heavy versus light forces - a middle ground

7/30/2019 Heavy Versus Light Forces - A Middle Ground

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The discussion over how the new light infantry unit should beentp[oyed is continuing. Is it best suited for low, mid or high-intensity warfare? Does it require more organic support, or areplugs the answer? What about mobility once it is deployed?[n this article, the author looks at some of these questions andpro-noses a solution.

THE infantry communitys interest inlight forces has had significant im-pact on the Armys programed force struc-ture. The decision to forgo the mechaniza-tion of another infantry division, the crea-tion of two new light infantry divisions andthe conversion of two other divisions repre-sent a major shift in emphasis.There have been a number of articles on

the use of light infantry in a mid to high-intensity environment. Some authors sug-gest the employment of light divisions in aEuropean environment, while others suggest that brigade or battalion-sized unitsmight be more easily integrated into aEuropean scenario:No one seriously questions the need for

light infantry in builtup areas where closecombat is the rule. This encompasses agood deal of Central Europe. But how isthe currently programed light infantrysupposed to move from one battle positionto another? I t is not going to walk fromtown to town. Air assault unifs do noteven have sufficient helicopters to jitter-bug acrossl the battlefield, let aIOne less-well-endowed light infantry. Besides,what is a battalion commander supposedto do on a rainy, foggy night with a tankdivision bearing down on him? Helicop-ters will perform many valuable func-tions, but picki~~up passengers underdirect fire fro~ massed enemy armor isnot one of themOur current mechanized infantry tac-

tics emphasize their mounted nature.Even when an M113 platoon dismounts,

the (armored personnel carrier) providesmost of the tire power.With the Bradley fighting vehicle, this

tendency increases. The infantry squidbecomes a curious marriage of a 3,000-

~ith theBradleyfightingvehicle . . . [the] itrfatrfrystyradbecomes acuriousmarriage Ofa3,W0.meter missilesysfenrwitha2tWmeter, small-armssystem,Thedismounted strength of aBradleycompany will bea&outha/f thestretrgthof its /ightinfanfry counterpart.

meter missile system with a 200-meter,small-arms system. The dismounted ~strength of a Bradley company will be,about half the strength of its light infantry~counterpart. With his mounts increased),:.,;, !antiarmor role, the emphasis on mobile tat-,tics and the need to avoid being fixed at:close range, the Bradley-mounted infan-!tryman E not likely to find his way to theclose terrain where his skills are moqtneeded.Perhaps the Bradley company might be

more appropriately viewed as missile-firing light armor with its own securityforce. When the opposing heavies fighteach other to a standstill on the high-speed approaches, who is going to tight theclose battle for the covered avenues? Who

MILITARY REVIEW s October 1986

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is going to man the strongpoints and repelthe close assaults or alternatively makethe assaults on enemy strongpoints? Is abattalion commander going to want torisk his high-value missile carriers atranges at which dismounted infantryassaults? How are company commanderssupposed to keep track of Bradleys in anoverwatch position 2,000 meters awaywhen his dismounted troopers are fightingfor their l ives against several times theirnumber?A full-strength Bradley squad dis-

mounts only six infantrymen. US doctrinecalls for the dismounted platoon to ma-neuver as a group as if it were an Over-strength squad. Mechanized infantry wasnot always configured this way. I n themid-1960s, the two teams iu a mechanizedinfantry squad were Alfa and Bravo fireteams, not the carrier and the dismountteams. Airborne, leg and mechanizedinfantry were all c,ensidered more similarthan dissimilar. The 1965 7-series fieldmanuals carried the subtitle Infantry,Airborne and Mechanized, Infantryfought i= infantry regardless of how theywere transported to battle,By the earIy 1970s, the doctrine

changed. Influenced by several foreignarmies, a transition was made to the con-cept of infantry fighting while mounted.Concentration was on the mobile fightbetween combat vehicles at extendedranges. Ml 6 rifles add little to this type ofengagement.The Soviets are well aware of the USpenchant for battle positions with long-

range fields of fire. They have re-empha-sized infiltration tactics through close ter-rain to penetrate forward positions. USexercises have pointed out this vulnerabil-ity. Infantry traveling through close ter-rain has been able to close with defensiveunits overmatching high-speed approach-es with little diffkulty.

