Yes.23 Q. If we go on to DOS/2/72 you can see what is said about

24 the 45 minutes at the bottom of the page.25 A. Yes.

191 Q. If we scroll down you can see this, the last bullet,2 last sentence:3 "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical4 or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to5 do so."6 Which appears to be a weakening of the language from7 that which had appeared on 10th or 11th September.8 A. Yes.9 Q. And indeed differed from the language we saw in the JIC

10 assessment.11 A. Hmm.12 Q. Were you aware of any of the discussions leading up to13 that weakening of the language?14 A. No, I was not.15 Q. Were you made aware of any discussions within the16 Defence Intelligence Services about the language used in17 the dossier?18 A. At that time DIS had produced several pages of comment19 on the previous dossier which been probably20 incorporated, although I have not checked it in detail,21 into the draft of 16th September. So that the process22 was a draft circulated on 11th September, several pages

23 of comments by the DIS which took into account the views24 of everybody consulted, it was a widespread


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25 consultation, which were sent back to the assessment

201 staff, I think on 12th September, and would have2 informed the next draft which appeared on3 16th September.

4 Q. Then after the 16th September draft the process appears5 to have been repeated, with various memoranda.6 A. Yes.7 Q. We have seen a document dated 17th September.8 A. Yes. From --9 Q. And 19th September.10 A. Oh yes, from the DIS, yes. That is correct.11 Q. Yes. What was the process by which those comments were12 collected? You outlined there were a number of branches13 of the Defence Intelligence Services.14 A. Yes.15 Q. Who was responsible for collating that? I do not need16 necessarily to know the names.

17 A. There was an individual in the proliferation study18 section of the global issues directorate of the Defence19 Intelligence Staff who was doing the collation. He had20 been appointed much earlier, I think several months21 before, when the first drafts of a slightly different22 document were being produced. So he just carried on23 doing the work because he was well versed in doing it.24 His task was to make sure that all involved or25 interested in the draft were consulted and their

211 comments taken on-board.2 I myself read the draft of 16th September, and

3 indeed of the 11th, and had no particular comments4 because, not surprisingly, it was pretty well in line5 with either extant intelligence over several years or6 new intelligence which had come in in recent weeks. So7 I was generally satisfied with it. So I myself did not8 feel it necessary to contribute to the actual substance9 of the comments going back to the assessment staff.10 I am sorry for such a long answer.11 Q. You were not feeding in then to the individual who was12 responsible for collating from the DIS?13 A. No. I would have done if I had felt it necessary to do14 so, but I did not.15 Q. Were you aware that Dr Jones' group was feeding into the

16 comments going back to the JIC, as it were?17 A. I was aware in the sense that I would have expected that18 to happen and indeed it did.19 Q. Right. But no-one made you aware of the specific20 comments?21 A. No.22 Q. Dr Jones has given evidence, and you are no doubt aware23 of that, where he said he became sufficiently agitated24 to write a memorandum on 19th September. We will come25 to that.

221 A. Yes.

2 Q. Before that, had you picked up anything to suggest he3 was unhappy or members of his staff were unhappy?


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4 A. Yes, I had, from the comments of 16th September, in5 fact, which went back to the Cabinet Office assessment6 staff where they questioned the language, not the7 inclusion of wording on 45 minutes or on chemical8 weapons production but the language of it. And those9 points, those queries were put back to the assessment

10 staff and they are there in the letter of11 16th September.12 Q. Right. And that was the extent of your knowledge of13 comments or unhappiness, as it were, in relation to14 those matters?15 A. Indeed it was. I received no indication of further16 unhappiness, either on the part of Dr Jones and his17 colleague or else in the DIAS.18 Q. When is the next meeting after 11th September of the19 JIC?20 A. The next meeting would have been on the 16th.21 Q. On the 16th, of the JIC?22 A. I am sorry, the JIC would have been on the 18th,

23 I think, if I remember ... yes, on 18th September.24 Q. On 18th September?25 A. Yes, that is correct. I am sorry, excuse me.

231 Q. Was there a discussion about the dossier at that time?2 A. At the meeting of the 18th September. If I may refer to3 my notes?4 Q. Yes, of course.5 A. Thank you very much. Yes, I attended the meeting on6 18th September and the Chief of Defence Intelligence7 being absent on duty. At that meeting the drafting8 process was very well advanced and the Chairman

9 congratulated or thanked everybody for the10 contribution --11 Q. That is Mr Scarlett?12 A. Yes -- that they were making; and confirming he was13 intending to pass the document itself to the printers14 the following day.15 In the event, that timetable slipped. He also added16 that a small number of new intelligence reports had been17 received on a particular issue relating to the dossier,18 which would need speedy analysis.19 Q. Was there any more extensive discussion of the dossier20 than that?21 A. No, there was not, not to my recollection.

22 Q. You have mentioned some DIS material that was dated23 16th September. Are you sure about the date?24 A. Yes. I think what happened was the draft was circulated25 on 16th September and comments were collected. The

241 actual work on preparing the comments went on very late2 until the evening; and I think that in the event the3 comments themselves were sent early on the 17th,4 although I cannot be certain about that at the moment.5 Q. Can I take you to a document which we have received,6 which is CAB/33/116.7 A. Yes.

8 Q. This, if we scroll down, says "Executive Summary".9 A. Correct.


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10 Q. Various judgments.11 A. Yes.12 Q. You can see halfway down the page:13 "Executive summary, para 3, 2nd bullet:14 "The judgment 'has military plans for the use of15 chemical and biological weapons, some of which could be

16 ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them' is also17 rather strong since it is based on a single source.18 'Could say intelligence suggests ...'"19 A. Yes.20 Q. That is referring to the executive summary which was21 produced on 16th September. I have shown you the22 dossier which was produced.23 A. Yes.24 Q. That had had the word "may".25 A. Yes.

251 Q. Executive summary we can see at CAB/11/141. If we then

2 go to page 142 we can see at the second bullet at the3 top of the page:4 "Has military plans for the use of chemical weapons,5 some of which could be ready within 45 minutes of an6 order to use them."7 That is what was picked up at CAB/33/116.8 A. Hmm.9 Q. What appears to have happened is that on 16th September10 two documents are produced, the executive summary which11 says "has" and "ready for use" and the dossier which has12 the use of the word "may".13 The Defence Intelligence Staff put in a response on14 17th September saying: we are not very happy with the

15 executive summary. They do not appear to make any16 specific point on the dossier point. As you rightly17 point out, they do not object to the fact it is18 included.19 A. Yes.20 Q. The only other document produced on 16th September is at21 CAB/11/38. This is a foreword which was not produced by22 the Intelligence Services so I will not necessarily take23 you through all of the aspects of it but just show you24 this is another document being produced on25 16th September.

