HISTORICAL REVISION NO. CXXII: BISMARCK AND THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR’

When the Franco-Prussian war broke out, most neutral observers unhesitatingly blamed France. She had declared it (19 July 1870) and they expected her to win it. Bismarck’s early German apologists, agreeing about the war guilt, added that she had made war inevitable by denying to south Germany peaceful unification with the North German Confederation set up after the Austro-Prussian war. Contemporary French historians, except for such interested and chauvinistic ones as Gramont, foreign minister at the time, conceded some validity to this argument ; but they also blamed Napoleon I11 for blindly playing into Bismarck’s hands, being convinced that Bismarck had intended Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen’s candidature for the Spanish throne (vacant since Isabella 11’s

1 Bibliographical note: The Prussian archive publication, Die Auswdrtige Politik Preussens. 1858-1871 (Oldenburg and Berlin, 10 vols, 1932-45) goes only to February 1869. Even when supplemented by R. Fester, Briefe, Aktenstiicke, und Registen ZUY Geschichte der Hohenzollernschen Thronkandi- datur in Spanien (Leipzig, 2 vols, 1913), R. H. Lord, The origins of the war of 1870 (Cambridge, Mass., 1924) -both concerning only the immediate origins of the war - and the dispatches in Bismarck’s Gesammelte Werke (Berlin, 19 vols, 1924-35, vol 6b), the Prussian side is not fully documented. That has been done for the French by Les origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870-71 (Paris, 29 vols, 1910-32).

Bismarck’s Reminiscences (Eng. tr., 2 vols, 1898) and Gramont’s apologia, France et la Prusse avant la guerre (Paris, 1872) show up badly against Bene- detti’s M a mission en Prusse (Paris, 1871). A. Sorel, Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande (Paris, 2 vols, 1873) is the best general account. Sybel, Die Begriindung des deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm Z (Munich, 7 vols, 1889-95, Eng. tr., New York, 1890-98) absurdly minimizes Bismarck’s respon- sibility, partly for reasons sketched above [cf. G. 0. Kent, ‘New notes on Heinrich von Sybel. , .’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xxviii (May 1955) 89-96]; but Sybel’s views, with those of G. Roloff, ‘Bismarck and German Unity’ (Cambridge Modern History, x, ch. xvi), and H. Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons IZZ von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870-71 (Stuttgart, 3 vols, 1926, first part tr. as Napoleon IZI and the Rhine, New York, 1928), are not now much attended to in Germany (cf. German history: some new German views, ed. Hans Kohn, 1954). For Gerhard Ritter, see his ‘Das Bismarck-Problem’, Merkur, Deutsche Zeitschrift fiir europdisches Denken, iv (June 1950), 657-76. G. Hanotaux’s views are cited from his Contemporary France (Eng. tr., i, 1903). Ch. Seignobos’s from vol. vii (Paris, 1921) of Lavisse, Histoire de France contemporaine, while H. Hauser’s interpretation in Du 1ibCralisme d l’imperialisme (Peuples ct Civilisations, xvii, Paris, 1939) is revised by F. L.’Huillier, ibid., 2nd edn. (1952). Grant-Robertson, Bismarck (1917) is superseded by Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (1949, Eng. abr. of same, Bismarck, Ztirich, 3 vols, 1941-4.) A. J. P. Taylor’s last interpretation appears in his Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman (1955). See also W. A. Smith, ‘Napoleon I11 andthe Spanish Revolu- tion of 1868’, The Journal of Modern History, xxv (September 1953). 211-33, for the candidatures.

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deposition in September 1868), to force Napoleon into a position where he must either fight, or accept a diplomatic defeat which would endanger the Bonapartist dynasty.

Some colour was given to that view by Bucher, Bismarck’s private secretary and an agent in the candidature, who called it a ‘trap for France’. Bismarck, and his admirer Sybel, denied this, but Bismarck’s accounts of the origins of the war are notoriously unreliable. In his Reminiscences, he insisted that the candidature was a purely personal and family matter, no concern of William I as Prussian king; that Leopold might have expected if successful to be persona grata to Napoleon, being more nearly related, despite Hohenzollern blood, to Napoleon than to William (patent absurdities, but accepted by Sybel); and that an arrogant French government turned the affair into a political issue, and forced war. Bismarck alleged his conviction in 1870 that war with France was inevitable, and that ‘the gulf’ between north and south Ger- many ‘could not be more effectively bridged than by a common national war against the neighbouring nation, our aggressor for centuries’ ; but though admitting that his redaction, publi- cation, and subsequent communication of the Ems telegram to the other powers was intended to provoke war, he claimed not to have decided on war until Gramont’s speech of 6 July threatened it unless the candidature were withdrawn. Sybel thought that this speech set off the train which led to war (William considered it sensible), and suggested that though Bismarck did not mind if the telegram provoked war, he would have been satisfied with forcing France to climb down and make amends for the speech and other insults to Prussia. Sybel minimized the responsibility of the invalid, irresolute Napoleon, suggesting also that until 14 July even Gramont (whom Sybel held most responsible) wanted not war, but Prussia’s humiliation. Sybel did not think the war inevitable before the French government decided upon it on 15 July, whereas Roloff asserted that Napoleon, by long, careful preparations, had made it so, Bismarck merely choosing occasion and pretext. Oncken, representing the dominant German viewpoint in the 1919-39 period, elaborated the theses of the war’s inevitability and Bismarck’s defence of national interests against French aggression-‘Seldom does a great

