hegel - philosohy of right

8/2/2019 Hegel - Philosohy of Right

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Preface

The immediate occasion for me to pubish this outine is the need to

provide my audience \ith an inoducon to the ectures on the

Philoophy o igh which I deiver in the course of my ofcia dues.JThis textbook is a more extensive, and in parcuar a more systemac,

exposion of the same basic concepts which, in reaon to this part of

phiosophy, are aready contained in a previous work designed to

accompany my ectures, namey my Ecopedi o he PhiloophiclScience (Heideberg, 1817).2

The fact that this outine was due to appear in print and thus to

come before a wider pubic gave me the opportuni to ampi in it

some of those emk whose primary purpose was to commentbriey on ideas [Voelg] ain to or divergent from my own, onrther consequences of my argument, and on other such matters as

woud be propery eucidated the ectures themseves I have ampi

ed them here so as to cari on occasion the more absact contentsof the text and to take fuer account of reated ideas [Voellgen]which are current at the present me. As a resut, some of these

Remars have become more extensive than the aim and se of a

compendium woud normay ead one to e'ect. A genuine com

pendium, however, has as its subject-matter what is considered to be

the enre compass of a science; and what disnguishes it apart,

perhaps, from a minor addion here or there is above a the way in

which it arranges and orders the essena eements [Momene] of acontent which has ong been famiiar and accepted, just as the form in

which it is presented has its rues and convenons which have ong

been agreed But a phiosophica outine is not expected to conform to

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tis patte, if only because it is iagined tat wat pilosopy putsforard is as epemeral a product as Penelope's weaving, wc is

begun afres eve day3It is certainly ue tat te prmary difference between te presentouine and an ordinary compendium is te metod wic constutesits guiding principle. But I am ere presupposing tat te philosopcal manner of progressing from one topic to anoter and of conducting a scienc proof tis enre speculave mode of cognion isessenally dierent from oter modes of cognon.4 Te realizaontat suc a dierence is a necessary one is te only ting wc cansave pilosopy from te samel decline into wc it as fallen inour mes. It as indeed been recognzed tat te forms and rules ofte older logic of denon, classicaon, and inference whciclude te rules of te understandings cognon [Vtaneekenntni], are inadequate for speculave science. Or rater,teir inadequacy as not so muc been recognized as merely felt, andten te rules in queson ave been cast aside, as if tey were smplyfetters, to make way for te arbiary pronouncements of te eart, offantasy, and of conngent intuion; and since, in spite of tis, relec

on and relaons of tougt ineitably also come into play, tedespised metod of commonplace deducon and raocinaon isunconsciously adopted. Since I ave lly developed te nature ofspeculave knowledge in my Science of Loc, I ave only occasionallyadded an explanatory coent on procedure and metod in tepresent outline. Given tat the subject-matter is concrete andiherently of so varied a nature, I ave of course omitted todemonsate and bring out te logical progression in eac and every

detail. But on te one and, it gt ave been considered superuous to do so in vew of te fact tat I ave presupposed a familiariwt sinc metod; and on te oter, it will readily be noced tatte work as a wole, like e consucon ubiug] of its parts, isbased on te logical spirit It is also ciely from tis point of view tatI would wis tis ease to be understood and judged. For wat itdeals wit is cience, and i science, the content is essenally inseparable from te .

It is ue tat we may ear it said by tose wo seem to adopt temost toroug approac tat form is a purely exteal qual, indifferent to the matter [Sae] itsel wic is alone of consequence;rtermore, the task of the writer, especially te pilosopcal writer,

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may be said to consist in the discovery of tth the statement oftth and the disseminaon of tth and correct concepts.6 But if we

consider how this task is actually performed, we see on the one handhow the same old brew is reheated again and agai and sered up toaland sundry - a task that may not be without its merits n educangand arousing the emoons, though it might sooner be regarded as thesuperluous product of overzealous acvi - 'for they have Mosesand the prophets; let them hear them.7 Above all, we have ampleopportuni to wonder at the tone and pretenousness that can bedetected in such witers, as if all that the world had hitherto lackedwas these zealous disseminators of uths, and as if their reheated

brew contained new and unheardof uths which ought, as teyalways claim, to be taken parcularly to heart, above all at the presentme. But on the other hand, we can see how whatever uths of thiskind are handed out by one par are displaced and swept away byuths of precisely the same kind dispensed by other pares Ad if,amidst this jumble of uths, there is something that is neither old nornew but enduring, how can it be exacted from these formlesslyluctuang relecons - how can it be disnguished and veried other

than by cientc means?The tth conceg ght ethic ad the tate is at any ratea old as

its oitio ad pomulgatio in public law ad in public moality adeligo. Wat more does this uth require, inasmuch as the thinkingmnd [Geit] is not content to possess it in this promate manner?What it needs is to be compehended as well, so that the content wchis already raonal in itself may also gain a raonal form and therebyappear jused free g. For such ng does not stop at

what i , whether the latter is supported by the exteal posiveauthori of the state or of mutual agreement among human beings, orby the authority of inner feeling and the heart and by the tesmony ofte spirit which immediately concurs with this, but starts out fromitself and thereby demands to know itself as united in its innermostbeing with the truth.

The simple reacon [Vehalten] of ingenuous emoon is to adherewith usng convicon to the publicly recognized uth and to baseones conduct and ed posion in life on this rm foundaon. Butthis simple reacon may well encounter the supposed difcul ofhow to disnguish and discover, among the iite ae o opiiowhat is universally acknowledged and valid in them; and this perplex

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i may easily be taken for a just and genuine conce with the matter[Sach itself. But in fact, those who pride themselves on this perplex

ity are in the posion of not being able to see the wood for the eesand the only perplety and difculty that is present is the one theyhave themselves created; indeed, this perple and difcul israther a proof that they want something other than what is universallyacknowledged and valid, something other than the substance of theright and the ethical. For if they were genuinely conceed wi thelatter and not with e van and paculaty of opinions and beingthey would adhere to the substanal right, namely to the comandments of ethics and of the state, and regulate their lives accordingly. -A rther difcul arises, however, from the fact that human beingsthnk and look for their freedom and the basis of ethics i [the realmo thought But however exalted, however diine this right may be, itis nevertheless ansformed into wrong if the only criterion of thoughtand the only way in which thought can know itself to be free is theextent to which it vee om what unveay aknowlege anval and manages to invent something pacula for itself.

The noon [Votellg] that eedom of thought, and of spirit

general, can be demonsated only by divergence from and evenhosli towards, what is publicly acknowledged might seem to bemost rmy rooted nowadays in elaton [Bezeg] to the tate; for thisvey reason it ight seem to be the essenal task of a phiosophy ofthe stte to invent and propound yet anothe theo and specicay anew and parcular theo. If we examine this noon [Votelg] andthe aci that is associated with it we might well imagine that nostate or constuon had ever preiously ested or were in estence

today, but that we had now (and this 'now is of indenite duraon) tostart right from the beginning, and that the ethical world had beenwaing oy for such intellectual consucons discoveries, andproofs as are now avaiable. As far as natue is conceed it is readiyadmitted that philosophy must recoe it a t that the phiosophers stone lies hidden omewhee but wth atue te thatnaure is atonal wthn te and that it is this actual reason presentwithin it which knowledge must invesgate and grasp conceptually -not the shapes and conngencies which are isible on the surface, butnaures eteal harony conceived however as the law and essencemmanet within it e ethcal wo on the other hand e state, orreason as it actualizes itself in the element of selfconsciousness, is

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not supposed to be happy in the kowledge that it is reason itself

which has in fact gained power and authority Ge] within this ele-

ent, and which asserts itself there and reains inherent wiin it.'

Aiio ( There are to knds of laws, laws of nature and laws ofight: the laws of natre are simply there and are valid as hey stand: theysuer no diminuon, although they may be infringed n indivdual casesTo kow what the law of nature is, we must faliarze ourselves wthnatre, for these laws are correct and it is only our noons Voe!]conceg them which may be false. The measure of these laws isexteal to us, and our cognion adds nothng to them and does notadance them: it is oly our cognion of the which can expand Kow-ledge is of ight is one respect simlar to hs and in anotherrespect dierent. We get to know the laws of rght n just he same way,simply as they are; he cizen knows them more or less in this way, andthe posie urist also stops shot at what is gien But the dierence isthat, wth the laws of right, the spit of reecon comes nto play andther ve diversity draws atenon to the fact that they are not absolute.The laws of ght are something id o somehng ee o humanbeings. It necessarly follows that our inner voice may either come tocollision wth them or concur with em. The human being does not stop

sho at e estent seiee], but clams to have wthin hmselfthe measure of what is rght; he may be subected to the necessi andpower of exteal authoi, but neer the same way as to naturalnecessi, for his inner self always tells him how things ought to be, and hends wthn hmself the conmaon or repudiaon of what is acceptedas valid. In natre, the highest uth is that a law ss in laws ofright, however, he thng e is not ald because it ests; on theconary, eeone demands that it should match hs own criteron. Thusa conct may arse beteen what s and what ought to be, beteen the

ight whch has beg in and for tself, which remains unaltered, and thearbiay determnaon of what is supposed to be accepted as ight. Adisuncon and conict of this knd is found oly in the sphere o ofthe spir, and since the prerogave of the sprit thus seems to lead todiscord and unhappiness, we often tu away om the arbiarness oflifeto the contemplaon of nature and are inclned to take the later as amodel. But these very discrepancies Gese] between that right whichhas being in and for ielf and what arbiarness proclams as ight makeit imperave for us to lea to recognze precisely what ght s. In rght,

Transators note Gst d Betraun; oho's noes, on whch Gans based hs Add-on smpl read Gest spr': see VPR l, 9.

bTransator note: De Rechgesee snd Gesettes egel plas on he smlar o heword Gmt law and Gettes someng lad down or posed.