26

1 So on 16th September we now have the foreword which2 is drafted on the Prime Minister's behalf and with his3 assistance by Mr Campbell.4 A. Hmm.5 Q. Then we have the executive summary. We have heard6 evidence that Mr Scarlett was responsible for that; and7 we have the dossier itself.8 A. Hmm.9 Q. Your response on 17th September, from the DIS, is to10 point out that the executive summary is too strong.11 A. Hmm.12 Q. In fact, there was also another response on13 17th September, which pointed out that perhaps the

14 dossier was too weak. Can I take you to CAB/11/66?15 This is a memo dated 17th September from Mr Campbell.


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16 If we go to 67 and to point 10, we can see:17 "On page 17, 2 lines from the bottom, 'may' is18 weaker than in the summary."19 A. Yes.20 Q. On the same day you have the Defence Intelligence Staff21 putting in its response saying: we are not so happy with

22 the executive summary, we do not mind the dossier. And23 you have Mr Campbell putting in: we are quite happy with24 the summary, not so happy with the dossier.25 A. Yes.

271 Q. If you then go on to page 70 you can see the response,2 which is dated 18th September 2002. This is from3 Mr Scarlett. If you go over to 71 at 10 you we can see:4 "The language you queried on the old page 17 has5 been tightened", which picks up the point in the6 dossier.7 A. Hmm.

8 Q. It seems, therefore, that Mr Scarlett was taking9 on-board the comment from Mr Campbell but not10 necessarily taking on-board the comment from the Defence11 Intelligence Staff.12 A. Yes.13 Q. Do you know whether or not that caused any unhappiness14 amongst the Defence Intelligence Staff?15 A. I think that the Defence Intelligence Staff, as you say,16 were concerned about the executive summary and its17 discontinuity with the main text. I put this down to18 the fact that the executive summary pulled together or19 reflected not merely recent intelligence which was20 being -- which was contained in the main text, but also

21 the general context of the new intelligence which had22 been received, such as knowledge, which we had had for23 many years, of the capabilities of the Iraqis in their24 use of chemical weapons and also our knowledge that they25 had commander control arrangements for the use of these

281 weapons in place. These other issues informed the2 judgment in the executive summary to which the Defence3 Intelligence Staff were objecting slightly or wanting to4 modify the wording.5 Q. On 18th September, after 16th September, the next6 dossier which is produced appears to be dated

7 19th September in the morning.8 A. Correct.9 Q. No-one has had a chance to note that at the10 18th September JIC meeting.11 A. Hmm.12 Q. With that to refresh your memory, was there any13 discussion on 18th September about the inconsistency or14 apparent inconsistency between the executive summary and15 the wording of the dossier?16 A. At the JIC meeting?17 Q. Yes.18 A. Not to my recollection. If I can just track back19 a little.

20 Q. Yes, of course.21 A. I apologise. The assessment staff reviewed the text of


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22 16th September at a meeting which they chaired, at which23 the DIS were present. The points raised about the24 concerns on the executive summary, about the 45 minutes,25 were raised at that meeting and the argumentation I have

29

1 just deployed to you was used to explain why the2 executive summary said what it did. This was reported3 back to me at a meeting which I held, I think, on the4 afternoon of 17th September.5 Q. So when was the date of this meeting, then?6 A. Which meeting? I am sorry.7 Q. When this inconsistency was being reviewed, as it were.8 A. At a Cabinet Office assessment staff meeting on9 17th September.10 Q. On the 17th?11 A. Correct.12 LORD HUTTON: Then, in the light of what you were told at13 that meeting, you decided to call a meeting yourself, is

14 that correct, Mr Cragg?15 A. No, my Lord, I was interested in the comments which had16 been made by the staff on the draft dossier and I wanted17 to have a session with those who had attended the18 Cabinet Office meeting to talk through that. That was19 one purpose of the meeting. A second purpose was that20 we were expecting, and I think by then --21 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, you arranged that meeting, did you?22 A. I did. It was an internal DIS meeting attended by the23 two directors most concerned, plus those who had24 attended the meeting in the Cabinet Office.25 LORD HUTTON: Who were those two directors?

301 A. The Director of Global Issues and the Director of2 Science and Technology, my Lord.3 LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you.4 A. The second purpose of the meeting was to review the way5 ahead, in the sense that we were expecting there to be6 a statement in Parliament the following week and we7 needed to make sure that we were prepared to provide8 back up for the issuing of that statement. So that, in9 a sense, was the main purpose of that, the meeting on10 17th.11 MR DINGEMANS: What did those who had attended the Cabinet12 Office assessment tell you about the discussion of the

13 inconsistency that we can see between the documents on14 16th September?15 A. They said firstly, on the actual detailed intelligence,16 recent intelligence underpinning the main text and17 partly the executive summary, that the Secret18 Intelligence Service, SIS, were satisfied that the19 source was established and reliable and they were --20 they supported the reporting, which had itself already21 been included in a JIC assessment on 9th September.22 Q. I do not want to ask you about the wording of the recent23 intelligence.24 A. No.25 Q. Or indeed where it had come from.

31


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1 A. Right.2 Q. But is this right: the recent intelligence did not deal3 with the 45 minute issue?4 A. It did.5 Q. It did?6 A. Yes. If I could just track back again. My staff also

7 reported to me there had been a discussion, as I say, of8 the general context in which the new intelligence had9 appeared which convinced them that it was quite10 reasonable to take the line they did in the executive11 summary concerning the likelihood or the capability of12 the Iraqis to deploy weapons of mass destruction within13 45 minutes of a decision to do so.14 LORD HUTTON: Mr Cragg, did part of this discussion relate15 to the point that I think Dr Jones had been concerned16 that the intelligence about the 45 minutes claim was17 single sourced, but then, as I follow the evidence, the18 SIS, at the meeting that you conducted or at the meeting19 in which you took part, said that they were satisfied

20 about the reliability of that source? Was that what21 occurred? Have I understood it correctly?22 A. SIS were present at the Cabinet Office meeting, my Lord.23 At that point -- I was not there myself, but24 I understand from my staff that there was a discussion25 on the validity of the source, which would almost

321 certainly have included whether it was single source.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.3 A. And the answer, I think, on the single source issue is4 that, as I believe Mr Scarlett said in his first5 appearance, my Lord, that single source clearly has to

6 be looked at with some care; but this was a known7 sourced, established and reliable with a good reporting8 record. And the statements he was making, the9 intelligence he was providing was well in context of10 known Iraqi approaches.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Yes.12 A. So in that sense -- I think Mr Scarlett said it fairly13 clearly -- there were no qualms about including this14 reporting.15 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Thank you.16 MR DINGEMANS: What was your understanding about ownership17 of the dossier --18 LORD HUTTON: Just before you ask that, may I ask you: at

19 the conclusion of the meeting which you attended, and20 you had knowledge that Dr Jones and his staff were21 concerned about the wording relating to the 45 minutes22 claim, what was your conclusion about the validity of23 their concerns?24 A. I felt, my Lord, bearing in mind the views expressed by25 SIS and supported by the assessment staff, that their

331 concerns had been dealt with satisfactorily. That was2 my judgment.3 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Yes. Yes.4 MR DINGEMANS: And your view was then made known to the two

5 directors who had attended?6 A. We discussed this round my table, so they knew.