Enter the infantryman. But how is hegoing to enter? Tro~ps without overheadcover are the most vulnerable system ofall. Tests conducted by the B undeswehrindicate that more than 95 percent of theinfantry would become casualties in a Sovi-et-type barrage: Bunkered light infantry isa formidable protected force, and thosesame tests predict less than 10 percent-casualties.Without the ability to maneuver, the

force is reduced to the crust defenses of the1940s. By employing firepower to create abreach and the mobility differentialbetween armor and foot infantry in exploi-tation, any contemporary tactician canmake short work of such positions over anextended front. A division sector, at bestone-thirtieth of the Central Front, is muchtoo large to expose to this risk. Even most10-kilometer brigade sectors are not likely ,l ight infantry candidates. But there are alot of battalion sectors and strongpointsthat are ideally suited to close-combatinfantry tactics.

ARMOREDmwmwwxsusMECHINFANTRY

Sometimes definitions clarify a point.Define armored infantry as infantrymounted in and fighting from heavilyarmed, armored vehicles. Bradley infan-try is armored-infantry. Mechanizedinfantry is light infantry that is trans-ported in lightly armored carriers. I t is1960s-era, twd-fire-team squad, Ml13-transported infantry. Like its air assaultcounterpart, it has a customary means oftransportation butfights at close quartersdismounted. Its


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Separating the[mechanized] infantry company fromitscarrierswould beastandard drill, Unhorsed, thecompanywouldbehavelikeany other infanhy company. Thecarrier sections could consolidateat battalion, besent off toanother task(perhapsprovidingmobility toalight unit) orsimplybe leftbehind.

(except in the improved TOW vehicle(I TV) company). I t fights in urban andheavily wooded terrain like any otherlight infantry but has the protected mobil-ity to move from one battle position toanother or from town to town in concertwith the mobile tactics envisioned in ourcurrent doctrine.Figure 1 shows the proposed organiza-

tion. Compare it to the light infantry bat-talion in Figure 2. The company antitanksection is eliminated. These spaces, withthe machinegun teams in the platoonheadquarters, provide the manpower forthe fourth squad in each platoon.Each squad has a Dragon and an M60machinegun. Because it has organic

transportation, it can carry the addedweapons. When dismounting, the platooncarries what it needs. I f the companydeploys without its carriers, it can deployeither Dragon or machinegun heavy,depending on the mission.The extra rifle squads maximize flexi-

bility and provide the element the heavy

MILITARY REVIEW o October 1986

community is currently missing. The four-squad platoon has the manpower neededto seize and hold close terrain.Separating the infant~ company from

its carriers would be a standard drill.Unhorsed, the company would behave likeany other infantry company. The carrierse,ctions could consolidate at battalion, besent off to another task (perhaps providin~mobility to a light unit) or simply be le~fbehind. The drill would be analogous tr#combat engineers reorganizing as infaq~ itry and would be practiced frequently. ~Careful analysis should be made of the

administrative vehicle structure. Mecha:nized units have a tendency to add supportvehicles over time. Light infantry uniiswill deploy with a very austere combatservice support structure. Mechanizedlight infantry can be similarly lightened.We have increased, battalion manpower

by about 100-40 carrier drivers, 50 main-tenance people and about 10 in the trans-portation section. But we have certairilyadded teeth. Compared to its foot-mobile,

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, l ight infantry counterpart, mechanizedlight infantry has one-third more riflesquads and twice the ground-mountedmachineguns, not counting the carrier-mounted 50-caliber machineguns. Dragontrackers are doubled and TO Ws quadru-pled.Given the emphasis on the opening bat-

tles of the next war, the trend to trade offnondivisional support for added deploya-ble combat units makes sense. We aretrading some sustainability for initialcombat power. The support spaces that areneeded to convert three battalions in eachof two divisions would require less head-

