hearing transcript - 21 august 2003 afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 21 August 2003 Afternoon

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Hearing Transcripts

941 record. The official declined to comment when Mr Adams2 put Dr David Kelly's name to that person.3 Q. Does he speak to anyone else?

4 A. He spoke to a second Whitehall official on the same off5 the record basis. The official did not confirm6 Dr David Kelly as the individual and referred Mr Adams7 to the MoD press office. Mr Adams then pursued his8 inquiries around the name of Dr David Kelly. Asked9 about Dr David Kelly's job and background, this official10 replied that he was seconded to the MoD from the11 Porton Down defence establishment and that his salary12 was paid by the FCO.13 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, now might be a convenient moment.14 LORD HUTTON: Very well. We will rise. I will sit again at15 2 o'clock.16 (1.00 pm)

17 (The short adjournment)18 (2.00 pm)19 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Blitz, I think we now have the computers20 back up. Can I take you to FIN/1/57. Was that the note21 Mr Adams had made? I think you just relayed to us what22 had been said.23 A. Yes. I understand that to be the case. He is in the24 throes of a conversation with a Whitehall official. He25 is asking that Whitehall official about Dr David Kelly.

951 The Whitehall official is telling Mr Adams that2 Dr David Kelly is seconded from Porton Down.3 Q. Then what did Mr Adams do with that information?4 A. At this stage, once he had concluded --5 Q. Paragraph 46 of your evidence.6 A. Once he had concluded that, there was a moment of cross7 checking between myself and Mr Adams. Just to recap on8 where we were just before lunch: I had established from9 a conversation with a Whitehall official that the10 individual mentioned in the MoD statement was paid for11 by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Mr Adams had12 just established in his conversation with the Whitehall13 official that Dr David Kelly was paid for by the Foreign14 Office. So there was therefore an important moment of15 matching of information.16 Q. What did Mr Adams do after that?17 A. Mr Adams then tried to speak to Ms Pam Teare, the head18 of the MoD press office, on the telephone but she was19 engaged on another telephone call.20 Q. Following that lack of success?21 A. Mr Adams spoke to a third Whitehall official on an off22 the record basis and pressed that person with23 Dr David Kelly's name. At the end of this conversation24 Mr Adams believed that Dr David Kelly was the individual25 mentioned in the MoD press statement the night before.

961 Q. Do we see, at FIN/1/58, his redacted note of that2 conversation?3 A. I cannot yet see it on the screen.


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4 Q. It will arrive.5 A. As far as I am aware, that is the case. If you wish6 to -- I would like to say at this point, if you wish to7 press further on this point you must speak to Mr Adams8 directly.9 Q. Do you speak to anyone at this stage?

10 A. Yes. At this stage, I speak to John Williams at the11 FCO. In his evidence to the Inquiry last week12 Mr Williams made reference to that second conversation13 he had with me that afternoon, which allows me identify.14 I asked him whether the individual was Dr David Kelly.15 Mr Williams said he was unable to help me and did not16 make any other comment. The fact was I had put17 a specific name to Mr Williams about somebody18 I understood well now to be paid for by his department,19 and I did not receive a flat denial of any kind. This20 left me -- I could deduce from this, without him giving21 any help to me, we were getting extremely close to22 identifying the individual concerned.

23 Q. How was the individual actually identified?24 A. It was only a few moments later that Mr Adams again25 called Miss Teare.

971 Q. Was she still on the phone?2 A. No. He put the name of Dr David Kelly to her and she3 immediately confirmed he was the individual in the MoD4 statement.5 Q. Does Mr Adams have a time or estimated time for this?6 A. Mr Adams does not recall the time of this conversation7 but has told me that he does not dispute her evidence to8 this Inquiry that the conversation took place at around

9 5.30 in the afternoon.10 Q. Having confirmed the name, he obviously told you, did11 he?12 A. That is correct.13 Q. And what did you do then?14 A. I then proceeded to speak to other -- to continue with15 the inquiries. Although I had confirmation of this, you16 must understand this was a most unusual situation.17 I telephoned another Whitehall official and spoke to18 that official on an off the record basis. I indicated19 to that person I had good grounds for believing that20 Dr~David Kelly was the individual mentioned in the MoD21 statement. This official did not expressly confirm my22 belief, but the language used left me in no doubt that23 Dr David Kelly was indeed the person in question.24 Q. So what did you do as a result of that?25 A. I relayed all the information I had to the main office

981 of the FT in London.2 Q. Did you then start to produce any article on the basis3 of this information?4 A. I did not, at that point, do that. Before writing the5 article I telephoned Ms Teare myself.6 Q. What did she say?7 A. I told Ms Teare I had gathered from Mr Adams that she8 had confirmed to him that the individual was9 Dr David Kelly. She told me this was correct.


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10 I established with her what his job title was and this11 appeared in the article which I had given the Inquiry12 and which appeared that night.13 During that conversation I told Ms Teare I was14 planning to write in the FT the next day that15 Dr David Kelly was the individual who had been mentioned

16 in the MoD statement. I told Ms Teare I wished to speak17 to Dr Kelly directly about this matter to see if he18 wished to make any comment. I asked Ms Teare if she19 could put me in touch with him. Ms Teare told me the20 MoD had a policy to confirm the name to any journalist21 who offered it. Miss Teare also told me that a decision22 had been taken by the MoD that in the event the name was23 confirmed to a newspaper, that newspaper would be told24 that he would not be available for interview.25 LORD HUTTON: Mr Blitz, what was your purpose in telephoning

991 Ms Teare? Because Mr Adams had already told you that he

2 had received the name from her, she confirmed the name3 to him. So why did you, yourself, speak to Ms Teare on4 the telephone?5 A. I was in the situation that afternoon, sir, in which6 I was contemplating putting the name of a man whom I had7 never met, whom I had never heard of and whose name, as8 far as I was aware, was not in the public domain, into9 the paper the next day in connection with a very serious10 political story. I had no idea at that point of course11 whether any other newspaper was going to do that. I12 therefore wished to establish directly with Miss Teare,13 as the leader of that team, that everything was the14 case. I did not doubt what Mr Adams was telling me, but

15 I wished to go through this again. And I also felt that16 I had to get in touch with Dr David Kelly to inform him17 of what I was doing.18 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. So you wanted to get in19 touch with Dr Kelly not just to ask him for his20 observations but to tell him what you are about to21 publish.22 A. Yes.23 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Thank you.24 MR DINGEMANS: You start to write the article. Does anyone25 contact you?

1001 A. Yes. In the course of writing the article I was2 contacted by a Whitehall official who wished to convey3 to me some thoughts about Dr David Kelly. I regard this4 conversation as having been off the record.5 Q. Some thoughts about Dr Kelly?6 A. Some thoughts, yes.7 Q. Right. What were those thoughts?8 A. The official expressed the belief that Dr David Kelly9 was the BBC source. The official informed me10 Dr David Kelly had appeared alongside the Foreign11 Secretary, Jack Straw, at a Foreign Affairs Select12 Committee meeting the previous year. The official13 expressed the belief the BBC had interpreted the14 appearance of Dr David Kelly at that meeting as15 signifying that he was more important than he was. The


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16 official indicated to me that Dr David Kelly had said17 almost nothing at that meeting.18 The official then indicated to me that19 Richard Sambrook, the head of BBC News, had described20 the source of the Gilligan report as a "senior21 intelligence source". The official indicated to me this

22 was not a correct description of Dr David Kelly. The23 official informed me Dr David Kelly had only been24 responsible for the compilation of a historical part of25 the dossier. I included elements of this briefing in

1011 the article which I wrote that night. I have a2 contemporaneous note of this conversation, a copy of3 which I have redacted to ensure that the identity of the4 person to whom I spoke is not revealed.5 Q. If we look at FIN/1/61, is this the document to which6 you refer?7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And then did you become aware, later on, that other9 journalists had identified --10 A. Dr David Kelly?11 Q. Yes.12 A. Yes. By the time I had filed the article -- at the time13 I filed the article I had had no contact of any14 constructive kind with any other journalist about the15 article I was writing. Around one hour after I filed16 the story, I was informed by a journalist on another17 newspaper that he understood that The Times and18 The Guardian had also discovered the name of the19 individual in the MoD press statement. This was the20 first moment at which I was aware of this fact.

