henry cassidy s11
TRANSCRIPT
What‟s In A Name? EU Foreign Policy Through the FYRM
By
Cassidy Henry
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
The Wilkes Honors College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences
With a Concentration in International Studies
And a Minor in History
Wilkes Honors College of
Florida Atlantic University
Jupiter, Florida
May 2011
ii
What‟s In A Name? EU Foreign Policy Through the FYRM
by
Cassidy Henry
This Thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate‟s thesis advisor, Dr.
Christopher Ely, and has been approved by the members of her supervisory committee. It
was submitted to the faculty of the Honors College and was accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelors of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences.
SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:
Dr. Christopher Ely
Dr. Timothy Steigenga
Dean, Wilkes Honors College
Date
iii
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible with the help of many people at Florida Atlantic
University. Specifically my thesis advisor, Dr. Christopher Ely; all of the librarians at the
Jupiter library who helped me request and receive the countless books I needed to write
this thesis; the FAU Undergraduate Research Grant that provided funding to attend the
European Union Studies Association conference in Boston, MA; and Ashley Coats, who
kept me sane through the whole process.
iv
Abstract
Author: Cassidy Henry
Title: What‟s In A Name? EU Foreign Policy Through the FYRM
Institution: Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Christopher Ely
Degree: Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences
Concentration: International Studies
Year: 2011
The European Union (EU) is a unique political/economic body in the world that has
created a more integrated union of European states. Yet the structure of the EU remains
under debate, as does the existence of the EU itself. Conflict about possible member
states, such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) is especially
contentious. By examining the FYRM‟s arduous process of gaining admission to the EU
this thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the current EU foreign policy.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables and Illustrations ...................................................................................... vi
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
1: The European Union ................................................................................................... 6
Common Foreign and Security Policy ................................................................ 6
Enlargement ...................................................................................................... 18
2: A Lost Country ......................................................................................................... 26
Ancient History ................................................................................................. 27
Macedonian Language & Church Life ............................................................. 30
National Awakening ......................................................................................... 32
3: Connections .............................................................................................................. 26
Rocky Road to Independence ........................................................................... 36
In Search of EU Recognition ............................................................................ 43
The Name Dispute ............................................................................................ 46
4: Enlargement Fatigue ................................................................................................. 52
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 64
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 68
vi
List of Charts
Chart 1: Institutions of the EU ..................................................................................... 27
Chart 2: Census Data 1981-2002 .................................................................................. 37
List of Illustrations
Map 1 .......................................................................................................................... 26
Map 2 .......................................................................................................................... 27
List of Abbreviations
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEC European Economic Community
EPC European Political Community
EU European Union
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
FYRM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAA Stabilisation & Association Agreement
SAP Stabilisation & Association Process
SEA Single European Act
TEU Treaty on the European Union (AKA Maastricht)
UN United Nations
USIP US Institute of Peace
1
Introduction
What can a small country in the Balkans tell the world about a much larger
conglomeration of economically and politically stronger countries? Quite a lot actually.
The Republic of Macedonia‟s-or Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM)1 as it
is known to the European Union (EU)-accession track to the EU reveals much about the
functioning of the EU. In fact, the FYRM‟s progress towards gaining admittance to the
EU highlights many problems that the EU is currently facing. Not only is the EU
undergoing a currency crisis with the Euro, but it is also undergoing a political crisis.
The EU is in a critical part of their development in a supranational economic and
political body, as the choices they make now will determine the future of the body. Since
the failed constitutional treaty in 2005, the determination of what sort of organization will
the EU be has been a hot topic of discussion, more-so than it was before the
constitutional treaty or the last enlargement. Is the EU to move forward on enlargement
and become a wider union while maintaining its current political organization? Will the
EU move forward, but change the political organization? Will the EU stop enlarging and
work towards becoming a stronger political union at the expense of its territorial size?
Current politicians in the EU are facing these questions as they move forward on the
project of European integration. While all of these questions are fundamental to an
organization that consists of individual sovereign states, the EU states that it wants to be
1 The EU acknowledges Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia per Greece‟s outrage
over Macedonia‟s use of the term Macedonia. The European Council even stated that they were willing “to
recognize the republic (on the condition that the word „Macedonia‟ did not form part of the region‟s official
name)” (European Parliament Working Papers “Positions taken by the European Council and the European
Parliament on external relations (1991-1995).” Pg 21). As this paper is working to analyze the admissions
process of Macedonia to the EU, I will use the acronym FYRM to acknowledge that as the name that
Macedonia goes by in its dealing with the EU. By using FYRM and its associated long form I do not wish
to take a position on the political dispute between Greece and Macedonia.
2
different. It wants to create a single voice in foreign and domestic policy. With this goal
in mind, the steps that the EU takes in the next few years in foreign policy and
enlargement will have as much importance as the steps they took in the 1950s.
The EU began to form back in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was an economic union of, at the time, the means
of war: coal and steel. In the beginning, forecasting did not predict a political union.
Actually, no one knew exactly what this community was to become. Through different
eras of expansion to include new states as well as a deepening of political integration, the
European Union has emerged. The EU is the only fully integrated political and economic
supranational regional body of individual member states in the world. While there are
other bodies that bring many different nation-states together to help solve issues
diplomatically, such as NATO, the G-20, or OPEC, none of these organizations combines
political and economic issues. Nor do the other organizations grant a body that is not
composed of the leaders of the states the ability to create legislation, like the EU
Parliament that the citizens of the EU directly elect currently does. According to the EU,
it is “a unique economic and political partnership between 27 democratic European
countries. [Whose aims are] peace, prosperity and freedom for its 498 million citizens –
in a fairer, safer world.”2
One way of achieving peace, prosperity, and freedom is expanding the union to
more states. Currently there are five candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia, FYRM,
Iceland, and Montenegro) and four potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and
2 “The EU at a Glance,” http://europa.eu.abc.panorama/index_en.htm, Accessed 7 December 2010.
Emphasis mine.
3
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo [under UN Security Council Resolution 1244]) to the
EU.3 Every state of the Western Balkans is either a candidate country or a potential
candidate country. A candidate country is one that is currently applying for EU
membership, meaning that they have submitted an application to the EU to begin
accession negotiations and the EU has accepted the application.4 A potential candidate
country is one that is seeking membership in the EU, but has not yet applied or the EU
has not yet accepted the application. Many of these countries see no other alternative than
to eventually join the EU.
Another way to increase the peace on the European continent is to strengthen the
common foreign policy of the EU. The EU has increasingly sought to integrate the
foreign policy of individual member states into one foreign policy so to better project
their influence in the world. Many member states resist the releasing of their sovereignty
to a supranational body that they do not have total control over. The EU addresses these
concerns in their treaties as well as the speeches that the leaders often make. The EU has
tried to create a common foreign and security policy (CFSP5) over the years. However,
the importance of the CFSP in top-level discussions has not been living up to the
expectations created through the Lisbon Treaty.
The FYRM offers a unique case study for the EU. Politicians and scholars often
laude the FYRM as the most advanced Balkan country to emerge from the Former
3 European Commission on Enlargement.
4 David Akast, “EU Enlargement,” in The Student’s Guide to European Integration, Ed Jorge Juan
Fernandez Garcia, Jess Clayton, and Christopher Hobley (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004), 268. 5 CFSP is the acronym that the EU uses when referring to their common foreign and security policy, thus I
will use it in this thesis.
4
Yugoslavia.6 They are the only country to secede from Yugoslavia without bloodshed or
war. They are also the only country not to descend into a civil war at any point since
secession, although they did come close in 2001. Due to many disputes over the chosen
name of the country, the Republic of Macedonia, and the claim to a Macedonian
nationhood, the FYRM has problems with two of its neighbors, both of whom are EU
members. This situation highlights one problem with the EU CFSP- the lack of clear and
commonly shared goals.
An important part of understanding the EU, is understanding exactly how it
functions and what makes up its parts. There are six main institutions of the European
Union: the Parliament, Council, Presidency, European Commission, Court of Justice, and
Court of Auditors.7 There is also the European Council composed of the Presidents and
Prime Ministers of the member states and the President of the Council and European
Commission. The European Council holds “summit meetings” that help to set the overall
policy of the EU and resolve issues that could not be settled at lower level council
meetings.8 Chart One provides an overview of the different institutions of the EU
including what institution, who is part of the institution, and what their duties are in that
organization.
6 Note that Balkans does not refer to Slovenia. See later.
7 Europa.eu, “Institutions of the European Union” http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm, accessed
28 March 2011. 8 All information in the following chart is taken from either the institutions website, the Europa.eu website
or The Student’s Guide to European Integration edited by Garcia, Clayton and Hobley
5
Chart One
In chapter one, I provide a background on the EU. This chapter includes
information on how the EU formed as well as the creation of a CFSP. In chapter two, I
Name of Institution Who? Duties
Parliament
Representatives elected by the
citizens of Europe every 5 years.
People are able to vote wherever
they live in the EU. They sit in 7 EU
wide political groups rather than
national groupings.
Partially pass EU laws, exercise democratic
supervision over other EU institutions.
Approve commissioners, censure
commission, partial authority over budget.
Council
One minister from each national
government, dependent upon
meeting agenda (environmental
ministers will attend a meeting on
the environment, etc.). Rotating
Presidency every 6 months.
Financial Affairs; Justice & Home
Affairs; Employment, Social Policy,
Health & Consumer Affairs;
Competitiveness; Transport,
Telecommunications & Energy;
Agriculture & Fisheries;
Environment, Education, Youth &
Culture.
9 different configurations, representing the
member states. Pass European laws, co-
ordinate broad economic policies of member
states, conclude international agreements
between EU and other
countries/international organizations,
approve EU budget. Develop CFSP, co-
ordinate co-operation between national
courts/police in criminal matters.
Presidency of the
Council
Undertaken by a member state's
national government rotates every 6
months, but retains the previous two
countries to retain continuity in the
process
Organize and chair meetings of the Council.
Agenda setting powers (what meetings to
call)
European Commission
One person from each country who
is appointed every 5 years, within 6
months of Parliament elections
Should represent the interests of the whole
EU. Drafts proposals for laws, which it
presents to the Parliament. Manage,
implement, enforce policies and the law.
Manage the budget
Court of Justice
One judge from each member state.
Usually sits as a Grand Chamber of
13 judges or in chambers of 3 to 5
Make sure that EU legislation is applied in
the same way in all EU countries, that
member states/institutions follow the law,
settle legal disputes
Court of Auditors
One member from each country
appointed by Council for renewable
term of 6 years.
Check that EU funds are properly collected
and spent legally, economically and for
intended purpose.
6
provide an overview of the history of the FYRM. Chapter two includes information that
stretches from the time of Greek‟s Ancient Macedonia to the end of Yugoslavia. Chapter
Three is about the interaction between the EU and the FYRM. Chapter three also includes
information about the different disputes that the FYRM has had over its history,
highlighting the current name dispute with Greece. In chapter four, I present my
argument- that the EU is facing a problem of definition and it is affecting its foreign
policy. The case of the FYRM highlights the nature of the crisis. This case shows the
differences in speaking with one voice and speaking with many voices and how that can
harm the future of the EU. The thesis ends with my conclusions about EU foreign policy
and how the candidate countries, specifically the FYRM, fit into the future of the EU.
7
Chapter One: The European Union
Common Foreign Policy
“Why has the European concept lost a lot of its force and initial impetus? I
believe that over the years the European public has lost a guiding light, namely
the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking this
joint task and the characteristics with which we wish to endow it. We must first of
all restore this common vision if we wish to have European Union.”
Leo Tindemans, Report on the European Union
These words written in 1975 have as much import now as they did then. The EU‟s
common foreign policy has lost its force for change in recent years, as has the ability of
EU to act collectively. Given that the EU is a unique body, part of what makes it unique
is the CFSP. While Tindemans was discussing the make-up of a community of nine
nations compared to today‟s community of 27 nations, the same thing is occurring. The
impetus for the “European concept” has run into numerous problems over the years.
The EU began to form in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), which would control coal and steel production, by the leaders of
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy. Without coal and
steel war could not occur, so essentially these countries wanted to control war on the
continent. To control war was critically important to a continent recovering from two
world wars, genocide, and an endemic lack of trust between two of the powers
controlling coal and steel (France and Germany). While they officially created the ECSC
in 1951, no major steps were taken until 1958 when they moved to create the European
Economic Community (EEC),9 which hastened trade integration in Europe throughout
9 World Regional Geography, 156.
8
the early 1960‟s.10
The creation of the EEC is also the first step that the leaders of Europe
took that narrowed the future options of leaders for political or economic integration.11
Before they created the EEC, the leaders could have taken one of many paths to
promote further peace and prosperity on the continent that did not lead to further
integration. The EEC established the community model as the basic institutional
framework for international relations on the continent.12
Throughout its evolution, the
leaders of the European Community (EC) continued to make decisions that supported a
community-based model of integration. There were, and are, many disagreements over
the technical aspects of the community, or duties of different organizations, and the
possible powers of these supervisory organizations.13
However, most no longer dispute
the community model. In the beginning of integration in Europe, to accomplish things at
a supranational level, the member states had to focus on the economic questions rather
than the political aspects of integration. The member states were not willing to give up
their sovereignty to a body they could not control and most are still not.14
Thus, economic
integration occurred at a much faster rate than political integration.
Soon the member states realized, however, that by only focusing on economics
and trade, they did not accurately reflect the power they sought to wield internationally.
The community was not taken as seriously as it had hoped to be. The Heads of
State/Government began discussing the possibility of a more political union than existed
before in order to exert their influence over a much larger area. The first official comment
10
Parson, 27. 11
Parson, 31 12
ibid, 31 13
ibid, 50 14
ibid, 89.
