British Special Operations Executive & Balkan Air Force Missions to Montenegro 1943-44:

A Background to the Brezna Landings

Kenneth Morrison

Author’s biography

Kenneth Morrison is a Lecturer in International Relations at Birkbeck College, University of London and an Honorary Research Associate at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES). He received his Master of Arts (MA Honours) degree from the University of Aberdeen and his PhD (which focused on contemporary Montenegrin politics 1989 – 2006) from the University of Stirling. He is the Programmer Director of the MSc Nationalism and Ethno-Political Conflict MA course at Birkbeck College, University of London, and has previously taught Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav politics at UCL-SSEES and Aberdeen University. He is the author of Montenegro: A Modern History (IB. Tauris, 2009) and numerous articles on Montenegro, Serbia (including Sandžak) and Bosnia & Herzegovina. He lives in London but returns to Montenegro whenever possible.

Author’s Note: Writing about the SOE and the Second World War in Yugoslavia The Second World War remains the most controversial period of Montenegrin and wider Yugoslav and Balkan history. In some respects, this period is the crucible of memory in the region and the period has been scrutinised (and politicised) like no other. In order to determine and convey with clarity and balance the events which took place on the ground, the historian is faced with two specific problems. Whilst there are a plethora of secondary accounts, there exists very little in the way of primary sources which cover the events (and specifically the events in Brezna in August 1944) which are the focus of this short piece. The second problem is that there are very few published primary sources dealing with the SOE operations in Montenegro - with a few notable exceptions (F.W. Deakin’s The Embattled Mountain, for example). Indeed, there are very few primary accounts of SOE operations in comparison with those conducted in other occupied European countries. Of those existing published sources, only a few cover events in Montenegro in any genuine depth. None cover the events in Brezna in 1944. To establish a clearer (albeit largely descriptive and – by dint of the word limit of the piece) I have drawn upon both primary (mainly British) and secondary sources in an attempt to determine the pattern of the complex events in Montenegro in August 1944. Although short, this should provide, I hope, a clear and concise interpretation of events, although it is not, nor is it intended to be, a concise or comprehensive history of the Second World War in the region or the role of either the SOE or the Balkan Air Force. There is simply no scope here for anything other than a relatively superficial account of events and I have concentrated primarily on events within Montenegro (and not, for example those that took place in Bosnia between 1942 – 1943). It is, however, intended as a starting point, a precursor, to more detailed research on this period, utilising sources from Montenegro, Serbia and the UK. Of the primary source material that does exist, the majority of the appropriate can be found in the SOE (and British War Office and Balkan Air Force) archives, held at the National Archives in Kew, London. Not all SOE material which was collected during the 1940s is housed there, however. Unfortunately, a fire at SOE headquarters in Cairo determined that much valuable material was destroyed. Nevertheless, many important

SOE, Balkan Air Force and British War Office archives remain in-tact. Information on the focus of this paper – the Brezna airlifts – proved very difficult to pin-down. Mention of the Dakota landings and airlifts can be found among BAF and SOE archival documents, but specific information about the Brezna events are very limited. Using the limited material available, what I have composed here is (to date) the most extensive piece on the events that took place in and around the Montenegrin village of Brezna (located in the Piva region) in August 1944. Much of the archival material used in the Montenegrin-language version appears in translation for the first time. This short paper, then, aims to facilitate a basic understanding of the events in Montenegro (and throughout occupied Yugoslavia) 1941 - 1945, and to reconstruct the story of a remarkable event – that of the Brezna airlifts. This event remains one of many worthy of further scholarly investigation, yet while I was piecing together the sequence of events, it dawned upon me just how remarkable it was and how incredible it was that the story had not received more attention from historians. It merits acknowledgement, lest information about it disappears into the dusty shelves of the archives - possibly forever. This paper was originally commissioned by the UK Embassy in Podgorica and could not have been realised without the tireless work of Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Montenegro, Kevin Lyne, and the embassy’s political officer, Ivan Vukčević. More importantly, however, I was also very fortunate to have traced former Flt Lt Philip Lawson (after a painstaking search), who was one of the British mission who helped construct the Brezna airstrip. To my knowledge, he is the last surviving member of the British party who participated in the mission. His story is one of youthful vigour and bravery, and I was privileged to be able to hear him recall these events first -hand, even though he was exceptionally modest in his assessment of his own achievements. Thanks to all those at the SOE and BAF archives at Kew Gardens in London who assisted me in gathering the archival material necessary to write this paper. Dragoljub and Zeljko Radojević (both born in Brezna) were invaluable sources of local information about Brezna and its specific local history – something you cannot capture however many archives you access. Dragoljub Radojević’s book, Rodoslov porodice Radojević, is a fascinating insight into the history of the Radojević family and their role in the 1941 – 45 conflict and an excellent source for the wider history of the Brezna area. All of the aforementioned people have been instrumental in the realisation of this short book. Montenegro’s history is rich, fascinating, complex and worthy of extensive scholarly research. The following, being limited by temporal and spatial constraints, represents only a snapshot in the history of a remarkable country and people in troubled times, and the small, but not insignificant, role of a small number of SOE operatives in that history. The Special Operations Executive (SOE) The role of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Yugoslav Wars (1941 - 45) has been well-documented in a number of secondary accounts (in both English and Serbian/Montenegrin). Most of the available literature, however, focuses more broadly on the role played by the SOE in the wider Yugoslav or Balkan context. A number of lesser-known events have been largely forgotten (for reasons mentioned in the introductory notes) but this does not mean that they do not merit special attention from contemporary historians. The joint SOE-MI (Special Operations Executive - Military Intelligence) operations in Montenegro between May and September 1943, the SOE landings in Montenegro in May of that year and the subsequent ‘Dakota landings’ in 1944 are two such significant events. The relations established during the F.W. Deakin-led

mission in 1943 would eventually lead to outstanding joint Allied-Partisan operations, the formation of the Balkan Air Force (BAF), a shift in the dynamics of the Yugoslav war, not to mention a shift in wider dynamics which would shape the outcome of the Second World War and the political geography of the region in the post-war era. These events, which took place in Montenegro between May 1943 and September 1944 represent, not simply an example of excellent military cooperation, but a pinnacle of man’s ingenuity and endeavour under the pressures of war and imminent danger or death. Such events should be acknowledged and celebrated regardless of ideological persuasion, although one should not attempt to de-politicise them or depict them as they were. The SOE was established in 1940 by Winston Churchill, an organisation borne of war. Following the fall of France in 1940, the British chiefs of staff concluded that the wartime objective of aiding resistance forces in occupied territories was so important that it merited a new and dynamic organisation that could be utilised to assist them. Based in Cairo, Egypt, the objective of the SOE was dualistic. Firstly, it was to support political subversion and anti-Axis operations in countries where there existed tangible opposition to Axis rule or occupation, and secondly, to become a domestic resistance movement in the event of an Axis invasion of Britain (an outcome that was not beyond the realms of possibility in the early years of the war). Subsequent events, however, dictated that the work of the SOE was primarily carried out overseas, their key role being, in Winston Churchill’s own words, “to set Europe ablaze.” In November 1940, as the Luftwaffe pounded Central London, the SOE established its first headquarters in two small flats off Baker Street. From this unlikely venue, the SOE began to recruit men and women to fill their ranks and embark upon overseas missions. Senior SOE staff were invariably recruited from ex-public school students and Oxbridge (Oxford and Cambridge universities) students and graduates, but the agents were drawn from a variety of social backgrounds beyond this narrow realm. From the outset, the SOE was staffed by an impressive and varied range of recruits. Early results were far from encouraging, however. By mid-1941 Britain had endured the Blitz, the German Army had made significant advances into Soviet territory, and the Axis powers had consolidated control over the Balkans following the March 1941 coup in Serbia and the brief (but effective) 13 July uprising in Montenegro. It would not be until 1943 that events would turn in favour of the Allies. Indeed, 1943 marked a significant shift in the fortunes of the Allied forces. Russian troops were advancing west following the German failure to take Stalingrad and British and American tenacity in North Africa had paid dividends. By September they had landed in Sicily and knocked the Italians out of the war. The latter development was of particular significance for Yugoslavia, part of the territory which had been occupied by Italian forces. But the two resistance movements - the Communist-led Partisans (whose objective was to create a communist, but federal, Yugoslav state) and the Chetniks (whose objective was to reconstitute the Kingdom of Yugoslavia under the Serbian regent) – were locked in a bitter struggle. Until 1943, Yugoslavia was not considered an area of particular political or geo-strategic importance by the British government or - by extension - the SOE. The British had sent numerous delegations to Yugoslavia, primarily in support of Draža Mihailović, the Chetnik leader, who had been identified as the main opponent of the occupying forces in Yugoslavia. But these initial missions were tentative and did not appear to generate significant possibilities (such as a potential land invasion) for the Allies. The mission led