21 Q. You have mentioned some conversations which are off the22 record. I entirely understand in relation to that. You23 have seen some waivers the Inquiry managed to obtain24 today and taken legal advice on that, and still feel at25 the moment you are unable to share with us the identity

1021 of those persons you spoke to off the record. That is2 the position?3 A. As a matter of principle, I would not reveal the4 identity of any person with whom I had had an off the5 record conversation, unless that person has first6 approached me to discuss the matter.7 Q. Right. I understand that. And if, at any stage, you8 are in the position of being able to share more with his9 Lordship, you will be in a position to let the Inquiry10 know?11 A. I would be in a position to let the Inquiry know.12 Q. Thank you very much. Subject to that, is there anything13 else that you know relating to the death of Dr Kelly14 that you can assist his Lordship with?15 A. There is not.16 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much?17 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Blitz.18 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Norton-Taylor, please.19 MR RICHARD SEYMOUR NORTON-TAYLOR (called)20 Examined by MR KNOX21 LORD HUTTON: Just give me a moment, please. Yes, thank


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22 you.23 Yes, Mr Knox.24 MR KNOX: Mr Norton-Taylor, could you tell the Inquiry your25 full name and your occupation.

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1 A. Richard Seymour Norton-Taylor, the Security Affairs2 Editor of The Guardian.3 Q. How long have you worked in that capacity at4 The Guardian?5 A. About five years.6 Q. Over the last year or so have you been dealing with Iraq7 and related matters?8 A. Yes.9 Q. Did you, in the course of your reporting, hear any10 reports from any sources about unease in the11 Intelligence Services about the September dossier?12 A. Many.13 Q. I am not going to ask you about who the sources were,

14 but what was the nature of the unease that was expressed15 to you?16 A. Well, I think there was widespread unease throughout the17 intelligence community, which was not happy about the18 dossier in the first place, a published dossier in the19 first place. That was early spring probably in 2002.20 For various reasons. People were saying there was21 nothing new to say, they felt under pressure probably22 they would have to come up with something "new" that, by23 definition, the nature of intelligence is made of24 judgments and assessments and interpretation, rather25 than hard evidence and gradually as the year went on

1041 they knew that the Government was pressing for and2 by September had decided to have a published dossier.3 But in the end, I think they learnt to live with it.4 They said their political masters wanted this and rather5 through gritted teeth I think they accepted that. They6 basically came, I think, almost to a constitutional7 convention really that they will do the dossier and what8 politicians make of it, they said, is their affair. And9 they were pointing a bit here and there to10 No. 10 Downing Street.11 I think it came to a head really on the dodgy12 dossier which came later, you know, in February this13 year, and some people would mention Downing Street and14 some people would mention Alastair Campbell. I was15 told, for example, that John Scarlett was -- did not16 have a bust up with Mr Campbell but I think the word was17 a "debate" with Mr Campbell during the time of the18 drafting of the dossier; and I think that is sort of the19 tenor, really, of the -- I think I was probably told20 that senior MI6 officers were nervous, I think is the21 word I was told, about the whole process.22 Q. Did you ever talk to Dr Kelly?23 A. No.24 Q. Did you even know of Dr Kelly's name before this whole25 dispute arose?

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1 A. I do not think so, no.2 Q. We know that on 8th July the MoD made a press3 announcement, which one can see at MoD/1/56. Did you4 see this or hear of this press announcement when it came5 out, which I think was about 5.45 or maybe 6 o'clock on6 8th July, Tuesday?

7 A. I did.8 Q. And what was your reaction when you saw it?9 A. Well, I thought this was really giving some sort of10 clues about -- firstly, it was news -- we did not know11 before then -- I did not know before then anyway the12 individual had -- any kind of individual had come13 forward.14 Q. So this was the first time you were aware any individual15 had come forward?16 A. Indeed.17 Q. Continue, sorry.18 A. And there were some clues, if you like, in there about19 what the person -- I think probably later on in the

20 statement, is it not? Anyway, it certainly whetted my21 appetite, put it that way, in trying to discover who22 this person was.23 Q. I think you have said at this time you did not even know24 who Dr Kelly was, is that right?25 A. Correct.

1061 Q. Did you make any enquiries at all on the evening of2 8th July which furthered your knowledge?3 A. I did not make many that particular day, no, further in4 that day.5 Q. We know on Wednesday 9th July that there was a press

6 briefing at 11 o'clock in the morning at7 No. 10 Downing Street, and again at 3.45 I think in the8 afternoon. Did you attend either of those press9 briefings?10 A. No.11 Q. What did you do on Wednesday 9th July to further your12 enquiries as to who this man might be?13 A. I was sort of bashing the phone around a bit, especially14 on trying to get more information from the Ministry of15 Defence and, in particular, the press office there.16 Q. Can I just ask you what the Ministry of Defence press17 office said to you when you asked?18 A. I was asking various questions through the day really.19 And as the day wore on, I was told -- I was asking about20 the background of this individual, and at one moment21 I was told this person had been a former -- I was asking22 about their background, what kind of work he had done23 and so on, that he was a former UNSCOM weapons24 inspector.25 Q. Right. That is one thing you are told?

1071 A. A crucial thing I would say I was told.2 Q. Was there anything else you were told that you can now3 recall?4 A. Not really, because I think this was such an important5 clue, if I can put it that way, that for the moment it6 was enough for me, as it were -- for me to go and make


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7 some further enquiries very quickly.8 Q. Can you recall what time of day it was you received this9 piece of information?10 A. Some time in the late afternoon maybe, I think.11 Q. We know that --12 A. Mid to late afternoon I would say.

13 Q. We know that one of the things that the press office was14 told they were allowed to do was to say if the right15 name was given to them then they would confirm it. Did16 they pass that on to you or was that kept back from you?17 A. They did not -- yes, at one point I think they did18 actually, yes. I am not quite sure when. But I was, at19 that point, really so sort of affected or impressed by20 the clue about the UNSCOM thing reference that I was21 concentrating on that, and I cannot actually remember22 whether they described the confirmation policy or not,23 at that stage.24 Q. Can I just ask you this: why is it quite such a big25 clue, this UNSCOM clue?

1081 A. Because there are not many certainly British people who2 were in the UNSCOM team.3 Q. Could you give us a rough idea of how many there might4 have been in that case?5 A. Not sure -- I am not a great expert on this, I was not6 writing about it at the time, maybe 10 or so. That is7 slightly out of the air, but not a big number.8 Q. So what did you then do once they had told you that?9 A. I think the first thing, a colleague mentioned someone10 who he remembered as an UNSCOM person, I am afraid I11 cannot remember that name either and I do not have my

12 notes either. So I then, I think, just quickly passed13 on that name to the MoD and they said: no. But at the14 same time I was -- I went to the Internet and searched15 through Google and I pressed a couple of words in,16 I typed in the search engine something like "Britain"17 plus "UNSCOM" plus maybe one other word. About the18 first or second item on that list that came up on Google19 was a lecture David Kelly had given, I think in America,20 and it said that he was a former British UNSCOM21 inspector. So that was one name I had very early on,22 possibly by chance. It was by chance actually.23 Q. Well, in one sense. Roughly what time of the day did24 you come across this article, in very broad terms?25 A. Between 5 and 6 I should think.