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7 Q. The Director for Science and Technology was the line8 manager for Dr Jones, is that right?9 A. He was, correct.10 Q. I was turning to the issue of ownership of the dossier.11 Was the word "ownership" ever used at the time, as far12 as you were aware?

13 A. I find this very difficult to remember. It was very14 clear though that the management of the dossier was15 being carried through by John Scarlett.16 Q. Can you help with a document, which is CAB/27/2, which17 is dated 18th September. We can see if we go down to18 CAB/27/3 at the bottom -- perhaps even 27/4, sorry.19 Yes. 18th September 2002. Going back then to CAB/27/2,20 having dated that document, and scrolling down to21 ownership of the dossier. A document or a memorandum22 dated 18th September appears to state:23 "Ownership of the dossier.24 "Ownership lay with No. 10."25 If we scroll up to the top of the record of the

341 meeting, this appears to be a meeting which was held,2 one infers, on 18th September because it says:3 "The following main points were agreed at a meeting4 held in John Scarlett's office..."5 Were you present at that meeting at all?6 A. No.7 Q. So the extent that the meeting is concerned you8 obviously cannot assist us?9 A. No.10 Q. Do you know whether anything was said about ownership11 before or after 19 September?

12 A. I cannot immediately think of anything. My basic13 understanding was that John Scarlett was in charge --14 had ownership of the dossier and operated -- worked his15 ownership through the medium of the Cabinet Office16 assessment staff, the main drafters.17 Q. We have heard of the drafts that were produced18 10th/11th September, 16th September, then 19th. The19 19th September appears to have been distributed early in20 the morning. Do you know if there was any sort of21 deadline for responses?22 A. Yes. To my recollection it was 15.00, 3 o'clock in the23 afternoon, but that is the memory.24 Q. Right. We have also seen, so I will not take you back

25 to it, a series of comments that were passed by DIS.

351 A. Correct.2 Q. At this stage, were you aware of anything following your3 meeting with the head of GI and head of science and4 technology about unhappiness with the 45 minutes claim?5 A. No, I was not at that stage, although later in the day6 it became clear.7 Q. How did it become clear later in the day?8 A. When I received a copy of Dr Jones' minute of9 19th September.10 Q. Can I take you to that, which is MoD/22/1.

11 Dr Jones has given evidence about this. The12 distribution says:


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13 "MA/DCDI."14 I imagine that means it came to you?15 A. It came to my office and was given to me.16 Q. Dr Jones has given evidence about this. He says at (1)17 that:18 "A number of people have been involved in the

19 generation of the Iraq dossier which has involved20 a number of iterations.21 "It is my understanding that some of the22 intelligence has not been made available to my branch."23 A. That is correct.24 Q. He must have picked that up following the meeting you25 had had with his director.

361 A. Yes. I specifically asked his director to make it clear2 that some intelligence, not on the 45 minutes but on the3 production issue, was not available to them because it4 was being held on a very small circle to which he was

5 not party and, indeed, nor was I.6 Q. So the recent intelligence was not on the 45 minutes7 issue?8 A. No, it was on chemical and biological weapons9 production.10 Q. Right. Was that the recent intelligence that had been11 referred to at the Cabinet Office assessment meeting,12 that was the genesis of your subsequent meeting?13 A. Well, my subsequent meeting covered two issues on this14 matter; firstly, the 45 minutes and secondly, the15 question of new intelligence, recent intelligence on the16 production of chemical and biological weapons. So there17 were the two issues.

18 Q. Sorry to interrupt.19 A. I was going to say, at the meeting chaired by the20 Cabinet Office on the 17th it was agreed that the SIS21 representative would make further representations to us22 about this material. In the event, he spoke to my23 Director of Science and Technology, who then himself24 spoke to Dr Jones to explain, firstly, that this was25 very tightly held intelligence and, secondly, SIS

371 believed that it was good intelligence.2 Q. Right. But that recent intelligence was not 45 minutes3 intelligence?

4 A. No, it was not. No. The 45 minutes intelligence came5 in, to my recollection, on 30th August.6 Q. Yes. We have heard other evidence it came in at the end7 of August.8 A. Indeed, yes.9 Q. Then we have seen the two assessments.10 A. It was assessed, yes.11 Q. The 5th and 9th September.12 A. Yes, the draft on the 5th and the final on the 9th.13 To continue, he certainly saw Dr Jones. I cannot be14 precise when, it was probably on the 17th or the 18th,15 to explain where we stood on the production issue.16 Q. Dr Jones' director?

17 A. Yes, he did.18 Q. Yes.


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19 A. I think, from Dr Jones' own testimony, that there was20 discussion of the dossier in general. But I am afraid I21 cannot give any further advice on that.22 Q. We have seen this document, 19th September, when23 Dr Jones has commented on it.24 A. Hmm.

25 Q. He says he had only been moved to write it, a document

381 similar to this, I think he said once or perhaps twice2 before in his 13 years as an intelligence assessor.3 A. Yes.4 Q. Is this strong language for intelligence personnel?5 A. Yes. I was quite surprised to receive the minute,6 because we had gone -- we had tried to explain what the7 situation was, certainly on the production issue and, as8 far as I can tell also perhaps, although I am not9 certain, on the 45 minutes.10 Q. And having received a document that surprised you, what

11 did you do as a result of that?12 A. Well, it arrived late on 19th September. I cannot be13 sure, but it would have been my normal practice to try14 to discuss it with him, but I did not. I think, and I15 cannot be sure about this, because by then he had left16 the office and I was faced with the document itself.17 Q. Were you given another version after 19th September?18 A. Of the dossier?19 Q. Yes.20 A. There was another version on the 20th, but I was on21 leave on the 20th September. What I was referring to22 was I found myself with Dr Jones' minute, which I had to23 decide what to do with.