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The siitual universe is sused rather t be at the ercy fcnngency and arbiariness, t be ore s that, accrding t

this atheis f the ethical wrld, h lies oue it, and at the saee, since reasn is nevertheless o sused t be resent in it,uth is nthing but a rble ut, we are tld, this very circustance juses, indeed bliges, every thinker t take his wn iniave,thugh nt in erh ofthe hilshers stne, fr this search is adesueruus by the hilshizing f ur es and everyne,whatever s cndin, can be assured that he has this stne in hisgras Nw it des adttedly haen that thse wh live within theactuali f the ste and are able t sas their kwledge andvlin within it - and there are any f the, re in fact thantnk r knw it, fr bi this includes eone - r at least thsewh onou nd sasfacn witn the state, laugh at such iniatives and assurances and regard the as an e gae, nw reausing, nw re serius, nw leasing, nw dangerus This restless acvi f vain relecn, alng with the recen and resnse it

the huan being ust encunter s w reasn he ust therefrecsider the ranali f ight, and this is the business f ur science, incnast ith sive urisrudence, which is en cnceed nly withcnadicns esides, the resentday wrld has a re urgent need fsuch an invesgan, fr in lden es there was sll resect andveneran fr the esng beehen law, whereas the culture if the resent age has taken a new diecn, and thught has adted aleading rle i the fan f values Theries are ut frard insin t what already ests eienn theries which seek t

aear crrect and necessary in and fr emselves Fr nw n, ereis a re secial need t recgize and crehend e thughts f ightSince thught has set itself u as the essenal f, we ust attet tgras right, t, in terms f thught f thught is t take recedence verright, this wuld see t thrw en the dr t cnngent inins butgenuine thught is nt an inin abut sething ie e but thecncet f the thing e itself The cncet f the thig des ntce t us by nature Eveyne has ngers and can take a brush andaint, but that des nt ake hi a ainter t is recisely the sae \vi

g The thught f right is nt, fr eale, what evebdy knwsat st hand n the cnay, crrect thiking is knving eand recgnizing the thing, and ur cgin shuld therefre bescienc

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encounters, might be regarded as a separate issue [Sae] developingindependently in its ow disnct way, were it not that philoophy in

general has ncurred a kinds of contempt and discredit as a result ofsuch behaiour. The worst kind of contempt it has met with is , asalready menoned, that everyone, whatever his condion, is connced that he knows all about philosophy in general and can passjudgement upon it. No other art or science is eated with thisulate degree of contempt, namely the assumpon that one can takepossession of it ouight.

In fact, what we have seen the phlosophy of recent mes proclaiming with the uost pretension in relaon to the state has no doubtentled anyone who wshes to have a say in such matters to the beliefthat he could just as well do the same thing on his own account, andthereby prove to himself that he was in possession of phosophy any case, this self-sled philosophy has expressly stated that tthite caOt be kO [ekannt], but that uth consists in what wel upom each individual' heat emotion and thuiam in relaon to ethical subjects, parcularly in relaon to the state, goveent, andconston What has not been said in this connecon to atter the

young in parcular?8 And the young have certanly taken note of it.The sayg 'for he giveth to his ow in sleep has been applied toscience, so that all sleepers have counted themselves among thechoen; but the concepts they have acqued in their sleep have ofcourse boe the marks of their origin9 A leader of this supercialbrigade of so-called phlosophers, Herr Fries, had the temeri, at asolemn public occasion which has since become notorious,!} to putfoard the following idea [Votelung] in an address on the subject of

the state and constuon: 'In a people among whom a genuinecommunal spirit prevails, all business relang to public aairs wouldgain its l om below om the people ite living sociees, steadfastlyuted by the aced bOd of fendhip would dedicate themselves toevery single project of popular educaon and popular serce; and soon. The chief tendency of this supercial philosophy is to basescience not on the development of thought and the concept, but onmmediate percepon and conngent maginaon; and lkewse, to

reduce the complex nner arculaon of the ethical, ie. the state, thearchitectocs of its raonali which, through determnate disnc-

Hg 's Ol I have esed esehere o he supercal o hs scence: see my Sc/Logic berg 82 Inoducon p. X

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ons beteen the various spheres of public life and the righs [Beect] they are based on, and through the sict proporons in

which every pillar, arch, and butess is held together, produces thesength of the whole om the harmony of is parts - to reduce thisrened ebit] sucture to a mush of 'heart, iendship, andenthusiasm2 According to this noon [Voteung], the ethicalworld, like the universe of Epicurus, should be given over to thesubjecve conngency of opinions and arbiariness; but of coursethis i not the case13 y the simple household remedy ofatibung toeg what reason and its understandg have laboured to produceover several thousand years, all the ouble involved in raonal insightand cognion, guided by the g concept, can of course beavoided. Goethes Mephistopheles - a good authori - says much thesame thing in lines which I have also quoted elsewhere:

Do but despise reason and scence,The highest of a huan gi -Then you have surrendered to he devind ust surey persh/

he next step is for this view to assume the guise of pie as well; forwhat lengths has such behaviour not gone to in order to lend itselfauthori! y means of godliness and the ible, however, it haspresumed to gain the supreme juscaon for despising the ethicalorder and the objecvi of the laws For it is surely also piety whichenvelops in e simpler intuion of feeling that uth which, in theworld itself, is diversied into an organic realm ut if it is the rightkind of pie, it abandons the form of this [emoonal] region as soon

as it emerges from [the condion o] inwardness into the daylight ofthe Ideas development [Entg] and manifest abundance, andit brings \vith it, om its inner worship of God, a reverence for thelaws and for a uth which has being in and for itself and is exaltedabove the subjecve form of feeling

he parcular form of bad conscience which beays itself in thevainglorious eloquence of this supercial philosophy may beremarked on here; for in the rst place, it is precisely where it is at its

mot piite that it has most to say about piit where its talk is driestand most lifeless that it is freest with the words life and 'enliven, andwhere it shows the uost selshness of emp arrogance that it mostoen refers to the 'people ut the disncve mark which it carries

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on its brow is its haed of law. That right and ethics, and the actualworld of right and the ethical, are grasped by means of thought and

give themselves e form of raonali - namely uiversali anddeternacy - by means of oughts, is what consutes the aw; and itis t which is jusably regarded as the main enemy by that feelngwhich resees the right to do as it pleases, by that conscience whichidenes right wth subjecve convicon The form of it as a duand a aw is felt by it to be a dead cod ette and a hacke; for it doesnot recognize itself in the law and thereby recognize its own eedomin it, because the law is the reason of the tng [Sache] and reasondoes not allow feelng to warm itself in the glow of its on parculari [Pakuatt] The aw is therefore, as I have remarkedelsewhere in the course of ths textbook,S the chief shibboleth bywhich the false brethren and iends of the socalled 'peopl givethemselves away

Since this arbiary sophisy has usurped the name of phioophyand persuaded a wide public that such acvies are philosophy, it hasalmost become dishonourable to connue to speak philosophcallyabout the nature of the state; and rightminded [etiche] men can

not be blamed if they grow impaent as soon as they hear talk of aphilosophical science of the state. There is even less cause for surprise that goveents have at last diected their attenon to suchphilosophizing, for philosophy with us is not n any case pracsed as aprivate art, as it was with the Greeks, for example, but has a publcestence [Exitenz], mpinging upon the publc, especially - or solely- in the serice of the state Goveents have had enough condence in those of their scholars who have devoted themselves to this

subject to leave the development ubidg] and import of phlosophy enely to them - ganted that here and there, they may havedone so not so much out of condence in science as out of indifference towards it, retaiing teaching posts in philosophy only forreasons of adion ust as in France, to the best of my knowledge,chairs of metaphysics at least have been allowed to lapse) But theircondence has frequeny been l repaid, or alteavely, if they arethought to be movated by indifference, the resultant decay of

thorough knowledge [EkentIi] should be regarded as the penalfor this indifference It may iially appear that this supecial philosophy is emineny compable at least ith outard peace and order,in that it never manages to touch the substance of ings [Sachen], or

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even to suspect ts estence t ou thus have no cause to fearpoce ntervenon at east ay f t ere not that the state aso

contane the nee for a eeper eucaon an nsght an emanethat ths nee be sase by scence But superca phosophy easautomacaly as far as the ethca [or] an rght an u ngenera are concee to those prncpes hch constute supercal ths sphere namey the prncpes of the Sopht as e nthem so ceary escrbe by PatoJ6 These prncpes en hat srght th ubjete end nd opnon, th ubjee en nd prr rkure] onton, an they ea to the esucon of nerethcs an the uprght conscence of ove an rght among prvatepersons as el as the esucon of pubc orer an the as of thestate The sgncance hch such phenomena Ehe] mustacqure for goveents can scarcey be reuce for exampe by thecam that the very conence shon by the state an the authorty ofan ofca poson are enough to arrant the eman that the stateshou accept an gve free ren to hat corrupts the substanasource of a ees namey unversa prncpes an shou evenalo tsef to be ee as f such eance ere enrey proper If

Go gves someone an oce he aso gves hm sense Vetnd] san o chesut hch scarcey be taken serousy by anyonenoaays.