1091 Q. What did you do next?2 A. I looked for other names and references to UNSCOM.3 I did know actually one or two former British UNSCOM4 people but did not think that they were advising the5 Government at all. So I dismissed the name, although6 I think I mentioned another name to the MoD press office7 at the same time as I mentioned Dr Kelly's name to them.8 Q. How did you eventually come to realise that it might be9 Dr Kelly?10 A. Well, I simply put the name to the MoD press office.11 Q. What time did you do that?12 A. 6.30-ish, getting on for deadline time, 6.30-ish I would


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13 say.14 Q. Had you made any further investigations after getting15 hold of that article by Dr Kelly?16 A. I made a few more enquiries about UNSCOM and people and17 so on. By then I had already got Kelly's name and no18 further enquiries were helpful at all actually, no

19 additional information.20 Q. You then ring up the MoD press office?21 A. Yes.22 Q. That is about 6.30 you said?23 A. 6.30/7 maybe.24 Q. Who were you put through to, can you remember?25 A. I noticed that Pam Teare said I spoke to the duty press

1101 officer; it was either that person or the chief press2 officer. The trouble is I talked to quite a few MoD3 press people at that time. Anyway, the MoD press office4 confirmed that name.

5 Q. How did the conversation go?6 A. I have two names here, I said, and the second one was7 Kelly and it was confirmed. Yes.8 Q. So they said no to the first one, yes to the second?9 A. Correct.10 Q. And did they say anything else?11 A. No.12 Q. And after that conversation with the press office did13 you make any further enquiries to find out something14 about Dr Kelly's background?15 A. Yes.16 Q. And what was the nature of those enquiries?17 A. Again through the Internet search, talk to people, did

18 they know him and what kind of fellow he was. You do19 not want a one sentence story: Dr Kelly was the fellow20 who came up. You want to know a bit of his background.21 Which by then, once you have the name, it is quite easy22 because he is referred to in many articles and he gave23 a lot of lectures and so on.24 Q. I think we heard from Mr Blitz that shortly after he25 identified the name he got calls from people in

1111 Whitehall. Did you receive any calls from people in2 Whitehall?3 A. No.4 Q. Did you, yourself, try to make any contact with anyone5 in Whitehall?6 A. No.7 Q. I think you eventually wrote your article which appears8 at CAB/1/521. This, I think, is the article that you9 wrote with Matt Wells. This is correct, is this right?10 A. Yes.11 Q. And you will see, in the third paragraph down, you refer12 to:13 " ... renowned microbiologist ... he spent seven14 years as an UNSCOM inspector in the 1990's, visiting15 Iraq on 37 occasions."16 Where did you get that information from?17 A. Secondary sources really, what had been said by various18 people and I think Malcolm Dando, who phoned up that


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19 night, talked a little bit about him, as you see.20 Q. I assume the rest of this article you got from an21 assortment of sources which were already in the public22 domain?23 A. Yes.24 Q. I see, right at the foot of the page:

25 "As this particular dispute continued to simmer,

1121 Whitehall officials said the MI6 source behind the2 claim..."3 That was something that was not relayed to you on4 the night before, that was totally separate?5 A. Yes.6 Q. Finally, Mr Norton-Taylor, is there anything else you7 would like to add by way of evidence to this Inquiry8 relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death?9 A. I do not think so. I think your first questions to me10 about the general unease in the intelligence community

11 I thought was relevant, but you asked me those questions12 at the beginning, otherwise I would have probably said13 something along that line at the end.14 MR KNOX: Thank you very much indeed.15 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.16 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Mr Beaumont.17 LORD HUTTON: Yes.18 MR PETER STUART BEAUMONT (called)19 Examined by MR KNOX20 Q. Could you please tell his Lordship your full name and21 occupation?22 A. Peter Stuart Beaumont. I am the foreign affairs editor23 of The Observer.

24 Q. How long have you held that post?25 A. That post for about three and a half years now, I think.

1131 Q. We know that on 2nd March I think an article appeared in2 the press which one can see at BBC/4/130. I wonder if3 we can just have that brought up.4 I think I am right in saying that the article under5 the heading "The Spies and the Spinner" is an article by6 you and Gaby~Hinsliff which appeared on 9th March 2003;7 do you see that?8 A. I do see that. I am having difficulty identifying which9 article -- I cannot actually read it.10 Q. I am sorry about that. You probably recognise the11 headline if nothing else.12 A. It does sound very familiar, yes.13 Q. I think in the second to last paragraph you talk about14 tensions between the Government and Intelligence15 Services.16 A. Yes.17 Q. Can you just tell us, briefly, what you knew from your18 sources, you understood from your sources to be the19 nature of the tension between the Government and20 Intelligence Services?21 A. Going back to about last October after the first dossier22 came out, I was aware, from those sources, that there23 were two different narratives. One which was the24 account that was coming from the Government about the


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25 threat posed by Iraq and what weapons of mass

1141 destruction it might hold and what programmes it might2 have. I was also aware that there was a different3 version that was actually much, much less alarming, that

4 was described to me by one source as being more5 theoretical in character, so the threat was not, you6 know, as described in some places as imminent, but they7 described a series of circumstances that might result in8 there being a threat.9 So I started looking into the tensions between what10 was being said in the dossiers and what was being said11 for public consumption, and perhaps what the alternative12 and rather quieter narrative was saying, and that was13 that -- that all these things could be interpreted in14 a rather different way; that while there was15 a perception of a threat, that it was not quite as it16 was emerging, and that it was more theoretical.

17 And once -- you know, those conversations continued18 right through to the war and to after the war, and it19 was in the aftermath of the war that I began to detect20 sort of a peak of unhappiness perhaps with, you know,21 the way that things had been described before the war,22 you know, by the Government and by the intelligence23 community, and in particular there was some concern over24 the second so-called dodgy dossier; and in conversations25 about that with sources, there was really some quite

1151 extreme unhappiness expressed about the way that piece2 of material had been handled.

3 LORD HUTTON: Can I ask you, Mr Beaumont, you refer to two4 different narratives; can you expand a little on what5 you mean by "narratives"?6 A. What I am trying to say is there were two7 interpretations of the material.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 A. There was the one that appeared in the -- you know, in10 the first dossier that seemed to be being briefed that11 actually Iraq was quite an imminent threat.12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.13 A. The second one was the one that seemed to be coming out14 of the intelligence community, that suggested very15 strongly that actually it was not that imminent but16 there was a difficulty in telling the story; and, you17 know, that story -- therefore, the story had been18 dramatised because even though there was a potential19 risk some way down the line, there was this kind of20 presentational issue and that there was a kind of21 a tension between these two accounts.22 MR KNOX: In this article, Mr Beaumont, you say, I do not23 know if you can read it yet:24 "The September dossier went through two or three25 final drafts, with Campbell writing it off each time,

1161 and had already resulted in fairly serious rows between2 Campbell, Omand and Stephen Lander, then head of MI5.3 "The essence of the disagreement is said to have


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4 been that intelligence material should be presented5 'straight', rather than spiced up to make a political6 argument."7 Pausing there for a moment, that obviously bears8 some similarity to some of the things Dr Kelly appears9 to have said later to Mr Gilligan, Ms Watts and

10 Mr Hewitt.11 Was Dr Kelly one of the sources for this --12 A. No, he was not. In fact, not at all. It was -- it is13 probably wrong to say it was commonplace at that time,14 that kind of discussion, but what I understood was that15 although there was not a problem with the material that16 was in the dossier per se, it was the way in which the17 material had not just been presented in the dossier in18 terms of some of the language but also the way in which19 that material had then been presented afterwards.20 Q. We know that on 15th June 2003 an article appeared in21 The Observer in which you quote a biological weapons22 expert working for the Government who said that the

23 mobile facilities recently found in Iraq were not for24 biological weapons but for hydrogen production. You25 recall, presumably, that; I am not sure we are able to

1171 bring it up, but you recall it?2 A. Yes, I do recall it.3 Q. Can you explain how you came to write that article,4 briefly?5 A. Towards the end of May there was -- the criticism over6 the non-discovery of weapons of mass destruction had7 been gaining pace and on both sides of the Atlantic this8 had been countered by the assertion at the highest

9 levels that in fact weapons of mass destruction had been10 found in these trailers. There had been some small11 articles that had actually suggested that these were not12 as described, and so the previous week to that article13 myself and a colleague set out to interview scientists14 and technicians who might know about this kind of thing,15 to ask whether they believed, on the basis of16 photographs that had been released, I think on the CIA17 website, whether they felt that those facilities could18 be as described.19 Generally, we were being told by these people that20 it looked wrong; I mean, they did not match up to the21 germ labs described by the Secretary of State,22 Colin Powell; there were a different number of pumps,23 things missing from the facility.24 Q. So you get information, is that right?25 A. We get information.