by F.W. Deakin in May 1943 would be different, however.1 The information garnered and political and personal relationships built during the operation would lead to a shift in British perceptions regarding internal Yugoslav struggles, and, more importantly, a shift in policy toward recognising and supporting the Communist-led Partisans as the group most likely to inflict damage on the Axis occupiers. Following Deakin’s mission, Yugoslavia became central to the SOE’s overseas strategy and wider British interests. Having already been the scene of a bitter internecine conflict between the Partisans, the Chetniks and the Montenegrin autonomists, Montenegro became a significant staging post for bold, inventive and ambitious SOE operations. It also began, despite the obvious ideological differences, an extraordinary collaboration that would, eventually, force out the occupying forces and bring the Partisans to power throughout war-torn Yugoslavia. The Second World War in Montenegro With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, Yugoslavia was in a precarious predicament. Following the fall of the Stojadinović government in February 1939, the new Yugoslav government, led by Dragiša Cvetković, attempted to remain neutral, hoping to maintain a distance between themselves and the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany. Whilst he and the Yugoslav Prince Regent, Pavle, sought to consolidate Yugoslavia’s neutral stance, the dynamics of the war dictated that, by 1940, retaining such a position became increasingly problematic. The fundamental problem was one of geography. Yugoslavia was not only located in dangerously close proximity to the fascist powers, it was also surrounded by their satellites, and despite the Yugoslav government’s previous efforts to placate their neighbours (such as the signing of the ‘Pact of Eternal Friendship’ with Bulgaria and the formation of the ‘Yugoslav-Italian Friendship Society’ with the Italians), it was too little too late. Germany’s determination to secure what (in the event of a failure to control Yugoslav territory and supply routes through it) would have represented something of a soft underbelly, rendered the Yugoslav government’s position increasingly untenable.2 With the application of pressure emanating from Berlin becoming intolerable, the Yugoslav leadership buckled under the strain, submitting to German demands and eventually agreeing to sign the ‘Tripartite Pact’ with Germany on 25 March 1941. But whilst the leadership acquiesced to this agreement, many within the Yugoslav military and among wider Yugoslav (particularly Serbian and Montenegrin) society were outraged. Many Serbs and Montenegrins viewed the Germans as the old enemy from the First World War with whom no concessions should be given. The actions of the Yugoslav government were, therefore, essentially perceived as a sell-out, and, what’s more, one which was at odds with the popular will of the people. Two days later, in the early hours of 27 March, a small group of embittered Yugoslav Army officers (supported by British Intelligence) executed a bloodless coup against the Cvetković government. They proclaimed the young King Petar II to be Serbia’s new monarch, dismissed the Council of Regency, and replaced the Cvetković government.3 The coup was widely supported by the citizens, who demonstrated their support on the streets of cities throughout Yugoslavia (not only in Belgrade, but in Cetinje, Podgorica, Split,

1 Prior to becoming an SOE operative, William Deakin had been a fellow and tutor in history at Wadham College, Oxford. He was seconded to the SOE from the Queens’s Own Oxford Hussars, with whom he served in Egypt before his Yugoslavia missions. 2 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.209. 3 Milan Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response, East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia Press, New York, 1988, p.2.

Skopje, Kragujevac and other cities).4 Crowds chanted bolje rat nego pakt (better war than a pact). Whilst the coup itself was planned and executed by a group of junior army officers, it was made possible by the spontaneous support and enthusiasm of many Yugoslav citizens. According to an SOE report from 1941, “the [Yugoslav] people knew full well the cost of war, but were determined to suffer again that cost.”5 But these actions simply stretched Hitler’s patience. Threatening to “destroy the Yugoslav state as it currently exists”, Hitler ordered the German Army to advance on Belgrade.6 The subsequent invasion (dubbed ‘Operation Punishment’) began on 6 April with a heavy aerial bombardment of Belgrade and airfields throughout the country. On the ground, Yugoslavia was attacked in a pincer movement with troops approaching simultaneously from Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Italy (with the Italians tasked to occupy Montenegro). The new Yugoslav government capitulated under intense pressure on 17 April. The royal government, headed by King Petar II, fled the country, eventually establishing a government-in-exile in London. Following the capitulation of the army and the departure of the royal government, Yugoslavia was partitioned among Axis powers.7 As part of this collective Axis offensive, Montenegro was occupied by German forces from Bosnia & Herzegovina and Italian forces stationed in Albania (the ‘Messina’ division), although the former withdrew almost immediately. Italy’s territorial ambitions on the eastern side of the Adriatic made Montenegro a natural focus of their attention.8 They annexed the Bay of Kotor to Italy, occupied the majority of towns in the hinterland, but ceded the areas of Ulcinj, Plav, Gusinje, and Rožaje to ‘Greater Albania’, an entity created and supported by the Italians which comprised the aforementioned areas in Montenegro, the majority of Kosovo and Metohija, parts of Western Macedonia and Albania proper. Here, the Balists, the armed forces of the Albanian nationalist movement, were awarded control. Whilst the Italian interest in Montenegro was primarily strategic (the Bay of Kotor would serve as an Italian naval base), it would prove problematic and costly to occupy the hinterland. The occupation of Montenegro was an economic burden from the outset. Throughout the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, their army frequently avoided incursions into Montenegro; the principle was simple: in rocky and barren Montenegro, a small army would be defeated and a large army would starve. It was a lesson the Italians learnt to their cost. Although the Italians could generate limited food supplies from local sources, they had to import significant stocks of food (estimated to be between 1,200 and 1,500 metric tons of food monthly) from the motherland.9 It was a practical and logistical burden that would serve only to dilute even the most basic efficacy of

4 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.209. See also, M. Kapandžić, Gradjanski rat u Srbiji, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 1958. 5 British Special Operations Executive, Report Drawn up by Lieutenant Glenn on his Relations with Yugoslavs, 17 November 1941, HS5/938. 6 John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press, p.201. 7 Yugoslavia was partitioned thus: Germany occupied northern Slovenia. Italy occupied the majority of Montenegro, much of the Croatian coastline and islands and some of the Croatian hinterland (central Dalmatia, Konavle). The Italian-sponsored ‘Greater Albania’ acquired Metohija, the majority of Kosovo and some areas of Montenegro, the Sandžak and western Macedonia. Hungary was ‘awarded’ areas in Serbia (Baranja and Backa). The Bulgarians acquired most of Macedonia, Pirot (Serbia), and a portion of Kosovo. 8 Elizabeth Roberts, The Realm of the Black Mountain, Hurst & Co. London, 2006 p.346. 9 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945, Stanford University Press, pp.138-139.

operations. However, these problems were simply a matter of practicality and could be overcome with good strategic and logistical planning. Convincing Montenegrins of the benefits of Italian occupation would prove much harder. To achieve this, the Italians attempted to emphasise the important dynastic links between Montenegro and Italy. King Nikola I Petrović’s daughter, Elena, was the wife of the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III, after all. Utilising these dynastic ‘justifications’ the Italians sought support from the local population in Old Montenegro. They calculated that such sentiments would be well received in the area, where the loss of Montenegrin statehood and the death in exile of King Nikola was bitterly lamented by many. Thus the Italian strategy was to promise Montenegrins that their independence would be reinstated under the tutelage of Queen Elena.10 The possible re-establishment of Montenegrin independence (regardless of the far from ideal circumstances) appealed primarily to a small group of Zelenaši (Greens); Montenegrin autonomists who advocated the re-establishment of an independent Montenegrin state. Upon the arrival of the Italians, they had established the ‘Committee for the Liberation of Montenegro’ forging friendly relations with the Italian civil commissioner in Montenegro, Count Stefano Mazzolini, and rapidly became the main local conduit for the Italians. Despite the external appearance of unity, the autonomists were by no means a homogenous group. Two clear factions existed, one led by Krsto Popović, the other by Sekula Drljević. Politically, the two factions disagreed over the form the future Montenegrin state should take. Popović’s faction were seeking the establishment of a independent Montenegro but left the possibility of joining a future Yugoslav federation open, dependent of course on the outcome of the war. The core of their support was concentrated in Old Montenegro and their members included members of the Montenegrin Federalist Party and a significant number of Gaetans - members of the Montenegrin army who had been stationed in Italy following the civil conflict which began with the Christmas Uprising in 1918.11 Whilst initially supporting many Italian initiatives, they were disappointed by Italy’s decision to annex the Bay of Kotor and grant Montenegrin territory (including Ulcinj and Tuzi) to Albania. As a consequence, Krsto Popović’s Greens would refuse to recognise the Italian proclamation of Montenegrin independence. Also advocating an independent Montenegro, Sekula Drljević’s Montenegrin Federalists had a slightly different, more obliging, approach. Drljević was no supporter of the Petrović dynasty and opposed to the aims and objectives of Krsto Popović. Willing to cooperate with the Italians to attain independence, Drljević’s faction were keen to act as a partner to the occupying forces and join with them in defeating the Communists and other domestic enemies. Drljević and his supporters rejected a reconstitution of Yugoslavia in any form. The persuasive powers of Drljević and his associates convinced the Italians that establishment of an independent Montenegrin state (supported by the Italian government) would meet with little resistance.12 Given that they knew well their fellow Montenegrins, it was a significant error of judgement. Whilst this may have been well received in parts of Old Montenegro, the attempts to foster the notion of Montenegro being closely linked to Italy, was not received so positively elsewhere. Montenegro’s complex and fractious political landscape would present the occupiers with significant

10 The original Italian plan had been to reconstitute an independent Montenegro with Prince Mihailo Petrović, the grandson of the late King Nikola, on the throne. However, he refused the offer of the throne throwing the Italian plan into chaos. 11 See Veljko Sjekloća, Krsto Popović: u istorijskoj gradji i literatura. Obod, Cetinje, 2001. 12 John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, p.214.

