hekman, susan - gadamer, althusser and the methodology of the social sciences

University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Beyond Humanism: Gadamer, Althusser, and the Methodology of the Social SciencesAuthor(s): Susan HekmanReviewed work(s):Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 98-115Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447847 .

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BEYOND HUMANISM: GADAMER, ALTHUSSER, AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

SUSAN HEKMAN

University of Texas at Arlington

IT HAS BECOME something of a cliche' in the social sciences that we are currently in a state of crisis. Although most social scientists would agree that the positivist (or behaviorist-empiricist) methodology

provided a common basis for the social sciences in recent decades, most would also agree that this consensus is a relic of the past. Furthermore, contemporary social and political theorists in particular would most likely share a common assessment of this positivist methodology: that it has been seriously discredited in contemporary methodological and philosophical discussions in the social sciences. Yet despite this general agreement among theorists the majority of practicing social scientists continue to conduct research on the basis of the positivist methodology. This fact is most commonly explained by pointing out that although social and political theorists may agree that positivist social science is untenable, they have not been able to agree on its replacement. The net result of this situation, and the reason for the characterization of the social sciences as in a state of crisis, is that the social sciences are cast adrift without a theoretical anchor.

POSITIVISM VS. HUMANISM

In the process of discrediting the positivist methodology in the social sciences, social and political theorists have not been remiss in proposing alternatives to positivism. A plethora of anti-positivist methodologies, which, for want of a better term, can be placed under the broad label of "humanism," have been suggested in recent decades. The list includes phenomenology, ethnomethodology, critical theory, ordinary language analysis, and symbolic interactionism as well as various offshoots of these positions. Although there are important differences among these positions, they share a number of common themes. On the most fundamental level the humanists argue that the positivist model of scientific knowledge, although perhaps appropriate for the natural sciences, is highly inappro- priate for the social sciences. They argue, furthermore, that the reason for this is that the subject matter of the social sciences is radically different from that of the natural sciences. The social sciences study "meaningful human action," a subject matter that cannot be apprehended by employ- ing the techniques of the natural sciences.

The humanist attack on positivist social sciences that characterizes contemporary discussions in the social sciences, however, is hardly new. Its roots go back at least to the nineteenth century's heated de- bates over the proper methodology of the social sciences, the Methodenstreit. There are distinct parallels, for instance, between Weber's critique of Mill which figured prominently in the Methodenstreit and Peter Winch's recent critique of positivist social sci-



Beyond Humanism 99

ence. These parallels, however, are more disturbing than reassuring. They suggest that the debate between humanism and positivism, instead of moving toward a satisfactory resolution, particularly for the social sciences, is instead proving to be unresolvable.

The reason for the persistence of the debate between positivism and humanism is not readily apparent. It would seem, on the face of it, that the humanists are offering a clear alternative to the positivist approach that rests on an entirely different epistemology. But closer examination shows this not to be the case. Both humanists and positivists, it turns out, share a fundamental epistemological assumption: the opposition of subject and object. The essence of the positivist approach has been to emphasize the object side of this opposition. They claim that the goal of scientific investigation is the accumulation of "objective knowledge" free from any taint of subjectivity. The humanists, on the other hand, have emphasized the subject side of the dichotomy. In the parlance of contemporary philosophy, what the humanists have effected is the "deconstruction" of the object of knowledge in the social sciences. That is, they have attempted to show that the brute, "objective" facts that provide the raw material for the positivist's production of knowledge simply do not exist in the social sciences. They argue, instead, that the subject matter of the social sciences is inherently "subjective" because it deals with meaningful action.

This epistemological perspective suggests both why the humanist critique has failed and why the debate between positivism and humanism has persisted: Positivism and humanism are, in essence, two sides of the same coin. This complementary relationship between positivism and humanism is increasingly coming to the attention of social and political theorists. One of the pioneers in this line of thought, Michel Foucault, argues that instead of challenging the epistemological foundations of positivism the humanists have succeeded only in standing positivism on its head. Because they have failed to question the opposition of subject and object that lies at the heart of the positivist epistemology, the humanists have, in effect, chosen one side of this opposition as their exclusive domain. The subjectivism fostered by humanism is, in this sense, the obverse of the objectivism of positivism.1

That the opposition between the objectivism of positivism and the subjectivism of humanism has created serious problems for the social sciences should be evident from recent theoretical discussions in the social sciences. Schutzian phenomenologists, Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophers, ethnomethodologists, and others in the humanist camp have presented eloquent and convincing arguments against the objectivism of positivism. These arguments have, to a large extent, con- vinced the social scientific community of the futility of looking for the "brute facts" defined by the early positivists. The arguments the humanists have advanced for an alternative methodology for the social sciences, however, have been far less successful. Their principal tactic has

See Dallmayr's excellent analysis of this theme in his recent Twilight of Subjectivity. Shapiro makes a similar argument in Language and Political Understanding.



100 Western Political Quarterly

been to argue that the social scientist's first and primary task is to describe meaningful social action in the actor's terms. Most of the humanist schools also argue that the social scientific investigator can and must move beyond this descriptive level, but these arguments have not been taken very seriously by their positivist opponents. Ignoring the humanists' claim that they are not limited to the descriptive level, the positivists have argued that the humanist position restricts the social sciences to the "mere description" of social action. It follows that the social sciences are relegated to the realm of"subjectivity" because they are excluded from the realm of "objective knowledge" that, for both humanist and positivist, characterizes the scientific realm.