1181 Q. Are you eventually led to Dr Kelly?2 A. No. What happens is I talk to a contact who has, you3 know, some knowledge of these things and he tells me of4 concern that they may not be -- and this is an official5 contact, they may not be as described. Once we have --6 you know, I am told that a team is going out to have7 a look. I do not know who is on the team but pretty8 soon we discover that someone associated with9 Porton Down is going out. It is at that point we write


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10 the first story.11 Q. You write an article basically about this?12 A. I write an article. I mean, I did try to make contact13 with Dr Kelly at that point because I --14 Q. Did you try to contact Dr Kelly before writing your15 first article about those mobile trailers?

16 A. Yes.17 Q. What did you do, you contacted him by phone?18 A. I had been told that Dr Kelly was unhappy with the19 description of the trailers.20 Q. So you received that information from one of your21 contacts?22 A. I had been told by a contact that Dr Kelly was one of23 those unhappy with the description.24 Q. How did you then try to contact Dr Kelly?25 A. I found a phone number for Dr Kelly.

1191 Q. That was a home number or mobile number?

2 A. It was the home number, I believe.3 Q. You rang that number?4 A. Yes.5 Q. Did you get hold of Dr Kelly?6 A. No. I think Dr Kelly was in Iraq looking at the7 trailers at that stage.8 Q. Did you leave a message?9 A. I left a message asking him to call me on this issue.10 Q. Then, as I understand it, the article was published,11 that is the first article on mobile trailers was12 published.13 A. I should also point out that the day before we14 published, the New York Times had published a very

15 similar investigation quoting a British source who had16 doubts about it.17 Q. Right. So the article is then published. Do you later18 hear from Dr Kelly after the article is published?19 A. Towards the end of the following week, which would be20 the Sunday of June 15th, I came into the office and21 found a message from him asking me to call him.22 Q. You called him?23 A. I called him, yes.24 Q. Briefly, how did the conversation go?25 A. He wanted to know what -- he had a vague idea what I was

1201 calling about but he wanted to know, and I pointed to2 the article we had written the week before and he said:3 I am sorry, I could not possibly have seen that. So4 I told him the substance of what it was. He replied:5 yes, yes, something like that. When I pressed him on,6 you know, what he meant, he said: well, the facilities7 are as the Iraqis describe them.8 Q. When would this conversation have taken place? I think9 the article comes out on 15th June.10 A. I think on the Friday, my recollection is on the Friday.11 Q. So that is the 13th June?12 A. I think so. I am not 100 per cent certain but I have13 a strong recollection it was a Friday.14 Q. Did Dr Kelly appear to be forthcoming or not15 particularly forthcoming in this conversation?


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16 A. He was forthcoming in the way he had actually confirmed17 that our story of the week before was correct.18 Q. Did he do anything except confirm the correctness of19 your previous story?20 A. (Pause). No, I mean essentially he confirmed we had got21 it right. Given we had been led to the concern in the

22 first place by a contact that I regarded as being23 authorised, I was not surprised that he had called me24 back because I was under the understanding that there25 was some effort to try to calm down that story at that

1211 time.2 Q. Did you get the impression that Dr Kelly was speaking3 with or without authority, from this conversation?4 A. I had the impression that it was a background briefing,5 although having seen the subsequent evidence to this6 Inquiry I was clearly wrong about that.7 Q. When you say "background briefing", what is the evidence

8 of something being a background briefing?9 A. I thought, you know, because I had already had10 conversations about this and as far as I knew there was11 no problem with me having this conversation and being12 led to the fact that there was a British team going out13 to investigate, that this was a continuation of that14 contact and was in the same form as that contact; and15 therefore, you know, that perhaps it had been suggested16 to him that he should reply to this phone call.17 Q. When you say "it had been suggested to him", suggested18 to him by people in Government?19 A. Yes, that would -- yes.20 Q. You did not actually name Dr Kelly?

21 A. I did not name Dr Kelly, no.22 Q. Why was that?23 A. Because at the end of the conversation I was going24 through the sort of list of things you do at the end of25 an interview and said, "Can I just check your official

1221 title?", which would have signified to him that2 I intended to quote him by name, and his response was,3 you know: just keep -- yes, I am such and such but can4 you just keep my name out of the article. So5 I understood that to be, you know, he did not want his6 name associated with it but he did not have a problem7 with the information being in the public domain.8 Q. It is apparent that this year you have been working on9 the same underlying story as Mr Gilligan was working10 on --11 A. Yes.12 Q. -- about the dissatisfaction in the intelligence13 community. Did you suppose that Dr Kelly was14 Mr Gilligan's source or might be Mr Gilligan's source?15 A. Not at all, because the kind of work I have been doing16 and the kind of contacts I had had, I had assumed that17 as described by Mr Gilligan it was a source in the18 intelligence community of some kind and therefore it19 never occurred to me that it might be Dr Kelly.20 Q. We know that Dr Kelly's name was finally put in the21 press on 10th July as Gilligan's source. Did you begin


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22 to have your suspicions as to this before 10th July?23 A. Yes.24 Q. If so, could you explain when and why?25 A. It first occurred to me that Dr Kelly could be the

123

1 source about five days before he was named, and2 I recall --3 Q. That would be, what, Saturday 5th July?4 A. It may have been the Friday then, because I recall --5 I just recall it striking me that it could have been6 Dr Kelly.7 Q. Can you give --8 A. There was so much detail about him, you know -- I was9 aware of who Dr Kelly was before I had actually spoken10 to him, and because of that it seemed patently obvious,11 from a lot of the hints that were being dropped, that he12 had to be a very strong candidate.13 LORD HUTTON: There was so much detail about him, this was

14 on 4th and 5th July. Where was this detail?15 A. I suppose -- yes, this is difficult. I would rather not16 answer that question.17 LORD HUTTON: I see. You said hints were being dropped18 about him.19 A. Yes.20 MR KNOX: Was this hints you were receiving privately or21 hints you were receiving by reading the press?22 A. I think both. I am sorry, I do not want to be drawn on23 this simply because of confidentiality of sources and24 because -- yes.25 Q. I am obviously not asking you about your sources now,

1241 but certainly so far as the press is concerned, the2 first time that any major development appears to have3 taken place is Saturday, 5th July when there is more4 information put out?5 A. It must have been the Saturday then. It must have been6 the Saturday then because it struck me, I remember7 having a conversation with a colleague saying: I have an8 idea who this is. But I thought it was on the Friday,9 not the Saturday.10 Q. Did you try to contact Dr Kelly once you saw that?11 A. No, because I think in the circumstances of my contact12 with him, I thought it might make -- if it was him13 I thought it might make life a lot more difficult for14 him, and because he had been a contact and I was not --15 I certainly was not so sure of what the status of that16 contact was in the circumstances, that I thought it17 might make his life more difficult for him, especially18 if he was not actually Gilligan's source.19 Q. Did you try to make your own enquiries to ascertain the20 position?21 A. Not at that point; but you know by the time -- I mean,22 I think, if I recall rightly, the name came up pretty23 quickly after that. I was involved in some other things24 and by the time it came round to that issue again,25 I mean, Dr Kelly's name had been released.

