history of the u.s. marine corps in wwii vol i - pearl harbor to … · 2017. 7. 7. · pearl...

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

History of U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II

VOLUME I

HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

PCN 19000262400

Pearl Harbor

to Guadalcanal

HISTORY OF U. S. MARINE CORPS

OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

VOLUME I

. by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK O. HOUGH, USMCR

MAJOR VERL13 E. LUDWIG, USMC

HENRY I. SHAW, JR.

Historical Bmnch, G-3 Diuisiwz, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

:I,ibrary of Congress C!atalog Card Ko. 58-60002

Foreword

With t,he recent completion of our bistoricnl monograph project,, the

Marine Corps historical program entered a new phase. This book is the first of a projected five-volume series covering completely, and we hope definitively, the history of Marine operations in World War II.

The fifteen hist,orical monogmpl~s published over n period of eight years

have served to spotlight the high points in this broad field. The basic resea~rch which underlay their preparat,ion vi11 be utilized again in this project. But a monograph by its very nnt,ure aims at, a limited obje&ve, and in its comxntm-

tion on B single bat,tle or campaign necessarily ignores many related subjects. All too oft,en it has been dificult~ to avoid conveying the impression that the

specific operation under discussion was taking place in a vuc~um. Thus, while mu& valuable &tory has been writt,en, the st,ory as R wlrole remains untold.

This lack the present project aims to rectify. The story of individual

b;rttlrs or rnmpaigns, now isolated between tire covers of separate publications,

will be, l;w&y rewrittrn and woven tog&her in an att,empt to show events in proper relation to exh other and in correct perspect,ivo to the war as a whole.

In addition, new mat,erial, especially from .Jalmnese sources, which has become available since the \wit,ing of the monographs, will be integrated into t,be story.

Only ~lren t,he broad pict,ure is awibd~le can tbo significance of the Marine

Corps’ cont,ribnt,ioo t,o t,lx final victory in tlw Pacific be fairly evnluated.

Non a word about Vo111me I wbicb sket,cbes briefly the development of the

Marine Corps’ nmphibions mission from its incept,ion and then carries t;he story of World War II t,broupb Guadnlc;~n;~l. ;Yis logistirnl officer of t,he 1st Marine

Division, I was privileged to take part, in this, our first, eflort t,o st,rike back

at, the Japa~ncse. Looking rearw;uxl from the vantage point of Inter years when our mxt,eriel superiority was “rorwlwlmin~, it, is dificult, t,o visualize tlrose

lean first, months in tlw Pacitiv ~~lwn there ws nerer enon,ob of anything, and Allird st,ratrgy of girirrp top prio&y to Europe meant that there would not,

be for some time to rome. Tbns “or initial offensive quickly and richly esrned the nickname “~l’Wlt~i”11 Slloest~ring.” But, t;he shoestring held during those

early criticrrl days n4wr it,s holding nppenred lri,~lrly questionnble; and when

it, did> the nlt,imnte outcome of t,he, WRI’ in the Pwrific ceased to remxin in doubt.

R. McC. PATE

Preface

This book covers Marine Corps participation through t,he first precarious year of World War II, when disaster piled on disaster and there seemed no way to check Japanese aggression. Advanced bases and garrisons rere isolated and destroyed: Guam, Wake, and the Philippines. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, “t,he day t,hat will live in infamy,” seriously crippled the U. S. Pacific Fleet; yet that cripple rose to t,nm the t,ide of the entire mar at Midway. Shortly thereafter the U. S. Marines launched on Guadalcan4 an offensive which was destined t,o end only on the home islands of the Empire.

The oountry in general, Rnd the Marine Corps in pnrt,icular, r&wed World War II in a b&ter state of praparedness than had been the case in any other previous conflic,t,. But that is a comparat,ive term and does not merit mention in the same sentence with the degree of Japanese preparedness. What the Marine Corps did bring into the var, however, was the priceless in- gredient developed during the years of peace: the amphibious doct,rines and techniques that made possible the trans.Pncific ndvance-and, for that mat,ter, the invasion of North Africa and the European continent.

By publishing t,his opernt,ional history iu a durable form, it is hoped to make the Marine Corps record permanently available for the study of military personnel, the edific,ntion of the general public,, and the contemplation of serious scholars of milituy hist,ory.

This initial volume was planned and outlined by Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards, former Head of t,he Hist,oricxl Branch, G-3 Division, Hend- quart,ers, U. S. Marine Corps. Much of the original writing was done by Lientemmt Colonel Frank 0. Hough, formerly Head of the Writing Section, Hist,orical Branch. Three historical monographs, Lieutenant Colonel Robert, D. Heinl, Jr.% The Defense of Wake and Xarinr.s at Xid,roay, and Major .John L. Zimmerman’s The ~~uadalmnlrl Campaign3 IRR adnpt,ed t,o the needs of this book by Major Verle E. Ludwig, who also cont,ributed considerable original writ,ing of his own. Mr. Kennet,h 717. Condit wrote the chapter on landing craft development aud shared, with Colonel Charles W. Harrison and Major Hubard I). Iiuokkil, t,he aut~horship of the chapt,rr tre;Lt,ing the evolution of amphibious doct,rine. The bnildq of I’wilic out,post, garrisons, the opening I~OV~S of the W:W, and the rword of Marines in the defense of the Philippines were written by Mr. Henry I. Sbnw, *Jr. The final editing was done by Colonel Harrison, present Head of t,he Historical Branch.

A number of the leading participants in t,be a&ions described have con- mented on preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of this manuscript,. Their

valueble assist~ance is gratefully acknowledged. Special t,hanks nre due to t,hose people who read and commented on t,be ent,ire volume: l&utenant General Edward A. Craig, I?. S. Marine Corps, Retired; Dr. .John ;\Iiller, Office of t,hr C,hief of Military Hist,ory, Department of t,he Army ; Captain Frederick Ii. Loomis, Ii. 9. Navy, N:~val History Division. Ofice of tlw Chief of Naval Operations, Department of t,he Navy; and (~‘olonel H&l. who initict,ed the original program of monographs dealing with &rine actions in World Wxr 11.

Mrs. Edna Clem Kelley and her successor’ in the Administrative and I’m- duction Section of t,he Historical Bmncb, Miss Kay I’. Sue, ably handled t,he exacting duties involved in processing tlre volume from first drafts tlrrougb final printed form. The many preliminary typescripts nod the JxGnst~alting task of typing the final manuscript, for the printer were done by Mrs. Miriam R. Smallxwod and Mrs. Billie J. Twker.

Most of the maps wxe prepared by tire Reproduction Section. Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. However, we are indebted to the OtIice of t,he Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for permission t,r, use Maps Nos. 3. 14, 15, 20, 21, and 2.3-27. which were originally draft,ed by its Cartographic Branch. Officinl Defense Ikpwtmrnt~ photogr;\phs bavr been used t~hroughont~ the test.

1% W’. SNEDEKER WAJCIH CENF.RAL, u. 8. MARI&-E CORPS

ASSr8~ANT CHIXF OF WTAFF. IF-3

Contents

PART 1 INTRODUCTIOX TO THE MARTNE CORPS

CHAPI‘F.R PACX

1. Origins of a, Mission 3 2. Evolution of Modern Amphibious Wnrfuy 1920-3941 8 3. Dcvrlopment of Landing Craft,. 23 4. Marine Occupation of Jrelrtnd 35 5. Thr Marine Corps 011 the Eve of Wa,r. 47

PART II WAR COMES

1. Prrver Situat,ion in the Pacific. .............. 59 2. JapanStrikes ...................... 70 3. Thr Sorrthcrn T,ifcline. .................. 84

PART III THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

1. Wa,ke.in the Shadow of War ............... 2.. The Emmy Strikes. ................... 3. Wake Under Siege .................... 4. The Fall of Wnkf ..................... .5. C’onclusions .......................

95 106 121 132 1.50

PART 1V MARINES IN THE PHTLlPPI~ES

1. China and Luzon .................... 155 2. Bnt,aan Prelude ..................... 172 3. The SiPge and Cnptnre of C’orregidor ............ 154

PART V DECTSION AT MlDWAY

1. Setting t,hc S&y: E&.rly Naval Operations 205 2. Japanese Plans: Toward Midwny and t,be Kort,h Pacific 214 3. hlidaay Girds for Bat,tle 216 4. Midway Venus the Japanese, 4-5 .June 1942 221 5. Batt,le of t,he Carrirr Planes, 4 June 1942 226

PART VI THE TURNING POINT: GUADAXIANAL

CHAPTER

I. Background and Preparations 2. Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 1942 3. Tulagi and Gavut,n-Tanambogo 4. The Bat,& of t,hr Tenaru 5. The B&e of the Ridge 6. Act,ion Along t,he Matanikan 7. Jspa~nese C?ount,eroffensivc 8. critical November 9. Final Period, 9 December 1942-9 February 1943

PAGE

235 254 263 274 294 310 322 341 359

APPENDICES

A. Bibliographical Notes 375 B. C~xlronolog>- 382 C. Marine Task Organizntion and C’ommand I,ist,s 387 D. Marine C~asualties 395 E. First, Marine Division Operat,ion Order-Gusdalcanal 396 F. Milit,ary Map Symbols 399 G. Guide to Abbrevist,ions 400 H. Unit, Commendat,ions 404

Index 413

1LLUSTRATIONS

C:ontinental Marines 6 Marincs of Huntington’s B&t&n 6 Marines in France in World War I 12 Bandit-Hunting Patrol in Nicaragua 12 Experimental Amphibian Tractor 25 Early Version of 1,anding Craft 25 Air Evaruat,ion of Wounded in Nicaragua 49 Army Light Tank Landing at, New River, K. C: 49 Pearl Harbor A&k 72 .Japanese Landing on Guam 72 Japanese Patrol Craft, Lost at, Wake 135 Japanese Naral Troops Wbo Took Wake 135 Japanese on Bnt,nan 174 Aerial View of C?rrcgidor Island 186 Effect of Japanese Bombardment of Clorrrgidor 186 An Army B-25, One of Doolit,tle’s Raiders 208 Ja,pancsr Can% Shoho 208

II,LUSTKI1TIONS--Continucrl

(!anmlmagrd lmkout ‘I’mrrr nt SWld ISliLUd ............ Japanese (‘ruisrr Mi~wna .................... Crude Sk&b Mnp of Gundnlrarml ................ Eqnipmmt~ for the 1st Marine Division .............. Murinc Rnidcrs and thr Cww of the Snbmarinr Argonaut ...... The Original Hmdrrson Field .................. Unloading Supplies nt Guadalcnnal ................ Tulagi Island ......................... Tannmbogo nnd Gnvrrt,u Islnnds ................. Marine Commnr~ders on Guadnlcarml ............... LVT Bridge Built, hy Marine Enginrrrs .............. Solomons Nat,ives Guide a Patrol ................. BOmm Antinircrnft, Guns of tbr 3d Drfcnsc Bnt,talion ........ 105mm Howit~zrr of the 1 I t,ll Mnrin~s ............... Rnidrrs! Ridge ......................... ~Iarincs of tlw 211 Rnidm Battalion ................ The Pagoda at IImderson Field ................. (ladus Air Forcr Planes ..................... Five Blasted J~~pnncse Talks ................... hlarinr Light, Tanks. ...................... Japnncsr Torpedo Planr ..................... lNavnl Gunfire support, ..................... :37mm Guns of t,bc Ammirnl Division ............... 1st Division Marinrs Lravc Guadelrannl ..............

1 F. ‘l’lrc I’mmrtcv, 1% A11gust 1’34% 287

x COhTENTS

MAPS+Cont,inued PAGE

17. Battle of t,he Tenaru, 21 August, 1942 289 18. The Perimeter, 12-14 Scpt,ember 1942 300 19. Edson’s Ridge-First Phase, 12-l? Sept,ember 1942 304 20. Edson’s Ridgo~Final Phase, 13 Scpt,rmbrr 1942 307 21. hlat~anikau Action, 24-27 Soptcmbrr 1942 314 22. Matonikati Offensive, 7-9 October 1942 318 23. October At,tacks on t,he Perimeter Map Srct,ion 24. Push Toward Kokumbona, l-4 Kovembu 1942 344 25. Koli Point, 4-9 November 1942 Mnp Section 26. Bat,& Area, Dewmber 1942~Jnnnary 1943 Map Sect,ion 27. XIV Corps Plan-~~-First January Offensive 1’fa.p Section 28. Capt,urc of Kokumbonn and Advance t,o t,he Poha Riwr, 23-25

January 1943 .CIap &&on 29. Final Phase, 26 January-9 February 1943 370

PART ONE

Introduction to the Marine Corps

CHAPTER 1

Origins of a Mission

In a sense, Marines may be said to haveexisted in ancient times when the l?hoeni-cians, and subsequently the Greeks andRemans, placed men aboard their shipsfor the specific purpose of fighting, incontrast to the crews who navigated themand the rowers who propelled them. How-ever, Marines in the modern sense date toSeventeenth Century England where, in1664, a regiment of ground troops wasraised specifically for duty with the fleetas well as ashore. This unit bore the some-what ponderous title: “Duke of York andAlbany’s Maritime Regiment of Foot.”Over a period of many decades of ex-pansion and evolution, during much ofwhich nobody knew for certain whetherit belonged to the Army or the hTavy, thisbasic unit developed into the corps knowntoday as the Royal Marines.

By the time of the American Revolution,the status of the 13ritish Marines hadjelled firmly. Thus, when the AmericanColonies revolted al;d began setting uptheir own armed services, they modeledthese much along the lines of the similarcomponents of the mother country, thesebeing the forms with which they were mostfamiliar and which suited them best tem-peramentally. This was true of the Con-tinental Marines and to an even greaterdegree of the Marine Corps, reactivatedunder the Constitution in 1798.

In the days of wooden, sail-propelledships the functions of the Marines becamewell defined. At sea they kept order andwere responsible for internal sec(mity. In

combat they became the ship’s small-armsfighters: sniping from the fighting tops,and on deck spearheading boarding partiesin close action or repelling enemy board-ers. Ashore they guarded naval installa-tions, both at home and abroad, and uponoccasion fought on land beside Army com-ponents. Amphibious-wise, they wereavailable as trained landing parties, eitherto seize positions on hostile shores, or toprotect the lives and property of nationalsin foreign countries. Both the Britishand IT. s. Marines have seen much suchservice.

At the time of this writing the MarineCorps is 181 years old, according to itsown reckoning, though its service has notbeen continuous. Marines celebrate theirCorps’ birthday on 10 November, this beingthe date in the year 1775 when the Con-tinental Congress authorized the raisingof two battalions of Marines for the Con-tinental service. The scanty records ex-tant show nothing to indicate that thosebattalions were actually raised, but manyMarines were recruited for service onboard the ships of the infant Navy wherethey performed creditably in all the majorsea actions of the Revolutionary War,staged two important amphibious land-ings in the Bahamas, and ashore partici-pated in the Trenton-Princeton campaignunder General Washington.

The Continental Marines, like the Navyand all but a minuscule detachment of theArmy, passed out of existence followingthe close of the Revolutionary War. How-

3

4 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

ever, foreign pressures brought the Navyback into existence in 1798 under the re-cently adopted Constitution, and on 11July of that year the Marine Corps wasreactivated as a separate service withinthe naval establishment.

Since that date Marines have fought inevery official war the United States hashad—and scores of obscure affairs thatlacked official blessing but in which, toquote the eminent Marine writer, John W.Thomason, Jr., “. . . a man can be killedas dead as ever a chap was in the .4r-gonne.”’ They have served as strictlynaval troops, both ashore and afloat, andparticipated in extended land operationsunder Army command, notably in theCreek-Seminole Indian Wars of the 1830’s,the Mexican War, both World Wars, andin Korea.

All over the world, Britian’s Royal Ma-rines were seeing much the same type ofservice. For a century or more the coursesof the two corps ran parallel, and theywere as functionally alike as it is possiblefor any two military organizations to be.Individual members of these services hadso many interests in common that, as oneBritish writer put it, they had a tendencyto “chum up” 2 when ships of the two na-tions put in to the same ports. Even thepresent [“. S. Marine emblem (adopted in1868 ) derives from that of the Royal Ma-rines; though at a glance they appear en-tirely different, the basic motifs of bothare the fouled anchor and globe: the East-ern Hemisphere for the British, the West-ern for the L;. S. Much in common existed

‘ Capt J. W. Thomason, Jr., l%r Bauon.ets !( Xew York : Charles Scribners Sons, 1955 ed. ),xiv.

‘ LtCol M. Rose, RMA, A Short Hi8tor~ of the

Ro~al Marine8 ( Deal, England: Depot RoyalMarines, 1911 ), 22.

at top level, as well, and over the yearsthe two organizations developed a veryclose and most cordial relationship thatexists to this day, despite the strange evo-lutionary divergence that set in betweenthem:

The transition of navies from sail tosteam began evolutionary developmentswhich profoundly altered the nature ofall shipboard duties, and temporarilythreatened both corps with extinction.From this the Royal Marines emergedburdened with a miscellany of often in-congruous duties never envisioned in theold days, and considerably emasculated bylack of a single mission of overriding im-portance. That the eflect on the U. S.Marines w-as precisely the reverse resultedfrom the fundamental difference in theproblems facing the txvo nations whichrequired L’. S, Marines to carve out a spe-cial mission for themselves, though theytraveled a long, uneven road in bringingthis to full fruition.

The basic problem that confronted theearly steam navies was that of obtainingfuel. Sail-propelled men-of-war, onwhich all naval experience and traditionup to that time was based, could operateat sea almost indefinitely, putting in onlyto replenish provisions and water, readilyavailable at nearly any port of call any-where in the world. But sufficient coalto support large-scale steamship opera-tions could be obtained only from wellstocked basesl and a fleet’s operatingradius thus became limited by the loca-tion of such bases, If an enemy lay be-yond that radius, the fleet might as wellbe chained to a post so far as getting at

“ LtCol R. 1). Heinl, Jr., “What Happened tothe Royal Marines ?,’” U&’XI Proceedings, Febru-ary 1!349, 169.

ORIGINS OF A MIS SIOAT 5

him was concerned, unless the source ofsupply could be projected farther in hisdirection.

To the British Empire, on which “thesun never sets;’ this posed no serious prob-lem; it had, or could build, all the bases itneeded without leaving its own territory.But the United States, with few outlyingpossessions, had genuine cause for con-cern. In order to give the fleet signifi-cant operating range in the Pacific, theNavy in 1878 set up a coaling station inSamoa, and in 1887 the government con-cluded a treaty with Hawaii permittingthe establishment of another at PearlHarbor.

But the United States had no deep-seated interest in the Far East during thisera, and no serious apprehension of an at-tack from that direction. The Navy’sprincipal concern lay in the possibilityof being obliged to enforce the MonroeDoctrine in the Caribbean or South At-lantic. As early as 1880, far-sightednaval officers began turning their thoughtstoward this mission. The cost of main-taining permanent bases in those areaswould have been prohibitive, so the prob-lem boiled down to devising a plan forseizing advanced bases when and wherestrategy dictated their need and develop-ing these as quickly as possible to with-stand attack. The scattered, under-strength U. S. Army of that era could notsupply sutlicient trained ground troops onthe short notice necessary to make suchoperations effective, so the Navy facedthe problem of developing groundtroops of its own for service with the fleet.’

‘E. B. Potter (ed ), !f’he United States andWorld flea Power (New York: Prentice-Hall,1955 ), .577-578, hereinafter cited as 7’. S. & Seal’otc<,r.

It would seem, particularly with bene-fit of today’s hindsight, that the MarineCorps would be the logical choice for thedevelopment of this mission. However,this was not so apparent at tile time. Ma-rines had never participated in tl~is typeof operation on anything resembling thescale envisioned, and they comprised avery small unit as compared to the blue-jackets. One school of thought con-tended that the advanced base functionshould be performed entirely by Navypersonnel under command of naval offi-cers, in the interests of unity and otherconsiderations.’ The controversy, strictly

on the theoretical level, waxed warm andsometimes acrimonious, giving rise atlength to one of those perennial efforts toeliminate the Marines altogether.G

However, the advent of the Spanish-American War found the Navy whollyunprepared to cope with the advancedbase problem. It was the Marine Corpsthat promptly organized an expedition-ary bzt.talion, including its own artillerycomponent, for the seizure of Guanta-namo Bay, Cuba, in order to enable the

U. S. Fleet to operate indefinitely in theCaribbean waters. At Key West thisunit underwent training in minor tactics,basic weapons, and musketry, and thenlanded in the target area on 10 June 1898,

ten days before the first Army troops ar-rived ofl the coast of Cuba. There theMarines quickly secured a beachhead andsuccessfully defended it against a nu-merically superior enemy.

$For detailed discussion of this controversy,see W. H. Russell. “The Genesis of FMF Doc-trine: 1879–1809,” M(7 Gazette, April–July 1951.

‘ Lt(M R. D. Heinl. .Jr., “’l’he Cat with Morethan Nine Lives,” ~“NA’I Proceeding.?, June 1954.

ORIGIN’S OF .i MI SSIOX 7

So expeditiously and etliciently was thisol)eration condllcted tllnt its eontriblltiontotlle speedy and decisi~ecllllllil]atioll ofthe war would be ditlicult to evaluate.This also grextly strengtllel~eci tbe Ma-rine Corps’ ‘cl ainl to tile hTavy’s amphibi-ous mission, x c1ainl tllntj gained still fur-ther strength by .Idmiral Dewey’s subse-quent statenlent tlmt if a similar Marinecomponent liad served with his fleet atManil:t 13:~y, tile wl~ole painful and pro-tracted I>hilippille Insurrection mightnave been avoided.

Tile Sp:lllisl~-.\llleric:lll l~ar signa]ize(lelllergeuce of tbe ITllited States as a worldpower. Possession of tile I’bilil)pinesCi\lH?(l tile Navy, to reappraise tile wl~oleFar E:lst situntlou. The 17SS (’ilc/r/e,s-ton. convoying A!rnly troops to lhniln,paused en rollte to seize tile Spanish is-laIId of ~TIIam to serve ;1s an advallce(lcoaling station>: and al)l~exation of H:I-

7Seizure of Guam reqllirc(l no lnntling force.The Spmish governor had not learned nbour thedeclaration of war and mistook the token mml

waii followed shortly.a Aclditional ad-vanced bases were established iu tl~e Pllil-. .Ipplnes themselves as soon m the situationpermitted.

This increasing consciousness of thehTavy’s widespread commitments ancl re-sponsibilities brought about tl~e evolu-tion:wy developments which culminate]in the early 1940’s in the amphibious as-sault cloctrines and tecbuiques “which fi-nally made possible what, Major Creuera],J. F. C. Fuller has czlled ‘the most, far--reaching tactical innovation of [World~~:lr II].? ‘? s

bombardment for a courtesy salnte and hurriedout to the Cy71arlcstot1to apologize for his inabil-ity t{) return it for lack of anmlunitim. Hel)roml)tly surrendered the island npon being ap-prised of the facts.

8 I~rior to the Sl)anish W;ar, the question of

the annexation of Hawaii had been under ne-gotiation off and on for many years betweenthat government and the I’nited States. In atreaty signed in 1875, Hawaii had been de-clared “an American sphere of influence. ”

‘Qnotedin [:. S.& Sc3a Potccr,587.

448777 O—58—2

CHAPTER 2

Evolution of Modern

Amphibious Warfare, 1920-1941

J!Y.4ZJ?LI”DE I’EL(ll’i7f A’lVI’Y

The success of the Gu:~lltal~amo Bayoperation auc{ tl~e very real possibilitythat tile l~niteci Stilt13S” l)ew position inworld affairs might lead to repetitions ofessentially tile same sitll~tion led nigh -level naval strategists to beconle inter-ested in establisl)ing a similar force on apermanent basis: a force capable of seiz-i?lg an(l defending :idvallced I)ases whichtile fleet could utilize in tile proseclltion ofnaval war in distal~t waters-waters con-ceivably mucl~ more distant tl~an the Ca-ribbean. This in tllrn led to tile settingup of a class ill tile fllll(lanlel]tals of ad-vanced base work at Newport> Rhoc]eklmd in 1901. I)uring the winter of1902-1903” a Marine batt:llioll engaged i~~advanced base (Iefence ~xercises ~11t]le is-land of (“ulebr:l in tile ~aribbe:l~l ill comjunction with the annual maneuversof the fleet. Expeditionary services in~uba :md Pamma ~)revent wl al] immedi -ate followup to this early base defenseinstruction, but in 1910 a pern]anent ad-vanced bnse school was organized at XTewI.ondon, Connecticut. ii ye:~r later it,was moved to Plliladelpllil.l

By 1913 sufficient progress had beenumde in xdvanced base instruction to per-

‘ .J. A. Isely and P. A. Crow], ‘Z’}/c [’. S’. .Va-vitles and Anlpltil)ious War (Prin(wton : Prince-ton I’niversity F)ress, 1!)51 ), 21–22, hereinaftercited as Marines nnd Amph ibicws li~ar.

8

nlit the formation of a perrmment ad-wmced base force. Made up of two regi-ments, one of coast artillery, mines,searchlights, ell.gilleers, conlmullicators,and other specialists for fixed defense,fin{l the other of infantry and field ar-tillery for mobile defense, the ndwmcedbase force totallecl about 1,750 officers andmen. In ,Tanuary of 1914 it was rein-forced by a small Mariue Corps aviation(detachment, and joiuecl the fleet for m:vneuvers at Culebra.z 13ut the analogy be-tween advanced base traiuillg and tile :lm-phibious assault techniques that emergedin Worlcl War II is easily overdrawn.Prior to World War I the primary inter-est was in defense of :1b:lse against ellenlyattack. There was no serious contem-plation of large-scxle landings againstheavily defended areas.

This all but exclusive concern for thedefense of bases was clearly borne outby the writing of Major Earl H. Ellis.El] is, one of the most brilliant youngMarine staff officers, was among thefarsighted military tl~inkers v-ho saw theprospect of war between the UnitedStates and .Japan prior to World Wzr 1.hound 1913, he directed attention to the

2Annuul Rrport of tltc .Vojo~ Cm?cral Com-

n[undnkjt of tltc Marine Corps, 1,91~ (lVashing-ton : ,GPO, 1914). Hereinafter all annual re-ports from the Office of the Commandant willbe cited as CMC AnRept ( year).

EVOLUTION’ OF MODERA- ANPHIBIOVS TVARFARE, 1W20–1941 9

problems of a future Pacific conflict. Tobring military force to bear againstJapan, Ellis pointed out, the L-nitedStates would have to project its fleetacross the Pacific. To support theseoperations so far from home would re-quire a system of outlying bases.Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines,which were the most important of these,we already possessed. Their defensewould be of utmost importance andwould constitute the primary missionof the Marine aclvanced base force.Ellis discussed ili considerable detailthe troops which would be required andthe tactics they should employ.

In addition to the bases already in thepossessiol~ of the United States, Ellisforesaw the need of acquiring others heldby ,Tapan. To the. Marine Corps wouldfall the job of assaulting the enemy-heldterritory. .iltllough he did not discussthe problems involved nor take up thetactics to be employed, Ellis fore-shadowed the amphibious assault whichwas to be tile primary mission of theMarine Corps in World War 11.3

The infant Advance Base Force was cli-verted to other missions almost as soon mit was created. Hardly were the Culebmmaneuvers of 1914 completed when theMarines were sent to Mexico for the seizureof lTera Cruz. The next year they went

ashore in Haiti, and in 1916 unsettled con-ditions in Santo Domingo required the

3Earl H. Ellis, “Naval Bases” (MS, n. d.).The date and origin of this MS and to whomit was addressed are obscure, but it appearsthat the work is either a lecture or a series oflectures with the following divisions: “l.Naval Bases ; Their Location, Resources andSecurity; 2. The Denial of Bases; 3. The Securityof Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Opera-tions; 4. The Advanced Base Force.”

landing of Marines in that country. Ex-peditionary service in these two Caribbeanrepublics WM to constitute a heavy andcontinuing drain on Marine Corps re-sources which might otherwise have beendevoted to advanced base activities.

The expansion of the Marine Corps toabout 73,OOO officers and men duringWorld War I served as a temporary stimu-lant to the Advance Base Force. In spiteof the demands for manpower resultingfrom the sending of an expeditionary forceto France, the Advance Base Force wasmaintained at full strength throughoutthe war. By the Armistice it numbered6,297 officers and men.’

Marines returning from overseas late in1919 picked up where they left off threeyears before. At Quantico the AdvanceBase Force, redesignated the Expedition-ary Force in 1921, stood ready to occupyand defend an advanced base or to restorelaw and order in a Caribbean republic.In that year it included infantry, fieldartillery, sigrml, engineer, and chemicaltroops, and aircraft. .4 similar expedi-tionary force was planned for San Diego,but perennial personnel shortages pre-vented the stationing of more than oneinfantry regiment and one aircraft squad-l’on t l~we durily the 1920’s.:

Nothing seemed clmnged, but delegatesof tl~e Cxreat Powers, meeting at Versaillesto write the peace treaty ending WorldWar I, had already t:aken an action whichwas to lmve far-reaching consequences for

‘ I.tCol C. H. Metcalf, A Ht.storv of M c United

States Marine Corps (New York: Putnam’s.1939) , 45+460, 472.

‘ CMC AnRepts, 1921–29.


a future generation of Marines. In thegeneral distribution of spoils, the formerGerman island possessions in the centralPacific had been mandated to the Japa-nese. At one stroke the strategic balancein the Pacific was shifted radically infavor of Japan. That country now pos-sessed a deep zone of island outposts.Fortified and supported by the Japanesefleet, they would constitute a serious ob-stacle to the advance of the United StatesFleet across the Pacific.

Earl Ellis was one of the first to recog-nize the significance of this strategic shift.In 1921 he modified his earlier ideas andsubmitted them in the form of OperationsPlan 712, “.kdvanced Base Operations inMicronesia.” In this plan Ellis stressedthe necessity for seizing by assault thebases needed to project the Fleet acrossthe Pacific. He envisioned the seizure ofspecific islands in the Marshall, Caroline,and Palau groups, some of which wereactually taken by Marines in World l~rarII. He went so far as to designate thesize and type of units that would be nec-essary, the kind of landing craft theyshould use, the best time of day to effectthe landing, and other details needed toinsure the success of the plan. Twentyyears later Marine Corps action was tobear the imprint of this thinking:

To effect [an amphibious landing] in the faceof enemy resistance requires careful trainingand preparation, to say the least; and this alongMarine lines. It is not enough that the troops beskilled infantry men or artillery men of highmorale; they must be skilled water men andjwlgle men who know it can be done—Marineswith Marine trainin~.”

The Commandant, Major General JohnA. Ifijeune, and other high ranking

‘ OPlan 712, AdvBOps in Micronesia, 1921.

Marines shared Ellis’ views. “The seizureand occupation or destruction of enemybases is another important function of theexpeditionary force>” he stated in a lecturebefore the Naval War College in 1923.“On both flanks of a fleet crossing thePacific are numerous islands suitable forsubmarine and air bases. .411 should bemopped up as progress is made. . . . Themaintenance, equipping and training ofits expeditionary force so that it will bein instant readiness to support the Fleetin the event of war,’> he concluded, “Ideem to be the most important MarineCorps duty in time of peace.” 7

The 1920s, however, were not the mostfavorable years for training in an~phibi-ous operations. .kppropriations for thearmed services were slim, and the Navy,whose cooperation and support was neces-sary to carry out landing exercises, wasmore intent on preparing for fleet surfaceactions of the traditional type. Still, alimited amount of amphibious trainingwas carried out in the first half of thedecade.

During the winter of 1922, a reinforcedregiment of Marines participated in fleetmaneuvers with the Atlantic Fleet. Theirproblems included the attack and defenseof Guantanamo Bay, Cubaj and the islandof Culebra. In March of the followingyear, a detachment of Marines took partin a landing exercise at Panama, and abattalion of Marines and sailors practiceda landing on Cape Cod that summer.

Panama and (hlebra both witnessedlanding exercises early in 19!24, with aMarine regiment participating. This setof exercises was the high point of train-

‘ Maj(;en J. A, Lejeune, “The United StatesMarine Corps,” MC Gawttc, December 1923,252–253.