difficulties. Even those Montenegrins who tacitly supported the Italians (in the hope of achieving their own political objectives) soon found reason to be dissatisfied. Despite Italian promises, many Montenegrins knew that this Italian-sponsored ‘independence’ would amount to nothing more than vassal status. Gradually, significant discomfort with Italian occupation steadily grew into full-scale rebellion. Both the sentiment for rebellion and the personnel required to carry it out existed in Montenegro. The collapse of the Yugoslav Army (within which Montenegrins were well represented) dictated that there were both men and munitions to bolster any potential uprising. To realise such an event, opposition to Italian occupation was harnessed from across Montenegro’s political and ideological spectrum. Only later did ideological divisions prove counter-productive. The Communist Party were strong and numerous in Montenegro, but whilst many historians have credited the Communists with starting the uprising, what became known as the ‘13 July Uprisings’ was a genuinely popular uprising - a people’s uprising, motivated more by the Montenegrin pride in freedom than by communist (or any other) ideology. That said, the Communists played a significant part, even if many Montenegrins who participated did not share their vision. Well before the events of 13 July, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) recognised that Montenegro was fertile ground for the beginning of armed operations against the occupying forces. Based on the deliberations of the Central Committee of the CPY, it was decided that Milovan Djilas, himself a Montenegrin, would be sent to foment an armed struggle in Montenegro. In his memoirs of that period, Djilas noted how the party leader, Josip Broz ‘Tito’, whilst recognising the potential for uprising, “afraid of Montenegrin narrowness and sectarianism.”13 Embarking upon such a mission, Djilas, having grown up near Berane in northern Montenegro, knew that such actions risked reopening Montenegro’s wounds, still raw from the events of the Christmas Uprising of 1918 and the bitter civil war that had followed. Nevertheless, the young, ambitious and ideologically-committed communist arrived in Montenegro immediately prior to the proclamation of Italian-backed independence on the 12 July 1941. According to his wartime memoirs, Djilas, upon his arrival in Montenegro, could immediately sense among Montenegrins a pervasive dissatisfaction with the Italian occupiers and their plans to create an ‘independent’ Montenegrin state. Even within the Greens, he noted that, “some of their more prominent adherents rejected all collaboration with the Italians and made common cause with the Communists.” At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Whites, “grew passive or joined the Communists as the strongest anti-occupation force.14 In Djilas’s assessment, there existed enough opposition and thus significant scope for a domestic uprising. Gathering these disparate forces and channelling their collective resentment against Montenegro’s Italian occupiers and domestic collaborators, the communists sought to instigate the uprising. But momentum was building rather independently, and on the 13 July, the day after the proclamation of the new ‘independent’ Montenegro, Communists, armed villagers, and a number of Yugoslav officers who opposed the Italian sponsored declaration of independence, rebelled. No one group could claim ultimate responsibility – it was a genuine grass-roots rebellion. The first of these attacks took place around the Cetinje and its environs. However, what began as small-scale attacks on the occupying forces soon spread throughout Montenegro. The rebellion took on a life of its own, and 13 Milovan Djilas, Wartime, Martin Secker and Warburg, London, 1977, pp.18-19. 14 Ibid, 1977, pp.18-19.

just one week later, most of Montenegro (with the exception of the towns of Podgorica, Nikšić, Pljevlja and Cetinje) had been liberated.15 According to a 1941 British Special Operations Executive (SOE) report, between 13 July and 9 August, the Montenegrin rebels had overrun and held Bijelo Polje, Kolašin, Berane, Andrijevica, Danilovgrad and Šavnik.16 The speed and efficiency of the uprising shocked the Italians and instilled further revolutionary fervour within the Communists. But the uprising prompted the Italians to shift from their liberal approach adopted in the early days of occupation to one which was significantly firmer. They quickly dropped their plans for a Montenegrin regent, and in the last week of July, they unleashed a series of violent reprisals in Old Montenegro, where many of the ambushes against Italian soldiers took place.17 Martial law was declared, strict curfews were imposed, and the civilian population were forced to surrender their firearms. These collective actions ensured that the uprising was quelled, and as the Italians reasserted control, the unity among the rebels began to crack; internal factions began to quarrel. The unity that had been inherent within the 13 July uprising began to fragment, with a number of factions emerging from the ashes of them. By late 1941, the Communists (changing their name from ‘communist guerrillas’ to ‘Partisans’) moved to the ‘second stage’ of their revolution. Upon the orders of Tito, Milovan Djilas was dismissed and replaced by Ivan Milutinović. The Partisans began to regain some of the territory lost following the Italian backlash, but their return was also marked by a series of revenge attacks and executions. Fanatical Montenegrin Communists proceeded to settle scores with perceived enemies of communism (those they deemed to be collaborators, fifth columnists or ‘class enemies’). These, often arbitrary, actions discredited the Communists in the eyes of many Montenegrins.18 Such revolutionary zeal would serve only to marginalise those who did not share their narrow ideological vision and would turn the Partisans into the main enemies, not only of the occupiers, but of domicile troops and quisling regimes founded on a variety of ideologies.19 In the wake of the Partisan reprisals in the winter of 1941, many Montenegrin villagers turned toward the nationalist groups seeking some form of protection. The Partisan policy of ‘leftist deviation’ targeted supporters of the Chetnik movement, wealthy landowners, and anyone considered to represent a potential fifth column. Subsequently known in post-war Titoist dogma as ‘The Mistakes of the Left’, these measures proved counter-productive. The burning of villages, the confiscation of property, and the execution of ‘fifth-columnists’ became commonplace.20 But such arbitrary ‘justice’ (characterised by events such as the slaughter at a site near Kolašin dubbed ‘The Dog’s Graveyard) served only to weaken the Communists and bolster support for opposing nationalist groups - both Green and White.21 According to a British War Office Report from 1941, this expression of “antipathy to Serb nationalism and their doctrinaire insistence on Communist dogma combined to make them odious in the eyes of the Montenegrins who glory in their Serb

15 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.212. 16 British Special Operations Executive, ‘Some Notes on the Yugoslav Revolt’, 22 June 1942, HS5/938. 17 Elizabeth Roberts, The Realm of the Black Mountain, Hurst & Co. London, 2006 p.352. 18 Ibid, p.214. 19 Ibid, p.213. 20 Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, Cornell University Press, Ithica and London, 1988, p.82. 21 On Orthodox Christmas Day 1942, a group of fanatical Partisans executed prominent townspeople who were deemed to be collaborators. The bodies (together with the corpse of a tortured dog) were dumped in near the town of Kolašin at a site which became known as the ‘The Dog’s Graveyard’. See Elizabeth Roberts, The Realm of the Black Mountain, Hurst & Co. London, 2006 p.361, and Thomas Fleming, Montenegro: The Divided Land, Chronicles Press, 2002, pp.136-137.

ancestry.”22 Thus, the 13 July, whilst celebrated as the day of the beginning of the anti-fascist uprisings (not to mention the first people’s uprising against occupation in Europe), was to have different connotations in Montenegro. Despite the dogma of the Tito era, which celebrated the ‘anti-fascist’ character of the uprisings, they were simultaneously the kernel for civil war in Montenegro. Opposition to the occupation may have been uniform in the summer of 1941, but this broad collective splintered into groups through groups with radically different objectives. Montenegro’s civil war within a war had begun. The domestic opposition to the communist-led Partisans came not only from the occupying forces but from Montenegrin autonomists, who sought an independent state of Montenegro, and Serbian royalists (Chetniks) whose main objective was to reconstitute the Kingdom of Yugoslavia under a Serbian monarchy.23 Led by the former Yugoslav Army Colonel, Draža Mihailović (who had refused to accept the terms of the Yugoslav government’s capitulation in May 1941), the movement had been established at Ravna Gora in Serbia, quickly growing and consolidating throughout Yugoslavia. But whilst the movement proliferated they remained a disparate organisation that did not constitute a united force with a single clear objective. Often, local rivalries took precedence over wider objectives. Broadly, however, the aim of the Chetnik movement was to create a homogenous Serbia - an concept drafted by Chetnik ideologue, Stevan Moljević.24 This proposed territorial space would comprise of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Macedonia, Sandžak, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Metohija, and Croatia south of Karlovac, and would become the ethnically homogenous nation-state of the Serbs under the Serbian monarch.25 With regard to the occupying forces, the Chetniks opted for a ‘wait and see’ policy. The rationale behind this strategy was simple; they would wait until overall conditions allowed for the seizure of power. Whilst in preparation for such an eventuality, the Chetniks would concentrate on eliminating their domestic enemies, the Partisans. The Chetnik movement continued to grow throughout 1941, consolidating until it was strong enough (with the assistance of the Montenegrins autonomists and the Italians) to force the Partisans out of Montenegro in 1942. In Montenegro, they tapped a deep vein of resistance to the Communists. The Montenegrin Chetniks (broadly led by Major Djordje Lašić) drew their support predominantly from northern Montenegro and Montenegrin Herzegovina. Only the eastern Montenegrin Chetniks, led by Captain Pavle Djurišić (who had fought alongside communists in Berane during the 13 July uprising) had direct contact with Draža Mihailović. Djurišić, who controlled Chetnik forces in Andrijevica, Berane, Kolašin, Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja, set about consolidating control over northern Montenegro Following the ‘mistakes of the left’, the Communists garnered a bad reputation among the Orthodox population of northern Montenegro, who had traditionally looked to Belgrade as their spiritual and political centre and who generally defined themselves as Serbs. The Chetnik gains in northern Montenegro were facilitated, as Djilas noted, by two key factors. Firstly, because of the perceived brutality of the Communists during the ‘red terror’, and secondly, because of the latter’s emphasis on

22 General Staff, British War Office, Director of Military Intelligence, M.I. 3b, 27 April 1943, Most Secret, ‘A Short History of the Revolt in Yugoslavia’; PRO Archives, document FO 371/33469, pp. 7-8. 23 Excellent analyses of the Chetnik movement can be found in the English language. See, for example, Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks, Stanford University Press, 1975, and Lucien Karchmar, Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement, 1941 – 1942, Vol.2, Garland Publishing, New York and London, 1987. 24 John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, p.214 - 215. 25 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.215.