The positivist side of the debate, however, has also failed to present a viable position on the methodology of the social sciences. Critiques of the objectivism of the naive positivist position have resulted in increasingly sophisticated reformulations of the positivist position. The strongest themes of these reformulations are, first, that the social sciences, if they are to claim the status of a science, must define their data in objective terms and, second, that the social sciences must be able to move beyond the "mere description" of social action if they are to avoid the relativism implicit in the humanist position. Both of these themes have struck re- sponsive chords among social scientists. But the positivists have been unable to describe to their opponents' satisfaction the constitution of the objective data of the social sciences and, further, have been unable to offer an epistemologically satisfactory justification for the purported objectivity of social scientific analysis.

This assessment of the state of the debate points to two conclusions. First, it suggests that in order to transcend the sterility of the on-going debate between positivism and humanism the validity of the positivist epistemology must be specifically challenged and the positivist definition of "scientific knowledge" called into question. Second, it suggests that, as a first step, it is necessary to complete the critique of positivism begun by the humanists by "deconstructing" the other side of the subject-object opposition: the knowing subject. It is necessary, in other words, to challenge the epistemological primacy of the knowing subject presupposed by the epistemology of both positivism and humanism. The aim of the following analysis is to examine two contemporary theorists whose work is moving in these directions. Although they are not the only contemporary theorists to move beyond the humanist critique of positivism, and although they stem from very different intellectual traditions, Hans-Georg Gadamer and, to a lesser extent, Louis Althusser nevertheless exemplify what is entailed by this movement.2 Both have succeeded in transcending the humanist-positivist debate by moving to a new epistemological plane.

2 It should be noted in this context, however, that a school of thought falling under the label of "realism" has also challenged the validity of the positivist epistemology and extended their critique to the social sciences. See Bhaskar (1971), Benton (1977), and Thomas (1980). In addition, at least one theorist has noted a strong similarity between the realists and Althusser's position (Scott, 1979: 327-40).



Beyond Humanism 101

They have done so, first, by calling into question the epistemology of the positivist methodology that lays exclusive claim to the production of "objective knowledge" through adherence to the scientific method. Sec- ond, they have rejected what has come to be the hallmark of the humanist position: an emphasis on the constituting role of the knowing human subject.

The significance of the movement represented by the work of Gadamer and Althusser can best be explained by describing it in the epistemological terms employed above. It was stated that both positivists and humanists accept the opposition of subject and object, that both accept that the object side of this dichotomy is definitive of the scientific realm, and that each focuses on an opposite side of this dichotomy. Specifically the positivists argue that the object side of the dichotomy can be apprehended a priori and define this apprehension as the acquisition of "brute facts." The humanists, although they deny the existence of brute facts in the social sciences, argue that the subject side of the dichotomy can be apprehended a priori and define this apprehension as the interpretation of meaningful action. Gadamer and Althusser deny both these post- ulates by arguing that both subject and object are creations of the conceptual scheme of the interpreter. They assert that neither can be apprehended a priori because neither subject nor object is a reality that exists prior to the conceptual scheme. Several important consequences follow from this view. First, because Gadamer and Althusser reject the opposition of subject and object they also reject the definition of scientific method founded on it, a definition accepted by both positivists and humanists. It follows that both avoid the humanists' problem ofjustifying the scientific status of the social sciences. But, secondly, and most importantly, by moving the social sciences onto a new epistemological plane in which neither subject nor object have a priori status, they offer a way of transcending the futile debate between positivism and humanism that has created the current crisis in the social sciences.

The purpose of the following examination of the work of Gadamer and Althusser is to reveal, in more concrete terms, how this transcendence is accomplished in each's theory. Because Gadamer attacks the problem of the futility of the positivist-humanist debate most directly, his work offers a clearer understanding of the methodological implications of this movement than does that of Althusser. But, despite the superiority of Gadamer's approach in this regard, Althusser's position is worthy of serious attention because, like Gadamer, he offers a means of transcending the impasse created by the opposition of positivism and humanism. The philosophical differences between the two theorists is also worthy of note. The fact that Gadamer and Althusser share certain epistemological assumptions despite their very different philosophical roots suggests the significance of this movement for the social sciences.

GADAMER

A. The critique of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge Gadamer's hermeneutics embodies two elements that are of

methodological significance for the social sciences: first, the rejection of




the peculiar status of the conception of scientific method developed in the Enlightenment and accepted by both positivists and humanists, and, second, the development of a theory of interpretation that avoids reference to the "subject" or "subjective intentions." Both of these positions are developed in the extensive critique of nineteenth-century hermeneutics which occupies Gadamer's attention in Truth and Method. Before examining this critique, however, an initial problem must be considered: the fact that Gadamer states in quite unequivocal terms that his aim is not to offer a methodology for the social sciences. In the introduction to Truth and Method he states that his goal is, rather, to understand what the human sciences are and what connects them to the totality of experience of the world (1975:xiii). Thus he is not concerned with method per se but what lies behind method, a position which rests on his definition of hermeneutics itself: "The hermeneutical experience is prior to all methodological alienation because it is the matrix out of which arise the questions that it then directs to science" (1976A: 26). Strictly speaking, then, an examination of Gadamer's position consists of an exploration of the methodological implications of his work rather than an explicit examination of "Gadamerian methodology."