EVOLIJTION OF MODERN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 192&l!Ml 11

ing reached in the twenties. It markedthe advent of serious experimentationwith adequate landing craft for troopsand equipment. However, it was mostnotable for the great number of mistakesmade in the course of the exercises, suchas inadequate attacking forces, insufficientand unsuitable boats, lack of order amongthe landing party, superficial naval bom-bardment, and poor judgment in the stow-age of supplies and equipment aboard thesingle transport used.8

The last landing exercise of the era wasa joint Army-Navy affair held during thespring of 1925 in Hawaiian waters. Itwas actually an amphibious commandpost exercise, undertaken at the insistenceof General Lejeune to prove to skepticalArmy officers that the Marine Corps couldplan and execute an amphibious operationof greater than brigade size. A force of42,000 Marines was simulated, althoughonly 1,500 actually participated. It ranmore smoothly than had the previousexercise, but still was handicapped by alack of adequate landing craft}

Even this meager amphibious trainingcame to an end after 1925. New commit-ments in Nicaragua, in China, and in the

United States guarding the mails servedto disperse the expeditionary forces. By1928 the Commandant announced in hisannual report that barely enough person-nel were on hand at Quantico and SanDiego to keep those bases in operatitm?”

‘ kfarinea and Amphibious War, 30-32.‘ 13riGen Dion Williams, “Blue Marine Corps

Expeditionary Force,” MC Gazette, September1926, 76-+%; LtGen M. B. Twining ltr to ACofS,G–3, HQMC, 25Jan57; BPlfm JA&Nav IMercise,1925, Problem No 3, Blue MarCor ExpedFor,8Jan25,

‘0 (7MC AnRept, 1928.

Whatever the shortcomings of the workin amphibious doctrine and technique dur-ing the 1920’s, the Marine Corps scoreda major triumph when its special interestin the field became part of the officialmilitary policy of the United States.~okt Action of the Army and Navy, adirective issued by the Joint Board of theArmy and Navy in 1927, stated that theMarine Corps would provide and main-tain forces “for land operations in supportof the fleet for the initial seizure anddefense of advanced bases and for suchlimited auxiliary land operations as areessential to the prosecution of the navalcampaign.”

Further, in outlining the tasks to beperformed by the Army and Navy in“Landing Attacks Against Shore Objec-tives,” this document firmly establishedthe landing force role of the MarineCorps: “Marines organized as landingforces perform the same functions asabove stated for the .4rmy, and becauseof the constant association with navalunits will be given special training in theconduct of landing operations.” II

ACTIVATION OF THEFLEET MARINE FORCE

The recognition of a mission did notcreate the doctrine nor the trained forcesto carry it out, and, in 1927, neither was athand. In January 1933 the last Marinehad departed from Nicaragua, and with-drawal from Haiti was contemplated.Troops were now becoming available fortraining in landing operations, but beforeany real progress could be made, one pre-liminary step was essential. A substan-tial permanent force of Marines with its

“ The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Armyand Navg (Washington: GPO, 1927), 3, 12.

EVOLUTION OF MODERN AMI’HIB1OCS WARFARE, 192@1941 13

own commander and staff would have tobe organized for the purpose, otherwisetraining would be constantly interruptedby the dispersal of the troops to othercommitments.

No one recognized this more clearlythan the Assistant Commandant, 13riga-dier General ,John H. Russell. He as-sembled a statl at Quantico to plan theorganization of a force which could berapidly assembled for service with theFleet. In August of 1933 he proposed tothe Commandant that the old “Expedi-tionary Force” be replaced by a newbody, to be called either “Fleet MarineForce,” or “Fleet Base Defense Force.”The new force, while an integral part ofthe LTnited States Fleet, would be underthe operational control of the Fleet Com-mander when embarked on vessels of theFleet or eng~ged in fleet exercises afloator ashore. When not so embarked or en-gaged it would remain under the MajorGeneral Commandant.

R uss e 11’s recommendations werepromptly approved by the Commandantand by the Chief of h’aval Operations.The designation “Fleet Marine Force”(FMF) was preferred by the senior navalstaffs, and the Commandant was requestedto submit proposed instructions for es-tablishing “appropriate command andadministrative relations between the com-mander in Chief and the Commander ofthe Fleet Marine Force.’; 12 The decisionbecame otlicial with the issuance of NavyDepartment General Order 241, dated 8December 1933.

This c{irective could well be called theMagna Carta of the Fleet Marine Force.It stated:

12 cNo Itr to CNIC, lz&3p33 ; Marine.s and

Amphibious War, 33–34.

1. The force of marines maintained by themajor general commandant in a state of readi-ness for operations with the fleet is herebydesignated as fleet marine force ( 1?. M. F.), andas such shall constitute a part of the organiza-

tion of the United States Fleet and be includedin the operating force plan for each fiscal year.

2. The fleet marine force shall consist of suchunits as may be designated by the major general

commandant and shall be maintained at suchstrength as is warranted by the general person-nel situation of the Marine Corps.

3. The fleet marine force shall be availableto the commander in chief for operations withthe fleet or for exercises either afloat or ashorein cuunec Liun with fleet problems. The com-mander in chief shall make timely recommenda-tions to the Chief of Naval Operations regardingsuch service in order that the necessary arrange-ments may be made.

4. The commander in chief shall exercisecommand of the fleet marine force when em-barked on board vessels of the fleet or when en-gaged in fleet exercises, either afloat or ashore.When otherwise engaged, command shall bedirected by the major general commandant.

5. The major general commandant shall de-

tail the commanding general of the fleet marineforce and maintain an appropriate staff forhim.

6. The commanding general, fleet marineforce, shall report by letter to the commanderin chief, United States Fleet, for duty in con-nection with the employment of the fleet marineforce. At least once each year, and at suchtimes as may be considered desirable by the com-mander in chief, the commanding general, fleetmarine force, with appropriate members of hisstaff, shall be ordered to report to the com-mander in chief for conference.~3

However significant the creation of theFMF may have been in terms of the fu-ture, its initial form was modest enough.The Commandant, was obliged to reportin .kugust 1934 that the responsibility formaintaining ship’s detachments and gar-risons abroad, and performing essential

u Sa~y Dept GO 241, 8Dec33.


guard duty at naval shore stations, pre-vented the Marine Corps from assigningthe component units necessary to fulfillthe mission of the FMF. At this time thetotal number of officers and men in theFMF was about 3,000.’4

“THE BOOK” COMES OUT

With the creation of the FMF the Ma-rine Corps had finally acquired the tacti-cal structure necessary to carry out theprimary war mission assigned to it by theJoint Board in 1927. The next order ofbusiness was to train the FMF for theexecution of its mission.

But the training could not be very effec-tive without a textbook embodying thetheory and practice of landing operations.No such manual existed in 1933. Therewas a general doctrine by the Joint Boardissued in 1933, and, though it offeredmany sound definitions and suggestedgeneral solutions to problems, it lackednecessary detail.

In November 1933, all classes at the Ma-rine Corps Schools were suspended, and,under the guidance of Colonel Ellis B.Miller, Assistant Commandant of theSchools, both the faculty and studentsset to work to write a manual setting forthin detail the doctrines and techniques tobe followed in both training and actualoperations. IJncler the title, TentativeManual for Landing Opevotiomsy itwasissued in ,January 1934.

On 1.4ugust 1934, the title was changedto Manua7 for Naval Ouerseas Operatiom

and some clmnges were effected in thetext. A few months later this publica-tion, now retitled Tentatike Landing Op-erations M amuzly WM approved by the

Chief of Naval Operations for “tempo-rary use . . . as a guide for forces ofthe Navy and the Marine Corps conduct-ing a landing against opposition.” 15 Inmimeographed form it was given rela-tively limited distribution within theNavy, but wide distribution within theMarine Corps. Comments were invited.

The doctrine laid down in this remark-able document was destined to become thefoundation of all amphibious thinking inthe United States armed forces. TheNavy accepted it as official doctrine in1938 under the title of Fleet TrainingPublication 167, and in 1941 the War De-partment put the Navy text betweenArmy covers and issued it as Field JIan-ual 314.

Remarkable as it was, the Marine am-phibious doctrine was largely theory -whenit was first promulgated at Quantico in1934. To put the theory into practice,major landing exercises were resumed.They were held each winter from 1935through 1941 on the islands of Culebraand Vieques in conjunction with fleet ex-ercises in the Caribbean, or on San Clem-ente off the California coast. .4 final ex-ercise of the prewar period on a muchlarger scale than any previously at-tempted was held at the newly acquiredMarine Corps base at New River, NorthCarolina, in the summer of 1941. Thesefleet landing exercises provided the prac-tical experience by which details of land-ing operations were hammered out.

In light of its importance, here might beas good a place as any to consider brieflythe more basic aspects of this doctrine asconceived in the original manual and mod-

K NavDept, Tcntf7tiue Lf7ndin~ Operations

Manual, 1935, hereinafter cited as !Z’entattveLandinf7 Operations Monunl.‘4 CM(7 AnRept, 1934.

EVOLUTIOX OF MODERN AMPHH310US WARFARE, 192&1941 15

ified by experience in fleet exercises up tothe outbreak of the war. Amphibious op-erations and ordinary ground warfareshare many of the same tactical principles.The basic difference between them lies inthe fact that the amphibious assault islaunched from the sea, and is supported bynaval elements. While water-borne thelanding force is completely powerless andis dependent upon the naval elements forall its support: gunfire, aviation, transpor-tation, and communication. In this ini-tial stage only tie naval elements have thecapability of reacting to enemy action. Asthe landing force, however, is projectedonto the beach, its effectii-eness, startingfrom zero at the water’s edge, increasesrapidly until its strength is fully estab-lished ashore.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

This basic difference between land andamphibious operations created a problemin command relationships which hasplagued amphibious operations from earli-est times. During the initial stage whenonly naval elements have the capabilityof reacting to enemy action it has beengenerally and logically agreed that theover-all command must be vested in thecommander of the naval attack force. Ithas, however, not been so generally agreedin the past that once the landing forceis established ashore and capable of exert-ing its combat power with primary relianceon its own weapons and tactics that thelanding force commander should be freedto conduct the operations ashore as he seesfit.

The authors of the Tentative LandingOperations Manualj writing in 1934, evi-

dently did not foresee that this particularaspect of command relations presented

a problem that required resolution.16 Theysimply defined the “attack force” as all theforces necessary to conduct a landing op-eration and added that the attack forcecommander was to be the senior naval of-ficer of the fleet units making up the at-tack force. His command was to consistof the landing force and several naval com-ponents, organized as task groups for thesupport of the landing. These included,among others, the fire support, transport,air, screening, antisubmarine, and recon-naissance groups. The commanders of thelanding force and of the several navaltask groups operated on the same levelunder the over-all command of the attackforce commander throtlghotlt the opera-tion.

This initial command concept was des-tined to undergo a number of modificationsand interpretations which will be discussedin this history as they occur. The first im-portant change did not come about untiltoward the close of the Guadalcanal cam-paign?’

NAVAL G UNFIR.E 8UPPORT

There is nothing new in the concept ofusing the fire of ships’ guns to cover anamphibious landing of troops during itsmost vulnerable phase: before, during, andafter the ship-to-shore movement. Our

‘e Unless otherwise noted the material in theremainder of this chapter is derived from !Fen-tative Landing Operations llanua~; FTP–167,Landing Operations Doctrine, L7. S. A’avv (Wash-ington: Office of the CNO, 1938) and changes 1& 2 thereto : 1st MarBrig ltr to CMC, 5Jun39 andencl ( a ) thereto ; 1st MarBrig Flex 6 Rept,“Notes from Critique for Makee Learn Problemat Culebra, 1415 Feb40 ;“ 2d MarBrig MinorLanding Exercises Rept, San Clemente Island,Calif, 17Apr–6May39.

‘7 See Part VI of this history.

16 PEARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAL

own history contains many examples ofthis technique, notably: two landings ofLT. S. troops in Canada during the War of1812 (York and Niagara Peninsula, sum-mer 1813 ) ; General Scott’s landing atVera Cruz in 1847 during the MexicanWar; several amphibious operations dur-ing the Civil War, e. g., Fort Fisher in1865; and Guantanamo Bay during theSpanish-American War in 1898.

However, the evolution of modernweapons posed difficult problems of atechnical nature, and the much belaboredGallipoli operation seemed to indicatethat these were insoluble. High-powered naval guns, with their flat tra-jectory and specialized armor-piercingammunition, proved no true substitute forland-based field artillery, and much studyand practice would be required to developtechniques which would make them evenan acceptable substitute.

Nevertheless, a rudimentary doctrineconcerning naval gunfire support evolvedduring the years between 1935 and 1941.But it evolved slowly and none tooclearly. Experimentation indicated thatbombardment ammunition, with its sur-face burst, was better suited to fire mis-sions against most land targets, whilearmor-piercing shells could be employedto good effect against concrete en)place-ments and masonry walls. The types ofships and guns best adapted to pertormspecific tire nlissions-c]ose support, deepsupport, counterblttery, interdiction,etc.—were detennil~ed. .Incl some prog-ress was made ill fire observation tecl~-nique.

Three types of observel’s ~vele l)rovidedfor: aerial, shipboard and, once the firstwaves bad lal~ded, s]lore tire coutrol par-ties. For the greater part of this periodthe latter were nmcle up of personnel of

the tiring ships , inexperienced in suchwork, untrained, and wholly unfamiliarwith the tactical maneuvers of the troopsthey were supporting. Not until 1941were trained Marine artillery officers withMarine radio crews substituted, the navalofficers then serving in a liaison capacity.

(lther considerations of a naval natureserved as further limiting factors on theNGF support concept. The necessity forthe support ships to have a large propor-tion of armor-piercing projectiles readilyxvailable with which to fight a surfaceaction on short notice restricted the ac-cessibility of and limited the amount ofbombardment shells carried. In turn, theprobability of enemy air and submarineaction once the target area became knowncaused much apprehension in naval mindsand dictated the earliest possible depar-ture of the firing ships from the objec-tive. An example of this apprehensionat work came to the fore early in theGuadalcanal campaign.’s

Furthermore, tradition dies hard inany service. The traditional belief thatwarships exist for the sole purpose offighting other warships dates far back inhistory, with one of its leading exponentsthe great Lord Nelson with his oft-quotedflictum: “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”This supposed vulnerability of surfacevessels to shore-based artillery remainedvery much alive in the minds of naval

planners. So they dictated that supportships should deliver their fires at maxi-nlum range, while traveling at high speedand maneuvering radically—not exactlyconducive to pill-point markmanship.ls

In sum, these considerations,” the starting con-cept of naval gunfire support with which we

‘mSee Part VI, Chap 2, of this history.“ ,Warines and Amphibious War, 38.

EVOLUTIOX OF MODERN- AMPHIBIO[l S WARFARE, I!ZW1941 17

entered World Mrar II, added UP to this : a bom-bardment of very short duration, delivered byships firing relatively limited ammunition al-lowances of types often not well suited to thepurpose, from long ranges while maneuveringat high speeds. Obviously, the best that couldbe expected would be area neutralization ofenemy defenses during troo~ debarkation andthe ship-to-shore movement, followed by a lim-ited amount of support on a call basis, with this,too, to be withdrawn as soon as field artillerycould be landed.’”

ilrea neutralization-that was the basic

concept, with deliberate destruction fire

ruled out. A blood bath would be re-

quired to explulge this from “The nook.’”

.4Z~ SUPPORT

As the Marine Corps developed the var-ious techniques contributing to a smoothlanding operation, it had to give moreand more consideration to the fastgrowth of military aviation as a powerful,arm.

Even the original Tentative LandingOperations Manual considered the vulner-able concentrations of troops in trans-ports, landing boats, and on the beachand called for a three-to-one numericalsuperiority over the enemy in the air.I,ater, in FTP-167, the ratio was increasedto four-to-one, primarily to wipe theenemy air threat out of the skies andsecondarily to shatter the enemy’s beach-head defense and to cut off his reinforce-nlents.

Considerable emphasis was placed, how-ever, on direct, assistance to the troopsthemselves. This included such support-ing services as guiding the landing boatsto the beach, laying smoke screens, andproviding reconnaissance and sl)otting for

‘“ NNI–67,~’at.ffl~t~oflrc in .~t)fph ibious Op<tw

tions ( Quantico : MCIX’, }1(’S, 1055), 2.

naval gunfire and artillery. Most impor-tantly, it included rendering direct firesupport to the landing force until theartillery was ashore and ready to fire.

For this air war, employment of Ma-rine squadrons on carriers was consideredideal but, due to a limited number of car-riers, was not always a. practical possibil-ity. Planners even considered movingMarine planes ashore in crates and as-sembling them, after the ground troopshad seized an airfield.

Hence, the Tentative Landing Opera-tions Manua7 called for the Navy to carrymost of the initial air battle. Marinepilots, however , might be employed withNavy air units. Actually, in order to exer-cise Marine air, most of the early traininglandings had to be scheduled withinround trip flying distance of friendly air-fields, Although by 1940 Marine carriertraining operations were becoming rou-tine, the heavy reliance upon Navy car-rier air over Marine landings lastedthroughout the war.

As noted before, close coordination ofair with ground received great emphasisin the Marine Corps. Even in SantoDomingo and Haiti and later in Nicara-gua, Marine pilots reconnoitered, strafed,and bombed insurgent, positions, droppedsupplies to patrols, and evacuatedwounded. Th,e Tentative Landing Oper-ations Manual incorporated this team-work into its new amphibious doctrine,and the landing exercises of the late 30’sdeveloped aviation fire power as an im-portant close ground support. weapon. By1939, Colonel Roy S. Geiger advocated andother Marine Corps leaders conceded thatone of the greatest potentials of Marineaviation lay in this “close air support..’)

The challenge became that of applyingthe fire power of Marine air, when needed,

18 PEARL HARBOR TO GU.4DALCANAL

to destroy a specific enemy front line posi-tion without endangering nearby friendlytroops.

Refinement of this skilled technique aswe know it today was slow because ofmany factors. There was so much forpilots to learn about rapidly developingmilitary aviation that close air supporthad to take its place in the busy trainingsyllabus after such basic drill as aerialtactics, air to air gunnery, strafing, bomb-ing, navigation, carrier landings, andcommunications, and constant study of thelatest in engineering, aerodynamics, andflight safety.

Also, whenever newer, faster, andhigher flying airplanes trickled into theMarine Corps in the lean thirties, theywere found to be less adaptable for closecoordination with ground troops than theslower, open cockpit planes which sup-ported the patrol actions of Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua the aviator in his opencockpit could idle his throttle so as tolocate an enemy machine gun by its sound,but in the maneuvers of 1940 pilots flash-ing by in their enclosed cockpits found itdifficult to see what was going on belowor even to differentiate between friendlyand “enemy” hills.” In Nicaragua, theMarine flier was most often an ex-infan-tryman, but 10 years later many of thenew Navy-trained Marine aviators werefresh from college and knew little aboutground tactics. The lack of a real enemyto look for, identify, and to shoot at hin-dered attempts at precision, especiallysince air-ground radio was not, yet as re-

“ From ~’alebra came the report, ‘.lst MA(;as a whole performed in a creditable manner, al-though at one stage they were impartial in theirattacks.” 1st MarBrig Flex 6 Rept, “Notes fromCritique for Makee Learn Problem at Culebra,14–15Feb40.”

liable as the old slow but sure systemwhere pilots read code messages fromcloth panels laid on the ground orswooped down with weighted lines tosnatch messages suspended between twopoles.

The main key to development of closeair support lay in reliable communicationsto permit quick liaison and complete un-derstanding between the pilot and thefront line commander. Part of the solu-tion lay in more exercises in air-groundcoordination with emphasis on standard-ized and simplied air-ground communica-tions and maps. By 1939 an aviator as anair liaison officer was assigned to the 1stMarine Brigade Staff. While both artil-lery and naval gunfire, however, employedforward observers at front line positions,air support control was still being chan-neled slowly through regimental and bri-gade command pos&.Z2 In the same yearone squadron sent up an air liaison oiiice.rin the rear seat of a scouting or bombingplane to keep abreast of the ground situa-tion and to direct fighter or dive bomberpilots onto targets by means of radio.=This was better but not best.

Meanwhile, war flamed up in Europe.Navy and Marine planners took note asthe Germans drove around the Maginotline with their special air-ground “ar-mored packets)’ in which aviation teamedup with the fast, mobile ground elementsto break up resistance.” By this time theMarines were working on the idea of plac-

= LtGen Julian C. Smith interview by HistBr,(&3, HQMC, 25Ju156.

28Col R. D. Moser interview by HistBr, G–3,HQMC, 31Aug56.

“ WD G–2 Memo for C/S, 23 Sep41, I. B. 130,Air-GrdOps, Tab C ; CinCLant Flex 6 Rept,13.Jun40, 14–15.

,,

EVOLUTION OF MODERN .4JIPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 192&1941 19

ing radio-equipped “observers’> on thefront lines to control air support for thetroops. But the Leathernecks were al-ready in the war before the first standard-ized Navy-Marine Corps instructions ontheir employment appeared.25 Also atthat time, on Guadalcanal certain infan-try officers were given additional duty asregimental ‘{air forward observers.”They were coached on the spot by aviatorsof the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.2e

THE SHIP-TO-SHOREMO VEiWEZVT

The ship-to-shore movement was vis-ualized by the Tentative Landing Opera-tions Manual in a manner which resem-bled closely a conventional attack in landwarfare: artillery preparation, approachmarch, deployment, and assault by the in-f antry. It stressed that this movementwas no simple ferrying operation but avital and integral part of the attack itselfand demanded a high order of tacticalknowledge and skill.

The two major problems in the ship-to-shore movement are the speedy debarka-tion of the assaulting troops and theirequipment into the landing boats and thecontrol and guiding of these craft to theirassigned beaches. To facilitate the first,the Tentative Landing Operatiom iKan-ual directed that each transport on whichcombat units were embarked should carryas a minimum sufficient boats to land areinforced infantry battalion,” Thus

‘s USN, CSP-1536, 5Sep42.w 1st MarDiv, Final Report on Guadaleanal

Operation, 1Ju143, Phase V, Annex D, OPlan 2-42,5. The directive on appointing air forward ob-servers was dated 20d.42.

z?This general concept that tI’OOPS and their

landing craft should be transported togetherto the objective area remained valid through-

each transport and its accompanyingtroops would be tactically self-sufficientfor the assault landing, and the loss of oneship would not be a crippling blow. Toexpedite their debarkation the Marinesgenerally went over the side via cargo netsrigged at several stations on the ship.

To solve the second major problem inthe ship-to-shore movement, that of con-trolling and guiding the landing craft totheir proper beaches, the Tentative Land-ing Operations Manual provided for: (1)marking the line of departure with buoysor picket boats; (2) a designated controlvessel to lead each boat group from therendezvous area to the line of departure,towing the boats in fog, smoke, or dark-ness, if necessary; (3) wave and alternatewave guide boats; (4) each boat to carrya signboard with its assigned letter andnumber indicating its proper position inthe formation; and (5) for a guide planeto lead the boat waves in.

The system for the control of the ship-to-shore movement was still substan-tially the same as prescribed in the Ten-tative Landing Operatiom Manual whenthe Marines made their first amphibiouslanding of World War II at Guadalcanalon 7 August 1942.

COMBAT UNIT LOADIiVG

“Combat unit loading” of transports isthe key to amphibious logistics as devel-oped by the Marine Corps. This is a prac-tical process designed to make supplieswnd equipment immediately available tothe ussault troops in the order needed, dis-regarding to a large extent the waste ofcargo space which results. In contrastis commercial loading which is equally

out. the war, although at times it was necessaryto deviate from it.


practical in utilizing every cubic foot ofcargo space available but prevents accessto much of the cargo until the ship isunloaded.

Highest priority items for combat unitloacling vary somewhat with the natureand problems of a particular operation.Relative priorities must be worked outwith minute care. The responsibility forhandlingt his was given to a Marine offi-cer designated transport quartermaster(TQM) aboard each amphibious assaultship. He had to know not oilly the weightand dimensions of each item of Marinegear carried but had to familiarize himselfwith the characteristics of the particularship to which he w7asassiagned: exact loca-tion and dimensions of all holds and stor-age spaces in terms of both cubic feet anddeck space, This familiarity required attimes accurate remeasurement of holdsand loading spaces as modifications, notshown in the ship-s plans, had often beenmade in the ship’s internal structure. Ini-tially, the Ten!atiw Lmdin.g (lperation.~Mwnuai directed that, the TQM shoulcl bean officer of the unit embarked, but suchwere the variations in ships that it subse-quently proved more feasible to assign zMarine officer, thoroughly familinr witliMarine gear, permanently to a particulitrship with which he would become equallyfamiliar through experience.

Practical experience with combat load-

ing between 19S5 and 1941 generally con-firmed the soundness of the doctrines setforth in the Tentative Landing Opera-tions iVanud. Application of these doc-trines in tile fleet landing exercises waslimited, however, by se~-eral factors,chiefly the lack of suitable transports.In addition, an uncertainty at times as to

ports of embarkation and dates of avail-

ability of ships sometimes entangled plan-ning procedures. .4s a result, there wasno ideal approximation of wartime com-bat loading.

SHORi? PARTY

One of the most serious problems en-countered in early landing exercises wascongestion on the beaches as men and sup-plies piled ashore. To keep such a situa-tion reasonably in hand requires a highdegree of control; control difficult toachieve under such circumstances, evenwhen the enemy remains only simulated..kssault troops must push inland with allspeed not only to expand the beachhead,but also to make room for following unitsand equipment to land and to providespace in which personnel assigned strictlybeach functions can operate.

To solve this problem the Tentai%ve

Latiing Operations Manual provided fora beach party , commanded by a navalofficer called a beachmaster~ and a shoreparty, a special task organization, com-manded by an officer of the landing force.The beach party was assigned primarilynaval functions, e. g., reconnaissance andmarking of beaches, marking of hazardsto navigation, control of boats, evacuationof casualties, and, in addition, the unload-ing of material of the landing force fromthe boats. The shore party was assignedsuch functions as control of stragglersand prisoners, selecting and marking ofroutes inland, movement of supplies andequipment off the beaches, and assignmentof storage and bivouac areas in the vicin-ity of the beach. The composition andstrength of the shore party were not setforth except for a statement that it wouldcontain detachments from some or all ofthe following landing force units: medi-cal, sLipply, working details, engineers,

E~Tc)LCTION1 OF }fODERN’ A~fPHIBIOCS WARFARE, 192&1941 21

military police, communications, and

chemical. The beach party and the. shoreparty were independent of each other, butthe Tentative Landing Opera tion-s Jfan-ual enjoined that the fullest cooperationbe observed bet~veen the beachmaster andthe shore party commander, and the per-sonnel of their respective parties.

It was not indicated from what source“working details” for the shore partywould come, but in practice, since therewas no other source, the policy of as-signing units in reserve the responsibilityfor furnishing the labor details quicklydeveloped. This in effect, however, tem-porarily deprived the commander of hisreserve.

NTOrealistic test of the shore ancl beachparty doctrine took place during the earlyfleet landing exercises. Although somematerial w-as landed on the beach, it gen-erally consisted of rations and small quan-tities of ammunition and gasoline. Notuntil 1941 were adequate supplies avail-able and the maneuvers on a large enoughscale to provide a test of logistic proce-dures. The results were not encouraging.“In January of 1941 . . . the shore partyfor a brigade size landing . . . consistedof one elderly major and two small pilesof ammunition boxes,” wrote a Marine of-ficer who “suffered” through those years.~~Theship-to-shore movement. of fUel WUS

a nightmare. We had no force leveltransportation, [no] engineers and no sup-porting maintenance capability worthy ofthe name. In short, the combination oftlm parsimonious years aild our ownapathy had left LIS next to helpless where

logistics were concerned.” 29

2’BriGen V. H. Krulak ltr to ACofS, G–3,HQMC, 5Mar5’i.

Major General H. M. Smith, the land-ing force commander at the New Riverexercise in the summer of 1941, reportedthat “considerable delay in the debarka-tion of troops and supplies was caused bylack of personnel in the Shore and BeachParties . . . . Roughly, the supplies ex-cept for subsistence it was possible toland . . . were insufficient to sustain theforces engaged for more than threedays.” 30

General Smith, who had a. deep respectfor logistics, was determined to correctthese deficiencies. “It is evident,” he re-ported to Rear Admiral Ernest J. King,Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet,“that special service troops (labor) mustbe provided for these duties in order toprevent reduction of the fighting strengthof battalion combat teams . . . . Thepresent doctrine results in clividecl author-ity between shore party commanders.>>He recommended that “the beach andshore party commanders be consolidatedinto one unit, a Shore Party, under con-trol of the landing force.” 3’

Solution to the problem of divided au-thority came from a joint board of Army,Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guardofficers appointed by Admiral King. Itsrecommendations closely followed thoseof General Smith and were accepted intoto and published on 1 August 19452asChange 2 to PTP 167. The principalchanges were: (1) joining together of thebeach and shore parties under the. titleShore Party, as a component of the land-ing force; (2) designating the beach part ycommander as the assistant to the shoreparty commander and his acivisor on

wcG LantPhibFor PrelinlRept to CinCLant on

New River Exercise 4–~2Aug41, 27Aug41.“ Ibid.

22

naval matters; anti (3) transferring theresponsibility for unloading boats at, thebeach from the. naval element to the land-ing force element of the shore party.3z

Marine Corps Headquarters solved thelabor force problem by adding a pioneer(shore party) battalionof 340tlicwrsan(l669 enlisted men to t}le marine division.x’This change occurred on 10 January 1942,too late for the personnel concerned togain practical experience in large-scaleexercises in the techniques of handlingvast quantities of sllpplies or to test theadequacy of the strength and organizationprovided. .>t Guadalcanal this lack cameclose to having serious conseqllences.:’~

General Smith was not content merelyto submit his shore part-y recomn~enda-tionsto Adn~iral King. .\t his direction,the logistics staff of the Amphibious

3’Ibid.a Marine Corps T/O D–94, 10Jan42.8’ See Part VI of this history.

I’E.IRL HARBOR TO GCADALC.4NAL

Force Atlantic Fleet prepared a detailedStanding Operating Procedure (SOP)covering all phases of logistics. Issued asForce Genera] Order No. 7-42, SOP forSupply and Evacuation, it served as thebasic guide to combat loading and shoreparty operations during the Guadalcanaloperation.35

By 7 December 1941 the Marine Corpshad made long stricles towards amphib-ious preparedness. It had n doctrinewhich had been tested in maneuvers andfouncl to be basically sound. Many ofthe errors in implementation had been

recognized and corrected; still others wereawaiting remedial act,ion when war brokeout. But the simuh~ted conditions of the

nmneu\7er ground were now to be aban-doned. The Marines and their doctrinewere now to submit to the ultimate testof war.

‘5Krulak, OP.cit.; Twining, op. C~~.

CHAPTER 3

Development of Landing Craft

IA7TRODUCTION

The amphibious warfare doctrine la-boriously developed by Mmines betweenthe two World Wars could never havebeen successfully executed without specialequipment to trxnsport the assaultingtroops and their supplies from ship toshore and to land them on an enemy-defended beach.

No one was more aware of the needfor such equipment than the Marines.Shortly after the end of World War Ithey induced the Navy to undertake de-sign studies on two landing craft, one forpersonnel and one for materiel. TroopBarge A, as tile first of these types wascalled, was tried out at Culebra in thewinter of 1923–24. ii shallow draft,twin-engined, 50-foot craft with a ratedspeed of about 12 knots and a carryingcapacity of 110 fully equipped Marines,it had good beaching qualities and couldretract from the beach with aid of a sternanchor. Three years lmter the secondtype, a 45-foot artillery lighter, was builtand tested. Equipped with two parallelhinged ramps in the stern, it could bebeached successfully stern-to and 155mmguns and other pieces of heavy Marineequipment unloaded. It lacked a powerplant, however, and had to be towed byanother craft.1

‘ LtGen K. E, RoclwY ltr to ~CofS, G-3,21Jun57; 2dLt W. 11 Trundle rept on experi-ments with Beetle Roat to CG,llarcmtlxped~or,3~lar24; Senior llIember, BoatCorn ltr to Pres,

Another item of equipment tried out in1924 was the Christie “amphibian tank.”Afloat, this unusual machine was drivenby twin-screw propellers at a rated speedof seven knots. On short, as a tractor, itcould make 15 mph; or, where good roadswere available, the remountable trackscould be removed, and on w-heels it coulddo 35 mph. It functioned well enough onland and in the sheltered waters of rivers,But in the open sea, under conditions thatmust be realistically anticipated for an as-sault landing, it proved so unseaworthythat the Marine Corps directed its atten-tion to other types.