In the mportance hch crcumstances have agan e goveentsto attach to the ay n hch phosophers conuct the busnessthere s no mstakng the fact that the sy of phosophy no seemsn many other respects to requre an eement Mome] of proteconan encouragement. For n so many pubcaons n the e of

the posve scences as el as n orks of regous ecaon another etermnate terature the reaer encounters not ony thatcontempt for phlosophy hch I have areay referre to n thatthe very peope ho revea that ther nteectua eveopmentGedkenbd] s exemey retare an that phosophy s competey aen to them aso eat t as somethng they have she anone th beyon ths e aso n at such rters expressypugn phosophy an ecare ts content the oneptu oton oJ

God an of physca an sprtua nature the oton oJ tth, to be afoosh ee sn presumpon an that reon, an agan re,an n eness repeon reon s arragne bette an conemne Or at the very east they et us see ho for a arge prop or

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on of those engaged in supposedly scienc study, the claims of theconcept constute an embarrassment from whch they are neverhe

less unable to escape. If, I say, one is confronted ith suchphenomena Ehee], one might almost begin to suspect hatadion is om h po oJ no longer worthy of respect norsufcient to garantee oerne and a connued public estencee] to the stdy of philosophy.8 - The declamaons andpresumptous outbursts against philosophy wch are so common inour me aord the peculiar spectacle on the one hand of being n theright, by vrtue of that superciali to wch phlosopcal science hasbeen degraded, and on the other of hemselves being rooted in thevery element against which they s ungratefully t. For by declaringthe cognon of uth to be a fule endeavour, ts selfsledphilosophizing has reduced all thoughts and all topics o he me e,just as the deposm of the Roman emperors reoed dnonbeteen paicians and slaves, virtue and vice, honour and dishonour,and knowledge Kenn] and ignorance.2 A a result, he concepof uth and the laws of ethics are reduced to mere opinons andsubjecve convicons, and the most criminal principles - since they,

too, are ono are accorded the same status as those laws; and inthe same way, all objects, however barren and parcular rkur],and all materials, however arid, are accorded the same stats as whatconsutes the interest of all ng people and the bonds of theehical world.

It should therefore be considered a soke ofoounefor science- although in fact, as I have already menoned,2 it is a neeonequee of the hn he] itself - that ths philosophizing, wch

could well have connued to spin itself into its own web of hoom, has come into closer contact with actali, in which theprinciples of rights and dues are a serious matter, and whch lives in

Hegel noe: I was reminded of such iews on reading a letter ofJohannes von Mller(Werke [Tbingen, 1810-19], Part V, p. 56), where he says of the condion ofRome in1803 when the city was under French rle: 'Asked how the public educaonal instuons were faring, a professor replied: "On les tolre comme les bordels. 19 One cansll even hear people recommeng so-called raonal theo [Vunlehre] i.e. loc,perhaps in the belief that no one in any case bothers about it any longer as a dr andunfruil science, or that, if this does happen now and again, those who stdy it wndonly vacuous formulae, neither bnecial nor demental, so that the recommendaoncannot possibly do any harm even if it does no good either

Tralaor's noe: They are tolerated, like the brothels

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the ght of its consciousness of these principles and that a pubsplithas consequently resulted between the to It is this e retion of

phiosophy to ui which is the subject of misunderstandings and Iaccordingly come back to my earlier obseraon that since philosophy is ortion of the rtion, it is for that very reason the omprehesion of the preset nd the u, not the setng up of a wod bondwhich ests God knows where or rather of which we can very wellsay that we know where it ests namely in the errors of a onesidedand emp raocinaon. the course of the following ease I haveremarked that even Platos Rubi, a proverbial example of an p

i,is essenally the embodiment of nothng other than the nature

of Greek ethcs; and Plato aware that the ethics of his me werebeing peneated by a deeper principle which wthin ts contextcould appear immediately only as an as yet unsased longing andhence only as a desucve force was obliged in order to counteractit to seek the help of that very longing itself ut the help he requredhad to come om above and he could seek it at rst only in aparcular ext form of Greek ethics. y this means he imaginedhe could overcome the desucve force and he thereby inlicted the

gravest damage on the deeper drive behind it namely ee innitepersonality ut he proved his greaess of spirit by the fact at thevery principle on which the disncve character of his Ide ts isthe pivot on which the impending world revoluon ed

What is raonal is actal;and what is actual is raonal

his convicon is shared by every ingenuous consciousness as well as

by philosophy and the latter takes it as its point of departre inconsidering both the spitu and the ntur universe If reecon

r form the sub ve consciousness e-' regards the preset as vain and looks beyond it m a sp of superior

knowledge, it nds itself i a vain posion; and since it has actualionly in the present, it is itself mere vani. Conversely, if the Ideaisseen as 'only an idea, a representaon [Vorstelmg] in the realm ofopinion, philosophy aords the opposite insight that nothing is actual

except the Idea. For what matters is to recogein the semblance ofthe temporal and ansientthe substance which is imanent and theeteal which is present For since the raonal, which is synonymouswth the Idea, becomes actual by entering into exteal estence

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[Exsten] it emerges in an innite wealth of forms, appearances, andshapes and surrounds its core wth a brightly coloured covering in

which consciousness at st resides, but which ony the concept canpeneate in order to nd the inner pulse, and detect its connuedbeat even thn the eteal shapes. But the innitely varied circumstances which take shape within this eteali as the essencemanifests itself within it, this innite material and its organizaon, arenot the subjectmatter of philosophy. To deal with them would be tointerfere in thigs [D1ge] with which philosophy has no conce, andit can save itself the ouble of giving good advice on the subject. Platocould well have refrained from recommending nurses never to standsll wth children but keep rocking them in their arms; and Fichtelikewise need not have perfected his passpo ulatons to the point of'consucng, as the epression ran, the requirement that the passports of suspect persons should carry not only their personal descripon but also their painted lkeness deliberaons of this kind, noace of philosophy remains, and it can the more readily absta fromsuch uawisdom because it is precisely in relaon to this innitemultde of subjects that it should appear at its most liberal. ths

way, philosophical science wlalso show itself rthest removed omthe haed which the va of superior wisdom displays towards amultde of circumstances and instuons - a haed in which petness takes the greatest of pleasure, because this is the oy way inwhich it can attain selfesteem [Selbstgh.

This ease, therefore, in so far as it deals with polical science,shall be nothing other than an attempt to comprehend a1d porray thestate as a1 1herently rato1al ent. A a phosophical composion, it

must distance itself as far as possible om the obligaon to consucta state as t ought to be; such insucon as it may contain cannot beaimed at inscng the state on how it ought to be, but rather atshowng how the state, as e ethical universe, shoud be recognized.

I 6 [ x H.Hi Rhodus, h salts.24

To comprehend what s is the task of philosophy, for what s is reason

As far as the indivdual is case atoo, is ts O1 tme comprehended 1 It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy cananscend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap

2 1


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Posopy ofRg

his own me or leap over Rhodes.25 If his theory does indeedanscend his own me, if it builds itself a world s it ouht to be, then

it certainly has an exstence, but only within his opinions a pliantmedium in which the can consuct anything it pleases.

With little alteraon, the saying just quoted would read:

H s the rose, dance h.6

What lies between reason as self-conscious spiit and reason as

present actua, what separates the former from the latter andprevents it om ndng sasfacon in it, is the fetter of some absac

on or other which has not been liberated into [the form o theconcept. To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present7

and thereby to delight in the present this raonal insight is theeonilition with actualty which plosophy grants to those who havereceived the inner call to ompehend to preseve their subjecvefreedom in the realm of the substanal, and at the same me to standwith their subjecve freedom not in a parcular and conngent situaon, but in what has being in and for itself.

Tis is also what constutes the more concrete sense of what was

described above in more absact terms as the uni ofn Id otent.For in its most concrete signicance is reason as conceptualcognion, and ontent is reason as the substanal essence of bothethical and natural actuali; e conscious iden of the two is thephilosophical Idea. It is a great obsnacy, the kind of obsnacywhich does honour to human beings, that ey are ung toacknowledge in their attudes Gesi] anhing which has notbeen jused by thought and this obsnacy is the characterisc

proper of the mode age, as well as being the disncve principleof Protestansm. What Luther inaugurated as faith in feeling and inthe tesmony of the spirit is the same thing that the spirit, at a moremature stage of its development, endeavours to grasp in the CoCt soas to free itself in the present and thus nd itself therein. It hasbecome a famous sang that a half-philosophy leads away from God'

and it is the same half-measure which denes cognion as anppimtion to the uth whereas ue philosophy leads to God'/8

the same apples to phlosophy and the state. Reason is not contentwith an approxmaon which, as something neither cold nor hot', itspews out of its mouth/9 and it is as little content with that cold

despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, thngs are bad or

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re

at best nderent, but that nothng better can be eected here, sothat for ths reason alone we should lve at eace wth actual. The

eace whch cognon establshes wth the actual world has morewarmth n t than ths.A rther word on the subject of issuin instions on how the

world ought to be: hlosohy, at any rate, always comes too late toerform ths funcon. A the thouht of the world, t aears only at ame when actual has gone through ts formave rocess andattaed ts comleted state. Ths lesson of the concet s necessarlyalso aarent om hstory, namely that t s only when actua hasreached matur that the deal aears ooste the real andreconsucts ths real world, whch t has grsed n ts substance, nthe shae of an ntellectual rea.30 When hlosohy ants greyn grey, a shae of fe has grown old, and t cannot be rejuvenated,but only recognzed, by the grey n grey of hlosohy the owl ofMnerva begns ts ght oy wth the onset of dusk.31

But t s me to conclude ths foreword as a foreword, ts nconwas n any case merely to make eteal and subjecve commen onthe ont of vew of the work to whch t s refaced. If a content s to

be dscussed hlosohcally, t wlbear only scenc and objecveeaent n the same way, the author w regard any crcsmeressed n a form other than that of scenc dscusson of thematter [She] tsef merely as a subjecve ostscrt and randomasseron, and wleat t wth nderence.