IWechanizedLightInfantryBattalion

,@mzQ @18 17VTOW12 MAW12 h46012 M113

k%chanizadLightInfantryCompanyAe eee1Qg1 M113 m- 03 k 10

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1M601 MAW1M113Figure 1

count than one Continental United States(CONUS)-based nondivisional engineerbattalion. Which will better enhance ourmobility and survivability in the openinqengagements?Mechanizing a light infantry unit is not

a etrap-on augment ation. It fundamen-tally changes the structure of line battal-ions. I t is clearly an organic change notamenable to a corps plug. We haveadded capability to the division.An alternative to fund the needed man-

power might be to eliminate a separateunit earmarked as a plug for the lightdivision. I doubt there are many division

light InfantryBattalion

c1lfC4107 mm Mortar E2!l

6 MAW

light InfantryCompany

Hlic.neadwrtersndkeadwarlwmmpwWNezdaua@ewlTWmpro,ed mwvih(cleMhw.raedlumotankweaponFigure 2

October 1986 * MILITARY REVIEW


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commanders who would prefer an aug-mentation that has not trained day by daywith his unit over organic capability,World War I I experience with generalheadquarters ,pool units reinforces thispoint. Divisions in Europe quickly latchedon to their nondivisional tank, antitankand antiaircraft battalions.The battalion, with fewer support

spaces and vehicles than its armoredinfantry counterpart, may be a libtle moredifficult to maintain. But the primarymission is not to closely follow fast-mOv-ing tank units. Mechanized light infantrywill spend a considerable amount of timeout of its vehicles and on the ground. I ttights as line infantry. It moves betweenfights at mechanized speed. I ts lightarmor protection allows it to move in theface ofkmall arms and artillery fragmentsthat can stop and destroy a foot-mobileunit.Mech infantry Becomes LightMechanized infantry can be assigned

any of the traditional light infantry rolesas it fights independently of its transpor-tation. Unlike its armored (Bradley) coun-terpart, it is not wedded to a 3,000-meter

. . . annorplate [has] itsadvan-tagesinalawtomedium.intensityfight. . . . anMl13.equippedforce isbetterahle tocany onextensivemountedpat#u//ing andcandosowithfewer casualties thanalightunif augmented withsomeHum.mere.Thiscouldmean thedifference between success and failure inalow-intensity policeactionLJrshowof force,

weapon. It is a close-combat, close-terrainforce.Unlike foot infantry, it can screen

extended frontages. This is especially crit-ical in the air-land battle as we concen-trate forces in decisive sectors. It hae beensuggested that light infantry be used in an :economy-of-force role to free heavies tomaneuver. Historically, this type of mis-sion was envisioned for highly mobile ,1armored cavalry. A relatively immobileunit covering an extended front is likely tobe overwhelmed.With the hordes potential opponents ~

can deploy in their assault echelons, it is a}flttle difficult to believe that sufficien},..combat units will be available to dedictatd ~.~some to rear area combat. However, mech -{anized light infantry, with its vehicularmobility, is much more suited for the roleof reaction force. Should helil ift be avah -ble, it can change mounts easily. 7L ight infantry missions will increase

with troop density. The need for holding jcovered approaches will increase as (hope-fully) the battle for high-speed approachesgrinds to a halt.Placing mechanized light infantry in

the CONUS-based North Atlantic TreatyOrganization-earmarked heavy divisions

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is an optimal method of integrating theminto the force. The substitution also re-duces the cost of POMCUS (pre-positioningof materiel configured to unit sets).Cross attachment of infantry units can

make a lot of sense. A mechanized lightinfantry company adds a lot of ground-holding and patrolling manpower to aBradley battalion. A Bradley companypositioned behind a mechanized lightinfantry battalion provides long-range,antiarmor tires. In both cases, the cross-attached force has the tactical mqbility forsynchronized action.Mechanized light infantry also increas-

es the flexibility of the heavies. Shouldwe find ourselves in another conflictinvolving large infantry formations, theseunits can be unhorsed and deployed.Remember, they are trained to fight asinfantry, not as mounted troops.fvlechLight Infantry Becomes HeawyOne need read only a few accounts of