The construction of these types ofamphibious equipment constituted a be-ginning, however humble, towards thesolution of the problem of transportingtroops and equipment from ship to shore.But a shortage of funds made it impossibleto follow up these developments until1935, when appropriations became moreplentiful as a result of the naval expan-sion program begun in the first Roosevelt

administration.

LANDING BO.4T8

With the publication of the TentativeLanding Operations .Ifanual in 1934 andthe resumption of landing exercises thefollowing year, work on the landing craft

IIGEB, 21Ju13&both in War Plans Sec HQllCfiles, folder “Landin~ Boats and Earges, lWl-1939,” herehmfter cited as War I’7an.s Files,1924–$9.

4487’77 O—58—3 23

\Y:ls ll?sullwd. Three types of lm:~ts for

landing olwmtions were collten)l)l:~te(l by

Wrine pl:tlll]ers of tile nli(l-tllirties.These il~clu(led fast, small, su~f boiits tolift tbe leadil]g Nwves; st:~n(l:trcl h’:~vybo:~ts :~nd life bo:lts of nlercl~allt resselsfor the bulli of troops: :Lild b:llges Nn(l]igllters for ]le:~vy l)l:lteri:~].’

Steps to solve tl~e first pl’oblem, p]wvision of speei:ll trool) lan(lil]g l)oiltS, l~ereinitiated in 19;).5. T]le 3Ltrine and XT:LVj-officers who txckle(l tl]e problenl that ye:lrhnd to st:lrt pretty H1llcI1from scmtcll, forTroop 13:uyge~i, :Ll)rolllisillge:lrly developmellt, fell victinl to tl\e size :md \l-eigllt re-strictions il]ll)ose(l by nar:l] sbil)s ill thoseclays. N:tvy thinking nnd planning fol’the develo])lllent of ampllibiolls eq~lipl]lentwas restricted by the types of slli])s tl)ellserving the fleet. Troop tr:\nslxjrts werepractically nol~existent, so it \\-:~spl:umedns ml emergency me:umre to lift M:lrinelanding forces in l)t~ttlesllil)s:tll(lcrllisers.A length of 30 feet, tbe size of chvits onthese ships, :lncl a weight of five tons whichwas the maximun~ ulp:lcity of tile clnl”itsjwere therefore inlposed ns basic require-ments for all new hnding croft.

In an effort to explore tbe suitability ofexisting comnlerci:ll cr:lft for l:lllclillg op-emtions, tbe AT:l~Ty,nt tile reqllest of tileMarine (Torps, ngreed to test ns wi(le nwriety of snl:~ll cw~ft flwm tile yrds ofpriv~lte builclem M tile limited funds n\7lil-able would permit. Bicls werp :L(lveltiseci,and nine replies were receive({, four ofwhich met with tile :Ipl)roval of tile M:t -rine Corps Equil)nlellt IIwrd :ln(l werencceptecL3

‘CMC to (Mief 13uC&R, 24 XOV36, Xl emlorse-ment to (l)]llin~h ltr t{) (’X(). lK)ct36, Ii’ar Z’latt.<J’ilcs, 1.924-39.

‘Ibid.

Tests of these a})l)rovecl types were co])-(ll~cte(l :\t (’:llw 31:\y, Se\v ,Jersey, in tileSllmnlel’of 1!):16. 13ut tile experilllents fellshort of tile oligillal intelltionl “to test :1swicle:1 w~riety of forms M wns pr:lcticable,’?bec:llw .illdre}v Ili~gills, :~ Sew orle:lllsbo:~t bllilder Tyitll :i plonlisil~g clesign, cle-clilled to sllblllit :1 bid. In 1926 IIigginsIL:tddesigl)eda sl)e(’i:ll sll:lllo\vclr:lft er:tft(’:llled the L’//wlY/for tile use of trappers:tlld oil {lril]ers :tlong tbe lolver Mississippi:lncl Gulf Const. It lmd :1 tunnel stern to

[)rotect the l)ropeller :tnd a q)ecial tyl)e

of l)OIV> cn]lecl by Higgil~s a ‘%poonbi]l,”wllicb eililble(l it to run well up on lowb:tnlm :~nd be:lclles nn(l retrxct easily. In1934 tlke illlelltorh:td visitecl (~u:~nticotointerest ll[:tril~es in his boat, and tbe N:tvyJ\-:tsnow- p:lrticlll:lrly anxious to test itwith other comp:tmble types of small(’1’;lft.~

The four bo:~ts \vllicb sllow-e(l up at Capelhy for the test \Yereof two general types.Tl~e sw ski if, x k)o:~temployed by At]:tnt iecoast fisbernlell, NW rel)resentecl by tl~e13xy Heacl, Red Bank, ancl Freeport boats.This type :~ppe:tred in theory to ofler a so-Iutio]l to tlie landin~ crxft problem, as it\Y:ls nornu~l]y l~~unclled :md landedtllrctllgll tlke he:lvy sllrf of tbe lLtlillltiC

beacbes in fishery work. Tl~e other bo:~t,

x se:~ slecl built by tile ~~reenport 13:tsin ancl

(yonstru(tioll (’omp:tny, wws z bi~b speed

rraft Ilot lIONIH1lIY employee] in surf nor

l:llldecl oil lxwclles. Tbe test be:@ com-

l)risin,g re~)resentntives of tile Navy gen-

er:~l lil~e, ll~~reitu of (’onstructioll and Re-]):lir, llurwu of Itllgineeri]]gj tile Coast(}[utr(l, :Lntl tile Il:lrille (’orps, rel)ortecltl~:~tnone of tbe bents \vere wholly sntis-f:wtory. They elinlillitted tbe sea sled ell-

‘ .hst Chief Bu(’&lt ltr to Higgins Industries,21( )ct36, SS2–3 ( 1.3) BuShips files.


they tended to dig in when retracting.They were so high forward that Marinesdebarking had to drop 10 feet from thebow to the beach. They were, moreover,

all unsuitable forlow-ering mldhoisting.GIn the light of the drawbacks revealed

by tests, the Bureau of Construction andRepair undertook the construction of aboat embodying all the best features of thefishing craft.’ This was the beginning of

a long and unsuccessful effort by the BLI-

reau to develop a satisfactory landing

craft. The ~’Bureau Boat” in various

forms showed up regularly at Fleet Land-

ing Exercises from 1939 through 1941, but

efforts to get the “bu~s>) out of its design

were abandoned in 1940.

Experiments with standard ~avy ships’

boats proceeded simultaneously with the

development of special types. From thefirst they proved unsatisfactory. Afterfive of them foundered in a four-foot surfat San Clemente during Flex 3, effortsto adapt standard Navy boats for beachhmdings were abandoned. The fact wasthat, having been designed for other pur-poses, none of them were suitable forbeaching operations. As the Command-ing Officer of the 5th Marines concluded:“hTavy standard boats are totally unsuitedfor landing troops of the leading waves,even under moderate surf conditions.They are in no sense tactical vehicles,lacking in speed and maneuverability andare extremely difficult to handle in surf.

“ CG1st llarBri~ Flex 4 Rept, 12Mar38; BriGenV. H. Krulali ltr to Head HistBr, G–3, HQllC,l~eb57, w/attachedcomments.

7C~lC to Chief BuC&R,24NoT36,2d endorse-ment to CominchItr to CNO,140ct36, ~t’arPian.s

Files, 19$?4-5’9.

They do not permit the rapid debarkationof troops at the water’s edge.” 8

By 1938 a beginning had been madetowards the solution of the lancling craft

problem. As a result of the early experi-ments the Marines had proved to their

own satisfaction what they had suspectedall along—that none of the standard Navyboats could be adapted satisfactorily forthe landing through surf of troops orheavy equipment. Nor were the experi-mental models based on commercial craft,though superior to hyavy boats, a satis-factory means for landing of assaultwaves on a defended beach. These results,though negative in character, at least

cleared the way for concentrating develop-ment on specially designed landing craft.

The fruitful line of development cameinto view with the re-entrance of Andrew

Higgins into the picture. In October1936, about a year after declining to bidon the experimental landing boat contract,Higgins had written the Navy offeringhis E’weka as a troop landing craft. As

funds for the purchase of experimentalboats had been exhausted, the Navy wasunable to purchase the Higgins craft atthat time.g

A year later Commander Ralph S.McDowell, who was responsible for land-ing craft development in the Bureau of

Construction and Repair, learned of theEureka boat. He wrote Higgins invitinghim to visit the Navy Department and

discuss this boat if he ever came to llTash-ington. Higgins and his naval architect

“CO .5th Mar Flex 3 Rept, 26FeVd7.

‘ .4sst Chief BnC&R ltr to Higgins Industries,210ct36, S82–3 (15) BuShips files.

DEYELOPMEST OF L.%XDIXG CRAFT a -

caught the first train for Washington.They spent about a week in McDowell’soffice working out, a conversion of thestandard Eureka into a landing craft. .\sfunds for tile purclutse of experimentalboats had been exhausted, the Navy De-partment at first refused to l)urchase theHiggins craft. But after the inventorot?ered to build a boat for ]ess tlmn cost,the Department relented, founcl the neces-sary funds, and gave Higgins :Lcontract,for one boat. Higgins deli~ered it to hTor-

folk in 30 days.’”

The Zllrekw was tested in surf atHampton Roads in the spring of 1938”and made its first maneuver appearance atFlex 5 in 1939 where it competed n~linstseveral Bureau boats and the by nowvenerable fishing craft. Marines were en-tl~usiastic about its performance. “TheHiggins boat gave the best. performanceunder all conditions. It has more speed,

more lll~llletl~er:lbility, handles easier, andlands troops higher on the beach,” re-ported the commanding officer of the 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines. “It also has

greater power in backing off the beach;

not once was the boat observed having

difficulty in retracting.” “

I.ieutelmnt (’omn~al~der R. B. Daggett,

the representative of the Bureau of Con-

strllction and Repitir at, Flex 5, did ]Iot

‘0 Capt Ralph S. Mcl)owell, USX, interview by

HistI\r, G–3, HQMC. 19.Jnn.77 : Asst Chief

BuC8ZR ltr to Higgins Industries, 210ct36, S%2–3

( 1.3) BuShips files.

“ LCdr G. H. Rahm ltr to CX(), 7Juu38, S8A3

(15 j BuShips tiles.

“ CO 1/5 Flex 5 Rept No 14 to CG 1st MarBrig,

15Mar39.

41

share tile Marines’ enthusiasm for theHiggil~’s ]~z<~el,{(. “The Higgins . . . bo:lt,

is too heavy. . . . l’he speed is too slow.

. . . All the Higgins boats have 250 horse-power with accompanying excessi~e gaso-line collsluuption for the speed ob-tainedj” 13]~e reported to his bureau.

1)aggett’s pl’eferellce was for n modified

Bureall boat, lxlilt by the Welin Company.The otl~er I]ureall types and the fishingboats he found unsatisfactory, and as theMarine (“orps iLnd the Bureau were in:tgreenlel~tl oll this point at least, these

CYiLft were discarded.

h-either the Marine Corps nor the BLL-reau of Construction tLnd Repair was tolii~~e the last word at Flex 5. The Com-

llmll(ler .~tlallt ic Sq~ladrol~, as representedb-y his I.allding Boat. De~elopnlent Board,l’ecommencled further tests for the Bureau

a]lcl F.’uvehf{ craft. Accordingly at Flex 6

the following year the drama was re-enacted. .~gaill the Nlarines declared the

E~lteka to be “the best so far designed.”The .itlantic Squadron, shifting slightlyfrom dead center, clecided that the Hig-gins “was the best a]l-around boat for thepurpose intended . . . [but] the Bureauw:ts alnlost :ts good. ” 14

By 1940 money for nawLl purposes wasbeginning to be nlore plentiful, and the

liTavy was now will illg to purchase landing

“ 1,(’dr R. R Daggett memo to Chief BuC&R,

13Feb39, encl to (Thief BuC&R ltr to CNO,

16Feb39, Wa/+ Pla}t.s FilQ& l.W&W.

14~olllment~ & Re~~mlllen~atiO1lS of Umpires

and Observers, Flex 6, .January-March 1940; Ex-

I)erimental Landing Boat Group Officer ltr to

ComLantRon, 10Mar40, Wu v Plms Files,

19~o–~1.

28 1’l;.\IL1/H. IRBOR TO GUADALCAATAI,

craft in quantity. But ill view- of tlwfact that the Fleet JVaSlmable to make aclear-cut recollllllellfl:~ti{)ll fol’ either the13ure:l~l or IIiggills types, the A“aly letcontracts for the first (i+ landing craft 011a fifty-fifty basis.”

Tile question was tillal]y settle(l ill Selktemlwr 1940. The Xavy \\-:lsnow coll-

vprting large nlercllal]t snips for Ilse tlstroop transports. These shills \veleequipped wit]i (lilVitS (w[)al)le of lulllcllil]g36-foot boats, al~(l as tl~e l’~~,cl,{ of 36-foot length llil{l twiw tile c:ll)arity of tile30-footer tl~el~ ill service :111(1COUI(ln)aketIle sanle spee(l v-itho(lt an ilwrease inIlorsepowelj the Sary <le(ide(l to a(lol)tthe larger as stanflar(l.’”

~ifter five yeal’s of \vork tile Marinesfinally h:ld tile lall(lillg Cl>at’tthey \\-illltP(l.

Tl~e ol~e featlil”e tl~at kef)t tlw 1Iiggillsbent frwlll fulfilling tllc i{lea] tll:lt theyhad built llp ill tl~eir n~il~(lswas the (liff -culty of eulptyinx it 011 the bea(’11: alltrool)s, equil)nlent, :ul(l sll])plies had to be~ulloaded over tile fairly lligll si(les. I)111’-ing N visit to Qllantico ill .I])l’il 1!)41,Higgins JVaSsl~o\J-]]a l)ict~lle of a .Jal):\-nese l:u~dil~g craft with a r:~nll) ill tl~e bowby Wjor Itrnwt 1+;.I.inwrt. Higgi])s l)e-(’~]l]f? ~l]thllsiilsti[’ a])~{lt tll(? i(k’a Xlld ]“I?-turned to Sew orlealls (Ieternline(l to ex-amine tile possibility of il~stalling :~ranlpin the bow of l~is ;MLfoot A’///P,I//,l.in-sert, who was serving as .Secretnry, A[:l-rine (’orps I+;quipnlel\t lh~r(l, recwn-mencle(l to tile I’residellt of tile Boa](l,Ilrigaclier (}ener:tl I+~lllilel’. Moses, tllilt

“ Ds?I]tContJ3d for I)er of Lan(ling Iloats Reptto CNO, 18M@0, and JhlShilm ltr to (’dt ;thNaval Dist, 8,Jul.40. both (’- S#2–3 ( 1.7) lluShil)sfiles.

‘“ CA-O ltr to Chief 13rrShi~]s, 2:3SeI)4(0, 245;+130–60 HQMC files,

tile Af:iril]e ( ‘orps procllre a ra]nl~-bow;M-foot fil(jvl~(. [rlwll receivil~g tile al)-[)roval of Marine Corps I lea(lq~larters,Most+ an(t I,illselt went to Ne\v orleans

to assist 11iggills, ~vllohad ilgreed to makeit 1)1’Ototyl)e, coll~el’t illg a St;1ll(iilrd ;~fi-foot Z:’I//eJOUinto a lanlp-bow boat at l~iso\Yllexlwnse,

on 21 May, inforllml tests were con-ciucte(l on l,ake l’ol}tcll:lltrtlill. The newcraft, l)lwved to be seal~ortl~y. Shebeaclw(l and rvtrwcte(l witl~ ease, andwl~ile otl tl~e beach tlw ranlp was lowered:111(1persol~llel a]l(l a light truck were de-barkwl :111(1leenlb:trked. on tile reronl-lllenclatiol~ of tile Navy I)epartnlent Coil -t il~llilig Boit](l for t lle I)evelopn~el~t ofI,all(lil~g lkmts, 17a s~)ecial 130al’clof Ma-riue (’orl)s :1])(I 1311reauof Slli1x3 officerswas :Il)poi)ite(l to collclllct ofiicial accep-t:tl]ce tests. TYith (~elierxl h~oses as sen-ior Illen)bel’ tile board calried out tile tests(lllring tl~e first \veel<ill ,Ju)le. T]le rmnl)-

lx)JYcraft ~w5se(l \~itl~flying colors.’sT]]lls was born tile l)recursor of the

I.(’VI’ ( lall(lil~g claft vel]icle, personl~el),

the craft which, in the opinion of Gen-elxl 11. 31. Smitl~, “ . . . (lid more to wintile ]var ill tile l’acitic than :Iny othersil]gle l~ieee of e(~llil)nlent.’q ‘:’

1’ ‘his bwird had been create(l by SecXav on12,Jan37 to coordinate landing craft develop-ment. It was composetl of rel~resentati~es ofthe (’X(3, Bn(’&R, IluF:ng. and MarCorps.

‘8 I.tCol F]. E. I,imsert inter~-iew by Hist13r,HQII(’, 3.Jntl.77. hereinnftw cited ns I,inscrtin-ferricw; IlriGen E. P. lIoses msg to CMC, w/endorselllellts, 21Ms@l, 2-45j-l:K-(io lIQMC

tiles : M:]j(:en 1;. I’. JI{MW ltr to .i(’ofS, G-3,lIQJ1{”, llAIII’37 : (’X() ltr to (XC (’t a[, 2J111141,24X-130-60” HQMC tiles.

‘“ G(JII11, 31, Smith, (’ol’al ~r)ld B) ’IJs.* (X”ew>-~~rl{: Ch;lrl.s Nerihner’s S{,ns, 1949), 72.

DEVELOPMENT OF LANDING CR.kI’r~ 29

LZGIITZ~’I-i,~ AN1) i?A RGE,V

The design of a successful tal)k lighterproved a Iol+q-erand more difficult processthan did the development of tile persomnel landing craft. The o1d -L-fOOt ar-tillery lighter, developed in 1927, wasconsidered to nave a limited ~lsefulnessfor lanfling heavy equipnlent in the laterstages of a]] ol)erationj but tile Marine(;orps hol)ed to obtain a lighter, self-pro-pelled craft particularly sllitetltol:lll(lillgtanks d~wing tile early stiiges.’”

As a stop-gap measure, Marines atQuantico came up with a device to adaptthe stanchwd Navy 50-foot motor launchfor landing light vehicles and artillery.“Boat Rig ii,” this contraption was called.It consisted of a platform fit.tecl withinthe hull of the boat, together with a port-able ramp by means of which tl~e vehiclecould g-o ashore over the bo]v when thecraft beached. The ramp was carriedinto the beach broken down, where it wasassembled and hitched up for debarkation.This completed, it would be disengagedand left on the beach to accotnn~odate thenext boat, coming in. The ramp could beassembled and nlade ready for use byeight, men in about 10 minutes. 011 sub-sequent trips, it took about four lninutesto connect, the ramp to the boat. Underideal conditions vehicles up to five tonsin weigl~t could be landed fronl a X-footmotor laul~ch using Boat Rig A. In calmwater Boat Rig A worked fairly well, butwhen it, was tried ollt at Culebra in 1~~~$it proved so top heavy that, it. nearly cap-sized in :L moderate swell. The experi-ment, was accordingly written Otf.zl

‘0CM(U to (:hief BuWCR, 24ATOV36,Xl endorxe-nwnt to (’omineh ltr to CAT(). lM)ct36, l~arPlans Fi7cs, 192~–39.

“ Marines and .Ampltibious War, 47 ; Tenta -

With the failure of Boat Rig A, theMarine, Corps turned its attention to de-veloping a self-propelled lighter designedspecifically for landing tanks and heavyequipnlellt throllgh the suff. In Decem-ber 1935 the Conlmandant requested theBureau of Construction and Repair todesign such a craft. It was to be capableof landing the 9,500–pound Marmon-Herrington tank which the Marine Corps\vas then considering. Negotiationsdragged on for more than a year, untilin April both the Marine Corps and theBureau had agreed upon x design. .%

M-foot craft, it made its first appearanceat a fleet landing exercise in 1938.22The Marines reported it to be “a distinctimprovement over previous experimentaldesigns. It is self-propelled, has suffi-cient speed, and is sound and practicablein construction. It is equally adaptablefor landing artillery and is an efficientrargo carrier.:”3

A M-footer, built at the. Norfolk h-avyYard in the autumn of 1938, showed up atCulebra the following winter for Flex 5.It was used successfully in transportingashore tanks and trucks of the types thenstandard in the Marine Corps. I~Ilder the

conditions encountered at Culebra in 1939,both the 38- a]ld M-foot lighters werejud~ed to be “. <Yoodsea boats, handle..ewe]], have sufficient power and speed, andare capable of retracting themselves fromthe bea(’h by llse of their stern anchors. . . .Both types . . . lJroved suitable for landingtanks an(l motor vehicles. The new

“ (’MC ltr to (lief Bu(’&R, 19Dec35. SSt2–3 ( 1~ ) RuShips fires ; Senior Member. I+ont(’onlltr tt~ l’res, MCEB, 21.Tu136 ; (’N() ltr to ChiefBu(%R, SJU130 ; CM(! ltr to Chief RuC&R,17AI)I’37 ; Chief Elu(’&R ltr to Cdr R, H. English,7Apr37, all in War Pluus Fi/cs, 19<?.j-J9.

tivc Lundinq operations Munaa7, 78–80. ‘3 VG 1N MnrBrig Flex 4 Rept, 12Mar38.

PE.4RL HARBOR TO GU.4DALCANAL

lighter proved superior to the old in re-spect to ease and safety of loading in aseaway as well as cargo-carrying ca-pacity.’’”

All tank lighter experiments conductedup to the end of Flex 5 had been builtaronnd the Marmon-Herrington tank.This vehicle, adopted by the Wu-ine Corpsin 1935, had been designed to fit withinthe weight limitations imposed by thehTLLVyfor amphibious equipment. Light-ness was just about the only virtue pos-sessed by this tank. By 1939 the MarineCorps had given up on it and was testingthe Army light tank for its suitability inamphibious operations. As the Armytank weighed about 15 tons, it could notbe carried in any of the tank lighters thenin existence. The N“avy accordingly pro-duced a new model 45-feet in length, capa-ble of carrying one Army and two Mar-mon-Herrington tanks.2s

One of the new 45-footers was completedin time for a trial at (hlebra during thewinter of 1940 in Flex 6. Tbe tests lackedsomewhat in realism, however, becausenone of the Army-type tznks were avail-able. Tbe new lighter performed ade-quately as a carrier of the Marmon-Herrington tank, for other vehicles, andmiscellaneous heavy equipment. At theend of Flex 6, General Smith recom-mended to the Commandant that “. . . .20 of the 45-foot lighters be constructed,at the earliest practicable date, for use bythe .ktlantic Squadron in landing opera-tions.;’ 2’

“ CO 1/5 Flex 5 ReIjt Xo 14 tu CG 1st Mar-Brig-, 15Mar39.

‘5 BuC&R ltr to Cdt h-orfolk Navy Yard, 6Ju139,War Plans Files, 19.@~l.

2“CG 1st MarBrig ltr to CMC, 29Apr40, lt’urPlan% File8 19@-~1.

In the fall of 1940 the h-avy contractedfor the construction of 96 45-foot tanklighters. After the contract had beenawarded, doubt arose as to the seaworthi-ness of the basic design. During a land-ing exercise in the Caribbeanj one of the45-footers capsized and sank when theArmy-type tank it was carrying shiftedto one side in a moderate sea.27

In the spring of 1941 the Marine Corpsfound itself in urgent need of all thelighters it could lay its hands on for usein a proposed amphibious landing in the.%zores.28 None of the 96 lighters orderedby the Navy had been delivered, and notmore than eight or ten were expected intime for the operation. Therefore, on 27May 1941 the Navy Department Con-tinuing Board for the Development ofI,anding Boats recommended that Hig-gins be given an opportunity to convertone of his 45-foot Eureka boats into atank lighter by installing a ramp in thebow. If this craft met service tests hewould be awarded a contract for 50 tank

lighters. The Secretary of the Navy gavehis approval on 29 May, and Higgins re-ceived this order by telephone the nextday.a

Higgins rushed through the conversion,completing it in time for testing and ac-ceptance during the first week in June bythe same board of Marine Corps and Bu-

27&anLantRon ltr to C~O, 13Dec40, 2455–130–00Il@lC files ; Senate Report iSo. 10, Part16, Additional Rel)ort of the Special committeeInvestigating the National Defense Program,

78th Congress, 2d Session, hereinafter cited asSel~atc 10,

“ See I’art I, Chal) 5 of this history.m(’NO ltr to (YWC et al, 2Jun41, 2455-130-00

HQMC files: Ncaate 10, 139; Capt R. B. Daggett,USX. interview by HistBr, G–3, HQMC, 20May57,hereinafter cited as Da(l(lett Interview.

DEVELOPMENT OF L.4NDIXG CRAFT 31

reau of Ships officers W1]O had come toNew Orleans to test the 36-foot ramp-bow,Yu~ekz. At the New River exercises tl~atsummer the Higgins tank lighters provedto be of excellent, basic, design. “Theywere found to be fast, subject to readycontrol znd retraction, relatively light,and equipped with a reliable powerplant,” reported General Smith.’O Theyalso proved to be too hastily constructed.The ramps were so weak that several col-lapse], and the sill was too high for effi-cient handling of vehicles. Higgins, whowas present, was confident that he couldcorrect the deficiency.s.31

Before the reports of the New Riverexercises had been received by the NavyDepartment, a contract had been let for131 additional tank lighters. These wereof a 47-foot Bureau design, a prototypeof which h:td never been built. As a re-sult of the good showing of t]~e Higginstank lighter at hTew Riverl this contractwas later reducecl to ten. Higgins was thelow biclder, and built one craft to Bureauspecifications, although lle was convincedthat, the clesign was unseaworthy. Hisfears proved to be well founded when thetests were camiecl out. By this time, how-ever, the tank lighter program lmci ag:linchanged direct ion.sz

On 4 October 1941, the .%uxiliary Ves-sels Board of the I’Tavy had reported thatthere was no lighter capable of lanclingthe newly (Ieveloped Army 30-toll mediumtank. The Secretary of the hTavy clirectecl

‘0 CG PhibLant ltr to CinCLant, 9SelAl,FMFLant files.

“ CA-O ltr to CMC c+ al, 2.Jun41,. 24X-130-60HQMC files : l)a~~ctt IjI tcrcicw; f,i)t,scrt IN tCY.‘rkw; CinCLant ltr to CN(), 70ct41, FJIFLantfiles,

3?Scllatc ~(), 139–140.

the Bureau of Ships to remedy this defi-ciency. Accordingly, in December exist-ing tank lighter contracts were changed toprovide 50-footers in lieu of the 45-footHiggins and 47–foot Bureau types still tobe built. Both Higgins and the BLlreaLL

procll~ced designs of W)-foot craft. Before

ttny deliveries could be made, president

Roosevelt, at a T$rhite House Conference

on -1 .~pril 19+21 directed the procurement

of 600 additional 50-foot tank lighters by

1 September for the North .%frican op-

eration. The BLH’e:lLL of Ships, to meet

this commitn~el~t, orclered 1)100 of its own

design:’

Since this order was earmarked for ser~’-

ice in a projected i~rnly operation, the

.~tmly showed keen interest in a test of the

two types held near Norfolk on 25 .lpril

19*2. E:Lch carried ~LX-ton tank, elabo-rately lashec] down in the Bureau lighter,]~lerely blocked ill place in the Higgins.Wind velocity ran 18 t.o 23 miles per hour,with wale heights estimated between 11/2and 2 feet. Both lighters showed a speedof 10 miles an hour over a measured 11/2-n]ile course. What happened after that isdescribed by the Army observer who madethe trip in the Higgins type:

.ks we neared the [antisubmarine] net it be-came a~)l)ilrent that the A“avy Burean.type tllnklighter was in trouble. She appeared to have atendency to di~e when headed into the seasand was taking considerable water aboard. Shestopped several tiules and men) hers of the crewcould be seen manning hand ~)umps antj trttenlpt.iug to t)etter secure the tank in the lighter. Oncewhen under }vay and making a wide tnrn, it ap.l)eared that the lighter was going to overturn,Some of the crew was seen straddling the higherbnl~vark and the cwxs~vain had left the I)iloth{)ltse and was steerin~ the yessel from the r:,il.

Jl%ile this was going on, our [Higgins] lighterwas Standillfg by, as W:LSa picket bt):lt :Irr{lt\~O

33I bid., 157.


Higgins 36-foot boats. N’one of these vessels wasexperiencing any difficulty. The Higgins tanklighter was maneuvering around in sharp turnsinto the sea, through the wave troughs.

We then [after Bureau lighter turned Wcklopened the engines up to 1,900 r. p, m. and pro-ceeded past Little Creek to Fort Storey. Thelighter took no w:iter except a little spray. Per-f ormanee was excellent in all respects. Thelighter was beached in the surf and the lank ranoff onto the beach dmpite poor hand]in~ by thecoxswain who finally allowed the lighter tobroach to. Iu spite of this the ~essel had suchpower and retraction qnalities [asl to get backinto deep water.

AS far as comlmrison of characteristics of the

types of tank lighters are concerned, it may bestated that in the May 25 tests there was nocomparison. .s’

As a result of these tests, the Bureauhastily notified all yards to shift to theHiggins type. Thl~s the Ili.ggins 50-footerbecame the standard tank lighter of thehTavy, the prototype of the I.(7M (landingcraft, mechanized ) m the, Marines knew itin World War II, and as they knom- it to-day in enlarged form.

Another vehicle which was to play avital role in the amphibio{ls operations ofWorld War H was the amphibian tractor( amtrack, I.VT). It was built in 1935 byDonald Roebling, a wealthy young in-ventor living in (lenrwater, Florida. The“Alligator,” as Roe.bling called his cre-ation, was a track-laying vehicle whichderived its propulsion afloat from flangesfixed to the tracks, essentially the l}rin-

ciple of early pacldle-wheel steamships.Originally illtenclecl as a ~ellicle of mercy,for rescue work ill the Everglades, the “.kl -ligator” was destinecl for fitme as an imstrument of war.

‘4Ibid., 163.

The Mimine Corps first took notice ofthe “.illi~ltor” in 1937, when Rear Ad-miral Edward C. Ifalbf us, Commander,Battleships, 13attle Force, IJ. S. Fleet,Showecl Major C~eneral I.ouis ~fcCarthyI.ittle, then commanding the Fleet MarineForce, a picture of the strange vehicle ap-pearing in Life magazine. General I~ittlewas quick to grasp its potentialities andsent the picture and accompanying articleto the Commandant. He, in turn, passedit along to the Equipment Board atQuantico.=

The Marine Corps hacl not forgotten theold Christie amphibian, of such brightpromise and disappointing performance.Here appeared to be a possible answer.The Board dispatched its secretary, thenXfajor ,John Iialuf, to Florida to see thevehicle perform and to consult with Mr.Roebling. I{aluf was favorably in~-pressed, ancl on this basis the EquipmentBoard reported to the Commmdant that<6. . . subject boat has possibilities for usein landing troops and supplies at pointsnot accessible to other types of smcdlboats.” In May 1938 the Con~mandantcited this opinion in recommending to theNavy that “, . . steps be taken to procurea pilot model of this type of amphibiousboat for further tests under service condi-t ions and cluring Fleet I,anding Exercise~To. ~.~~ 36

Both the h’avy Board and the Bureauof Construction and Repair endorsed therecommendation unfavorably on thegrounds of economy. The boat clevelop -

% Linscrt Interview; LtCol V. J. Croizat, “TheMarines’ Amphibian. ” MC Gazette, June 1953,4z–43 ( cr~i~at takes his inforn,ation from

I,insert ).w (NC ltr to Senior Member, NavDept ContBd

for Dev of Landing Boats, 18May36, War PtmtsI~iles, 1924–39.

