heidegger britannicaarticle

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The New ScholasticismEditor: John A. OesrerleAssociote Editor: Ralph M. MclnernyBusiness Manoger: Jude DoughertyEditoiol Consahonts:Louis Dupr6Alden L. FisherDoaald A. GallagherTheodore E. James

Jamec V. McGlynn, S. J.Copy Editot:

AII manuscripts and books for review should be addressed to The Ediror,Tnn Nnw Scnor.asrrcrslr, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana46556.Manuscripm should be typed double-spaced with footnotes preferably ona separate sheet. Prospective contributors are invited to request our styleeheet from the editor. They should rerain a carbon copy of their manu.script for reference. A 100 to lbo word summ:uy is requested.New subscriptions and changes of address should be sent to Dr. JudeP. Dougherty, Treas., American Catholic philosophical Association, Catho.Iic University of America, Washington, D. C. 20012.

-:Published quarterly byAMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION109 Market Place, Baltimore, Maryland, ZlZ02The Catholic University of America'Washington, D. C. 20017

fssued in Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn. Second class postage paid at

Tfte l{ew SchclasticismVolume XLIV S{.JMMER, 1970 Number 3

Table of ContentsArticles

The Idea of Phenomenology. . . . . .Ilenrrx I{nmncenn 325Some Medieval Anticipations of fnertiaJarrPs F. O'BnrPn 3+5Faith Seeking Understancling: An Atheistic Interpreta-tion....... IIr,rs Vnnwnv"elt 372

Review ArticleRecent Trends in Ethics . .. .Vnnnon J. Bounxp 396Discarsion Articles

Is Probability Inapplicable-in Principle-to the Gocl-Ilypothesis?.. ....RosrnrA.Oaxns 426Id.entity-Statements and Bssentialism.I'ftcnapr' J' loux 43IIlow Many Logics Are There ?. . . . Josnpn J. Rouarvo 4+0Descartes' Ontological Arg'ument as Non-Causa1Jeuns M. Ilurvrepn 4+9

ChronicleThe Secretary's Chronicle KerstrnrNp Rosn l[arqr-pn ronGnonep F. Mcl,new, O. M. f. 460

Ernan ll/[6[\ilntlinFfarry A. NielsenJoseph Owens, C.Ss.R.Elizabeth G. SaLnonKenneth L' Schr"itz

Jean T. Oeeterle

i

Baltimore, Maryland


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II Tabl,e of ContentsBooh Comments

Vendler: Li.ngui,sti,cs in PhilosophyKenny: The Fiae Wags: St. Thomas Aqainas' Proofsof God,'s Er'istenceFrege: The Found,atiorts of Arithemeti,cMrcsenr, J. LouxShibles : Wittgenstein, Language and, Phi,losophyDennett: Content and, Conscio,trs,ness: An Analysi,s ofMental Phenomena ... .Veuorl R. McKimChurch: Hume's Theory of tlue tlnderstand,i,nglocke: Problem,s amd, PerspectiuesLocke: Two Tructs on Goaeru,m,ent

Conupr,rus F. Dnr,anarIfudson : Ethical Intui,tioni,sm,Jones (ed.) : Approaches to Eth'i,cs. ...Jonrv Donrvnr,r.yRhees : Wi,thout AnswarslVliddleton (ed.) : Belected Letters of Fri.edrich, Nietzsche

'W. Devrn Sor,ouonGrlI: Essa.ys on Ki,rkegaard,Ifartmann: Bartre's OntologySchrag: Erperience and, Being: Prolegom,ena to aFuture Ontologg. ....Rupor,prr J. GnnnnnSwinburne: Bpace and, TimeAchinstein: Concepts of Bcience, A Phitosophi,cal

Analysi,sSchlegel: Contpleteness ,im Bcience. . . . .Gany GumrwcO'Toole z The Mystery of Com,mitmentMenv Rosp Bannar, 482Books Received

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The Idea of Phenomenologyby Martin Heideggertranslated by John N. Deely ondJoseph A. Novak, with the ossist-ance of Eva D, Leo

..Every *uo,,, .o,,3;::ii"t#"ff-.:",::"r, expend his chierthought and attention on the consideration of first principles-arethey or are they not rightly laiil down ? . . . a1l the rest wiil follow."This remark is perhaps by itseif suflicient to indicate the capitalphilosophical interest of the following article, coming as it doesfrom one of the principal auctores of contemporary philosophy,and at a time when the phrase " phenomenologically speaking "(or some equivalent) is a standard introduction to much of thecurrently circulated writings by professors in philosoph;'.