9
on political integration was made at a meeting at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969
when the Heads of State/Government told their Foreign Ministers “„to study the best way
of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of
enlargement‟ of the European Communities.”15
Following that discussion, the Foreign
Ministers of the Member States published the Davignon Report from Luxemburg on 27
October 1970. In this report, they found that “tangible form should be given to the will
for a political union which has always been a force for the progress of the European
Communities.”16
The report suggested that more be done so that one day “Europe [could]
speak with one voice.”17
The objectives of further cooperation, as the Foreign Ministers
saw it, was “to ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of
international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly” and “to
increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of
attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.”18
They also proposed a
framework of how to enact this cooperation including Ministerial meetings, a Political
Committee, and consultations between member states.19
The member states adopted the Davignon report to form European Political
Cooperation (EPC). In a profile about EPC, the journal Europe called it “the process of
information, consultation and common action among the 12 E.C. member states in the
field of foreign policy. Its aim is to maximize their influence in international affairs
15
“Davignon Report” (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970), in Bulletin of the European Communities.
November 1970, No 11, pp 9-14. Http://www.ena.lu/davignon_report_luxemburg_27_october_1970-2-881,
2 16
ibid, 2 17
ibid, 3 18
ibid, 3 19
Ibid, 3-5
10
through a single coherent European approach.”20
EPC had a presidency (which was to be
the same country as the EC presidency). The EPC was “not based on the treaties
establishing the European Communities and it [had] quite a separate institutional
structure.”21
EPC opened the way for the first enlargement of member states by
increasing cooperation that allowed the community to take a joint stand to increase
membership.22
A few years later in 1972, the Heads of State/Government again met to discuss
the possibility of further political integration. They “confirmed their wish to step up their
political cooperation and to give Europe the means whereby it could act as a coherent
political entity on the international scene.”23
Then in 1973, after the admission of
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom the year before, the Nine24
reconfirmed “the
importance of a European identity in the EEC‟s external relations.”25
By a “European
identity,” the nine meant presenting a united front to the world on social and foreign
policy.26
The next major step forward took place in 1986 with the signing of the Single
European Act (SEA). The SEA was the first major amendment to the treaty establishing
the EEC. According to the summary of the SEA published by the European Union, “the
chief objective of the SEA was to add new momentum to the process of the European
20
“European Political Cooperation,” Europe, Oct 1988, 280, 26 21
Europe, 27 22
http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/key_dates/index_en.htm 23
Étienne Deschamps. “How European Political Cooperation Worked in Practice.” Translated by CVCE.
Centre Virtuel de la Conniassance sur l‟Europe.
www.ena.lu/european_political_cooperation_worked_practice-2-6191. Accessed 6 November 2010, 2. 24
The states were called the Nine for the 9 countries that made up the community. 25
Deschamps, 2 26
Ibid, 2
11
construction.”27
The SEA institutionalized the EPC and the member states formally
agreed to “inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest
so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible.”28
The member states agreed to work to avoid any action or position that impairs their
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or to impede any consensus.29
The EU continues to see the SEA as a stepping-stone for the Treaty on the
European Union. The meeting at Maastricht in 1992 resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht
on European Union (TEU). The TEU is the result of external and internal influences from
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe to the desire to supplement the progress of
the SEA with more reforms.30
It is a clear statement of the EC trying to create a Europe
that is more than just an economic union with a little political cooperation, as it had been
up until 1992. The TEU created what is commonly known today as the European Union,
and is often seen as the founding date of the EU, which consists of three pillars: European
Communities (consisting of the EEC, EURATOM31
, and ECSC); CFSP; and police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Within the CFSP pillar, an “intergovernmental
decision-making process which largely relies on unanimity” exists.32
Most CFSP
decisions require all member states to agree 100%, at least at this time.
27
Single European Act Summary, accessed 13 November 2010, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
institutional_affairs/treaties/ treaties_singleact_en.htm 28
Single European Act, Title III, Article 30, 2 (a) 29
SEA, Title III, Article 30, 2 (d) and SEA, Title III Article 30, 3 (c) 30
Summary on Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, accessed 13 November 2010 31
EURATOM is the European atomic energy community that originally was to coordinate the peaceful use
of nuclear energy, and todays helps to pool knowledge, infrastructure, and funding of nuclear energy.
(ec.europa.eu/energy) 32
Summary on the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union
12
In the TEU, the Member States agreed that the union should project its identity to
the world mostly through a CFSP.33
The TEU specifically defines that the objectives of a
CFSP would be:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the
Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.34
In addition, the treaty requires Member States to support “the Union‟s external and
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”35
By including this statement, the members wanted to create a united front to better display
the power they thought they deserved. They thought that the new front would not only
increase their presence on the world stage, but also create a more unified internal
cooperation. The TEU also requires member states to conform their national foreign
policy to that of the EU and act as a representative of the EU on the world stage. They
would do this through coordinating action at international conferences and joint actions
on the world stage. 36
There were many concerns over the transfer of sovereignty to
Brussels, since it would be the largest transfer of sovereignty in the EC‟s history and a
33
TEU, Title 1, Article B 34
TEU, Title 5, Article J.1, (2) 35
TEU, Title 5, Article J.1, (4); emphasis mine 36
TEU, Title 5, Article J.2, 1-4
13
large political battle ensured.37
Many states were able to hold up the progress to gain
support for their political goals, or wrest an exclusion of some part of the treaty from the
other members. Eventually, the Member States of the EC signed the TEU on 7 February
1992 and thereby creating the EU.
As agreed upon at Maastricht, the governments would meet again in Amsterdam
in five years (1996) to reform the TEU. The years between 1991 and 1995 were not quiet
years for a CFSP. In fact, this period was one of the most critical in the formation of a
CFSP. During this time, the European Council stated that the fundamental goal of an EU
foreign policy was “to maintain and promote peace and stability throughout the world.”38
In addition, they stated that they wanted to support democratic structures, respect for
rights and principles, promote global prosperity, prevent conflict, and combat cross-
frontier problems (such as terrorism, crime and pollution).39
However, it is generally
accepted that they failed at these goals.
During the beginning of the first steps of a European CFSP, Yugoslavia was
breaking apart as a socialist republic as was the USSR. It was fragmenting into many
different separate nation-states based upon ethnicity and national identity. As Yugoslavia
was disintegrating, Germany quickly recognized Croatia and Slovenia in June of 1991 for
its own internal political reasons without consulting any other member of the EU.40
Germany‟s rapid recognition pressured the rest of the EU and its member states into
37
George Brock and Philip Webster, “Britain may veto „federalist‟ treaty,” The (London) Times,
http://docs.newsbank.com/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/0F91EF1EF6E3AA2B/0D0CB4F5C0EA43AA?p_
multi=LTIB&s_lang=en-US 38
European Parliament Working Papers “Positions taken by the European Council and the European
Parliament on external relations (1991-1995).” W-28, 06-1997, Political Series. PE 166.803. Pg 7 39
European Parliament “Positions (1991-1995),” 7 40
James Caporaso, The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration, 126.
14
recognizing the individual states, sometimes against the will of its leaders. Yet in June of
1991, the Community sent some foreign ministers on a mission to Serbia that provided
visibility to the EU‟s foreign policy despite over disagreement on what to do. Simply
sending diplomats proved that they had a CFSP and that other nations should take it more
seriously.41
As James Caporaso points out, the EU contributed effectively to helping in
Yugoslavia through NATO led forces rather than through its own separate peacekeeping
forces.42
It is important to note that it was through NATO rather than through the EU that
contribution occurred because the EU was attempting to distance itself from needing
NATO. The EU was simply not equipped to handle the demands put on their infantile
system. While the “Union‟s main task [must] obviously be to restore peace, with the
priority being a global, lasting solution to the conflict,” Parliament only suggested
stepping up humanitarian aid while not letting the new aid be an “alibi for failing to take
the necessary political and diplomatic steps to find a solution.”43
During the crisis, all EU
countries helped to alleviate problems in Yugoslavia, but they did so through unilateral
national ways rather than through the EU, thus negating the possible influence of acting
with a CFSP.
After the utter failure of the CFSP as written in the early 1990s, according to
many different sources the TEU needed a revision, but no one agreed upon what was
needed. The European Parliament had consistently been advocating for CFSP to fall
under their jurisdiction rather than through extra-institutional procedures, as they
41
Caporaso, 127 42
ibid, 128 43
European Parliament Working Papers “Prospects for a Common Foreign and Security Policy-Preliminary
Review,“ W-7, 1-1995m Political Series, PE 165.082, 24
15
believed that this set up weakened the EU‟s ability to act for a CFSP as well as the
legitimacy of the EU.44
Part of the impetus for the revision, besides the requirement of
the TEU to meet again, was the failure of the CFSP to prevent conflict in the FYRM. The
Community had been presented with a common challenge and failed. Although this
challenge technically emerged before the signing of the TEU, it persisted past the
signatory date and at this point the EU failed to take a critical step towards their states
goal of a CFSP. After signing the TEU, the EU failed to prevent further bloodshed and
eventually had to wait for the US and NATO to take over and “solve” the crisis.
The main change in the Treaty of Amsterdam was the idea of absenteeism.
Constructive absenteeism allows member states who abstain to be able to not apply the
decision on the national level, or be present as they are performed; 45
however, the
member states are not to act in a way that contradicts the common action taken by the
EU.46
For constructive absenteeism to count no more than 1/3 of all votes can be absent
in this way. Critically, Article 23, which includes both constructive absenteeism and
qualified majority voting, does not apply to defense or military actions. This treaty also
established the principle of “enhanced cooperation” which “allows those member states
that wished to do so to cooperate more closely through the Union‟s institutions and
means for taking action, without harming the process of European integration as a
whole.”47
Part of this „extra‟ cooperation is now taking place within the Eurozone
community as part of the larger EU community.
44
European Parliament Working Papers “Positions.” 30. 45
Treaty of Amsterdam, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0131010021 46
ibid. Title V, Article 23 (1) 47
The Treaty of Amsterdam, www.ena.lu, accessed 14 November 2010
16
While the 2000 Treaty of Nice revised the TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam, it
did not revise any of the CFSP sections. Then in 2004, the EU attempted to adopt an EU
level Constitution. The constitution would have revised all of the previous treaties and
“started” from scratch by creating a new legal foundation for the EU by incorporating all
previous treaties into one constitution. The constitution was to make the EU more
democratic, more transparent, and more efficient. However, it failed in referendums in
both France and the Netherlands in 2005.48
Most scholars agree that the no votes were
not an outright rejection of the constitution, but rather a rejection of the direction that the
EU was taking.49
Directly after the failed constitution50
the Heads of State/Government
backed off further deepening of both political and economic integration. However, they
did realize that they needed to reform the EU somehow if it was to function with a much
larger group of commissioners.
Essentially the EU still functioned under the same sort of considerations with 27
commissioners as it did with six. Therefore, they decided to reform the exiting treaties
with a new treaty rather than creating an entirely new constitution. The reform occurred
in the Treaty of Lisbon that was signed on 13 December 2007.51
The Lisbon treaty, as it
is commonly known, essentially contains all of the same important reforms of the failed
48
"The Netherlands: decisive “no” vote on European constitution." World Socialist Web Site.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jun2005/neth-j02.shtml (accessed March 27, 2011). 49
Anca Pusca, “Is the Constitutional Project Dead? An Introduction,” in Rejecting the EU Constitution?:
from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 1-14 (New York: International
Debate Education Association, 2009), 4. 50
The constitution failed because all states had to ratify it for it to go into effect. 51
Anthony Cowgill & Andrew Cowgill, “Background to the Treaty of Lisbon,” in The Treaty of Lisbon in
Perspective: The European Reform Treaty- Consolidated Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, xv-xxvi (Gloucestershire: British Management Data
Foundation, 2008), xx
17
constitution, but does so by revising the existing treaties rather than throwing them out.52
In part, the Lisbon Treaty was to prepare the EU for enlargement and address the fears of
member states of a larger union actually functioning in the same makeup of the one
created for six nations.53
Additionally, the Heads of State/Government wanted to enhance
the efficiency of the EU‟s external action and increase its visibility overseas.54
The Lisbon treaty renumbers previous treaties and includes the charter of
fundamental rights as a legal entity. It also creates the post of High Representative of
Foreign Affairs, which merges three functions: acting as the foreign policy envoy of the
European council, acting head of the external relations for the European Commission,
and Chairman of the EU foreign Minister meeting.55
This post also is in charge of the
External Action Service (EAS), the EU version of a diplomatic corps.56
The Lisbon
Treaty also created the post of a “permanent” President of the European Council,
compared to the rotating presidency of before. The new post of President will hold a two-
year term and be able to be reelected.57
There is an important new clause in the treaty that did not exist in any other
treaty. Called the “solidarity clause,” it requires all member states to “act jointly in a
spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a
52
Thomas Christiansen, “The EU Treaty Reform Process since 2000: The Highs and Lows of
Constitutionalism in the European Union,” in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional
Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 29-40 (New York: International Debate Education
Association, 2009), 37. 53
Cowgill, xv. 54
Ibid, xxi-xxii 55
Charlemagne, “Waiting For the Big Call,” The Economist, 16 September 2010. 56
New York Times, “Treaty of Lisbon,” 25 February 2010, www.nytimes.com/info/treaty-of-lisbon
(accessed 27 March 2011). 57
General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, “Background: President of the European Council,”
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111298.pdf, November 2009,
accessed 27 march 2011.