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conflict begin with such open and deliberate will to war on the one side.’ Gerhard Ritter, doyen of present-day German historians, less prejudiced, insists that in 1870 Napoleonic and Bismarckian diplomatic offensives collided. Other German historians, however, now emphasize the contemporary criti- cism of Bismarck’s methods and of Bismarck’s solution of the German problem as ‘unhistoric’ and reactionary. Others, again, endorse Burckhardt’s judgment in 1872 that Bismarck had merely forestalled the social democrats, whose rise ‘would produce an endless situation of violence, either through the democrats themselves, or the governments. He [Bismarck] said, Ipse faciam, and waged the three wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870.’

French historians have been noticeably less partisan in their approach. To Hanotaux, for example, war was ‘the logical conclusion’ of Napoleon’s political system, though, at the same time, Prussia was France’s ‘predestined rival’ in ‘the capital question of the Rhine’. Napoleon could not yield to Prussia the Burgundian inheritance which France had denied Austria, but he ‘lost every justification for his existence’ when the national principle, the source of his reputation and strength, was turned against him. Nevertheless, with the Ems telegram in mind Hanotaux cited (as the French did in 1870) Montes- quieu’s dictum that the real author of a war is not the man who declares it, but he who makes it necessary. Seignobos argued that Bismarck never intended the candidature to force war (‘on ne pouvait calculer si longtemps d’avance des faits qui Cchappaient A toute prCvision’) ; that his secret manoeuvrings were designed to ‘surprise’ France, as in 1866 he had ‘surprised‘ Austria and Russia with the successful Rumanian candidature of Leopold’s brother Charles; and that the Spanish dispute was only the external form of the Franco-Prussian contest for pre- eminence in Europe. Hauser endorsed Bismarck’s claims to have wanted and prepared the war, but added that Gramont collabor- ated admirably; that France’s final demands (13 July) that William should endorse Leopold’s withdrawal and guarantee its non-renewal were inadmissible and pointless, the real point hav- ing been gained; and that the Ems telegram was no forgery, but brutal, explicit statement of fact-France’s challenge had been thrown back. L‘ Huillier, pointing out that Bismarck’s interest

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in the candidature increased after Benedetti, the French ambassador, expressed France’s hostility to it, blamed Gramont, Eugenie, and Bonapartist extremists for the final demands, and concluded that while Bismarck did not falsify the Ems tele- gram, he gave it a tendentious character, and the explosion which Bismarck had expected in Paris forced the helpless Napoleon to meet Bismarck’s wishes, and declare war.

Most ‘neutral‘ historians, for example Grant-Robertson, Lord, and Eyck, while not excusing Napoleon’s final blunders, believed that Bismarck took up the candidature to force war - Benedetti had warned him that it was an ‘interest of the first order’ to France; Bismarck told William in March 1870 that in case of war with France, a pro-Prussian Spain would be worth two army-corps, while the Hohenzollernd European status, if Leopold succeeded, would resemble the old Hapsburg dynasty’s ; while at the famous dinner of 15 March 1870, Moltke’s neigh- bour asked Moltke: ‘If Napoleon takes it ill, are we ready?’ Eyck, insisting that the far-sighted, supremely intelligent Bismarck must have known the possible consequences of the candidature in infuriating France, flatly called it a trap, adding (incontrovertibly) that had it not caused war, Bismarck’s plan to call the Reichstag and send France an ultimatum (12 July) must have done, unless she drew back. Knowing exactly how the French would react, he ‘made them his tools’, ‘they did what he wanted’, and ‘the primary responsibility rests with him’, But A. J. P. Taylor, denying Bismarck such uncanny prescience, has argued that the candidature was intended to raise Prussian prestige in south Germany, and to keep France quiet and away from the Rhine, so making German unification, postponed by Bismarck to the future, possible without war. He did not expect war in June 1870, when he met the tsar at Ems, or he would have tried to ensure Russian neutrality. After that meeting, he returned to holidaying at Varzin; had Bismarck, ‘too impatient and highly-strung to let a crisis mature behind his back’, anticipated war, he would have been in Berlin to control events, and then have gone to Ems to William, whose side he had never left in the 1866 crisis. Again, but for a German embassy clerk’s blunder in Madrid, Leopold would have had the throne before France knew what was happening. Taken by surprise when the crisis broke, Bismarck at first