Montenegrin (as opposed to Serb) nationality.26 Indeed, the ‘mistakes of the left’ simply drove people who were anything but collaborators or kulaks into the hands of the Chetniks. Such developments did not go unnoticed by the occupying forces. Following the 13 July uprising, the Chetnik leadership had correctly assessed that the Communists were in the ascendancy. The brutal Communist reprisals, however, aided a shift in perceptions. General A. Pirzio Biroli, the Italian Military Governor of Montenegro, aware of the burgeoning Chetnik animosity toward the Communists, offered a deal - that the Italians would not encroach into Chetnik-held areas if the Chetniks would reciprocate. Thus began the Chetnik-Italian collaboration that would eventually undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of both the people and the Allies. However, in the meantime, the collaboration (aided by a number of Partisan military and political blunders such as the unsuccessful Partisan attempt to take the northern Montenegrin town of Pljevlja) brought the Chetniks significant successes.27 Indeed, the Partisan attempt to take the town of Pljevlja in December 1941 was a fatal error. A heavily fortified Italian garrison, Pljevlja was strategically vital to the Partisans - key to their efforts to control the Sandžak.28 The resulting attack was was badly planned and poorly executed, resulting in heavy losses. Estimates vary, but approximately 300 Partisans perished and 900 were injured during the attempt to take the town. By early 1942, following the debacle at Pljevlja and subsequent setbacks, the Partisans were incrementally squeezed out of Montenegro. The Chetniks were now in the ascendancy, a fact clearly demonstrated by the decision by Draža Mihailović and the Chetnik High Command to move their headquarters to Gornje Lipovo, near Kolašin. Within months, the Partisans had all but fled Montenegro, leaving behind the areas that they had previously liberated. The leadership of Ivan Milutinović concerned Tito, who quickly reinstated Djilas and despatched him back to Montenegro in 1942 to continue to continue the struggle. The need to retain control of at least a part of Montenegro was self-evident. As Roberts points out, “not only was Montenegro a traditional bastion of Communist support, but its loss would rule out the prospect of the Partisans in Serbia receiving help by sea, as well as forfeiting large tracts of country best suited to guerrilla warfare.”29 But despite orders from the Central Committee instructing Partisans to halt their arbitrary and unjustified killings, Djilas discovered that the Partisans’ brutal campaign against perceived enemies and a series of “hasty executions” had turned the peasantry against them, regardless of reassurances from the leadership the mistakes of the past would not be repeated.30 Such promises did little to assuage the peasantry, many of whom had lost faith in the Partisans. The Chetniks, having profited from the fear of Partisan reprisals, continued to consolidate their control of Montenegro. Under the auspices of the occupying authorities, they (along with Montenegrin autonomists, police, army and militias) thereafter policed much of the country. Montenegrin auxiliary armed

26 Milovan Djilas, Wartime, Martin Secker and Warburg, London, 1977, p.149. 27 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945, Stanford University Press, p.143. See also Radoje Pajović, Kontrarevolucija u Crnoj Gori: cetnicki i federalisticki pokret, Cetinje, 1977, p.34. 28 Elizabeth Roberts, The Realm of the Black Mountain, Hurst & Co. London, 2006 p.363. See also Labović & Basta, Partizani za pregovarackim stolom 1941 – 1945, Vrijeme, Zagreb, 1986, pp.19-20. 29 Ibid, p. 366. 30 A communication from the Central Committee to the Montenegrins appealed for them to, “continue their struggle against the hated Italian occupiers and their fifth-columnist forces.” See Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ 1941 - 1945, Yugolovenski pregled, Beograd, 1988, pp.134 – 139. See also Milovan Djilas, Wartime, pp. 147-150.

forces (comprising the aforementioned) numbered around 17,000.31 The Italians re-established control over Montenegro’s main towns, whilst in the less-populated and rural north of the country, the Chetniks imposed their authority. But whilst they sought to assert control, the Chetniks repeated the mistakes made by the Communists. Prison camps, show trials and indiscriminate killings characterised the period following the Partisan departure from Montenegro. Often a law unto themselves, regular and irregular Chetnik groups focused their energies not simply on the remaining Communists, but on attacking Sandžak Muslims.32 The horrific effects of this policy were particularly pronounced in the towns of Bijelo Polje (specifically in the villages of Donji Bihor and Korita), Pljevlja and the village of Bukovica, where many Muslims were massacred.33 As a consequence, Montenegro’s Muslims began to organise themselves into armed militias, who were equally suspicious of both the Partisans and the Chetniks.34 Unlike the Balists in the areas annexed to Albania, these militias were poorly organised and were primarily concerned not with ideology but with protecting their own areas. Their formation was indicative of the fragmentation of resistance groups on Montenegrin territory. The main body of the Partisan leadership, meanwhile, had established their temporary headquarters in Foča in eastern Bosnia. But it represented only a temporary respite. On the 11 March 1942, a joint German-Italian (supported by local nationalist forces including Chetniks, led by Pavle Djurišić, Bojo Stanišić and the Montenegrin Greens, led Krsto Popović, and Muslim militias) operation began with the express purpose of annihilating the Partisans. Fleeing the onslaught, Tito and the Partisan leadership headed in the direction of Montenegro. But circumstances there were hardly favourable either. Exposed, outnumbered, and increasingly encircled, they settled first in the environs of Podgorica before proceeding to Nikšić, where they made only minor gains. Calculating that an ambitious attack upon Kolašin (a heavily fortified Chetnik stronghold) may bring dividends, the Partisan leaders began preparations for an ill-fated attack, one which Djilas later acknowledged had failed primarily because of doubts about its strategic benefits and low morale: Our failure resulted largely from the doubts of our men about the wisdom of that battle. Everyone knew that the Italians and Chetniks were advancing on our flanks and to our rear - from Nikšić, Pljevlja and Foča. Even had we taken Kolašin, we would not have settled the Chetnik problem in Montenegro. In fact, the let-up in the uprising in Serbia was slowly making itself felt in Montenegro, Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia. The leadership was not yet reconciled to this fact or able to see it. The rank and file could see it because they had no strategic aims or ideological concepts.35 That ambitious, but ultimately unsuccessful, attack of May the 16th threw the Partisans into crisis. With the Italians and their collaborators bearing down upon them, the only choice was retreat. Thus began ‘the long march’, which would take the Partisan leadership several hundred kilometres to western Bosnia. Capturing first the town of Livno, the Partisans took the larger western Bosnian town of Bihać by November, gaining support and replenishing their forces en route. In Bihać they created the political wing of the liberation movement dubbed, AVNOJ (the Anti-Fascist National Liberation

31 Ibid, p.143. 32 John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, p.214 - 215. 33 Šerbo Rastoder, A Short History of Montenegro, p.135. 34 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.217. 35 Milovan Djilas, Wartime, Martin Secker and Warburg, London, 1977, p.171.

Council of Yugoslavia). The adoption of the principle of self-determination for all Yugoslav nations struck a chord with many smaller Yugoslav nations, who had perceived the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to be overtly Serb-dominated.

By the end of 1942 the Partisans had made considerable gains, liberating several towns in Bosnia (including Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Duvno, Mrkonjić Grad and Jajce), asserting control over an area extending from the western approaches to the Neretva river to Karlovac in the north of Croatia.36 This rapid expansion of Partisan-held territory added to German concerns. Indeed, the Germans had good reason to be concerned. Holistically, the war effort was faltering. Bogged down in Stalingrad, facing imminent defeat in North Africa, the Germans needed to ensure that the Yugoslav coast could not be used as a landing zone for an Allied invasion. It was within this context that the Germans launched Operation Weiss (known in Partisan terminology as ‘The Fourth Offensive’).37 Put simply, the objective of the plan was to encircle the Partisans and crush further resistance to the occupation. What happened subsequently has become part of the Partisan legend (or myth). Fleeing from advancing German and Italian forces, the Partisan column managed to cross the Neratva River (where the bridge had already been destroyed) and engage the Chetniks awaiting them on the other bank. Unprepared for the Partisan advance following the crossing of the Neretva, the Chetniks suffered a defeat from which they would never fully recover. Chaotic leadership, poor planning, and a determined and desperate adversary combined to seal the Chetniks’ fate.38 The Partisans, following their break-through of Chetnik defences, headed back toward Montenegro. The SOE and Operation ‘Typical The British interest in Yugoslavia was limited and played a relatively insignificant role in their strategic thinking in the early days of the war, with only occasional interest demonstrated during the Belgrade coup and the 13 July uprisings in Montenegro.39 The complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground made it difficult for foreign intelligence agencies to assess which armed group represented the most significant opposition to the occupying Axis forces. The British (and the SOE) were almost completely in the dark regarding the resistance within Yugoslavia. In the early years of the Yugoslav missions, they recognised the Chetniks as the group most likely to oppose the Germans, yet they were relatively ignorant of the Partisan movement. It became a matter of some importance to the Allied war cause to provide assistance to the forces which were most effectively opposing Axis occupation. Seeking clarity, the British sent a number of missions to Montenegro. The first British mission, called ‘Operation Bullseye’ passed through Montenegro following the suppression of the 13 July uprising in 1941.40 Led by Lt Col. David Thomas ‘Bill’ Hudson, the aim of the mission was to establish the nature and status of resistance groups operating on Yugoslav territory. Their first contact after arrival in Montenegro was with the Partisans in the coastal town of Petrovac on the evening of 20 September. The British mission entered into a difficult and dangerous

36 Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks, Stanford University Press, 1975, p.232. 37 These events became part of Partisan mythology and were celebrated in the Veljko Bulajić film Bitka na Neretvi (The Battle of Neretva) which included Hollywood actors such as Yul Brynner and Orson Welles. 38 Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks, Stanford University Press, 1975, pp.250-252. 39 Heather Williams, Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans, Hurst & Co., 2003, p.243. 40 Milan Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response, East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia Press, New York, 1988, p.2.