18
natural or man-made disaster.”58
The solidarity clause requires other members to help the
attacked member state (if it requests the help) in the aftermath. While this is a drastic
increase in a commonality, it is included in the external action area of the treaty of
Lisbon.59
However, in the train of the treaties that came before, the Lisbon treaty makes
sure that “national security is stated as remaining the sole responsibility of the member
states.”60
Yet, the member states will increasingly work towards a converging CFSP.61
In
addition, the EU hoped that the Treaty of Lisbon would, in the words of José Manuel
Duras Barroso, the European Commission President, “reinforce the Union‟s cohesion,
coherence and effectiveness in external affairs.”62
The only part of the previous treaties
that remained as written was the CFSP pillar- the other two pillars were revised into a
single treaty that did not mention pillars.
The Lisbon Treaty mentions, for the first time, the option of withdrawing from the
union.63
This step is critical in light of the reasons, mentioned above, that the EU started
out to create the Treaty of Lisbon-further integration and enlargement. In addition,
between the years 2014-2017, the EU will implement a new commissioner system,
according to the Treaty of Lisbon. It will rotate the commissioners around so that the
individual member states will have a member on the commission every 10 out of 15
58
The Treaty of Lisbon, Title 7, Article 22 59
Stephen Sieberson, Dividing Lines between the EU and Its member States: The Impact of the Treaty of
Lisbon, (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008), 50. 60
Cowgill, xxiii 61
ibid, xxiii 62
José Manuel Duras Barroso, “The E.U. After the Lisbon Treaty,” SPEECH/07/795,4 December 2007, in
The Treaty of Lisbon in Perspective: The European Reform Treaty- Consolidated Treaty on European
Union and the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (Gloucestershire: British
Management Data Foundation, 2008), 295 63
Anca Pusca, “Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century”, in Rejecting the EU Constitution?:
from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 159-174 (New York: International
Debate Education Association, 2009), 160.
19
years.64
These two portions are some of the fundamental changes to the previous treaties
in a CFSP. Throughout the treaty, statements recognize the supremacy of the nation over
the supranational body of the EU, while carefully balancing the new positions/goals of
the EU that require more transfers of sovereignty than before. While different Member
States were able to get exemptions on certain areas of the treaty, mostly relating to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, new members will not be able to get permanent
exemptions.
Enlargement
The first enlargement of the European Community (EC) was in 1973 when the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC bringing membership to nine from
the original six. Norway had signed a treaty of accession with the EC, but its voters had
not agreed to join in the referendum. Then in 1981, Greece joined the EC. In the
Eurobarometer65
poll number 15, taken in 1981, the first after Greece joined, found that
69% of peopled surveyed favored “efforts being made to unify Western Europe.”66
However, 43% of that 69% only agreed “to some extent” rather than “very much so.” In
addition, the report went on to say that for all “nine countries where a medium- or long-
term comparison is possible, the tide of support has never been lower.”
64
Treaty of Lisbon 65
The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys taken twice a year throughout the EC/EU since 1973 on behalf
of the European Commission. The surveys report on public opinion relating to any aspect of the EU. 66
Eurobarometer 15, 1981
20
Then in 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the EEC. After they joined, 60% of the
community viewed membership to the EEC as a good thing.67
However, the number is
slightly misleading. Spain and Portugal had support from over 56% of their population,
while only 40% of English citizens thought membership was a good thing.68
The high
level of support from Spain can be seen as a belief that Europe was “a symbol of the
freedom and progress [Spain] aspired to” during the Franco dictatorship; they were still
in the “honeymoon phase” of their relationship with the EU.69
Some analysts believed
that by enlarging the EEC (widening) rather than forming a more involved economic
union (deepening) that the EEC chose the easier course to increase influence.70
After the EU officially formed in 1992, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were the
first new states to join in 1995.71
The EU had a 56% approval-rating overall in the first
poll after these countries joined. A wide range of people stated that membership is a good
thing, from the UK with the low of 40% to the high of Greece with 60%. Overall, two out
of three EU citizens viewed the 1995 enlargement as positive. 72
Norway‟s voters once
again chose not to join the EU, by almost the same margin as in 1972.73
The Times
suggests that the refusal comes from the fact that “Norwegians are internationally-minded
67
Eurobarometer 25, 1986. From now on any reference to how the country/community views membership
to the EC/EU is based on the Eurobarometer question, “Generally speaking, do you think that (your
country‟s) membership to the European Community (Common Market) is…? (1) A Good thing, (2) A Bad
thing (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Don‟t know” 68
Eurobarometer 25, 1986 69
Peter Strafford, “Special Report on Spain (1): A nation returns to Europe – King Carlos and Queen Sofia
begin a four day state visit to Britain.” The (London) Times, 21 April 1986. 70
David Smith, “Finance and Industry: Threat of more failure in the growing EEC - The impact of Spanish
and Portuguese accession” The (London) Times, 6 January 1986. 71
Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Europa 72
Eurobarometer 43, 1995. 73
“A free no” The London Times, 30 November 1994
21
Europeans with a robust attachment to open government and decentralised, accountable
power structures,”74
which they feared they would have to give up if they joined the EU.
After this enlargement, there was a 9-year interval before any new states joined
the EU. In 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU, bringing the number of member states to
25. The adding of 10 new states was the biggest enlargement that has ever taken place
and the first to expand to Eastern Europe. After this enlargement, EU approval was at
54%. While this number was lower than the poll immediately before the accession of the
new states, it was one of the highest since 1994.75
Even 55% of those interviewed
believed that EU membership provided benefits for their country (compared to 33% who
did not believe this).76
Then in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined, bringing the member
states to 27.
According to Heather Grabbe, EU enlargement has been generally positive for the
entire EU, but “unless there is a marked change in EU policy, enlargement will also have
negative impacts for the wider region.”77
Referring to all of the candidate countries,
Grabbe points out that working towards EU membership, while an impetus for domestic
reforms, can also cause problems with internal reform and foreign direct investment
(FDI) if the chance of joining is perceived by many as far in the future.78
For example,
FDI did decrease to Bulgaria and Romania when they found out they would not be
74
“A free no” The London Times, 30 November 1994 75
Eurobarometer 63, first results 10 76
ibid, 12 77
Heather Grabbe, “Implications of EU Enlargement” in Developments in central & Eastern European
Politics 3, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003) pg 266. 78
Grabbe, 260
22
joining in 2004.79
Often politicians justify harsh restructuring as a prequalification for
joining the EU to convince those in their country that might not be as supportive to go
along with the reforms. The EU provides consistent external pressure for reforms on
successive governments, but slower reform in some countries has had an adverse effect
on performance and FDI.80
One thing that makes exporting the “EU system” difficult is
that there are a large variety of different democratic processes within the current EU
member states.81
Many candidate countries do not know which system to follow, so often
they try to combine many different systems.
Ambassador Erwan Fouere, currently the EU Special Representative to the
FYRM, stated that Europe is “united in diversity.”82
„United in Diversity‟ is now a theme
of EU CFSP- through diversity the EU is a stronger Union- in a way they are celebrating
a fundamental challenge to the EU. In 2000, Martin Walker argued that the EU was “not
yet a federal system but far more than a confederation of independent nation-states.”83
That the EU is not a federal system, but also not just a group of states, highlights the
debates on the makeup of the EU. On one side there are those advocating a wide/broad
union that includes as many member as possible, but is politically weak. On the other
side are those who want a “deep” union that is “characterized by authoritative and
79
Grabbe, 260 80
ibid, 262. 81
ibid, 259. 82
Erwan Fouere, “Where is Europe” 23 September 2010. This is also the motto of the EU. 83
Martin Walker, “Enlargement of the European Union: How New EU Members will change the shape of
the EU” in Europe in the New Century: Visions of an emerging Superpower. Ed Robert Guttman.
Colorado: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2001. 65
23
demanding political institutions as well as detailed policies across many issue areas.”84
The UK is an example of a broad member while Germany is a deep member.
Broadening the EU could create problems of cohesion in voting and collective
action. Within voting, many of the CFSP questions, as well as other vitally important
areas of the EU, are determined by unanimous voting not qualified majority voting.85
For
collective action, be it in CFSP or in other policy areas such as the environment, member
states are supposed to work together, or at least not block the other states collective
efforts. In addition, with more states the process would take even longer and be more
complicated that it currently is with 27 states. Deepening also has its own problems with
nation states giving more and more sovereignty to the EU rather than maintaining it on
their own, which is the major fear of many euroskeptics. Many states worry about the
loss of their sovereignty to a supranational body in Brussels. Sir Major, the UK Prime
Minister, said that the Treaty of Amsterdam could create a “further threat to Britain's
already diminished sovereignty.”86
Deepening could also potentially create a “fortress
Europe” with a flourishing state inside the fortress, and the states outside the fortress
languishing without EU trade or support.
Gaining entrance to the EU is not an easy step by any measure. All new applicants
have to accept the acquis communautaire. The acquis, which is French for “acquired
material of the community,”87
refers to everything that the EU has achieved since its
84
Caporaso, 97 85
ibid, 97 86
Michael Jones, “Whisper who dares: ministers are saying their Euro-prayers - Inside Politics” The
(London) Times, 11 December 1994. 87
acquis communautaire. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th
Edition. HarperCollins Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/acquis communautaire
(accessed: March 27, 2011).
24
early origins in the ECSC.”88
It includes everything from treaties to court judgments and
the rules of EU governance. In addition, to the acquis, at the Copenhagen European
Council in 1993, the EU laid out four conditions for membership:
the candidate country has [1] achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, [2] the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union…
[3] the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the
aims of political, economic and monetary union. [4] the Union's capacity to
absorb new members89
Usually around 35 chapters of negotiation for accession to the EU cover the above
criteria.90
The European Commission,91
which oversees the Enlargement of the EU, has a
large amount of discretion on whether a country fulfills a chapter or not, since it is “very
difficult to pinpoint exactly when each of the accession conditions has been met.”92
In
addition, the “targets” are essentially moving as more and more legislation or decisions
are made that increase the acquis that new members have to absorb. The FYRM, Iceland,
and Montenegro have not opened any chapters, Croatia has eight chapters left open, and
Turkey has closed only one chapter, but opened negotiations on eight.93
Croatia is hoping
to finish negotiations by June 2012.
88
Caporaso, 109 89
European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993 Conclusions of the Presidency, pg 13 90
EUROPA. "The policy - The process of enlargement." European Commission on Enlargement.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/process-of-enlargement/mandate-and-framework_en.htm
(accessed March 27, 2011). 91
The European Commission “initiates most new programs and is responsible for implementing them once
they are enacted.” (Charles Hauss, Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges
(Belmont, CA: Thomson and Wadsworth: 2006, 187). 92
Grabbe, “The Implications of EU Enlargement” pg 255 93
Valentina Pop, “Croatia moves closer to EU membership, Turkey stalls,” euobserver.com, 20 April 2011,
accessed 24 April 2011, http://euobserver.com/9/32216/?rk=1
25
After the last enlargement in 2007, the EU is suffering from “Enlargement
fatigue” as it is called by writers and has become common reference in the EU. EU
officials deny that enlargement is slowing down. When they meet in December 2006 a
few days before the official enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, the
leaders/commissioners agreed to “put the brakes on future expansion of the bloc” in order
to “streamline decision-making in an enlarged Europe.”94
While at this summit, the 25
heads of government/state endorsed a partial freeze to Turkey‟s membership talks.95
The
Commission finally seemed to agree with the Parliament that they needed to revise the
rulebook of the EU to work effectively with 27 members‟ compared to the original 6 or
even the 12 that created the EU. Prominent leaders went so far as to acknowledge, “We
need a Europe with borders.”96
However, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair‟s spokesperson
stated, “We do believe the candidates for membership should meet the criteria set down.
We do not believe that any new criteria should be imposed on them.”97
Bronwen Maddox
of The Times, points out that the EU will have a hard time convincing the applicant
countries, such as Turkey or states in the Western Balkans, that this step back is just
temporary and not a permanent no.98
Maddox goes on to point out that it is not just letting
in Turkey, which would become the most populous, poor and Muslim member of the EU
if admitted, but that is also relates to all other countries.
94
Stephen Castle and Andrew Grice, “The Independent: EU endorses tough new stand on membership.”
The Independent, 15 December 2006. Brussels 95
ibid 96
ibid 97
Castle & Grice 98
Browen Maddox, “EU pulls up drawbridge leaving hopefuls outside-World Briefing” The (London)
Times. 15 December 2006, London.
26
Fears against enlargement are tied up in unemployment, new cheaper workers,
and Europe‟s global competitiveness.99
However, those who are naysaying the expansion
seemingly forget the success that expansion has brought to the EU.100
Alexander Stubb,
Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, argues, “Integration capacity is an issue for the EU,
but it cannot be a condition for enlargement. Integration capacity is the responsibility of
the member states, not the candidates. It is up to the EU to sort itself out before it takes
on board new members.”101
There is also a theory that impedes enlargement that
“candidate status is more conducive to reform than actual membership.”102
The EU
wanted to focus on its own house before allowing more members into it. The Treaty of
Lisbon was negotiated partially to help alleviate fears about enlargement.
After the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, the Commission of the European Communities
laid out its view of the future of the Balkans. The Commission believes that for the EU,
Europe and the countries themselves that “the region should go ahead as rapidly as
possible with political and economic reform, reconciliation among peoples and progress
towards the EU.”103
In this communication, the Commissioners reaffirmed their desire to
see the Balkans become members of the EU,104
which is a turnaround from their earlier
statements right before Bulgaria and Romania joined.
99
Shada Islam and Leon Mangasarian, “EU leaders meet amid discord over further expansion” Deutsche
Press, 14 December 2006. Agentur 100
Alexander Stubb, “Comment: Let us stop crying doom at the Union‟s expansion,” Financial Times, 8
December 2006. London. 101
ibid 102
Zoltan Dujisin, “Can EU anchor in Romania, Bulgaria, Stabilize Balkans?” Inter Press Service 28
December 2006. 103
Commission of the European Communities. “Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective”
communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels 5 March 2008.