Bern, 25 June 820

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Inoducton

I

he sbjectmatter f the phlosophl sene of rt s the e of rt- the cncept f rght and its actalzan

Phlsphy has t wth Ideas and therefre nt wth whatare cmmnly descrbed as mere COts On the cnary tshws that the latter are nesided and lackng th andthat t s the COt alne (nt what s s en called by thatname bt whch s merely an absact determnan f thedng) and sch a way that itgves actal t tself Eveg ther

s anstry tene[Dse] eteal cnngency pnn appearance wthtessence nth decepn etc he whch the cncept

assmes ts actalzan and whc s essenal fr cgnn f the .COt itself s different m ts n f bengprely as ccept and s the ther essenal mment f theIdea

Aiio . he cncept and is estence ] are t aspecs fe same hing] separate and nited ike s and bdy he bdy is thesame ife as he s and yet he t can be said t ie side neanther A s witht a bdy wd nt be a iving hing and vice versa

hs he estence sei] f the is is bdy jst as e aterit. he bds have he ee win and

i ere seng agh hey are nt yet he ee isef. heee crespds enrey t he simpe image f e bd. f e bdy des

25

BOQ8Z9 nersts KutOnes

)


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Posopy ojRg

not corrspond to t sou, it is a wrtchd tin indd. f stnc se and t concpt, of bod and sou, is t Ida. It is not !

just a arony, Notin ivs which isnot in so way Ida. is and in ordr to buy apprhndd, it ust b rconiab in its concpt and in t concpts stnc sei

2

The scienc of rght is pr phosophy. t has therefore to dvelophe e which is the reason wh an objct Geges] out of thconcept; or what to he sae ng, ust observe the properanent devlopent of he hng he] itel As a part [of philo-as a determnate sg po which is the resu and hof what preee it, and what preceded it is he so-called proofof hatreslt. Hence he concpt of rght, so far as i omg o beg isconceed, fas oide he science of rght; is dedcon is prespposed here and is to be taken as ge

Aiio ().Phiosophy fors a circ.2 It has an inia or idiatpoint for it ust bn sowhr a point which is not donsatd

and is not a rsut. But th starn point of phiosophy is idiatyrav, for it ust appar at anothr nd-point as a rsut. Phiosophy isa squnc which is not suspndd in id-air; it dos not bin idiaty, but is roundd o witin its

Accordn to the foral, non-phlosophcal ehod of hesciences, he rst thng whch is soht and rqred, at leastfor he sake of exteal scienc form, is he!J. Theposive science of right cannot be ch conceed wh hs,however, sinc its chef am is to stat3g

Rehes] i.e. what he parcular legal determaons are. Ths is the rason for he wan: 'ois deno n iure

cil perculosa.3 And in fact, the ore incohernt and ntr- nally conadictory the detrmaons of a [syste o rght

are, the less possible it wlbe to ake deons whn it; for denon shold contan nve

present contex, hese wod mmediately ake he conadicwhat is unjst s Uree] -"nslators I/Ote I cii a a deios are hazardous.

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Inroduon 1-2

sble n all ts nakedness. Thus, n Roman law s rseReh], for example, no denon of a hu be would be

possble, for the slave not be subsumed underndeed, the status S] of the slave does volence to thatconcept. The denons of 'proper and propretor wouldseem equally hazardous n many stuaons. - But the deducon of the deon may perhaps be reached by means of

or chely by absacon fromthe

lun] of human bengs. The correcess of the denon then made to depend on ts agreement \th prevalng

Vorselen]. Ths method leaves out of account what salone essenal to scence -wth regard to content, the neessyof he hn Se] n and for tself (n ths case, of rght), andwth regad to form, the nature of the concept. In phlosophcal cognon, on the other hand, the chef conce s the

and the route by whch t has become adeducon. Thus, gven that ts COen s

necessaryr se the second step s to look around for what

corresponds to t n our deas Voelen] and language.But ths concept as t s for tself n ts h may not only bederent from our rreeo Voel] of t: the twomust also dffer n ther form and shape. If, however, therepresentaon s not also false n ts content, the concept maywell be sho to be contaned n t and present essencethn t that s, the representaon a be rased to the formof the concept. But t s so far om beg the measure and

crteron of the concept whch s necessary and ue for tselfthat t must rather derve ts uth om the concept, andrecognze and correct tself th the help of the latter. - But f,on the other hand, the former maner of cognon th tsformal deons, ferences, proofs, and the lke has nowvrtually dsappeared, the other mode whch has replaced t sa bad substute: that sIdeas n general, and hence also theIdea of rght and ts rther determnaons, are taken up and

asserted n mmedate fashon as C of onsouess, and our natural or ntensed feelngs, our O her and enhuss,;e the source of rght.4 If ths s the most convenentmethod of all, t s also the least phlosophcal not to menon


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Posopy of Rg

here other aspects of this view, which has immediaterelevance hI] to acon and not just to cognion.

Whereas the st adttedly formal method does at leastrequire the of the concept in its denions and the of Iss cognion in its proofs, the mode of mediateconsciousness and feeling makes the subjecv, con-ngency, and arbiariness of knowledge into its prciple. - Afamar wth the nature of scienc procedure in philo-sophy, as expounded in philosophical logic, is herepresupposed.

Right is in ofhavinwithina [parcular] state; is the prnciple whichunderles knowledge Kts] of right, i.e. th postv s of rht In terms o ot, this rght acquires a posive element ()through the parcul1ople, its stage ofstorl development, and the whole context of relaons goveed byturl ss; () through the necessity whereby a system of legalright must contain the pplton of the unversal concept to theparcular and xtl given characterscs of objects Gst]and instances an applicaon which is no longer [a matter o] specu-lave thought and the development of the concept, but [o subsump-on by the understanding; y through the deteaonsrequired for m sos in actuali.

If the feelings of the heart, [personal] inclinaons, andarbiariness are set up in opposion to posive right andlaws, philosophy at least cannot recognize such authoriesThat force and anny may be an element i posive right isconngent to the later, and has nothing to do with its nature.Later in this work ( 21 1-21 4) it wl be shown at what

become posive. The deteaowlbe discussed in that context are menoned here only in

order to indicate the lnts Gr] of phiosophical right andat the same me to rule out any possible idea VotluI] letalone expectaon, that its systemac development should giverise to a posive code of laws such as is required by an actal

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Inroduon

state. - Naural law or plosopcal rgt s derent om /posve rgt, but t would be a grave msunderstandng to

dstort ts derence nto an opposon or antagosm onte conary, ter relaon s lke tat beteen Instutes andPandects2 - Wt regard to te storcal element n posvert(st reerred to n 3 above), Montesqueu stated teue storcal vew, te

legslaon n general and ts sould not be consdered n solaon and n te absact, butrater as a moment wtn Oe total, n te con

text o all te oter determnaons wc constute te

2-3

ter and ence ter juscaon3

ons o rgt th pper n tme skTs task, lke tat o recognzng te logcal consstency osuc determnaons by comparng tem wt prevously estng legal relaons, s mertorous and praseworty wtn tsown spere, and b

l

approac - unless, tat s to say, om storcal s consed wt develosgncance o storcal s

" vad ;wc s very mportant and sould

iy boe n nd, s at e same me a very obvous one adetermnaon o rgt may be sown to be enrelyrouded and COsstet th te revang rumstnes and tn legal

nstuons, yet t may be conary to rgt retlh] andrraonal n and or tsel lke numerous determnaons o Roman cVl law Pvtret] wc ollowed qute consstentlyom suc nstuons as Roman pateal autor andRoman mamony. But even te determnaons o rgt arernal, t s one tng to demonsate tat ts sso - and ts cannot uly be done except by means o teconcept - and anoter to depct ter storcal emergence

and te crcumstances, eventales, needs, and ncdentswc led to ter noducon Ts knd o demonsaonand (pragmac) cognon n terms o promate or remotestorcal causes s oen called 'explanaon, or even more

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Phosophy ofRgh

commonly comprehension', in the beef Meiung] that thisind of historical demonsaon is al - or rather, the one

essenal thing - that needs to be done in order to ompehethe law or a lega instuon, whereas i fact the uly essenalissue, the concept of the thing She], has not even beenmenoned. - Simiarly, we oen hear tak of Roman or Germanic onts of gh, or of such onts of right as aredeed in ths or that legal code, although these codes containno reference to concepts, but ony to general eteitios ofght, proposions of the understanding, principles, laws, and

the ike. - By disregarding the dierence i queson, itbecomes possible to shi e point of vew and to tu therequest for a ue juscaon into a juscaon b circumstances, a logical deducon from premises which may inthemselves si] be as valueless as the conclusions derivedom them, etc.; in short, e relave is put i place of theabsolute, and in place of the nature ofthe thig a juscaon conses an i exteal factors th an ori n in the concept, it unconsciously achieves the opposite of what it intendscan be shown at the origin of an istuon was enel

and necessary under the specic circumstances ofme, e reqUements of the storical ie oint are

But s is osed to

ison has thereb lost its

Thus i for example, the monstees are jused by an appealto their serces in culvang and populang areas of widerness and in preserg scholarship through insucon, copying of manuscripts, etc., and these serces are regarded as thereason G and purpose estig] of their connuedestence, what in fact foows om thse past serices is that,since the circumstances have now changd completely, themonasteries have, at least in this respect, become sand inappropriate. - Since it has now been shown that thehistorical signicance of origins, along with their historicaldemonsaon and exosion, belongs to a different sphereom the philosophical view of the same origins and of the