24 Q. So, for the reasons you have given, you do not do25 anything about it on the 19th?

391 A. Oh I did.2 Q. Sorry?3 A. In the sense that I reflected on Dr Jones' concerns and4 decided that on the issues he raised I was satisfied5 with the actual text of the dossier, which I had in6 front of me. I can expand further if you wish.7 Q. Yes, please do.8 A. Dr Jones, quite rightly -- I have no problems with him9 raising issues, indeed I have always encouraged debate

10 in the DIS on these issues. On the question that --11 I took the view that on the question of the 45 minutes12 and of the chemical weapons production, this had already13 been considered at length with the Cabinet Office in14 their meeting of 17th September and that I was satisfied15 with the decisions reached and consequently with the16 wording of the dossier at that point.17 On the other issues raised, which I think relate to18 the importance attached to the possession of chemical19 weapons, the absence of proof that they are seen as a --20 they are not seen, excuse me, as a weapon of last21 resort. And the absence of proof, definitive proof,22 that efforts are being made to conceal them. I took the

23 view that on each of those there had been much24 intelligence over the years, not merely in the past few


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25 weeks but over a long period, which sustained the view

401 taken in the dossier.2 LORD HUTTON: Did you consider, Mr Cragg, whether you should3 report Dr Jones' concerns to the Chief of Defence

4 Intelligence or to the JIC? In a sense, I think you5 have perhaps given an explanation already, but I would6 just like you to respond to that particular question, if7 you would, please.8 A. Well, certainly, my Lord, the Chief of Defence9 Intelligence, who was not in the office on the Thursday,10 was in the office on the Friday and himself took a view11 on Dr Jones' concerns. No doubt you will hear from him12 on that point.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes.14 A. On the question of approaching the Chairman of the JIC,15 I took the view that since all of the issues had either16 been discussed with the Cabinet Office or were well

17 within the general thrust of known intelligence that it18 was not necessary to raise the issue with Mr Scarlett.19 If I had done, I am as sure as I can be that he would20 have asked: what is the view of yourself and the Chief21 of Defence Intelligence on this issue?22 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.23 MR DINGEMANS: On 20th September there was another document24 which was produced. Can I take you to CAB/33/114? We25 can see the date of that top left-hand corner.

411 A. Yes.2 Q. It says this: "Iraq Dossier", at A a memo dated

3 19th September 2002. And then the draft issued on4 20th September.5 A. Yes.6 Q. We can see from what A is from paragraph 1:7 "At reference A Bryan Jones recorded concerns of his8 branch ..."9 We know that is the document we have just looked at.10 A. Correct.11 Q. "I have now seen the draft issued today and although one12 of the points referred to in reference A [has] been13 addressed, others remain. The 20th September draft14 still includes a number of statements which are not15 supported by the evidence available to me. I have set

16 out below my concerns about CW aspects of the paper17 since this is my area of responsibility."18 Then he goes through the Prime Minister's foreword19 and he makes two comments on that, scrolling down the20 page, concluding with:21 "And the document discloses that his military22 planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within23 45 minutes of an order to use them."24 A. Yes.25 Q. He says this:

421 "A similar statement appears in the dossier. This

2 is reported as fact whereas the intelligence comes from3 a single source. In my view the intelligence warrants


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4 no stronger a statement than 'intelligence suggests that5 military planning allows...'"6 Then over the page, to 115, he talks about the7 executive summary.8 A. Hmm, hmm, hmm.9 Q. And a number of points continuing to the bottom of the

10 page.11 A. Hmm.12 Q. For perfectly understandable reasons we have the bottom13 blanked out. I am sure you know who was the person who14 sent this memo.15 A. I do, yes.16 Q. But this appears to be a separate memo from the memo17 sent by Dr Jones.18 A. Yes.19 Q. One memo might perhaps be understandable. Is two20 beginning to indicate a pattern?21 A. First of all, if I could say that I was absent from the22 office on 20th September, so I did not see this

23 document.24 In terms of patterns or trends, I think not really,25 in the sense that the views of Dr Jones were being

431 informed, quite rightly, in part by the individual who2 wrote this, the expert who wrote this text. So it is3 not as if they are approaching the issue from two4 different angles. This is reinforcing what was already5 there.6 Q. I do not want to know the name of the individual but is7 this an individual we have heard evidence from as Mr A?8 A. No.

9 LORD HUTTON: Without naming him, was he a member of10 Dr Jones' section?11 A. Yes, he was, my Lord.12 LORD HUTTON: And Dr Jones was his superior?13 A. Superior, yes, my Lord.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Yes.15 MR DINGEMANS: Can I also ask this: I asked about Dr Jones'16 reaction or description of his memo. He said: very17 unusual, I think 2 or 3 times in the 13 year period.18 This memo seems to be in broadly similar language to19 that of Dr Jones; is that fair?20 A. Yes, I think so, broadly similar.21 Q. When did you first see this memo of 20th September?

22 A. To my recollection, this is going back a year, I believe23 I only saw it when I came into the office earlier this24 week to review the papers.25 Q. Right. If you had seen it at the time, would that have

441 altered the view that you had taken for the reasons that2 you have already given?3 A. I do not think so, because it covers the same ground in4 terms of the 45 minutes and in terms of the production,5 both of which were underpinned by intelligence to which6 SIS attached importance and both of which were within7 the general trend of known intelligence.

8 Q. You go on leave, I think, on the evening of9 19th September.


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10 A. Yes.11 Q. Do you return before the dossier is published?12 A. No, I returned the following Wednesday, the day after it13 was published.14 Q. Which must be 25th September.15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And so you have no further involvement in the steps17 leading up to publication?18 A. No, I did not.19 Q. Can I then just ask you to look at something that was20 said by the Foreign Affairs Committee about the21 45 minutes claim? It is at FAC/3/28.22 If we scroll down, they refer to what Dr Inch had23 said, someone writing in The Times, Bronwen Maddox, and24 what the Foreign Secretary had said. They say at the25 bottom:

451 "This answer begs the question why the 45 minutes

2 claim was highlighted by the Prime Minister when he3 presented the dossier to the House, and why it was given4 such prominence in the dossier itself, being mentioned5 no fewer than four times, including in the6 Prime Minister's foreword and in the executive summary?7 We have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question.8 We have been told that the entire document, including9 the executive summary, was prepared by the Chairman of10 the JIC, except for the foreword, which he approved. We11 node with disappointment that we were unable to find out12 why Mr Scarlett chose to give the 45 minutes claim such13 prominence, as we have been prevented from questioning14 him."

15 Did you think that the 45 minutes claim was given16 undue prominence in the dossier?17 A. Bearing in mind the structure of the dossier I think18 not, in the sense that it was mentioned in the main body19 and then picked up in the executive summary and then20 referred to in the foreword. It was an important piece21 of intelligence, but I am not surprised that it was22 mentioned four times because of the way that the dossier23 was structured.24 Q. I am afraid we have not yet been able to scan in the25 Intelligence and Security Committee report. Have you

46

1 had a chance to read that?2 A. I have seen the conclusions and recommendations.3 Q. If I can read it out. Sorry you do not have it in front4 you have. At paragraph 108 they talk about the drafting5 process and they note that the JIC Chairman stated6 unequivocally he did not feel under any pressure and7 said the document was not sexed up by Alastair Campbell.8 At paragraph 109 they say Mr Campbell did not chair9 meetings on intelligence matters.10 At paragraph 110, to put it in context, the use of11 the phrase "continued to produce chemical and biological12 weapons" in the foreword and the absence of detail on13 amounts of agents produced could give the impression he

14 was actively producing both chemical and biological15 weapons. They comment on that.