The key both to Gadamer's allegiance to nineteenth-century hermeneutics and to his departure from this tradition can be found in his critique of the Enlightenment's definition of objective, scientific knowledge. In summary, Gadamer's argument is that although Dilthey and Schleiermacher began this critique in the right direction, they left it unfinished. Gadamer sees his work as both a continuation of their work and, at a crucial juncture, a significant departure from it. The core of the Enlightenment's definition of knowledge is the identification of "true," "exact," and "objective" knowledge with the product of the scientific method, that is, the method of the natural sciences, and, furthermore, the identification of all deviations from this model as inexact and subjective. The error of nineteenth-century hermeneutics, on Gadamer's account, was its failure to offer a sufficiently radical critique of this position. Even though Dilthey and Schleiermacher attempted to formulate a methodology for the human sciences in opposition to that of the natural sciences, this attempt was a failure because implicit in their approach is the acceptance of the validity of the Enlightenment's definition of objective knowledge. Thus they could not, as they claimed, offer a distinctive method for the social sciences. What their thought amounts to, on the contrary, is an explication of how the human sciences fit into the Enlightenment conception of knowledge, either by mimicking the objectivity of the natural sciences or by conceding the "subjectivity" of the human sciences (1975: 6-9).

Given the magnitude of the failure of nineteenth-century hermeneutics, it would seem that Gadamer would do well to abandon the hermeneutical tradition altogether in his search for a proper understanding of the human sciences. Gadamer's specific criticisms of these thinkers, however, explain why he employs their thought as a starting point for his own critique of the Enlightenment. What Gadamer sees to be the value of



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this tradition is most evident in his examination of Dilthey. Dilthey's contribution was to advance the principle that all understanding is historically conditioned. This principle forms the core of Gadamer's approach to hermeneutics as well. But Dilthey's theory also contains two fundamental errors. First, Dilthey presupposes that, in the process of historical interpretation, historical observers occupy an Archemedean point vis-a-vis the text. He assumes, in other words, that interpreters can overcome their own historicity and offer an "objective" analysis of a text. His second error is his assumption that historical understanding involves "getting inside the mind" of the author of the text, that is, apprehending the subjective intentions of its author (1975: 204ff).

In the process of correcting these two errors in Dilthey's methodology Gadamer develops the two themes that, it is being argued, are of methodological significance for the social sciences. The first theme is developed in the context of an examination of the nature of historical understanding. The essence of Gadamer's argument is the assertion that Dilthey did not understand his own principle that all understanding is historical. He failed to see that all understanding, without exception, necessarily involves preconceptions that are a product of the historical setting. Gadamer defines these preconceptions as "prejudice." His argument with regard to prejudice is radical in its simplicity: All understanding necessarily involves prejudice and thus neither observer nor observed, text or interpreter can be said to be free from prejudice. Prejudice is not, as the Enlightenment thinkers argued, something that must be eliminated on the way to truth. Nor is it, as Dilthey thought, something that the historical observer can sidestep in the process of interpretation. Rather, it is a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing (1975: 236). The basic principle of Gadamer's hermeneutics, then, is his provo- cative statement that the attempt to remove all prejudice is itself a prejudice (1975: 244). Both the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century hermeneutics failed to grasp the phenomenon of understanding because they failed to understand the necessity of prejudice.

This correction of Dilthey establishes two important points: first, it establishes that in the process of interpretation, interpreter as well as text are bound by prejudice, and, second, it reveals that the Enlightenment's definition of truth as the elimination of prejudice is erroneous. These points form the basis of Gadamer's theory of the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding, he asserts, is the interplay of the movement of the tradition and the movement of the interpreter. It is a dialectical process he compares to the dialectic of question and answer. And, most importantly, both elements of the dialectic, the interpreter as well as the text, are historically conditioned.

At the beginning of all historical hermeneutics, then, the abstract an- tithesis between tradition and historical research, between history and knowledge, must be discarded. The effect of a living tradition and the effect of historical study must constitute a unity, the analysis of which would reveal only a texture of reciprocal relationships. (1975: 251.)




It is important to note at this point, however, that Gadamer phrases his discussion of the necessity of prejudice in understanding in positive rather than negative terms. His point is not the negative one that we should resign ourselves to the necessity of prejudice. Rather, he insists that prejudice represents the productive possibility of understanding. Understanding a historical text involves being aware of the effect of the text on the interpreter's own understanding of it. Understanding, in short, is reflexive; it involves an openness to tradition that permits the tradition to speak.3 What occurs in understanding Gadamer labels the "fusing of horizons." Both the text under investigation and the interpreter of the text, he claims, have "horizons" of understanding that are historically conditioned. The process of interpretation does not, however, entail that the investigator simply enters the horizon of the text. Rather, it involves the fusing of the two horizons into a distinct unit:

The projecting of the historical horizon, then, is only a phase in the process of understanding, and does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of understanding. In the process of understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed. We described the conscious act of this fusion as the task of the effective-historical consciousness. (1975: 273-74.)