L. What does it mean to say, "phenomenologically speaking . . ."not, indeed., as a mere fashionable incantation, but as a preliminaryto a piece of philosophizing consistent with itself and groundeclin principle ? What, in other words, are the limits virtual to anyphenomenological philosophy precisely as such? Or (so as not tobeg the issue with those, like Ileidegger, for whom phenomenologyand philosophy are interchangeable designations), what is the powerand limits of philosophy itself phenomenologically conceived ? Thefoliowing article, aibeit cryptic, brief, and (like Heidegger's Beirzund, Zeit) truncated, taken together r,vith the methodological dis-cussion in the introductory chapterc of Sein und, Zeit, goes fartherin our judgment than any comparable piece of phenomenologicallore towarcl supplying an answer to these and related. questions.2. However this may be, part and parcel of the interest of thispiece is the light it throws on the nature of the phiiosophicaldifierences which finally separated the young Heidegger from hisgreat master, Edmund llusserl.W'hen asked in 1922 to write the article on Phenomenology for

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326 IIarti,n Heideggerthe 14th edition of the Encycloped,i,a Bri"tu,nnica, Ilusserl saw inthe offer an opportunifir 1e t..oocile rvith his own methodologicalviews and in their long-term interest the already divergent phe-nomenological stance adopted by the young lleidegger.r\ccordingly, he asked" I{eidegger to co-author lhe Bri,tannicq,article. The draft which lleidegger drew up in response to Husserl,srequest is the text which The New Scholu,sticism is here makingavailabie for the first time in llnglish translation. The full tifleof lleidegger's draft ae it appears in Band IX of the Husserh,ana,pp.256-263, translates as foilows: "Attempt at a Second Formu-lation. fntroduction. The Idea of Phenomenology and of theBegress to Conscious Alvareness." It is called a " second formula-tion " because it is based on llusserl's own preliminary draftarticle, which was in Heiclegger's possession. It may weil be thatthe text as here translated was not dra'wn up entirely ab ouo hyI-Ieidegger, but that rather what Ileidegger dicl was to base himselfas far as possible on the very rvorcling of Husserl's preliminarytext (the greater part of the article would suggest this), makingonly a few modiflcations in it here and there, so that the textualcritic with an eye to the strict canons of his profession mighthave some misgivings as to just whom should be singled out as theinitiator of any given paragraph or line-although the reaaleracquainted with l{eidegger can have no doubt about the distinctiveair and origin of the opening paragraphs, all in all the mostclecisive section of the piece. (Ambiguities of the nature justindicated woulcl account for the wording of the footnote in theHussediana, p. 256 of Band IX, explaining thal ', Diese Er'nleitungund Teii I, bis S. 263, ist von Heidegger red,igiertr, lemphasissupplied]. t'Redigieren " means " to edil, revise, or prepare for thepressr" rather than "to author.") But the only point of presentinterest is the fact that, however little or much lleidegger may havemodified or contenteal himself with the rvording of Ilusserl,s ownpreliminary draf! the end result was a text acceptable as far as itwent to lleidegger, but acceptable no longer to llusserl. Thisis indisputably sufficient, so far as any properly philosophicalmatters are at stake, to make Ileidegger the principal author-and.not merely a copy editor-of the piece here translatecl, howeveruncomfortable this determination may perforce leave the practi-tioners of textual criticism or the collectors of . Ilusserliana.,

Th,e Idea of Phenom,enologY 327badly for the purpose behind. its being undertaken at all, inasmuchur ii *.t finally (after several exchanges) rvith rejection -onilus*url's part, ancl the encyclopedia received its final copy underflusserl's signature alone. Thence ilerives a seconalaly importanceof tr.idugg.t's clraft: it marks the final parting of the way betweenfleidegger anil Husserl, as Heidegger recently wrote, " on the basisof *t ut to this day I stil1 consiiler a more faithful adherence to theprinciple of Phenomenology." The passage is worth noting:Dialogues with Husserl provicled fhe immediate experience of the phe-nomenological method that preparecl the concept of phenomenologyexplainetl in the Introduction to Being and' Ti'me ($ 7).Subsequent to this . . . the meaning and scope of the principle of Phe-nomenology, (( to the things themselves," became clear. As my famil-iar.ity wiih Phenomenology grew, no longer merely through literaturebut by actual practice, the question about Being, aroused by Brentanotswork, nevertheless remaineil ahvays in view. so it was that cloubt arosowhether the (( thing itseif " was to be characterizecl as intentionalconsciousness, or even as the transcendental ego. If, incieeil, Phenome-nology, as the plocess of letting things manifest themselves, shoulclcharaeterize the standarcl methocl of philosophy, and if from aneienttimes the guide-question of philosophy has perclurecl in the mostcliverse forms as the question about the Being of beings, then Being hadto remain the first ancl last thing-itself of thought.Meanwhile '( phenomenology " in Husserlts sense was elaboratecl intoa clistinctive philosophical position aceording to a pattern set byDescartes, Ka,ret, and Fichte. The Being-question, unfolded' inSein, und Zeit, patted company with this philosophical position, antlthat on the basis of what to this day I still consider a mole faithfuladherence to the principle of Phenomenology. (From M. Ileicleggerts((Vorwort" to IM. J. Richardsorls Heid,egger: Ihrough Phenorne'nol,ogg to Th,ouglr,t, pp. X-XIV, passi,rn.)