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1 MR KNOX: Is there anything else you would like to add about2 the circumstances which led to Dr Kelly's death?3 A. No, I think I have covered it all in the first question4 that you asked me.5 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.6 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Baldwin, please.

7 MR THOMAS DANIEL BALDWIN (called)8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS9 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?10 A. My name is Thomas Daniel Baldwin.11 Q. Your occupation?12 A. I am a journalist.13 Q. Who do you write for?14 A. The Times.15 Q. How long have you been writing for The Times?16 A. Four and a half years.17 Q. Were you interested in the story disclosed on Today on18 29th May?19 A. I was on holiday on 29th May. When I returned this

20 story was still dominating the front pages. Even at21 that stage I thought the nature of the allegations and22 the degree of public interest meant it was a legitimate23 line of newspaper enquiry for us to examine who the24 source was. It was a single anonymous source,25 Mr Gilligan was saying, and it seemed to me one of the

1261 ways to get to the bottom of what was growing into2 a major dispute between the Government and the BBC was3 to examine the motivation, the credibility and indeed4 the identity of the BBC's single source.5 Q. I think you published an article on 4th June quoting

6 John Reid suggesting that rogue elements in the7 Intelligence Services were trying to undermine the8 Government.9 A. That is correct.10 Q. You wanted to say something about the origins of that11 report.12 A. Merely that it has been suggested that that was a story13 which was encouraged by Downing Street, which it was14 not, and I think we now know that, from15 Alastair Campbell's testimony, he was away at the time16 and came back on that day to a series of phone calls17 from the Intelligence Services which probably displeased18 him. I think it far more reflected the suspicions of19 people like John~Reid and Hilary Armstrong, who are keen20 students of Labour history, about the role the21 intelligence services have played with previous Labour22 Governments.23 Q. On 28th June you did another related piece. Do you24 recollect that?25 A. Yes, that is right.

1271 Q. What was that about?2 A. It was a question and answer piece in which one of the3 questions I asked was: who was Gilligan's source?4 Q. Right. And the next article you appear to have written5 related to this was 4th July. What does that say?6 A. This was a story under the headline "BBC on edge of


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7 defeat in Iraq dossier row".8 There were two essential elements to it. One was9 information coming to my colleague, David Charter, about10 what had happened on the Foreign Affairs Committee.11 David was, I think, given some information that12 Mr Campbell was likely to be cleared of the most

13 significant charges against him, at the same time that14 Mr Sambrook has confirmed to this Inquiry he had15 attended a meeting at The Times offices with myself, the16 deputy editor and others on July 3rd.17 Q. On July 3rd. How did that meeting take place?18 A. I think Mr Sambrook, at the time, was doing the rounds19 of various national newspapers, and I was told in the20 morning that he would be coming in; and we --21 Q. Sorry to interrupt. What did "doing the rounds" relate22 to? Was it the story of the BBC against the Government?23 A. Yes. I think Mr Sambrook was keen to put the BBC's24 point of view across and what other messages he wanted25 to bring to us.

1281 Q. Was there any discussion about Mr Gilligan at that2 meeting?3 A. Yes, there was.4 Q. And what was the nature of those discussions?5 A. You will see from my story that a BBC executive is6 quoted talking about whether Mr Gilligan should be7 writing newspaper articles, for instance. I say in my8 statement that I asked Mr Sambrook, at the end of the9 meeting, if he was happy to be identified with an10 apparent ban the BBC had put on Mr Gilligan writing11 newspaper articles, and Mr Sambrook agreed to that.

12 Q. You wrote an article on 5th July, we have seen it13 a number of times throughout the course of the Inquiry,14 headed "BBC dossier source believed to be in Iraq". In15 the article you said the source was believed to be16 a military expert who is now based in Iraq and among the17 100 British intelligence and weapons specialists18 currently in Iraq. Where did you get the information19 for that from?20 A. Mr Sambrook has chosen to confirm to this Inquiry that21 he provided some of the information, some of the quotes22 attributed to a BBC executive in that story, including:23 is he abroad? My question: is he abroad? Something24 like that, including the quote relating to how the BBC25 had tried to contact the source again to check some of

1291 their facts but had been unable to do so because of the2 nature of the position. The record will show3 Mr Sambrook has already confirmed that he was the source4 of that information.5 There was also additional information provided to me6 in the meantime by two other journalists at the BBC who7 had come into contact with Kevin Marsh. I will not name8 the two journalists I spoke to, but I have spoken to9 them since and they are happy for me to say that their10 information was that Mr Kevin Marsh, who is the editor11 of the Today Programme, Mr Gilligan's line manager, had12 given a very strong hint that he believed Mr Gilligan's


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13 source was in Iraq.14 Q. Right. And those people, without identifying them, were15 BBC personnel?16 A. They are BBC personnel, yes.17 Q. The next story you appear to write is on 8th July, which18 contained a passage: Who was the BBC's source? If I can

19 read it without bringing it up:20 "Mr Gilligan says it was a credible and senior21 official involved in drafting the dossier. The BBC says22 it has been unable to contact him since May because of23 the nature of his position. Some executives have hinted24 that he may be in Iraq searching for WMD."25 That repeats effectively the position you had got to

1301 on Saturday:2 "Such loose talk in the BBC has convinced3 Downing Street that he is not a member of the4 Intelligence Services and was not involved in drafting

5 the report but more likely is a WMD specialist at the6 Foreign Office."7 That discloses there was contact with people apart8 from the BBC. What was the last sentence based on?9 A. It was based on conversations I had with Whitehall10 contacts.11 Q. Whitehall contacts. I think you have seen the waivers12 that have been obtained. I understand your position to13 be that until the source has confirmed to you privately14 that they are happy for their identity to be disclosed,15 you are not going to take the matter further.16 A. I think my position is that if somebody wants to release17 themself from the anonymity which my duty of

18 confidentiality would normally protect them, that is19 a matter for them; and if you want to ask them questions20 about whether they told me something or not, that is21 a matter for you but I am not going to do that.22 Q. Thank you very much. If later on you are released from23 that, you might be able to assist his Lordship?24 A. I think you can talk to individuals yourself but I am25 not going to talk at any stage about what somebody told

1311 me off the record.2 Q. That is 8th July. On 9th July there is a headline,3 a news story "MoD man admits 'I spoke to the BBC'".4 That obviously was part based on the MoD press statement5 on 8th July; is that right?6 A. Yes, that is correct.7 Q. But you also included this statement:8 "The adviser is understood to work for the9 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat and The Times10 understands that the adviser has known Mr Gilligan for11 some time ... said to have previously worked as a UN12 weapons inspector."13 Perhaps you can just identify what the position is14 in relation to those sentences?15 A. The same as the previous article.16 Q. Thank you very much. That is 9th July. We know that17 during the course of that day you come to prepare an18 article in which the name Dr Kelly is identified. How


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19 was the name actually identified?20 A. I never got the name Dr David Kelly; my colleague,21 Michael Evans, the Defence Editor of The Times, got the22 name David Kelly.23 Q. He got the name. I understand he is going to come after24 you just to deal with that. So he gives you the name

25 and you then produced the article?