This notion of what occurs in the phenomenon of understanding reveals the error of the Enlightenment's exclusive identification of truth with the scientific method's elimination of prejudice. But to demonstrate that error and to suggest a model for the kind of truth sought in the human sciences Gadamer must produce an "experience of truth" that is distinct from the scientific method yet indisputable in itself. This problem provides the context for his discussion of the aesthetic experience in the first section of Truth and Method. Rhetorically he asks: "Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but equally certainly is not inferior to it? (1975: 87.) Gadarner's specific aim in this section is to rescue the aesthetic experience from the subjectivism to which Kant and sub- sequent Enlightenment thought relinquished it and, thus, to retrieve the notion of truth in art (1975: 88). More broadly, however, his goal is to reveal the fundamental inadequacy of the scientific model of knowledge. Instrumental to this larger goal is his discovery of an aspect of the experience of truth in art that contradicts this model. In the aesthetic experience the spectator is an intimate and inseparable part of the process of knowing. In the scientific model, however, the knower is defined as aloof from that which is known (1975: 114-17). What Gadamer's analysis of the aesthetic experience suggests, then, is that if the aesthetic experience is a valid experience of truth and if these elements are valid components of

3 Gadamer expresses this principle in the context of his discussion of effective (or operative) historical consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein). "Effective history" he defines as the demonstration of the effectivity of history within understanding itself (1975: 267).



Beyond Humanism 105

that experience, then the fact that they contradict the scientific model entails that it does not, as its proponents claim, encompass all possible experiences of truth. Rather, it suggests that other, perfectly valid "kinds of truth" are possible, both in aesthetics and in the human sciences.

B. "Subjectless" interpretation and the role of language The second theme of Gadamer's thought that has methodological

significance for the social sciences concerns his rejection of the claim that interpretation involves "getting inside the author's mind." This theme is most completely developed in his extensive analysis of language in Truth and Method. The starting point of this analysis is his assertion that language is a universal phenomenon:

The phenomenon of understanding, then, shows the universality of human linguisticality as a medium that carries everything within it - not only the "culture" that has been handed down to us through language, but absolutely everything - because everything (in the world and out of it) is included in the realm of "understanding" and understandability in which we move. (1976A: 25.)

Gadamer's discussion of language solidifies a number of key points made earlier in his discussion of aesthetics and historical consciousness. In his discussion of historical consciousness he argued, first, that understanding can never be free from prejudice and, second, that it involves the unity of observer and observed (the fusing of horizons). In the discussion of aesthetics the latter point was phrased in terms of the participatory role of the spectator in the aesthetic experience. Both of these points are now established as universally applicable in the discussion of language. First, language, quite obviously, entails participation. It is impossible to remain aloof from the language through which understanding occurs. Second, the linguisticality of understanding identifies the locus of the "prejudice" so crucial to Gadamer's account. It becomes clear that we cannot escape this prejudice because we cannot escape our language and the pre- understandings embodied in it.

But Gadamer's analysis of language does more than merely clarify previously established points. Rather, it establishes a distinctive theory of interpretation that ascends to a new epistemological plane. The key element in that theory is his point that language is "I-less." For Gadamer this entails that language is necessarily common. In his words, "Whoever speaks a language that no one else understands does not speak"(1976A: 65). Following Wittsenstein, Gadamer compares participation in language to participation in a game, and, furthermore, defines the activity of language as a form of life. But for Gadamer it is not the case that we, that is, subjects, play games with language, but, rather, that language plays us:

Strictly speaking, it is not a matter of our making use of words when we speak. Though we "use" words, it is not in the sense that we put a given tool to use as we please. Words themselves prescribe the only way we can put them to use. One refers to that as proper "usage" - something which does not depend on us, but rather we on it, since we are not allowed to violate it. (1976B: 93.)




Two important consequences follow from this position. First, in the process of interpretation the interpreter is always inside language. When a text is interpreted the interpreter does not step outside language to an Archemedean point of objectivity, but, rather, moves in the horizon defined by the language employed. Second, and more importantly for the present argument, Gadamer's theory establishes that the phenomenon of understanding that occurs in language does not entail recourse to the consciousness of the individual subject. In other words, when we understand a text what occurs is not the grasping of the author's subjective intentions, but, rather, the interplay of the (linguistic) traditions of interpreter and interpreted. Gadamer states this point very explicitly:

When we understand a text we do not put ourselves in the place of the other, and it is not a matter of penetrating the spirtual activities of the author.... The meaning of hermeneutical inquiry is to disclose the mira- cle of understanding texts or utterances and not the mysterious communi- cation of souls. Understanding is a participation in the common aim. (1979: 147.)

This statement is the essence of what has been referred to above as Gadamer's rejection of the subject in his theory of interpretation. What Gadamer is asserting is that the subjective intentions of the author of a text are not the "real" objects of the interpreter's analysis. Rather, for Gadamer, the meaning of the text is independent of the author's intentions. It forms a horizon of meaning constituted by the historical setting of the text. Gadamer's position on subjective intentionality is, moveover, a controversial one. The methodological significance of Gadamer's stance on this issue can be illustrated by referring to the controversy his position has aroused among literary critics. Eric Hirsch, in an ongoing debate with Gadamer, has attacked his position on subjective (or what he calls "autho- rial") intention. Briefly, Hirsch's objection to Gadamer's position that the author's intention does not fix the meaning of a text is that it obviates the possibility of the objective interpretation of texts. Against Gadamer Hirsch claims that the meaning of a text is fixed and "objective" because it is determined by the author's intention. From the perspective afforded by the foregoing discussion, however, it is easy to identify Hirsch's position as falling prey to the same errors as that of Dilthey. Hirsch, like Dilthey, fails to see that the determination of what he calls the "meaning" of a text is a dialectical process which must take into account the historicity of the interpreter as well as that of the text. Hirsch assumes, instead, that interpretation means "getting inside the author's mind" from a position of historical objectivity. Gadamer's analysis of historical understanding, however, showed this position to be fundamentally in error.