3. These remarks in turn point to a third reason for the im-portance of this little-known sketch by lleidegget of " The Ideaof Phenomenology," speciflcally, the light it can throw on thequestion of the relation of the later writings by Heidegger to hisearly work, and to Being and Tima rn particular.Quite expressly lleidegger aleclares in the opening pages of hisgreat book that "with the question of Being, our Investigationcomes up against the fundamental question of philosophy .that must be treated Tthenomenologi,cally" (Sein und' Zei't, p. 2?).Ileid.egger's attempted " second formulation,r, in short, farecl


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He declares that " Ontology and phenomenology are not twodistinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms char-acterize philosophy itself rvith regard to its object and its way oftreating that object" (ibid., p.g8). The term,,ontology,, ihusis just a way of accenting the subject-matter of philosophy, whereas" phenomenology " names the way of approach o" rnuthodologyalone adequate to the treatment of this subject-matter in allphilosophizing which has become ,, transparent to itself,r, i. e.,grounded in principle and consistenily develop ed. ,, Only as phe_nomenology is Ontology possible" (ibid., p. gb), because that iswhat philosophy itself xs-((1111iys1sal phenomenological ontology r:(ibirl., p.38). In the draft article here translated, written dir#tvafter the appearance of Sei,n und, Zeit, Ileidegger cleclares ,ro t..'uemphatically thal" whaf, constitutes phenomenology is the clarifica-tion at last of the philosophical Being-questiol',-an historicalfirst, be it noted-" and the [consequent] systematic restriction tothe methodologically settlecl philosophical tas\r, thus bringing toa3 end " the 'ague generarity and vacuity of traditionat prriioro-phizing."The point of calling attention to these early remarks is tharthey_express a judgment against traditional philosophizing (i.e.,all philosophy prior to the early German phenomenjogirui *oo._ment as stemming from TTusserl and, indirecily, Breitano), to_gether with a forthright statement of the importance o phenome-nology which holds for the whoie of lleidegger,s thought fromBein und, Zeit Lo the immediate present: a juigment ani a state-ment dtich He'id,egger neaer toole baclc or mod,if,ed,, except perhapsto fix them more strongly through his actual philosophizing. rft is true that with the famous Kehre oL ., reyersal ,, in hislhgught after 1980, first evidenced clearly perhaps in the Ei,n_filhru:LS in die X[etaphysilc, Heidegger,s break with Husserl is socompiete that he gradually foregoes so much as expricit ,uf.ruo..to phenomenology, and even abandons its ., recognized " t.r_io_ology. Nonetheless, it_ is a thorough misunderJaoairrg oJ- iorcalize that and how these later writings, even more purely andrigorously than the early writings, are conceiveil ,"d ";i..;;n a perspective through and through phenomenologicar. rreidee.-ger makes it quite clear in various places (e. g., b"trr*rrr;i,Bprache, p. 21) that he abandoned. the label ;pfr*"*."Jfr*1"even as he deveroped its genuine climensions, rargery o"t or a.i.riii*

The ld,ea of Phenont'enologY 3291e his repudiation by Ilusserl, who did after all hold a kind olnotion on the term: all, including fleidegger, acknowledged'Iiorr.rl as having fatherecl the original phenomenological move-rl.er:-t.The important letter from lleidegger which appears as the,.VorwortJ' to Fr. Richardson's extensive book-review, Heid'egger:Througtt Pltenomanology to Thought, again provides the decisiveiestimony. with regard to the change or l(ahre that marks hisway, Heidegger is at pains to point out:This change is not a consequence of altering the stanclpoint, much lessof abandoning the issue, of ]ei,tr, und Ze,it. The thinking of fhe reversalresults from the fact that, I stayed with the matter-for-thought (of)"Being and Time" . . . (PP. XVI-XV[).Further:one neeil only observe the simple fact that in sein und zei,t the problemis set up outsicle the sphere of subjectivism . . . for it to become strik-ingly clear that the((Being" into which Sein und, Ze'it inqu\red' cannotlong re*ain something that the human subject posits. . ' ' As a result,.o.o in the initial steps of the Being-question in Sein wnd, Zedt tho:ughtis called upon to undergo a change the movement of which cor-respondswith the reversal (pp. XVIII-XVIX).And he adds quite clearly, strongly, unmistalrably: " the reversalis a play within the matter itself. Neither did I invent it, nordoes it affect my thought alone " (i'bid.). In effect Heidegger issaying that anyone who understands the question of Being and themethodological approach alone proper to it would, if he successfullypursueil the question, be forced to make-or rather to " unclergo "-the same shift that clistinguishes the later (" Ileidegger II ") asagainst the early (" Heidegger I ") writings by Heidegger. It isin this sense that the question and method set forth in the intro-ductory chapters oI Sein und Zeit are constants in the philoso-phizing of llartin lleidegger. They remain constant throug'hout hisway of thought, and indeed define its ownmost character. That iswhy an approach to the philosophy of l{artin Ileidegger in termsof his idea of phenomenology is in the way of grasping, with asingle effort of thought both the internal structure of that phi-losophy and the general answer which Heidegger formulates inanswer to the widespread uncertainty evidenced today as to thenature of the uniquely philosophical task.