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16 A. Hmm.17 Q. They say in paragraph 111 "not considered a current or18 imminent threat."19 At 112 they say this, I am sorry to give you the20 context but it is not in front of you:21 "The dossier was for public consumption and not for

22 experienced readers of intelligence material. The23 45 minutes claim, included four times, was always likely24 to attract attention because it was arresting detail25 that the public had not seen before. As the 45 minutes

471 claim was new to its readers, the context of the2 intelligence and any assessment needed to be explained.3 The fact that it was assessed to refer to battlefield4 chemical and biological munitions and their movement on5 the battlefield, not to any other form of chemical or6 biological attack, should have been highlighted in the7 dossier. The omission of the context and assessment

8 allowed speculation as to its exact meaning. This was9 unhelpful to an understanding of this issue."10 Would you agree with that paragraph that I have read11 in full?12 A. I am trying to think back to the actual text of the13 intelligence report itself.14 Q. Can I help you, rather than test your memory, and take15 you to CAB/17/3. This is the redacted assessments.16 (Pause). Having had a chance to read that memorandum --17 A. Yes.18 Q. -- would you agree with the paragraph that was written19 by the Intelligence and Security Committee?20 A. Well, I think it was very difficult at the time because

21 the intelligence did not go into great detail, to my22 recollection, on the types of weapons, to go much beyond23 what was actually in the intelligence without24 speculating. So I think it was a best effort on the25 available information. I am not trying to pass the

481 buck, but I do think that John Scarlett may be able to2 help you more on this because he was party to the3 precise formulation.4 Q. Right. Mr Scarlett has already given some evidence.5 A. Yes. But certainly, just to complete it, I was6 satisfied that the text of the dossier reflected both

7 the intelligence itself and the JIC assessment which8 appeared on 9th September.9 Q. Can I take you to a document, SJW/1/39? These are10 comments said to have been recorded from Dr Kelly to11 Ms Watts. If we look at 39 and scroll halfway down the12 page, Dr Kelly said this:13 "You have to remember I'm not part of the14 intelligence community -- I'm a user of intelligence.15 Of course I'm very familiar with a lot of it, that's why16 I'm asked to comment on it. But I'm not deeply embedded17 into that xxx. So some of it I really can't comment18 because I don't know whether it's single sourced or19 not."

20 He is asked:21 "But on the 45 minutes."


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22 He said this:23 "Oh that I knew because I knew the concern about the24 statement. It was a statement that was made and it just25 got out of all proportion. You know someone. They were

49

1 desperate for information. They were pushing hard for2 information which could be released. That was one that3 popped up and it was seized on, and it was unfortunate4 that it was, which is why there is the argument between5 the intelligence services and cabinet office/number ten,6 because things were picked up on, and once they've7 picked up on it you can't pull it back, that's the8 problem."9 From your involvement in the process, would you say10 what Dr Kelly had said there was accurate?11 A. No, I do not think so, on the grounds that the dossier12 reflected the JIC assessments on the recent13 intelligence; and the JIC assessments were an accurate

14 reflection, put into context, of the intelligence15 itself. So it was a flow of perfectly reputable16 intelligence conveyed by the assessment staff and17 ourselves into the JIC assessment and thence into the18 dossier.19 Q. Can I take you to CAB/23/15, which is a memo of20 11th September. I think you may have seen this or seen21 reference to it before. This was a memo which, if we22 scroll down, says:23 "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on24 the first draft of the dossier [which is the 10th/11th].25 Unsurprisingly they have further questions and areas

501 they would like expanded."2 Then they relate those. At the bottom,3 prepenultimate, they say this:4 "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around5 at least some of these buoys before, particularly6 item 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the7 document to be as strong as possible within the bounds8 of available intelligence. This is therefore a last(!)9 call for any items of intelligence that agencies think10 can and should be included."11 A. Hmm.12 Q. Was that a document that you saw at the time?

13 A. No, I did not. No.14 Q. Were you aware of a perception amongst members of your15 staff that they were being pressed, as it were, for any16 intelligence that would make the case to be presented in17 the dossier stronger?18 A. I was aware of what you might call general grumbles in19 my staff that they were being -- that they were involved20 in an exercise which involved multiple drafting and was21 an attempt to try and ensure that the draft was as22 accurate as possible, in terms of the intelligence, but23 also a telling public document.24 Q. Can I go back to SJW/1/39 and pick up below the answer25 that I have just referred to. Ms Watts asked this:

51


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1 "But it was against your advice that they should2 publish it?3 "I wouldn't go as strongly as to say that particular4 bit, because I was not involved in the assessment of it,5 no. I can't say that it was against MY advice. I was6 uneasy with it. I mean my problem was I could give

7 other explanations, which I've indicated to you, that it8 was the time to erect something like a scud missile or9 it was the time to fill a 40 barrel, multibarrel rocket10 launcher.11 "45 minutes might well be important and -- I mean I12 have no idea who debriefed this guy. Quite often it's13 someone who has no idea of the topic and the information14 comes through and people then use it as they see fit."15 At 40 at the top of the page:16 "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying17 don't put it in don't put it in, it's just it was in18 there and seized upon -- rather than number ten19 specifically going against?

20 "Dr Kelly: There were lots of people saying that --21 I mean it was an interesting week before the dossier was22 put out because there were so many things in there that23 people were saying well we're not so sure about that, or24 in fact they were happy with it being in but not25 expressed the way that it was, because you know the

521 wordsmithing is actually quite important, and the2 intelligence community are a pretty cautious lot on the3 whole but once you get people putting it/presenting it4 for public consumption then of course they use different5 words. I don't think they're being wilfully dishonest

6 I think they just think that's the way the public will7 appreciate it best. I'm sure you have the same problem8 as a journalist, don't you? Sometimes you've got to put9 things into words that the public will understand."10 The comments Dr Kelly is reported as having said11 there, would you say that those were accurate?12 A. I think they go far beyond what my understanding was of13 the concerns expressed by my staff, which came down to14 two individuals commenting about two specific issues.15 I think that is all I can say on that.16 Q. Or perhaps even -- two individuals who do it in writing?17 A. Yes.18 Q. And a third individual I think we have heard of through

19 the video link.20 A. Yes, who did not work for me.21 Q. Sorry, who did not work for you but came in at least to22 one meeting?23 A. Yes, yes. If I could say on this as a sort of general24 contextual point, that is I was, myself, perfectly25 satisfied with the way in which the drafting of the

531 document, the dossier, was taking place under the2 management of the assessment staff, supervised by3 John Scarlett. I am quite sure, from having read the4 dossier many times, it does not go beyond the remit, as

5 it were, of available intelligence.6 Q. We have heard reference to the wordsmithing that has


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7 been used.8 A. Yes.9 Q. Indeed we have seen a number of documents in which10 specific suggestions are made. I showed you the11 memorandum that was produced at CAB/11/66, which was12 comments made by Mr Campbell. Perhaps I can just show

13 you that again.14 A. Hmm.15 Q. You can see:16 "Please find below a number of drafting points."17 He goes over the page to detailed comments on the18 draft.19 A. Hmm.20 Q. I think you have seen that document and Mr Scarlett's21 response?22 A. Hmm.23 Q. Are those the sort of comments that one might see made24 by persons assessing intelligence?25 A. Well, to take one particular point, 6, "vivid and

541 horrifying", those are the sort of words which are not2 used in the preparation of intelligence assessments.3 What you would expect in preparing the assessments is to4 ensure the text is aligned as effectively as possible5 with the intelligence and that any background6 contextualising information is accurate and valid, both7 from the sense of assessments already made and in terms8 of the language used, to ensure that it is actually9 accurate, in the sense of gallons of toxin or whatever.10 Q. But going back to this document --11 A. Yes, I am sorry.