The importance of Hirsch's criticism, however, lies not in its novelty but rather in the fact that it reveals the significance of Gadamer's rejection of subjective intentionality in the context of contemporary discussions. Hirsch's conviction that "objectivity in textual interpretation requires explicit reference to the speaker's subjectivity" (1967: 237) leads him to a position that is characteristic of those who unquestioningly accept the



Beyond Humanism 107

legitimacy of the scientific model of objective knowledge: searching for the "objective facts" that will make the social sciences truly "scientific." Hirsch, along with many contemporary social scientists, argues that if social scientists can identify the "objective data" in their discipline that parallels that of the natural sciences, then the social sciences, too, can obtain objective knowledge. Hirsch puts it this way:

The identity of genre, pre-understanding, and hypothesis suggests that the much-advertised cleavage between thinking in the sciences and the humanities does not exist. The hypothetico-deductive process is fundamental in both of them, as it is in all thinking that aspires to knowledge. (196: 246).

There is a certain irony in this position. What it comes to is that the subjective intentions of authors become the objective data of the social sciences. And, although this position is distinct from the positivist view that the data of the social sciences are objective in the strict sense, it clearly depends on the assumption of the validity of the positivist conception of scientific method.

Hirsch's quarrel with Gadamer points to the following conclusion: unless the validity of the positivist conception of scientific method itself is challenged the social sciences will inevitably fall into the error of mimicking the methods of the natural sciences. Gadamer's rejection of subjective intentionality suggests, further, that the positivist conception of scientific knowledge can only be challenged by calling into question both sides of the subject-object dichotomy on which that conception rests. It cannot be debunked by proclaiming, as Hirsch does, the objectivity of subjectivity. Nor can it be debunked by giving up on objectivity altogether and em- bracing subjectivity.

It can be concluded, then, that, taken together, the two themes of Gadamer's theory - the rejection of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge and the rejection of subjective intentionality - offer a radically different perspective on the nature and task of the human sciences, and, most particularly, their relationship to the natural sciences. In the course of his analysis of the linguisticality of understanding Gadamer shows that all understanding involves, first, the participation of the knower in the act of knowing, and, second, the inescapable influence of the knower's "prejudice." This prejudice is defined as the pre- understanding or forestructure, that is a precondition of all human understanding. From this it follows, however, that, on Gadamer's view, in the natural sciences the goal of knowledge is precisely to exclude both of these fundamental elements of human understanding. The natural sciences define knowledge in terms of the exclusion of the influence of the observer's perspective as well as any historical, particularistic aspects of the experience under analysis. It must be concluded, then, that the natural sciences are an aberrant and highly unique mode of knowing rather than the model for all true knowledge. As Gadamer puts it, "the concept of objectivity represented by the sciences exemplifies but a special




case" (1979: 129). But even more significant is Gadamer's conclusion as to where this leaves the social sciences. On this point he is very clear:

If Verstehen is the basic moment of human in-der-Welt-sein, then the human sciences are nearer to human self-understanding than the natural sciences. The objectivity of the latter is no longer an unequivocal and obligat- ory ideal of knowledge. (1979: 106).

Gadamer's extensive examination of the relationship between truth and method, then, leads to two conclusions: first, that truth is not strictly the province of scientific method, nor is that method the universal model of certain knowledge, and, second, that the understanding which is sought in the human sciences provides the foundation or precondition for the natural sciences (1975: xvii, 446-47). This position has the effect of, in a sense, turning the tables on the natural sciences by defining the human sciences as epistemologically prior. It also has the effect of removing the "inferiority complex" that is the result of the acceptance of the En- lightenment's model of scientific knowledge. The acceptance of this model leaves the social sciences with only two alternatives: first, to attempt to identify the "objective data" of the social sciences (either as the be- haviorists do, in a "value-free" assessment of human behavior, or, as Dilthey does, in the apprehension of subjective intentions) or, second, to identify the human sciences as inherently "subjective" and, hence, excluded from the realm of truth. By calling into question the legitimacy of the Enlightenment's identification of truth with scientific method and by rejecting the appeal to subjective intentions Gadamer offers to the human sciences a self-identification distinct from either of these conceptions.

ALTHUSSER

Althusser's social theory, with its ties to both French structuralism and Marxism, would seem to be the polar opposite of Gadamer's hermeneutics. But there are two important respects in which the theories converge: first, both explicitly eschew subjective intentionality as a valid basis for analysis and, second, both offer an epistemology that repudiates the Enlightenment conception of scientific method and objective knowledge. The convergence of the two approaches on these issues, however, is all the more striking precisely because of the differences between them. Despite these differences and despite the fact that Gadamer's approach is on the whole superior to that of Althusser because he offers a more radical critique of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge, it is worth exploring how the two theories converge on these issues. And, more positively, it can be argued that in certain respects Althusser's theory serves as a kind of complement to Gadamer's approach. While Gadamer merely proclaims his rejection of subjective intentionality, Althusser goes on to offer a specific deconstruction of the concept of "man," the knowing subject. Also, while Gadamer concerns himself solely with a critique of the Enlightenment's scientific method, Althusser's theory supplies a more fully developed non-positivist (or, in Althusser's terminology, non-



Beyond Humanism 109

empiricist) conception of scientific knowledge. This complementarity can be explicated by focusing on two aspects of Althusser's extensive corpus: his discussion of the ideological concept of "man" and his understanding of the construction of scientific concepts.