ilIartin Heid,egger


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Th,e ld'ea of PVuenom'anologg 331330 Martin Heid,egger4. The three-fold importance which we have just sketched asattaching to this obseure but quite crucial ilocument from lleideg-ger's early years, thus, is not the sort of importance that has, as itwere, genetic signifi.cance in IJeiclegger's " pelsonal " philosophicaldevelopment. The whole Britannica afrair would be peripheraiwithin any such psgch,ological perspective, and it is doubtful, insuch terms, whether l{eidegger attached a crucial signiflcance to

the draft in itself-a small effort to say the least, by contrast withthe just releaseal portions o! Bein und, Ze'i,t-or would rememberthe circumstances of the affair with any particular clarity. Thesketched tri-aspectual import is not for that reason any the lessindependent and real (it is at no point limned in the terms ofpsychological genesis), and may perhaps be summarized at thispoint in a single sentence: If Ileidegger is correct in contendingthat the break of his thoug'ht with that of l{usserl (and with thelarger phenomenologica] movement generally) was ilictated by amore faithful ad.herence to the principle of phenomenology, then anunderstanding of Heidegger's thought in terms of his idea itself ofphenomenology should suggest to us something a good deal moredecisive than one man's opinion as to the nature of the philosophicaltask; specifically, it should indicate to us the limits virtual toany phenomenological philosophy which is consi,stent wi,th i,tsel,fand, ground,ed, in pri,nci,plB. In our judgment it would seem possibleto express in just such terms the essential superiority of lteideg-gerean phenomenology over every other form.This last suggestion is not without certain general considerationsto recommend it. Is it not true that what has characterized everygreat thinker has been an abiiity to lay holcl of an idea and followthrough its implications relentlessly ? The characteristic of athinker, and of a philosophical thinlcer in particular, is the abilityto lay ideas bare in their ultimate import. (And the assertoriclimitation of each philosophical genius to one iclea often proves tobe but a wistful projection of one philosopher,s limitation on toothers . . .).

5. A few bibliographical references pertinent to the mattersindicated seems in order. W-alter Biemel gives a good many detailsof historical and speculative interest in his discussion of .. rlusserlsEncyclopaerli,a Britannica Artil


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332 Martin Heid,egger The ld,ea of PhenomenologY 333German (' Seiende," whereas ., Being ,, (with the upper case


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The ld,ea of Phen'ornenologY 335334 Mart'in Heid,eggerflective turn of sight' " reflective turning of the gazer, or soqgsimilar phrase. The related. expression .. Blickwendung, we rex-d.ered as '( turn of sight."Of particular importance for translation is Heidegger,s explicitidentification of " Seele" ("seelisch,,) and,,psychisch,, (r.p.y_chisch") as synonymous. We have appended a note at the pointin the text where this is explicit.

There are other points of terminology that might be mentioned.of course, but these highlights may be sufficient to suggest to thecaptious scholar that we were not unmindful of the lexation vexa-tions which always beset the work of translation. (rt is also worthobserving that they do not differ in kind from the difficulties ofparaphrasing within any one language, i. e., that they are not uniqueto translation, as is sometimes pretended.) Anyone who can "uoiu.he text better is welcome to do so; but the rendition depends inthe end on one's grasp of the phiiosophicai matter-at-issue, andw-e are confident on this score.W"e turn accordingly to the text of Heidegger,s Varsuch, einerzweiten Bearbeitung. Einl,eitung. Die ld,ee d,er phiinomenologieund, d,er Riickgang auf clas Bewusstsein.The universe of beings is the sphere {rom which the positivesciences of nature, history, space, secure at any given time theirregional o'bjects. Directed straight to beings, they take over iniheir totaiity the analysis of a1l that is. Thus there seems t'bo nothing left for philosophy, which fron. antiquity ranks asthe foundational science. But does not Greek philosoph;, fromits decisive beginnings make precisely . being , the obiect o{inquiry ? Assuredly : yet not so as to define this or that being,but rather in order to understand. being as bei,ng, that is, wi[respect to its Being. This way of setting up the question andtherewith the answers remained for a rong time shro,'ded inobscurities. Yet already in the beginnings a curious ambivalencefein Merkwiirdiges] appears. philosophy seeks the erucidationof Being through a consideration of the thoughf of being(Parmen'id,es). Plato's unveiling of the rdeas takes its oriental