12 Q. -- we have seen your personnel writing: you should not13 use "shows", you should say "indicates".14 A. Yes.15 Q. Here we can see someone saying "may" is weaker than the16 summary, "could" is weak, et cetera.17 A. I see what you mean, I beg your pardon, yes.18 Q. With that context, would you say this is similar to the19 task that was being carried out by those assessing the20 intelligence?21 A. On some issues or on the presentational issues, which is22 what I think Alastair Campbell was interested in, then23 by definition almost there will be arguments about what24 words you can use and how far they are acceptable in the

25 sense of reflecting the intelligence. So in that sense,

551 yes.2 Q. What was your own view of whether or not Mr Campbell,3 for example, should have been making these types of4 comments?5 A. Well, if I may say so I did not know at the time that6 Mr Campbell was commenting on the text.7 Q. Right. So any view would be only with the benefit of8 hindsight?9 A. Yes, indeed.10 Q. With that qualification?

11 A. I have no problems about Mr Campbell making proposals on12 the presentational side of the dossier, provided that it


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13 does not go beyond the intelligence underpinning the14 dossier itself.15 Q. What were your exact dealings with Dr Kelly? I think16 you have told us that you were aware that he came into17 Dr Jones' section. Did you have any other personal18 dealings with him?

19 A. If I may say so, I had no personal dealings with20 Dr Kelly at all. I did not know of him until his name21 became public.22 Q. Right. And you did not see any documents which he23 produced for your purposes at all?24 A. I did not, no.25 Q. Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of

561 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?2 A. I do not think so, my Lord. If I could make a couple of3 points in conclusion which do not relate to the specific4 circumstances of the death of Dr Kelly.

5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 A. That is that in my view, from my perspective, the7 dossier was prepared and produced by a rigorous process8 of drafting. I myself saw what you might call the9 rolling draft as being the principal means by which the10 JIC membership, the individuals, contributed to and11 exercised influence over the process. It is certainly12 the case that as drafting proceeded, some points were13 accepted and some were not. That is the nature of14 drafting of course. But I am quite sure, in my own15 mind, that the reasons for accepting or rejecting were16 rational and good reasons, it was not done in an17 arbitrary way.

18 LORD HUTTON: Yes.19 A. I and my senior managers were satisfied with the20 outcome. I have no reason to believe that21 Air Marshall French himself was not personally satisfied22 with the outcome. If I had not been satisfied, I would23 have said so.24 One further point, if I may; and that is I would25 like to extend, on my behalf and I am sure also on

571 behalf of my former colleagues in the DIS, our deepest2 sympathy to Mrs Kelly and her family.3 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Mr Cragg.

4 A. Thank you, my Lord.5 LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time for a short6 break.7 (12.05 pm)8 (Short Break)9 (12.10 pm)10 AIR MARSHALL JOSEPH CHARLES FRENCH (called)11 Examined by MR DINGEMANS12 MR DINGEMANS: Could you tell his Lordship your full name.13 A. Yes. My full name is Joseph Charles French.14 Q. Your current occupation?15 A. I am a serving officer in the Royal Air Force and I am16 Commander in Chief of our personnel and training command

17 in the Royal Air Force. I was previously Chief of18 Defence Intelligence from November 2000 to April 17th


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19 this year.20 Q. So that took in the period of time that the dossier was21 published?22 A. Yes, it did.23 Q. Can you give an outline of your role as Chief of Defence24 Intelligence?

25 A. I answered to the Permanent Secretary, Sir Kevin Tebbit,

581 and the Chief of Defence Staff. As you are probably2 aware, the Ministry of Defence covers two functions; one3 is a department of state and the other is the senior4 military headquarters within Her Majesty's armed forces.5 As such we were collecting and analysing intelligence to6 actually inform deployed operations, also to help in7 determining future equipment programmes and also in the8 formulation of policy within the department.9 Q. Did you sit on any Committees as a result of your role10 as Chief of Defence Intelligence?

11 A. Yes. Specifically, within the context of this hearing,12 the Joint Intelligence Committee and I was one of the13 two Deputy Chairmen of that Committee.14 Q. When did you become aware that the Government was likely15 to publish the dossier it did publish in September 2002?16 A. Obviously there was talk of a different context of17 a document which dealt with weapons of mass destruction18 in four countries and associated issues much earlier in19 last year but eventually, obviously, we led to20 the September dossier which was printed on21 24th September.22 Q. Were you involved in any of the decision-making to23 decide to publish the dossier?

24 A. Through the body of the Joint Intelligence Committee,25 yes.

591 Q. And what was decided in relation to that? When was the2 first meeting that discussed the publication of the3 dossier?4 A. I am not sure I could actually give a date where it was5 put in such explicit terms; but obviously the agenda was6 set for the Joint Intelligence Committee, which I played7 a full part in through various situations on the dossier8 leading up to its printing.9 Q. We have heard that the Prime Minister announced on

10 3rd September that the dossier was to be published. Had11 the Joint Intelligence Committee discussed the dossier12 on dates before that?13 A. In that it had been a rolling process from, as I say,14 earlier in the year, I think April, but explicitly in15 the terms, again I am not sure when we would have been16 told explicitly that. The next meeting after that date,17 the 3rd, was obviously the following day, on the18 Wednesday, which is the weekly Joint Intelligence19 Committee meeting day.20 Q. Did you attend the meeting on 4th September?21 A. Yes, and also the meeting on 11th September.22 Q. Was there any discussion about the announcement that had

23 been made the preceding day by the Prime Minister?24 A. I have not seen the minutes of that but I would be very


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25 surprised if it had not come up under Any Other Business

601 that we would have been told explicitly by the Chairman,2 Sir John Scarlett.3 Q. Do you recollect any discussion about the dossier?