A. The ideological concept of "man" Like Gadamer, Althusser's theory rests on a critique and reinterpreta-

tion of the nineteenth-century approach to epistemological issues. In the case of Althusser the core of his approach is a distinctive interpretation of Marx's social theory. Alhusser's interpretation of Marx revolves around the thesis that, after 1845, Marx effected an epistemological break (or rupture) with the humanist philosophy of his youth and entered into what Althusser calls a new "continent of thought" by introducing a radically new epistemology. Althusser defines his task as that of explicating this epistemological perspective which is implicit in Marx's later work. His principal argument is that Marx's epistemological break with the classical economists was constituted by his definition of the economy as a theoretical concept rather than a "real" object of theoretical inquiry. For the classical economists, the economy was defined as a "real" object in the sense that it was seen as the result of human relations ultimately reducible to individual human actions. Thus, for these theorists, both the object and the subject, that is, both the economy and the "men" who constitute it, were attributed reality.

It is this identification of Marx's breakthrough as the separation of real and theoretical objects that forms the core of Althusser's epistemology. Central to this argument is the thesis that the objects of the real and theoretical worlds are produced in analogous ways. Marx's task in Capital, as Althusser sees it, is to "construct" the concept of the economy as a purely theoretical concept and to show, entirely in the theoretical realm, how it is produced (1970: 182). The goal of Althusser's discussion is the parallel one of revealing the error of the classical economist's assumption that "man" can be an object of theoretical knowledge. For Althusser, "man" is not, as the classical economists assumed, the "real" object of theoretical inquiry. He is, rather, the "bearer" of the structure of capitalist economy. In Marx's analysis, Althusser insists, men never appear as men. His theory precludes the possibility that individual men can be seen as the articulation of the social structure. Men, rather, enter the analysis only insofar as they fill certain determinate places in the social structure (1970: 252-53).

Gadamer's critique of Dilthey's understanding of subjective intentions forms the basis of his epistemological understanding of the role of the subject. In a parallel fashion Althusser's critique of the classical economists' and, derivatively, the humanist Marxists' concept of "man" forms the basis of his epistemological understanding of what he calls the "category of the subject." The humanists' error, on Althusser's account, is to interpret the social totality as a totality of intersubjective relations between "men," who are "real" objects of theoretical inquiry. Marx's mature theory, in contrast, identifies the real protagonists in history as the




social relations of production. Biological men are only the supports or bearers of the guises assigned to them by the structure of relations in the social formation. History is, thus, "a process without a subject" (1971: 124). Historical events cannot, as the humanists argue, be explained by reference to individual wills, but, rather, something becomes a historical event by insertion into forms that are themselves historical (1969: 126). What Althusser is asserting, in other words, is that "subjects" have no independent reality apart from their theoretical status. They are theoretical objects constructed in the scientific realm of thought, not, as both the humanists and classical economists thought, "real" entities.

The concept of"man," then, for Althusser as for Foucault, epitomizes the errors of the humanists' approach to social theory. Althusser's deconstruction of this concept, furthermore, is a key element in his theoretical approach.4 By arguing that both subjects and objects are products of theoretical discourse he has effectively undermined the humanists' position and the dichotomy between subject and object on which it rests. Their appeal to the reality of subjects and subjective wills is shown to be as unfounded as the positivists' appeal to the reality of brute facts. Further- more, the convergence between Althusser's position on this issue and that of Gadamer should be clear. Both argue, although in different ways, that the "subject" and, more specifically, the subjective will or intention of social actors is not the "real" object of theoretical inquiry. Gadamer does this by rejecting the notion that interpretation involves probing subjective intentions; Althusser rejects it by arguing that subjects are theoretical rather than "real" entities. But these positions come to much the same thing: the rejection of the essence of the humanist position - the constituting human subject.

B. The construction of theoretical concepts The second aspect of Althusser's position that converges with that of

Gadamer can be found in his discussion of the construction of theoretical concepts. On the face of it, however, Althusser's position on this issue appears to be radically, opposed to Gadamer's approach. In contrast to Gadamer's broad examination of the nature of human understanding, Althusser's examination is cast in terms of a narrow concern: the formu- lation of scientific concepts. Also, in his approach Althusser defines no significant differences between the natural and social sciences while Gadamer's theory rests on the definition of a profound difference be-

4 But Althusser's deconstruction of the subject also raises a serious problem. If Althusser rejects the "bourgeois myth" of the subject as the origin, then the question arises as to how he deals with biological human beings in his theory. Here Althusser is less clear. He declares that human beings are agents in history that work in and through historical forms (1976: 95). In other words they are active in history rather than creators of it. Althusser insists that Marx's theoretical anti-humanism does not entail "despising" man, but, rather, establishes the necessity of abstracting from concrete individuals (1976: 200). It seems fair to conclude, however, that although Althusser has taken an important step in revealing the dependence of humanism on the concept of the subject, he has not as yet worked out a coherent theoretical approach that serves as an antidote to the humanists' error in this regard.