operational context. Many of Montenegro’s towns and cities had been re-occupied by the Italian forces following the events of 13 July. Nevertheless, Hudson reached the village of Radovce (17 kilometres from Podgorica) on 9 October, from where he sent a telegram to London recommending that the British government offer assistance to what Hudson rather ambiguously described as the ‘Montenegrin National Freedom troops’.41 Hudson’s ambiguity reflected the opaque intelligence coming from the field. Assessing the real situation on the ground proved a significant challenge. Whilst the British had taken the lead in establishing contact with both the Partisans and the Chetniks, at this juncture the British possessed little understanding of the dynamics between different Yugoslav resistance groups, rendering uniform and effective aid problematic. Thus following their initial contact with Communist fighters in Montenegro, the British mission rapidly moved on to make contact with Draža Mihailović at his headquarters in Ravna Gora, Serbia. Recognition as the sole legitimate resistance by the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile, who were based in London, led to the British government placing their support firmly behind Draža Mihailović in favour of further communication with the Communists (this policy aided by the Conservative Party fear of communism and communist resistance groups). The British also sought to persuade the Chetniks and Partisans to unite against the occupying forces - a strategy that (given the ferocity of the Yugoslav civil war) met with little success. Regardless, the intelligence gathered by SOE operatives Hudson and S.W. Bailey was often conflicting in their analysis of Mihailović and the Chetniks, which, according to Williams, “veered from the totally positive to the totally negative.”42 Only when the British, through their intelligence networks on the ground, began to suspect that the Chetniks were not the most effective anti-Axis force in Yugoslavia did policy slowly change. Instead, the British opted to send SOE missions to the Partisans, in order to evaluate who was the most effective resistance force on the ground. The intelligence gathered during these SOE missions would lead to a shift in policy - toward the Partisans, who, whilst rejecting previous errors (leftist deviation), did not reject (despite shifting their ideas toward the framework of a struggle for national liberation from the occupiers) their fundamental goals of class revolution and Communist control.43 By 1943 significant shifts in both internal and external dynamics were becoming apparent. Much was determined by the growing distrust of the Chetnik movement and their leader, Draža Mihailović. By April, nine additional British missions with independent radio contact to Cairo were dispatched to join Mihailović.44 But once again, the information flooding back to SOE headquarters did little to dispel growing doubts over Mihailović’s commitment to the overarching Allied cause. Changing tack, the SOE decided to take the initiative elsewhere in occupied Yugoslavia, preparing the despatch of military arties into areas outside Mihailović’s area of control, and to other Yugoslav resistance groups.45 One such area outside Mihailović’s control was the area around Mount Durmitor in Montenegro, where a large group of Partisans had gathered following a remarkable escape over the Neretva river, where they had been pinned-down by both German and Chetnik forces. The Partisans were fighting for their very survival,

41 Mark Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940 – 1943, East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980, pp.70-71. 42 Heather Williams, Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans, Hurst & Co., 2003, p.245. 43 Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, Cornell University Press, Ithica and London, 1988, p.82. 44 Thomas Kirkwood Ford, Jr. Pawns and Pawnbrokers: OSS and Yugoslav Resistance During the Second World War, PhD Thesis, University of Southern Mississippi, May 1980, p.87. 45 F.W. Deakin, The Embattled Mountain, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 180.

but (unlike the Chetniks) they were taking German casualties - precisely what the Allied command wanted. Under such circumstances, ideological differences between the British and the communist-led Partisans ceased to matter much. On 28 May 1943, the first of the SOE missions to the Partisans, a British mission led by Colonel Fredrick William Deakin and Colonel Bill Stuart, arrived on Yugoslav territory with the express intention of establishing stronger relations with little-known Partisans. Similarly, the British mission would arrive at a time when the Partisan leaders were open to cooperation with the Allies. The mission, a joint SOE-MI (Special Operations Executive - Military Intelligence) operation, was dubbed ‘Operation Typical’ - although it was anything but.46 The mission had arrived in Montenegro from Derna (a British-held North African base) to be met at a pre-arranged landing zone near the village of Negobudje close to Durmitor Mountain, before meeting Tito in a tent near Crno Jezero (Black Lake). Stuart’s excellent grasp of Serbo-Croat helped ease initial tensions, and his message to Tito’s biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, that his brother was alive and well in the United States, helped to forge the foundations for good personal relationships.47 But there was little scope for anything beyond basic pleasantries, the situation around Durmitor was critical. The Partisans, concentrated primarily around the mountain, were almost completely encircled by German forces as part of an offensive known as Operation Schwarz (Operation Black), and were engaged in a life and death struggle. According to Djilas, the initial meeting was cordial, with Tito outlining clearly to the British mission the dangers of the current situation before mischievously adding that the British would have, “the opportunity to convince yourself whether it is we or Draža Mihailović who is fighting the Germans and Italians.”48 Such cordiality was hardly indicative of what was to come. As nightfall approached, the mission set out across Durmitor to acquaint themselves with the local situation. It was to be a baptism of fire for Deakin and Stuart. During the long trek, both witnessed first-hand the intensity and brutality of the conflict being waged in Montenegro. In his wartime memoirs The Embattled Mountain Deakin (by profession an Oxford historian) described his shock at the nature of the conflict: The theatre of desert war, with its touch of chivalry between regular armies, was now beyond the grasp of our imagination….In the space of days we had been buffeted, protected by an evaporating innocence, into an epic being fought out within a cauldron. There was no front and no quarter. We had been pulled into a closed and simple world. We had no past and the future would be counted out by minutes.49 That epic was the German offensive, with the objective of destroying the Partisans, had begun on 15 May, two weeks before the arrival of the British mission. The German command had assembled an impressive force of over 110,000 armed men, including German, Bulgarian and Italian units (Chetnik units did not take part, having been, for the most part, disarmed by the Germans), and these forces, some trained specifically for mountainous warfare, were pitted against a Partisan force that numbered only approximately 18,000.50 The German push was relentless, and as the fighting intensified

46 The other members of ‘Operation Typical’ were Corporal Walter Wroughton, Sergeant John Campbell and Sergeant ‘Rose’, a Palestinian Jew called Peterz Rosenberg. See Walter Roberts, Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941 – 1945, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967, p.117, and Heather Williams, Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans, Hurst & Co., 2003, p.139. 47 Dedijer said of Stuart’s news, “That was the first time I had heard about my brother, Stevan, since 1939. I was overjoyed.” See Vladimir Dedijer, The War Diaries of Vladimir Dedijer, Volume 2, November 28 1942 to September 10th 1943, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990, p.273. 48 Milovan Djilas, Wartime, p.253. 49 F.W. Deakin, The Embattled Mountain, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 13-14. 50 Milovan Djilas, Wartime, p.259.

the British mission took their first casualties. Within a fortnight of their arrival, on 9 June, Col Stuart was killed in a German air attack upon the Partisan base. Both Deakin and Tito were wounded in the same attack. The Germans also suffered heavy losses during the fighting, which was, according to the German General von Lohr, “extraordinarily heavy. All our commanders agreed that their troops were going through the most bitter struggle of the war.”51 Indeed, the intensity of this struggle for survival in a life and death situation, led to the consolidation of trust between the Deakin-led mission and the Partisan leadership. Deakin, in particular, had the unusual opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the senior staff of the Partisans. But whilst these experiences would give Deakin an intimate knowledge of the Partisans’ capabilities and objectives, the Partisan leadership had initially been deeply suspicious of the British mission, the more ideologically-driven deeming them merely as agents of British imperialism (not to mention that the British had previously supported the Partisans’ Chetnik adversaries). The difficult early days of the mission - during which the British mission experienced the horrors of the battles on Durmitor - forged the foundations of mutual trust upon which later British missions could build upon. The results of this were tangible, however. British policy toward the resistance fighters in Yugoslavia began to change following the events of May – June 1943. The shift was dictated both by Deakin’s influence and the fact that messages received by Churchill (by Deakin’s and other SOE missions) implicated the Chetniks in collaboration with the Germans. Such messages continued to accumulate throughout the summer of 1943 (although a number of studies have suggested that the shift in policy was facilitated by Communist sympathisers within the SOE headquarters in Cairo). Indeed, of the twenty SOE missions on the ground, the vast majority determined that it was the Partisans who were inflicting the most damage upon the occupiers.52 The battles around Durmitor had been crucial in shifting the perception of the Partisans as the most likely victors. According to a report submitted by Lt. Col. David Thomas Hudson in July 1943: No fewer than six major offensives were launched at various times against the Partisans by the combined might of the Axis. These reached a bloody climax in the Montenegrin campaign of summer 1943, when

the main body of Tito’s forces came near to being encircled and wiped out by a force including, besides seven German and four Italian divisions, Bulgarian, Ustasi and Domobran troops together with Mihailovic’s Chetniks, backed by strong artillery and air support. The attack failed; and the Partisans emerged from the battle stronger and more confident than ever.53

That same month, events in Italy changed the dynamic on the ground in Montenegro. Mussolini’s fall from power lead to the capitulation of Italy in September. Broadly, this determined that the balance of power swung against the Germans. More specifically, it determined that the Partisans rose, in Hudson’s words, ‘to greater heights of power.’54 The subsequent Italian withdrawal enabled the Partisans to seize large quantities of arms, equipment and other military supplies which were used to bolster the growing Partisan

51 Quote by General Alexander von Lohr in Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, p.195. 52 A number of studies published since the Second World War have suggested that the switch toward supporting the Partisans was down primarily to a communist plot within the SOE led by James Klugmann. See David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990, Nora Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy Victor Gollanz, London, 1985, and Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990. 53 British Special Operations Executive, Report by David Thomas Hudson on situation in Yugoslavia, July 1943, HS5/934. 54 British Special Operations Executive, Report by David Thomas Hudson on situation in Yugoslavia, July 1943, HS5/934.