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Inroduon

of the the to approaches can to that extentone another. But since they do not

always maintain such peacel relaons, even in sciencmaters, I shall quote something relang to their mutual con-tact whch appears in Herr [Gustav] Hugo's Ttbook of thesto of Romn Lw [Lehrbuh er Geshte s rmshRehts 1790], and which wlalso rther elucidate their sup-posed mode of opposion. Herr Hugoout in thepassage in queson (h edion [1818], 53) that Ciceropraises th Telve Tables, while ookn kne at the philo-

sophers',6 whereas the philosopher Favorinus eats them justas many a great philosopher has subsequently eated posiveright'. the same contex, Herr Hugo replies once and for alto such eaent wth the explanaon that Favorus unrstoo the Twelve Tablesjust s tte as the philosophers haveunderstood posive right'. As to the correcon of the philo-sopher Favorinus by the jurist Sexts Caecilius n [Aulus]Gellius' Notes Atte x, I , it is primarily a statement of theue and lasng principle which must underlie the juscaon

of anyhing whose mpact is merely posive. Non ignoras',says Caecius very aptly to Favorinus, legm opportunttes etmedelas pro tempom moribus et pro rerum pubcarmenebus ac pro uitatm presentum raonibus, proquevtom quibus medendum est, feobus mutr ac etneque uno sttu onsstere quin, ut facies coeli et maris, itarem atque rtune tempestabus vetur. Quid salubriusvisum est rogaone ila Stolons . . . quid ulius plebiscito

Vocono . . . quid tam necessarum esmatm est . . . quamlex Licinia . . ? Omna tmen haec obtert et opert suntcivitas opulena . . a These laws are posive in so far as

and appropriateness are rmstnt and

"Tanslaos noe: Yo kow ry wll that th aatas a rms aor by thlaws ha a ary aora wth th stoms o th a a s o osto wth osraos o rst aata a o s to b rm athat thy o ot rst a ostat stat. O th oary thy ar ha by storms o ha a rmsta jst storms ha th a o th sa a skyWhat ol b mor saltary tha th lal roosal oStolo8 . what mor sl thath olar r oVoos9 . . . a what has b m as ssary . . . as thLa law . ? yt thy ha all b obltrat a obsr by th ol oth rst statI .

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commony 'comprehesion, in the beief [Mein] that thiskind of historica demonsaon is a - or rather, the one

essena thing - that needs to be done in order to omprehenthe aw or a ega instuon, whereas in fact the uy essenaissue, the concept of the thing [She], has not even beenmenoned. - Simiay, we oen hear tak of Roman or Germaic onts of h, or of such onts of right as aredeed in his or that ega code, athough these codes containno reference to conceps, but ony to genera eteintions ofht, proposions of the understanding, prncipes, aws, and

the ike - By disregarding the dierence in queson, itbecomes possibe to sh the point of ew and to u therequest for a ue juscaon into a juscaon b circumstances, a ogica deducon from premses which may inhemseves [{r siI] be as vaueess as the concusions derivedom em, etc.; in short, the reave is put in pace of theabsoute, and th in pace of the naure ofthe thing [She] ief When a hstorica jucaon conses an n extea factors with an or n in the concet, it uncosciousy achieves the opposite of what it intends.\ it can be shown that the origin of an instuon was enreedient and necessary under e specic circumstances of

me, e requIrements of he storica ie oint arele But s is osed to

insuon has ost its

Thus if, for exampe, he monsteries are jused by an appeato their seices in cuvang and popuang areas of widerness and in presering schoarship through isucon, copying of manuscrpts, etc., and these serces are regarded as thereason [G and purpose [timmun] of their connuedestence, what in act foows om thse past serces is that,since the cicumstances have now changd competey, themonasteries have, at east in t respect, become sand inappropiate. - Since it has now been shown that thestorica sigcance of origins, aong wth their historicademonsaon and exposion, beongs to a different sphereom the phiosophica iew of the same origins and of the

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I

Inroduon

of the the to aroaches can to that extentone another But since they do not

aways maintain such eace reaons even in sciencmatters sha quote somethng reang to their mutua contact which aears in Herr [Gustav] Hugos Ttbook of theisto of Romn Lw Lehbuh de Gesihte ds misenRehts 1790] and wch wlaso rther eucidate their suosed mode of oosion Herr HugSout in theassage in queson ( edion [1818] 53) that Ciceroraises th Teve Tabes whie lookin kne at the hio

sohers/

whereas the hiosoher Favorinus ea them justas many a great hiosoher has subsequeny eated osiveright n the same context Herr Hugo reies once and for alto such eaent with the exanaon that Favorinus unstood the Tweve Tabes just lttle as the hiosohers haveunderstood osive right A to the correcon of the hiosoher Favorinus by the jurist Sextus Caeciius in [Auus]Geius Noes Atie x, I , it is rimariy a statement of theue and asng rincie which must undere the juscaonof anything whose imact is merey osive Non ignorassays Caeciius ve ay to Favorinus egum oppounittes etmedeas ro tempom moribus et ro rerum ubicarumenebus ac ro utatum pesentium raonibus roquevitiom quibus medendum est feobus mut ac eineque uno sttu onsistee quin ut facies co ei et maris itaem atque une temestabus ventu. Quid saubriusisum est rogaone ia Stoonis quid uius ebiscito

Voconio quid tam necessarium esmatum est quamex Licinia ? Omnia tmen haec obltet et ope suntciitas ouena . . .a These aws are osive in so far as

and aroriateness are iumstntil and

"Tanslaos noe: You know ve we tat te advantage and remedie aorded by teaw cange and vary accordance wi te cutom of e age and pe of cotu-on wi conideraon of preent advantage and of deciencie to be remedied andtat tey do not perit a contant tate On te conary tey are canged by eto of cance and circumtance jut a torm cange te face of te ea and kyWat coud be more auta tan te ega propoa ofSto0 wat more uefu tante popuar decree ofVoconiu and wat a been deemed a neceary a teLicinian aw , ? nd yet tey ave a been obiterated and obcured by te opuence ofte preent tateJ

3 1


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Posopy of Rg

. their value is therefore enrely historical; they are accordin

goveents have done for e circumstances of their meand laid down for the condions under which they lived is adsnct issue [] which should be assessed by

recognion of it wlbe all the more profound such an assessment is supported by philosophical insights Ishall, however, cite an example of Caecius' rther attempto jus the Twelve Tables against Favorinus, because in sodoing, he employs the etealy decepve method of the

understanding and its mode of raocinaon, namely by supp i a ood rea [Gr a bad Sathat the latter has thereby een jused He menons the

w which, aerl had elapsed,gave the creditor the right to kthe detor or to sell intoslaver, or even, if there were several creditors,d so anyone ha u o oomuh or oo lile he should inr no seq leal disavanae"(a clause whch would have beneted Shakespeares Shylockin e Merhan Venie and whch he would most gratellyhave accepted)1 support f this law, Caecilius putsforard the oo reason that it proded an addional guarantee of good fa-that, given the abominable nature of thelaw, it r intended that it should be enforcedY In histhoughtlessness, he not ony fais to rect that ts latterprovision [esimmuI] usates the former intenon, namelythat the law should guarantee good faith, but also overlooks

e fact that he iflexample immediately aerwards of how the law on false wess was rendered neffectual by its excessive sevei But it is not clear what HerrHugo means says that Favorinus did not unandthe law any schoolboy is capable of understanding it, andShylock would have understood better than anyone else theclause in queson, which would have been of so much advantage to h by unandin Herr Hugo must have meant

only that degree [ild] of understandng whch is sasedTranslaor's oe The text i the Suhkamp edio o Hegels Werke VII eads Rechsan

e! (legal shae. This is clealy a eo o Resnaeil, the coect eadig as igs edio (PR II 102).

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if a good reson can be found fo such a law Incidentally athe sundestanding of which aecilius convicts

Favoinus in the sae context is one to which a philosopheay eadily confess without blusng naely his faiue toealize that iumentum which the law specied as disncto rcer as the only ode of anspot to be povided tobing a sic an as wiess to the cout should be undestoodto signi not only a hose but also a coach o wagonP aecilius was able to deve o s legal deteinaon a the poof of the excelence and pecision of the old laws fo

in deteining how a sic wiess was to be suoned totes in cout they even went so fa as to disnguish not justbeteen a hose and a wagon but even beteen dieentinds of wagon beteen a coveed and upholsteed wagonas aecilius explains and a less cofotable one We wouldthus be le wth a choice beteen the sevei of the oiginallaw and the iviali of such deteinaons; but to descbesuch things let alone leaed eXposions of the as iviawould be aong the geatest possible aon to scholashipof this and othe inds

But in the textboo cited above He Hugo also has occasion to spea of rtionl in connecon with Roan law andI was paculaly suc by the folowing points In his eatent of the peod om the ogin of the stte to the Telve Tbl( 38 and 39) he says that people (in Roe) had anyneeds and wee obliged to wo equiing the ssistnce ofdaught anials and beasts of buden such a e ouelves

possess that the teitoy of Roe consisted of alteate hillsand valeys that the city stood on a hil etc alusions which wee pehaps eant to l the intenons of Montesquieubut which wlscacely be found to have captued the lattesspiit He then points out ( 40) that the posion with !to rightwas s vey fa o sasing the highest deandsreson (This is quite coect; Roan faily law[Fmienrecht] slavey etc do not sas even the ost

odest deands of eason) But in dealing wth late peiodsHe Hugo fogets to tell us in which of the if any Roanlaw stied the highest mn of reson In 289 howeveHe Hugo says of the classical juists in the peiod of the