4 A. No, I do not, not on that day.5 Q. What was your involvement between 4th and 11th September6 in the drafting of the dossier?7 A. We had several iterations of the dossier and I saw all8 of those; and through the Director of Global Issues who9 was coordinating across the DIAS at the director level10 I gave him my own views on part of the structure and11 some of the information that was actually in the various12 drafts in the dossier.13 Q. On 10th September, a document which is at CAB/33/131, if14 I can show you this.15 The first draft of the dossier on 5th September did16 not include any part relating to the role of the JIC

17 et cetera. But if you look at this document scrolling18 down in paragraph 1:19 "Some of you will have seen Alastair Campbell's note20 to me of 9th September setting out the broad, proposed21 structure for the 'dossier' on Iraqi WMD which is now22 under active presentation. Alastair did not refer to an23 additional section, which I have agreed with him, would24 be considered for inclusion in the 'dossier'. This25 would give an account of the JIC assessment of

611 developments in Iraqi WMD programmes since UNSCOM2 inspectors were withdrawn in late 1998. On present

3 plans, within the dossier, it would follow the section4 setting out the intelligence based account of what the5 Iraqis had been doing since late 1998..."6 Were you aware of any of those discussions leading7 up to that memorandum?8 A. Obviously through the memorandum, which came to me, yes.9 Q. Yes.10 A. But given Alastair Campbell's role in the presentation11 then it does not surprise me, nor the comments from12 John Scarlett. That was very much consistent with the13 discussion in the JIC on the 11th, where we were at14 pains to make sure the dossier reflected assessed15 intelligence and assessed the intelligence available to

16 us.17 Q. Now, we have heard from Mr Cragg, who was not present on18 11th, but you were?19 A. Yes.20 Q. What was discussed in relation to the dossier on21 11th September?22 A. There were three broad issues I recall. One was that we23 were broadly content with the way the drafting process24 was going forward. The second, reiterating the point25 I just made now, was to make sure that it was based on

621 intelligence. The third issue was that it would be

2 appropriate at some point to actually share the nature3 of the drafting the process and what was coming out in


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4 the dossier with Ann Taylor, who was Chairman of the5 ISC.6 Q. We have seen some e-mails that passed between Mrs Taylor7 and the Cabinet Office in that respect.8 A. Thank you.9 Q. Did you discuss the detail of the dossier?

10 A. No. In that it was an ongoing process and, as has been11 described before, particularly in Dr Jones' transcript,12 which I have read obviously, that we had a process13 surrounding JIC meetings and assessments that would14 allow the staff first to be involved with the assessment15 staff to prepare a draft for members of the JIC; and16 certainly in the case of the Defence Intelligence Staff,17 its staff rather than services, we met probably late18 morning on the Wednesdays ahead of the meetings to19 actually go through any of the issues that the staff20 felt were not appropriately resolved by the assessment21 staffs at the current intelligence group, then I would22 decide whether it was appropriate or not to pursue those

23 with the Committee itself later in the day.24 LORD HUTTON: With whom would you meet on those occasions,25 Air Marshall?

631 A. It would be very much the individual specialist staffs2 who were dealing with the specific issues. If I could3 reiterate a point made earlier by Mr Cragg, that whilst4 Dr Jones was an expert in his own particular field, he5 was one of many who were contributing to the overall6 discussion of the dossier on the part of the DIS and7 indeed the intelligence community as a whole.8 MR DINGEMANS: In terms of the 45 minutes claim, that

9 related primarily to the area in which Dr Jones was the10 expert; is that fair?11 A. No, I would say that it came across the piece and that12 the technical aspects would be his, but in terms of13 dealing with tactics for employment or the doctrine for14 employment that would fall in another part of the15 defence analysis staff. Also, again, I think we have to16 remind ourselves that these were issues we had been17 dealing with for many many years, and also that the18 Iraqis had used these weapons in the past, and put in19 a military context, that you could have various20 readiness states, the ultimate being instant readiness.21 I am afraid as a military man the fact that 45 minutes

22 was mentioned does not surprise me at all within this23 consideration.24 Q. Why is that?25 A. Well, in that you could go -- they had used military

641 weapons or weapons of mass destruction in the past and2 that if you went to instant readiness, which is one of3 our states, and knowing their tactics and doctrine, then4 it could well have been, in certain circumstances, that5 the Iraqis themselves would have been on an instant6 readiness state.7 Q. After the meeting of 11th September, did you attend any

8 other JIC meetings before the dossier was published?9 A. No, I was not in office on the 18th and was represented


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10 by Mr Cragg, who is a member of the JIC himself.11 Q. And we have heard from Mr Cragg.12 A. Yes, you have. Yes.13 Q. On 11th September you say you had a meeting beforehand14 to discuss any issues that had been raised. On 10th to15 11th September there is the first draft of the dossier,

16 which is produced after the 45 minutes claim has been17 finally assessed by the JIC. Was the 45 minutes claim18 raised at that stage?19 A. Not in the JIC on the 11th, no.20 Q. Was it raised in the meeting with you beforehand?21 A. I am not aware at this stage. Obviously the assessment22 went through. It could well have been brought to my23 attention, but I would have not been surprised nor do24 I go against the mention of 45 minutes.25 Q. If it had been mentioned to you, would you have raised

651 it at the Joint Intelligence Committee?

2 A. No, because from a military perspective the 45 minutes3 is something that I would fully understand that in4 certain circumstances forces could be well able of5 actually starting to deliver systems within that6 timeframe.7 Q. When did you become aware of any unhappiness or concerns8 about the 45 minutes claims within members of the9 Defence Intelligence Staff?10 A. Well, the concern came out when I returned to the office11 on the morning of the 20th, where I was shown Dr Jones'12 minute, which you have obviously shown to Mr Cragg13 earlier in the morning.14 Q. Were you aware of any earlier comments on the 45 minutes

15 claim? For example, CAB/33/134 which is dated16 17th September. If we scroll down that. Sorry I think17 that must be a rogue reference. I will come back to18 that one.19 On 17th September, we have seen a document this20 morning whereby the Defence Intelligence Staff reported21 on the draft of 16th September. Were you aware of that?22 A. Without specifically looking at the document, I23 cannot --24 Q. You were away on 18th September?25 A. I was away on the 18th. But obviously the nature of all

66

1 that was going on at the moment, you have to remember we2 had been in operations through Afghanistan and a whole3 range of issues that we actually deal with, that I was4 in regular contact with the office and I got back on the5 morning of the 19th and was actually shown, in my flat6 in London, a copy of the draft of the dossier that day.7 Q. The reference I gave you is 134. Can we try CAB/33/116?8 This is the letter of 17th September. Did you see that9 before you went away or was that sent to you?10 A. (Pause). I am not -- I cannot give a straight answer to11 that because we saw so many documents relating to it.12 Obviously I did see, though, Dr Jones' minute and the13 other minute unnamed which you showed earlier.