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tried to dissociate himself from the candidature and to make William responsible if, as Bismarck then expected] it ended in Prussia’s humiliation. He finally returned to Berlin on 12 July to ensure that William incurred any odium, while he got any credit, and was ready to sacrifice the king to save his own position. The French demands solved his problems for him. His editing of the Ems telegram (late on 13 July) was no forgery; it ‘emphasized the real issue’-William had rejected demands made under threat of war. Bismarck later claimed to have planned the war long before, and provoked it by the telegram; in reality, ‘the French blundered into a war which was not unwelcome to them; and Bismarck. . . turned their blunder to his advantage’. Again, it was some time after the outbreak of war before he decided to complete German unifi- cation, and then it was done to keep the south German states, who were getting tired of it, to stay in the war. ‘Far from using the war in order to promote unification, he sought unification in order to continue the war.’

A thorough examination of the secret file of Prussian documents (now in London) concerning the candidature might possibly answer the question. Sybel, whose work Bismarck commissioned, was denied after Bismarck’s dismissal the use of that file and of other documents; and Sybel’s original version of the candidature, as Hohenlohe admitted, differed radically from that of his book, being replaced, after great official pressure had been put on him, by one not compromising to the Prussian government. This points to warlike motives (which Bismarck would not have feared to admit), though the adop- tion of the candidature was certainly no new departure. Bismarck had already welcomed the growing insecurity of the anti-Prussian, ultramontane Isabella, and had perhaps secretly favoured a previous candidate, the Orleanist Mont- pensier, to check Napoleon; Napoleon wished to ensure that in a Franco-Prussian war, Spain would either favour France, or be unable to intervene] and from 1868 had pursued an aggressively interventionist policy in Spain. Again, while there is no proof that Bismarck took Benedetti’s warnings seriously, it seems incredible that he should not have realized that war was a possible outcome of the candidature, especially since from the time of the Luxemburg crisis he had reckoned

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on war with France. It may well be that after the establishment of l’Em+ire libkral in January 1870, it was improbable that France would go to war to prevent German unification, provided that Prussia did not force it on the southern states. But Bismarck, with his experiences of internal German opposition to his Prussianisation of the North German Confederation and with a stiff fight due in 1871 over the military establishment, could not await with any optimism the south’s voluntary adhesion. It is true that the south, disliking Prussia, would not join her against France to further Hohenzollern aggrandize- ment (witness hostile Bavarian reactions when the news of the candidature broke in early July), and that even on the issue of ‘national honour’ southern support was not axiomatic. Never- theless, only war could give Bismarck what he wanted, on his terms-united Germany, but not a liberal, democratic Germany. Certain, as Taylor shows, of Austrian and Russian neutrality, he had no need to forestall attempts at an anti-Prussian coalition (Sore1 caustically opined that in 1870 Napoleon’s diplomats counted on French victories to bring allies, Nap- oleon’s generals on French allies to bring victories), so that there was no necessity to discuss a French war at the meeting with Alexander on 1-4 June. This might have shown Bismarck’s hand prematurely, and made him the aggressor in Russian eyes. More important, William, who always disliked the candid- ature, gave final approval to it only on 21 June, and talk of war in such circumstances would have set him immovably against it. Probably Bismarck had not definitely decided on war at the beginning of July, but any surprise then was most likely due to the course taken by the crisis-ie., that the storm, by preceding Leopold‘s election, precluded it-for his secretive methods over the candidature had produced the inflammable situation. His staying at Varzin is attributable to his agreement with the Spanish premier that the Prussian government was officially ignorant of the candidature; his bitter opposition to William’s peace moves at Ems is inadequately explained by desire to shift responsibility; and it is more reasonable to ascribe Bismarck’s return to Berlin to fears that prospects of war were receding. Perhaps he made up his mind only after Gramont’s speech-he always had two strings to his bow. He certainly decided on war before he knew of the final French

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demands, and it was his official communication to other powers of the Ems telegram (in itself, admittedly, not untruthful), which forced Napoleon, who hitherto had always shrunk from the supreme ordeal, to follow his fading star towards the Rhine. The evidence so far available suggests that the war of 1870 was not inevitable, for Napoleon until the end was irresolute, and Bismarck could have prevented it. Bismarck always knew that Prussia had a choice. Napoleon finally felt that France had none-rightly, for the success in 1866 of ‘blood and iron’ had put a premium on the military solution.

FRANK SPENCER^

a Mr F. Spencer, M.A., is lecturer in modem history in the University of Hull.