DEVELOPMENT OF LANDING CRAFT 33

ment program was at last well under way,and it seemed unwise to divert any of thelimited appropriations to x purely experi-mental project, CNO concurred in therecommeuclation of the Boarc{.3T

Marine interest in tile amphibian tractorpersistecl, however, and in October 1939,General Moses visited Roebling at his shopin Clearwaterj Florida. He inspected the1atest moclel tractor, and persuaded Roe-bling to design a model including clesireclmilitary characteristics.3s

In January 1940, Roebling had com-pleted the new design. ikn appropriationwas secured from the Bureau of Ships,and work started on the first. militarymodel of an amphibian tractor. In NO-vember the completed machine was

delivered at Quautico where it was demon-strated for the Commandant and a largeparty of high ranking officers of the Armyand hTavy.sg It measured up in everyrespect save one. Its aluminum construc-tion was not considered rugged enoughfor hard military use. Still the tractorwas so impressive in e~ery other respectthat the Navy contracted with Roeblingfor 200 of the machines constructed ofsteel. As Roebling did not have the facili-ties for mass manufacture, he subcon-tracted the act~lal const,rllctiou to theFood Machinery Corporation which hada plant in nearby Dunedin. The first ve-hicle, now designated 1,VT (1) (Landing

Vehicle Tracked), came off the assemblyline in July 1941.40

ml~id., and endorsements thereto.= Pres MCEB ltr to CMC, 29Aug-10, 2455–13@–

20 HQMC files ; Linsert Intcru-irw; Croizat, OP.cit.

39Lin.swt Interview; Croizat, op. cit.4 Chief BuShips ltr to Cdt 5th Naval Dist.,

6Dec40, 2455–13G60 HQiklC tiles ; SecXavContBd for the Dev of Landing Vehicle,

Quantity procurement of LVT (1) didnot, halt further development of anlphi-bian tractors. By October 1941, theprototype of LVT (2) had put in an ap-pearance, but volume production of thenew moclel was delayed by the entry ofthe L’nited States into the war. Toachieve maximum output,, the design ofLVT ( 1) was “frozen” shortly after PearlHarbor and the vehicle put into massproduction.”

This early LVT ( 1) was unarmed,though capable of mounting machineguns. The Marines, now that they hadmade a start, wanted sometking more: anarmored, turreted m o cl e 1 capable ofmounting at least a 37mm gun and servingas the equivalent of a seagoing tank inlanding operations. At Clearwater inJanuary 1940, Roebling sketched a tur-reted version of the LVT, the plans forwhich Major Linsert, Secretary of theEquipment Board, ]ater completed.”

Nothing more was done about thearmored LVT until June 1941, when theCommandant recommended that such avehicle be developed, using the existingLVT as a basis. The new vehicle shouldbe’’ . . . capable of sustained point-blankcombat against shore-based weapons . . . .It should be able to approach a defendedbeach from the sea, land, over-run enemyweapons, destroy them, and continue op-erations ashore to support our groundtroops.” ‘3 Armor protection again9t .50caliber machine-gun tire and an armament

Tracked, ‘“History of Landing Vehicle Tracked,”lDec45, hereinafter cited as LVT Hist.; Da~~cttInterview.

4’LVT Hist.

4’Croizat, op. cit.“ CMC ltr to CNO, 27Jun41, and CA-O 1st en-

dorsement thereto to Chief BuShips, 13Ju141,2435–130–20 HQMC files.

34 lw:L\RL H.kRBOR TO GUADALCAN.4L

inc.luding a 3’inlm antitank gun and three.30 caliber machine guns would be re-quired to accomplish this mission. TheChief of Na\7al (operations approved theproject ancl directed the Bureau of Shipsto perfect a desigl~.

B~~re:~uel~gilleers beg:lll de}elolJ1ne~~t incooperation with Roebling and the engi-neersof the Food Machinery Corporation.But theirs wasnot to be the first armoredLVTconlpleted. l~orlcillg illdel>ellclelltlyand at its own expense, the Borg-WarnerCorporation procluced model “Al,” the firstttlrretecl:~l~~pllibi:~l~tr:~ctor. Design workon the Roebling-Food Machinery moclel,1,1’T (A ) (1) W-:Mnot completed until ~e-cember 1941, and tl~e prototype did notemerge from the Food Machinery plantuntil June 1942. It was an LVT (2 ) hullmounting a 3’imn~ gun in a standard lighttank turret. It was quickly pllt in pro-

duction, and the first vehicle rolled off theassembly line in August 1943.44

The, craft, clescribecl here were, of course,only a few of the wide variety of boatsancl beaching ships that performed yeo-man service in all theaters during World

War II. These ranged in size from thebig lumbering LST (Landing Ship,Tanks, ”or “Large, Slow Target”), orig-inated by the British, to the Arn~y-devel-oped DIXW, an amphibious truckpropeller-driven afloat. B L1t Marinesplayed no notable part, in the developmentof any of these, and none had appearedduring the period covered by this volume.They will be described in subsequent vol-umes as they came to play their part inthe tactical picture of Marine operations.

“ I,VT His+; Croizat, op. cit.

CHAPTER 4

Marine Occupation of Iceland’

“It has been said,” wrote WinstonChurchill, “’J~7hoever possesses Icelandholds apistolf irmlypointed at England,America, and Canada.”)z At the timeofwhich he wrote, the “pointed pistol”threatened most immediately the Britishlifeline: the northern con~~oy route be-tween Great Britain and the WesternHemisphere, upon which the island king-dom was dependent for most of the mate-rials to sustain its war effort as well asmuch that was needed for its very sub-

‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in thischapter is derived from the 1st Mar13rig ( Prov )Rept of .kctivities 16Jun41–25Mar42, 26Mar42;6th Mar ( Reinf ) Repts of Activities 25May–30Nov41, 13Dec41 ; 5th DefBn Repts of Activities7Jun41-28Feb42, 27 Feb42: Correspondence filesdealing with Marine occupation of Iceland;J. L. Zimmerman, Notes and MSS on Marineoccupation of Iceland (located at XTRMC, Job14051, Box 9, Folders 129–130), hereinafter citedas Zimmerman iKSS; Gen O. P. Smith, Diaryand A“arrative covering the occupation of Ice-land, hereinafter cited as SmitlL A“arratioe;

S. Corm and B. Fairchild, “The Framework ofHemisphere Defense,” MS of a forthcomingvolume in the series United States Armu in WorldWar II (located at OCMH ), hereinafter cited as

Hewzisphere Defense; B. Fairchild, MS chapterstitled “Planning the Iceland Operation: TheArmy’s First Task Force,” “Establishing the Ice-land Base Command,” and “Bermuda and theNorth Atlantic Bases,” part of a forthcomingvolume of the same series; W. L. Langer and S. E.Gleason, The Undeclared War (A’ew- York :Harper & Brothers, 1953), hereinafter cited asUndeclared War.

2 TV. S. Churchill, !/’he Grand .4 Uiance ( Bos-ton: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 138.

sistence. Icelancl perched on the flank ofthese shipping lanes, which were underheavy attack by (3erman submarines.Hostile air and naval bases on the islandwould almost certainly render the north-ern route unusable, and put pressure, per-lmps intolerable pressure, on the longerand more vulnerable southern route.

At the outbreak of the war Iceland en-joyed the status of autonomous parlia-mentary monarcl~y, sharing the same kingwith Denmark. When the Nazis overranthe latter nation in April 1940, the Ice-landic Parliament voted to take over theexecutive power of the Danish King andto assume control of foreign affairs. Thestrategic island became, for all practicalpurposes, a completely independent re-public ‘—and a wholly defenseless onewithout even the pretense of an army ornavy. This state of affairs gave rise toconsiderable concern in London andWashington, more genuine concern thanit caused initially among the insular-minded Icelanders.

To the British the threat appeared verydesperate indeed. Early in May they de-termined to occupy Iceland, and the needfor speed and secrecy fused decision and

‘t’at, lon.~ There was no time to stand on

‘On 16May42 the Parliament announced thatI{heland would not renew its union with T)emmark and in 1944 the island became in name aswell as i%ct a republic.

4J. R. M. Butler, Grand S’t?wtcgy: Volume11—Histor~l of tltc Second W’ortd War ( London :HMSO, 1957), 262.

36

ceremony; despite Churchill’s bland as-sertion that the ?dritish occupation of Ice-land was etiectecl “with the concurrenceof its people,’> s they lmcl, in fact? notbeen consulted beforehand. “is the atti-tude likely to be adopted by the IcelandicGovernment toward such an ‘invasion’was in some doubt they were not informedof the proposed expedition. ” ~ Indeed thefirst inkling the natives had that anythingout of the ordinary was afoot came whenearly-rising fishermen discovered a Brit-ish destroyer nosing up to a jetty in theharbor of the island capital, Reykjavik.At 0620 on 10 May, a reinforced battalionof Royal Marines landed and occupied thetown, moving so swiftly that it \vasable toseize the (3erman (’onsulate before thehapless C’onsul could destroy his papers.

According to plan, the Royal Marineswere to take the situation in hand in or-der to pave t]le way for ]arger occupa-t ion forces. They were relieved in tendays by a Canadian Army brigade whichwas first reinforced and later replacedby British units. By the time Icelal~dbegan to loom large ill ~’, S. defense

plans, the big, bleak, sparsely-populatedisland ~~its occul~ied by nearly 25,000 13ri-tish troops. Hvalfjordur. a deep inlet ofthe sei~ 30 nliles nort b of Reykj avikj be-came the site of a vital naval fueling an(lrepair base, \vllile the principal airfields,also near the capital, were honle bases forsquadrons of patrol bombers that huntedthe German submarines.’

.%s reverse followed reverse, however,the British increasingly felt tile need forthe return of their troops from Iceland

‘ Churchill, Toe. cit.o Maj D. B. Drysdale, RM, ltr to LtCol ,J. L.

Zimmerman, 7Sep54, in Zinl )J/(,rMICJI‘Ifs’s,Kokler 130.

‘ Butler, op. cit., 2W, 287, 402?, .469.

PEARI, HARBOR TO GLIADALCANAL

to tile home islands, seriously threatened

~~-]tl~ invasion :Illd (Il)c{er ]le:lyv :lir :lt.

tack. The prospect of llritisb withdrawalcaused sonw alal.nl among tile Ice]al~dersand led to diplomatic soundings of theAmerican positiol).

on 18 I)ecember 1!)40 t l~e 1celandicMinister of Foreign Affairs, V. Stefans-sou, arranged a l)l’iVilte n]eet illg with t lleI?. S. Consul (+elleral, I_lertel E. lKlllli-1101111.After firm ass(lrances that hisproposal was strictly m)otlicial, the Mill-ister suggested to I<uniholnl that thel~nited States might consider the possi-bility of declaring Iceland l)art of theare:l covered by tl~e Monroe T)octri~~e, ineffect joining tile island to the WesternHemisphere Ifuniholrn duly reportedthe tentatit-e. proposition to Washingtonand near]y ,a month later lle received ataut ious reply from the Secretary of Statewhich advised him that no action was1ikely to be forthcoming in the near fu-ture but that he sl~otlld neither encour-age nor discourage furt]ler approachesalong this line.!)

In unheralded &nerican-13ritisll stitff

col~versations which took place in Wash-ington in the first months of 1941, planswere laid for iillied action in case theIT. S. should be drawn into the war be-side 13ritain. ~~nder these plans the de-fense of Iceland was to become the re-

SAlthcmgh the location of the eastern bound-ary of the \Vestern Hemisphere is a subject of{lebate amon~ geographers, most maps of thisperiod show Iceland as clearly within the East-ern Hemisphere. Secretary Hull, however, re-membered associates bringing him maps (at thetime Hitler seized I)enmark ) \vhich showedGreenland wholly and Iceland partly within theWestern Hemisljhere. T/i e Memoirs of CordellIIn71, 2 vols ( ~~e~v York : The Macmillan Com-pany, 1948) , I. 73.

‘ Ibid., I, 754.

MARINE OCCI:PATIOX OF ICELAX1) 37

sponsibility of the United States: .~rnlytroops were to relieve the B1’itisll ilS soonas practiml)le after the outbreak of war,b(lt certainly no sooner tl~all 1 Sel)tenlber1941, as tile .Irnly did not feel it WOU1(lbe ready to take ‘on SUC1la conlnlitll~entuntil then. ]() But as tile spl’ing of 1941wore on, ~$merican llleasures ill aid ofBritain, such as Iien&Ifiase al~d tile pro-gressive extel]sion of tile Xelltralit-y l’tl -trol into the mici--ltlantic, bro(lght tileI:. S. closer and closer to conflict with(+ermany. Open ancl increasil]g sllpportof the British seemed to suit tl~e l}ublicmood; a survey of public opinion takenby the Gall(lp Poll in early May sllowe{lthat an overwhelnling majority (75(;{) ofthe American people favored helping Brit-ain even if such a course was sure to leadtl~e uation into v-ar with C~ernlany.” Thestage was thus set for what OlleeXllilllStiVp

study of this period has called an “overtact of participation in tile Europeanconflict. ” ‘z

By late spring Britain felt her b~ckagainst the wall. (’hurclli]l asked I’resi-dent Roosevelt to send .imerican troo])sto Iceland to replace the British garrison.The President agreed provided an invita-tion to the American occupation force wasforthcoming from the Icelandic C~overmment. Cllurchil] undertook to I)roducethis invitation, but the l)rocess -provedmore one of extraction than of produc-tion. Icelandic rell~ctance to “il~vite” a

‘“M. E. Matloff and E. }1. Snell, 6’tratc~icPlunF7ivt{/for Coalition Warfffr(,-LTnitcd S’tutfs.lrw~y i}f World lt’ur 11 (Washington: OCMH,1953), 46, hereinafter cite(l as ~t)otcf~ic Plfln-

foreign force to occupy the island verynearly lll)set a timetable a]reacly ill oper-ation.

On 4 ,Jl~ne, the I’resiclellt orclered tile.~rnly to prepare a plal~ fol tile illlnledi-ate relief of British troops in Iceland.Theqllestiono fwlleret hetroops Jvere go-illg to come fronl arose imnlediately. .il-thou:h the .!rnly had reached a strengthof nearly a nlil]ion and a l~alf nlen, tilegreat, bulk of its solcllers were raw re-crllits gat]lered ill by Selective ,Serviceand recellt]y called Llp ~ational (}uards-men. ~-llder existing legislation thesemen COU1(]not be sent beyond the West-ern Henlispl)ere (Illless the-y volmlteeredfor such service. Equipment in nearlyevery category was in snort supply, evenfortl:~illillg~)t~rljoses. Tile.\rmyne.ededits conlparatively small force of regularsto form cadres for l~ew units. To with-draw these cadres for an expeditionaryforce would throw the whole immensetraining program out of gear.

.1 review of the .irmy’s immediate capa-bil it ies convinced the President that theMarine Corps would have to furnish theinitial occupation force for Iceland.Since all Marines, both regular and re-serve, were volunteers, there were no ,geo-graphical restrictions on their use. on5 ,June, Roosevelt, directed the Chief ofN a v a 1 Operations (CNO), .idmiralHarold R. Stark, to ha~-e a Marine bri-gade ready to sail in 15 days’ time. TheOrgallizatioll of this brigade was facili-

tated by the fact that a reinforced infan-try regiment slated for expeditionary dutywas at that, moment en route from the\\Testcoast to the e:lst.

ninfl, .it this time the Marine Corps was“E. Roosevelt and J, P, Lash (eds. ), F. D. R. :

His Per.sonul Lettrrs 1928–19~,7, 2 vt)ls ( N’ewheavily committed to a progranl of organ-

York : l)uell, Sloan and I’earw, 1!)30), II, 1158, izing, eql~ipping, and training two divi-

“ Lan~er and Gleason, op. cit.,573. sions, one on each coast. Since the infan-


try regiments of both divisions were stillforming, they were considerably under-strength, and it had been necessary toreinforce tile east coast’s 1st MarineDivision when it was tabbed for a major

role in a proposscl landing operation. on24 May, the Commandant drew on the 2cIMarine Division at (’an]p Elliott, Cali-

fornia, for the l~ecessary regiment, andColonel Leo D. Hermle’s 6th Marines(Reinforced) was selected “for temporaryshore duty beyond the seas. ” 13 The regi-ment was brought up to full strengthby substantial drafts from tile ~d and 8t]~Marines/’ and on 28 May it joined itsassigned reinforcing artillery, tank, andservice elements. ~Six days after he rec-eived his orders, Colonel Hermle had hiscommand combat loaded; the ships, threelarge transports and four destroyer trans-ports, sailed from San Diego on 31 May.

When it had embarked, this regimenthad orders to report to the CommandingGeneral, I Corps (Provisional), FNIF,

Atlantic Fleet. At that time, its mostprobable mission appeared to be either theseizure of Martinique or the occupation ofthe Azores, both cliscussed in the follow-ing chapter. Momentous events, however,were developing in Europe, and theseserved to change the whole pattern of thewar, as well as the mission of the regiment.Both British and American intelligence.indicated that Hitler was getting readyto attack Russia, and soon. Such anevent would automatically cancel any im-mediate threat, to Gibraltar and renderthe Azores venture pointless. President

‘36th Mar(Reinf )Re@s, op. cit., 1.‘4 “The rnle was that [these] men mnst have

been in the service for one year and must haveclear records. The other regiments ‘played ball’in this resI]ect and we received good men. ”.$’111ith ~1’arratice, 17.

Roosevelt, in fact, ordered a suspension ofplanning for the Azores operation on 7June, while preparations for the move-ment to Iceland proceeded apace.

While the 6th Marines$ convoy WLLSstillin the Pacific heading for the PanamaCanal, the wheels were set in motion tocomplete the organization of the. pro-jected brigade. One other major unit, the5th Defense Ilzttzlion at Parris Island,was designated for duty in Iceland; itscommanding officer, Colonel Lloyd L.I.eech, flew to Washington on 7 June fora two-day round of briefing and reports.The battalion’s antiaircraft gLnxs andgunners were what was wanted, so whenthe order assigning the 5th Defense toI Corps (Provisional) was published on10 June the 5-inch Artillery Group wasshown as being detached. In addition tothe 6th Marines (Reinforced) and the 5thDefense Battalion (less 5-inch ArtilleryGroup ), the budding brigade received acompany of engineers, a chemical platoon,and a platoon of scout cars from the 1stMarine Division at New River. The portfor the hurried assembly of ships, mate-riel, and men was Charleston, S. C.

The men of the 5th Defense Battalionhad some inkling of their probable areaof employment; Colonel Leech’s warningorder phoned from Washington on the8th had directed that special attentionbe paid to provision of warm clothing.On board the 6th Marines’ transports,however, speculation was rife that theregiment was heading for the Caribbean,perhaps for Guantanamo Bay, but morepopular was the rumored destination ofMartinique. 11’hen the convoy turnednorth after clearing the canal, passed thewestern end of Cuba, and headed forCharleston most of the “scuttlebutt” stillheld out for a tropical objective. Need-

MARINE OCCUPATION OF ICELAND 39

less to say, the issue of winter clothingafter the regiment arrived at Charlestonon 15 June came as a real “shocker.?’ Theseverely limited time to assemble and loadout the Iceland force made this coldweather gear “the darndest collection ofwinter clothing ever assembled ;“ 15 therewere bits and pieces of everything.

On the day following the arrival of the6th Marines in Charleston the 1st MarineBrigade (Provisional) was formally or-ganized; its commander was BrigadierGeneral John Marston. The troop listincluded:

Brigade Headquarters PlatoonBrigade Band6th Marines5th Defense Battalion (less 5-inch Artillery

Group)2d Battalion, 10th MarinesCompany A, 2d Tank Battalion (less 3d Pla-

toon )Company A, 2d Medical BattalionCompany C, 1st Engineer Battalion1st Platoon, Company A, 2d Service Battalion3d Platoon, 1st Scout CompanyChemical Platoon

On 18 ,June, (leneral Marston arrived in(larleston from Quantico, bringing withhim a small headquarters deti~chment andhis instructions from the (73’() for the op-eration of his brigade in Iceland. Theseorders, dated 16 .June, gave ]Iim a si)npleand direct mission:

In Cooperation with the British Garrison, De-fend Iceland Against Hostile Attack.”

The question of over-al] command in Ice-land had, of course, risen early in the top-leve~ negotiations. l’he British wishedthe brigade to be placed directly undertheir control since they bad tile nlajor

“ klajGen H, R. Paige ltr to A{’ofS, G–3,HQ}IC, February 1957.

16c~o serial 069312 to CG, Ist NIarBrig-(Prov), 16Jun41.

force on the island, but Admiral Starkthought that it would be going too far for11. S. troops, ostensibly neutral, to beplacecl under the commaud of an officer ofa belligerent power. Marston’s orders,therefore, read that he would coordinatehis actions “with the defense operations ofLhe British by the method of mutual co-operation,’- 17 while reporting clirectly tothe CNO.

Tl~e brigade spent a week in Charleston,most of it devoted to loading suppliesthat arrivecl from camps and depots allover the eastern half of the IT. S. The.lrmy might not be sending any troopsin this first contingent, but a goocl portionof the weapons and equipment that wentout with the Marines was taken fromArmy units.’8 On 22 ,June, the last cargothat could be handled within the timelimits set was loaded and at 0800 the fourtransports and two cargo vessels carrying4,095 officers and men set sail for Argentia,Newfoundland.

At sea a formidable escort force includ-ing battleships, a couple of cruisers, andten destroyers joined up.” Five days outof Charleston, the convoy arrived atArgentia and hove to awaiting furtherorders. These orders were not, forthcom-ing until 1 JLdy, when the Icelandic reluc-tance to actually “invite” American occu-pation was finally compromised in a much-qualified statement by the island’s PrimeMinister to President Roosevelt that thepresence of IT. S. troops was “in accord-ance with the interest of Iceland. ” 20 Thisleft-handed invitation was the go-ahead

17Ibid.18G_4 draft memo for TAG, “Tran~fers of

Equipment to the U. S. Marine Corps,” 5Jun41.“ U. S. Atlantic Flt OPlan F41, 20Jun41, 1–2.n Msg sent by Prime Minister Herman Jonas-

son of Iceland to President Roosevelt, 1Ju141.

448777 O—58—-L

40 PEARL H.\ RJ30R TO GUADALCANAL

signal and the brigade was headed eastby dawn on 2 ,July. The Marines were go-ing with the blessing of Churchill whohad written the President earlier that:

I am much encouraged by . your marinestaking over that cold place and I hope that oncethe first installment has arriwd you will givefull publicity to it. It would give us hope toface the long haul that lies ahead.”

The President made the desired an-nouncement on 7 ,July as the convoy an-chored in Reykjavik harbor, pointing outthat the Ameiicans were there “to supple-ment, and eventually to replare, the Brit-ish forces,” and that, an adequate defenseof the strategic island was necessary toward off a potential threat to the WesternHemisphere.22 .~ third, but urmnnonnced,purpose of this American occupation wasthe acquisition of a naval and air base in

Iceland to facilitate the prosecution of our

antisubmarine war in the North Atlantic .23Wrhile. the threat of German attack was

always present,, the likelihood of it hap-pening steadily lessened as the year woreon.” On the day that the 1st Brigade left

“ Quoted in Hull Memoirs, op. rit.,II, 947.‘2 S. 1. Rosenman ( ed ). The FWblic Papers mld

.kddreawa of Franklin D. Roo.wwelt, 13 vols(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), X,255-256.

‘8 S. E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic-S’cptentber 19,?9–May 19@l—History of tit e

United States Xa%al t?peration.,s in. World WarII (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947),7S, hereinafter cited as Battle of tlie .4tlantic.

a An estimate of the situation prepared by aspecial board convened by the brigade shortlyafter its arrival in Iceland attributed to theGermans the following capabilities : To land inforce from air or sea ; to conduct bombing at-tacks ; and to conduct raids by surface vesseland submarines. The board concluded, however,that as long as the British Home Fleet oper-ated in superior numbers in the water surround-ing Northern Scotland, the Orkney. Shetland,

Charleston, Germany attacked Russia.Hitler repeatedly in the months that fol-lowed indicated that, he wanted to avoidprovoking the U. S. into war while heconcentrated on the oflensive in Russia.His submarine commanders were givenorders to spare American shipping asmuch as possible, even though it had beenpublicly announced that IT. S. X“avy ves-sels were affording protection to Britishand Canadian ships that joined Ameri-can convoys headed for Iceland. StillHitler decreed that there would be no ac-counting for the submarine commanderwho sank an American vessel by mistake.ITp until the actual U. S. entry into thewar this part ial immunity of Americanvessels from attack held good.zs

The fact that Hitler had decided to goeasy on LT.S. ships in the North Atlanticwas natural 1y not known to Americannwval commanders. There was consider-able pressure to get the brigade and itsequipment unloaded in the shortest pos-sible time and the convoy headed back forthe States. This unloading proved anonerous task. There was little local labor.Marines had to furnish all working partiesand the men toiled around the clock,helped not a little by the fact that at thistime of year it was light, 24 hours a day.

Only two ships could be docked at Rey-kjavik at a time and the places beside

and Faroe Islands it would be impossible forthe Germans to support a force of any size inIceland. lstMar13rig ( Prov ) Estimate of the Sit-uation (Defense of Iceland), 5Aug41.

“ “Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs,193%1945,” Brassey’s .Nawzt Annaal 1948 (k-ew

York : The Macmillan Company, 1948), 220ff.See the transcripts for the conferences of21Jnn41, 9.Ju141, 25Ju141, 17 Sep41, and 13Nov41for the continuity of German policy regardingAmerican shipping.

MARINE OCCUPATION OF ICELAND 41

the wharves were reserved for the cargo

vessels which carried heavy equipment of

the 5th Defense Battalion. The rest of

the convoy rode at anchor in the harbor,while men and supplies were lighteredashore to a gently sloping pebble beacl~

near the city. Early on 12 ,July the jobwas finished, the convoy sailed, and theMarines had their first real chance to lookaround them.

They drew small reassurance from whatthey saw. The Icelandic landscape wassomething less than prepossessing, at leastto men raised where soil produces vegeta-tion and a tree is u tree. No trees abovedwarf height grow on Iceland’s rugged,mountainous terrain, and vegetation islimited to a little sheep pasturage on thecomparatively flat stretches. It has beendescribed as the most volcanic region inthe world. Craters, many of them oc-casionally active, pock its surface, andlava flows lace across it.

The most unpleasant thing about Ice-

land’s weather is its very uncertainty; themountains usually insure that the samekind of weather rarely exists simulta-neously all over the island. Although thetemperature range is moderate, the hu-midity is consistently high, and precipita-tion frequent but erratic. About the onlyconstant is the assurance of steady winds,which may change abruptly to galeforce.”

The island is slightly smaller in areathan Kentucky, but barely supported apopulation of about 120,000 at the timeof the occupation. AIOllg its 2,300 miles

n In a hurricane on l&Jan@ wind velocitiesof over 125mph were recorded. It did an enor-mous amount of damage. Ships were driven on

the rocks and huts and other lmildings whichwere not firmly anchored were blown away.Paige, op. cit.

of jagged coastline were a number ofsmall fishing villages; and except for the

area around Reykj avik where there was

a roadnet, all communication was by sea.

The prim little capital boasted about

38,000 inhabitants, two movie houses, and

one first class hotel; as a liberty town for

nearly 30)000 British and .American troops

it boasted nothing. The only living

things the island had in abundance were

sheep and ponieslz’ and the IWarines never

developed a taste for mutton and were

forbidden to ride the runt-sized steeds.

.kltogether, it was probably good for

morale tl~at the IWarines did not know at

this time that they were destined to see

Iceland—and nothing but Iceland—for

eight dreary months to come.

Even before the first brigade unit set

foot on shore, the &Iarines learned what

the term ‘(mutual cooperation” meant to

the British. They could not have been

more cordial, generous, and helpful. As

the brigade was woefully short of motor

transport, the British put more than 50

trucks at its disposal, together with driv-

ers familiar with the region and the traffic

problems peculiar to Iceland—and left

them in the hands of the Ylarines for sev-

eral weeks. They also furnished rations

and turned over several of their perma-

nent camps to the new arrivals, moving

into tent camps to make room.zs

The enthusiastic reception by the Brit-

ish included a highly prized offer by their

27Most of the information on Iceland’s climateand terrain was taken from Col L. P. Hunt, “Re-port of two-day reconnaissance of Iceland, June1’2-13, 1941,” 18Jun41.

‘g “Ollr reception by the British has beensplendid. They have placed at our disposal allof their equipment and have rationed us for ten(10 ) days to cover the Iwiod of disembarka-tion.” BriGen J. Marston ltr to MGC, 11Ju141.

42 PE.4RL HARBOR TO GU.ADALCANAL

commander, ~lajor General H. O. Curtis,

to provide the ~arines with the distinc-

tive polar bear shoulder insignia of the

British force. General llarston accepted

for the brigade ancl noted later that:

The mutual cooperation directive worked, tothe entire satisfaction of the British Com-mander and the Brigade. The British compliedwith our requests and we complied with theirs.It was as simple as that. A British commanderless sympathetic than General Curtis might haveupset the applecart but under that talented otli-cer no incident of conflict Occurred.n

In their new camps the filarines made

their first acquaintance with the ~Lssen

hut, an introduction that was to ripen

into familiarity that rarely reached the

friendship stage. ln the months to come

the men of the brigade were to build and

maintain roads and construct defenses;

they were to become very practiced at the

art of the stevedore; but most of all they

were to become efficient builders of the

ubiquitous Nissen hut. The hut itself

“was an elongated igloo covered with cor-

rugated iron roofing and lined withbeaver board” 30 designed to accommo-

date about 14 men. It was possible to

erect several huts in combination to ac-

commodate larger numbers of men or for

use as officesj mess halls, recreation rooms,

and classrooms.

For the first week ashore the hfarines

were fully occupied gett,in~ their camps

established and then they were fitted into

the EIritish scheme of cletense. Initially,

the brigade’s primary mission was to

serve as a mobile reserve although its lack

of transportation meant thilt most of its

mobility would be dependent on foot

‘9 MajGen J. Marston ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC,31Jan57.

‘0 i3rnitlL iVarra tive, 34.

power.” The various units, which werespread out over a good part of the coun-tryside around Reykjavik, were also re-sponsible for 10C:L1defense of their biv-ouac areas, a responsibility that grew toinclude long segments of coastline whenthe British units defending these possiblelanding points were later relieved.

The machine guns and 3-inch guns ofthe 5th Defense Battalion were integratedinto the British antiaircraft defensesaround the airfield and hzrbor and re-mained a part of this system for the restof the Marines’ stay. As a result, the 5thDefense spent most of its time performingthe duties for which it was constituted;its state of training was good and it im-proved as a result of a steady round ofgun watches and drills and frequentthough unproductive enemy aircraftalerts. In contrast, the men of the 6thMarines and its reinforcing units hadreason to think that they were on onegigantic and never-ending working party,

and the re~iment labelled itself a “labor

regiment” in its August report to General

hfarston.

A welcome break from the steady grind

of labor details occurred on 16 August

when Prime &Iinister Churchill visited

lceland en route to 13ngland following his

famous Atlantic conference with Presi-

dent Roosevelt. He was accompanied by

an imposing array of h@ British rank:

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound,

First Sea I,ord; General John Dill, Chief

of the, Imperial General Staff: and Air

(’hief Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman,Vice Chief of Air Staff. After payingtheir respects to local officials, they at-

“ Iceland B’orre memo IF/168/l/G to CG, 1stMarBrig, 16,Ju141 ; 1st MarBrig OpOrd No 3–41,16,JuM1.