force.55 In the meantime, and with the worst of the fighting behind them, the Partisan leadership settled for a two-week period in August 1943 at Petrovo Polje before moving on to Jajce in Bosnia (from which they would establish a new ‘free territory’). Whilst there, Deakin and the Partisan liaison officer, Vlatko Velebit established a close relationship. The bond between the two men (and by extension the British and the Partisans) would have a further impact upon British attitudes toward the Partisans, not to mention British policy toward them. However, Deakin was unaware that the Partisans too had collaborated with the Germans. In March 1943, Milovan Djilas (under the pseudonym Miloš Marković), Vlatko Velebit (under the pseudonym Vladimir Petrović) and Koca Popović (using his real name) had travelled to Zagreb to negotiate, mainly prisoner exchanges, with the Germans, a fact to which Deakin and the SOE remained oblivious.56 Nevertheless, the capitulation of Italy and subsequent Partisan gains raised hopes of an end to the war. The German forces (sent from Sandžak, Albania and Herzegovina) moved into Montenegrin territory to secure what were deemed key military and strategic positions such as the Montenegrin coast. This, of course, would ensure that there could be no Allied landing on the Montenegrin coast. But largely due to a lack of personnel the Germans essentially left significant swathes of Montenegrin territory open to penetration by the Partisans making progress in the west of Montenegro. Following the Battle of Neretva and their push into Chetnik-held eastern Herzegovina, the Partisans moved swiftly forward, liberating approximately two thirds of Montenegrin territory by October 1943.57 The Germans remained a potent force, however, and progress was impeded by their presence. Cetinje became the base for the ‘Prinz Eugene’ division, rated by the SOE as “the best that the enemy has in the Balkans….formed of Volksdeutsche from Balkan minorities.”58 But the arrival of the Germans also marked a turning point in the war. Their failure to destroy the Partisans during Operation Weiss and the subsequent Operation Schwarz, which took place in the winter of 1943 (with the objective of disarming Chetnik forces in Montenegro), marked the end of the Chetnik ascendancy. Support for the Partisans increased throughout 1943, largely due to their commitment to the right to self-determination for Yugoslavia’s nations. On the 15 November 1943 at a congress in Kolašin, the Communists proclaimed that Montenegro would be recognised as an equal federal unit within a new socialist federal Yugoslavia, a decision later ratified following the National Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia’s assembly in Jajce in Bosnia.59 1943 was also significant in that it marked the entry of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) into the Allied Balkan operations - which had theretofore been exclusively led by the British. What’s more, the British sent their first representative to

55 Walter Roberts, Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941 – 1945, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967, p.146. 56 The meetings in Zagreb were, of course, omitted from Partisan historiography throughout the Tito era. However, in the 1970’s Walter Roberts, in his Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941 – 1945 wrote of the event, and Milovan Djilas would later recount the event in his Wartime. The Yugoslav government filed a formal protest to the US following the publication of Roberts’ book in 1973, although Roberts himself remained steadfast and critical of the Partisan account of events during the Yugoslav wars, asserting that, “nothing in the Balkans is ever back or white - there are only shades of grey.” See Walter Roberts, Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941 – 1945, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967, p.3 and p.108, and Milovan Djilas, Wartime, Martin Secker and Warburg, London, 1977, p234. 57 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.223. 58 British Special Operations Executive, A Note on the Morale of German Forces in Question, Draft, Appx ‘J’, 20 March 1944, HS5/922. 59 Šerbo Rastoder, A Short History of Montenegro, p.135.

Tito, one Fitzroy Maclean60 His actions would be the deciding factor in the British decision to support the Partisans at the behest of Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks. The Formation of the Balkan Air Force and the Brezna Airlifts But whilst the overall situation was becoming clearer, British operatives on the ground found it hard to comprehend the complexities and fluid character of the conflict. According to a report submitted by British Army Captain, A.I.G. Ramsay, in the early summer of 1944 the situation was becoming extremely difficult. The Partisan- Chetnik conflict in Montenegro and Herzegovina has reached a new crisis of late. The civil war, which has appeared to be inevitable, seems to have started whilst the Germans are still in the country. The various cross-sections and shades of opinions held are becoming increasingly difficult for an observer to understand and it is becoming increasingly difficult to make any sort of clear cut report on the subject.61 Indeed, as 1944 progressed, the Allies were dissatisfied with the progress made in the region. The immediate objectives were to build up the Partisans by dropping much needed supplies, cover lines of communications and attack key enemy lines of communication. These efforts were successful in that they pinned-down German units which could otherwise have been deployed (perhaps more effectively) elsewhere. The Germans held the principal key towns and communications infrastructure throughout the occupied territory. Numerous, but ill-coordinated, Partisan attacks were temporarily effective but frequently the Germans recovered and reorganised quickly. The Partisans were provided with Allied arms and equipment, and were often supported by Allied air and naval attacks, but these were limited in terms of both scope and efficacy.62 Furthermore, according to BAF intelligence, the Partisan leadership - at least that of the 2nd Corps - refused to admit that they could learn anything from outside sources. They were, moreover, disinclined to allow outsiders to take part in their battles.63 But cooperation, however limited, was key to both parties. In order to effect real change, therefore, the Allies needed to focus their energies on creating a body that could deliver the necessary assistance. According to a British assessment in 1944: What was needed now was a central coordinating Air Force H.Q. which would operate over the Balkans as a prime commitment, to cooperate with the other service H.Q’s engaged in Balkan operations of all types, and generally carry the air war against the enemy, thereby increasing his commitments and difficulties, aiding the Partisan forces directly by offensive air operations and by carrying on the task – already underway – of bringing them arms, food and clothing.64

60 Before the war Maclean had served in the British diplomatic service and had previously been stationed in Moscow. When the war broke out in 1939 Maclean had attempted to leave the British Foreign Office in order to enlist in the army, but received news that it would not be possible to be released from the FCO. Maclean sought to circumvent this ruling, discovering that by enlisting as a candidate for parliament he could simultaneously leave his posting. Almost as soon as leaving the Foreign Office, Maclean joined the Cameron Highlanders. See Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches, Cape, London, 1946. 61 Report by Capt. A.I.G. Ramsay on the Chetnik situation in Montenegro. British War Office Records, Ref: MML/L/141. WO 202/512. 62 Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force, ‘A History of the Balkan Air Force’, July 1945, p.4. AIR 23/882. 63 Balkan Air Force Report on the Situation in 2nd Corps Areas, 17 July 1944. WO 202/152. 64 Ibid, p.79. AIR 23/882.

And thus the Balkan Air Force (BAF) was born. In a directive dated 7 June 1944, from the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, a new unit was formed that would be adaptable to developing situations but would primarily be utilised for Balkan operations.65 Led by Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Vice Marshals William Elliot and George Mills, F.W. Deakin (with his intimate knowledge of the dynamics of the conflict) was attached to them as an advisor. The new unit was provided with two spitfire squadrons, two Italian Air Force ‘Macchi’ squadrons, two Halifax squadrons (one RAF, one Polish), two Dakota squadrons (one RAF, one United States Air Force).66 This initial force was, in both July and December 1944, reinforced to provide a larger number of Dakota squadrons. Fifteen types of aircraft were employed, flown by aircrew of eight different nationalities – British, South African, Italian, Greek, Yugoslav (and for supply operations) American, Polish and Russian.67 With the BAF established, operations began – primarily those which would provide logistical assistance to the Partisans. Many of these joint SOE-BAF missions were instrumental in helping the Partisans achieve military victories, and during the summer of 1944 they were engaged in evacuating the injured and providing logistical support. In terms of the former, it was imperative that planes could land on what was exceptionally mountainous terrain. Air fields had to be constructed that would allow for this objective to be met, and difficult as it was, the Balkan Air Force assessment was that these makeshift airstrips ‘sprung up like mushrooms’ in the period between April and August 1944.68 Reconnaissance missions by the British identified possible locations that could be used for evacuations – Negobudje, Kolašin, Gornje Polje and Nikšićko Polje were all identified as promising locations.69 As a result of the endeavours, what has become known as the ‘Dakota Landings’ took place, albeit at a different location. It remains one of the most remarkable stories of the Second World War (at least in Montenegro). A joint Allied-Partisan project, the landings were facilitated by the BAF. Based in Bari in Italy, their role was to provide aerial support and allocate resources to resistance movements in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. Eventually, it would organise units which would operate on Yugoslav soil, harassing the Germans as they retreated, but their first mission was to provide aerial and logistical support. The BAF comprised two specific branches, light bombers and special operations. Predominantly British, they also included several American, Italian, Greek and Polish units.70 They adopted all supply runs across the Adriatic, a task previously carried out by the Mediterranean Allied Air Force and had, by July 1944, flown over 2,400 sorties, including the dropping of supplies to the Partisans, bombing of German communication routes and strategic targets (such as German-held chrome and steel works), as well as airlifting wounded to Bari. The Dakota aircraft were perfect planes to be utilised for the missions. First built in 1935 as a civilian aircraft, and known as Douglas DC-3’s, they were converted for use during the war. There were three variations – the C-53, R4D and C-47 (the Dakota). They, but particularly the latter, were used extensively to transport troops, cargo, wounded and on logistical missions. Reliable and robust, the Dakota’s had, by the end of the war, the Dakota’s had carried 22 million tons

65 The BAF mainly supported the operations of the Partisans against German forces in Yugoslavia, but also provided support to Greek and Albanian resistance groups. 66 Ibid, p.5. AIR 23/882. 67 Ibid, p.80. AIR 23/882. 68 Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force, ‘Report on the First Year of the RAF Liaison with Partisans’, 12 December 1944. AIR 20/9035, p.5. 69 Report on a Visit to Montenegro by Major R.A. Simmons Breene, June – July 1944. British War Office Records WO 202/512. 70 Walter Roberts, Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941 – 1945, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967, pp.229-230.

of goods and flown 67 million passenger miles. They were a crucial factor in supporting ground operations.