Beyond Humanism 111

tween the two. Despite these contrasts, however, it can be argued that, in a broad sense, the two approaches dictate a similar approach to the definition of knowledge in the social sciences. First, and most importantly, both Gadamer and Althusser move the debate over the social sciences beyond the narrow confines of the positivist-humanist dichotomy by rejecting both alternatives. As a result of this position both claim, second, that the goal of the social sciences cannot be defined as the acquisition of "objective knowledge" of social reality as it has been defined by the positivists. Asking for the "objectivity" of knowledge in the social sciences, in both accounts, is asking the wrong question. But neither Gadamer nor Althusser turn, as do the humanists, to the subjectivity of the social sciences to rectify this error. Both turn, instead, to an analysis of the internal dynamic of the production of knowledge. In the case of Gadamer this meant examining the relationship between truth and method. In the case of Althusser it means examining the construction of scientific concepts.

Althusser's theory of the production of scientific concepts, like that of his deconstruction of the concept of "man" is rooted in his understanding of Marx's theoretical approach. His theory can be reduced to two theses which he derives from Marx's analysis in Capital: first, the radical separation of the realms of thought and reality, and, second, the analogy between the production of scientific concepts and the production of objects in the material world. The first thesis stems from the position that science has no object outside its own activity but, rather, produces its own norms and the criterion of its own existence. Althusser opposes this theory to what he labels the "empiricist" conception of knowledge, a position roughly equivalent to what was referred to above under the heading of positivism. On Althusser's definition the empiricist sees knowledge as the extraction of the essence from the real, concrete object. This extraction, which retains the reality of the object sought, is accomplished through the use of the scientist's "abstract" concepts. In opposition to this conception of knowledge Althusser proposes a radical separation of the realms of thought and reality that entails a rejection of the empiricist notion that knowledge is a part of the real world. Marx's analysis in Capital, Althusser claims, is informed by this position. For Marx the production process of real, material objects takes place entirely in the real world, while the production of thought objects takes place entirely in the realm of thought (1970: 41). The goal of Marx's analysis, then, is not to understand the relationship between the real and the thought, but, rather, to analyze the process of production of thought objects (1970: 54).

As Althusser understands it, then, what is accomplished in the acquisition of scientific knowledge is not, as in the empiricist account, the appropriation of the real world by the world of thought. This is the case because "the sphere of the real is separate in all its aspects from the sphere of thought" (1970: 87).5 The goal of Althusser's theory, rather, is to

5 Althusser's separation between thought and reality has been the subject of much criticism. See Scott (1974), Callinicos (1976), Benton (1977) and Glucksmann (1974). In addition to arguing that Althusser's separation of these two realms is illegitimate, these authors




present an analysis of how the scientist produces and manipulates concepts within the realm of thought. His point of departure is the assertion that, in the separate worlds of the real and the theoretical, an analogous form of production occurs. Like production in the material world, the production of scientific concepts begins with raw materials. But these raw materials are not, as the empiricists claim, "objective" or "given" facts about the real world. They are, rather, the body of concepts operative in the scientific community at a particular time. This body of concepts will necessarily differ from one historical period to another and with the developmental level of a particular science. But they are at any given point a product of the norms and values of scientific discourse and the particular problematic motivating that discourse.6

This understanding of the process of the production of scientific concepts provides Althusser with answers to a number of questions central to the definition of knowledge in the social sciences. One of these questions is the definition of what constitutes a scientific concept. Sci- entific concepts, on Althusser's account, have no connection with the real world. They are formulated with only one end in view: the production of knowledge. Another question concerns the means of guaranteeing the scientificity of the knowledge produced by the scientific community. Al- thusser's answer to this is very straightforward: the guarantee of scientificity is given by the operating norms and rules wholly internal to scientific discourse (1970: 67). Two important results follow from this position. First, Althusser clearly rejects the empiricist notion that the scientificity of results is guaranteed through reference to the "facts." Since there are no "facts" in the sense of real world data in Althusser's theory, there can be no "checking" of the facts to guarantee the accuracy of the results. In short, the whole question of the "objectivity" of scientific facts is dissolved. The second result is equally significant. Since Althusser claims that the criterion of scientificity is given by the norms of scientific discourse and that these norms change with the development of the particular science, it follows that those things that are recognized as "knowledges" are historically conditioned. Since the norms of the scientific community are historically produced, there is no general criterion of scientificity, but only the particular criteria developed by particular sciences (1970: 62-7).7

also point out that he is confused on this point. Despite arguing for the radical separation of the real and the thought, he also wants to maintain the primacy of the real over the thought (1970: 87).

6The "abstract" concepts that provide scientists with their raw materials Althusser labels Generalities I. They are operated on and, in his words, "transformed" by Generalities II: the axiomatic methods of the science. The result of this transformation is Generalities III: the "knowledge" that is the goal of scientific analysis. Althusser is careful to insist, however, that Generalities III do not reveal the essence of Generalities I. Rather, Generalities III, which he also refers to as the "concrete in thought," are transformations of the abstract concepts of Generalities I (1969: 184-85).

7 This aspect of Althusser's theory has been attacked on two contradictory grounds: first, that he needs a univesal criterion of scientificity and fails to supply one (Glucksmann, 1974), and, second, that he overemphasizes the absoluteness of the criterion of scientificity and, hence, fails to give proper emphasis to the historical conditions under which it is produced (Callinicos, 1976: 102; Geras, 1972: 80).