COM (2008) 127 final, SEC(2008) 288, 2 104
ibid 3
27
Of the candidate countries, the FYRM has not yet started negations to join, while
three of the other four have. Montenegro just became a candidate country in November
2010. Albania and Serbia had applied for membership, but the European Commission has
not yet replied.105
On 9 November 2010, the Commission released the new Progress
Reports for the candidate and potential candidate countries. Commissioner Füle states, in
the newest report on the FYRM‟s progress, "This report confirms that the country is
ready to start accession negotiations. These negotiations will help to tackle a number of
important challenges such as strengthening the rule of law and public administration as
well as increasing competitiveness and reducing unemployment.”106
Yet history often
stands in the way of progress.
105
Europa 106
“Key Findings on the progress reports on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” 9 November
2010. Brussels. MEMO/10/556
28
Chapter Two:
The history of the Republic of Macedonia, as the republic is constitutionally
known, has been rocky. „Macedonia‟ has been struggling for international recognition
since the inception of its nation in the mid-1800s. As Aleksandar Panev writes, “the name
„Macedonia‟ refers to what is probably the most contested geographical entity in
Southeastern Europe.”107
The problems range from claims of territorial aspiration by
Greece to claims that their language is merely a dialect of Bulgarian.108
Geographically, “Macedonia” is composed of three parts: one in Greece, one in
Bulgaria, and one composed of the Republic of Macedonia as seen in Map 1.109
The most
commonly accepted geographical definition of Macedonia follows the borders, seen in
Map 2: the Shar Mountains to the north, Pindos Mountains to the west, and Mount
Olympus to the south. The Vardar River cuts
through the center of geographical Macedonia,
forming a delta at Thessalonki/Salonica into to
the Aegean Sea. The Western boundary passes
through Lake Ohrid and Prespa. The eastern
border follows the Rhodope Mountains and the
Mesta/Nestos River.
107
Aleksandar Panev, “Macedonia.” Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Land, and Culture.
Vol 3, ed Richard Fruht. Denver: ABC CLIO, 2005. 583. 108
Panev, 583 109
"Map of Geographic Macedonia in relation to surrounding states." Macedonian Heritage.
http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/Maps/MapRegionToday.html (accessed February 3, 2011).
29
30
Ancient History110
The problems of forming the state, recognized as „the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia‟ by the United Nations and the EU, pre-date the creation of the Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. There has been conflict over the name and history of Macedonia
since the mid-1800s when the Slavs who migrated in the 6th
or 7th
century AD to the
Balkans began calling themselves Macedonians and using Macedonia as their national
appellation. 111
Their migration took place long after the Ancient Macedonians had died
off or possibly merged with the new invaders.112
The name „Macedonia‟ traces its history
to an ethnic group that lived in present northwestern Greece in the seventh and eighth
century B.C.113
They were known as being from Macedon, not specially “Macedonians”
at first, and include figures such as Phillip II and Alexander the Great. Ancient
Macedonians were not Greek, despite current Greek claims to the contrary. Greek claims
on the term Macedonian, focus on the time period of Alexander the Great due to his
influence in spreading Hellenic culture to Asia.114
There are arguments on the Grecian side that Ancient Macedonians were Greek,
because they spoke the Greek language.115
However, more researchers find that the
opposite is true. While the Ancient Macedonians might have used Greek officially and
110
Writing about the history of the area known as Macedonia, and specifically the area known today as the
FYRM is extremely problematic. Different national historians with political agendas at one point in time or
another have twisted almost all of history since the time of the Ancient Macedonians. I have tried to be as
unbiased and take information from all sources both those with an obvious leaning and those without. 111
Stoyan Pribichevich, Macedonia: Its People & History (London: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1982), 2. 112
John Shea, Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation, (London: McFarland
& Company, Inc., 1997), 14 113
Pribichevich, 3; Panev, 583; Ivan Mihailoff, Macedonia: A Switzerland of the Balkans (St. Louis, Mo:
Pearlstone Publishing Company, 1950), 28 114
Shea, 23 115
Kariophile Mitsakis, Macedonia Throughout the Centuries (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies,
1973) 7-8.
31
when talking to the Greeks (who were the historians of the time), but they would use their
language at home.116
Many Ancient Greeks referred to the Ancient Macedonians as
barbarians.117
Historians agree that Alexander the Great united all of Greece under one
Greek banner, but that unity fell apart after he passed away.118
Greece also currently
claims a linear descent from Ancient Macedonians, but this claim is not supported by
research. What more likely occurred was that during the Great Migrations, other Ancient
peoples who moved into the area absorbed the Ancient Macedonians, or they simply died
off during the Roman era.119
After the Ancient Macedonians disappeared, Rome took over the geographical
area of Macedonia.120
From roughly 171 AD to 235 BC, the Romans were in control of
“Macedonia.”121
The geographical area either was an imperial province or under Roman
Senate control.122
The period directly after 235 AD was followed by the breakdown of
the Roman Empire and led to the control of Macedonia by the Byzantines. Byzantium
identified a “Macedonian” province that usually encompassed the greater part of
Southeastern Europe, greatly beyond the border of geographic Macedonia.123
During the
Byzantine period in the sixth century, the Slavs appeared in Macedonia.124
Ironically, the
Slavs were seen as either peaceful nomads or violent invaders when they first appeared in
116
See Kyril Drezov “Macedonian identity” in The New Macedonian Question, 47-59, ed James Pettifer
(New York: St. Martins Press, Inc, 1999) 48. 117
Shea, 25 118
Pribichevich, 37. 119
ibid, 3 and Shea, 14 120
Michael Cosmopoulos, Macedonia: An Introduction to its Political History (Winnipeg, Manitoba:
Manitoba Studies in Classical Civilization, 1992), 47. 121
Cosmopoulos, 45-51 122
ibid, 50 123
Nadine Lange-Akhund, The Macedonian Question, 1893-1908 From Western Sources (New York: East
European Monographs, 1998) 4 124
Pribichevich, 2 and Mitsakis, 19.
32
the Balkans due to differing contemporary reports.125
Many settled as peasants in
geographical Macedonia, both in the areas of the FYRM and the Grecian province of
Macedonia.126
There was much infighting while the area was under Byzantine control,
including the short kingdom of Samuel. King Samuel ruled from Ohrid from roughly 976
to 1014 AD.127
His kingdom included most of geographic Macedonia.128
Samuel‟s
kingdom is one of the historical areas that receives much attention for later nationality
struggles: Was Samuel Bulgarian, as he often called himself? Or was he Macedonian, but
used Bulgarian for ease? Is his kingdom the beginning of the struggle for international
recognition of the „down-trodden Macedonian people‟?129
Adding to the confusion,
Samuel‟s kingdom fell to the Byzantine Empire under Basil II,130
and afterwards Serbia
briefly gained control of the area of Macedonia and established its capital in Skopje.
However, the Serbian kingdom also fell to the Byzantine Empire.131
After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in the early 1300s, the Ottoman Empire
took over control of geographic Macedonia.132
The area got the name of “Balkans” under
the Ottoman Empire. Balkan originally meant the area of Turkey that was located in
Europe.133
During the time when the area was under the control of the Ottoman Empire,
125
Mitsakis, 18. 126
Pribichevich, 65 127
Panev, 589 128
Shea,58; Panev, 590 129
Panev, 589-590; Cosmopoulos, 57; Shea, 58 130
Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1950), 14; Cosmopoulos 58; Panev, 590 131
Barry Turner, “Macedonia” in The Statesman’s Yearbook 2011: the Politics, Cultures, and Economies
of the World (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 813. 132
Panev, 593; Turner, 813; Cosmopoulos, 65; Mitsakis, 34-35 133
Harvey Pekar and Heather Robinson, Macedonia: What Does It Take To Stop a War? (New York:
Villard Books, 2007), 25.
33
the Empire did not identify anything as Macedonian.134
Instead, the Ottoman Empire
identified subnational groups by religious affiliation: Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Bulgarian
Orthodox, etc. The Bulgarians were eventually able to gain recognition as a nationality
from the Ottomans while the „Macedonians‟ were not. The Ottoman Empire ruled
geographical Macedonia until roughly WWI.135
Critical to the development of a national
consciousness, the Ottoman Empire inadvertently promoted the Orthodox Church that
governed the social and religious life of most inhabitants of geographical Macedonia.136
Macedonian Language and Church Life
Like every part of the history of the FYRM (or geographical Macedonia), the
history of the “Macedonian” language is greatly disputed. It is difficult to know the
origins of the Macedonian language because not only did the alphabet change over time,
but so did the grammar of a language that was not codified. Stoyan Pribichevich claims
that the first Slavic language was Macedonian and written as Church Slavonic by Cyril in
roughly 862 AD.137
Others claim that „Macedonian‟ did not develop as a literary
language until 1945.138
All sides claim whatever is pertinent to their national heritage and
ignore any other possible scenarios. For example, both Bulgaria and the FYRM claim the
creation of the first church in what is today the FYRM.
134
Panev, 584; also Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalism, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of the
Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 142 135
Turner, 813; Pekar, 25; Panev, 597 136
Panev, 593; Mitsakis, 37; Barker, 14-15; Poulton, 2 137
Pribichevich, 70 138
Poulton, 50
34
Cyril and Methodius, who were Macedonians, created the first Slavonic alphabet
in the 9th
century.139
Their disciples later revised their alphabet in roughly 885.140
By the
end of the 19th
century, the Balkans were speaking one language that was Slavic. 141
Cyril
and Methodius‟s disciples, Clemant and Naum, went on to found the first Macedonian
Orthodox Church in the beginning of the 10th
century in Ohrid under the rule of King
Samuel.142
After the conquering of Macedonia by the Byzantine Empire in 1018, the
Greek clergy took over the archbishop.143
The Patriarch of Constantinople attained full
authority over the Macedonian Orthodox Church, but he allowed them to maintain their
own archbishop.144
While its highest priest was only an archbishop, the church was also
autocephalous (self-governing), which allowed it to develop its own schools and religious
training in comparison to the teachings that came out of Constantinople.145
The schools
taught the missionaries in Slavonic,146
and they completed their missionary work among
the people in the local language.147
The Christianization of the Balkans (and some even
claim the Christianization of Russia) originated from Ohrid.148
However, under pressure
139
Mary Lee Knowlton, Cultures of the World: Macedonia (New York: Benchmark Books, 2005), 91.
Cosmopoulos, 56-57 140
Shea, 57 141
Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Publications,
1991), 1. 142
Knowlton, 85 & 91 and “Macedonian Wedding”; Risto Lazarov, This is the Reublic of Macedonia
(Skopje: NIP Nova Makedonija, 1993), 20. Bulgarians claim that this was the first Bulgarian Orthodox
Church. 143
Knowlton, 85-86 144
Panev, 591 and Knowlton, 85 145
George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 311. 146
Which was at this time a form of Macedonian, the generic Slavic language that Cyril and Methodius had
created. 147
Pribichevich, 107-109 148
Cosmopoulos, 56-57; Lazarov, 20.
35
from outside groups, in 1767, the Ottoman Empire abolished the Archbishop of Ohrid
and total authority reverted to Constantinople.149
The different local dialects of a Slavonic language diverged after this point in
time, with Macedonian often falling by the wayside because Macedonia was never in a
position of power. Much later, in the 20th
Century, the communists in the Yugoslavia
Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia formed a committee to codify the language in
1945.150
The committee accepted the alphabet on 3 May 1945, established the correct
spelling on 7 June 1945, and created a grammar in 1952.151
While the Bulgarian language
and the Macedonian language are close, Bulgarian is based on an eastern dialect and,
Yugoslavia claimed, Macedonian is based on a western dialect with enough differences
to constitute a separate language. Bulgaria disagreed then and still disagrees about this
point, claiming that Macedonian is a dialect of Bulgarian.152
This disagreement will
eventually cause more problems for the FYRM when they actually join the EU. Will
Macedonian be added as an official language of the EU, or will Bulgaria have enough
weight that it will not?
National Awakening
At the turn of the 1800s, western influences and nation-state aspirations inspired
the modern national definition of Macedonia to emerge.153
Parts of these aspirations were
linked to the millet system, or religious political units with control over certain areas of
149
Panev, 593 150
Hupchick, 430 151
Poulton, 50 152
ibid, 49-56 153
Panev, 584
36
land, under the Ottoman Empire.154
The creation of the Orthodox millets, helped to create
a national consciousness. It was not until the mid-1870s that a Macedonian movement,
organized by Macedonian communities, attempted to form a distinct Macedonian church,
or rather to re-separate from the Greek Orthodox authority.155
During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, the territory of geographical
Macedonia was under the control of the Ottomans. Thus, the Treaty of San Stefano
ending the war affected who controlled geographical Macedonia. Under this treaty, “the
whole of Macedonia, excepting Salonica and the Chalcidice peninsula, was included in
the newly-formed Principality of Bulgaria.”156
Shortly thereafter, the „Great Powers‟ of
Europe could not stand that Russia would be granted greater access, or control, of the
Turkish Straits, and called for a „real‟ treaty to end the war in Berlin. The European
nations gathered to emphasize the “territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire”157
as a
way of ending the Russo-Turkish War. They created the Treaty of Berlin, which almost
entirely reversed the Treaty of San Stefano, and left Macedonia under Turkish
administration while Bulgaria retained its newfound independence in a much smaller
form, stroking nationalist desires for many years to come.158
At these conferences, the
Great Powers did not consult even one of the actual Balkan states. The treaties also
ignored the nationalist sentiment in the area, helping to inspire the Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) to form in 1893 with the purpose of “full political
154
Panev, 593 155
ibid, 595 and Pribichevich, 114 156
Christ Anastasoff, The Tragic Peninsula: A History of the Macedonian Movement for Independence
Since 1878 with 10 maps, 36 illustrations and a research bibliography on the Balkans (St. Louis, MO:
Blackwell Weilandy Co, 1938), 9 157
Pribichevich, 115 158
Anastasoff, 9
37
autonomy or independence of Macedonia, to be acquired through a revolution of the
people” as well as opposing the partition or division of Macedonia.159
The IMRO
promoted the creation of a state encompassing the entire geographical Macedonia.160
When politicians, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, claimed to be pursuing the IMRO
objectives, the idea of country of geographical Macedonia angered the Greeks.