On the ground, however, there was little for the Partisans to celebrate. On 17 July, a German offensive began with an artillery advance and air attacks upon Berane and Andrijevica. Three successive days of bombing led to a Partisan retreat from both towns. In response, the BAF provided air support to the Partisans, which allowed for an easing of the pressure. The BAF attacked Pljevlja, Prijepole, Sjenica (all in Serbian Sandžak) and Andrijevica (in Montenegrin Sandžak), a successful endeavour which facilitated the return of Partisan forces to the latter. Undeterred by the Partisan-BAF actions, the campaign to eliminate them continued unabated. Battles continued to rage, and with three German divisions (plus Chetniks and the Albanian SS Skenderberg Unit). The struggle for towns such as Berane and Andrijevica was intense and the German offensive was well-organised and brutal. By August 1944 the 2nd Battalion of the Partisans were in retreat and increasingly pinned-down by German forces in the vicinity of Durmitor. By 12 August, desperate battles were being waged for control of Šavnik (12 miles north of Nikšić). Indeed, a BAF airstrip in Negobudje (which had been earmarked for the evacuation of Partisan wounded) fell into German hands.71 Pinned-back to a line west of the Nikšić-Pljevlja road, the Partisans awaited their fate. With the number of dead, injured, and incapacitated growing steadily (not to mention the burden imposed by the bearing of stretchers, estimated to incapacitate at least two, possibly four fighting men or women), the Partisans were at risk of being overwhelmed by the superior German battalions. The wounded became a burden, limiting the capacity of the Partisan fighters; their ability to defend themselves against the onslaught diminishing with every casualty taken. Put simply, the situation was critical. The Partisans could only become mobile again if the wounded were airlifted out. But whilst this was theoretically possible, it was in practice exceptionally ambitious and potentially hazardous. But luck was on their side. The capitulation of both Bulgaria and Romania in August 1944 dictated that the Germans had to refocus their efforts (and manpower) on safeguarding rail communications in Serbia, and thus they were forced to withdraw a significant number from the Šavnik-Nikšić area.72 But whilst this relieved the immediate pressure, it did little to solve the problem of the burden of the Partisan wounded. They could not become mobile before this matter was resolved. The BAF was required to airlift them out, but this would prove problematic. The first problem would be finding a space where large enough craft (Dakota’s) could be accommodated. In the mountainous territory surrounding Durmitor, the chances of finding an appropriate piece of ground upon which an airstrip could be constructed for that purpose was, put simply, slim. Arguing to their superiors at SOE headquarters in Bari that an airlift was the only option for saving the Partisan effort, two SOE officers who had been seconded from the RAF - Flt Lt Thomas Mathias and Flt Lt Philip Lawson - were despatched to the Durmitor region on a reconnaissance mission to find a suitable piece of terrain upon which to construct an airfield which would allow for the landing of Dakota aircraft. After several fruitless expeditions, and two days of marching, they found such a spot near the village of Donja Brezna. Hardly ideal and only just large enough, the space would have to suffice. A small strip of flat ground in the village of Brezna was decided upon. After several fruitless expeditions, and two days of marching, they found such a spot near the village of Donja Brezna (located

71 Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force, ‘Report on the First Year of the RAF Liaison with Partisans’, 12 December 1944, p. 97. AIR 20/9035. 72 Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force, ‘A History of the Balkan Air Force’, July 1945, p. 97. AIR 23/882

between Nikšić and Šavnik). Agreement on the construction of the airstrip at Brezna was reached on 18 August in the village of Mljetičak between the Commander of the 2nd Corps and Commissioner Radoje Dakić and the British Major John Reed. The village of Brezna incorporating lower (donja) and upper (gornja) was the largest valley in the Piva region of Montenegro. Situated about 30 miles north of Nikšić, the valley stretched between Komarnica Canyon on its northern edge to mount Vojnik on its southern. The village itself was situated on about 1000 meters above sea-level and the valley was about 8 miles long from east to west and around a mile wide. The north- eastern part of the valley is called Gornja (Upper) Brezna and Donja (Lower) Brezna on the north-western section of the valley. The central part of the valley is called Potprisoje. Before World War II the village was possessed only 1000 inhabitants with agriculture as main source of an economy, predominantly the nomadic style of cattle and sheep breeding. Prior to the arrival of the SOE, the majority of the population supported the communist-led Partisans, although a small proportion opted to support the Chetniks. A number of villagers took an active part in fighting with Partisans against the Italians and Germans. It is estimated that 104 people died during the war, 43 from Gornja Brezna, 24 from Potprisoje and 37 from Donja Brezna. The majority were innocent civilians killed by Germans between 1943 and 1944. The worst incidents involved the feared German Prince Eugene Division during the Fifth Offensive against Partisans. During this period the Germans forces slaughtered many civilians in Piva Region, among them almost 70 people were killed in Brezna, with the majority killed by firing squad or burned alive in their homes.73 In Brezna and the surrounding villages, locals (mostly children, women and older men) were mobilised into action - to clear the fields, destroy existing walls, fill in ditches and prepare the foundations for the airstrip.74 Hardly ideal and only just large enough, the space would have to suffice. In a broadcast given to the BBC in August 1944, Flt Lt Philip Lawson described the scene: The plan of making an airstrip in this particular zone where no strip had been made before was decided on as the only hope. I was sent ahead to reconnoitre for level ground. With me came a British Army Major, a Partisan engineer and some couriers. The ground wasn’t exactly ideal. It was on a slight hill, with a wheat field, slit trenches and sheep folds across it. But we collected the inhabitants of five villages, and people came from miles around. They scythed down the green corn, removed fences and filled the trenches. They carried the hard white stones away in wooden buckets and on the evening of the second day of work the airfield was ready.75 With the work completed within 48 hours, the landings could begin. But according to Flt Lt Mathias, the pilots had no idea that an airfield had been built at Brezna (they had been instructed that their next mission was near Dubrovnik). Upon seeing the airstrip, however, he noted that it was ‘very satisfactory for a daytime operation – being approximately 830 yards long and 80 yards wide.’76 On 20 August, British spitfires guided by the white parachute canopies laid out on the runway, dropped message bags informing the beleaguered Partisans that British and American Dakotas would soon

73 Thank you to Dragoljub Radojević and for the information regarding events in Brezna during the war. 74 Author’s interview with Flt Lt Philip Lawson, Balkan Air Force 1944 - 1945, Saxmundham, Suffolk, June 2008. 75 Transcript of BBC broadcast on the evacuation of the Partisans, August 1944, p.3. 76 Report on the evacuation of 900 wounded from Brezna by Flt Lt. T.R. Mathias, 16 August 1944. British War Office Records. WO 202/512.

arrive to provide vital assistance to the wounded, landing in waves of six per hour (with approximately thirty wounded on each plane). In the meantime, to ensure that the objective of landing Dakotas could be achieved, it was imperative that the Partisans held their line of defence during the German assault. Failure to do so would mean that the Partisans would have to leave their wounded to an uncertain fate. Flt Lt Mathias succinctly described the scene as he arrived at Donja Brezna: The atmosphere at Lawson’s airfield was the tensest I have ever known. Some of the wounded had been travelling for more than four months with little or no skilled attention. This, they knew, was their only chance. If the planes did not come they would be driven again to the hills, and with the Germans closing in, many would undoubtedly have been slaughtered.77 As the German forces advanced, the Dakota’s (protected by Mustangs and Spitfires) landed in Donja Brezna. The airstrip was secured by the Montenegrin 3rd division and the Lička 6th division who fought in close and intensive ‘hand-to-hand’ combat against the German Division 7SS and the Prince Eugene and Brdska Division II regiment – ‘Brandenburg’. Fierce battles also raged around the Komarnica canyon. Time was of the essence. However, on the morning of 22 August, the airlifts began, with the first Dakota (protected by smaller fighter aircraft) landing at 9am. For the next seven hours – until 4pm – a total of thirty six flights landed and departed safely. In this daring, chaotic and ambitious manoeuvre led by Wing Commander James Polson, more than 800 wounded (SOE and BAF estimates vary between 800 and 1000) were airlifted to Italy.78 Typhus was widespread among those airlifted out, and many were suffering critical injuries. Polson was shocked by the condition of the wounded, as he recounted following the event: From a medical point of view, most of the wounded were in a pathetic state of malnutrition. Because of their shortage of stretchers and bearers, these partisans consider anyone who can stand upright and breathe to be a ‘walking case’. One man had walked to a report centre after having had a bullet pass clean through his chest, touching his left lung. He too was a walking case…They don’t always have

anaesthetic for their amputations and conditions were such that the general state of sepsis was appalling, apart from the presence of lice, typhus and some malaria. But despite their weakness they gave a tremendous cheer each time a plane landed.79 The Dakota’s managed to airlift thirty-five people per flight, taking, according to Flt Lt Mathias, ‘twenty five minutes to load and get each of the six aircraft away.’80 Releasing the burden of the injured and infirm liberated the stretcher bearers, who were now free to engage the German forces. Despite this, the Partisans were overwhelmed and forced into retreat, and a few hours later the Germans occupied the village of Donja Brezna. The ambitious airlift had been successful only by a matter of minutes. It remains one of the most spectacular, yet little known, air stories of the war in Yugoslavia. The Dakota landings were the first in a series of joint SOE-Allied-Partisan actions that proved instrumental in changing the dynamics on the ground. But the role of the Balkan Air Force, whilst celebrated in the context of the Dakota landings, has been the subject of 77 Transcript of BBC broadcast on the evacuation of the Partisans, August 1944, p.3. 78 Some estimates place the number of evacuated at over 1000. See for example, George Saunders & Dennis Richards, The Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vols. I-III, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954. They place the number at 1078 individuals – comprising 1059 Partisans, 16 Allied pilots and 3 members of the SOE mission. 79 Ibid, p.5. 80 Report on the evacuation of 900 wounded from Brezna by Flt Lt. T.R. Mathias, 16 August 1944. British War Office Records. WO 202/512.