don from the n'uon'ologue (" logos ") of the soul with itself'The Aristotel'iam categories originate in view o{ the predicativerecognition fdas aussagend'e Erkennen] o{ reason' Descw'tes."nilttt "ulbli*n".l liirst Philosophy on the '( res cogitans'"K-*t', transcendental problematic moves in the sphere of' con-sc'i,ousness fBewusstseins]' Is this shift in perspective [Um-wendung d.es Blickes] from being to consciousness arbitrary oris it periapu d.*und"d by the peculiarity of that which' underthe title of Being, is constantly attended to as the ProblemArea of philosophy ? The clarification in principle fgrund-sritzliche] of the necessity for regression fRiickgangs] to con-scious awareness fBewusstsein], the radical and explicit d'eter-mination of the ltray or path and of the proced'uraI steps ofthi. ".t"ogression Iniictsu"g], the fundamental fprinzipielle]"i""o-.""iption and systematic fsystematische] exploration ofthe sphere of pure subjectivity which is opened up along thisouuy -bu"k fRiickgang] : such is r'vhat constitutes Phenome'ootogy. The fnal clariflcation of the philosophical Being-prob-lem and the methodical retrenchment or (( cutting back " [diemethodische Zuriickfiihrung] to the systematically fwissen-schaftlich] settled philosophical task overcomes the Yague gene-rality and vacuity of traclitional philosophizing' The stating ofthe question, methodical research, and interpretation conformto the fund.auental arrangement fprinzipiellen Gliederung] o{preciselythe'being'ofpositivityaccordingtoallofitskindsuna gt*a"r. But has not this same task been taken over bypsy.Ulology since the time o{ Locke? Does not a radical layingof the foundation of philosophy require something other than apsycholory o{ pure conscious subjectivity methodically conse-iolot "po" and restricted- to that which we und'ergo withinolo"**lou* [innere Er ahrung] only ? Fundamental fgrundsii'tz-liche] deliberation on the object and method of mere psychologyhowever can make evident that it is in principle [grundsritzlich]notinthepositiontoestablishfoundationsforphilosophyasa

!{::i. i


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93736 Martin Heid,egger T'ha ld,ea of Pltenontenol'oggscience' For it is itserf positive science lpositive wissenschaft]and, in keeping with the research-mode of positive science assuch, leaves untouched the question which concerns all fpositivescience] in the same way, namely the question of the meaningof the Being of their regions of Being. The regression toconscious awareness, which all philosophy searches for withvarying sureness and clarity, extends back therefore beyondthe region of, the pure psychic into the sphere of pure sub-jectivity' Because in this fsubjectivity] the Being of art thatwhich for the subject can be experienced in a difieren t wzy,the transcend,ent in the broadest sense, is constituted, it is calredtranscendenlal subjectivity. The pure psycho,logy as positiveknowiedge fpositive wissenschaft] of conscious awareness refersback to the transcendentar knowredge ftranszendentale'w'isserr-schaft] of pure subjectivity. rt is the yeahzution of the ideaof Phenomenology as scientifc [wissenschaftlicher] philosophy.conversely the transcend.entai knowledge of conscious awarenesssecures for the first time the co*plete insight into the essenceof pure psychology, its fundamental ffundamentale] functionand the comditions of its possiblity.

The fdea of a pure psycho,logyAll experiences in rvhich we have a relation directed to objects(underg'oing [Erfahren], thinking, wanting, evaluating) admitof a turn of sight lor a reflective gaze,, (Biickweidung)],through which they themselves becoie objects. The diversemodes of experience are revealed. as that wherein everythingwhich we stand in relation to comes to light tsich zeigt],appears'' The experiences therefore are ca'ed phenomena.The reflective turning o{ the gaze [Die Umwenar_g a.*Blickes] on to them,. the undergoing [Erfahrung] and deter-mination of the experiences simply as such is the piino_uoologi_cal attitude. fn this manner of speaking the term ,, phenome-nological " is still used in a preriminary iuor". w-ith the reflec-

dve turning of the gaze toward the phenomena a universalturk opuo* op, ou-"ly, to systematically fsystematisch] investi-gut" th" varieties of experiences, their typical {orms' grades'ind hie"a"chization fsiufenzusammenhdnge]' and to und'e-r-stand fthem] as fforminS] a totality closed in itself [ein insich geschlossenes Ganzes]' Turned to experiencest we trans'fo"-1h" ways of, behavior of the 'soul,' the pure psychic'* intothe object. it is callecl pure psychic because in looking towardexperiences as such one looks away frorn all psychic functionsin the sense of the organization of, corporeality fleibl'ichkeit]'that is to say, away from the psychophysical' The abovementioned phenomenological attitude secures the access to thepure psychic and makes possible the thematic investigation ofth" .u*" in the sense of a pure psycho'logy' The clarification[Au-fkkirung] of the understancling of the id-ea of a pur"efsychology requires the answ'ering o{ three questions:1. What is prope to fgehort] the object o{ the pure psy-chology;2..Whichisthewayodaccessandma.nipulationthatthisobject demands according to its proper cond-ition fVerfassung] ;3. What is the function in principle fgrund.shtzliche] ofthe pure psYchologY ?