The IMRO helped organize the1903 St. Elijah‟s Day Uprising in Kruševo, located
in the central-south-west part of the country. The people of the town declared a Socialist
Republic, which lasted 10 days.161
Turkish troops crushed the rebellion quickly with a
troop ratio of 16:1.162
The temporary republic inspired dissent that lasted for about three
months.163
The Turks were unable to stop the Republic from sending a declaration to
Europe asking for help to stop the bloodshed of Christians in Macedonia.164
Their plea
led to the creation of the Mürzsteg Reforms. There were six main conditions of these
reforms. The Chief Inspector was to have two “helpers,” one from Austria-Hungry and
one from Russia to help “direct his attention to the needs of the Christian population and
to the ill doings of the local authorities.” There was to be a foreign general and officers
for the gendarmerie. The Ottoman Sultan was to reform the administration and allow civil
servants to be Christians. There would be a mixed Christian/Muslim investigative team
for the recent disturbances. Turkey would pay indemnity to the Christian refugees for
reconstruction. Finally, any irregular troops were to be disbanded.165
The reforms were to
159
Lange-Akhund, 5, 38, 236. 160
Barker, 16; ibid 161
Knowlton, 122 and Pribichevich, 127 162
Pribichevich, 129 and Knowlton, 122 163
Lazarov, 23 164
Pribichevich, 129 165
ibid, 132
38
stop the persecution of the Christians by the Muslim police. In a weird twist, the IMRO
rejected the compromise because “it consolidated Turkish rule by trying to make it more
tolerable.”166
However, since they were not actually involved in the negotiations, their
vote or lack of support did not matter. A few years later, the Balkan Wars of 1912 and
1913 led to the re-partition of Macedonia in the Treaty of Bucharest among Serbia,
Bulgaria, and Greece.
The Macedonians‟ first attempt to gain international recognition took place in
March of 1913 when a group of Macedonian supporters, the Macedonian Colony,
submitted a Memorandum for the Independence of Macedonia to the Russian
government.167
Russians did not help the Macedonians at this time, probably due to the
belief held by many Russians that Macedonia was Greek.168
The IMRO followed up the
memorandum by working at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 with the same plea-
independence for Macedonia. The IMRO was so unsuccessful that the peace conferences
resulted in the division of the area known as Macedonia among Serbia, Greece, and
Bulgaria.169
From the end of the Balkan Wars to the end of WWII, “Macedonians in all
three regions were subject to violent campaigns of assimilation and denationalization
whose goals were to deprive them of their true Macedonian identity and convince them
that they were actually Serbs, Bulgarians, or Greeks.”170
All three nations commenced
violent campaigns of assimilation to ensure their domination over the new area of control.
166
Pribichevich, 133 and Anastasoff, 115-120 167
Panev, 597 168
Anthony-Emil Tachiaos, The Bulgarian National Awakening and its Spread into Macedonia
(Thessaloniki: Society For Macedonian Studies, 1990), 34. 169
Panev, 597 170
Loring M Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in Transnational World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995), 51
39
In fact, the first, and for a long time only, international organization to recognize
Macedonia as a separate nationality was the Communist International in 1934.
Between WWI and WWII, the area of geographical Macedonia that is currently
known as the FYRM, was joined with Yugoslavia in late 1918171
and placed under
Serbian control.172
Yugoslavia of the interwar years denied the existence of Macedonians,
and thus refused to adopt that they were under treaty obligations to protect them.173
The
Serbians in charge in Yugoslavia continued to treat Macedonians with the same campaign
of assimilation to become better Serbs before WWII as they did before WWI. It was the
Nazi occupation during World War II that finally led to a cohesive nationalist movement
in the area of Macedonia due to the further oppression that the area suffered at the hands
of the Nazi army. The Macedonian Separatists created the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the
National Liberation of Macedonia, which declared, “on the basis of the inviolable,
permanent, and inalienable rights of the people to self-determination” the establishment
of the Macedonian state on 2 August 1944 in an area smaller than the current FYRM.174
They did not gain any international recognition, and thus this state is not considered
recognition of the Macedonian nationality.
However, after WWII in 1945, Macedonia was promptly considered part of
Yugoslavia again, this time under communist control as a socialist federation. Tito, the
communist ruler of Yugoslavia, realized that “the Macedonian nation did exist and that it
171
December actually 172
Barker, 20 173
Barker, 22-23 174
Panev, 598
40
had a right to statehood.”175
Tito created a federal republic in Yugoslavia that consisted
of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia (which
consisted of two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo).176
Though in reality a
double-edged sword that would lead to more problems later, Macedonian appeared as an
official nationality for the first time when recognized as a republic in Yugoslavia.177
175
Pribichevich, 151 176
Poulton, 6; Barker, 94 177
Dennis Hupchick, The Balkans from Constantinople to Communism (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 430.
41
Chapter Three: Connections
Rocky Road of Independence
In 1963, per regulations in Yugoslavia, the Parliament changed the name to the
Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The Yugoslav constitution accorded republics the right
to independence, and in 1991 Macedonia held a referendum in which they voted for
independence.178
Before declaring independence, Macedonia had a weak economy and
was dependent on the other republics for a market. In addition, it was a multinational
republic that was established only half a century ago. Yet it was the only republic to
establish its independence from Yugoslavia without bloodshed.179
The first hints of the
many future challenges, besides
the name issue,182
came in the
vote for independence. Ethnic
Albanians (the largest minority
in the FYRM) boycotted the
referendum while ethnic
Macedonians voted for
independence.183
There were
enough turnouts for the vote to count, but the votes left a feeling of distrust in many
178
Elizabeth Pond, “Rescuing Macedonia,” in Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 169 179
Nina Dcbrkovic, “Yugoslavia and Macedonia,” in in The New Macedonian Question, 79-94, ed James
Pettifer (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, Inc, 1999), 90. 180
As spelled in the census. 181
Roman descendants in the area 182
See below 183
Pond, 169
Chart Two
19811 1991
1 2002
1
Total 1,912,257 2,033,964 2,022,546
Macedonians 1,281,195 1,314,000 1,297,981
Albanians 377,726 427,313 509,083
Serbs 44,613 NA 35,939
Moslems180
39,555 NA NA
Romanian 47,223 NA 53,879
Turks 86,691 NA 77,959
Vlachs181
7,190 NA 9,695
Bulgarians 1,984 39,555 NA
Other 26,080 6 others
unlisted
NA
42
ethnic Albanians. Census data, while often unreliable in the FYRM, provides a little
information on the ethnic composition of the FYRM since 1981. Many political scientists
consider 1981 the last year for reliable census data before politics took over the census in
the FYRM. The distrust that appeared during the referendum on independence would
simmer until it flared up in 2001.
On 11 January 1991, the Badinter Commission184
recommended that based on the
“political, social, ethnic, and judicial situation in the republic” Macedonia deserved
international recognition.185
Nevertheless, the EU did not recognize Macedonia, but
instead recognized Slovenia and Croatia. Greece continued to block the EU‟s recognition
of the Republic of Macedonia for two years, and was able to do so due to the TEU that
needed Greece‟s signature to come into effect and was under consideration at the same
time as the FYRM‟s statehood. In fact, Greece explicitly “promised to recognize
Maastricht in exchange for EC support on the Macedonian issue.”186
In 1992, the CIA World Factbook first included Macedonia in its country profiles,
with the note that although “Macedonia has proclaimed independent statehood[, it] has
not been formerly recognized as a state by the United States.”187
The US did not
recognize the FYRM until 1994.188
Then in 2004, the US decided to use the name “the
184
This is the common name of the Arbitration Committee that was chaired by Robert Badinter, the
President of the French Constitutional Council, which was to evaluate the requests of the Yugoslav
republics that requested EC recognition during the early 1990s. (Allain Pellet. “The Opinions of the
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples,” European
Journal of International Law 3, (1), 1992, 178-185. 185
Panev, 605 186
Danforth, 150 187
CIA World Factbook 992, “Macedonia,” Office of Public and Agency Information, Washington, DC,
1992, 207 188
http://www.b-info.com/places/Macedonia/republic/WhiteHouse_Recogn.shtml, accessed 9 February
2011
43
Republic of Macedonia,” in diplomatic relations.189
The Factbook classified Macedonia
as an “emerging democracy” in its government type.190
The 1992 Factbook points out the
economy will suffer from the seclusion of being a breakaway republic unless the
economic ties are reformed. In fact, “Macedonia‟s geographic isolation, technological
backwardness, and political instability place it far down the list of countries of interest to
Western investors.”191
The US Institute of Peace (USIP), which is a nonprofit organization funded by the
US Congress whose goals are to help “prevent and resolve violent international conflicts
and promote post-conflict stability and development,”192
highlighted many of the
problems that the FYRM faced (or would face in the 2001 conflicts) in its reports, yet
still remained optimistic. A report issued on 27 March 2000, stated that the FYRM
needed to focus on economic development and incorporating Albanians into the
democratic structure.193
The USIP states that the FYRM “represents an apparently
successful model of preventive diplomacy and improving inter-ethnic and inter-state
relations.”194
They note the success of FYRM to stay out of the interstate and ethnic
clashes that highlighted the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Yet, they also note that
there is a danger of parallel development between ethnic groups that could erupt in civil
war.195
189
Xinhua . "Bush reiterates US recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name." China View.
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/11/content_2320096.htm (accessed February 9, 2011). 190
CIA World Factbook 1992, 207 191
CIA World Factbook 1992, 208 192
United States Institute of Peace website, www.usip.org/about-us, accessed 3 January 2011 193
USIP, “Macedonia: Prevention Can Work,” Washington DC: USIP, 27 March 2000, 1 194
Ibid, 2 195
ibid, 5
44
Yet, despite the challenges that the FYRM faced as a new emerging democracy,
they persevered. The votes in the first election in the country divided along ethnic lines,
with Macedonians voting for Macedonian parties and Albanians voting for Albanian
parties. The ethnic tensions seen in the elections erupted in violence first in 1995 when
ethnic Macedonians physically blocked the opening of an Albanian language university
in Tetovo.196
The violence resulted in 1 death and 18 injured.197
It was not until 2000 that
the government finally recognized the university.198
Then, when tensions rose in Kosovo
in 1999, many refugees fled to Macedonia. They numbered more than 300,000 or 1
refugee for every eight citizens of the FYRM.199
Most of these refugees were of Albanian
ethnic origin. The influx of more ethnic Albanians stressed the tensions even more. In
addition, the ethnic Albanian birthrate is rising at a faster rate than the ethnic Macedonian
birthrate, bringing the Albanian portion to 25.17% in 2002 compared to 12.5% in
1953.200
In 2001, these ethnic tensions seemed to have been solved to such a point that
Macedonia became the first western Balkan country to sign a Stabilization and
Association Process (SAP) with the EU on 9 April, but this notion was false.201
A SAP is
the first step in becoming a member of the EU.202
Interestingly enough, the SAP was
signed while the Macedonian forces were dealing with sporadic ethnic rebel activity in
196
Pond, 170 197
David Binder, “Balkan College for Albanians Fights to Stay Alive,” New York Times, 14 Feb 1996, pg B
12 198
Pond, 172 199
ibid, 171 and Jane Cowen, Macedonia: the Politics of Identity and Difference, (London, Pluto Press,
2000) 200
Panev, 615 201
Pond, 172; Europa.eu, “Key Dates in the Country‟s Path towards the EU” 202
See more below
45
the northern part of their country. A group of Albanians, believing that their political
parties had abandoned them began to fight for more rights and greater equality between
ethnicities.203
It became clear that the FYRM‟s security forces would be unable to handle
the challenges they faced. Their forces were undersupplied and did not have the numbers
to put the rebellion down. The EU and NATO stepped in, four months later in early July,
to help mediate a cease-fire between the rebels and the government forces.204
While there
are conflicting claims about the numbers of dead both civilian and military, the most
reliable figures claim that the Macedonian forces lost 63 while the ethnic Albanian forces
lost 64. About 30 civilians were killed by the conflict while 2,000 refugees had left the
cities by one month into the conflict.205
The parties in conflict finally reached a framework agreement at Ohrid in August.
The Ohrid Framework Agreement, as it was called, was a landmark agreement that was
to promote the development of the FYRM and make sure that the state was acting in the
best interests of all the citizens of the FYRM. There are five basic principles that were
agreed upon in the framework:
1) To reject the use of violence for political means
2) To reject territorial solutions to ethnic issues
3) The multiethnic character of the citizens must be reflected in public life.
4) The constitution must meet the needs of the citizens and the highest standards
of the international community (which are evolving, as the constitution must
also)
5) Local self-government is essential206
203
Pond, 172; Paul Wood, “The rebel‟s agenda” (London: BBC, 11 March 2001) accessed 24 April 2011. 204
Panev, 616 205
“What Do the Casualties of War Amount to?” AIM Press, Skopje, 30 December 2001, Accessed 24
April 2011 206
Ohrid Framework Agreement, http://faqs.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf, 13 Aug
2001, accessed 30 Dec 2010, 1.
46
In addition to recognizing the essential role of local self-government, the
agreement went on to state the powers of local government: they shall have power over
issues relating to “public service, urban and rural planning, environmental protection,
local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health
care.”207
The framework also stated that any laws made relating to the “culture, use of
language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols must receive a majority
of votes”208
including a majority of the minority in the legislature. The agreement also
finally consented to instruction in the native language of the minority, but required those
who do not speak Macedonian also to have Macedonian language instruction.209
The years between 2001 and 2004 were filled with recovery and rebuilding.