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Posopy of Rg

hhe eopmen ub] ofRom ene that ithas long since been noced that the classical jurists had a

philosophical educaon; but few people are aware' (althoughthe many edions of Herr Hugo's textbook have ensured thatmore people are now aware) that no category of writers is soeminently desering as these same Roman jurists o be keneto the mathemacians in respect of logical deducon omrst principles or to the new founder ofmetaphysics in respectof the sgly disncve way in which they develop theirconcepts the latter being conrmed by the rerkbe fact

that there are nowhere so many hoome as in the classicaljurists and in Kant' That logical consistency which Leibnizpraises is certainly an essenal characterisc of the science ofright, as of mathemacs and every other science ofthe under-standing but this logical consistency of the understanding hasnothing to do with the sasfacon of the demands of reasonand ith philosophical science1 Apart om this, however,

j' \e very Cen of the Roman jurists and praetors should

be regarded as one of their greatest virtues, for it enabled

them toble stuons, although they were at the same me compelled todisncons on the y (as when they called

bOompo what neverthlss amounted to aninheritance)5 and even silly excuses (and silliness is equallyan inconsistency) in order to preserve the letter of the TwelveTables, for example by the con or pretence that a daughterwas a son (see . .] Heineccius, Aquum Rom

. . ber I [rankrt, 1 77 ] , t. II 24)16 But it is ludicrousto see the classical jurists lumped togeer with Kant becauseof a few rhoomou divisions parcularly those cited inNote 5 to Herr Hugo's remarks and to see this kind of thingcalled development of concepts'

J

Translator's note: Hege uses hee he La adeb callde.bTranslator's note: Hege uses he La ad Geek es fco ad {YQau;Translator's note: Hege uses he La emsfla ad fls

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Posopy of Rg

ee it opposion and make its content my own. I is at homein the world when it knows it, an even more so when it has compre

hended it. So much for the theorecal attue. The praccal atude, onthe other hand, begns with thought, with the itelf, and seem at stto be opposed [to the world] because it immediately sets up a separaonIn so far as I am praccal or acve,myself, and to determne means a

ierences whic I posit are nevertheless also mie, the determinaons apply to me, and the ends to which I am impelled belong to me. Noweven ifI let go of these determinaons and dierences, Le ifI posit themin the so-caled exteal world, they sll remain mine: they are what Ihave done or made, an they bear the imprint of my mind Geis. This,then, is the disncon between theorecal and praccal attudes; therelaonhip between them must now be descrbed.essenally contained thin the praccal; e iea Voe that thetwo are separate must reJecte , or one cannot have a wlwoutintelligence. On the conay, . The wldetermines is aninward nature, for what I will I represent to myself as my object Gees. The animal acts by nsnct, it is d by something iward andis therefore also praccal; but it has no wl because it does not representto itself what it desies It is equaly impossible to adopt a theorecalattude or to thik without awl for in g we are necessarily acveThe content of what is thought certainly takes on the form of being; butthis being is somethig mediate, something posited by our acvThese disnct attudes are therefore inseparable: they are one and thesame thing, an both moments can be found in every acvi, of thiningand willing alike

With regar to te eeo of e w, we ay recoect e

oler eo of cogon t sply presuppose e rreseio [Voe] of e ,vlan aepte to set up a eion of e w by eacg it o s representaon en, e maer of e oler epcal psychology, e socaeproofof e w's eeo was eve fro e vaous feelngs an phenoena [Empde d Echei] ofornay consciousness, such as reorse, gut, an e e,whch coul aegely be ied oy tem of aee ,vl.

But it is ore conveent siply to ahere to e noon hateeo is ie as a of consciousness in wch we ustsply beie. he eucon h he w is free an of hhe w an eedom are as aeady reare in above


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Inroduon

is possible only within the context of the whole [of philosophy]. The basic feaat spiit isinialy inteigene and that the deteninaons through whchit proceeds in its development,

[Voellen] to thou are the way by which it prod-uces tsel as w .ch, as praccal spirit in general, is thepromate uth of intelligence. have given an account ofthese matters in my Enlopei of the Philosophil Sienes(Heidelberg, 181 7) 363399 and hope to deal wth themin greater deta on a ture occasion3 t is all the morenecessary for me to conibute in ths way to what hope wlbe a more thorough cogon of the nature of sprit, because,as ponted out n the Enopei (Remarks to 367) it i \hard to magine that any philosophcal science can be n so bad and neglected a condion as that one of spitwhch isusuay called 'psychology.4 And as for those elements[Momente] of the concept of the w whch are menoned inths and the following paragraphs of the noducon andwhch result om the prese referred to above, it i possibleto form an idea [Votelen] of them by consulg the selfconsciousness of any indivdual n the rst place, anyone candiscover in hmself an abili to absact om an what

and lkewse to determine hmself, to posit ny content

ples of the rther deteinaons [of the wll] wthn his selfconsciousness.

5

The wl contains () the element o or of the ! s pure reecon into itself, n which every imitaon, eve content,wely through natre, through needs, desires,and drives, or given and deterned in some other way, is dissolved;this is the limitless inni of bsolute bsttion or ie , ure thinking onesel

Those who regard thinking as a parcular and disnctC0,divorced from the wl as an equaly disnctI, and who inaddion even consider that thinking is prejudicial to the \ill

37


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Posopy of Rg

especally the good wll show from the very outset that theyare totally gnorant of the natre of the wl (a remark whch

we shall often have occason to make on ths same subject)J ' Only one of the wll s dened here ths boue0 every I

nd myself or whch I have posted i the om

thought [e Voeun] con-sders ts as ect n tself ] as freedom and holds fastto s nee reedom r the freedom of the under-

reedomandtheorecal, t becomes n the relUS realm the Hndu fanacsm of but f t tus to

csm of desucon, e

any organzaon whchto rse up anew3 Only n does ths

a feelng of ts own estence [Den] Itwell t wlls posve condon, fornstance thelrel ous lfe, but t does not n fact actual of

at once gves rse toa both of nstons but

negave freedo arses Thus, whatever such freedom beleves [en] that t \vlls can n tself [r ] be no morethan an absact representaon [Voe] and ts actualza-on can only be the fury of desucon

Aiion ,G t s nheret n ths elemet of te ll tat am able toee myself om everg, to and to absact fomeverhg4 he huma beng aloe s able to abadon all g evehs own lfe: he anmal caot o hs t always

remans oy neve, n a etermao whch s ale to t a to whcht meely grows accustome he huma beg s pue thnng of h

self, and oly thng s he s powe to gve hmself unvesal, hats, to egsh a parcular, all etermacy hs egave freeom


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Inroduon

or s onesded, bu hs onesdednessalways an essenal deermnaon and should here

ore no be dsmssed bu he deec o the undersand n s ha eas

"

a onesdeion as unque and elevaes o su reme satus rThs orm o reedom occurs y SOry The Hndus, or

example, place he hghes value on mere perssence n he knowledge oone's smple den wh onesel, on remanng whn hs emp spaceo one's nwardness lke colourless lgh n pure nuon, and onrenouncng every acvy o le, every end, and every represenaonVoe. In hs way, he human beng becomes n There s nolonger any dsncon beween he ne human beng and Brahman

nsead, derence has n hsThs orm [o eedom] appears more concreely n the acve anacsmo both polcal and relgous leA example o hs was the Regn oTerror n the French Revoluon, durng whch all derences o alenand auhory were supposed o be cancelled ou eoben Ths was ame o emblng and quakng and o nolerance parcular For anacs wlls only wha s absac, no wha s ar

Co tha whenever derences emerge, nds hem ncompablevh s own n ee an cancels e e se hs s why hepeople, urg he Frenc evo uon, desoyed once more the nstuons hey had hemselves creaed, because all nsuons are ncopable wh the absac selconscousness o equal

6

() e sae way, 'J s e anson om underenaedndeenacy o driion einion and e o o aeemnacy as a conen and obec hs conen ay er been by naure, o r generaed by e concep o sp ough sposng o sel as soeng deeine '1 se s no senceDsein n general - e absolue oen o niude or pi r/riion o e

hs second oen odeeinion s us as uch neiiand canceaon ] as e rs or s e cancea

on o e rs absac ne av - Jus as e pacular s n

eneral conaned n e unversal, so n consequence ss second oen aeady conaned whn e rs and s" merely a o wha e rs are)s he rs

sel - no ue nn

39


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Posy of Rg

or the onee unversai of the concept, but oy soetingeinae and one-sided. For since it is absacon fro a

deterinac, it s itsef not wihou deterinacy; and the factthat it is absact and one-sided constutes its deterinacy,decency, and nitude. The dierenaon and deterna

of the to oents re ee to to e oun il ein that Kant etc, except

taon 'J,as the unbounded the st proposion of his eo ofKOwledge [Wissshaslehre] is taken purey and sipy assoethingposiive (and thus as the unversai and iden ofthe understanding). this absact

as a extea iit or as an acvi ofthe '! itsef is therefore soething o it the secondproposion). The rther step which specuave phisophy had to take was to apprehend the negaiviy which isianentwthin the universa or the idenca, as in the 'J astep the need for which is not perceved by those who fai to

apprehend the dualism of inniy and niue even thatmanent and absact for which Fichte understood it

Aiio ) s second oent appears as te opposn one. It s tobe appreended n its uversa ode: t beongs eedo, but does notconstte te woe of eedo e 'I ere eer es o nderen ated indeternacy to becoe d erenated, to post soe . g deternate as ts content an object gan not w