1321 A. We wrote the article together. There was some churn2 between different editions, in that a front page3 article -- the front page article we produced for the4 first edition then got squeezed down to a few5 paragraphs. Then we extended the inside piece to try to6 sort of tell our readers what this is all about, again7 really because I think it had become rather sort of8 anorak-ish. We had probably got so sort of caught up9 with the minutiae of the story, some of even The Times10 readers would have been sort of puzzled as to the finer

11 details of this.12 Q. Was that a reflection amongst journalists as a whole13 that this really was a dispute that had run its course14 before this development?15 A. I think by the time the name was actually disclosed16 interest was waning. I think you have heard already17 that there was some frustration within Government18 that -- certain parts of the Government anyway, that the19 name could not come out earlier; and a lot of journalism20 is about timing; and this -- I think that in a sense --21 this sense was that the heat was going out of this22 issue.23 Q. Right. Is there anything else that you know about the

24 circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you can25 assist his Lordship with?

1331 A. No, I am afraid there is not.2 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.3 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Evans please.4 MR MICHAEL STEPHEN JAMES EVANS (called)5 Examined by MR DINGEMANS6 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?7 A. Michael Stephen James Evans.8 Q. Occupation?9 A. I am a journalist on The Times.10 Q. How long have you worked for The Times?11 A. Since 1986.12 Q. We have heard from Mr Baldwin you were the man who13 actually, as far as The Times were concerned, got14 Dr Kelly's name. How did that come about?15 A. If I may, I will go back just slightly --16 Q. Yes.17 A. Effectively, I had been trying to get the name of the18 official for two days. I personally had never had any19 interest in seeking the source for Andrew Gilligan's20 story, although there was obviously tremendous interest21 in finding the source. I was quite interested in22 finding maybe the department where this information had23 come from but I was not interested in the source.24 However, when the Ministry of Defence statement was


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25 made it transformed everything completely. By then it

1341 was not a question of finding the BBC's source, it was a2 question of trying to identify the Ministry of Defence3 official who had come forward. In my view, that was two

4 separate things. Whether the man was the source or not5 was neither here nor there. The point was an official6 had come forward.7 So on July 8th and July 9th I had been engaged in8 trying to find out the name of this official; and I did9 it through all kinds of very conventional methods, as10 one of my colleagues earlier mentioned, checking the11 Civil Service year book, looking at my contacts book,12 ringing up contacts, speaking to various people I knew,13 speaking to the Ministry of Defence and, as has been14 published, I think in several newspapers, I came up with15 quite a lot of names, in fact 20-odd names. Many of16 them just came out of the Civil Service year book, which

17 I then passed to the Ministry of Defence and asked them18 to confirm whether they could confirm if any of them19 were correct.20 Q. How many names did you put to the Ministry of Defence?21 A. About 20 names I would guess.22 Q. So question 1, no; question 2, no. Where was Dr Kelly23 on that list?24 A. Well, Dr Kelly was not on that particular list.25 Q. So how do you get to his name?

1351 A. He is name number 21.2 Q. How many others did you have on that list?

3 A. Well, that is it. It is about 21 names.4 Q. There were 21 names?5 A. Clearly Dr Kelly was the last name.6 Q. And that was a Ministry of Defence press official?7 A. Absolutely, straightforward press department.8 Q. Had you asked any other questions of the Ministry of9 Defence press office at this stage?10 A. Yes, I did. I asked whether there was any background11 information on the official; and I was told quite a lot12 of things, most of which have already come out in13 the Inquiry. I do not think I learnt anything more than14 anybody else did.15 Q. But before you get to your 21 names you had already had16 conversations during the day asking, you know, the17 background, UNSCOM inspector, et cetera?18 A. Absolutely. The day before, July 8th, and July 9th.19 Q. So on July 8th you had conversations and were provided20 with some material?21 A. Yes.22 Q. Again, we do not need to know who it was but from the23 Ministry of Defence press office?24 A. Just straightforward. Not special contacts, just25 straightforward.

1361 Q. We have seen the defensive Q and A material, you have2 probably seen it a number of times on the screen --3 A. Indeed.


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4 Q. -- asking those sorts of questions and getting those5 sorts of answers.6 A. Absolutely.7 Q. Do you know on 8th July, when you were getting those8 sorts of responses back? I appreciate that time is very9 difficult, even after a month.

10 A. I do remember that July 8th was a fantastically busy day11 for me. I had a huge number of stories to write, in12 fact I counted five this morning when I checked. So13 I had a very, very busy day. So I was literally doing14 it in between everything else. I cannot put a time on15 it but I would have continued until probably about16 7 o'clock at night, maybe later.17 Q. Do you think any of these calls to the Ministry of18 Defence press office, which at least resulted in some19 information on 8th July, were made before lunchtime?20 A. No.21 Q. And before or after tea?22 A. I think it really would have been in the latter part of

23 the day, because I had too much to do for most of the24 day.25 Q. So early evening?

1371 A. It was not a major focus for my day. My focus was on2 other things that day, until, of course, the statement3 from the Ministry of Defence about the official, then of4 course that became a priority.5 Q. On 9th July you confirm the name in the circumstances6 you have given us. Do you recall what time that was?7 A. I recall between 6.30 and 7 o'clock. I know it was8 quite late in the day and there was not actually much

9 time to write to it before I had to leave to go to10 a very important official dinner engagement.11 Q. Is there anything else that you know of relating to the12 circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist13 his Lordship with?14 A. There is not at all. I wish there was, but there is15 not.16 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.17 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Broucher, please.18 MR DAVID STUART BROUCHER (called)19 Examined by MR DINGEMANS20 LORD HUTTON: Forgive me just a moment.21 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?22 A. David Stuart Broucher.23 Q. What is your occupation?24 A. I am a member of the Diplomatic Service and I am25 currently a Permanent Representative to the Conference

1381 on Disarmament in Geneva.2 Q. How long have you held that post for?3 A. Since September 2001.4 Q. Briefly, before that what was your previous role?5 A. I was the British Ambassador in Prague for four years6 before that.7 Q. What do you do as the UK's Permanent Representative to8 the Conference on Disarmament?9 A. To keep it short, and the thing that is relevant to this


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10 Inquiry is that I have been concerned with the11 implementation of the biological weapons convention.12 Q. Right. And in the course of that did you have any13 contact with Dr Kelly?14 A. Yes. I met Dr Kelly once in connection with my duties.15 To the best of my knowledge this meeting took place on

16 27th September, but there has been some difficulty17 confirming this because I was definitely in Geneva on18 that day and according to the Foreign Office travel19 records Dr Kelly was in New York. But we managed to20 establish this morning that he did not attend a meeting21 in Baltimore on 28th February that he was due to attend,22 so my feeling is that he probably returned to Geneva --23 to Europe early and that he came to Geneva, because24 I did see him there.25 Q. So the effect of all that is, doing the best you can,

1391 you think you met him on what day?

2 A. On 27th February.3 Q. Of this year?4 A. Of this year.5 Q. And why were you meeting Dr Kelly?6 A. We had tried to meet before, I believe on 8th November,7 but that had not proved possible. We wanted to talk8 about the verification of compliance with the biological9 weapons convention and I was keen to pick his brains10 because I knew that he was a considerable expert on11 these issues in relation to Iraq.12 Q. So the meeting in February 2003, and doing the best you13 can, you think in Geneva, is that minuted anywhere in14 your diary?

15 A. No, I did not minute it and it is not recorded in my16 diary because it took place at very short notice.17 I remember that Dr Kelly rang to say that he was in18 Geneva and he was going to pop in and see me.19 Q. About what time do you think he turned up, during the20 day?21 A. Probably around noon.22 Q. Right. Did you have a meeting with him?23 A. I did.24 Q. How long did the meeting last?25 A. About an hour.

1401 Q. You said you wanted to pick his brains. What were you2 discussing?3 A. We talked about the history of Iraq's biological weapons4 capability, about his activities with UNSCOM, about what5 he thought might be the current state of affairs, and we6 talked a little about Iraq and the biological weapons7 convention.8 Q. What view did Dr Kelly express about the Iraqi position9 in terms of preparedness?10 A. As far as I can recall, he felt that if the Iraqis had11 any biological weapons left it would not be very much.12 He also said that the -- I believe it is called the fill13 for the weapons would be kept separately from the14 munitions and that this meant that the weapons could not15 be used quickly.