Eventually the legislature passed laws that allowed the Albanian flag to fly next to the
Macedonian one in 2005.210
In the 2005 EU Commission report on the FYRM‟s progress,
they commended Skopje for its progress while noting that much more needed to be
done.211
Freedom House noted in their 2009 report that much further progress has been
made in increasing ethnic Albanian civil servants; in 2007 alone there was a 3.75 percent
increase.212
However, in the 2008 elections, key international standards were not met for
free and fair elections. In addition, an amendment that lowered of the threshold for the
election of the president by 10% points to 40 percent passed, which decreased democracy
207
Ohrid Framework Agreement, 1 208
ibid, 2 209
ibid, 3 210
RFE/RL Newsline, “Macedonian Government Takes on the Flag Question,” June 1, 2005 in Pond, 183 211
European Commission, “Analytical Report for the Opinion on the Application from the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU membership” (November 9, 2005), p 19. Quoted in Pond, 186 212
Zhidas Daskalovski, “Macedonia,” Freedom House Nations in Transit, Freedom House: Washington,
D.C., 2009, 348
47
in the country.213
Yet despite all of the problems that the FYRM faced, Freedom House
still gave it a rating of 3.86 on a scale of one to seven with one representing the most
democratic, which was a positive change of 0.07 over the previous year214
However, as part of Ohrid and EU requirements, the highly centralized
government needed to decentralize and provide more representation to the ethnic
Albanians. In order to pass the decentralization requirement on to the people, the
government did not try to convince them that it was a good thing for the country, but only
stated that it was necessary for joining the EU, which was the only way to gather support
for the unpopular initiative.215
Since a majority of the republic was ethnically
Macedonian, they needed convincing that the ethnic Albanians could have a part in a
decentralized rule without breaking up the republic, which was the main fear- that they
would want to separate to form a „Greater Albania.‟ Seemingly addressing these fears,
the ethnic Albanian leader, Ali Ahmeti, has stated “[Macedonia] is my country. I have no
other country.”216
By June 2008, 59 of the 85 municipalities marked for decentralization
had entered the second phase of that process.217
Those that did not pass into the second
phase had large debts and corresponding legal proceedings, which is why they did not
proceed.218
213
Daskalovski, 348 214
ibid, 1 215
Pond, 183 216
Peter Beringer, Return to Europe: Macedonian Wedding, (First Foundation, 29 May 2009) found at
http://derstandard.at/1242316121241/Doku-Reihe-Balkan-Express-Mazedonien?_artikelIndex=2 (accessed
31 March 2011). 217
Daskalovski, 349 218
ibid , 359
48
In Search of EU Recognition
On 16 December 2005, the European Council decided to grant the FYRM
candidate status based on the progress made with respect to the legislation regarding the
Ohrid framework.219
Yet having granted the FYRM candidate status, in the next
paragraph the Council stated that the FYRM had much to work on before it could ever be
admitted. The council also mentioned that the “absorption capacity” of the union needed
to be taken into account.220
In March 2008, the Commission adopted the
“Communication on the Western Balkans” which provided an outline for the next steps in
the accession process for the states in the western Balkans. In this communication, the
Commission stated multiple times that the EU is the best location for the western Balkans
in the future.221
Specifically for the FYRM, the Commission held that reform had been
slow, but were picking up speed, which was good for their future EU prospects.222
The
commission stipulated that the FYRM needed to meet certain benchmarks before
undertaking accession negotiations.223
The report further noted that visa liberalization
was very important to the people in the Western Balkans and that both the EU and the
individual countries need to work towards fulfilling these wishes.224
When you do not need a visa to travel to a country, in this case the EU, this is
known as visa liberalization. Visa liberalization began in 2007/8 with visa facilitation that
reduced the costs for obtaining a visa, and simplified the procedures for receiving a visa
219
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 30 January 2006, 15914/1/05 REV 1, 7 220
ibid, 7 221
Commission of the European Communities, “Western Balkans,” 2-3 222
ibid 4, 21 223
ibid 21 224
ibid 8
49
to the EU Schengen Area.225
Full visa liberalization occurred on 19 December 2010. The
visa waiver only applied to holders of biometric passports. Those without biometric
passports had to still apply for a visa. Biometric passports contain an electronic chip of
information about the holder. “The chip inside the passport contains information about
the holder‟s face – such as the distances between eyes, nose, mouth and ears…The chip
also holds the information that is printed on the personal details page.”226
In 2010, the European Commission reiterated its 2009 recommendation that the
FYRM begin accession negotiations with the EU.227
The Commission recognized that
there are sufficient legal and institutional protections for human, minority, political and
civil rights228
in the FYRM to begin negotiations. The fact that the FYRM has these
protections shows their progress since the 2001 conflicts. In order to further support their
recommendation that the FYRM open accession negotiations, the commission points out
that there has been progress in many areas, from foreign, security and defense policy, that
is now closer aligned with the EU‟s declarations/acquis, to the fact that the FRYM was
the least affected by the financial crisis.229
While some policies do need to be improved,
much of this can occur in negotiations. The Central & Eastern Europe Countries (from
225
Commission of the European Communities “Western Balkans” 8; The Schengen Area is an area of no
internal borders within the EU. An example is that if you flew from Paris to Germany you would not have
to pass through customs. 226
“What are biometric passports?” Directgov,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/TravelAndTransport/Passports/Applicationinformation/DG_174159, accessed
5 January 2010 227
EU Commission, “Enlargement Strategies & Main Challenges 2010-2011,” Communication From the
Commission to the European Parliament and The Council, 9 November 2010, Brussels, COM(2010)660,
15 228
Ibid, 36 229
Ibid, 41 and 14
50
the 2004 enlargement) took roughly 14 years to gain admittance to the EU.230
The FYRM
has been seeking to gain admittance to the EU since 1991 when it became a country, but
more realistically since 2001, or 10 years.
Progress towards EU integration has been a long road for the FYRM. On 9 April
2001, the EU and the FYRM signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
The SAA is part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) whose goals are to
stabilize the countries involved by pushing them towards a market economy that is
supported by regional cooperation.231
The whole purpose is to help the countries under a
SAA build their abilities to accept the acquis.232
The FYRM‟s SAA agrees to examine
the progress that the FYRM makes on the chapters through the annual progress reports,
which will identify the priorities for further work.233
As the FYRM worked on
maintaining progress on the SAA, it applied for EU membership on 22 March 2004, a
week after their president died in a plane crash.234
Soon after, they faced a new
presidential election, which formed a new government. This new government‟s task was
to further fulfill the Ohrid agreement, creating new legislation that the EU was
demanding to advance the FYRM‟s candidacy, while completing the EU‟s country
230
Mary Anne Normile and Susan E. Leetmaa. "A Historic Enlargement: Ten Countries Prepare to Join the
European Union." USDA Economic Research Service.
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/April04/Features/AHistoricEnlargement.htm (accessed March 31,
2011). 231
European Commission on Enlargement,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu
/sap/index_en.htm, accessed 5 January 2011 232
ibid 233
European Council, 2008/212/EC, “Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities
and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
repealing Decision 2006/57/EC, 19 March 2008, p 32-45, accessed online no pages provided 234
Pond, 182
51
readiness survey.235
The country readiness survey is a series of questions the EU puts to
incoming candidates to test their readiness to join the EU. The FYRM completed the EU
country readiness survey within four-and-a-half months and presented the 14,000-page
document to Brussels.236
Immediately after the FYRM‟s acceptance of candidacy later
that year, they received “unlimited duty-free access to the EU market for virtually all of
its products [and] increased EU [financial] assistance.”237
The Name Dispute
On 7 June 1991, the Macedonian National Assembly deleted the designation
“Socialist” from their name through a constitutional amendment, thus creating the present
constitutional name: the Republic of Macedonia.238
Their choice of name would become
the source of a 20-year disagreement with Greece, a disagreement that still has no end in
sight. The Republic of Macedonia has been forced to use the nomenclature of FYRM
because Greece thought that by using the name “Macedonia” it “implied illicit claims on
the Greek–held portion of the old geographic Macedonia.”239
The Badinter Commission
recommended that the states of the Former Yugoslavia prove that they held no further
territorial aspirations. In response, on 6 January 1991, the FYRM passed two
constitutional amendments renouncing any future territorial aspirations.240
The Badinter
Commission also stated, however, that the name “Republic of Macedonia,” did not imply
235
Pond, 182 236
ibid, 185 237
ibid, 185 238
Panev, 598 239
Pond, 170 240
Panev, 605
52
territorial aspirations.241
Yet, as Misha Ghenny points out, “How this tiny impoverished
and effectively unarmed nation intended to invade Greece, a member of both NATO and
the EU, was never explained.”242
Most importantly, Greece feels that the name “Macedonia” rightly belongs only to
Greece‟s national history and thus no one else should be allowed to use this name.243
The
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the “former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia is exercising a policy of irredentism and territorial claims fuelled by the
falsification of history and the usurpation of Greece‟s historical and national heritage.”244
The FYRM argues that every state has the right to determine its own name, no matter the
connections to other states.245
The cultural heritage part of Greece‟s argument goes back
to the ancient history discussed earlier. On 10 December 1992, the Republic of
Macedonia added (Skopje) to its official name so that in international organizations the
official name would be the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje).246
Yet, this did not appease
Greece, which originally demanded that the phrase “Macedonia” not be used in any part
of the name of this new republic.247
Greece in fact had so much influence in the EU that
the Lisbon Commission, on 27 June 1992, commented on how they would only recognize
241
Dimitar Mirčev, “Foreign Policy of Macedonia,” in The New Macedonian Question, 201-225, ed James
Pettifer (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, Inc, 1999), 208 242
Misha Ghenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999, (New York: Penguin,
1999), 656 243
Panev, 605 244
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia name issue,” (Athens,
Greece: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2010), Accessed 24 January 2011, www.mfa.gr 245
Fotis Mavromatidis, “The Role of the European Union in the Name Dispute between Greece and FYR
Macedonia,” in Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 18, No 1 (March 2010: 49 246
Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” in The New Macedonian Question, 201-225, ed
James Pettifer (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, Inc., 1999), 42 247
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece
53
Macedonia if “Macedonia” was not included in the name used by the country.248
Greece‟s
position has since changed and they are willing to include the term Macedonia in a name
if it has a geographical qualifier. The next year, a few days before the Danish Foreign
Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, was to leave office, he published a statement that
included a scathing commendation of Greece‟s, and the EU‟s, actions. He claimed that
Greece was holding the EU hostage and the “failure to recognize the Republic of
Macedonia only because of demonstrating understanding for Athens was a dark stain on
the Community‟s foreign policy, which had to be removed.”249
Whether the Danish
Foreign Minister‟s speech was the deciding factor or not, by the end of 1994, all EU
member states, except for Greece, had set up bilateral diplomatic relations with the
FYRM (some using the FYRM others using the Republic of Macedonia).250
The Republic
of Macedonia gained UN recognition on 8 April 1993 under the name of the FYRM
rather than their constitutional name.251
In 1995, Greece and the FYRM signed an Interim Accord, which established
“diplomatic relations and a code of conduct between the parties.”252
The Accord, which
confirmed existing borders, established diplomatic relations, and recognized the FYRM
as an independent and sovereign state. However, the FYRM was immediately expected to
change its flag.253
In addition, the Republic of Macedonia agreed to use the Former
248
Mirčev, 212 249
Reuter, 43 250
Mirčev, 218 251
Panev, 606 252
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs 253
Mirčev, 219. Note: The original flag that the FYRM had decided to use for the national flag used the
sunburst that the Ancient Macedonians are expected to used/had been found next to the grave of Phillip II,
which had 16 points. The new flag uses a different type of sunburst pattern, which uses 8 points. It
maintained the same colors of a yellow sun on a red background.
54
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) when seeking recognition in international
organizations until a mutually acceptable negotiated name could be agreed upon under
UN guidance. In the agreement, Greece promised to refrain from objecting to the
application or membership of the FYRM to international, regional or multilateral
organizations, unless Macedonia applies under a name other than the one referred to in
[United Nations Security Council] Resolution 817-1993.254
In April 2008, the FYRM‟s application for membership in NATO was heard in
Bucharest. Greece vetoed the application, stating that Greece wished to resolve the name
issue as an essential precondition to NATO membership.255
Since all states‟ agreement is
required for membership to NATO, the FYRM‟s application was denied. The FYRM
claims that this is a “clear violation of [Greece‟s] obligations under the Interim Accord”
and sued Greece in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).256
The FYRM further alleges
in their argument to the ICJ that Greece has made it clear they will continue to prevent
both NATO and EU membership based on the name alone.257
Since for both the EU and
NATO, all member states have to agree to admit members, the negotiations have
stalemated. Published documents prove the validity of the FYRM‟s claim against Greece.
In 2007, in a televised debate, Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis stated that
Greece will veto the FYRM‟s application if the name dispute is not solved.258
The Greeks
are in agreement with the Prime Minister‟s policy with an overwhelming 83% of Greeks
254
Mirčev, 219. The name is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 255
Mavromatidis, 50 256
ICJ application, 14 257
ibid ,14 258
“Maramanlis: Greece to veto Macedonia‟s EU, NATO bids if name issue not resolved,” Southeast
European Times, 09 July 2007, www.setime.com accessed 8 February 2011.
55
supporting the veto if the name issue is unresolved.259
Greece counters that the FYRM
violated the interim agreement long before Greece did, do Greece is justified in denying
membership. Hearings for the ICJ case began in March 2011, but have not reached any
conclusions at the time of publishing.