Beyond Humanism 113

It can be concluded, then, that despite the differences between the two theories, Althusser, like Gadamer, rejects the Enlightenment conception of scientific methodology not by claiming, as the humanists do, that it is inapplicable to the social sciences, but, rather, by attacking its central epistemological tenets. He rejects the possibility or even desirability of "objective knowledge" provided by this model not by claiming that the social sciences are inherently subjective but by denying any connection between the real and theoretical worlds. He also establishes the unavoida- ble historicity of knowledge by defining the production of scientific discourse in historical terms. In sum, he grounds his conception of knowledge entirely within the confines of scientific discourse and grounds that discourse firmly in history.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing I have attempted to establish that both Gadamer and Althusser make valuable contributions to contemporary discussions of the philosophy of the social sciences because both theories move beyond the sterile dogmatism of the positivist/humanist debate. Both accomplish this movement, first, by challenging the fundamental premises of the En- lightenment conception of scientific method and, second, by rejecting the constitutive role of the individual subject that has been the hallmark of the humanist critique. The result of this movement in both cases is to place the social sciences on a new epistemological plane. In conclusion the methodological implications of this movement can be specified by iden- tifying three aspects of their approaches that point the social sciences in distinctly new directions. Although in two of these cases Gadamer's approach is clearly superior to that of Althusser, it is nevertheless significant that, in a broad sense, their approaches move the social sciences in similar methodological directions.

First, the work of Gadamer and Althusser points to an approach to the social sciences that defines analysis in terms of modes of discourse rather than in terms of specifying the relationship between the real world and the world of theory. Gadamer and Althusser approach this issue in different ways, however. By focusing on the problem of the nature of human understanding, Gadamer, on the one hand, encourages us to think of interpretation not as the appropriation of the "real" subjective intentions of authors, but, rather, in terms of the dialectical interplay of traditions. Althusser's approach, on the other hand, is cast in terms of his thesis of the radical separation of the worlds of thought and reality. The advantage of Althusser's approach is that, like Gadamer, his analysis is cast in terms of guaranteeing the correspondence between theory and fact. But it should also be noted that Althusser's position, as his many critics have argued, also raises a serious problem. Even though he uses the thesis of the radical separation of the two worlds of thought and reality to specifically attack the empiricist (positivist) relationship between these two realms, it is nevertheless the case that simply by positing the existence of the two worlds he perpetuates the positivist illusion that, somehow, there is a




"real" world out there that is distinct from the world of thought. Gadamer's perspective, in contrast, avoids this problem entirely. By analyzing the universal phenomenon of human understanding, Gadamer's approach definitely rejects the notion of a real world opposed to the world of discourse.

Second, the work of Gadamer and Althusser points to the definitive rejection of the inferior status dictated to the social sciences by both the positivist and humanist approaches. Althusser accomplishes this by virtu- ally ignoring any distinction between the natural and social sciences, but, at the same time, rejecting the epistemological position that relegates the social sciences to second-class status. His analysis of the production of scientific knowledge holds for all scientific analysis, thus placing the branches of science on an equal footing. Gadamer, however, defines the social sciences as epistemologically prior to the natural sciences because they deal with the universal phenomenon of understanding which is the precondition for all human knowledge. Again, it can be argued that Gadamer's approach to this particular issue is superior to that of Althus- ser. Althusser fails to account for what is the most significant discovery of Gadamer's hermeneutics: his identification of the "prejudice" that un- dergirds knowledge in both the natural and human sciences. Although both theorists put the social sciences on a new footing vis-ai-vis the natural sciences, Gadamer's position, by delving more deeply into the problem of human understanding, offers a more complete analysis of the relationship between the sciences.

Third, the work of Gadamer and Althusser dictates a position that defines the activity of analysis or interpretation in terms of the interplay of concepts within a mode of discourse. The terminological differences between the two approaches make it difficult to express this point in general terms, however. Althusser's position is cast in terms of the production of discourse: scientists use their conceptual apparatus to operate on the object of investigation in order to produce the object of knowledge. Gadamer casts his argument in terms of the process of interpretation: the horizon of the interpreter is fused with the horizon of the text into a distinct entity. Although the two approaches are, as was indicated above, far from identical, it can nevertheless be argued that what is common to both is the position that the production of knowledge is to be understood in terms of an interplay of meanings and concepts internal to discourse.

In these three areas, then, both Gadamer and Althusser point the social sciences in directions that would move them beyond both positivism and humanism. By encouraging social scientists to be suspicious of the "subjects" as well as the "objects" presupposed in positivist social science, both Gadamer and Althusser have made a significant contribution. By encouraging us, furthermore, to think in terms of the production of discourse rather than in terms of "objective" knowledge they offer new directions for inquiry in the social sciences. It is in this sense that their approaches are worthy of close attention. Although the specifics of the



Beyond Humanism 115

methodology dictated by both theorists have yet to be worked out, it seems clear that the social sciences would profit by moving onto the epistemological plane suggested by their analyses.

REFERENCES

Althusser, Louis (1976). Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. Grahame Lock. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

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York: Pantheon Books. Benton, Ted (1977). Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. Boston:

Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bhaskar, Ray (1979) The Possibility of Naturalism. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities

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(1975). Truth and Method. New York: The Seabury Press. Geras, Norman (1972). "Althusser's Marxism: An Account and Assessment." New

Left Review 71 (January-February): 57-86. Glucksmann, Miriam (1974). Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought: A

Comparison of the Theories of Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hirsch, Eric D. (1967). Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Scott, John P. (1979). "Realist Sociology and the Critique of Empiricism." Philoso-

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hekman, susan - gadamer, althusser and the methodology of the social sciences

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