A wc, as descrbed n te preious paragrap, ws onysnohing and i terefore not a w at a. e

to be a tat te sor s wat as a e

s caed te st oent aey as so

as a ere negaon of ts ndetenacy Buttis indeternay s tsef erey a negaon regard to te detenate, to itde 'I s ts sotde and absoute negaon. e ndete

nate s to tc ests n eredeteinacy


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Inroduon 6-7

yThe will is the u of both these moments

ino and ereb restored to ivea t is individuali[Einelhei], the se/deeinaio of the , in that it posits itself asnegave of itself, that is, as deizae and and at the sameme with itself [bei sic], that is, in its idiy wih iseanduniversali; and in this deteninaon, it joins together with itselfalone. ' detenines itself in so far as it is the selfreference ofnegavi. this rerece o ise it is likewise indifferent to thisdeteninacy; it knows the latter as its ow and as idal, ossibii by which it is not rescted but in which it nds itself merely it posits itself in it. This is the eem of the wl whichconsttes the concept or substanali of the wl its gravi, just asgravi consttes the substanali of a body.

selfconsciousness knows itself as universal, as theand as

parcular, with a deteninate object [Gegesa], content,and end. But these two moments are only absacons what is

concrete and ue (and eveg ue is concrete) universali which has e parcular as its opposite, but this

its reecon into itself, has beenreconciled uni iindividualy, as a sg e ut as in

idea [Voelg] of individuali but rather in(see

of he 112114);/ in other words, this

is in fact none other than the Thest to moments that the wlcan absact from evegand that it is also detenind (by itself or by something else) are easy to accept and grasp,[r sic], momen of the understanding and devoid of uth.But it is the third moment, the e and speculave (andeveg e, in so far as it is comprehended, can bethought of only speculavely), which the understanding

to enter into, because the concept is precisely theunderstanding as incomprehensible. Theprovg more detail this innenost

insight of speculaon that is, inni as selfreferring

41


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Posopy of Rg

negav, ulmate source of all life, andspeculave

The only thing which remais to be noted here is that, whenwe say that e universal and that e determinesitself, we speak as if the wlwere already assumed to be a

But the wlis not complete and universalunl it is determned, and unl ths deterinaon is superseded and idealized; it does not becme \l unl it is thisself-mediang ac and ths reu into itsel

Ao . Wat is properly called the wlcontains both the precedingmoments. 'I as such is primarily pure acvi, the universal which is \ithitself be ] but this universal determines itself, and to tat etent i nolonger \vith itself but posits itself as an oter and ceases to be te universal. hen the third Oer as it detees itself, it anddoes not cease to hold fast to the universal. his, then, is the concreteconcept of freedom, whereas the two previous moments have been foundto be toroughly absact and one-sided. But we already possess isfreedom in the form of feeling p], for eample in

and love.2 ne-sidedly witinelves wit reference to an oer, even while knowing ourselvesin tis limitaon as ourselves. In this deterinacy, the human beingshould not feel deterined; on the conay, he hisonly by regarding te oer as other. hU freedom lies neiter in

is both at once. he \ill whichlimits itself eclusively to a h is the \vill of te stubbo person whoconsiders himself unee uness he has h will. But te will is not ed tosomething limited; on te conay, it must proceed ther, for the natureof the \i is not is one-sidedness and rescon.determinate, yet to be \vit oneself be h] in tis determinacy

to the universal.

The rther determaon of pruon (see 6 above) con

stutes the difference between e forms of the \ll: (a) in so far asdeterminacy is the 1en the ubjeveon the one hand and the objeve as eteal immediate estence

42


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Inroduion 7

Exez] on the othe, this is the will as selcon-sciousness, whichn an exteal wold outside itself. indidu

into itsel, it is

isolutely ue and own (seeEnope 363) the elaon of consciousness consttes nooe than he spe ofthe wills ppece. his aspect will not besepaately r h] consideed any the hee.

Ao (H). The consideaon of te \iU's deteminacy is the task of e

undestanding and is not pial. Thewl

is detemined byno eans oly in te sense of content, but also i the sese of fo. Itsdeteminacy wt egad to fom is its end and the accoplisent of iend. At st tis end is only subeie and inteal to e, but it should alsobecoe and thow off the deciency of ee subjecvi. Oneay ask hee why it has this deciency If that which is decient does notat the sae me stand above its deciency, then i deciency does notest fo it. Fo us an aial is decient, bt not fo itself In so fa as anend is sl oly ous, it i fo us a deciency, fo to us, feedo and wlae the ui of the subjecve and the objecve. Hence the end ust beposited objecvely, and it theeby attains not a new onesided detemina-on but oly its ealaon.

Translator's ote The iso betee the ajee/al a the peeigaeas to a o paua sigiae. O subsequet oasios the Rechtsphilosophie (fo exampe 123 a Heges Remaks to 13 1 135, 1 39 261,et Hege uses o/el.

() In so fa as the wills deteinaons ae OW - that is, its elected paculaizaon in geneal -

s content, as content 0 , is its end nthe fo specied unde (a) above eithe its inne o subjecve endas epesented in the act of willing, o its end as actalzed andaccoplished though the ediaon of its acvity as it anslates thesubjecve into objecvi.

3


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Phlosophy of Rgh

10

This content or the disnct deteninaon of the il is primarilyimmedie Thus e il is in iseor u or it is in generalthe wll in is . Only when the wll has

eensn is itr isewhat it is i7 ise

Finitude according to this deteninaon consists in the factthat what something is in iseor in accordance with i concept i dierent in its estence enz] or appearance omwhat it is r ise thus for examplemutual exteali of nature i space butTwo points should be noted in this connecon: rst thatbecause the ue is simply the Idea we do not yet possess anobject or detennaon in its uth if we grasp it ony as it is iniseor in its concept; and secondly that something s onor in ise likewise es and this estence [Esenz] is ashape proper to the object (as wi space in the above example). The separaon whic is present in the nite world

beteen beinginitself and begforitself at the same meconstutes the nte worlds mere sene [Dsein] orpperne (immediate examples of this ill arise in connecon with the natural will and then with formal right etc). Theunderstanding stops at mere bei7Iiniseand therefore callsfreedom in accordance with this a[Vee7], since it is indeed in this[Mlhei]. But the understanding

on as absolute and perennial and takes the relaonship[ieh7] of freedom to wat it wills or in general to ireali merely as is pplion to a given material an applicaon which does not belong to the essence of eedom itself.In this way the understanding has to do with the absactalone not with the Idea and uth of freedom.1

Aiion (G). w wc s a ony accordanc wt s concpt se sfbut at te sa un for t woud b uy ony as

a y dtrnat contnt te ar cas t s fr for sf asedo as ts obct and i do. Watvr s s oy n accordanc s concpt watvr s ry n sf s ony dat oynaura. W ar aso faar s n rprsntaona out i

44


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Inoduon e

Vote child is human bein nit is only the is n-

1accordance wih Is Now what ests as in iself does beng who is raonal \process of self-producon both by going out Of himselfJ

and by educang himself inwardly, in order that he may also becomeraonalr hmse

The w whch s ree as yet ony tses te mmete or nturw The eteraons of te derence whch s posted wtn te

w by te sedeteg concept appear wt the edate was an mmete present content: tese are te res esres nnntons by whch te w nds tsef Thscontent aong wt te deternaons eveope wt t oesdee orgate n te w's S raona but expressed so eate a or t oes not yet have te or o

For me ts content adttey enrey mne; but ts

or an tat content are s erent, so tat te w s nte wthn tse

Eprca psychoogy reates an descrbes tese rves andncaons an te needs erve o te as t encounterste or beeves t encounters te n experence anattepts to cass t gven atera te usua way Wesha scuss beow what te objete eeent o tese rvess, what shapet eeent assues n ts ut (wout teor o rraona wch t possesses as rve), an aso whatshape t assues n ts estence [Exsten].

Aton he anal, too, has drves, desires, and inclinaons, but thas no wland must obey s drive f nohing exteal preven it. But ehuman beng, as wholly ndeterminate, stands above his drves and candetermne and posit them as his on he drve i of nature, but topost it i his !

,mywl, whch therefore cannot appeal to

fact at the drive is grounded n naure.

45


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Phlosophy of Rgh

I 2

The syste of tis content as it is e pes in its iediacy inthe wlests ony as a utude of varied drives, each of which isme in ge aonge e soethinguversa and indeternate which has a knds of obects Gegsne and can be sased in a kinds of ways nasuch as the wl,in t doube indeterinacy, gives itsef the for of iiiuiyEiehei] (see ) it is a resoving wi, and oy i so far as it akesany resouos at a is it an acta w

To resove on soething es besi] is to canceeb] that indeterinacy in which each and every contentis iiay no ore than a possibii ut our angage asocontains the ateave expression si e 'todecide], which indicates that the indeterinacy of the wlitsef, as soething neua yet tey ui, the origi aseed of a estence Dsein] contains its deteri aons andends within itsef, and erey brings the forth fro wthin

Traslaors nOle: Litea t cse smeinbTraslaors nOle Litea t uncse nese

y resovng, the wlposits itsef as the wlof a specic indiduaand as a wlwhich fro ut apart

wi,because of the difference between its for and its content (see I Iis purey; its ony appropriate ncon is that ofbs esouion and its content is not yet the content and product of its freedo

so far as inteigence is a hining power, its obect Gegsn] and content reain unie and thfbehaves as a universa n the wi, the universa aso

is ne, as iniiu

Eieei]; and i the iediate, ie fora wl it signiesabsact individuai which is not yet led with its freeuniversa t is therefore in the w that the pope eige]niu of inteigence begis, and it is ony by raisi g itsef


40/57

Introduction

once more to the level of thought and by conferring immanentunversality upon its ends that e wl cancels uebt] the

difference of form and content and makes iself objecve,te wl Thus those who believe hat the human being iste in the realm of the wl in general, but that he - orreason iself - is limited in the realm of thought, have lileunderstanding of the nature of g and g.1 so faras g and g are sll disnct, it is rather the converse which is ue, and g reason, as wl is [reason]deciding enthleen] on its ownntue.