Vietnam tiretights where armor plate wasavailable to gain an appreciation of its ad-vantages in a low to mid-intensity tight.The ividespread availabil ity of light anti-tank weapons means that any vehiclelighter than the Ml tank faces an ambushthreat from light forces. However, anMl13-equipped force is better able to carryon extensive mounted patrolling and can doso with fewer casualties than a light unitaugmented with some Hummers. Thiscould mean the difference between successand failure in a low-intensity police actionor show of force.A mechanized company adds a highly

mobile maneuver force to a leg lightinfantry battalion. It allows the battalioncommander to concentrate on the defensein a timely manner. On the offense, thecarriers allow rapid maneuver, increasingthe tempo of the attack.

PureLightInfantryHistQrically, light infantry operations

are mounted at battalion level and lower.Conventional tactics are no good forlight forces.L ight forces may be deployed at the

operational level of war, but they alwaysfight at the tactical level.Normally, l ight forces are ill-armed to

defend against armored vehicles, even inclose terrain.These quotations answer the question,

Is pure light infantry a tactical or opera-tional concept? Most light infantry con-cepts are tactical ones. Yet, a division is amajor subelement of an operational-levelformation. I ndividual battalions canemploy unconventional tactics. Divisionscannot.We may face a heavy opponent, or we

may face an opponent best countered by !the high tactical mobility of air assault.Strategically, mobile light infantry bat-talions and brigades may be needed asblocking units as our forces hurry acrossthe globe. Tactically, we may need them tohold strongpoints around which moremobile units maneuver. Butonly in excep-tional circumstances are we likely to needoperational-sized units that maneuver atboot-leather speed.Light infantry is manpower-intensive.

Unfortunately, this characteristic militatesagainst the United States supplying lightinfantry to an allied effort. No other coun-try can afford the density of high-cost, hlgh-technology systems the United Statesfunds. Conversely, the United States ismuch less willing to generate additionalmilitary manpower.True, light infantry lends itseif to air

assault tactics, especially in a ThirdWorld environment. But we are not add-ing helicopters commensurate with theneed to move the formations we are cr~ati

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ing. In an allied environment, infantrywill be in greater supply than helicopters.We do need the ability to act unilater.ally. But, in most of these scenarios, we

are talking about brigades, not corps.Among the Rangers, the airborne and theMarines, we have significant capability.

POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS

Stopping a sudden lunge by a heavilyarmored opponent in Central Europe isviewed as the Armys most demandingtask. It is also one of the least likely.The creation of light forces has been

viewed asa move to increase ourcapabil-ity to react to more likely scenarios in theThird World. We face the tradeoff betweencurabil ity torespond quickly to a distanttrouble spot and our ability to sustainheavy combat once we arrive.The light infantry division emphasizes

strategic mobility at the expense of fire-power and battlefield mobility. I t can beairlifted in about 500 C141 sorties. 1I t has been pointed out that it may be

able to deploy quickly, but it may not beable to survive once deployed. The lightinfantry division has neither the brigadeantitank companies of the airborne divisionno~the suft3cient organic 155mm artillery

Strategically, mobile lightinfantry battalions andbrigadesmayheneeded asblocking unitsaSour forcesfmrryacross thaglobe. Tat-,tics//y, wemayneed themtohold

stmngpoints around whichmoremobile unitsmaneuver. But only inexceptional circumstances arewelikely toneedoperational-sizedunitsthatmanetwerat boot-/eathersfleed. i

of the air assault division.Southwest Asia is the most distant and

difficult area for deployment. All of theindigenous armies and potential foesdeploy large armored formations. Whilemuch of the terrain is mountaino&, moreof it is suitable for mechanized movement.Third World nations everywhere are

increasingly heavily armed. The heavythreat is great, even in areas thought of asinfantry country. North Korea has 2,800 tanks, Cuba has 540 and Vietnam has2,500. One-third of the Nicaraguan armyis mechanized. 1Given our adversarys firepower, how, ~much foot-mobile light infantry do we

riced? SL 7 fast transports can sail from ~the East Coast to the Persian Gulf in 17, ,days. How much light infantry is going to ~be airlifted in behind the airborne? ~,~MIt is difficult to question the need for the ,