MARINE occupation OF ICELAND 43

tended a large joint British-Americanmilitary review held in their honor. ofthis event Churchill wrote later: “Therewas a long march past in threes, duringwhich the time ‘United States Marines7bit so deeply into my memory that I couldnot get it out of my bead.’? 32

The reason for the continuous roundof camp construction W:lS two-fold.First, somebody had to build the campsto accommodate the expected influx ofb-my troops; neither the British nor theIcelanders were in a position to clo so.The process of simple elimination gavethe Marines the job. Second, it soon be-came apparent thfit the h’farines them-selves were going to stay for a while anda good part of their time had to be spentpreparing their own facilities for the on-set of winter.

A common, indeed, official, belief tlmtthe Marines were going to be relieved in~September by Army troops held stronglyfor about a nlontb after the brigade ar-rived in Iceland. There were numerouse.widenres that, this was the intention ofthe top planners when the concept of theMarine Corps furnishing the initial oc-cupation troops was first broached. Bymid-August, however, it became eviclentthat the Army would not be able to pro-vide enough men to relieve the brigadeand that, the lack of readily availabletroops would make the role of those whodid arrive one of reinforcement ratherthan relief. The British, who were sup-posed to return to their home islands, hadto stay on to bolster the defenses. Thecrux of the .irmy;s dilemma was the factthat not all of its men were available forassignment; ‘(the passage of legislationin August 1941 permitting the retention

32Churchill, OP. cit., 449.

in service of the selectees, Reserve oflicers,and the National (Am-dsmen still left theproblem of restriction on territorial serv-ice—a problem which was to remain withthe Army until Pearl Harbor brought adeclaration of war.” “

There was really not too much troubletaking care of the first Army contingentto arrive, a small force of about 1,000men built around a pursuit squadron andan engineer battalion. Their convoymade port on 6 August and the units,which came under Marston’s command,moved into a camp set up for them bythe Marines. Howe~’er, preparations forthe arrival of a second Army echelon ofbrigade strength due in mid-Septembermeant that every Marine available had toturn to on camp construction. It wasthe difficulties attendant upon the raisingof this second force that led to the de-cision to hold the Marines in Iceland.3A

The commander of the Army troops ofthe September echelon was senior to Gen-eral Marston; according to the originaloccupation plan, the principle of unity ofcommand was to hold in Iceland, andunder it the senior officer present, regard-less of service of origin, would have as-sumed operational control over all .lmeri-can troops. Acording to this concept,Army Major General Charles H. 130ne-steel would simply have superseded C~en-eral Marston and all hands woldd havecarried on as before. But in the interimbetween June and September, the Army

Chief of Staff, General George C. Mar-

“ Ntfltfytc Plat/nin~, ;1.“ AG memo to ACofS, War Plans Div, 6Sep41.

In order to field the force that finally reachedIceland in September, the Army had to drawon posts and stations all over the U. S. AGWrnO to Army commanders concerned, 14Aug41(located at TAGO ).


shall, had decided that unity of commanddid not go far enough, at least as far asIceland was concerned. He determinedthat if General Bonesteel was to havefull responsibility for the American occu-pation, then he should also have full ad-ministrative as well as operational controlover all the troops in Iceland.

Such a transfer of the Marines fromNavy control could be effected by execu-tive order, as had been done by PresidentWilson in the case of the Marines servingin France in World War I. Unfortu-nately, from the Marines’ point of view,this transfer involved a great deal morethan a simple change of command, Itbrought them under the Army’s adminis-trative and disciplinary system which dif-fered considerably from that of the Navyand with which they were unfamiliar.

The Commandant, who had seen thesystem at work in W’orld War 1, protestedvigorously. On 4 September he wroteAdmiral Stark:

The proposed change will not only necessitatea complete revision of this plan [unity of com-mandl but would introduce many administrativedifficulties, with no corresponding advantagesin so far as command relations are concerned.A complete change of the administrative systemwould again be required when the First MarineBrigade is detached from the Army.=

And again on 5 September:

In view of the existing situation in Icelandand the probable nature of other operations tobe conducted by the Navy elsewhere, the pro-posed plan has many undesirable ramifications.If carried to its logical conclusion, it will mean,at best, frequently shifting Marine units fromthe Navy to the Army and back again, withmuch administrative grief. It will probablychange our concept of command relations injoint operations.~

= MGC memo for Adm Stark, 4Sept41.“ MGC memo for Adm Stark, 5Sep41.

But it was a losing fight, Marshallstated that he had no intention of estab-lishing a precedent and remained ada-mant, The Commandant did not learn ofthe proposed change until it was prac-tically an accomplished fact, and the sup-port he received from the (3NO was luke-warm. The actual transfer of commandtook place on 24 September and GeneralHolcomb w-as directed to report to theSecretary of War on all matters pertain-ing to the brigade.37

The resultant administrative difficultiesdid not prove to be as bad as Holcomb andmany others had feared. The change-over was more of an annoyance than itwas a definite hindrance,; after all, as onebattalion commander commented later,“while administration difficulties may bebothersome they can be handled.” 38 Inthe course of trying to master Army pro-cedures, General Marston wrote the As-istant Commandant:

They have a tremendous amount of paper workwhich the Marine Corps seems able to avoid.The barrage of force orders coming out of staffsections is appalling. Of course we are gettingalong all right but it will be months before weare “oriented in the new direction . . . If thefuture develops another situation similar to thatof this Brigade in Iceland, I hope that you willbe able to have the transfer deferred with atleast two months notice so that the officers con-cerned can get themselves oriented in prepara-tion for the jump.”

One of General Bonesteel’s first acts asthe Commanding General of the new Ice-land Base Command was to send a letterof appreciation to the 1st Marine Brigade(Provisional) which extended his “sin-

3’Presidentialdirective to SecWar and Seth’av,22Sep41.

88MajGen W. A. Worton ltr to CFIC,lFeb57.3’llriGen J. Mar&n ltr to BriGen A. A.

Vandegrift, 100ct41.

MARINE OCCUPATION OF ICELAND

cere thanks for the splendid assistance[given] inthe preparationof the variouscampsites and in numerous other waysprior to and during our arrival in Ice-land. The an~ount of hard and extendedlabor involl-ed is fully recognized anddeeply appreciated,” ‘0

The onrush of winter made it necessaryfor all troops to devote a good part oftheir time to camp maintenance andweatherizing. And as supplies continuedto come in for the depots being built upnear Reykj avikl working parties had tobe provided to empty ships as well as toconstrllct the storehouses needed to pro-tect the equipment. Days rapidly short-ened until there were only four hours ofa sort of hazy daylight to accomplishnecessary functions.

With the continued requirements forcamp construction and preparations foran arctic winter, the bri~~de was not ableto conduct a satisfactory training pro-gram.

Every possible opportunity was seizedby unit commanders, however, to improvethe state of readiness of their men. Manyof the specialists, of course, like thecornnlunicators, engineers, and servicepersonnel received considerable on-the-jobtraining. J$rhile large-scale exerciseswere not, possible, sm:Lll units operated to-

gether as the press of construction al-

lowed. In particular, a considerable

amount of r:tnge firing of crew-served

weapons was accomplisl~ed. Il%en the ~d

Battalion of the tjth &Iarines was moved

to ii camp too far away from Reykj avik to

make it feasible t o use its men for working

part ies, tl]e commanders of 1/6 and 2/6

agreed to alternate ill fllrnishing working

40CG, IBC Itr to CG, 1st MarBrig ( J?rov ),27 Sep41, quoted in Zimmrrmun Mfltl, I’older 129.

I)art ies “in order to get in a minimumamount of train ing. ” ‘i The 3d Battalion,encamped in a pass that lay right in thepath of winter winds howling out of themountains near Hvalfjordur, was forcedto “button-up” for the winter almost assoon as it shifted in September.

The lack of adequate unit training hasbeen emphasized by some critics of theMarines’ employment in Iceland. Train-ing did not stop; it was hampered andcurtailed by the weather and the require-ments of working details, but it did go ondespite all the very real obstacles. Themen, trained and indoctrinated as am-phibious assault troops, however, wereperturbed when they heard the news ofPearl Harbor while huddled around thestoves in their N issen huts. Were theyto be left forgotten in the wrong ocean?

Once the war broke out in earnest theNavy, too, did not view with favor the em-ployment of a Marine Brigade on a de-fensive mission in Iceland. The Marineswere needed in the Pacific and pressurewas put on the Army to get them relieved.Plans were laid to send a convoy with8,000 men from h“ew York on 15 Januaryto provide the brigade’s relief and returntransportation. But, like so mnny pre-vious false starts, this was not to be. Sev-eral of the ships in this convoy werediverted elsewhere and the resulting trooplift was only enough to relieve one battal-ion. General Marston picked 3/6, whichcheerfully turned over its wind-blownbillets to the Army troops and embarkedon 28 January. The battalion left Ice-land on the 31st and reached New Yorkon 11 February.

A start had been made and the brigadebegin negotiations to turn over its camps,

“ Gen O. P. Smith ltr to ~CofS, G–3, 7Feb57.

46 PE~RL H.4RB0R TO ~UADALCANAL

defense mission, and heavy equipment tothe Army. The convoy carrying the finalrelief put into Reykjavik on 3 March, andthe Marines began loading out the follow-ing day. .It 1010 on 8 March, GeneralMarston closed his (.71> OIL shore andopened it on board the USS McCa.u’7ey;at, noon that date the brigade returnedto the j urisdict ion of the 3Tavy. It is in-teresting to note that this is the only in-stauce in World War 11 where a Marineunit was “detached for service with the,Lrmy by order of the. President.:’ In thenutny joint, operations thzt followed, allSer},ices adhered to tl~e priucil)]e of unity

of conunanc]. General Bonesteel recog-nized the Marines’ dislike for the “de-tached service” concept but in a final let-ter to (}eneral Mal’ston commended thebrigade whose “every officer and enlistedman gaye his whole heartecl sl~pport andcooperation to our efforts to a muchgreater extent than mere compliance withinstructions impliecl.:’ 4’

The brigade landed at, h“ew York on~ZS~l:lrch aI~cl was immediately disbanded.‘The 5th Defense Battalion ~~-asorderedl-o Parris Island, the 6th Marines to theSecond Division at Camp F.lliott, nnd the:Supportiug units to their l)arent organiza-tions wherever those might, be.

Thus lmssed into l~istory an nncomfort-:Ible and at times f rust rat il~g mission, themilitary value of which was not, clearly:~ppare~lt at the time. The Mariue Corps’(expansion pro~ram in late 1941 ancl early

19+! was admittedly haml)ered by the ab-

sence of such a sizeable body of w-ell-

= CG, IBC ltr to CG, 1st MarBri K(Prm’),lMar42, quoted in Zimmerman 11S’S’, Folder 130.

trained regulars and reserves. The bri-gade bad relieved no appreciable numberof British troops, which had been the orig-inal purpose of the ~imericau occupation.There is no concrete evidence that theGermans ever seriously considered attack-ing Iceland, although it is conceivable,even if somewhat unlikely, that the knowl-edge of the presence of the brigade mighthave deterred such an attack. The mili-tary value of the Iceland occupationstemmed from rigorous service in the field.In the many scattered and detached posts,heavy responsibilities fell on the shouldersof the young company grade oflicersand hT(XOs. .fdversity developed andstrengthened leadership. Once the bri-gade reached Iceland there m-as a n~ini-mum rotation of officers and men. Thisstability of personnel gave the command-ers an opportunity, seldom afforded inpeacetime, to develop teamwork and unitesprit de corps. ITpon return to theIynited States, almost all ranks received apromotion and all units of the brigadewere drawn on heavily to provide leadersfor newly activated units, The 6th Ma-rines furnished large drafts to the raiderand parachute battalions, as well as tonnits of the 2d Division.

The military know-how, discipline, andqualities of leadership developed in Ice-land were invaluable in providing cadresof experienced Marines around which tofornl these new units. As a result, the6th Regiment, which sailed from SanDiego for h’ew Ze&nd in late October19+2, contained only a very small percent-age of “Icel:~lld Marines.>? The iflilitarywealth lmd been shared.

CHAPTER 5

The Marine Corps on the Eve of War 1

THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT:DEFENSIVE EXPANSION

While war came to Europe in Septem-ber 1939, the LTnited States did not for-mally enter the struggle against the AxisPowers for another 27 months. Theformal declarations of war did not, how-ever, pro ject the nation directly from astate of isolation and indifference intoactive belligerency. Although the UnitedStates declared its neutrality—our aimbeing to avoid conflict while guardingagainst totalitarian penetration of theWestern Hemisphere—we were graduallydrawn deeper and deeper into short-of-war operations in support of GreatBritain and her allies,

Initially, the Administration movedwith caution. In the years following the“war to end all wars,” disappointment inthe League of Nation’s failure and theworld-wide depression of the 1930’s hadserved to increase our isolationist tend-encies. Aware of the national sentiment,zPresident Roosevelt initiated a programfor gradually increasing the armed serv-ices, strengthening our bases, and develop-

‘ Unless otherwise noted the nraterial in thischapter is derived from ~,lfC .lnRe@s, 193%

1941.

‘ The Roper Poll in September 1%39 showedthat extreme interventionist sentiment waslimited to Z.Syo of the total population; 37~opreferred to have nothing to do with the }varringnations. R. E. Sherwood, h’oosecclt and Hop-kins, .-in Intimate History (New York : Harperand Brother, 1948 ), 128.

ing a foundation for the expansion of ournational resources and industry. On 8September 1939, seven days after Hitler’sarmies crossed into Poland? the Presidentofficially declared a limited national emer-gency. As the rising tide of Nazi aggres-sion swept over Europe in 1940 and 1941,Americans awakened more and more tothe peril and supported increasingly thenational policy of strengthening ourarmed forces.

As of 30 June 1939, two months beforeHitler’s armies launched their BZitzhwieg,Marine Corps strength stood at 19,432 of-ficers and enlisted? of whom 4,840 (in-cluding aviation components) were as-signed to the Fleet Marine Force. FMFground forces were organized in two unitsoptimistically designated “brigades,>’ eachin actuality an understrength infantryregiment 4 reinforced by skeletonized sup-porting elements: 1st Brigade based onthe east coast (Quantico ), 2d Brigadeon the west coast (San Diego). Eachbrigade had the support of a Marine air-craft group of corresponding numericaldesignation, and FMF aviation furtherboasted a scouting squadron (VMS-3)based in the Virgin Islands.

However, conversion of internationaltension into armed conflict in Europe re-sulted in a marked quickening of United

3Table DGB–220@DJP’ prepared by PersAcctSect, RecordsBr, E’ersDept, HQM(3, 26Now54.

45th and 6th MarRegts of WW1 fame, basedon the east and west coasts respectively.

47

48 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAN’AL

States defense efforts. And from thatpoint on the Commandant’s Annuzl Re-ports reflect a steady succession of upwardrevisions in personnel planning until by30 November 1941 total strength stood at65,881, the number, give or take a few,with which the Marine Corps would enterthe war against the Axis Powers a weeklater at Pearl Harbor.

But of greater significance than theincrease in over-all strength was the grow-ing proportion of that strength repre-sented by the Fleet Marine Force. Fiscal1940 saw the numbers of the Corps’ strik-ing arm more than doubled : from 4,525 to

9,749; and this figure in tllrn had morethan tripled by 30 h’ovember 1941, reach-ing 29j532. One factor largely responsiblefor this impressive increme was nlobiliza-tion in No\-enlber 1940 of the entire Or-ganized Marine Corps Reserve, bothground and air, thus making available alarge number 5of officers and men, at leastpartially trained, for incorporation intothe FMF with a minimum of delay.

This increased strength made possibleorganization of a unit larger than theMarine Corps hzd ever operated before:

the triangular division, consisting of threeinfantry regiments, an artillery regiment:supported by engineer> reconnaissance,and signal units plus medical and otherservice troops. Thus on 1 February 1941the brigades stationed on the east coastand west coast ~vere officially activatedas the 1st Marine I)ivision and 2d MarineDivision respectively. T’o efiect the nec-

essary expansion, cadres were drawn from

existing units around which to build andtrain new units of the same type. Thisproved a S]OWand ]aborious process, and

‘ Total of 5,241 officers and enlisted,

months passed before either division couldbe built, up to authorized strength.

Growth of Marine Aviation kept pacewith that of the g-round forces, and againthat, pace looked faster on paper than itwas in actuality. Simultaneously withthe conversion of the two brigades intodivisions, the east coast and west coastFMF aircraft groups, based at Quanticoand San Diego respectively, were acti-vated as the 1st LLnd!2c1Marine AircraftWings (Jf.~W). ~~ut, as with the divi-sions, bringing them up to authorizedstren.g!ll proved no overnight process.

Inltlally, each could boast, only ~ singleaircraft group of mixed composition,designated M.lC~-11 and MAG-21 respec-tively. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, FMFair personnel numbered 2,716 otlicers andenlisted out of a total aviation strengthof 5,911.C These were divided among thetwo wings and the detached squadron inthe Virgin Islands. The 1st MAJJ7 hadremained based at Quantico. But theconling of war found the 2d MAW scat-tered far and wide, with a squadron atWake Island: a detachment at MidwayIsland, and the balance of the wing atEwa> on Oahu, T. H.’

ThoLIg-h the two divisions and two

wings comprised the N1arine Clorps: prin-

cipal striking arm , considerations of im-

‘ Tbe two groups were identical in composi-tion hut slightly unequal in strength. Eachcontained 2 fighter, 2 scout-bomber, 1 observa-tion, and 1 utility squadrons. MAG-11 had 100operational aircraft to 90 for MAG-21. The

l’ir,qin Islands detachment operated 8 utility-scouting planes, bringing the total of FMF air-craft of all types to 198. Altogether, MarineAyiation included 13 Squadrons and 204 opera-tional planes of all types.

‘ “AciI~lillistr:ltive History of U. S. MarineCorps in World J1’:lr II” (MS in HistBr Ar-chives ), 1W hereiuaf ter cited as .4@nLinHis t.


armament consisted of antiaircraft andcoast defense guns.8 The first four ofthese, with consecutive numerical desig-nations, were activated during fiscal 1940.By the time of Penrl Harbor the numberhad reached seven with two more in proc-ess of formation.g

Concurrent with increased numberscame increased responsibilities. TheNavy, too, was expanding at an unprece-

dented rate, diverting more Marines fromthe FMF to perform the Corps’ tradi-tional functions: security of naval instal-lations ashore and service afloat. By 30Sovernber 1941, ships’ detachments hadgrown to 68, manned by a total of 3,793Marines.’”

Ashore the Navy’s stepped-up trainingprograms, particularly in naval aviation,created more and more bases, security ofwhich imposed a serious additional drainon Marine man power. In fiscal 1940 the

Corps was called upon to provide guarddetachments at four new naval air sta-tions in the Continental United States andthree in U. S. overseas territories.” Thefollowing fiscal year added another four

‘ The genesis of the defense battalion was at-

tributable to two factors : (a) the acceptanceof the advanced base concept and its logical tac-

tical requirements; and (b) during the pre-World War II period, while the nation was

apathetic towards rearmament and/or militaryexpansion, an increase in Marine strength, un-

der the guise of a defense force, was politically

more acceptable.

‘ CNO ltr to CMC, 9Dec41, Encl (a).

mCompilation from muster rolls closed

30Nov41 (located at Unit Diary Sect, HQMC ).

“ NAS Key West and Jacksonville, Fla. ;

Tongue Point, Oreg. ; Alameda, Calif. ; Sitka and

Kodiak, .41aska; and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

air stations, a naval ammunition depot,

a naval supply depot,12 and 18 other newinstallations ranging in character and lo-cation from David Taylor Basin, Car-derock, Maryland, to Naval Magazine,Indian Island, Washington. Further-more, garrison detachments were detailedto twelve stations overseas, as will be dis-

cussed subsequently.

Simultaneously with filling the Navy’sdemands, the Marine Corps assumed ad-ditional security problems of its own asexisting bases expanded and new ones

were established. (See below.) Thus,the period under discussion saw the acti-vation of seven new guard companies ofa non-FMF character: at Quantico, SanDiego, Dunedin (Florida), and Bremer-ton (Washington).

GRO WTZ/ OF MARIATE TRAZNINGA.VD OPERA TZONAL BASES

Inevitably the problems of housing,training, and equipping rapidly expand-

ing manpower imposed increasing pres-sure on the Corps’ existing facilities,pegged as these were to peacetime needsand the economy of depression years.

Following World War I, activities

strictly Marine Corps in nature had beenconcentrated generally at the recruit train-ing depots at Parris Island and SanDiego~3 and at the operational bases atQuantico and San Diego, where the East

o NAS Cape May, N. J.; Miami, Fla. ; CorPusChristi, Tex.; and Quonset Point, R. I. ; NAD

Burns City, Ind. ; NSD, Oakland, Calif.

“ Generally, all recruits from east of the Mis-

sissippi were trained at Parris Island, all from\vest at San Diego.

THE M.4RINE CORPS ON THE EVE OF W.4R 51

Coast and West Coast components of theFleet Marine Force were stationed. FMFaviation was based nearby at MCAS,Quantico, and NAS, San Diego.

Marines first laid eyes on Parris Islandearly in the Civil War when they partici-pated in the naval expedition whichseized adjoining Port Royal. This servedas an important naval base throughoutthe war, but the Navy did not begin con-struction of installations on the islandproper until 1883. The first record of aseparate Marine detachment setting upthere permanently occurs in June 1893.The post did not begin functioning, how-ever, in its present capacity until &’ovem-ber 1915 when the East Coast Marine re-cruit depots were transferred there fromNorfolk and Philadelphia.

Retained as a permanent base afterWorld War I, Parris Island continued itsrole as the point of initial contact withmilitary life for all newly enlisted Ma-

rines from the East. Partly for this rea-

son, its facilities were maintained at a

fairly high level during the lean years of

the 1920’s and 1930’s. Nevertheless, the

flood of recruits soon overflowed existing

facilities and forced a rapid expansion.

Thus in 194041, even as the full train-

ing program continued and was intensi-

fied, new barracks, a new post exchange,

and a new rifle range were added to those

already operating at full capacity.

The Recruit Depot, San Diego, which

had operated as such since August 1923,experienced similar problems and arrived

at similar solutions. As events proved,

both of these bases managed to keep

abreast of the expansion program

throughout the war and thus accomplish

their basic missions.Much of San Diego’s success in its pri-

mary mission was owed to the activationof nearby Camp Elliott in mid-1940 tofurnish advanced training and serve as a

base for West Coast elements of the FMF.

Until then San Diego had housed both

of those activities, and with the speed-

ing-up expansion program they were be-

ginning to get in each other’s way. The

first FMF units began the transfer early

in 1941 and greatly eased the pressure;

though, as will be seen, Camp Elliott

itself was eventually pressured out of

existence.

Quantico, acquired by the Marine Corps

immediately following U. S. entry into

World ?Var I, found its difficulties less

readily resolved. During the interim be-tween wars, this post assumed a position

of paramount importance in the develop-

ment of Marine amphibious doctrine and

techniques, and in the training of Marine

officers and technicians. The passage of

years saw additional educational units

move in until the Virginia base became

the center of higher learning for the Ma-

rine Corps.

Advent of the national emergency soon

made it apparent that, no practicable phys-

ical expansion would enable Quantico to

continue these activities, all rapidly grow-

ing and intensifying in scope, and at the

same time serve as home base for east

coast FMF units, especially when opera-

tional forces were to reach division size.

Parris Island, hard pressed to keep

abreast of its own problems, could do

52 PEARL HAR~OR TO GUADALCANAL

little to relieve the presure. Clearly thesituation called for construction of an en-tirely new and extensive base for FMFoperations on the eastern seaboard. Thisrequired Congressional approval, whichwas obtained on 15 February 1941.

The site selected lay in the New River-Neuse River area of the 3Torth Carolinacoast. The surveying and purchasing ofland began immediately. By the end ofApril this preliminary work had beencompleted, and construction of TentCamp #1, Marine Barracks, Ne~v Rivercommenced. The isolated location of thearea made development an enormous task.Transportation to the site was aln~ostnonexistent, electric power lines wereeither lacking or greatly overloaded andable to provide but a fraction of the curr-ent needed. .4nd the necessary labor

could be obtained only by offering specialinducements to workers. Both the MarineCorps and civilian contractors approachedthese problems to such good effect that bythe summer’ of 1941 the fiw-fronl-com-pleted camp had reached a stage of devel-opment that mrrde it available for rise.

The fledgling 1st Marine Division, stillunderstrength, ~4 moved in shortly after itsreturn from maneuvers in the Caribbean.There it participated in a series of an~-phibious exercises, one with the Arnly>s1st Infantry ~)ivision, the fiLWt of four.krmy divisions to receive sLIch training

jointly with Marine units or under the

direction of llarine oficers.

hen of the Marine division pitchecl into improve camp conditions while continu-ing their intensive training for combat.

‘4While the table of organization listed three,the 1st MarDiv had only tw-o infantry regimentsat this time.

(’ivilian contractors pushed constructionof permanent buildings so effectively thatsoon varions specialized training andschooling facilities and other units begantransferring to the new base from bothQ(lantico and Parris Islmnd. The 1st Ma-rine Division, however, had long sincedeparted beyond the seas by the timeMarine Barracks, New River, reached thestage of development where the powerstlmt be saw fit to dignify it, late in 19+2,with the nan)e Catnp I.ejenne.

l,ike tile division, the 1st Marine Air-craft, Wing began outgrowing its Quan-t ico facilities long before it achieved fullst rcngt h. Even while development pro-gressed at Sew River, the Marine Corpsobtained authorization for a new air

base nearby. Cunningham Field, CherryPoint, North (’aro]ina, was designated aMarine Corps Air Station for develop-nmnt purposes on 1 December 1941, andwork begs n on what, would become by

comn~issioning day, 20 May 1942, a vastnew base capable of hand] ing the greaterl)art of a completely bnilt-up Marine air-(Oraft wing.l:

(h the west coast, (‘amp Elliott, lessIlanlpered than Quantico by :1multiplicityot’ activities, proved capable initially ofllillldlillg tile vastly increased ]O:Ld of acl-

I-anced train ingl though the camp was ex-

lm])ded :Lnd developed to many times its

original size in the I)rocess. Its 29,000

acres housed the, 2d l~arine I)ivis ion fromits activation m~til its departure for thePacific. It also t)6iCillllE? the home of theMarine (’orps’ tirst tank training centerand tile infantry training center for)\nnlerwus replacenlent drafts.

“ Affrnit?Hist, 159.

THE MARINE CORI’S OX THE EVE OJ!’ W.$R 53

During the years between wars, the per-vasive spirit of pacifism which led to re-peated attempts by this country to cooper-ate in reduction of naval armaments andin international treaties militated againstadequate defense preparations, as didbudgetary restrictions. Such peace asthese measures :~cl~ie~’edl}l’oved~ll~easy atbest, but the fact that the U. S. lived upto its agreements, whereas some other na-tions did not, contributed toward makingolw defense program a shadow of whatit might, have been. This was particwlarly serious in the Pacific, N will be seen.But in 1939%41, with war flaming throughEurope, the more immediate danger lay inthe Atlantic. where Hitler’s submarinesappeared nearly invincible.

In the fall of 1939 the United Statesarmed forces were barely adequate for thedefense of the Western Hemisphere. Aslong as the national sentiment did notsanction total rearmament and militaryexpansion, the administration wtLs forcedto rely on existent means and a partialmobilization of both nmnpower and mate-rial. I?nfortunate]y, the. ln]l in militaryoperations in F,urope during the winterof 1939-1940 seemed to justify publiclllXLth~ and n~ade the problem of rearma-ment more ditlicult for the l’resiclent. andhis military planners.

Britain’s historical donlillance of theAtlantic sea 1anes h:Ld gi veil us a falsesense of security there, an(l pernl itted theUnited States to commit a major part of

‘“ Unless otherwise noted the materinl ia thisand the following sections is tleri~ed fronlHmi.spit rrc Ilrfrt).w; Undcclarm7 ll-ur; S“tratc~icPlanning; Battle of tll c Atlantic,

tlie Savy to guard against .Japanese ag-gression in the Pacific. However, theGerman ofielisive in the spring of 1940served to jolt Americans from their com-placency. Germ:ul troops overran Den-mark, Norway, the I~ow Countries, andFrance. President Roosevelt recognizedthe danger in this and caused a shift inour military policy to provide greatersecuritl~ ill tile .Itlantic.

Dur& the sunmler and fall of 1940,Congress stepped up the procurement of:LiL’CL’ilft, mobilized the reserves, passedselective service legislation and launchedthe t~~o-ocean navy building program.]tut completion of these measures wouldtake time, and we had no assurance thatthe Axis partners would sit idly by andenjoy the fruits of their initial aggression.To in~plement the rearmament program,I’resident Roosevelt adopted the policyof i~idi]lg ];ritain and RLlssi:L(after rTLLlle1941) while cent inuing diplomatic rela -t ions with Germany and ,Jap:Ln. ~f~ithindnst ry expanding and the armed forcesilicmasing in size and equipment, the .kd-nlinistration did every tl~ing short of war

to bolster Britain’s tottering position.In the fall of 1940 ~ritain and the

I“nited States completed negotiations\vhich culminated in one of the most ex-t raordinary military deals in history.Briti~in, hol(ling numerous Caribbean pos-sessions, desperately needed additionalconvoy vessels to l)rotect her vital Atlanticsupply 1ine against, submarine depreda-tions; the U. S., possessor of numerouso~erage destroyers, wished to Strengthen

defense of eastern ap~)roaches to tl~e main-

lancl and the Pananla C’anal. <ks a result

of this situtttimlj on 2 ~eptember 1940 the

I‘. ~. agreed to s\v:Lp 50 of these destroy-


ers17 in return for 99-year leases on cer-tain base sites in various strategicallyplaced 13ritish possessions: the Bahamas,Jamaica, Antigua, Saint Lucia, Trinidad,and British Guiana.

Since plans called for development ofthese sites into naval activitiesof varyingnature, the first Americans to move inwere Marines of the several security guarddetachments. The same held true in thecase of two additiomd bases not includedin the destroyer deal: at Argentia ( Newf-oundland) and in Bermuda. Thus, whilein the throes of expanding the FMFj theMarine Corps found itself, saddled withstill more garrison duty beyond the con-tinental limits of the United States.

DEFENSE OF THE WEf.7TERiVHEMISPHERE : MAA?TIA’IQUE

The fall of France and the Netherlandsalarmed the tTnited States to the dangerthat New World possessions of thesecountries 15 might fall into Germany’shands should Hitler force the conquerednations to cede them, or to provide servic-ing there for German L’-Boats operatingin the Atlantic.

Martinique, the administrative and eco-

nomic center of France’s colonies in theCaribbean, became the focal point of

‘7These were 1,200-ton, flush-deck four-stack-ers, vintage of World War I, many of whichhad been laid up since that struggle and hadto be recommissioned. By the time the tradewas completed ( 10Apr41 ), the U. S. had becomemore deeply involved and threw in an additional10 escort vessels of the “Lake” class CoastGuard cutter.

mDutch Guiana, Aruba, and Curacao; FrenchGuiana on the South American continent ; SaintPierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland; Mar-tinique, Guadaloupe, and several smaller islandsin the West Indies.

American interest and concern. Forshould the three French warships there,including the aircraft carrier Beam(loaded with 106 American-manufacturedfighter planes destined for pre-VichyFrance), be taken over by the enemy, thesecurity of British and American ship-ping in the Atlantic would be seriouslythreatened. Furthermore, the FrenchHigh Commissioner for the Antilles, RearAdmiral Georges Robert had declared hisallegiance to the Vichy government andwas emphatic in his refusal to acceptAmerican and British offers of “protec-tion.”

One solution, and one which was imme-diately discarded, called for an Americanbreak with Vichy and the occupation ofthe islands by American forces. It wasnot expected, however, that Admiral Rob-ert would yield without a fight-and wewere not ready to scrap our neutral pol-icy and draw accusations of Yankee im-perialism from friendly Western Hemis-phere nations. Dire necessity, however,required some plan of operation. On8 ,July 1940, the Joint Planning Commit-tee completed a plan for an expeditionaryforce, to be readied for embarkation fromNew York on or about 15 July, The 1stMarine Brigade ‘9 was earmarked for theinitial landing force, to be followed by atask force based on the Army’s 1st Infan-try Division.