1. Th,e Obiect of tlt'e Ptr're Psychology'By what is the being, which thro'ngh the phenomenologicalturn of sight becomes the object, generally characterized' as

such ? In all pure psychic [seelischen] experiences (in theperception of something, in the recollection of something, in theimaginiog of something, in delighting in sorrething, in judging

* Note here lleitlegger's explicit equation of 'clie verhaltungsweisen iler,, seele ,, , to . d.as rein psychische ,: . Den Erlebnissen zugewendet machenwirdieVerhaltungsweisencler..Seele,,,dasreinPsychischezumGegen.stand, Rein psychische wird. es genannt. . . ., It is this statement whichjustifiesthesynonymousrenileringoftheformsof"seelisch"antl" psychisch."


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338 Martin Heideggerabout something; in wanting something, in hoping for some-thingi etc.) there lies originally a being-directed toward. . .Experiences arc intentional. This referring-to . . . is linkedto the psychic not just subsequently and occasionally as anarbitrary relation, as though experiences could be what they arewithout the intentional reference. Rather, with the intention.ality of experiences the essential structure of the pure psychicmanifests itself. The totality of a coherence of experience[Erlebniszusammenhangs] of a psychic fseelischen] life existsat any given time in the sense of a seif (an f) and as such itlives in de facto [faktisch] communion fGemeinschaft] withothers. The pure psychic proyes for that reason accessible bothin what the isolated sel{ undergoes [Selbsterfahrung] and inwhat is undergone intersubjectively in contact with an extrane-ous or foreign psychic tife fin der intersubjektiven Erfahrungfremden Seelenlebens].Each of tho experiences which reveal thenaselves in what theself undergoes [in der seibster{ah'ung] has for itself initiailyits own essential form or pattern fWesensfonn] with possiblemodes of modification which are proper to it. The perceptionfor instance od a cube has this one thing even in the originatingperceptive glimpse [Blick]. Nevertheless it is not in its char-acter as experience a simple empty having-here fDa-haben] ofthe thing. Tho thing presents itself in the perception ratherthrough manifold t ways of appearance., The correlationfZusammenhang] o{ these, which directly constitutes the per-ception in the first place, has its own proper type and its owntypical regulation of its completion. The modes of appearancein the recollection of this same thing are the same and yet

inflected in the manner proper to memory. Moreover difierencesand grades of clarity show up, of relative d.eterminateness andindeterminateness o{ comprehension [Erfassens], such as tem-poral perspective, attentiveness, etc. Such is the case in anopinion consciously judged fdas in einem urteil Geurteilte]

The ld,ea of Phanornenol'ogg 339one time as evident, another time as not evident. The judgingas not evident can for its part occur as something random orbe explained step by step. Correspond'ingly, the experiences olwanting and evaluating are always unities of hidd'en [p"o]esiablishecl ffundierenclen] t ways of appearance'' In such ex-neriences however that which is experienced" does not appearsimply as ldentrca-t and clifierent, ind"ivid"ual and general' asbeing and not being, possibiy and probably being, as serviceable'bruotifol, good, but it proaes itself as true or untrue, genuineor spurious. The essential patterns fWesensformen] of theindividual experiences are embedded' though in a type of possibles;ntheses and completions within a closed' psychic co rtextfseelischen Zusammenhangs]. It has as totality tho essentialfo"m [wesensform] of a psychic life of an individ.ual self assuch. This fself] exists on the basis of its enduring convictions,decisions, habits, qualities of character' And this totality ofthe habituality of the self reveals in turn essential patterns offormation [Wesensformen d.er Genesis], of its proximately[jeweiligen] possible activity, which [fo'rmative activity] forits part remains stratified. in the associative interconnections[Zusammenhiinge] whose specific pattern o{ happening [Ge-schehensfo,m] is one rrith that fformative activity] throughtypical successive references. The self lives de faclo aI anygiven time in communion with others. social acts (addressinganother, agreeing with him, dominating his will, etc') have notonly their own proper pattern as experiences of groupst tribes,corporations, and alliances, but also their own type of happen-ing, of efiect (power and powerlessness), of development anddecline (history fGeschichte]). This totality o{ the life of theinclivid.ual in possible communings fGemeinschaften], in itsel{constmcted. intentionally through and thro,ugh, constitutes theentire sphere of the pure psychic. fn what way is sure accessto this region accomplished, and which is the manner of itsadequate disclosure?


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3+0 Martin Heid,egger2. The Me{;h,od, of tlte Pure Psychology.