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16 Q. Your concern was, you have obviously the disarmament17 conference and the BWC. What does the BWC mean?18 A. It is the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which19 forbids the states parties to manufacture, store or20 transfer biological weapons.21 Q. And did you discuss that with Dr Kelly?

22 A. Yes, I did. The particular issue is whether it is23 possible to verify compliance with the Convention by on24 site inspection.25 Q. And you discussed that with him?

1411 A. Yes, I did.2 Q. And what was his view?3 A. I think from his experience in Iraq his judgment was4 that you could gain quite a lot of certainty about5 compliance with the Convention because, in the case of6 Iraq, there were very precise written records about what7 they had made and destroyed. This was something he said

8 that they had learned from the British.9 Q. Was Iraq, at the time, a member of the BWC?10 A. He told me that Iraq did not ratify the BWC until 19 --11 if I may just refer to my notes.12 Q. I think it is September 1991.13 A. September 1991.14 Q. Was there an issue about whether or not Iraq would be15 chairing the Conference?16 A. There was an issue about whether Iraq should chair the17 Conference on Disarmament. It was their turn by18 alphabetical rotation but we were trying to prevent19 that, and I believe that we did.20 Q. And at this stage, we know that Resolution 1441 has been

21 passed and there had been further subsequent22 inspections; Dr Kelly was not part of that team.23 I think the Iraqis had objected to any British or24 American inspectors taking part.25 A. That is my understanding.

1421 Q. Did you discuss that with Dr Kelly?2 A. I did not discuss the fact that the Iraqis had objected3 to British inspectors, no.4 Q. No. Did you discuss whether or not inspections were5 going to be enough to deal with the situation?6 A. My recollection is that Dr Kelly felt that inspections,7 properly carried out, would give a degree of certainty8 about compliance.9 Q. In relation to this meeting, you have told us, I think,10 that you did not have a note in your diary. Do you have11 a clear recollection of this meeting?12 A. Yes, I do.13 Q. Did you then go on to discuss the possible use of force14 in Iraq?15 A. We did.16 Q. Can you tell us, in your own words, what was said?17 A. I said to Dr Kelly that I could not understand why the18 Iraqis were courting disaster and why they did not19 cooperate with the weapons inspectors and give up20 whatever weapons might remain in their arsenal. He said21 that he had personally urged -- he was still in contact


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22 with senior Iraqis and he had urged this point on them.23 Their response had been that if they revealed too much24 about their state of readiness this might increase the25 risk that they would be attacked.

143

1 Q. Did Dr Kelly say how he was in contact or not?2 A. He did not give any details of names or places or times;3 and I did not ask him that.4 Q. Did he say what he had said to those persons that he had5 contacted?6 A. He said that he had tried to reassure them that if they7 cooperated with the weapons inspectors then they had8 nothing to fear.9 Q. Which, as I understand it, was the position adopted by10 the United Nations.11 A. So I understand, yes.12 Q. And did he disclose how he felt about the situation?13 A. My impression was that he felt that he was in some

14 personal difficulty or embarrassment over this, because15 he believed that the invasion might go ahead anyway and16 that somehow this put him in a morally ambiguous17 position.18 Q. Did he say anything further to you?19 A. I drew some inferences from what he said, but I cannot20 recall the precise words that he used.21 Q. What inferences did you draw?22 A. Well, I drew the inference that he might be concerned23 that he would be thought to have lied to some of his24 contacts in Iraq.25 Q. Did you discuss the dossier at all in this conversation?

1441 A. We did discuss the dossier. I raised it because I had2 had to -- it was part of my duties to sell the dossier,3 if you like, within the United Nations to senior4 United Nations officials; and I told Dr Kelly that this5 had not been easy and that they did not find it6 convincing. He said to me that there had been a lot of7 pressure to make the dossier as robust as possible; that8 every judgment in it had been closely fought over; and9 that it was the best that the JIC could do. I believe10 that it may have been in this connection that he then11 went on to explain the point about the readiness of12 Iraq's biological weapons, the fact they could not use13 them quickly, and that this was relevant to the point14 about 45 minutes.15 Q. Did you discuss Dr Kelly's position in the Ministry of16 Defence?17 A. He gave me to understand that he -- it was only with18 some reluctance that he was working in the Ministry of19 Defence. He would have preferred to go back to20 Porton Down. He felt that when he transferred into the21 Ministry of Defence they had transferred him at the22 wrong grade, and so he was concerned that he had been23 downgraded.24 Q. Right. Did you have any other conversation with25 Dr Kelly that day?

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1 A. As Dr Kelly was leaving I said to him: what will happen2 if Iraq is invaded? And his reply was, which I took at3 the time to be a throw away remark -- he said: I will4 probably be found dead in the woods.5 Q. You understood it to be a throw away remark. Did you6 report that remark at the time to anyone?

7 A. I did not report it at the time to anyone because I did8 not attribute any particular significance to it.9 I thought he might have meant that he was at risk of10 being attacked by the Iraqis in some way.11 Q. And you, at the time, considered it to be a sort of12 general comment one might make at the end of13 a conversation?14 A. Indeed.15 Q. Where were you in July this year on about16 17th/18th July?17 A. I was on leave in Geneva.18 Q. And did you hear of Dr Kelly's death at all?19 A. I believe I heard about it on the television news.

20 Q. Right. And did you see a picture of Dr Kelly on the21 news?22 A. Yes.23 Q. What was your reaction to that?24 A. I recognised him, I realised that I knew him.25 Q. And as a result of that what happened?

1461 A. Nothing happened immediately because I was aware that2 I knew him but it was not until later that I became3 aware of the circumstances of his death and realised the4 significance of this remark that he had made to me,5 seemingly as a throw away line, when we met in February.

6 Q. Did you contact anyone about your recollection?7 A. Yes, I did, not immediately but when the Inquiry began8 on 1st August it seemed to me that I needed to make9 known this fact.10 Q. Can I take you to CAB/10/9? How did you make this fact11 known?12 A. I sent an e-mail to my colleague, the press officer for13 biological weapons in the Foreign Office, Patrick Lamb.14 Q. And you say to Patrick Lamb:15 "Is the FCO preparing evidence for the Hutton16 Inquiry?"17 We have heard from Mr Lamb:18 "If so, I may have something relevant to contribute19 that I have been straining to recover from a very deep20 memory hole."21 Is that right, that at the time your impression was22 that it was a throw away remark, and is it also fair to23 say that it was deeply buried within your memory?24 A. Yes, that is fair to say, and the other facts of the25 meeting took some time for me to remember; and it took

1471 a long time to establish when the meeting took place2 because it was not noted in my diary.3 Q. And can you just read to us the middle three paragraphs?4 A. Of that e-mail?5 Q. Yes.6 A. "In a conversation in Geneva which I think took place in


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7 late February, he explained to me that he thought that8 the Weapons Inspectors could have a good idea what the9 Iraqis had built and destroyed, because they (Iraqis)10 were inveterate keepers of written records, something11 they had, he thought, learned from us. There was12 a paper file on everything down to the smallest item.