To this day, Macedonia and Greece have not resolved the name issue. Greece
maintains that it has “approached the UN-led negotiations in a constructive way, and
ma[de] every effort to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue.”260
Greece
claims that no significant progress has been made due to the FYRM‟s bad faith and
provocative irredentist actions, and this is their counter-argument to the ICJ case.261
The
FYRM, via the Prime Minister Nikola Gurevski, comments, “I believe that Greece, for
now, is not prepared to make a compromise. Twenty years since our independence and
one year since the start of frequent meetings, our interlocutors still face a serious obstacle
to accept that Macedonians live in this country who speak Macedonian.”262
Gurevski has
also said, “We are ready to discuss changes. But to change our name, our identity? The
citizens are not ready.”263
Poll data back up Gurevski‟s claims. In 2010, Macedonians
were polled on the name issue; 66.5% backed the constitutional name “Republic of
Macedonia.” Even further, only 26.2% think that accession to the Euro-Atlantic
structures is more important than their constitutional name.264
Currently, 131 countries
259
Michael Seraphinoff, “Dimensions of the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute” (Greenbank, WA:
MacedonianLit, 2008), 2. 260
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece 261
ibid 262
Emphasis added. “PM Gruevski: I wish a name solution with Greece to be found,” Idivi, Skopje: 20
January 2011, www.idividi.com/mk/English accessed 20 January 2011. 263
"Macedonian Wedding." Return to Europe. 264
“Constitutional Name more important than EU, NATO accession: polls,” Vmacedonianews.com, 14 July
2010, Accessed 20 January 2011.
56
use the name “Republic of Macedonia,” 18 use the “FYRM” in diplomatic relations.265
Of the UN Security Council Permanent Members, only France uses the “FYRM” as the
designation, all the others use the constitutional name. In the EU, 14 states recognize the
state by its constitutional name, 11 by “FYRM,” and 2 are unknown/unclear in their
usage.266
The EU Commission on Enlargement states, “Maintaining good neighbourly
relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue,
under the auspices of the UN, remains essential”267
to the possible admittance to the EU.
Dimitris Droutsas, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, says, “The name issue must be
solved before we can even think of opening accession negotiations with Skopje.”268
The
FYRM has continued to work towards EU accession and continues to promise joining the
EU to its citizens, despite Greece‟s decision to not precede with accession negotiations.
265
www.makdenes.org, Id # 2279371, accessed 20 January 2011 266
“Macedonian Naming Dispute,” www.ask.com 267
European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011,” Communication From
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. COM(2010) 660. Brussels: European
Printing Office, 9 November 2010. 37 268
“Greece Again Challenges Macedonia on EU accession,” Athens: RFE/RL, 28 October 2009
57
Chapter Four: Enlargement Fatigue
The previous three chapters addressed the history of the EU and the FYRM, but
did little to link their stories together to the larger goals of this thesis. Let us go back to
the original question of this thesis: what can a small country in the Balkans tell the world
about the much larger conglomeration of economically and politically stronger countries?
The FYRM admissions process to the EU highlights the problems that the EU is currently
having. The EU is facing a critical discussion of its own definition on what sort of union
it will be.
Currently every member state has the same amount of power and say in the
Union. While differences have been allowed for in monetary policy and the expansion of
the Euro, all countries have at least one commissioner that has a say over the start of new
accession negotiations or expansion of the Union‟s CFSP.269
While this is an important
feature of the EU- it prevents any one state from dictating the direction of the EU- it also
limits the effectiveness of the EU. The EU states that it wants to be heard with one voice
in the world.270
An example of the problem that the EU faces in speaking with one voice,
unrelated to the Balkans, is the Copenhagen Climate Talks in 2009. While the EU has led
the way in “going green,” at the Copenhagen summit, it was sidelined and ignored in the
process of global discussion. The EU does not have the political influence to guarantee its
desired outcomes.271
Although it has often times created or been the first to pass
269
Common Foreign and Security Policy; As noted before, this will change in 2014-2017 to a rotating
basis. It is still required to have unanimity in CFSP, and thus might still apply to enlargement negotiations. 270
European Commission, The EU in the World: The Foreign Policy of the European Union,
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/67/en.pdf, June 2007 (accessed 26 October 2010) 271
James Kanter. "Europe Stews As Its Clout Diminishes On Climate: [Foreign Desk]." New York
Times, December 3, 2009, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 20,
2011).
58
legislation for climate change, other countries ignored the EU at the Copenhagen
Summit. In Copenhagen the EU diplomat as well as representatives from every major
state, including France and Germany, represented the EU. Too many agents from the EU
diluted its influence as the world was unsure whom to look towards for guidance in
climate change discussions.272
Too many agents also can backfire when viewing the overall credibility of the
EU. When one or two states hold the progress of the EU hostage to accomplish their own
political goals, the credibility of the EU is in danger.273
In fact, “the case of Macedonia,”
Dušan Relijic argues, “has already indicated that the EU‟s political considerations-which
have little to do with the actual achievements of particular countries within the SAP-have
a strong influence on the EU‟s decisions.”274
The “political considerations” mentioned
can often be boiled down to the discussion between a wide and deep union as mentioned
earlier. A broad union can be defined as “that of the intergovernmental view of separate
nation states acting together where appropriate and in a free market;” while a deep union
would refer to “a single political entity operating under the principles of a European
social market with members having a subordinate role.”275
272
Pamela Barnes, “Too Many Presidents Spoil the Broth‟ – the Role of the commission in Global Climate
Change Politics” Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston,
MA, March 3-5, 2011. 273
Danish Foreign Minister‟s words about Greece and the progress in the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU) 274
Dušan Relijic, “A Long Way to EU accession?: Membership Perspectives and the Stabilization &
Association process for the Western Balkan Countries,” in “State Building & Regional Cooperation in the
Western Balkans: Europe‟s engagements 12 years after Dayton” Foreign Policy in Dialogue Vol. 8 Issue
23, pg 16-23, ed Marco Overhaus, et al. (Trier, Germany: deutsche-aussenpolitik.de, 2007), 20. 275
Anthony and Andrew Cowgill, The Treaty of Lisbon in Perspective: The European Reform Treaty-
Consolidated Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (Gloucestershire: British Management Data Foundation, 2008), viii.
59
The EU has grown significantly since the 1950s, but “an odd characteristic of the
EU is that it has grown so significantly without ever settling the question of its own
nature.”276
A critical aspect of the question “what sort of union should the EU be?”
involves enlargement. If the EU is to be wide and not deep, it must further expand to
other countries. If it is to be deep and not wide, enlargement must stop now. If it can be
both, expansion must proceed and political union must increase. Both sides have
supporters and detractors. Supporters of integration argue that “the EU has done the job it
was set up for, fostering partnership amongst nations and…helping to prevent Europe
from descending into the kind of continent wide conflagration that killed so many during
the 20th
century”277
and thus should continue expanding to help stabilize the Balkans
which are in danger of descending into a region wide conflict that emerged in Western
Europe in the 20th
Century. The original idea behind the ECSC was to stabilize Europe
and to ensure further peace by connecting key industries of previously warring nations
and this has been a success.
However, currently, “when enlargement could once again serve as a tool for
promoting stability further east and south, some of the original beneficiaries seem
preoccupied with securing the possibility of an exit strategy.”278
The Lisbon Treaty
includes the first mention of leaving the EU, and member states demanded that this
clause be in the treaty. The EU Commission believes that the enlargement process
276
Nicolas se Boisgroiller, “The EU Disunion,” in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional
Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 90-97 (New York: International Debate Education
Association, 2009), 93. 277
Gordon Kerr, A Short History of Europe: From Charlemagne to the Treaty of Lisbon, (Harpenden,
Herts: Pocket Essentials, 2009), 150. 278
Jana-Hynkova-Dvoranova, “The Lisbon Treaty and the Future of EU Enlargement,” in Rejecting the EU
Constitution?: from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 71-87 (New York:
International Debate Education Association, 2009), 85.
60
“contributes to stability in Europe and to the security and well-being of its citizens.”279
In
addition, one of the main impetuses behind the Treaty of Lisbon was to “prepare the EU
for enlargement, in particular that the institutions of the Union would be organized to be
able to operate on a more efficient basis.”280
Yet enlargement has often taken a backseat
to many different concerns in the years since the Lisbon Treaty. Others argue that by
trying to make the EU a deeper union it will “undercut one of Europe‟s greatest recipes
for success,”281
which is competition and trade.
The Economist, notes, “There is nothing wrong in principle with the idea of some
EU countries going farther and faster towards political integration than others.”282
While
The Economist is referring to current member states rather than potential member states,
it is necessary to consider how the process of enlargement will change towards candidate
countries if some members move towards closer integration while others move away,
even while all still theoretically support expansion. Complications will arise when some
countries desire deeper, closer integration and others wider integration when discussing
enlargement, since the two ideals are often at odds with each other. Yet The Economist
also notes, “The more [the EU] speaks as one, the more they can hope to be heard.”283
Put
another way, the more the member states recognize that they are more powerful as one
entity, the sooner that they will accept a CFSP.284
279
EU Commission, “Enlargement Strategy,” 2 280
Anthony and Andrew Cowgill, xv 281
Matt Peterson, “What Made Europe Great?” Euobserver.com, 30 June 2010. 282
“Pact of uncompetitiveness,” The Economist, 12-18 February 2011, 16. 283
Charlemagne, “Out of the Limelight,” The Economist 5-11 February 2011, 64. 284
Silvia Kofler, “The Frontiers of Europe,” presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA)
Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.
61
By joining, the EU the member states “have opted, freely and democratically, for
membership [in] a community in which sovereignty is partially transferred…to common
institutions established in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg for the benefit of all
[member states.]”285
However, during the past 7 years of enlargement that almost doubled
the size of the EU, member states have begun to question the validity of expansion, and
to a lesser extent the Union itself. While the prevailing view is that the EU‟s borders are
not final, the belief is that only the Western Balkans stands a realistic chance.286
A recent
Eurobarometer poll displays conflicting views of the future of the EU in which 43% of all
EU respondents believe that the EU in 2030 will go far beyond the limits of the European
continent, compared with 37% who do not believe this, and 20% who are not sure.287
A
contrast exists in the idea that other countries will apply to an organization in which its
own members are not currently happy holding memberships. The potential and candidate
countries find more worth in joining the EU than in staying out, while the member states
question the benefits of staying in. While in the past, Euroskepticism has mostly been a
fringe event, many more mainstream politicians are beginning to express skepticism
about the value of staying in the EU. The President of the Czech Republic and many
nationalist parties are examples.
When members such as Greece or Cyprus block a candidate country‟s accession,
the façade of EU unity cracks. If the member states are supposed to present a united front
to the world, then when any one state acts differently than the rest, the union is exposed
285
Brian Nelson & David Roberts, “Introduction” in The European Community in the 1990s: Economics,
Politics, and Defense, Ed Brian Nelson, et al (Oxford: Berg, 1992), ix 286
Ahto Lobjakas, “Top EU Official Draws Line Between Enlargement, Neighborhood Policies” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 June 2010 287
Eurobarometer 71, “Future of Europe” 2009; these statistics were taken from the EU wide averages.
62
as being divided. The threat is especially real in the case of the FYRM, which has
consistently made progress towards every benchmark that the EU has placed in its way.
While not ready for immediate accession, the process of negotiating can often solve many
of the problems that the candidate countries face in adopting the acquis. Negotiations
have acted as this sort of catalyst in the past, especially with the new Central-Eastern
European states. In addition, negotiations will give the FYRM concrete steps, goals, and
timelines to reach for rather than the blanket term “the acquis” that currently exists.
Negotiations will also let the FYRM know which goals are critical to EU accession and
which they may have a bit more leeway in working towards.
While the EU claims to want to speak with one voice, many of its policies
towards the Western Balkans are disjointed.288
The confusion relating to the Balkans is
representative of the confusion in all of the EU‟s CFSP. Despite progress made towards
creating a CommonFSP, many member states struggle to maintain a “semblance of
unity”289
when creating foreign policy or interacting with the world. The High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in the 2009 Annual Report,
stated, “coherent implementation of the renewed consensus on enlargement based on
consolidation of commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality, better communications
and the EUs capacity to integrate members continues to form the basis of EU actions.”290
The Treaty of Lisbon was to “bring coherence between the different strands of EU
288
Roberto Belloni, “European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects, and Obstacles,”
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern States 11, 3 (2009):314 289
ibid, 325 290
Council of the European Union,2009 Annual Report from the High representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of CFSP, 1831-9033 (Belgium: EU Publishing,
2009), 17
63
external policy.”291
Since the Lisbon Treaty has only been in effect for 1 year and four
months (1 December 2009), to evaluate the effect on CFSP is difficult. Little to no
scholarly research currently exists on the effect of the treaty for CFSP except in
speculation. However, as noted before, the purpose of the treaty was to refine EU
institutions to address the concerns that many member states had over enlargement under
current terms. When taking the next steps to further enlarge the community, it should be
kept in mind that part of the revision of the treaties was intended to facilitate
enlargement. Therefore there should be little surprise or rejection of enlargement at least
for the candidate and potential candidate countries. Of course, there will be dissent on
members where dissent already exists such as Turkey, the FYRM, or Serbia.
No concrete steps toward enlargement have occurred since the passing of the
Lisbon Treaty in 2007. In fact, the opposite has occurred. The EU and individual member
states have hardened their position by placing more barriers to enlargement. Greece has
come out and publically stated that until the FYRM changes its name, Greece will not
begin accession negotiations. Cyprus is currently blocking Turkey‟s negotiations due to
the border dispute.292
The financial crisis has also put a damper on the possibility of
enlargement due to fears of the increased problems with new, smaller unstable states.