The essential components of the method determine them-selves from the basic constitution [Grundverfassung] andspecies o{ the Being of the object. If the pure psychic isessentially intentional and aceessible in the first instance irrwhat the individuai self undergoes [der Selbsterfahrung desEinzelnen], [then] the phenorirenological turn of sig'ht towardexperiences must be executed. suchwise that these show them-selves in their intentionality and become g6mprehensible withreference to their type. The access to the intentional beingaccording to its basic state [Grundverfassung] is effectecl byway of, the phenonoenological-psychotrogicai reduct,i,on. Remain-ing in the reductive attitrde the eid,etic analysis of the purepsychic is carried out, that is to say, the exposure of the essentiaistructures o the individual species of experience, their patternsof interconnection and happening [Zusammenhangs- und Ge-schehensformen]. rnasmuch as the psychic becomes aecessi-ble in what the seif und.ergoes both alone and in connpanywith others [in der Selbsterfahrung und intersubjektiven Er-fahrung], the reduction is articulated [gliedert sich] accordingto the egological and the intersubjective.a) The Phenomenological-psychological Reduction.The reflective turn of sight away from the unconsid.eredpercep'tion of, say, a thing of nature, toward. this perceivingitself has the peculiarity that in it the apprehensive tendencywhich previously was directed at the thing draws back fvom th,eunconsidered perception in order to direct itself to the nerceiv-ing as such. This device (reduction) for following up theapprehensive tendency [Diese Rtickfiihrung (Reduktion) derErfassungstendenz] from within the perception and the trans-position o the apprehension unto the perceiving so 1itt1e changesthe perceptio.o, that the reduction makes the perception directly

The ld,ea of PhenomenologY 3+taccessible as that which it is, that is to say, as perception of thething. The thing of nature itself is indeed essentially neYer thepossible object of a psychological reflection, yet shows itselfigainst the reducing gaze o\ the perceiving, since this [perceiv-ing] is essentially perception of the thing. The thing belongs tothe perception as that which is perceived. The intentionalrelation of the perceiving to be sure is not a {ree-floatingrelation directed into a vacuum, but as (( intentio " it has an((intentum " essentially beionging to it. Whether the very thingperceived" in the perception is present or not, the intentionalassumption of the perception is nevertheless, accord'ing to itsown apprehensive meaning, directecl to the being as physicallyat hand. Every perceptual illusion makes this clear. Onlvbecause the perceiving as intentional essentially has its " in-tentum " can it be modified in the direction of a deceptiot aboutsomething. Owing to the per{ormance of the reduction the fullintentional content of an experience becomes originally visible'Since then al1 pure experiences and their interconnections areintentionally corxtructed, the reduction guarantees the universalaccess to the pure psychic, that is to say, to the p'h,enotnena.Ilence the reduction is called phenomenological. 'What becomesprimarily accessible in the execution of the phenomenologicalreduction is however the pure psychic as a de facto aniqlnecoherence of, experience of the current [jeweiligen] self' Be-yond the characteristic descriptive of this (on each occasion)unique experience completion fErlebnisabiaufes], is a genuinelyscientific, that is, objectively valid, recognition of the psychicnow possible?

b) The Eidetic Analysis.ff intentionality constitutes the basic state of all pure ex-periences and is different in relation to the separate kinds ofexperience [Erlebnisgattungen], then the laying bare o{ that


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I olto42 Martin Heid,eggerwhich belongs, for example, to a perception as such, to a wantingas such, in every case according to their full intentional struc-tural content, emerges as a possible and necessary task. Thereductive attitude toward. the pure psychic, which [pure psy-chic] presents itself at the outset as a de facto ind,ividuaiexperience.coherence [Erlebniszusammenhang], must thus pre-scind from or disregard fabsehen] aIi psychic facticity. Thislinitia]ly given psychic f.acticiby] serves only exemplarily asbasis for the free variation of possibilities. Thus for examplethe phenomenologicai analysis of the perception of spatial thingsis in no wly a report about, the perceptions de facto occwringor empiricaily anticipated, but is the laying bare of, the neces-sary structural system without which a synthesis of manifoldperceptions as perception of one and the same thing would" beunthinkable. The exhibiting of the psychic effected in the reduc-tive posture has in view accordingly the iru;ari.snt standing outwithin the variations, the necessary pattern-style (Eidos) of theexperience. The reductive attitude toward the psychic func-tions therefore in the manner of an eidetic analysis of thephenomena. The scientific exploration of the pure psychic, thepure psychology, can be rcalized only as reductiae-eidet'i,c, asphenomenological. The phenomenological psychology is descri,p-tine. That means: the essential structures of the psychic aremade to stand out from it by direct intuition in the method ofvariation. All phenomenological concepts and propositions re-quire direct verifications upon the phenomena themselves. fn-sof,ar as the reduction in the sense charaeJwized, secures theaccess only to one's own psychic lifo fSeelenieben], it is caliedegologi,cal. Yet because each self stand,s with others in empathicassociation [Einfiihlungszusarnmenhang] constituted within in-tersubjective experiences, a necessary amplification of the ego-logical reduction by means of the intersubjecti,ae is required.The phenomenology of empathy, which must be treated in itscompass! by the clarification of the manrler in which empathic