82d Airborne and the Ranger regimerit. ~They provide the capability to handle qwide range of threats from terrorism! toproviding tbe break-in force to enter ~hostile theater in a large conflict.But we are creating four light dfvisions

based in the 50 states, all with apparent ~

Lstrategic reserve roles. Are we lik ,Y toinsert a corps-size force by air? Even f wemove the assault elements, the sustainisupply tonnages and the follow-on forcekwill most certainly be delivered by sealifti.

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q Vietnameaa Wger scout and 9th Infantry Divialontroops (background) walfto ba exfracatad byUHIIJHueya, Long An Prodnca, 30 October 1968

Recent US military demonstrations inCentral America allowed sufficient timeto move materiel in by sea. One of thosedemonstrations was an exercise by aTexas National Guard armored unit.Replacing some light infantry battal-ions with mechanized light infantry cer-tainly adds to the divisions weight, It alsoadds a lot of capability. An ITV companywould be a welcome addition io an air-lifted light infantry unit facing an oppo-nent with armor and a tire support systemcapable of delivering a high explosive onantitank guided missile positions. At26,000 pounds, the ITV is easily trans-portable. By comparison, the Bradley is50,000 pounds, and the light armoredvehicle (LAV) is about 28,000 pounds.The Ml 13 represents an available and

relatively inexpensive mount. However,any vehicle that provides battlefieldmobility in the face of small arms andartillery fragments fits the concept. LAVS,wheeled armored vehicles and a plethoraof others may prove to be superior. But

*a

Infhe#tehmgOe/ta,he9fhDivision dismmmtedits mecha-nizadinfantfibattalion. But [even-tuaiiy], it depioyedan armoredcavahy regiment, amechanizedbrigadeandcavai~ squadrons. . .asweii as thewyanic armor ofseverai infantry divisions.. . . inaiowtomid-intensity envimn-menf, pmtectedmobiiityhasproved itsworth.

Ml 13s are here now with little strain onthe US treasury. With Gramm-Rudman-Hollings a reality, this becomes increas-ingly impdrtant.Replacing one-third of a divisions lightinfantry begs the question of its support-

ing artillery. The versati~ty of 155mmtubes almost dictates their use.If the light infantry unit deploys along-

side heavy units, TACFW?E (Tactical FireDirection System) will be very important.Without digital tire support communica-tions, the light unit will have great diffi-culty integrating into the fire support sys-tem of the heavy unit.Mechanized infantry is proposed to tilltwo requirements. First, it provides themanpower and close-combat capability tofight in urban and wooded close terrainthat is missing in long-range, engage-ment-oriented heavy forces. I t does sowhile retaining battlefield mobilityboththe ability to move at vehicular rates andthe ability tomove in the face of small-arms and artillery tire. ,1

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HEAVYVERSUS LIGHT

Second, mechanized infantry providesthelightciivision with a mobile force. ItsITVS add much-needed under armorantitank capability. By employing carri-ers in shifts, itispossible to move a largeportion of the parent light force by bounds.In meeting these two requirements, we

create a unit with improved versatility. Ifanything, history has taught us to expectthe unexpected. General purpose forceshave repeatedly proved their worthoften by performing roles their creatorsdid not foresee.Vietnam wasviewed as atypical light

infantry country. In the Mekong Delta,the 9th Division dismounted its mecha-nized infantry battalion. But, before itwas through, it deployed an armoredcavalry regiment, a mechanized brigadeand cavalry squadrons of the 1st and 2dArmored Divisions, as well as the organicarmor of several infantry divisions. Theywere among the last units withdrawn.