Many states, such as Germany, are worried about the financial stability of new states
before they join the union. While a valid concern, it does not mean that all enlargement
291
European Commission “Reforming Europe for the 21st Century” COM 2007 412 Final, in The Treaty of
Lisbon in Perspective: The EU Reform Treaty – Consolidated Treaty on European Union and the
Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, ed Anthony and Andrew Cowgill, 309-
314 (Gloucestershire: British Management Data Foundation, 2008), 313. 292
The EU member State of Cyprus controls part of Cyprus and the other part is controlled by the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus which is recognized only by Turkey. Cyprus refuses to extend negotiations
until Turkey recognizes Cyprus‟s supremacy on the island.
64
should stop. It is as if current strong member states choose to ignore the fact that the
member states which joined before 1984 are facing the worst of the current financial
crisis.293
None of the 2004 or later members are facing bailouts by the Union. This
scenario suggests that perhaps the candidate countries could bring vitality, rather than a
challenge, to the union. In response to fears and doubts about enlargement in 2010, the
EU reaffirmed their commitment to the Balkans and dismissed fears of “enlargement
fatigue.”294
Yet no real steps have been taken. While the EU has extended candidate
country status to other states, only Iceland has progressed towards negotiations.
Yet the larger question about whether the EU wants to expand also provokes a
further question- what benefits do the candidate countries bring to the EU? Enlargement
should not only benefit the candidate countries but also the EU. Some scholars argue that
the consideration of benefit to the EU is the most important consideration of all. There is
little obvious benefit to the EU from the smaller states in the Balkans. They have small
economies, with little to no markets and almost no competitive marketable goods. The
main benefit of enlargement towards the Western Balkans is the increased safety and
security of the EU. The benefit should not only be to the safety and security of the EU
citizens. However, due to the Lisbon Treaty and the solidarity agreement, for the EU, that
security agreement might just be enough in the current political atmosphere. The security
of the EU is mentioned often in relation to the Balkans. In addition, enlargement
may “increase the prestige of the EU as a global player [and] enhanc[e] its visibility in
293
Antoine Blua “WU Commits to Opening Door to Western Balkans, But Warns Progress Still Needed,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 02 June 2010 294
ibid
65
global trade agreements.”295
Other benefits could include economic trade and efficiency
gains.
Almost all scholars agree on the fact that without the Western Balkans inside of
the EU, the EU has the potential to be unstable due to the geographical position of the
Western Balkans surrounded by the EU.296
In fact, the question of Macedonian statehood
was a major problem of the 20th
century and a contributor to all major wars since 1878.297
The Balkans is an important “element in the overall security of the continent. Stability
and security in Europe as a whole cannot be achieved and sustained if this part of the
continent is dragged into economic and social turmoil.”298
However, the EU is currently
reluctant to accept all of the Balkans or Turkey. 299
A minister of Foreign Affairs in
Serbia has stated, “The Western Balkans is without a doubt already a part of the EU.”300
Yet their admission is far from clear. In its current form, the stringent conditionality
imposed upon the Western Balkans is adding to the stress of already stressed systems;301
for the FYRM, overwhelming the civil service.302
However, if this conditionality does not
exist before the countries join the EU the goals set to meet the acquis will not be met.
295
Akast, 263. 296
For example, see John McCormick, Jorge Juan Fernandez et al. 297
Andrew Ressors, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Macedonia‟s independence and Stability,” in
Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower, ed Robert Guttman (Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2001), 111. 298
Guner Oztek, “Opening remarks” in Proceeding of the International Conference on the EU Enlargement
Towards South-East Europe, 15 Dec 2005, ed Ozan Erӧzden, YTU Aud/Yildiz Campus, 17-20: 18. 299
Ozan Erӧzden, “EU Enlargement Towards the Balkans as a Problem of Physics: Quantum Mechanics
vs. Newtonian Mechanics” in in Proceeding of the International Conference on the EU Enlargement
Towards South-East Europe, 15 Dec 2005, ed Ozan Erӧzden, YTU Aud/Yildiz Campus, 21-27, 24 300
Sasa Ojdanic, “Future Development of the European Union (2010-2020): challenges and perspectives of
EU Enlargement.” Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston,
MA, March 3-5, 2011. 301
Conditionality is the benchmarks and other goals that the candidate countries have to meet to open
accession negotiations, or move forward in the process. 302
Milda Anna Vachudova, roundtable participant “Deepening or Widening? Debating the European
Union‟s Agenda for the Next Decade,” at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference,
Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.
66
One only has to look towards Bulgaria and Romania to see what could occur if the acquis
is not fulfilled before admission- the EU has lost most of its bargaining power over
fulfillment of EU policies that were not met before admission to the EU. 303
Bulgaria and
Romania have continued to fall behind in progress towards goals to meet the acquis after
they were admitted.304
From fear of the same happening in the Western Balkans, the EU
is imposing a much stricter conditionality on the potential candidate countries than ever
before. Once there is no longer a “carrot” guiding and justifying the harsh policy changes,
countries often lose their political will to implement the often severe policies to bring
their country in line with EU policy. If the EU does expand into this hotbed of
confrontation, it has a chance of quelling the dissent and ethnic nationalism that could
rise up to haunt Europe again. In fact, if the EU accepts that it is unable to enlarge due to
its absorption capacity, then the opposite will occur- a radical or nationalistic agenda
could be bolstered by the EU‟s inaction.305
There is current academic discussion of how
the lack of a credible possibility of admission has slowed marked progress towards EU
benchmarks in candidate countries.306
Confidence in the EU is consistently falling both
outside of and within the organization.
303
Zoltan Dujisin, “Can EU anchor in Romania, Bulgaria, Stabilize Balkans?” Inter Press Service 28
December 2006; Stephen Castle “With Romania and Bulgaria joining the EU, how much bigger can it
get?” The Independent. 29 December 2006. London; Vessela Sergueva “Bulgaria, Romania enthusiastic to
squeeze into EU” Agence France Presse. 30 December 2006. 304
Irina Angelescu, “Punching Below its Weight: Romanian Foreign Policy and the Impact of its European
Integration,” paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA,
March 3-5, 2011. 305
Biljana Gaber, “The Republic of Macedonia‟s Way To The European Union” in Proceeding of the
International Conference on the EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe, 15 Dec 2005, ed Ozan
Erӧzden, YTU Aud/Yildiz Campus, 103-108: 108. 306
Gergana Noutcheva and Senem Aydin Duzgit, “Lost in Europeanization? Turkey and the Western
Balkans” Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA,
March 3-5, 2011.
67
The Balkans is one area where confidence is slipping fast. Essentially, the same
thing is occurring with the Balkans as occurred with the Copenhagen Climate talks,
particularly with the FYRM. The EU itself, in the form of the Commission, is offering the
FYRM membership and congratulating them on their progress. The Council refuses to
make a decision, always delaying it until the next presidency. Greece refuses to allow the
FYRM to progress until it reaches a result on the name issue. The UK is trying to support
the membership application to no avail.307
These challenges, along with others that the
EU faces, such as dealing with the current crisis in the Middle East, require a strong EU
CFSP. Currently, however, such unity is missing due to fears over loss of sovereignty to a
supranational governing body.
307
Sandrino Smeets, “The Yellow Brick Road from the Balkans to Brussels. An Analysis of Ten Years of
Council Negotiations on the Balkans,” Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA)
Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.
68
Conclusion
The EU is a unique body; an organization created out of the devastation of WWII
has morphed into the largest economic body in the world. While its political heft is vastly
inferior to its economic heft, the EU is trying to rectify the difference. Often, due to the
unequal economic and political power, the EU will use “economic external policies as
tools for political ends”308
rather than using political methods, such as diplomacy.
Humanitarian aid, such as that provided to the FYRM in 2001 to prevent a civil war, is a
way that the EU uses economic policy to influence political events. The economic aid to
candidate countries is tied up in the conditionality imposed upon them. However,
Danijela Dolonee notes “EU conditionality has an effect, but not to the extent that
[member states] expect.”309
All but one of the candidate countries is from the Balkans;
since they see the EU as a moving target,310
admission is beginning to lack legitimacy.311
The further conditionality imposed upon the Western Balkans, especially in the form of
different policies of member states, highlights cracks in the unity of EU foreign policy.
Throughout the years since 1951, the EU has consistently enlarged to include
more states while also joining in a deeper political fashion with the states that were
current members. Since the fall of communism, there have been doubts about whether the
EU should enlarge to include many former Soviet states. Accompanying the fear of
enlargement is the fear of a union that has a higher political authority than the nation-
state. In order to quell some of these fears, the EU has constructed treaties that continue
308
Isabelle Welpe, “External Policies,” in The Student’s Guide to European Integration, Ed Jorge Juan
Fernandez Garcia, Jess Clayton, and Christopher Hobley (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004), 263. 309
Danijela Dolonee, “Deepening or Widening? Debating the European Union‟s Agenda for the Next
Decade,” at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011. 310
Dolonee 311
Noutcheva and Aydin Duzgit
69
to recognize both the need for a common foreign and security policy and member state‟s
desires to retain the bulk of their sovereignty in foreign policy. Yet when states retain
their sovereignty, it can create 27 different foreign policies trying to merge into one
common policy. Not only does this sound impossible, it has proved impossible. The
Treaty of Lisbon, the most recent of all EU treaties, established a careful balance between
members who preferred a broader union and those which preferred a deeper union. Yet
the Treaty of Lisbon was based on the ideals enshrined in the many previous treaties that
created the closer cooperation of the EU. It also maintained the multiple EU institutions
that had formed over the years to help the it function, giving some of them the first legal
basis.
The Treaty of Lisbon was created partially to address fears about enlargement.
The EU has morphed from a limited institution with six members to a massive institution
with 27. Currently five candidate countries and four potential candidate countries are
waiting to join this institution. This list does not mention the other countries that have
expressed a desire to join, but their cases are too politically unstable to make them
acceptable candidate at present. The enlargement process is especially critical to the
Western Balkans, since every country is either a candidate or a potential candidate. The
candidate status of these countries also changes the foreign policy of the EU towards
these countries. Their geographical location, surrounded by the EU, is another factor that
leads to a different policy towards the Western Balkans than other EU neighbor states.
The EU cannot treat them the same as they would Ukraine or Belarus, which only share
one border with one, maybe two, EU countries. A policy that would effect transportation
of good from Bulgaria to Slovenia on the shortest way possible goes through the
70
candidate countries; this is just one example of how geography can affects the policy of
the EU towards the Western Balkans.
The country that highlights the difficult choices that the EU is facing is the
FYRM. The FYRM is located in one of the most historically contentious hotspots in the
Balkans. Everything from the country‟s name, to its nationality, to its language is
questioned by the surrounding states. The area of geographic Macedonia has been known
as “Macedonia” since the time of the Ancient Macedonians. However, the land has
changed hands numerous times, and the original inhabitants no longer have any
decedents living in the area. This lack of direct decedents makes the current political
situation that much more unstable, because of conflicting claims over the term
“Macedonia.” Greece is the main country that opposes the term due to the supposed
territorial and cultural claims on the “true” Macedonia, which is located only in Greece.
Despite the stumbling blocks that Greece and the EU have enacted on the way to
international recognition, the FYRM has continued on, often achieving textbook success
by consistently working towards goals despite internal chaos. The FYRM has met almost
every goal that the EU has set in its search for accession. While there are ethnic problems
that the FYRM has to still address, the country is working towards fixing the problems.
While this thesis has addressed the problems in EU foreign policy, highlighted by
the admissions case of the FYRM, many research questions have been left unanswered.
Will the financial crisis change the CFSP? Or the admissions process? Will the financial
bailout of Greece affect their ability to control accession negotiations with the FYRM?
How will the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty affect the CFSP and enlargement
process? Will some states give up on EU membership due to the lack of a credible
71
accession? These questions are unable to be answered at this point, but offer insights to
the future direction of the EU.
The EU needs to figure out what sort of state/governing body/organization it
wants to be. There needs to be leadership at the highest levels, as was required before
when the EU was created, to guide the EU in determining what sort of policy it will
formulate as it moves on. 312
Until the EU learns to speak with one voice, its joint
economic power will always be more powerful than its political power. If the EU wants
to broadcast its desires, or political needs, to the world and be on an equal footing with
emerging superpowers, it needs to speak with one voice through one person (at most
two). While this is not the case with economic policy, the EU economic unit as a single
market has more weight than the combination of political actions. Ideally, it would be the
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the EU President, the two positions set up to
project EU power abroad. However, until the EU creates a degree of true common foreign
and security policy, enlargement will come to a standstill. Since enlargement is a form of
foreign policy in the EU, as it figures out its foreign policy outlook, enlargement will
slow.
The FYRM continues to highlight the problems that the EU is facing due to the
unique process of admissions to the union. Through the admissions process, one sees the
main problem that the EU has yet to solve: what kind of political cohesion will the EU
manage to achieve? Through arguments about whether the EU will expand to a larger
union, or integrate policies more in a deeper union, or do both, the foreign policy of the
EU is deeply unresolved. Since the EU cannot make a decision over foreign policy or
312
Parsons
72
enlargement without solving the issues of its makeup, both have essentially ground to a
halt. While technically both are continuing, enlargement has slowed considerably as
benchmarks, usually only made after negotiations have begun, have been placed as goals
prior to the opening of negotiations. Foreign policy is impaired as the High
Representative tries to juggle 27 different foreign policies by creating one foreign policy.
The CFSP is beginning to show progress, but many hurdles exist in the future. The EU
may never solve this dilemma, as it is built into the design of an organization made up of
many sovereign states. However, the EU states that it wants to become a stronger actor
with a CFSP. If this is truly its goal, and member states support this goal, then something
will have to give in the struggle over a wide or deep union in order to support the future
of the union.
73
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