The ld,ea of Phenom'enologYphonomena of my pure psychic coherence are able to developin the mode of consentient feinstimmig'er] verification, leadsnot only towards the description of syntheses of this type asthat fi. e., as a description] of my soul. What here establishesitsel{ in a speciflc evidence-frame is the co-er'i'stence of' aconcrete other self indicatecl consequently and with evel'new determinations of content-along with a corporality[Koryerlichkeit] experienced rvithin my sphere of consciousawareness fronc the outset and of a niece with it' But thisforeign self on the other hand. is not here fron the o'utset inthe same way as one's own [self] in its singular foriginalen]relation to ofs co'rpolality. The carrying through o{ the phe-nomenological recluction in my real and possible validation ofa , foreign, psychic life in the eviclence-patterl o{ consentaneous[einstimmiger] empathy is the intersubjective reduction' From'the basis of the egological reduction it makes the foreign psychiclife in its primord_ial self-certification accessible within its purepsyehic consistencies [Zusammenhringen]'

3. TIte Funct'ion i'n Princi'ple lgrund'siitzlichef ofthe Pure PsycVuologY.The recluction opens the way to the pure psychic as such'The eid"etic analysis unveils in its essential coherences the

recluctively accessible along this way. The former is i'n'd'ispensa'ble, t}le latter the constitutive element adecluuting fhinrei-chende] along with the former the method of, pure psychology.According'ly, in the reductive eidetic investigation of the puropsychic, the cleterminations which belong to the pure psychicas such, that is to say, the ground; concepts of psychology, ariseinso{ar as it [i. e., psychology] has, as empirical knowledge ofthe psychophysical totality of concrete man, its central domainin the pure psychic life as such. Pure psychology supplies thenecessary a-prioristic fundament for empirical psychology withregard to the purely psychicai [Seeli.sche]. Just as a systematic

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344 Ma,rti,n Heid;eggerfsystematischen] unveiiing of the essential patterns of a natureas such is required fcr the establishment of an , exact, empiricalnatural scieace, without u'hich [unveiling] nattre, more specifi-cally, [a] space-time franrc, motion, change, physicai substan-tiali6', and causality could not be thought; so also a scientificallyfwissenscha{t1ich] ' exacl,' psycho ogy recluires an unveiling ofthe a-priori type [Typik], without which [unveiling] the f(equally the we), conscious awareness, the objectivity of con-sciousness and consequently a psychic life as such-with allthe differences and essentially possible forms of syntheses whichare inseparable from the idea of an individually and commun-ally psychical totaiity-could not be thought.* Althoug.h thepsychophysical interrelation [or ('set up ,' (Zasammenhang) ]as such has its o,rvn a-priori which has not yet been determinedby means of the purely psychological ground-co rcepts, the psy-chophysical a-priori still requires in principle such an orienta-tion with respect to the a-priori of, the pure psychic.

Instdtwte for Phi,losoplt i,oal Reseorch,Ch,i.cago, Illinois.

{' Cf. Heitlegger's remarks on ., den vollensenschaft " in Bein und, Zeot, pp. 862-368. existenzialen Begriff der Wis-

Some Meclieval Anticipations of Inertiaby lames F. O'Btien

IFIE IDEA OF inertia is a to,uchsto re to a philosophy ofnature. N. R' Hanson noted recently,

Too often the inteilectual excitement of science seems only geared toresearoh in eontemporarT physics. However there a're statements'hypotheses ancl theories of classical science that ave rewarding inthu**ulru*-*ithout having to be referred to the agonies that nowconfound quantum theory ancl cosmology, speciflcally, Newton's flrstIaw of motion-the law of inertia-which has everything a logician ofscience eould clesire.l

one can also add. that the larv is filled with meaning {or anymetaphysics which wili be relevant not only to the world of"*pu"i"n"u but also'to the

mind. trained' in science as it existstod-ay. It neecl only be recalled that Newton's law of lnertiaand the general ideas about motion which either led to itsformulation, were deduced from it, or are at least compatilrlewith it, constitute a major reason for the rejection of Aris-totelian-Thomistic type philosophies o{ natule since the seven-teenth century. There is no doubt that the law led Newton andothers to ideas about God's relation to the physical world quitedifferent from those of the medievals, such as Aquinas, perhapsmost obviously in terms of His conservation of things in theirbeing and concurrence in their activity' ft has also played akey role in greatly diminishing the persuasive power of the

1N. R, Ilanson, "Newton's First Law: A Philosopher's Door intoNatural Philosophy," in Begond, The frd'ge of Oertacntg, etlitecl by RobertG. Colodny (Eisays ,in Conternltorarg Sci,ence anr1 Phi1oso,th,g, Yo1. 2,university of Pittsburgh series in the Philosophy of science [EnglewootlCiifis, N. J., 19651 ), p.5. See also N. R. Ilanson, "The T'aw of InertiarA Philosopher's Touchstone," Plr,ilosoplty of Soi'en'oe,30 (1963)'345

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