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Even in a low to mid-intensity envmon-ment, protected mobility has proved itsworth.Some mayobjec~to the lesseningcf

strategic mobility. Butwhataretheprob-abilities of need? We are more likely todeploy a large force by sea than by air.Any large force is likely to be engaged forextended periods. Thenumber of militaryoperations that have lasted a week is ove~-whelmed by the nuniber that have lastedmonths and years. Mechanized lightinfantry, if necessary, can deploy withoutmostor allof its carriers and receivethem as reinforcement. Substitutingmechanized light infantry for foot infan-try in one-third of the battalions adds atremendous amount of versatility andcombat power. Should we not organize forthe most likely requirementsustainedcombatand retain an option for tbeexceptionair deploymentrather thanconcentrate just onthe exception? %

NOTES1 Ma, OGee,al HW+Wd G Cr@,e!, Jr anOL,etenan, Coloe, Ja,ed Dev,d J 0,.,,, lnlanfv,n Dese Amor OPera,,ons Ann., seP$emb,,. ,L. Bales, He.wy+ght C.annectton D,,,,,.., lfantry, July-Agusl Oc!obe< 19831984, and Lieutenant Colonel Robe S K,llebrew, NATO De@,rence 9 L,eulenant Co,cmel Robe. G Chadrue Requew f. tlw lhltan. ,and L,ghl D,wsmn,, M,ltt.T Re!,w, MaY7985, PP2-15 M,y-June 1978, P 2 9

2 L,eutenan! Colonel Jack B Wood, Heavy-L, ght Conect,on Br,- 10 Eng,nee, Combat Operz,rons, Deoaament of the Army.gad., lfatry, July.Ag St 1984 )C ,1979 APP,6,x D

3 See, for examPle, F,eld Manual (FMI 100-5 0Per8tros, Oqme-,)co!t R McM#chael, Pro.ertEoilhe L#ght Infantry, M,l,fpy,

men! of the Army, Washington, D C P3-9 -. --. -?5 DP24.25and274 Coloe!W B,ce Mooeand Ma,oGlenn M Harneti, A,r A,,ault fThe L,ght Force in,t,at,ve, Mfa( Rev@v d. ,.,tho Deseti Howlo Fqh!, Mr/(fav Revtew, Jauav1985, PP43-605 FM 77-1, Tank and MechantzeO l. fantq Company Team (How to

F,ght), DePmlment of the Army, Wa#ungton, D C 30 June 1977, PP 5-27.

6 FM7-15, Rrf!. PleCoons .nd Sq.adslnfantT A,rbor.e and Mach.-,zad. De,adment olthe Arm,, WaShlnoton, DC ,1965

$ry Ifmtv, h10 FM 5-101

Wash, gton, D11 Ma,o, sc

Review, sep!e,l,..! !,..12 Wtll,arrIJ 01s,, 1

1985,03 The US A,r Fmcehas 271 C7418,7 ;.,.,.,-,14 The Mwfaryt?ala.ce, 7984.85 Thel.ternat!on.a !n.t,!.tefor?!p?!{,

leg,. S1.6,,s, band.., Eng15 L,eulenat General Jultan J Ewel! a.d Ma,or General (WA Hunt :

J,. Vrelnam S1dSes SharDe!nQ fhe Combat EOoe The Useot AaWs,, 7 C N Donnelly, So.,it Tactics ior O.ercom#.g NATO Antltimk foRe,lorce Mtl,tsV Jdgme!,-US Govern meni?l$ng Olf#ce, W;$h- !

De f eses; lntemet,onal Delense Rev,ew Ju1Y1979 mgton, OC v374, PP 16-178 Cap!e,n GregOv Fonlenot and Captain Mallnew D R.hens, Plug. 16 Sbelby L S1aton V,etnam Orde, of Battle US News B+ka,

9,.9 Holes a.d Me.d,,9Fe.ces 1. fantV. May-June 1978, and M8)or Washington DC ,1981 P334 t/ \ >

MILITARY REVIEW c October 1986

heavy versus light forces - a middle ground

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