14 Q. Yes, this is not that document.15 A. No.


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16 Q. This is, I think, the collection of comments, but --17 A. It would have been dealt with at the officials level, at18 the director level, as Mr Cragg has said, with the19 Directors of Scientific and Technical, Global Issues and20 others, coordinating on behalf of the DIS.21 Q. I appreciate that. But this letter is the coordinated

22 letter sent into the Joint Intelligence office23 assessments staff.24 A. Yes.25 Q. We can see, halfway down the page, that there is being

671 expressed at this stage, which is 17th September, on2 behalf of the DIS as a whole, the comment that the3 45 minutes was rather strong because it is based on4 a single source. Were you aware, at any time before you5 saw Dr Jones' memo, of these concerns being expressed6 more generally?7 A. No, and I am not sure I would express it in those terms

8 "concerns more generally"; we come back to the process9 where the staffs were invited to actually put their10 comments through. It was discussed in detail with the11 assessment staff, with representations not just from the12 scientific and technical personnel, which is what you13 are actually alluding to there, but a range of others14 who would have been experts in this field, and also15 those who contributed from the agencies within the Joint16 Intelligence Committee overall.17 Q. Is this document here from the science and technology18 group alone?19 A. No, it was an amalgam of the comments from across the20 Defence Intelligence Staff.

21 Q. Which rather suggests, having amalgamated the comments,22 the Defence Intelligence Staff took the view that the23 45 minutes claim was, as expressed in the dossier --24 they have given the dates, 15th September -- rather25 strong.

681 A. In the staff view at that level. Ultimately the2 document had to be cleared at the Joint Intelligence3 Committee level and I was content with the wording that4 appeared in the final draft. I come back to, again,5 this is a regular process. As Dr Jones' minute makes6 clear or infers, he had had many of his points actually

7 included in the document and we had actually got down to8 the last one or two points, which is where I had been9 informed on the 20th that these issues were still then10 in the minds of the staff.11 Q. Right.12 LORD HUTTON: Air Marshall, when you say it has to be clear13 at the Joint Intelligence Committee level, do you mean14 by that at the level of the JIC assessment staff --15 A. Well, it goes through a twofold process, my Lord. One16 is for the assessment staff to present the draft, the17 final draft ultimately on the 20th, to the Joint18 Intelligence Committee itself. And then ultimately for19 the Committee members on the part of the Defence

20 Intelligence Staff, myself, to say that I am content21 with the wording as it stood.


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22 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.23 MR DINGEMANS: Before we get to the 19th September memo,24 there was a memo, I think you were in court earlier on25 this morning when Mr Cragg looked at it, which discussed

69

1 ownership of the dossier. I appreciate it was a meeting2 you were not at. It was a memo dated 18th September.3 What were you aware of in relationship to ownership of4 the dossier?5 A. The dossier rested with the Joint Intelligence Committee6 and that was obviously under the chairmanship of7 Mr Scarlett.8 Q. At all times?9 A. At all times.10 Q. You return from your travels, I think, on11 20th September.12 A. 19th. I was back in the office the first thing on the13 20th. I was in London on the 20th.

14 Q. You did not come into your office?15 A. No, but I received work, including the dossier, from my16 office directly to my flat in London.17 Q. Did you receive Dr Jones' memo at that stage?18 A. No because, as I understand it now and obviously having19 gone through the times on it, he did not release it20 until about 17.00 on that Thursday and I was shown it21 the next morning when I got into the office.22 Q. Can we look at that? That is MoD/22/1. I think you23 were in court earlier on when Mr Cragg saw it.24 A. Yes, I was.25 Q. I will not therefore necessarily take you through it, if

701 I may. Mr Cragg was going off, I think, on leave for2 the next week and was away for the next week. So for3 the reasons he has given he did not do anything about it4 directly on the evening of the 19th September, and you5 were dealing with it, he knew, on the morning of the6 20th September. What did you do with this document?7 A. I think he said he satisfied himself, Mr Cragg, with the8 main issues that were actually raised within it.9 Q. Yes.10 A. I got this document the next day and, having obviously11 seen these issues or discussed these sorts of issues in12 the weeks leading up to this, I come back to the point

13 again that this is heavily qualified in the intelligence14 that was available to Dr Jones and to people within his15 particular area of the DIST. And that what I had been16 through with the directors over the two or so weeks17 beforehand, that the 45 minutes, I think we have covered18 already, on some of the chemical and biological weapons19 issues, the intelligence there was on a very limited20 distribution; and as you quoted earlier, that the ISC21 did consider this and, as they put in their own report22 last Thursday, they fully understood the conclusions23 that both the DIS and myself in this instance and the24 JIC came to on that limited distribution intelligence.25 Q. The limited distribution intelligence did not refer to

71


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1 the 45 minutes claim?2 A. No, it was chemical and biological issues.3 Q. So to the extent that Dr Jones was making comments about4 the 45 minutes issue, that was or was not answered by5 the recent intelligence?6 A. Not that chemical and biological. There was

7 intelligence which I think was either 29th or8 30th August which dealt specifically with the9 45 minutes.10 Q. We have heard of the reporting of that.11 A. I have to keep reiterating, Dr Jones more specifically12 would be looking at the technical aspects of weapons,13 how they were put together, the effects of actually14 using them. It would be other parts of the15 organisation, who certainly had no quibble with the16 45 minutes, who would also contribute equally well to17 that discussion.18 Q. Having seen Dr Jones' memorandum, what did you do as19 a result of that?

20 A. We were on the 20th, which was the final draft day.21 Q. Yes.22 A. And that ultimately I had to make the decision whether23 or not the DIS was content for the document to go to24 print; and I was content for it to go to print.25 Q. Were you sent a copy of the dossier that was produced on

721 20th September?2 A. Yes, I was.3 Q. Did the JIC meet in committee to approve that dossier on4 the 20th?5 A. No, in that we have gone through several iterations and,

6 as is normal Government practice, something that had7 been in the drafting that long quite often we would have8 out of committee clearance and sometimes that clearance9 would be on silence procedures, i.e. if you have not10 reported by the due date time then it would be11 recognised that you were content for the document to go12 forward.13 Q. So a copy was distributed and it was up to you to make14 any objections known?15 A. Yes.16 Q. The other document that we have seen is at CAB/33/114,17 which is 20th September 2002. Mr Cragg said this came18 from someone else in Dr Jones' team. It refers to the

19 45 minutes claim. If we look at the bottom of the page20 you can see --21 A. Yes.22 Q. -- the 45 minutes claim.23 "This is reported as fact whereas the intelligence24 comes from a single course ... the intelligence warrants25 no stronger a statement than ... suggests."

731 That has come pretty close to the DIS representation2 that was made on 17th September to the Joint3 Intelligence office of the assessment staff. What did4 you do with all those three combinations?

5 A. With those combinations you still ultimately have to6 decide what is going to go to print. The 45 minutes,


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hearing transcript - 15 september 2003 morning

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