Hiroshima: The World's Bomb by ANDREW J. ROTTER; Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimsonand the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan by SEAN L. MALLOY; The Nuclear Taboo: TheUnited States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 by NINA TANNENWALDReview by: LAWRENCE D. FREEDMANForeign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008), pp. 161-162Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699391 .

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Arabia and Switzerland. Altogether, this volume is a handy and interesting source of information. Meanwhile, intracountry mi

gration, about which information is harder

to get, is undoubtedly much higher than

intercountry migration; migration within China alone probably matches the global total for migration between countries.

quaint. Today s higher oil prices make the expansion of oil- and gas-production

capacity financially easier but also post pone the long-term need for finding new sources of revenue. This is an informative

analysis of these important organizations and their evolving relationships with their

government owners.

Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East, by valerie marcel.

Brookings Institution Press, 2006,

322 pp. $52.95 (paper, $22.95). Oil and gas production was nationalized

by many governments in opec (the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) in the 1970s. In the subsequent three decades, the resulting national oil

companies (nocs) matured professionally; moved downstream into refining, distri

bution, and sometimes petrochemical

production; and became more commercial

in orientation. But despite their importance in world oil production, they remain little studied. Based in part on over 100 inter

views, this book attempts to correct that

for five nocs: those of Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Nocs

have not hitherto been notable for their

openness, but they are reevaluating their

approaches to it, as well as to the two very different worlds in which they must simul

taneously operate: an international business

environment, still dominated by a hand

ful of Western-based international oil

companies, and a domestic political environment, often governed by fierce

nationalist sentiments and heavily depen dent on the revenues provided by the nocs. The interviews for the book took place in 2004, and the analysis goes only through 2005: the oil price of $35 a barrel, which is the price used in the book, now looks

Military, Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

Hiroshima: The World's Bomb, by Andrew

j. rotter. Oxford University Press,

2008,384 pp. $29.95. Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the

Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan. by sean l. Malloy. Cornell

University Press, 2008, 248 pp. $26.95. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and

the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since

1945. by nina tannenwald.

Cambridge University Press, 2008, 472 pp. $85.00 (paper, $34.99).

The literature on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki continues to grow. It moved some time ago beyond both the orthodox insistence that using the bomb was the necessary means to conclude a

brutal war and the revisionist claim that the true aim was to gain advantage in the

coming confrontation with the Soviet Union. In practice, given the availability of the weapon, the state of the war, and

the growing tension in relations with

Moscow, the default position favored the bombs use. The tougher call would have been to argue for restraint.

Rotter provides a readable account of the

political and scientific contexts in which

FOREIGN AFFAIRS - November/December 2008 [ 161 ]

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the bomb was developed and used and of some of the aftermath. He seeks originality by stressing the international cast of char

acters implicated in the bomb s develop ment and the countries that subsequently built their own?so that Hiroshimas bomb becomes the worlds bomb. As a unifying theme, this is a bit contrived. Malloy

manages more originality. He approaches the decision to use the bomb from the

perspective of a key player, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who had a record of opposition to indiscriminate attacks

on civilians, evident misgivings about the

prospective use of the atomic bomb, and

concern about the implications of its use

for future peace and security. When the

time came for a determination, Stimson was

78, tired and unwell, and faced with many urgent decisions. Opinions and assump tions were fluid about the reliability of the bomb and its likely effects on the Japanese leadership, the possibility of a conditional

Japanese surrender, the costs and dangers of an invasion, and the potential impact of the bombs use on wider international

relations. Stimson was unhappy with the

resulting decision, but Malloy claims that he contributed to a "brutal and tragic act"

by failing to pay attention to the details of the targeting, not doing enough to push the diplomatic track, and not insisting on keeping to the fore the potential long term consequences.

Malloy also quotes an April 1945 memo from Stimson to President Harry Truman

warning of the possibility of these weapons' eventually being constructed in secret and

used for surprise attacks. Malloy describes

this memo as prescient, which normally means having accurate knowledge of future

events. But in fact, the most striking thing about nuclear weapons since 1945 is that

they have not been used. Tannenwald

has done more than most to develop the

concept and describe the workings of the "nuclear taboo," which has led to what

previous generations might have considered

to be an unnatural restraint demonstrated

by successive generations of political leaders. She notes that the bombing of

Hiroshima, with its demonstration effect

and Asian victims, was a factor inhibiting the bombs use in the Korean War and the

Vietnam War. Her book demonstrates

how through these wars and on to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the taboo took root and was institutionalized in U.S. policy. But as Tannenwald warns, this taboo does

not constitute a full delegitimization of nuclear weapons, and whether the inhi

bition would continue to work in, say, Israel or Pakistan in the face of an exis

tential threat is a much trickier question.

Targeting Civilians in War. by

Alexander ?. downes. Cornell

University Press, 2008,328 pp. $29.95. Those who would rely on norms as a source

of restraint in war even in the face of the

developing frustration of wartime leaders

desperate for a way out would do well to read Downed Targeting Civilians in War. There is nothing new about abhorrence of the idea of victimizing civilians, yet as the

strategic incentives pile up, restraints have

generally turned out to be depressingly fragile. Like most contemporary American

political scientists, Downes is obliged to

explore whether certain categories of states,

notably democracies, do better at maintain

ing restraint, but in the end, explanations based on strategic logic hold up better than those focused on regime type. If anything,

when things get tough, democracies are less restrained than other states.

[162] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 87 No. 6

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