%ile the expeditionary force wasreadied, officials of the Departments ofState and Navy worked out a compromiseto relieve the tense situation. The Ameri-

“ The 1st MarBrig then based at GuantanamoBay, Cuba, was composed of 5th Mar, 1st Bn,10th Mar (artillery ). Ist EngBn, 1st kledBn,three provisional (casual) companies, BrigHqCo,and one company each of service troops, chemi-cal troops, tanks, and motor transport.

THE MARINE CORPS ON THE EVE OF WAR 55

can representative in negotiations thatfollowed, Rear Admiral John W. Green-slade, arrived at an agreement with Ad-miral Robert to maintain the status quo;and the ‘ihot:’ Martinique problem wastemporarily resolved without the UnitedStates being forced into military action.

However, heightened tensions duringthe late summer of 1940 again indicatedthe possibility of French connivance withGermany. Accordingly, late in October1940 the President “ . . . asked the Navyto draft a plan for an emergency opera-tion. . . .“ 20 This plan called for an as-sault on Martinique, by a naval force in-cluding a landing party of some 2,800Marines of the 1st Marine Brigade, to besupported by two reinforced Army regi-ments. Later plans increased the size ofthe force; revised estimates were based onthe possibility of more than token resist-ance from the seven to eight thousandFrench soldiers and sailors on the island.

Fortunately, the operation againstMartinique died stillborn. AdmiralGreenshide reached a new “gentlemen’sagreement’> with Admiral Robert., al-though there were frequent instances laterwhen President Roosevelt still thought itmight be necessary to occupy the island.The Marine Corps remained preparedfor possible action until Admiral Robertsurrendered his command to AmericanVice .ldmiral tJohn S. H~ver in June1943.

THE AZORES

As early as spring 1940, PresidentRoosevelt was deeply concerned over thepossibility of a German invasion of thePortuguese Azores. These islands lieathwart the vital shipping lanes between

mQuoted in Hemisphere Defense, Chap IV, 6.

448777 0—58—5

the L“nited States and the Mediterranean,and Europe and South America. Whilethe Army considered them of little valuein Western Hemisphere defense considera-tions, their danger was measurable bytheir value to Germany. From air basesand naval facilities in the islands, Ger-man aircraft and submarines could sortieafter the bulk of British shipping.

Our deep concern for the safety and in-tegrity of the islands led to a series of dis-cussions with both the British, Portugal:sally, and the Lisbon government. ByOctober 1940, United States Army andNavy planning officers had drafted a planfor a surprise seizure of the Azores.However, the plan to land one reinforceddivision was built on sand: the Army didnot have the necessary troops to commit,nor did the Navy have adequate ships totransport and support the landing force.And, politically, it was contrary to Amer-ican policy at this time to become a. defacto participant in the European war.

By May 1941 intelligence estimatesfrom Europe again indicated the possibil-ity of a German movement into the Iber-ian peninsula and German occupation ofthe Azores and adjacent ishmds. On the22d of that month, President Rooseveltdirected the Army and Navy to draft anew plan for an expedition to occupy theAzores. This plan (GRAY), approvedby the Joint Board on 29 May, providedfor a landing force of 28,OOO combattroops, half Marine and, half Army; theNavy was responsible for transportingand supporting the force. Major GeneralH. M. Smith, USMC, would command thelanding force, under Rear AdmiralErnest J. King, the expeditionary com-mander.

However, while these preparations werebeing made, other factors developed and


altered the originalmission of the mixedforce. Portugal was opposed to an An~er-ican occupation of the Azores, and UnitedStates planners became preoccupied withthe threat of German efforts to occupySouth America, particularly 13razil. Thesucceeding weeks witnessed a change inboth the urgency for the Azores oper~tionand in the mission of the Marine con~ple-ment of the. Azores force.

During the early part of ,June, intelli-gence sources in Europe produced credit-able evidence that C~ern~any did not planto invade Spain ancl Portugal but in-tended rather to attack in tile oppositedirection. Russia would be Hitler”s nextobjective. The forecast of the Gernlanplans put an end to American fears forthe safety of the Azores, and permittedthe United States to clivert the Marinesto Iceland.

How thin the Marine Corps hacl tospread its manpower in order to fulfillits many commitments is indicated by thetable that follows showing the distribu-tion effective 30 November 1941, on theeve of Pearl Harbor. The fact that thefigures qnoted do not. add up to totalCorps strength is accounted for by omis-sion of minor categories in~rolving indi-viduals or small groups of men.

Continental U. S’. (TLOft-FiWF)

Major Marine Corps Bases ‘------------ 14,707Posts & Stations (43) ------------------ 10, 089Headquarters & Staff ------------------ 780

Recruiting (4 districts) ________________ 847

Total --------------------------- 26, 423

Posts & Stations (24) ------------------ 3,367Tactical Units ‘2----------------------- 5, 498Shipboard Detachments (68) ----------- 3, 793

Total ---------------------------- 12, 658

Fleet Ma?<ne Force, continental G. 8.

1st MarDir -------------------------- 8,9182d MarDiv (less dets) ----------------- 7, 5402d DefBn _____________________________ 8651st MA}v ----------------------------- 1, 3012d MAW (less dets) ------------------ 682Miscellaneous _________________________ 633

Total --------------------------- 19,939

5 DefBns (Pacific) -------------------- 4, 3992d MAW ( elements) ( Pacific) __________ 7332d MarDiv (elements) ( Pacific) -------- 489

Total --------------------------- 5,621Total above categories ___________ 64, 641Total strength Marine Corps _____ 65, 881

n Quantico, Parris Island, San Diego, CampElliott, New Ri~7er.

2’ -lth Mar ( Philippines), 801; 1st SepBn(Philippines), 725; Ist MarBrig (Prov ) (Ice-land ), 3,972.

PART TWO

war Comes

CHAPTER 1

Prewar Situation in the Pacific

SUMMARY OF NEGOTIA TIONS ‘

In the late years of the 1$X11Century andthe early decades of the 20th, ,Japan setout to gain more territory. Consistentlyfollowing a policy of encroachment inAsia and the Pacific, and retreating onlywhen confronted with the threat of supe-rior force, the ,Japanese Empire steadilygrew in size and strength. Warning sig-nals of an impending clash between ,Japanand the Western nations with extensiveinterests in the orient became increasingly

emdent. In the 1930’s when these nationswere gripped by economic depression andtheir military expenditures were cut tothe bone, Japan struck brazenly.

In 1931 Japanese troops invaded Man-churia and no concerted international mil-itar~ effort was made to halt, the seizure.An ineffectual censure by the I~ague ofNations, far from discouraging ,Japan,emboldened her to further action. An-grily, the Japanese delegates stalked outat Geneva and gave formal notice of in-tention to withdraw from the I~ague.The country thickened its curtain of se-crecy which shrouded the I,eague-man-

‘ Unless otherwise notecl the material in thisseethm is derived from Senate I)oc No. 244,79thCongress, 2d Session, Report of the Joint Com-mittee on the Investigation of tile Pearl Harbor

A ttudc (Washington : GPO, 1946), hereinaftercited as Pearl Harbor Rept and the Committee’srecord of 39 volumes of hearings and exhibits,hereinafter cited as IIearings Record; G. N.

Steiger, A History of the Far East (Boston :Ginn and CO., 1944).

dated islands awarded Japan as its shareof the spoil of C~erman possessions lost in11’orld War I. In 1934 the Japaneseserved notice that they would no longerabide by the limitations of the J~Tashing-ton Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1922.Finally, in 1937, Japan attacked Chinaand horrified the world with the excessescomtnitted by her soldiers in the infamousRape of N’ankingo But still there was noeffective military action to curb this ramp-ant aggression.

In this period Japan was not withoutsupporters. Germany and Italy, bent onsimilar programs of territorial aggran-dizement in Europe and Africa, madecommon cause with the Japanese. These“his” powers signed a mutual assistancepact in 1937, ostensibly aimed at the Com-munist Cominform, but in essence as ashow of strength to forestall interferencewith their plans of conquest. In August1940. after the outbreak of war in Europeand the fall of France, Germany forcedthe Vichy Government to consent to Jap-anese occupation of northern Indo- China.The three predatory nations combinedagain in less than a month, this time inthe Tripartite Treaty of 27 Septemberwhich promised concerted action by theAxis in case of war with the United States.

The United States, traditionally afriend of China and a supporter of an“Open Door” policy in Asia, strongly op-posed ,Japanese moves to establish hegem-ony over the strife-torn Chinese Republic.

59


While the political sentiment of the ma-

jority of ~mericans in the late 1930’s

WOUIC1 condone no direct military inter-

vention, the government and the nation

were openly sympathetic to the ~hinese

cause. Both moral and legal embargoes

agy~inst munitions shipments to Japan

were put into effect and increasing

amounts of material aid given to China.

American pilots, including members ofthe armed forces, were permitted to volun-teer to fly for the Chinese Air Forceagainst the ,Japanese.2

By early 1941 ,Japan was hurt in pride$purse, and potency as a result of .lrnericanpolitical and economic measures taken tohalt its expansion. In March a new Am-bassador, Admiral Nomura, was sent toWashington to negotiate a settlement of,Tapanese-American differences. He wasconfronted with a statement of four prin-ciples which represented the basic An~eri-can posit ion in negot iations. These were:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity andthe so~ereignty of each and all nations:

(2) Support of the principle of noninterfer-ence in the internal affairs of other countries ;

(3) SupPort of the principle of equality, in-cluding eqna]ity of commercial opportunity;

(4) Nt)ndisturbance of the .$taf?{s quo in thePacific except as the status quo may be alteredby peacefal menns.”

In retrospect, it seems obvious thatthere was little likelihood of ,Japan ac-cepting any of these principles as a basisfor negotiations. At the time, however,considerable and protracted effort wasmade to resolve differel~ces. Postwar evi-dence indicates that the ,Japanese Premier,Prince Konoye, as well as AmbassadorNomura were sincere in their efforts to

2 United &Yates Rt’latiwrs with Cl! ina (Wash-ington : I)ept of State, 1949), 24.

‘ Hearinfl.s Record, Part 2, 1103–1104.

achieve a peaceful solution of the threat-ening situation in the Pacific. It wasnot Konoye, however, who called the turnin Imperial policy, but the JapaneseArmy. And the Army adamantly re-fused to consider any concession thatmight cause it to lose face.

.&fter Germany attacked Russia in June1941, the longtime threat of Soviet inter-vention in ,Japan’s plans for expansionwas virtually eliminated. The JapaneseArmy moved swiftly to grab more terri-tory and to add to its strength. SouthernIndo-China was occupied and conscriptsand reservists were called Lip. ln the face

of this fresh evidence of ,Japanese in-

transigence, President Roosevelt froze all

,Japanese assets in the lJnit.ed States, ef-

fectively severing the last commercial

contact between the two nations.

In October the Army forced the ~onoye

cabinet to resign and replaced it with a

government entirely sympathetic to its

position.’ The new premier, General

Toj o, sent a special representative, SaburuI<urusu, to ~~Tashington to assist h“ornuraand revitalize negotiations. The Japa-nese diplomats were in an untenable posi-tion, They were instructed, in effect, toget the United States to accept ,Japaneseterritorial seizures on ,Japanese terms.Their mission was hopeless, but behind itsfacade of seeming interest in true negotia-tions, Tojo’s go~ernment speeded Up itspreparations for war. As far as the<Japanese leaders were concerned, war withtl~e Vnited States was a now or never]}roposition, since .~merican-inspired eco-nom ic sanctions would soon rob them ofthe necessary raw materials, particularly

‘ M. Kate. The Lost War (New York: A. A.Knopf, 1946), 48.

PREWAR SITUATION INT THE PACIFIC 61

oil, which they had to have to supply theirmilitary machine.

The only event that, might have haltedJapanese war preparations would havebeen a complete almeg-ation by the [Jnitec]States of its principles of negotiation.On 22 November Ambassador Klw{u+u re-ceived the third and last of a series ofcommuniques from ,Tapan setting dead-lines for successful negotiations. He wasinformed that, after 29 November thingswere “automatically going to happen.” 6

As far as the ,Japanese were concernednegotiations were at an end and the timefor direct action had come. The twoJapanese envoys were carefully instructed,however, not to give the impression thattalks had been broken off. The stage hadbeen set for “the day that will live ininfamy.”

After an extremely thorough investiga-tion of the negotiations during this periodprior to the outbreak of the war, a ,JointCongressional Comnlittee summed up theduplicity of Japanese negotiations in thissuccinct statement:

In considering the negotiations in their en-tirety the conclusion is inescapable that Japanhad no concessions to make and that her pro-gram of aggression was immutable.”

JAPANE8E WAR PLAN 7

Both the United States and ,Japan haddeveloped plans for war in the Pacificlong before December 1941. Each nation

‘ lfcari?]~,$Record, Part 12,Exhibit No. 1: 165,6Pearl Harbor Rept, 49,

‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Peurl Harbor Rept;

Hcari?t~s Record, Part 13, Exhibits 8–81), Japan-ese Records; USSBS ( Pac ), NavAnalysisDiy,(“ampaigns of the Pacific War ( Washington:GPO, 1946 ), hereinafter cited as Campaigns oftlte Pacilic War.

considered the other to be its most proba-ble enemy. There was, however, a funda-mental moral difference between the re-spective war plans. The Americansplanned for defense and retaliation in caseof attack; the ,Japanese intended to strikethe first blow. (See Map 1, Map Section)

Japan’s prime objective was economicself-sufficiency, and the prize she soughtwas control of the rich natural resourcesof Southeast Asia and the islands of theEast Indies, her “Southern ResourcesArea.” The ,Japanese were well awarethat, invasion in this area would bringthem into conflict with a coalition ofpowers. The lands they aspired to con-quer were the possessions or protectoratesof Great Britain, Australia, New Zeahmd,the Netherla.nds, and the United States.By means of surprise attacks, launchedsimultaneously on a half dozen differentfronts, the ,Japanese. expected to catch theAllies off-balance and ill-prepared.

The obvious threat of war with Japanhad not been ignored by any of these Al-lied nations, but the tremendous advan-tage of choice of time and place of at-tack rested with the aggressor. Japan in-tended to strike during a period whenmost of the resources in men and materialof the British Commonwealth were beingdevoted to the defeat of the EuropeanAxis partners. The Netherlands, whichexisted only as a goverlllnent-in-exile,could contribute quite a few ships but onlya small number of men to a common de-fense force. And the ITnited States, mostcertainly Japan’s strongest enemy, washeavily committed to support the Alliesin Europe and the Near East. Moreover,that nation was only partially mobilizedfor war.

The initial ,Japanese war concept didnot envisage the occupation of any terri-


tory east of Tarawa in the Gilberts. -Mloperations beyond the limits of the South-ern Resources Area were designed to es-tablish and protect a defensive perimeter.The cordon of strategic bases and islancloutposts was to stretch from the Kurilesthrough Wake Atoll to the Marshalls anclGilberts and thence west to the 13ismarckArchipelago. The islands of Timor, Java,cmd Sumatra in the East Indies were tobe seized and ,Japanese troops were to oc-cupy the Malayan Peninsula and Burma.

The major force which might preventor delay the accomplishment of the ,Japa-nese plan was the ITnited States PacificFleet based at Pearl Harbor. Recogniz-ing the threat posed by the Americannaval strength, the Commander in Chiefof the ,Japanese Combined Fleet, AdmiralIsoroku Yamamoto, directed that a studybe made of the feasibility of a surpriseaerial attack on Pearl, timed to coincidewith the outbreak of war. In February1941 the first staff considerations of theprojected raid were begun, but the actualdetails of the operation were not workedout until September when it seemed in-creasingly obvious to the ,Japanese highcommand that war was inevitable and thatthey needed this bold stroke to insure thesuccess of initial attacks.

On 3 November the Chief of the NavalGeneral Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano,appro~ed the draft plan, and on the 5thcommanders of fleets and task forces weregiven their assignments. (lrders were is-sued to selected task force units to beginmoving singly and in small groups toHitokappu Bay in the Kuriles on or about15 November. Ten days later a strikingforce, its core six large fleet, carriers trans-porting the pick of the Japanese Navy’splanes and pilots, sortied from the se-cluded anchorage bolmd for the Hawaiian

Islands. The approach route lay wellnorth of the search areas patrolled byAmerican planes based at Midway andWake and out of normal shipping lanes.

The tentative clay of attack, X-day, hadbeen set for a Sunday, 7 December (PearlHarbor time). Japanese intelligence in-dicated that most of the Pacific Fleetwould be in port on a weekend. Talliesof the ships present at the Pearl HarborNaval Base received from the Japaneseconsulate at Honolulu were transmittedto the attack force as late as 5 December.Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the strik-ing force commander, received ordersfrom Yamamoto on 2 December confirm-ing the chosen date. There was still timeto turn back; if the approaching shipshad been discovered prior to 6 Decemberthey had orders to return. N’o one sawthem, however, and the carriers arrivedat their launching point right on schedule.

At midnight of 6-7 December, the Jap-anese Combmed Fleet Operation OrderNo. 1 informed its readers that a state ofwar existed with the United States, GreatBritain, and the h-etherlands.

A.lf ERZCA,V WAR PLAN ‘

A nation’s war plans are never static.The constantly changing world politicalscene demands continual reevaluation andamendment. In the 1930>s,American war

sUnless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Pearl Harbor Rept;ATavy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), 26iMay41 and Appendix I, ,Joint Army -h’avyBasic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, quoted in fullin Hearings Record, Part 33, Exhibit No. 4;MarCorps Plan C–2, Rainbow No. 5, 5Jun41,Plans & Policies Div Files; M. S. Watson, Chiefof fltaff: Prexar Plans and Preparation%—Zrnited S’tates .4rf?zy {n World War II (Wash-

ington: HistDiv. DA, 1950) ; S. E. E1orison,

63

plans were concerned primarily withcourses of action to be taken in the eventof a conflict in one theatre and againstone nation or a contiguous group of na-tions. In these so-called “color plans,”each probable enemy was assigned a sepa-rate color designation; ,Japan becameOrange. With the advent of the Axiscoalition, American military men beganthinking in terms of a true world war..% these new plans evolved they weregiven the name Rainbow to signify theirconcept of a multi-national war.

The United States was deeply involyedin the war in Europe soon after its out-break, if not as an active belligerent, thenas the arsenal of the democracies. Bv.the spring of 1941 American naval ves-sels were convoying shipments of war ma-teriel at least part of the way to Europeand they were actively guarding againstGerman submarines a Neutrality Zonethat extended far out into the Atlantic.The intent, of these measures and otherssimilar to them was clearly to supportBritain in its war against Germany, Italy,and their satellites. There v-as little ques-tion where the, sympathies of the majorityof Americans lay in this struggle and noneat all regarding the position of theirgovernment.

On 29 ,January 1941, ranking Britishand American statf officers met in Wash-ington to discuss joint, measures to betaken if the United States should beforced to a war with the Axis Powers.It was regarded as almost, certain thatthe outbreak of hostilities with any one

The Risino Sun in tlc Pacific lf131-i4pril19.j2—

Hi,?tory of U}litcd S’tutcs .Nural Opcration~ in

TI’orld Ti’ar II ( Boston : Little, Brown and Cmn-pany, 1948), hereinafter cited as Ri.sif)q ~~(n intl[ e Paci@.

of the Axis partners would bring imn~e-diate declarations of war from the others.By insuring action on two widely sepa-rated fronts, the Axis could expect at thevery least a decreased Allied capability toconcentrate their forces. The .Unerican-British conversations ended on 27 Marchwith an agreenlent (A13C–1 ) which wasto have a profound effect on the course ofWorld War II. Its basic strategical de-c ision, which never was discarded, statedthat:

Since Germany is the predominant member ofthe Axis Powers, the Atlantic and Europeanarea is considered to be the decisire theatre.The principal United States military effort willbe exerted in that tbeatre, and operations ofUnited States forces in other theatres will beconducted in such a tminner as to facilitate thateffort . . . If Japan does enter the war, theMilitary Strategy in the Far East will bedefensive.’

The defensive implied in the wari~gai]~st ,J:~l):~]~was not to be a holdingact ion, however, but rather a strategic de-fensive that contemplated a series of tac-tical offensives with the Pacific Fleet astl~e striking force. .i new .imerican warl)lan, Rainbow 5, was pronlulgated soonafter the end of tile .illleric:lll-l;~itislltalks. .%lmost tile whole of tile Pacific\VilS made an .Inlerican strategic responsi-bility al]d the .irmy’s primary missionlmder tile plan was cooperation with and

sllpport Of the fleet.A listing of the contemplated offensive

actions of Rainbow 5, which included therapture of tile (’arolil]e and Marshall Is-lal~ds, would be interesting but academic.T]le success of tile ,Japanese raid on Pearl1{arbor forcecl a drastic revision of strat-egy which etiect ively postpo]led amphib-

nI’ara 13 of AB(.’--1 quoted in Hearil?g8 Rec-

ord, I’art 33, 9.58.


ious assaults in the Central Pacific. C’er-taiu defensive nleasures which were nlen-tioned in the plan, however, were inlple-lnented prior to the outbreak of war andin most of them Marine forces figuredprominently.

Some of the Marine defense hnttalions,tailored to meet tllenee(lsof garrisons forisolated island olltposts, w-ere alreacly inthe Pacific by tile time Rail) bow 5 waspublished. The plan called for the cle-velopment of bases, primarily air bases, at~~idway, tJol)l~ston, Palmyra, $iamoa, andWake. .111 of these islands, which wereImder control of the N“avy, were to lmvell:trilleg:lrrisolls. Gll:lIYl,illtllecellteroftl~e ,Japanese-helcl Mariauas, which hadlong hacl a small Marine barracks cletacll-ment, was decisively written OHin the warplan : its early capture by the Japanesewas conceded. The rest of the islandswere placed in a category which called fordefense forces sufficient to repel majorattacks.

The purpose of est ah]ishing bases onthese islands was twofold. Samoa was tohelp protect tile mutes of colllllltll]ic:ttiollto the Southwest Pacific; Johnston, Pal-myra, Wake, and Midway were to serve asoutguards for the Pacific, Fleet’s homeport at Pearl. (See Map 1, Map Section)

MARZZVE GARRISONS ‘0

The Navy did not start cold with its ad-vance base development schen]e for thefour island outposts of the Hawaiian

‘0{unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from VSO Serial 070412,

23.Jnn41, “i’olicy re~arcling employment of Mar-ine Defense Battalions in the I’acifi(, Are:i”( located at XRMC) : CXO Serial 091812,25 SeIAl, ‘“Enlploynwnt of Marine Defense Bat-talions” ; cO, 1st I)efBn ltr to OIC, HistI)i~,

Group. A blueprint, for base expansionin the Pacific had been laid out in the re-port of the Navy’s Hepburn Board, aCongressionally authorized fact-findinggroup which, in t~e spring of 1938, madea strategic study of the need for addi-tional {Tnited States naval bases. Thepotential utility of Midway, Wake, ,John-ston, and Palmyra was recognized,ll andsurveys were conducted and plans madefor the construction of base. facilities, air-fields, and seadromes during 1939 and19M. The responsibility for developinggarrison plans and locating coastal andantiaircraft gun positions was given toColonel Harry K. Pickett, 14th Naval Dis-trict Marine Officer and CommandingOfficer, Marine Barracks, Pearl HarborNavy Yard. The fact that Colonel Pickettpersonally surveyed most of the base sitesinsured active and knowledgeable cooperat-

ion at, Pearl Harbor with requests fromthe islands for men and materiel to imple-nlellt the garrison plans.

.Uthough they were popularly referredto in the singular sense, a custom that willbe continued in this narrative, each of theoutposts was actually a coral atoll encom-passing varying nunlbers of bleak, low-

HQMC, 29Dw43; CO, :M DefBn ltr to OIC,HistDiv, HQMC, 4Feb44 ; MD, 1st DefBn,PalnlyraIs, Annual Rept of .$ctivities. 1.Ju143:Hist of the 7th DefBn, ’21Dec4!2 ; Ist SanloanBn,MC’R. Anfiual Rept of .irtivities, LTu142; I.tColR. L). Heinl, T//c Dcfc)/.!c, of Wake (Washington :HistSet,, I’nbInfoDiv, HQMC, 1947), hereinaftercited as Drfcnsr of Wa7:c; I,t(’olR. D. Heinl,.Ilaril(r,s at J[idway ( Washington : IIistSec,l’nb Inf{jI)iv, HQMC, 1948), hereinafter cited ns.lfaf-ittcs at .11i{ltru,ij.

“ House I )OC A-o. 61, 76th Con~ress, I st Ses-si(m. “Report on the X~ed of .i(lditi~ni~l A’:tvalRases to Defend the (’omt of the United States,its Territories nnd I’{k+sessions” ( Hepburn

Board Rel)t ), 3Jan:l!l, p(~.wiw.

PREWAR SITCTATION IAT THE PACIFIC 65

lying sand islands within a fringing reef.Each atoll had at least one island bigenough to contain an airstrip; Midwayhad two. The lagoons within the reefswere all large enough to permit the dredg-ing and blasting of seaplane landinglanes and anchorages for small cwrgoships; Midway’s and Wake’s were alsoslated for development as forward basesfor the Pacific Fleet’s submarines. Civil-ian contractors were hired to build the na-val base installations, but until war actu-ally broke out, most of the work on theisland defenses was done by the men whowere to man them, Marines of the lst, 3d,and 6th Defense Battalions.

The organization of the defense battal-ions varied according to time and placeof employment, but by late 1941 the stand-ard T/O called for a unit, with more than900 men assigned to a headquarters bat-tery, three 5-inch coast defense gun bat-teries, three 3-inch antiaircraft batteries,a sound locator and searchlight battery, abattery of .5o caliber antiaircraft machineguns, and a battery of .30 caliber machineguns for beach defense. Midway was theonly outpost that actually drew an entirebattalion, although Wake originally wasslated to be garrisoned by one. On ,Tohn-ston and Palmym the habitable area wasso limited that it was impossible to accom-modate more than a small defense detach-ment.

Some development work had been doneon Wake and Midwayt the two northernislands, before the arrival of the navalcontractors’ construction crews. In 1935Pan American World Airways had set upway stations for its Clipper service to the

Orient on both Midway and J1’uke and arelay station of the trans-Pacific cable hadbeen in operation on Midway’s Sand Is-

land since 1903. Most construction, likethe passenger hotel on Wake and the quar-ters for the airline’s and cable company’spersonnel, was of little military value.

Midway, which had the most ambitiousbase plan, was also the first outpost sched-uled to receive a Marine garrison-the 3dDefense Battalion which arrived at PearlHarbor on 7 May 1940. The bulk of thebattalion remained in Hawaii for the nexteight months while reconnaissance details,followed by small advance parties, didthe prelim~lary work on supply and de-fense installations?’ On 27 January1941, in the face of the threat posed by,Tapan’s aggressive actions, the Chief ofNaval Operations ( CNO) directed thatthe rest of the 3d Defense Battalion bemoved to Midway, that detachments of

the 1st Defense Battalion be establishedat Johnston and Palmyra, and that the6th Defense Battalion, then in training atSan Diego, move to Pearl Harbor as a re-placement and reserve unit for the out-

posts?’On 15 February, the same day that the

3d Battalion began unloading its heavyequipment at Midway, an advance detach-ment of the 1st Defense Battalion left SanDiego on the Enterprise. At Pearl Har-bor the detachment left the carrier andtransferred to a small cargo ship thatsteamed on to the southwest for 800 miles

‘2 BriGen A. R. Pefley notes on draft manu-script, 14Jan57. Since all fresh water had to bedistilled, the capacity of the distillers set thelimit for the size of the island garrison. In termsof water consumption each contractor’s w-ork-man took the place of a Marine. Adm C. C.

Bloch ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, 7Jan57.‘3 CNO Serial 0618, 17Jan41, “Establishment

of Permanent Marine Defense Forces at John-ston, Midway, and Palmyra Islands.”

66 rlMR1, HARBOR TO GUADAI.CANAL

to reach tiny Johnstonwhere on 3 Marchtwo 5-inch guns, six Marines, and twonaval corpsmen were set ashore. After afew days layover to help the caretaker de-tail get set up, the rest of the advanceparty (3 officers and 45 enlisted men)went on to Palmyra, approximately 1,100miles south of Oahu.

After the remainder of the 1st DefenseBattalion arrived at Pearl, small reinforc-ing detachments were gradually added tothe southern outpost garrisons as the is-lands’ supply and qwwtering facilitieswere expanded. On tJohnston and Pal-myra, as at Midway, the civilian contrac-tors’ crews and construction equipmentwere heavily committed to the naval airbase program, and only occasionally

could the Marines borrow a bulldozer,truck, or grader to help out in their ownextensive schedule of defense construction.For the most part, the garrisons relied onpick and shovel to get their guns emplacedancl to dig in the ammunition magazines,command posts, and fire direction centersnecessary for islancl defense.

Duty on the small atolls was arduousand dull with little relief from the monot-ony of a steady round of work and train-ing. When a few hours off was granted,there was no place to go and little to do;the visible world shrank to a few uninvit-ing acres of dunes> scrub brush, and coralsurrounded by seemingly endless stretchesof ocean. The visits of patrol planes, sLlp-ply ships, and even inspection partieswere welcomed. t-rider the circumstances,morale at the isolated l>osts remained sur-prisingly high, helped perhaps by theprospect of action.

In so far as possible, the 14th hTavalDistrict attempted to follow a policy of

rotation for the men at the outlying posts,replacing those that had been longest “inthe field” with men from Pearl Harbor.In midsummer a group of 1st DefenseBattalion personnel was sent to Midwayto start the relief of the 3d Battalion andon 11 September the 6th Defense Battal-ion arrived to take over as the atoll’s gar-rison, The 3d Battalion returned toHawaii for a well-deser~-ed break fromthe gruelling monotony and work ofbuilding defenses.

By August 1941 the work on the navalair base at Wake was well along and theneed for a garrison there. was imperative.An advance detachment of the 1st De-fense Battalion arrived at the atoll on19 .$ugust and immediately began thenow familiar process of backbreakingwork to dig in guns, dumps, aid stations,and command posts. Again the contrac-tor’s men and machines were largely de-voted to work on the airfield and thelagoon, and the Marines had to get alongwith the hand tools organic to the unit.In late October reinforcements from theparent battalion made the 2,000-mile tripfrom Hawaii to bring the garrison L~ptoa strength of nearly 400 men. The unitscheduled to be the permanent garrisonon Wake, the 4th Defense Battalion, ar-rived at Pearl Harbor on 1 December, toolate to reinforce or replace the Wake De-tachment. A most important addition tothe atoll’s defenses did arrive, however,before war broke. Twelve GrummanWildcats of Marine Fighter Squadron211 flew in to the airstrip off the Enter-

prise on 4 December.Just before the Japanese attacked, the

strength of defense battalion personnel onoutpost duty and at Pearl Harbor was:

PREWAR SITLTATIC)XIX THE PACIFIC 67

~cwlHwb~r Johnston Pdmyr~ }~idwa~ wake

off ilnl 0s I ml-iv-’ ml, ‘- C)fi ‘ ;n~ ‘-;;- ~n,———.— ——— I_ —

IlstDefB1l_______________ 20 i 241 i 71 155 7! 151 !-... -. ------ 16 4063d DefB1]---------------- 40 I 823 ------4th De fBt)_______________ 38 780 ______6thDefBl~_______________ 4 17 ------

For armament the outposts reliecl

mainly on the organic weapons of the de-

fense battalions: 5-inch naval guns,

3-inch antiaircraft gIuIs, and .30 ancl .50

caliber machine guns. Midway had, inaddition, three 7-inch naval guns still tobe mounted ancl CLfourth gun at PearlHarbor waiting to be shipped. Thebreakdown of weapon strength showed: ‘4

~lidw.a~Johnston P~lmYrawake

5-inch guns.. _ 6 2 4; 6

3-inch guns... 12 4 41 12.50 cal MGs -- 30 8 8! 18.30 cal LfGs. 30 8 S! 30

Although the list of weapons was impos-ing, the garrisons were not strong enoughto man them adequately; the standard de-fense battalion of 1941, moreover, in-cluded no infantry.