significant debate. Holistically effective, the Allied intervention brought some negative effects. The Allied bombing of major towns and communication routes, through which the German forces were retreating, wrought significant damage upon Nikšić, Bijelo Polje, Ulcinj, Pljevlja and Podgorica.81 Following the Dakota landings and numerous other SOE operations, a Partisan offensive was launched that would force the German units from Montenegrin soil. The fighting in the summer months of 1944 was fierce. The German command in Berlin had only one objective left, ensuring that Montenegro did not fall to the Communists, and in this they found a willing partner in the Chetniks. Between February and July 1944, the Chetniks carried out mass executions in the areas they still controlled, whilst in the north-east of Montenegro the notorious, Albanian-dominated, 21st SS Skenderberg Division massacred over 400 of the Orthodox population around Andrijevica.82 Both these areas were back under Partisan control by the end of August 1944. What is known as Ratweek also began in September 1944, with much of the planning being done in the BAF headquarters in Bari. Ratweek changed the dynamics and trajectory of the conflict. By late 1944, the Partisans were in control of the majority of Montenegrin territory. The last of the occupying forces left Montenegro in early 1945, in a column heading north-west toward Slovenia and the Austrian border. With theretreating Germans was a Chetnik column led by Pavle Djurišić, who had severed relations with Draža Mihailović (the latter branding Djurišić as a traitor).83 Djurišić was later arrested an interned by Ustasha in the Jasenovac, where he met his death. Remnants of the Montenegrin autonomist armed units also fled for Slovenia. Sekula Drljević was captured and killed in Judenburg in Austria alongside a number of his compatriots. The victory of the Communist-led Partisans (with significant aid from the Allies) was sealed between mid 1944 and 1945. The decisions reached by AVNOJ at both Jajce, and later at Kolašin, guaranteed Montenegro’s status as a republic within which elements of its former sovereignty would be re-established - albeit within the framework of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But the war had exacted a heavy price: physically, socially, and psychologically. According to the Montenegrin historian, Radoje Pajović, at the end of four years of war, around 14,000 Montenegrin Partisan fighters had died, whilst an equivalent number of Montenegrin Chetniks had been killed. In addition more than 21,000 private homes and public buildings, 321 school buildings, 15 industrial sites, and 80 percent of the republic’s bridges were destroyed.84 Šerbo Rastoder estimates that the total demographic loss (taking into account natural population growth and the displaced) between 1941 and 1945 was in the region of 103,000.85 Some of Montenegro’s main population centres were almost completely destroyed. Podgorica, bombed on over seventy occasions, was reduced to rubble with much of the old town devastated.86 According to Milovan Djilas, “Titograd [Podgorica] was so devastated by Allied bombings - they say there were over twenty - that it resembled an archaeological excavation through which had been cleared. The people of Podgorica had scattered to the villages or to the caves around the Morača river.”87 Both the occupation and the endgame had wrought terrible consequences for human life, not to mention widespread destruction. Yet, in the final analysis, more Yugoslavs lost their 81 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.225. 82 Ibid, p.225. 83 Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks, Stanford University Press, 1975, p.453. 84 Radoje Pajović, Crna Gora kroz istoriju, Obod, Cetinje, 2005, p.36. 85 Živko Andrijašević & Šerbo Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006, p.226. 86 According to secret US-OSS intelligence reports from 1944, the Americans were well aware of what may happen to Podgorica, warning flatly that it “will be leveled by bombings.” OSS Report on Economic Conditions in Montenegro, November 1944. Report No. GB-2818. WO 202/512. 87 Milovan Djilas, Wartime, P.445.

lives to fellow Yugoslavs than to the occupying Axis forces. These wounds would take many generations to heal. The role of the SOE, Allied and Balkan Air Force missions cannot be underestimated, yet scholars continue to debate how instrumental the role of Allied governments’ (particularly the British) interventions were in shaping the direction of the war. The BAF was disbanded following the end of the Second World War (in July 1945), whilst the SOE was disbanded in January 1946. Following the Brezna operations, a small number of BAF units harassed the retreating Germans. Between 19 March and 3 May they flew 2,727 sorties, attacking the German withdrawal route from Sarajevo to Zagreb and supporting the Fourth Yugoslav Army advancing from Bihac to Fiume. The airfield at Brezna was never used again following the end of the war, although the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) allegedly had plans to construct a major military airport there. But as a consequence of the thick fog which often covered the entire Brezna valley the plan was later abandoned. After the war, the Yugoslav communist government adopted massive program of industrialisation, which drew large numbers into the urban centres (mainly Nikšić and Podgorica – the latter known as Titograd between 1946 and 1992) and away from the villages. As a consequence, the population of Brezna steadily declined over the years. Only one wood processing factory opened in the Donja Brezna shortly after the World War II, offering an alternative source of income to agriculture. Gornja (Upper) Brezna is almost deserted over the winter months, whilst Potprisoje and Donja (Lower) Brezna still have around hundred permanent inhabitants. Today, however, one can clearly see where the airstrip was constructed, although a number of houses and other buildings have been erected in the subsequent period. Nevertheless, the sense that something remarkable happened in this small valley still permeates.

Bibliography Primary Sources Author’s interview with Flt Lt Philip Lawson, Balkan Air Force 1944 - 1945, Saxmundham, Suffolk, June 2008. Transcript of BBC broadcast on the evacuation of the Partisans, August 1944. Balkan Air Force Report on the Situation in 2nd Corps Areas, 17 July 1944. WO 202/152. British Special Operations Executive, A Note on the Morale of German Forces in Question, Draft, Appx ‘J’, 20 March 1944, HS5/922. British Special Operations Executive, ‘Some Notes on the Yugoslav Revolt’, 22 June 1942, HS5/938. British Special Operations Executive, Report Drawn up by Lieutenant Glenn on his Relations with Yugoslavs, 17 November 1941, HS5/938. British Special Operations Executive, Report by Bill Hudson on situation in Yugoslavia, July 1943, HS5/934. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ 1941 - 1945, Yugolovenski pregled, Beograd, 1988. General Staff, British War Office, Director of Military Intelligence, M.I. 3b, 27 April 1943, Most Secret, ‘A Short History of the Revolt in Yugoslavia’; PRO Archives, document FO 371/33469, pp. 7-8. Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force, ‘Report on the First Year of the RAF Liaison with Partisans’, 12 December 1944. AIR 20/9035. Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force, ‘A History of the Balkan Air Force’, July 1945. AIR 23/882 Report by Capt. A.I.G. Ramsay on the Chetnik situation in Montenegro. British War Office Records, Ref: MML/L/141. WO 202/512. Report on a Visit to Montenegro by Major R.A. Simmons Breene, June – July 1944. British War Office Records WO 202/512. Report on the evacuation of 900 wounded from Brezna by Flt Lt. T.R. Mathias, 16 August 1944. British War Office Records. WO 202/512. Secondary Sources Andrijašević, Živko & Rastoder, Šerbo, The History of Montenegro, CICG, Podgorica, 2006.

Banac, Ivo. With Stalin Against Tito, Cornell University Press, Ithica and London, 1988. Beloff, Nora. Tito’s Flawed Legacy Victor Gollanz, London, 1985. Deakin, F.W. The Embattled Mountain, Oxford University Press, 1971. Dedijer, Vladimir. The War Diaries of Vladimir Dedijer, Volume 2, November 28 1942 to September 10th 1943, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990, p.273. Deroc, Milan. British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response, East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia Press, New York, 1988. Djilas, Milovan. Wartime, Martin Secker and Warburg, London, 1977. Kapandžić, Milan. Gradjanski rat u Srbiji, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 1958. Karchmar, Lucien. Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement, 1941 – 1942, Vol.2, Garland Publishing, New York and London, 1987. Kirkwood Ford, Jr., Thomas. Pawns and Pawnbrokers: OSS and Yugoslav Resistance During the Second World War, PhD Thesis, University of Southern Mississippi, May 1980. Labović & Basta, Partizani za pregovarackim stolom 1941 – 1945, Vrijeme, Zagreb, 1986. Lampe, John. Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press, 2001. Lees, Michael. The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990. Maclean, Fitzroy. Eastern Approaches, Cape, London, 1946. Martin, David. The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990. Pajović, Radoje. Pavle Djurišić, CID, Podgorica, 2005. Pajović, Radoje. Kontrarevolucija u Crnoj Gori: cetnicki i federalisticki pokret, Cetinje, 1977. Pajović, Radoje. Crna Gora kroz istoriju, Obod, Cetinje, 2005. Radojević, Dragoljub. Rodoslov porodice Radojević, Gornja Brezna, 2005. Roberts, Elizabeth. The Realm of the Black Mountain, Hurst & Co. London, 2006.

Roberts, Walter. Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941 – 1945, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967. Saunders, Hilary St. George & Richards, Dennis, The Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vols. I-III, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954. Sjekloća, Veljko. Krsto Popović: u istorijskoj gradji i literatura. Obod, Cetinje, 2001. Tomasevich, Jozo. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945, Stanford University Press. Tomasevich, Jozo. The Chetniks, Stanford University Press, 1975. Wheeler, Mark. Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940 – 1943, East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980. Williams, Heather. Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans, Hurst & Co., 2003, p.245.