13 "Kelly said that his Iraqi contacts had pointed to14 out to him that revealing too much about their state of15 readiness might well heighten the risk that they would16 be attacked. To gain their trust he had been obliged to17 assure them that if they complied with the Weapons18 Inspectors' demands they would not be. The implication19 was that if an invasion now went ahead, that would make20 him a liar and he would have betrayed his contacts, some21 of whom might be killed as a direct result of his22 actions. I asked what would happen then, and he23 replied, in a throw away line, that he would probably be24 found dead in the woods.25 "I did not think much of this at the time, taking it

1481 to be a hint that the Iraqis might try to take revenge2 against him, something that did not seem at all fanciful3 then. I now see that he may have been thinking on4 rather different lines."5 That e-mail that you sent to Mr Lamb, I think6 Mr Lamb brought to the attention of those within the7 Foreign and Commonwealth Office and indeed has not yet8 answered the question whether he knows of anything9 surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that10 he might assist his Lordship with, so that you can give11 this evidence.

12 Is there anything further that you can say or13 recollect relating to the meeting?14 A. No, I think we have covered everything.15 Q. In terms of strength of recollection, you have suggested16 that it was, as you thought at the time, a throw away17 remark and you have shown on the e-mail a very deep18 memory hole. Is that reasonable to characterise the way19 in which you had approached it at the time?20 A. I think what I meant by a deep memory hole was that21 these were events that -- this was a conversation that22 took place six months ago, and it had taken me some time23 to recall all the details of it.24 Q. Is there anything else that you know relating to the25 circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist

1491 his Lordship with?2 A. No.3 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Broucher.4 I think this would be a convenient time to take a break.5 (3.15 pm)6 (Short Break)7 (3.20 pm)8 MR LEE TERENCE HUGHES (called)9 Examined by MR DINGEMANS10 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?11 A. Lee Terence Hughes.12 Q. What is your occupation?


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13 A. I am a senior civil servant in the Department for14 Constitutional Affairs currently acting as Secretary to15 this Inquiry.16 Q. And in that capacity have you made requests for17 documents and received documents?18 A. Yes, I have.

19 Q. And the documents that have been referred to on the20 screen, have they been put on the web pages?21 A. Yes, they have.22 Q. Apart from?23 A. Apart from those which are referenced ISC, which stands24 for Intelligence and Security Committee.25 Q. And why have they not gone on to the website?

1501 A. We agreed with that Committee that we would not publish2 those documents until such time as the Committee had3 done so; and I understand that will be in the next few4 weeks.

5 Q. We have referred to a considerable number of documents6 so far. But are those all the documents that have been7 supplied to you?8 A. No.9 Q. And is it intended, from today, to put the other10 documents that have not yet been referred to on the11 website?12 A. For the most part, yes.13 Q. And there are exceptions. What are those?14 A. Of course the ISC, as I mentioned, documents will not be15 put on. Also there are a few, I think about three16 pages, that we will not place into the public domain for17 national security reasons.

18 There are other documents that we will either not19 place on the website or will redact, that is edit to20 remove certain information on personal privacy grounds.21 Q. What falls in that category?22 A. There are witness statements provided to the Inquiry.23 Q. Or notes?24 A. Or notes.25 Q. And those are not going to be put on the website?

1511 A. No, because any information relevant to the Inquiry2 would have been elicited by counsel during the course of3 the Inquiry.4 Q. Or we hope would have been elicited.5 A. We hope.6 Q. Chronologies that people have prepared?7 A. They are covered by that same exception.8 Q. And diaries that people have been requested to submit?9 A. Yes.10 Q. That is covered by that as well?11 A. Yes.12 Q. Is everything else going to go on the website?13 A. I should say also covered by that exception are other14 items of personal information that are on documents,15 home telephone numbers, that kind of thing we will edit16 out.17 Q. You will try to ensure those are removed?18 A. Absolutely, yes.


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19 Q. Subject to those exceptions, would all the other20 documents be available?21 A. There is one other exception, which is evidence received22 from Thames Valley Police, which contains a very great23 deal of personal information. We will be placing that24 on a website but it will probably take another week or

25 so for us to get through the editing process, because

1521 obviously we do not want highly personal information to2 be published.3 Q. That will also exclude witness statements as well?4 A. Absolutely, yes.5 Q. When is this process of putting the documents on the6 website going to start?7 A. Well, it is starting now, but the evidence will not be8 available until some time on Saturday. That is the9 intention. It simply takes that long for it to go10 through the process. There are a vast number of

11 documents.12 MR DINGEMANS: Right.13 Does your Lordship have any questions?14 LORD HUTTON: No.15 Thank you very much, Mr Hughes.16 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, that is the evidence for this week.17 LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much Mr Dingemans.18 We are now halfway through the first stage of this19 Inquiry. I will sit again next week on Tuesday20 26th August; and on that day evidence will be given by21 Mr Andrew Mackinlay MP, by Mr John Scarlett, the22 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, by23 Sir David Omand, the Permanent Secretary for Cabinet

24 Office.25 Then on Wednesday the 27th, evidence will be given

1531 by Mr Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence.2 Evidence will also be given by two officials in the3 Ministry of Defence who knew Dr Kelly well; and evidence4 will be given by Mrs Ann Taylor, the chairman of the5 Intelligence and Security Committee.6 On Thursday 28th August evidence will be given by7 the Prime Minister and by Mr Gavyn Davies, the chairman8 of the board of governors of the BBC, and by the9 journalist, Mr Tom Mangold. I will then rise, as usual,10 at the end of that Thursday afternoon.11 I will sit again on Monday 1st September; and on12 that day the Inquiry will hear evidence from members of13 Dr Kelly's family and from some friends of Dr Kelly.14 On Tuesday 2nd September evidence will be given by15 a number of persons who were concerned in the search for16 and the discovery of the body of Dr Kelly, by the17 pathologist who carried out the post-mortem and by18 Assistant Chief Constable Page of the Thames Valley19 Police, who will describe all the actions or summarise20 the actions taken by that police force. Evidence will21 also be given by some individual police officers.22 Also on Tuesday 2nd September evidence will be given23 by a psychiatrist who is being called to assist24 the Inquiry in its considerations.


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25 Then on Wednesday 3rd September evidence will be

1541 given by a member of the Baha'i faith.2 After that evidence has been given, that will be the3 end of the first stage of the Inquiry. I then, as

4 I have already indicated, propose to adjourn for a week;5 and I will be giving then, and of course a little6 earlier to that, consideration to what witnesses I wish7 to recall for further examination in the second stage8 and whether there are any additional witnesses whom9 I would wish to call.10 Then, the second stage of the Inquiry will commence11 on Monday 15th September, when I will hear a statement12 by counsel to the Inquiry and also statements by some13 other counsel who represent interested parties. I will14 then proceed to hear further evidence from the witnesses15 that I decide to recall or to call to deal with any16 further matters; and I will hope to hear closing

17 statements from counsel on or about Thursday18 25th September. That will bring the second stage of19 the Inquiry to an end and it will then take me some time20 to prepare my report.21 So, ladies and gentlemen, that is the timetable for22 the next few weeks.23 I will rise now and sit again at 10.30 on Tuesday24 morning.25 (3.35 pm)

1551 (Hearing adjourned until 10.30 am2 on Tuesday 26th August 2003)

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1561 INDEX2 PAGE3 MR DONALD ANDERSON (called) ...................... 1


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45 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 167 MR NICHOLAS RUFFORD (called) ..................... 6089 Examined by MR KNOX .......................... 60

1011 MR JAMES SIMON BLITZ (called) .................... 871213 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 871415 MR RICHARD SEYMOUR NORTON-TAYLOR ................. 10316 (called)1718 Examined by MR KNOX .......................... 1031920 MR PETER STUART BEAUMONT (called) ................ 1132122 Examined by MR KNOX .......................... 113

2324 MR THOMAS DANIEL BALDWIN (called) ................ 12625

1571 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 12623 MR MICHAEL STEPHEN JAMES EVANS ................... 1344 (called)56 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 13478 MR DAVID STUART BROUCHER (called) ................ 138

910 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 1381112 MR LEE TERENCE HUGHES (called) ................... 1501314 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 1501516171819202122232425

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hearing transcript - 21 august 2003 afternoon

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