In contrast to the garrisons of the PearlHarbor outposts, the 7th Defense Battal-ion slated for duty at Tutuila, main islandof American Samoa, was a composite in-fantry-artillery unit. The battalion wasorganized at San Diego on 16 December1940 -with an initial strength of 25 officersand 392 enlisted men. Its T/O called for

“ ComFourteen Rept of Status of DefBns as-signed to the 14th A-D, lDec41 (located at

NRNC ) . Personnel figures include naval nledi-cal personnel assigned to the defense battalions.

. . . . . .. . . . . . 1 ______ ______

~:!: ‘-----33 ‘----- ‘----- ‘-----810 -.- . . . ______

a headquarters company, an infantry com-pany, and an artillery battery as well as asmall detail which had the mission of or-ganizing and training a battalion of?, amoan reservists,

The islands of American Samoa had anative population of almost 10,000 whichCOUICIbe drawn upon as a labor force andfor troops to back up a regular gmrison.This was not, the only significant differ-ence between the outpost atolls and Samoa,however. The terrain of Tutuila, whichwas by far the largest and most heavilypopulated of the islands, was nlountain-ous and heavily forested, and its 52 squaremiles contained a number of areas thatcould be converted into camps and supplydepots. There was room for trainingareas and small arms ranges. The fineharbor at Pago Pago, site of the U. S.hTaval Station and headquarters of thenaval governor , could be used by large

vessels. This combination of harbor, el-bow room, ancl an indigenous labor force,plus its location along tlie snipping route

to the Sol~thwest Pacific, made Tutuilaa vital strut egric base. (See Map 3)

During the” spring and early summerof 1940, Major Alfred R. Pefley ofColonel Pickett’s staff made a thoroughsurvey of Tutuila and prepared a detailedplan for its defense. On 29 XTovember theCNO directed that, defense plans based onPefley’s recommendations be implemented


immediately. Tl~ella~’al got’erllor \\-:~sall-thorized to begin construction of coast cle-fense and antiaircraft gun positions.Most of the guns to be mounted were al-ready in storage at the naval station andthe Bureau of (lrdnance was directed toprovide the ammunition cLnd additionalweapons still needecl.l~

The primary purpose of raising the 7thDefense Battalion was the manning of thefour 6-inch naval glu]s an(l six 3-inchantiaircraft guns provided for in initialdefense plans. The wisdom of includinginfantry in the battalion and makin~ pro-vision for reinforcement by trainecl Sz-moan reserves can hardly be questioned.Tutuila was far too large an island to beadequately protected by CLrelatively fewbig guns, most of which were concen-trated around Pago Pago harbor. Smallbeach defense garrisons were needed allaround the island shorelines to checkenemy raiding parties. It was intendedthat most of the Samoan reserves wouldbe equipped and trained with rifles takenfrom naval stores and used in the beachdefenses where their knowledge of theterrain would be invaluable.

An advance party of the. 7th DefenseBattalion, which left the States before theunit was formally activated, arrived atPago Pago on 21 December 1940. Therest of the battalion made the 4,500-milevoyage from San Diego via Pearl Harborin March, arriving on “the 15th. The nextmonths were busy ones as gLms were em-placed and test fired, beach defenses wereconstructed, miles of communication lineswere laid, and trails were cut which wouldenabh? quick reinforcement of threatenedlanding points.

“ CNO serial 054430, 29Nov40, “Defense ofAmerican Samoa, ”

It was midsummer before the first Sa-moan Marine was actually enlisted, butmany natives voluntarily took weaponstraining on an unpaicl status, continuinga practice begun by the naval governor inNovember 1940.” The first native recruitwas enlisted on 16 .~ugust 1941 and the1st Sanloal~ Battalion, Marine Corps Re-serve, was a going concern by the timewar broke. The authorized strength ofthe battalion was 500 enlisted men, butthis figure could never be reached becauseof the great number of men needed aslaborers on essential base construction.

There was one factor of the defensepicture at Tutui]a that, matched the situ-ation at Midway, ,Johnston, and Palmyra.None of these islands had, at the onsetof war, any land planes. The Marine airsquadrons which were scheduled to jointhe defenders were either still in theStates or else based on Oahu, waiting forthe signal that the airfields were readyfor use. That part of Marine Air whichwas in the Hawaiian Islands was based atEwa Field, located approximately fourair miles west, of Pearl Harbor. Justprior to the Japanese attack, the unitsstationed at the field were Headquartersand Ser\Tice Squadron of Marine Aircraft

Group 21 (IWAG-21) ; Marine ScoutBomber Squadron 232 ( VMSB-232 ) :Marine Utility Squadron 252 (VMJ-252 ) ; and the rear echelon of VMF-211,which had moved forward to Wake. Op-erational control of the Marine planes inthe Hawaiian area was exercised by theCommander .\ircraft, Battle Force, Pa-cific Fleet.”

‘“ (+OVof Amer%moa ltr to C~O, 1~1’ebll,“~sta~lishn]ent of Native Insular Force. ”

‘7 2dLt B. Hollingshead, “The ,Japanese Attackon 7 December 1941 on the Marine Corps Air

PREW.IR SITI”.ITIOX IX THE P.\(’IFIC 69

Aside from the Marine forces in theN’estern Pacific assigned to the .IsiaticFleet,” the only sizealde Marine units inthe Pacific not already accounted for wereguard detachments on Oahu and the XiEngineer Batt alien (less Companies Cand D) which had been sent to Oahu toestablish an advance amphibious trainingbase for the, 2d Marine Division. Therewas a 485-n~an Marine Barracks at thePearl Harbor X’avy Yard and 102 menassigned to the barracks at the XTavalAir

Station at E\Vii, ():11111. Territory of Hn\~nii”(31S, HistL)i~, HQM(’, .Jiinll:]ry 1!)43), 3-8. hereinafter cited ?IS f;lr~f .Vo)lo(lroph. The othersqumlrons nssigned to 31.4{+–21 were either i~t

sea }Yith lhe X:lvy’s (.iirriers or still in the V. S.“ See I’rtrt IV, “31arines in the I’hi]ippines,”

for the Imew:ir situation in (’hin:l Nnd the I’hilip-pilles,

Station at Ford Island. Marines pro-vided the guard (169 men ) at the YTaval.%mm~ulition Depot at Lualualei in thehills northwest of HonoILdu. The defensebattalions which were ql~artered in or nearthe navy yard were under the operationalcontrol of the Commanding Officer, Ma-rine Barracks, Colonel Pickett.

There were an :Idditional 877 Marinespresent in Pearl Harbor on 7 Decemberas members of the guard detachments ofthe battleships and cruisers of the PacificFleet.” In all, there were more than4,500 Jlarines on Oallu that first day.

“ The strength of most hlarhle units on Oahuis listed in Hca/”inys Record, Part 24, ExhibitA“(). 40. “Location of regularly assigned tom-lutrnding officers of shil)s I)resent during the,Tapanese attack of ‘i December 1941.”

CHAPTER 2

Japan Strikes

PEARL HARBOR’

Perhaps no action in American mili-tary history has been so thoroughly docu-mented, examined, and dissected as thePearl Harbor attack. Investigation hasfollowed investigation; a host of bookshave been written on the subject, all in aneffort to pin down the responsibility inthe welter of charge and countercharge.The issue of, -what indivic]uals or set ofcircumstances, if any, should bear theblame for the success of the Japanese raidhas not been, and may never be, finallydecided. On one point, however, therehas been unanimous agreement—that thecourage of the vast majority of defendingtroops was of a high order.

The first inkling of the Japanese attackcame not from the air, but from the sea.At 0637 on 7 December, more than anhour before any enemy planes weresighted, an American patrol bomber andthe destroyer Ward attacked and sank anunidentified submarine in the restrictedwaters close to the entrance to Pearl Har-bor.’ This vessel was one of five Japa-

1Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from l’rarl Horbor Rcpt;Hrarin.qs Record, Part 13, Exhibits Nos. 8–8D,Japanese Records, and Parts 23 and 24, Hear-ings and Exhibits of the Roberts (’orumission ;MarFor, 14th ND .Jnl, December 1941 ; EIW

Monograph; Col H. K. Pickett ltr to BriGenC. D. Barrett. 22Dec41 ( located at NRMC, Job6608, Box 25) ; Risinq Surf i)t t7tr Pffcific.

2 “’Unfortunately, the radio report sent to the14th N. D. was not clear, and in view of many

nese two-man submarines which had theextremely risky mission of penetrating thePacific Fleet’s stronghold. The midgetswere transported to the target on boardlarge long-range submarines, part of anundersea scouting and screening forcewhich had fanned out ahead of the enemycarriers. Not one of the midget raidersachieved any success; four were sunk andone ran aground.

The Japanese attack schedule allowedthe Americans little time to evaluate thesignificance of the submarine sighting.The first enemy strike group was airborneand winging its way toward Oahu be-fore the Wa~d fired its initial spread ofdepth charges. The Japanese carrierforce had turned in the night and steamedfull ahead for its target, launching thefirst plane at 0600 when the ships were ap-proximately 200 miles north of PearlHarbor. A second strike group took off at0745 when the carriers had reached a posi-tion 30 miles closer to the American base.Although a radar set on the island pickedL~pthe approaching planes in time to givewarning, the report of the sighting wasbelieved an error and disregarded, andthe ,Japanese fighters and bombers ap-peared unannounced over their objectives.

The enemy plan of attack was simple.Dive bombers and fighter planes would

preyious false reports, it was considered neces-sary to check the report. The air attack startedbefore ~erification was received.” Adm C. C.Block ltr, op. cit.

70

JAPAN STRIKES

strafe and bomb the major Army andNavy airfields in an attempt to catch de-fending aircraft on the ground. Simul-taneously, the battleships moored to pil-ings along the shore of Ford Islandwould be hit by high- and low-level bomb-ing attacks. The shipping strike groupsincluded large numbers of dive and hori-zontal bombers, since the Japanese antici-pated that protective netting might pre-vent their lethal. torpedo bombers frombeing fully effective. In all, &21 planestook part in the raid, while 39 fightersflew protective cover over the carriers toguard against a retaliatory attack thatnever materialized.

At 0755 the soft stillness of Sundaymorning was broken by the screamingwhine of dive bombers and the sharp chat-ter of machine guns, At half a dozendifferent bases around the island of OahuJapanew planes signaled the outbreak ofwar with a torrent of sudden death. Pa-trol bombers were caught in the water atKaneohe Naval Air Station, across theisland from Honolulu; closely parkedrows of planes, concentrated to protectthem from sabotnge, were transformedinto smoking heaps of useless wreckage atthe Army’s Whee]er and Hickam Fields,the Marines’ air base at Iihva, and theh’avy’s Ford Island air st~tion. The at-tack on the airfields had barely startedbefore the first bombs and torpedoes wereloosed against the sitting targets of “battle-ship row.>’ Within minutes most of thebattleships at the Ford Island mooringshad been hit by one or more torpedoesand bombs. If the Japanese had drawnoff after the first fifteen minutes of theirattacks, the damage done would have beenterrific, but the enemy planes kept onstrafing and bombing and the toll of ships,planes, and men soared.

448777 0—5.s-6

71

The Americans did not take their beat-ing lying down. The first scattered shotsfrom sentries ashore and watch standerswho manned antiaircraft guns on boardship flashed back at the enemy even be-fore the bugles and boatswains’ pipessounded “Call to Arms” and “GeneralQuarters.” The ships of the Pacific Fleetwere on partial alert even in port andmost of the officers and men were onboard. Crew members poured up the lad-ders and passages from their berthingcompartments to battle stations, Whiledamage control teams tried to put downfires and shore up weakened bulkheads,gun crews let loose everything they hadagainst the oncoming planes. In manycases guns were fired from positionsawash as ships settled to the bottom andcrewmen were seared with flames fromfuel and ammunition fires as they con-tinued to serve their weapons even afterreceiving orders to abandon ship. Onmany vessels the first torpedoes and bombstrapped men below deck and snuffed outthe lives of others before they were evenaware that the attack was on.

The reaction to the Japanese raid wasfully as rapid at shore bases as it was onboard ship, but the men at the airfieldsand the navy yard had far less to fightwith. There was no ready ammunition atany antiaircraft gun position on the is-land; muzzles impotently pointed sky-\\,ard~~,hiletrucks were hurried to muni-

tions depots. Small arms were brokenout of armories at every point under at-tack; individuals manned the machineguns of damaged aircraft. The rage tostrike back at the Japanese was so strongthat men even fired pistols at the enemyplanes as they swooped 10VVto strafe.

At Ewa every Marine plane wasknocked out of action in the first attack.

JAPAN STRIKES 73

The men of IWIG-21 recovered quickl~ ~Yithin the same half IIollr that, wit-from their initial surprise and shock ancl liessed the, loss of l~wa’s planes, the possi-fOLl@t back with what few rifles aIIc{ nla- bility of effective aerial resistance waschine guns they hacl. Salvageable guns cal~celed ol~t by simil:tr enemy :Itt:tcks allwere stripped from {lan~aged planes anti

over OallII. ~orcl island’s seaplane rampsset LIp on hastily in~provisecl mounts; onescout-bomber rear

and rlll~ways were made a shambles ofmachine ~Ll11 ITa s

wrecked aIId burning aircraft in the open-mannecl to swell the vol[une of antiair-craft fire. Although the .groul) conlmancl- ing stase of tl~e ,Japanese assault. The

Marines of the air station’s guard detach-er, I,ieutenant (?olonel Claucle :1. Lark in,had been wounded almost as soon as he ment nlal~l~e(lrifles Ind mlchine gmls to

arrived at tile field tlmt morning, he con- beat otf fllrther enemy thrusts, but the

tinued to coordinate the efforts to meet clire bombers had done their job well.

further enemy attacks. There was no need for them to return. TheTwo ,Japanese dive. bombers streaked ferns of all attacks became the larger ships

over the field from the direction of Pearl in the harbor.Harbor at 0835, dropping light fragn~en- The raid drew alltomatic reactions fromtation bombs and stratil~g tile Marine gun tile few Marines ill tile navy yarcl who sawpositions. A few min~~tes after the the first enen)y planes diving on the ships.bombms left, the first of a steady proces- Wllile the guard bugler broke tl~e n~ajor-sion of enemy fighters attacked Ewa asthe ,Japanese began ~ssembling a cover

ity of the men of the barracks detachment

force at nearby Barber”s Point to protectancl the 1st ancl 3d Defense Battalions out

the withdrawl of tl~eir strike groups. Theof their qllarters, the early risers were al-

Marine machine g~u]s accounted for at ready runl~ing for the armories and gun

least one of tile ellenly planes aild claimecl sheds. By 0801 when Colonel Pickett or-

another probable. Two and three plane dered the defense battalion machine-gunsections of fighters orbited over the field, ~(YNUpS to nl;Iu tliei r Iyeaponsj eight of the

and occasionally dived to strafe tile gull- g[lns lmd already been set L~p. More nla-ners, until tl~e last elemel~ts of the .Jap:t- clline gIIIIS were IIastily pllt in positionl~ese atta(k force Ilea(le(l ollt to sea arollu(l0945.

i~ll(ln~el~were detailecl to belt the anllnuni-

Three of tl~e Marine airn~e]~v-ere killed t ion needed to feed them, while rifle a]n-

during the attacks, a fourtl~ died of n~llnitioil was issued to the hundreds of

\~OLUldS;13 woumled nlen were treated in men assembled on the barracks’ parade

the group’s aid station. Flanlw denlol- gllmnd. Pickett ordered the 3-inch anti-ishecl 33 of tile -47 pl:mes at tl~e thld: :11”1but two of tile remainder sutiere(l Ill:Ijor

aircraft, gIIlls in tile defense battalions’

damage. The sole bright note in the pic-reserve sup])l ies to be taken out of storage

aIId en)l)lace~l 011 tl~e parade. IIe dis-tnre of destrll(tion lvas tl~e fact that 18 ofVMSB-231’S planes \vere 011 boi~](1 tl~c

]Jatc]le(l trllcks and working parties of the

hzingtoN, sclle(ll]led for a tly-otf to Mi{l- A{ Engineer ~;:~ttilli~]~ to I~Llalualei, ~~

way, and thereby save(l fron~ tl~e enenl?- miles llp in tile hills, to get the necesmrygllns. :1-inch shells. The Marine engineers also

74 PEARL H.lRBOR TO G~AD.ALCA~AL

sent their heavy earth-moving equipmentto Hickam Field to help clear the runways.

Thirteen machine guns were in actionby o&20 and the gunners had zlready ac-counted for their first enemy dive bomber.During the next hour and a half the fireof twenty-five more .30’s and .5o’s wasadded to the yard’s :mtiaircraft defenses,and two more planes, one claimed jointlywith the ships, were shot down. The3-inch glms were never able to get into ac-tion. The ammunition trucks did not re-turn from the I,lmlualei depot until 1100,more than an honr after the last Japxneseaircraft had headed back for their carriers.By that time the personnel of all Marineorganizations in the navy yard area hadbeen pooled to reinforce the guard andantiaircraft defense, to provide an infamtry reserve, and to furnish the supportingtransport and supply details neecled tosustain them.

In the course of their attacks on battle-ship row and the ships in the navy yard$sdrydocks, the enemy planes had strafedand bombed the Marine barracks area, andnine men had been wounded. They werecared for in the dressing stations whichPickett had ordered set up at the begin-ning of the raid to accommodate the flowof wounded from the stricken ships in theharbor. Many of these casualties weremembers of the Marine ship detachments;102 sea-going Marines had been killed dur-ing the raid, six later died of wounds, and49 were wounded in action.3

The enemy pilots had scored heavily:four battleships, one mine layer, and a tar-

‘ Casualty fi,mres were compiled from recordsfurnished by Statistics Vnit, PersAcctSec,PersDept, HQMC.

get ship sunk; four battleships, threecruisers, three destroyers, and three auxil-iaries damaged. Most of the damagedships required extensive repairs. Ameri-can plane losses were equally high: 188aircraft totally destroyed and 31 moredamaged. The N’avy and Marine Corpshad 2,086 officers and men killed, the Army194, as a result of the ~ttack: 1,109 menof all the services survived their wounds.

Balanced against the staggering .hneri-can totals was a fantastically light tallysheet of .Tapanese losses. The enemy car-riers recovered all but 29 of the planes theyhad sent out; ship losses amounted to fivemidget submarines; and less than a h~Ln-dred men were killed.

Despite extensive search missions flownfrom Oahu and from the Enterprise,which was less than 175 miles from portwhen the sneak attack occurred, the enemystriking force was able to withdraw ml-detected and unscathed. In one respect

the Japanese were disappointed with theresults of their raid; they had hoped tocatch the Pacific Fleet’s carriers berthedat Pearl Harbor. Fortunately, the urgentneed for Marine planes to strengthen theoutpost defenses had sent the Lexingtonand the Enterprise to sea on aircraft ferr-y -ing missions. The Enterprise was return-ing to Pearl on 7 December after havingflown off VMF-211’S fighters to Wake, andthe Lexington, enroute to Midway withVMSB-231’s planes, turned b’ack whennews of the attack was received. Had

either or both of the carriers been sunkor damfiged at Pearl Harbor, the outlookfor the first months of the war would havebeen even more dismal. The Japanese suc-cess had the effect of delaying the scheduleof retaliatory attacks and amphibious op-

JAPAN STRIKES 75

erations in the Central Pacific that hadbeen outlined in Rainbow 5. .i completereevaluation of Pacific strategy was nec-essar y.

The critical sitmction facing the outpostislands was clearly appreciated and an at-tempt was nmde to get reinforcements toWake before the ,Japanese struck; it didnot come in time. The tiny atoll ~~ils oneof the first objectives on the enemy time-table of conquest} Midway was more for-tunate; when the Lexington returned toPearl on 10 December with its unde.liveyeclload of Marine scout bombers, they wereorclerecl to attempt an over -lvat er flight tothe atoll. On 17 I)eeember, ten days xfterthe originally scheduled fly-otl, 17 planesof VMS13-231, shepherded by a mcval pa-trol bomber, successfully rnacle tl~e 1,137-mile flight, from Oahu to Midway. It wasthe longest single-engine landplane massedflight on record, but more important itmarket] il vital addition to Midway’s de-fensive potential.

The outpost islands needed men andmateriel as well as planes. Rear Admiral(laude C. Rloch, Commandant of the l+ltbNaval District, gave the reslJonsibility fororganizing aucl equipping these reinforce-ments to (’olonel Pickett,. On 13 Decem-ber, all Marine ground troops in the clis-trict were placed under Pickett as Con~-manding OfIirer, Marine Forces, 14thNaval District. The necessary reinforce-ments to be sent to Midwayl Johnston, zndPalrnyra were drawn from the lst, 3d, and4th Defense %ttalions. By the month’send the first substantial increments of men,guns, and equipment hacl been received ateach of the outposts.~ They were not safe

‘ For the detailed story of the defense of Wakesee Part 111.

‘ CO, MarFor, 14th ND ltr to MGC, 5Jan42,Development of outpost garrisons.

from attacks by any means, but their posi-tions were markedly stronger.

The Washington Naval DisarmamentTreaty of 1922 provided for the mainte-nance of the status quo in regard to forti-fications and naval bases in certain areas ofthe Pacific. American adherence to theseterms through the 14-year life of thetreaty had the practical effect of weaken-ing the defenses of the Philippines andpreventing the development of Guam as anaval stronghold. The Hepburn Board of1938 recommended that Guam be heavilyfortified and garrisoned, 7 but Congressfailed to authorize the expenditure of thenecessary funds. IJnhappily, the plannersof Rainbow 5 had to concede the captureof the island in the first stages of a warwith the Japanese. It was almost as ifthey could look over enemy shoulders andsee the terse direction to the commanderof the Japanese Fourth Fleet to “invadeWake and Guam as quickly as possible” 8at the onset of hostilities. (See Map 2)

Guam was a fueling station for navalvessels making the long run to and fromthe Orient, a relay point for the, trans-pacific cable, the site of a naval radio sta-tion, and a stop for Pan American clip-pers. Assigned to protect its 20,000natives and its 228 square miles of rugged,junglecl terrain was a token force of 153

“ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Maj O. R. Lodge, The Re-cwptare of Guam ( Washington : HistBr, G–3 Div,HQMC, 1954), 7–9; Capt G. J. McMillin, USN,OflRept to the CA-O of the Surrender of Guamto the Japanese, llSep45; T. Wilcls, “The Japa-nese Seizure of Guam,” MC Gazette, July 1955.

‘ Hepburn Board Rept, op. cit.nHrariasn Record, Part 13, Exhibit No. S-C,

CombFlt OpOrd N“o. 1, 5Nov41, 475.

76 PE.4RL H.IRBOR TO GUADALCAXAL

Marines. Backing them up was a Guam-anian infantry unit, the 80-man InsularForce Guard, and a volunteer nativenaval militia with 246 ill-armed znd ill-trained members.’ The island’s govern-ment departments and naval station ac-tivities were manned by 271 regular Navypersonnel. A naval officer, CaptainGeorge J. McMillin, was both island gov-ernor and garrison commander.

The war threat was so real by October1941 that all women and children of U. S.citizenship were evacuated from Guam.On 6 December the garrison destroyed allits classified papers and like other Pacificoutposts awaited the outcome of the U. S.-Japanese negotiations in Washington.The word came at 0545 on 8 December (7December, Pearl Harbor time). CaptainMcMillin was informed of the enemy at-tack by the, Commander in Chief of theAsiatic. Fleet. In less than three hoursSaipan-based Japanese bombers were overthe island.

The initial enemy target was the minesweeper USS Penguin in Apra Harbor;this small ship’s 3-inch and .50 caliberguns were the only weapons larger than.30 caliber machine guns avail able to theGuam garrison. Under repeated attacks,the Penguin went to the bottom, and hersurvivors joined the forces ashore. Theattack continued throughout the daylighthours with flights of bombers hitting thevarious naval installations and strafingroads and villages. The island capital,Agana, was cleared of civilians, and the

‘ The members of the Insular Force Guardwere in the U. S. Government service and re-ceived W l)ercent of the pay of correspondingratings in the U. S. Navy. The native militiaser~ed \vithollt pay and had no arms e~~eptobsolete and condemned rifles, RAdm G. .J. Mc-Millin ltr to CMC, 3XOT52.

few local Japanese were rounded up andinterned.

That night a native dugout landed nearRitidian Point on the northern cape of theisland, and the three men in it were cap-tured. They claimed to be Saipan nativessent over to be on hand as interpreterswhen the Japanese landed. These nati17esinsisted that the Japanese intended to landthe next morning (9 December) onbeaches near Agana. Captain MciMillinsuspected a trick. He believed that bythis ruse the Japanese sought to draw theMarines out of their prepared positions inthe butts of the rifle range at Sumay onOrote Peninsula. He decided not to allowthis information to cause a shift of hismajor defensive force from a positionwhich guarded important Apra Harbor.

By guess or knowledge the Saipan na-tives had one of the landing sites locatedaccurately, but they were off on their time.The 9th brought no landing, but thebombers came back to give Guam anotherpounding. The Insular Force Guard wasposted to protect government buildings inAgana, but the rest of the island’s garri-son remained at their assigned posts.Lieutenant Colonel ~$’illiam K. Mcxulty’s122 Marines of the Sumay barracks con-tinued to improve their rifle range de-fenses, and the 28 Marines who were as-signed to the Insular Patrol, the island’spolice force, kept their stations in villagesthrougllout Guam.

After the Japanese bombers finished forthe day all was quiet until about 0400 on10 December. At that time flares burstover Dungcas Beach north of Agana, andsome 400 Japanese sailors of the 5th De-fense Force from f$aipan came ashore.While the naval landing party moved into.Ag:tll:t \vhere it cl:~shed with the Insular

Force Guard, elements of the Japanese

,JAPAN STRIKES 77

RI TIDIA N POINT

TUMONBA )’

&J,

CAEIRAS

OROTEENINSULA

YONA o

7rPAGO BAY

BANG{ POINT

FACPI POINT TALOFOFO BAY

?&gI.. (-)

dJMATAC.“:MT BOLANOS

/

JAPANESE CAPTURE&J4(.) OF GUAM

dcocos

Is 10 DECEMBER 1941SCALE

~I

STATUTE MILES

I MAP 2

78 IWARL IIARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

South Seus Detmhd Force (approxi-10,Ilade separate 1alld-mately 5,500 men)

ings at ‘rLllllOll Bay in the north, on tilesouthwest coast near Merizo, and on theeastern shore of the island nt TalafofoBay.

At .~gana’s l>lxz1 the lightly-armedChamanians, comn~andecl by Marine FirstI,ielltenant (’harles S. Tocld, stood off theenrly ,Jnpanese attacks, bl:t their rifles andmachine gulw dicl not provide enol~gh fire-power to I101cIagainst a coordinatec~ ~ttfickby the Dun.gcas 13each landing force.

Captain McMillin, aware of the over-whelming superiority of tile enemy? de-cidecl Ilot to el]danger tile li~-es of the tlloll-sands of civilians in his charge by furtherand fruitless resistance. “Tl~e situationwas simply hopeless,>’ he later related.11He surrendered the islanc{ to tile ,Japnnesenaval commander shortly after 0600, anclsent, orders to the Marines at Sunlay not,to resist. Tile word clid not reach all de-fenders, however, al}cl scattered fightingcontinued throughout tl~e day as theenemy spread ollt to complete occupationof tile island. Illlt this an)ounted to onlytoken resistance. Tl~ere was no clmncetlmt the determined ,Japanese might bedriven off by a force so small, e~”en if thedefenders CO1lId ha~e regroll])ecl. Guamhad fallell, and it would be t~vo and a halfyears before the I“nited States was in aposition to win it back.

‘0This reinforced brigade, commanded byMajGeu T’omitara Horii, had been organized inX’ovember 1941 to take part in the capture ofGnanI and to move on from there to seize Rabaulin the 13isumrcks. It was built arolmd the 144thInfRegt and reinforced by ~lnits of the .TaImnese.Z5th T)ivision. MIT)iv, WD, Order of 13attIe forJalmaese Armed Forces, 131ar45, 122.

‘1 McMillin Surrender Rept, op. cit.

During the two clays of bombing and inthe fighting on 10 December, the total gar-rison losses were 19 killed and 4!2wounc]edincluding four Marines killed ancl 12wounded.12 The civilian population suf-fered comparable but undetermined casu-alties. The .Japanese evacuated .kmericanmembers of the garrison to prison campsin ,Japan on 10 ,January 19+2, ancl theenemy naval force that had been presentzt the sl~rrender settlecl down to duty asoccupation troops.

FIRST A TT.4 PK ON M ll?WA Y “

Part of the Japanese striking forcewhich raided Pearl Harbor wzs a task unitof two destroyers and a tanker which pro-ceeded independently from Tokyo Bay toa separate target—Midway. The missionof the clestroyers was implied in theirdesignation as the Midway NeutralizationUnit: they were to shell the atoll’s air baseon the night of ‘i December while the ,J~p-znese carrier force retired from the Ha-waiian area. (See Map 10, Map Section)

DawIL of 7 December found five sea-planes of Midway’s patrol bomber squad-ron (VP-21 ) aloft on routine search mis-sions; two other (Dutch) pat rol bombershad just taken off for Wake, next leg oftheir journey to the Netherlands EastIndies. On the Sand Island seaplaneramp two more P13Ys ( C’atalina patrol

n Marine casualty figures were compiled fromrecords furnished by the Statistics Unit.PersAcctSec, PersDept, HQMC.

‘3 C“nless otherwise noted the material in thissection is deri~ed from HearinOs Records, Part24, Exhibit A’o. 34, “History of Action Occurringat Midway 7—31Dec41 as Compiled from OfficialDispatches and Correspondence,” Exhibit Xo. 35,C(), XAS, Midway Itr to CinCPac, Action of7Dec41, n. d., and Exhibit No. 36, CO, 6th DefBnltr to ComFonrteen, Rept of action on the nightof 7Dw41, 121)ec41 ; Moriues at .lfid~cay.

JAP.4N STRIKES 79

bombers) were warming up to guide inv&fS~-231 ~Y]lic}l ~vas schedtlled to fly

off the Lecmkgton that day. .4t 0630(0900 Pearl Harbor time) a Navy radiooperator’s signal from Oahu flashed thefirst news of the Pearl Harbor attack. Afew minutes later a dispat.:h from .4d-miral B1oc11confirmed this report and di-rected that current war plans be placed ineffect.

Commander Cyril T. Simard, the Is-land Commander, recalled the DutchPBYs (which were then put to useby VP–21 ), established additional airsearch sectors, and ordered LieutenantColonel Harold D. Shannon’s fith DefenseBattalion to general quarters. The re-mainder of the day was spent in prepara-tion for blackout, and in issuing ammuni-tion, digging foxholes, and testing com-munications. All lights and navigationalaids were extinguished after it was learnedthat the i5ew%gton, with VMSl?-231 stillon board, had been diverted to seek the en-emy’s Pearl Harbor striking force.

.4ir searches returned late in the daywithout having sighted any signs of Japa-nese ships or planes, and the atoll but-toned up for the night with all defensivepositions fully manned. At 1842, a Ma-rine lookout saw a flashing light some dis-tance southwest of Sand Island, but itquickly disappeared, and it was about2130 before the one operational radar onSand began picking up what seemed to besurface targets in the same general direc-tion. Simultaneously two other observ-ers, equipped with powerful 8x56 nightglasses, reported seeing ‘fshapes>’ toseaward.

Shannon’s searchlight battery com-mander, First Lieutenant Alfred L. Booth,requested permission to illuminate, but hisrequest was turned down. Senior oficers

did not want to risk premature disclosureof defensive positions. It was also er-roneously believed that friendly shipswere in the area, and there were strictorders against illuminating or firingwithout specific orders.”

The apprehension of these observerswas justified. The Japanese destroyersAkebono and Llshio had left their tankerShi?iya at a rendezvous point some 15miles away and made landfall on the xtollat about 2130. By the time LieutenantBooth had been cautioned about his search-lights, the two enemy ships had their gunstrained on Midway and were ready tomake their first tiring run. The firingbegan at 2135.

