Overview of Testbed AreaPAWNS TestbedSecure Sensor MiddlewareIntegrating Policy and Group Key Management

Himanshu KhuranaSenior Security Engineer, NCSA

Testbed Area

Goal: provide a testbed for integration, evaluation, and demonstration of technologies developed by NCASSR

Long-term Vision: a testbed integrated with NCASSR organizations’ and external testbeds for scalability testing and transfer of technology

NCSA’s globus alliance and production environment efforts DHS/NSF Deter Testbed NRL Protean Lab

Step-by-step approach Provide a means for testing individual NCASSR

technologies Enhance collaboration between NCASSR and other

organization projects to develop integrated technologies

Y2 Testbed Projects

Five projects managed by three organizations SABRE – PI: Ouderkirk (PNNL) Multilevel – PI: Irvine ( NPS) CyberCIEGE – PI: Irvine (NPS) PKI Testbed – PI: Basney (NCSA) PAWNS – PI: Khurana (NCSA)

PAWNS: A testbed for Programming Applications for a Wireless Network of (motes-based) Sensors

Team Members: Himanshu Khurana, Peter Bajcsy, Rakesh Bobba, David Scherba

Goal: Integrate, evaluate and demonstrate Hazard Awareness using sensors (PI: Bajcsy) Security services for sensor networks (PI: Khurana)

PAWNS/Hazard Awareness/Secure Sensor Middleware Technology Components

Hazard Awareness and Response Deploy Point Sensors (“smart” motes) Using Robot

Control Calibrate Spectral Cameras and Point Sensors Proactive Camera Control Using Point Sensors Hazard Analysis and Human Alert Hazard Confirmation and Elimination Using Robot

Control Security and Reliability over multi-hop sensor

networks Encrypt data between sensors and base station

Key Management using Smart Dust, Public-Key and Random Graph techniques

Tinysec link-layer encryption with Skipjack Reliability transfer of messages

Link-level retransmission, erasure codes

Experimental Setup and Hazard Simulation *

* Slide provided by Peter Bajcsy

Proactive Camera Control and Hazard Alert and Elimination *

Proactive Camera Control Logic:

If light = on then visible camera = on

If light = off then thermal IR camera = on

Based on image analysis re-direct human attention to hazardous situation

* Slide provided by Peter Bajcsy

Integrating Policy and Group Key Mgmt Research Area: Secure Group Communication (SGC)

GCSs enable collaborative applications such as C&C and conferencing

Need for scalable security and multicast services Problems

Scalable Group Key Management approaches require Group Controllers to bear significant trust liabilities

Lack of tools to evaluate efficacy of key mgmt techniques Policy and key mgmt are both necessary to enable SGC but have not

been integrated

Goals/Approach Develop new key mgmt solutions that minimize trust liability in

group controllers Implement SGC framework based on IETF MSEC WG Security

Architecture specification Evaluate key mgmt solution in framework Framework integrates policy and key mgmt

Team Members Himanshu Khurana, Luke St. Clair, Neelay Shah

Minimizing Trust Liability in GC

Previous scalable key mgmt schemes use a trusted GC

GC organizes long-term member (symmetric) keys in a tree to enable O(log n) scalability

If GC is compromised, adversary gets access to data and key encryption keys and makes recovery costly

Our solution (TASK) using proxy cryptography so that GC does not have access to data and key encrypting keys

GC organizes shares of member (asymmetric) keys in a tree, uses shares to transform messages between members, enables O(log n) scalability

If GC is compromised, adversary only gets shares which can be refreshed easily for quick and cheap recovery

Publication Himanshu Khurana, Rafael Bonilla, Adam Slagell, Raja Afandi,

Hyung-Seok Hahm, and Jim Basney. Scalable Group Key Management with Partially Trusted Controllers. To appear in the International Conference on Networking, Reunion Island, April 2005

SGC Framework Implementation

Key Mgmt: Task, LKH

Auth:Openssl, IKE

Policy Spec:Antigone

M1 M2 Mn M1 M2

Key MgmtAuth

PolicySpec.

Domain A Domain B

GC Policy Server GC Policy Server

…

Reliable Multicast Layer: NORM, SpreadReliable Multicast Layer: NORM, Spread

Testbed Area Funding (Y2)

SABRE (Simulated Anomalous Behavior & REcognition) Ouderkirk

PNNL/Battelle $350,000

PAWNS (Programming & testing Applications on Wireless Network of Sensors) Khurana NCSA $175,000

Multilevel Testbed Encryption Experiments/Trusted Channel Implementation Irvine NPS $80,000

PKI Testbed Basney NCSA $255,000

CyberCIEGE Extended Scenarios Irvine NPS $200,000

Thrust Total Budget:     $1,060,000