12-14

Adition . A wlwhich resolves on nohing i not an actual wl; echaracerless man can never resolve on anyhing The reason G forsuch indecision may also lie in an overrened sensibili which nowsha, in determnng somehing, it enters the realm of nide, imposng alimi on iself and ye i does no wish to renounce

a Git is dead, even ifitsaspiraon is o be beaul.2 'Whoever aspres o great things, saysGoehe, 'mus be able o limt himsel3 Only by making resoluons canhe human being enter actuali, however be

inea wou er emerge om ha nwar rooding in whic itreseres a universal possibili for itself isThe wlwhich is sure of itself does nodeerines

Tanslatos note T M nox (Kno p 23 note) une te d of te ognaut uey ead do Gan o coped te ddon' a py taen t eooe o Hoto ancpon of Hege ectue (c VPR 131)

14

The nite wl purely with regard o its form, is the selfrelecngnnte which is with itself [ h e/bt] (see e its conent, i.e its various drves, and also above he rherindividual ways in which these are actualized and sased. A thesame me, since it is only formally innite, it is ted o this conen asto the determinaons of its nature and of i exeal actuali (see

and I I ; but since it is indeterminate, it is no resicted to this orthat content in parcular. To is extent, this content is only a possible one for he reecon of the '/

,into itself; it may or may not be

mine and '!,

is th pobl of deermining myself to this or to

47


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Philosophy of Right

something else ofhoog beteen these determnaons which the 'must in this respect regard as extealI

1 5

The freedom of the wl, according to this determinaon is arbtrari-e in which the following to factors are contained: free reeconwhich absacts om eveg and dependence on an inwardly or

content and material Since this content which issame me determined as a

possible content in opposion to ee reecon it follows thatarbiariness is otge in the shape ofwl.

The commonest idea [Voteug] we have of freedom is thatof arbtrarie - the mean posion of reecon beeen thewill as determined solely by naural drives and the wlwhichis ee in and for itself. hen we hear it said that eedom ingeneral consiss in l, such an idea

[Votellg]can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of

intelecual culture [Bg de Ceake] for it shows note least awareness ofwhat consutes the wll which is free inand for itsel or right or ehics etc Reecon te aluniversali and unity of selfconsciousness is the willsabtra certa of its ree om but t not yet the tth ofthis freedom because it does not ye

the subjecve side is sll other

alsonstead of being the wlin its - n hethe me of Wols metaphysics as to whether the wl isacually ee or whether our knowledge of its freedom ismerely a delusion it was arbiariness which people had inmind/ To the certain of this absact selfdeterminaon

which as something

not certain and thereforeome to t om outde - although 'outside here denotes driveor [Votelug], or -

in such a way that its content is not derived


42/57

Introdon

. from its ow self-deteg acv as such Accordingly,'Oee self-determinaon is

immanent n arbiarness, whereas the other element issomethng given to it, arbiarness may indeed be called adelusion if it is to be equivalent to eedom a

as n that of Kant and subsequenty nFress utterly supercial resion of it, eedom is nothngoer ths formal self-acv2

Ao . Sice I have the possibili of deteg myself n t orthat drecon that is, sice I am able to choose I possess an arbiary

ill, ad this is what whch I havelies of the wil, whereby I can ake ths or that [thng]e This [thig] which is mie is a parcular content ad is thereforeicopable with me; thus it is separate from me and is oy potenallye, just as I am oly the potenali of unig t it The choicetherefore les i the deterinacy of the and the deternacy of thecotet content, te

gh it has in itself the aspect of inni a fonal sese None ofthese contents iseping wit it, and it does ot ly have ielf n any

of te It is herent in arbiarness that the cotet i ot detemied e b the natre of my will, but by o thus I am alsodependet on this content, and this is the coadico whch uderlies

The coon an thinks tat he is ee whe he is alowedto act arbiarly, but tis ve arbiariess iples that he is not eeWhe I wll what is raonal, I act not as a parclar aare]divdual, but accordace wth te concepts of etics n general: in aeical act, I vdicate not yself but the thg [ ] But a personwho doe soeerse gves the greatest pronence to hs par

culari Para raonal is te high road which eveoefollows and where no oe stands out fro te rest When great arscoplete a work, we ca say tat it h to be so; tat i, te arstsparculari has copletely disappeared ad o maem is apparent nit Phdias has o aerss; the shape itself lves ad stads out But

arst more we see of hiself, of hs parculari andarbiariness3 If we stop our equiry at arbiariess, at the huanbeigs abli to will ts or that, this does deed costte his eedo;but if we bear ly i ind tat the cotet of what he wills i a giveoe, it follows at he is deterned by it ad is in ts very resect nolonger ee

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Philosophy of Right

16

Whatever the has decided to choose (see 4) it can ikewiserelinquish (see 5) But wit this possibii of proceeding in tubeyond any other content which it ay substute for the previousone, and so on d um it does not escape o nitude, becauseevery such content is dierent fro te form of the ] and therefore nite; and te opposite of determinacy naey indeterminacy,indecision, or absacon - is only the other, equally onesidedoent.

That conadicon which is the arbiary (see I S akes itsappara as a da of drives and inclinaon wch conict witheach other in such a way tat e sasfacon of one deands tat tesasfacon of the other be subordinated or sacriced, and so on; andsince a drive is erey the simpe direcon ofits own detrminacy andtherefore has no yardsck within itse this determinaon that it

should be subordinated or sacriced is te conngent decision ofarbiariness - whether te ater is guided by cacuaons of theunderstanding as to which drive ,vlafford te greater sasfacon, orby any other consideraon one cares to nae.

Ao Drives or incnaons are prary a content o e wl, andony reecon stands above he but hese drves ] thesevesbecoe ipeing d], pres upon each oer, and conict wih eachoher, an he ish to be ased I, hen, I put a the others

aside and cot yse to n oneo the, I nd yse in a desucveiao, or by y vey act I have which isa al' dries utit is o just as ie hep erey to subordinateceran drves [to ohers] - he course o aco to which he undersandng usuay resrs - because no yardsck by which hey ight bearranged n order is avaiabe hre he eand or such an order thereore usuay ens in tedious paudes

1 8With regard to thejudg1 of drives the appearance of the diaeccis such that, as mma1 and hence asoposv the deterinaons o

50


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Introduction 16-19

the immeite wi re good thus ma is si to be by ature good. Butin so fr s they re

deteat0oppose to freeom n

to the concept of the spirit in generl n therefore egatve they mustbed thus ma is si to be by at l. situon theecision in fvour f one sseron or e other likewse epens onsubjecve rbiriness.IAddo . he Chrsn ocine tht mn is by ntre evl is superiorto the other ccorng to which he is goo. nterprete philosophicllythis ocne shoul be unerstoo s foows. A spirt mn is eebeing

Wes]who is in posion not to let himself be etermine by

ntrl rives. When he ests n n mmeite n unciliegebee] conion he is erefore in siton in which he oughtnot to be n om which he must liberte himself. his is the meningof e

ocine of originl sin without which Chrisn woul not be

e religin of freeom.

I 9

Unerlyng the emn for the

pucato of the dveis the generl

ie [Votelug] tht they shou be ee om the fmz of theiimmeite ntl etermincy n from the subjecvi n conngency of thei coet n restore to thei substnl essence.The uth behin this ineterminte emn is tht the ives shoulbecome the ronl system of the wills eteminon to grsp themthus in tems of the concept is the content of the science of ight.

The content of this sciene cn be expoune with referenceto ll its iniviul moments sh s ight prope morli

fmily the stte etc. in the followng form: mn ha by ntre rive towrs ight ad alo ive towrs prope nmorlity ad alo rive towrs sexul love rive towrssocibili etc.I If one prefers to ccor the igni of philosophicl shpe to this form of empiricl psychology thenthis in the light of wht hs psse in recent mes for philosophy (s ws erlier note) n conues to pss for it cnbe chieve

at low cotsimply by eclring tht mn s

within mself s of h cocoue tht he wills ightproper the stte etc. This sme content which ppershere in the shpe of rives will recur lter in nother formnmely tht of dute.

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Philosophy of Right

20

en reecon appies itself to the drives, represenng them,esma em, and co p n em wi one another and then withthe means they employ, their consequences etc., and with a sum totalof sasfacon - ie with happi

- it confersal ivalupon

t material and puries it, in ths exteal crudi and

Aiio In happiess thought already has some power over the

atral force of e drves for it is not contet ith e instantaneous, butrequires a whole of happness This is coected wth educao to theextet tat educao likewise implemens a uiversal But two momentsare preset te ideal of happiness: te rst is a universal which issuperor to all paculares; but secodly, snce e content of tisuniversal is in merely uiversal pleasure, te dividual ad parcular, ie a nite quan, reappears at is poit, ad we are compelled toret to te drve Sce e cotet of happiness lies i e subjectyad feelig

pg]of everyoe, ts universal ed is itself parcular

aika] so tat o ue ui ofcotet ad fo is yet preset itnit

2 1

The uth, however, of this formal universai, which is indeterminate for itself and encount

hegel - philosohy of right

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