The first salvos fell short, but as the de-stroyers closed range on a northeast coursethe shells begin to explode on Sand Is-land. The initial hits struck near Bat-tery A’s 5-inch seacoast guns at the southend of the island, and subsequent roundsbracketed the island’s power plant, a re-inforced concrete structure used also as thecommand post of a .50 caliber antiaircraftmachine-gun platoon. One round camethrough an air vent and exploded insidethe building. The Japanese ships thensuspended fire while they closed on theatoll for a second firing run.

In the island’s power plant First Lieu-

tenant George H. Cannon, although se-verely wounded, directed the re-establish-ment of wrecked communications and the

evacuation of other wounded. He refusedevacuation for his own wounds until after

Corporal Harold R. Hazelwood had putthe switchboard back in operation. Can-non died a few minutes after reaching the

‘4 LtCol .%. L. Booth Itr to CMC!, 27Jan48, here-inafter cited as liooth; LtCol L. S. Fraser ltr toCMC, hereinafter cited as Fraser.


aid station, but for this action l~e receivedposthumous award of the Medal of Honor.He was the first Marine so honored inWorld War H.

Meanwhile the enemy ships openecl fireagain, this time at closer range, and Com-mander Simard ordered Slmnnon to en-gage targets of opportlluity. .Japaneseshells set the roof of tl~e seaplane hangaron Sand ablaze, 1ighting Ilp the tzrget forthe enemy gunners , and accurate sall”osstruck the Pan .tmericau radio instalhl-tion, the island launciry, and adj scentshops. .it 2153 the Marine searchlightcrews got Shannon’s orders to illuminate,but by then only the light on the south endof Sand could bear on the ships. Thislight silhouetted the .4Ze60no about 2,500yards south of the island, before z nearmiss from one of the destroyers put it outof commission. Crewmen reacted inlme-diately to get the light back in zction andon target, but 13attery k’s t5-inchers stayedsilent because comn~unication damage hadprevented passing of Shannon’s commandto open fire.”

13nt Captain ,Jean H. Bllckuer, coln-mancliug Battery D’s 3-incl~ antiaircraftgl~ns, could now see the large ,Japauesebattle flag on the .llwbono’s foremast, ancll~e.ordered his g~~nsinto action. Splashesconlcl not be made out, altllougb illun~in:t-tiol~ was excellent, and 13nckl~er’s fire con-trolmen were positive that the sl~ells wereeither passing throllgl~ the ships’ super-structures or into their hulls. Battery B(First I.ieutenant Rodney 31. Halldley)on llasterl~ Island now aclcled its 5-inchfire to tile battle and .50 caliber macl~inegUnS openecl up on tl~e targets wl~ich were

well within range. This firing from the

“ Boot}~ ; J’r({scr; (:01 L, A Hohn ltr to CMC,3f.)Jan48.

Marine batteries kept up for five minutesbefore the Japanese succeeded in knockingout the searchlight. Although some ob-servers believed that the Uilcio had alsobeen hulled, results of this Marine firehave never been determined.’G Both Japa-nese ships retired soon after the light wasshot out and a Pan American clippercaptain flying overhead that night en routefrom Wake reported seeing an intense fireon the surface of the sea and the wakes oftwo ships on the logical retirement courseof the destroyers. Both enemy ships,however, returned to Japan safely, despitemy damage tlmt might have been done bythe Marine guns.

The enemy fire had cost the 6th DefenseBattalion two killed and ten wounded; ‘7two men from the naval air station werekilled and nine wounded. Material dam-age on Midwav was not too severe and was.confined to Sand Island: the airfield onEastern Island was not touched. The sea-plane hangar had burned, although theframe was still intact, and one plane waslost in the flames. Another PRY wasbadly damaged by shell fragments, andfragments also caused minor damage to anumber of buildings. The ~lrrison hadstood OR its first ““Japanese attxck, butthere was little comfort in this. The de-fenders estimated-correctly-that theenemy would be back sooner or later withx much more serious threat.

With the outbreak of war, completionof the coastal and antiaircraft defenses ofMidway took first priority and Marineswere treated to the welcome and unusual

‘“ The C7,S1!io, evidently a ~ery lucky ship, wasthe only enemy vessel that took part in the PearlHarbor attack that was still afloat on V–J Day.

“ Casualty figures were compiled from records17~as~lalty fig~lres were compiled from records

furnished by Statistics l-nit, I’ers.kcctSec,

tJ~PAN STRIKES 81

sight of the civilian contractor% heavyequipment turned to on dugout and bat-tery construction. Authorities at PearlHarbor were determinedtoget reinforce-merits to the atoll and within a week afterVMSB-231 made its historic long flightfrom Oahu, two batteries of the 4th De-fense Battalion with additional naval 3-inch and 7-inch guns for coast defensewere being unloaded. On Christmas, theBrewster Buffaloes of VMF-221 flew infrom tl~e ,Yaratogti wbicll had been rushedout to Pearl from San Diego after the,Japanese attack. This carrier had takenpart in the abortive attempt to relieveWake. The next day the island receivedanother contingent of 4tl~ Defense Bat-talion men, the ground echelon of VMF-221, and much needed defense materielwhen the seaplane tender Tan@er, whichhad also been headed for Wake, unloadedat Midway instead. By the end of Decem-ber the atoll, which was now Hawaii’smost important outpost, had for its garri-son a heavily reinforced defense battalion,a Marine scout-bomber and a fightersquadron, and VP-21’S patrol bombers.Midwmy was in good shape to greet. the,Japanese if they came back, and the pas-sage of every month in tbe new yearmade the atoll a to~lgher nut to crack.ls

THE SO [TTHER.V O UTI’0ST8 “

Tiny ,Johnston Island, set off by itselfin the open sea southwest of Hawaii,proved to be a favorite target of ,Japanese

‘SSee Part V, “The Battle of Midway” for thestory of the eyents leading up to the decisiveurrval action which took place at Miclway in June1942.

‘0 Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Hea Ving8 Rf’cord, Part 24,Exhibit No. 27, ‘“History of Action Occurring atPalruyrn Island 7–311)ee41, As Compiled from

submarines in the first month of the war.It was too close to the Pacific Fleet base atPearl and too limited in area to make it aprize worth risking an amphibious as-sault, but its strategic location, like an ar-rowhead pointing at the .Japanese Mar-sha]ls, made damage to its air facilitieswell worth the risk of bombardment at-tempts. The airfield on the atoll’s name-sake, .Johnston Island, was only partiallycompleted on 7 December, but temporaryseaplane handling facilities were in oper-ation at Sand Islet, the only other landarea within the fringing reef. There wasno permanent patrol plane complement,but ,Johnston was an important refuelingstop and a couple of PBYs were usuallyanchored in the lagoon.

The news of the outbreak of war cre-ated a flurry of activity on Johnston, andthe civilian contractor’s employees turnedto at top speed to erect additional earth-works around the Marine guns and to pre-pare bomb shelters.zo No Japanese ship orsubmarine made its appearance on 7 De-cember, perhaps because the first day ofwar found the Indianapo7i.y and five de-stroyer minesweepers at ,Jollnston testingthe performance of the Higgins landingboat on coral reefs.” T1~ese ships were

()fficial Dispatches and Correspondence,” ExhibitNo. 28, “History of the Action Occurring at John-ston Island 7–31Dec41, As Compiled from Offi-cial Dispatches and Correspondence,” ExhibitNo. 31, CO, XAS, PalnlyraIs ltr to ConlFonrteen,24 Dec41,, and Exhibit N-o. W, CO, NAS, John-stonIs ltr to C’omFourteen, 19Dec41 ; (’0, NAS,JohnstonIs ltr to CornFourteen, 22Dec41 ; Mar-GarFor, Pac File C–1455–41H, “Defense-Fortifi-cation Johnston Island,” 12Sep41–13Jun43 ; Mar-GarFor, Pac File (1–1455–40–15, “Defense-Forti-fication Pahoyrrr Islands,” 26 Sep41–30Jun43.

mCO, NAS, JohnstonIs, Progress and Read-iness Rept, 15Dec41.

“ H(,uri)?.qs Record, I’ar’t23, 758–75!3.

82 1’E.4RL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

immediately recalled toward Pearl toform part of the extensive search patternfor the enemy carrier force, and .John-ston’s defense rested with its own slim

garrison. Major Francis B. I,oomis, <Jr.,Executive (Miter of the 1st J)efense Ihlt-talion, caught while returning to Pearlby air from an inspection of the westernoutposts> assumed command of the ,John-ston detacl~ment as senior Marine otlicerpresent.

Shortly after dark on 12 December it

submarine surfaced 8,000 yi~tds off SandIslet and began tiring green stal; clusterswhich burst high over the island. The 5-iuch battery could not pick up the vesselin its sights, bLlt it tired one star shell in

the general direction of tile subnlarine.The submarine ceased firing immediatelyas she, evidently was not seeking a duel.

The next enemy attack canle at dtlskthree days later. The supply ship i%ur-

7’0~os had delivered a barge IOM1of SUP-

plies originally intended for the Wakeg:lrrisoll :Ind picked {Ip 77 civilian COI~-

struction employees for retllrn to Pearlwhen a sentry atop ,Johnston% water

tower spotted a flash to seaward illld

sounded general quarters. The flash had

been spotted by the batteries also, al~d the5-inch control estimated the range at 9,000yards. The 3-inch director and heighttinder made out two ships, one larger thanthe other. The first two enen~y salvosbracketed ,Jolmston and the third str~lcknear the contractor’s power house and setoff a 1,200-gallon oil tank whieb imme-diately fired the building. .i strong windwhipped LIp 50-foot flames from the oi]tire, and “as observecl from the Naval .! ir

Station at Sand Islet, .Johnston Island

seemed doomed.?”2 The Japanese ccm-tinued to tire for ten minutes at this well-lighted target and they hit several otherbuildings. The 5-inch glms deliveredsearching fire, mnd just as the Marineswere convinced they were hitting closeaboard their targets, the enemy tire ceasedabruptly.

The enemy vessels had fired from theobscuring mists of a smmll squall and spot-ters ashore never clemly SilW their targets,but the defenders believed that they hadengaged two surface vessels, probably alight cruiser and a destroyer. I.ater anal-ysis indicated, however, that one or moresubmarines had n~ade this attack. For-tllnate]y no one in the garrison was hurtby tile enemy tire. although flames andfragments caused considerable damage tothe power house and water distilling ma-chinery. The Burrow, although clearlyoutlined by the fire, was not harmed. Thefi~ct that its nnchorage area was knownto be studded with submerged coral headsprobably discouraged the Japanese fromattempting an underwater attack, and,Johnston’s 5-inch battery ruled out a sur-face. approach.

During the exchange of fire one of theMarines’ 5-inch guns went out of action.Its counter-recoil meclmnism failed. Afterthis the long-range defense of the islandrested with one gLm until 18 Decemberwhen two patrol bombers from Pearl ar-rived to join the garrison. This gun wasenough, however, to scare off an enemysubmarine which fired star she]]s overSand Islet after dark on 21 December..Qain the simple expedient of firing inthe probable direction of the enenly wasenough to silence the submarine. The

“ l~id., I’art 24 Exhibit No. 32, CO, ~M3,,Jt)hnstonIsltr to CmnFourteen, l$lDec+ll.

JAPAN STRIKES

next night, just as the ready duty P13Ylanded in the lagoon, another submarine,perhaps the same one that had fired illumi-nation over Sand, fired six shells at theislets. Both 5-inchers on Johnston nowwere back in action and each gun fired tenrounds before the submarine submerged.The patrol plane was just lifting from thewater as the last enemy shot was fired.Only one shell hit Sand, but that oneknocked down the CAA homing tower andslightly wounded one Marine.

Johnston Island was clearly a discour-aging place to attack, and the shelling of22 December marked the last enemy at-tempt at surface bombardment. It wasjust as well that the ,Japanese decided toavoid Johnston, because reinforcementfrom Pearl soon had the atoll bursting atits seams with men and guns. .&n addi-tional 5-inch and a 3-inch battery, 16 moremachine guns, and the men to man themarrived on 30 December. In January aprovisional infantry company was sentand eventually the garrison included evenlight tanks. The expected permanent Ma-rine fighter complement never got settledin at Johnston’s airfield. The island be-came instead a ferrying and refueling stopfor planes going between Pexrl and the,Sout,hand Southwest Pacific.

Palmyra, 900 miles southeast of John-ston, also figured in the early develop-ment of a safe plane route to the southerntheater of war. But before the atoll fadedfrom the action reports it too got a tasteof the gnnfire of a Japanese submarine.At di~~~non 24 December an enemy raider

surfaced 3,000 yards south of the mainisland and began firing on the dredgeSacramento which was anchored in thelagoon and clearly visible between twoof Palmyra’s numerous tiny islets. Onlyone hit was registered before the fire ofthe 5-inch battery drove the submarineunder. Damage to the dredge was minorand no one was injured.

Colonel Pickett’s command at PearlHarbor had orgmized strong reinforce-ments for Palmyra and these arrived be-fore the end of December. LieutenantColonel Bert A. Bone, Commanding Offi-cer of the 1st Defense Battalion, arrivedwith the additional men, guns, and equip-ment to assume command of the defenseforce. On 1 March the official designa-tion of the Marine garrison on Palmyrawas changed to 1st Defense Battalion andformer 1st Battalion men at other baseswere absorbed by local commands. TheMarine Detachment at Johnston became aseparate unit,

After these submarine attacks of De-cember, Palmyra and Johnston drop fromthe pages of an operational history. Theatolls had served their purpose well; they

d~ua~ ed :1 vulnerable flank of the HaW,ai-lan Islands at a time when such protectionwas a necessity. While the scene of activefighting shifted westward the garrisonsremained alert, and when conditions per-mitted it many of the men who had servedout the first hectic days of the war on theselonely specks in the ocean moved on tothe beachheads of the South and CentralPacific.

CHAPTER 3

The Southern Lifeline

STRATEGIC REAPPRAISAL’

In December 1941 reverse followed re-verse in the fortunes of the Allies in thePacific. The Japanese seemedtobeevery-where at once and everywhere successful.Setbacks to the enemy schedule of con-quest were infrequent and temporary.On the Asian mainland Hong Kong felland Japanese troops advanced steadilydown the Malay Peninsula toward Singa-pore. In the Philippines Manila was evac-uated and American-Filipino forces re-treated to Bataan and Corregidor for alast-ditch stand. To the south the first~Japanese landing had been made onBorneo, and superior enemy forces pre-pared to seize the Netherlands EastIndies. The capture of Wake and Guamgave the Japanese effective control overthe Central Pacific from the China coastto Midway and Johnston. (See Map 1,Map Section)

By the turn of the year only the seaarea between the Hawaiian Islands andthe United States and the supply routefrom the States through the South Pa-

‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from The War Reports of f7en-eral of the Army Qcorge C. fifarshall—~eneral ofthe ArTny H. H. Arnold—Fleet Admiral Ernest

J. King ( Philadelphia & ATew York: J. B. Lip-pincott Company, 1947), hereinafter cited as War

Rep@rta; FAdm E. J. King and Cdr W. M. White-hill, Fleet .~dnliraz Ki~lq: A .Naval Record ( hTewYork: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1952)hereinafter cited as King’8 ~awzl Recwd; k’tra-te~ic I’la?tning.

84

cific to New Zealand and Australia werestill in Allied hands. The responsibilityfor holding open the lines of communica-tion to the Anzac area 2 rested primarilywith the U. S. Pacific Fleet. On 31 De-cember that fleet came under the commandof the man who was to direct its opera-tions until Japan unconditionally sur-rendered—.kdmiral Chester W. Nimitz(CinCPac).

As soon as he arrived at Pearl Harbor,Nimitz was given a dispatch from Ad-miral Ernest J. King, the newly ap-pointed Commander in Chief, UnitedStates Fleet (CinCUS, later abbreviatedas CominCh). King’s message outlinedNimitz’s two primary tasks as CinCPac.He was to use his ships, planes, and menin:

(1) Covering and holding the Hawaii-Midwayline and maintaining its communications withthe west coast.

(2) Maintaining communications between thewest coast and Australia, chiefly by covering,securing and holding the Hawaii-Samoa line,which should be extended to include Fiji at theearliest possible date.a

Although the Japanese had severely

damaged the Pacific Fleet in their Pearl

Harbor raid, they had concentrated on

‘ Anzac is actually the abbreviation for Aus-tralian and Sew Zealand Army Corps used inWW I, but the term was so understandable andeasy to use in reference to the two Conlmon-wealth nations that it was adopted in the Pa-cific War and applied frequentlygraphic area in which they lay.

‘ King’s Naval Reccwd, 353–354.

to the geo-

THE SOUTHERN LIFELINE 85

ships rather than installations, and the re-pair facilities of the navy yard were vir-tually untouched. Round-the-clock workpromptly restored to operation many ves-sels which might otherwise have been lost,for good or long delayed in their return tofleet service. But Nimitz’s strength wasnot enough to hazard a large scale am-phibious offensive, even with the additionof reinforcements sent from the AtlanticFleet. In the first few months of 1942,Allied strategists had to be content withdefensive operations. The few loca] at-tacks they mounted were hit-and-run raidswhich did little more than boost ]lome.front and service morale at a time whenmost news dealt with defeat and sur-render.

From 22 December to 14 January, thepolitical and military leaders of theUnited States and Great Britain met inWashington (the .4RCADIA Confer-ence ) to chart the course of Allied opera-tions against the .4xis powers. TheAmericans, despite the enormity of theJapanese attack, reaffirmed their decisionof ABC–1 that Germany was the pre-dominant enemy and its defeat would bedecisive in the outcome of the war. ThePacific was hardly considered a secondarytheater, but the main strength of the .41-lied war effort was to be applied in theEuropean, African , and Middle Easternareas. Sufficient men and materiel wouldbe committed to the battle against Japanto allow the gradual assumption of’ theoffensive.

One result of the .4RCAL)IA meetingswas the organization of tile Combined

Chiefs of Staff (CCS), a supreme mili-tary council whose members were thechiefs of services in Great Britain and the

United States. The CCS was charged

with the strategic direction of the war,subject only to the review of the politicalheads of state. The necessity of present-ing a united American view in CCS dis-cussions led directly to the formation ofthe United States ,Joint Chiefs of staff(JCS) as the controlling agency of Amer-ican military operations.

On 9 February 1942, the first for-mal meeting of General George C. Mar-shall (Chief of Staff, ~Jnited StatesArmy), lJieutenant General Henry H.

,Arnold (Chief of the ilrmy Air C’orps),

~dmiral Harold R. Stark (CIJO), and

Admiral King ( CominCh ) took place,

~xcept for the combination of the offices

of CominCh and C~O in the person of

Admiral King which took eflect on 26

March (.4dmiral Stark became Com-

mander CT. S. Naval Forces Europe) and

the addition of ~dmiral ~villiam D.

I~ahy as chief of Staff to the President

on 20 July, the membership of the JCS

remained constant for the duration of the

war. As far as the Marine Corps was

concerned their representative on the JCS

was Admiral King, and he was consist-

ently a champion of the use of Marines at

their greatest potential—as specially

trained and equipped amphibious assault

troops.’

4On 13.4pr51, before a subcommittee of theSenate Committee on Armed Services, Gen Hol-comb stated that he was called in during theARCADIA conferences and “sat as a memberof that group.” Later “ , . . a formal organi-zation occurred in which I was not included.However, because of my intercourse with Ad-miral Stark I was in on nearly all of the dis-cussions that took place.” This intimate rela-tionship changed, however, when Stark was re-lieved m CNO on 26Mar42. An interesting sequelto this story of the “exclusion” of the Comman-dant. from the JCS was revealed by Gen Holcombwhen he further related how after a dinner party

86 PEARL H.4RBOR TO G~.4DALC.4hTAL

On 10 ,January 19+2, the CCS, ackingwith the approval of Prime Minister

Churvhill ancl President Roosevelt, set upa unified, inter-Allied command in the}vest.ern Pil(’ifiC to control defensive opera-tions against tl~e ,Japanese along a broadsweep of positions from Burnla throughI.uzon to NTew Guinea. l’l~e commanderof ABDA (.\l~lericall-Brit isl~-I)t~tcll-.i~~s-tralian ) forces holding the barrier zonewas the British Conlmancler in Chief inIndia, General Sir .ir~llibitld P. Wavell ;his ~iBD.1 air, naval, and ground conl-manders were respectively an F.nglish-man, an .imerican, and u Ihltchnlun. But.illD.k ~OIllllliillCl h:td 110 chance tO StOp

tile ,Japanese in the East Indies, Malaya,

or the Philippines. Wavell’s forces were

beaten b:wk, cut ofi, ordefeatecl before hecould be reached by rein forcen~ents thatcould make a significant difference in thefighting-. By the end of February Singa-pore had fallen :uld the .%BI).I area wassplit by an enemy thrust to ,Sumatra.

Wavell returned to India to muster troopsto block ,Japanese encroachment into

at the white House in ~lul~1$)43,the PresicJent,associating hiulself with the Jlarine corps, hadsaid to him contideutially: “you lmow, the firstthing You know we are ~oin~ to he left out ofthings. Tt’e are not represented on the .Jointchiefs of Staff . . how would You like to bea meud)erof the ,TointC;hiefsof Staff?’ Holcoulbreplied that he Ivould like it very much butdidn’t know how the .Joiut Chiefs WOUIC1feelabout it. That was the last, however, that Hol-conlh e~er heard of this matter directly or offi-cially. Semite Committee on Armed Services,Wd Wngress, Heariu~s on S. 667, “.~ Bill t(,Fix the l’erw)nu~l Stren~th of the [-nited StatesJIarine ( ‘tjrljs :Iu(i t{) lllilk+? the (’{)llllllandant oftile Marine (’orIM :1 I’erlnane]lt }Ienll)er of the.Jl}int (’hiefs of St~lfi” ( Il”ashiugtou : G1’( ), 1951 ),34-13(;.

Burma. Ch 1 March ABDA C’ommandwas formally dissolved.

Although this first attempt at, unified.Mlied command was short-1 ived and un-successful, it set a pattern which governedoperational control of the war through its

. .remammg years. This pattern amountedto the selection as over-all commander ofa theater of an otlicer from the nation hav-ing the most forces in that particulartheater. His principal subordinates wereappointed from other nations also havinginterests and forces there. Realistically,

the CCS tried to equate theater responsi-bility with national interest. Ch 3 Marchthe Conlbined (“l~iefs approved for thewestern Pacific a new dividing 1ine whichcut through the defunct ABDA area.Burma and all Southeast Asia west of anorth-south line between ,Java and Su-matra were added to Wavell’s Indiancommand ancl the British Chiefs of Staffswere charged with the strategic directionof this theater. The whole Pacific eastof the new 1ine was given over to Americ-an .JCS control.

The ,Joint Chiefs divided the Pacificinto two strategic, entities, one in whichthe hTavy would have paramount interests,the Pacific Ocean Area ( POA), and theother in which tile Army would be thedominant service, the Southwest PacificArea ( SWPA). (See Map 1, Map Sectionfor boundary. ) NTaval planners had suc-

cessfully insisted in ,J(TS discussions thatall positions sn(h as New Caledonia, theN-ew I1ebricles, and N’ew Zealand whichguarded t lle 1ine of (,ol]llllllllic}~tio]ls fromPearl H:ld)ol” to .~nstralia must he con-trolled by the Navy. Ill ternls of the airage, the ,1(’S divisiol~ of the Pacific gavethe .irnly operational responsibility for

THE SO~THERN I>IFEI.INE 87

an area of large land masses lying rela-tively close together \vhere land powersupported by shore-based air could be de-cisive. Tothe Navy the,JCS assigned thedirect ion of the war in a vast sex area withwidely scattered island bases where thecarrier plane reigned supreme.

The American commander in the Phil-ippines, C~eneral Douglas MacArthur, wasthe ,Toint (.’hiefs’ choice. to take over direc-tion of SWPA operations; Admiral hTi~n-itz was selected to head POA activities.Formal almollllcement of the new set-u])~vas not ma(]e llntil Mac.frthllr had es-

caped from (’orregidor and reached safety

in .fustralia. On 18 March, with the con-sent of the Australian government, Mat’-Arthur was announced as Supreme (Yonl.mander of the SWP.k (CinCSWPA)The ,JCS directive outlining missions forboth Pacific areas was issued on 30 March,and the confirmation of hTimitz as Com-mander in Chief of the POA ( Cin(’PO.1)followed ou 3 xipril. By CCS and ,JCSi~greernent, both commanders were to haveoperational control over any force, regard-less of service or nation, that was assignedto their respective theaters.

Nirnitz still retained his command ofthe, Pacific Fleet, in addition to his dutiesas CinCPO.%. The fleet’s striking arm,its carriers and their supporting vessels,st:l.yerl under h“imitz as Cin CPac no mat-ter where they operated. In the finalana]ysis, however, the major decisions onemployment of troops, ships, and planes~vere made in Washington with the adviceof the theater commanders. MacArtllllrwas a sllbordirli~te of Marshall :{lld re-

ported through l~in~to tl~e ,JCS; an iden-t icill command relationship existe(l be-tween Nimitz and King.

448777 0—58—7

S.4.I1OAIV BA)S’TZOiV 5

The concern felt in Washington for thesecurity of the southern route to Australiawas acute in the days and weeks immedi-ately following the Pearl Harbor attzck.I)espite world-wide demands on the troopsand equipment of a nation just enteringthe war, (leneral Marshall and AdmiralKing gave special attention to the needfor holding- positions that would protect.iustralia’s lifeline. Garrison forces, mostof them provided by the h-m-y, movedinto the Pacific in substantial strength toguard what the Allies still held and toblock further ,Japanese advances. 13e-tween ,January and April nearly 80,000.lrmy troops left the States for Pacificbases.

An infantry division was sent to .%us-

tralia to take the place of Australianunits committed to the fighting in theMiddle East. At the other end of thelifeline, a new division was added to theHawaiian Island garrison. Mixed forcesof infantry, coast and antiaircraft artil-lery, and air corps units were establishedin early February at Canton and Christ-mas Islands, southwest and south of PearlHarbor. At about the same time a NewZealand ground garrison reinforced byAmerican pursiiit planes moved into theFiji Islands, and a small garrison wassent to the French-owned Society Islandsto guard tile eastern approaches to thesupply route. In March a task force of

‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from HqDeFor Rept ofSanloan GruAdv13 Facilities, 100ct42 ; 2d Mar-Brig AnRept, 16.J11142; Xl MarBrig Diary,23Dec41–30.JunW ; CG 3d Mar13rig ltr to CMC,loSep43 : 3d MarBrig Brief of Ops, 21Mar42-31.\ug43 ; M.\G-13 War Diary, lMar42-31May43;Hist of the 7th DefBn, 21DecW; S’tratc>~icPlan?? iblg.

88 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANA1,

almost division strength arrived in NewCaledonia and the ,Joint Chiefs sent addi-tional.irmy garrison forces to Tongatabuin the Tongs Islands, south of Samoa,and north to Efate in the hTew Hebrides.By the end of March 1942 the supplyroute to Australia ran through a corridorof burgeoning island strong points andthe potential threat of major <Japaneseattacks had been substantially lessened.(See Map 1, Map Section and Map 3)

Actually the initial ,Japanese war plancontemplated no advances into the Sout l).Pacific to cut the line of communicationsto .~llstral ia. Tile Allied leaders, however, can be forgiven for not being clair-voyant on this point, for the enemy’schance to seize blocking positions alongthe lifeline was quite apparent. Samoaseemed to be one of the most invitingtargets and its tiny garrison of Marineswholly inadequate to stand off anythingbut a minor raid. The necessity forbuilding up Samoan defenses as a preludefor further moves to Fiji and h~ew Cale-donia had been recognized by AdmiralKing in his instructions to Nimitz to holdthe Hawaiian-Samoa line ,tiand reinforce-ments from the States to back up thoseinstructions were underway from SanDiego by 6 ,January. These men, mem-bers of the 2d Marine Brigade, were theforerunners of a host of Marines whopassed through the Samoan area andmade it the major Marine base in the Pa-cific in the first year of tile war.

(Xlly two weeks’ time was necessary toorganize, assemble, ~llld load Ollt tile ~dBrigade. .icting on orders from the~omrnandant, the 2d Marine Division :~c-tivated tile brigade on 24 I)ecember atCamp Elliott, outside of San Diego. The

aKing’x .Vaval Rwwrd. .354.

principal units assigned to the new con~-mand were the 8th Marines, the 2d Bat-talion, I(kh Marines, and the 2d DefenseBattalion (dispatched by rail from theeast coast). (;olonel (later BrigadierGeneral ) Henry L. Larsen was namedbrigade commander. A quick estimatewas made of the special engineeringequipment which the brigade would needto accomplish one of its most importantmissions-completion of the airfield atTutuila. Permission was obtained to ex-pend up to $.200,000 in the commercialmarket for the purchase of such earth-moving equipment as could not be sup-plied from quartermaster stocks. Whenthe first cargo ship arrived at San Diegoon h“ew Year’s day, the brigade went ona round-the-clock loading schedule. Six-ty-two hours later all assigned personneland gear had been loaded and the 4,798officers and men were on their way toTutuila.

When the news of Pearl Harborreached Samoa, Lieutenant Colonel Les-ter .1. Dessez, commanding the 7th De-fense Battalion, ordered his troops to mantheir positions. The Samoan Marine Re-serve Battalion was called to active dutyand assigned to reinforce the defenses.Despite a spate of rumors and falsealarms, no sign of the ,Japanese was evi-dent until the night of 11 ,January, whena submarine shelled the naval station for

about seven minutes from a position10,OOWI5,000 yards off the north shorewhere the coast defense guns could not

bear. The station suffered only lightdamage from the shells, some of which fellharmlessly into the bay, and two menwere wounded slightly by fragments.The Marines remained on alert but re-ceived no further visits from the enemy.


On 19 January radar picked up signs ofnumerous ships, and observation stationson the island’s headlands soon confirmedthe arrival of the 2d Brigade.

While still at sea, General Larsen hadreceived orders from the liTavy Depart-ment appointing him Military Governorof American Samoa and giving him re-sponsibility for the islands’ defense as wellas supervisory control over the civil gov-ernment. As soon as the ships dockeclantiaircraft machine guns of the 2d I)e-fense Battalion were promptly unloadedand set up in the hills around Pago Pagoharbor. The %h Marines took over beachdefense positions occupied by the 7th I)e-fense Battalion and immediately beganimproving and expanding them. Theartillerymen of 2/10 and the 2d Defenseset up their guns in temporary positionswhile they went to work on permanentemplacements. Navy scouting amphib-ians of a shore-based squadron ( VS-I-D14 ) attached to the brigade soon werealoft on a busy schedule of antisubmarineand reconnaissance missions.

The airfield on Tutuila was only 10per cent completed when Larsen arrived,but he directed that construction be

pushed around the clock, work to go onthrough the night under lights, He alsodetailed the brigade’s engineer companyto assist the civilian contractors in gettingthe field in shape. For the 2d Brigade’s

first three months in Samoa, its days weretilled with defense construction. Therew-as little tinle for any combat trainingnot intimately connected with the prob-

lems of Samoan defense. The work wasarduolls, exacting, and even frustrating.since the brigade had urrived during therainy season and the frequent tropicalrainstorms had a habit of destroying in

minutes the results of hours of pick andshovel work.

General Larsen took immediate stepsflfter his arrival in American Samoa toascertain the status of the defenses inWestern (British) Samoa, 40 or so milesnorthwest of Tutuila. On 26 January thebrigade intelligence officer, I.ieutenantColonel William L. Bales, flew- to Apia,the seat of government on the island ofUpolu, to confer with the New Zealandauthorities and make a reconnaissance ofUpolu and Savaii, the two principal is-lands. The New Zealanders were quiteanxious to cooperate with the Marinessince they had a defense force of only 157men to guard two large islands with acombined coastline of over 250 miles.Bales, whose investigation was aimed pri-marily at discovering the feasibility ofdeveloping either or both of the islandsinto a military base, reported back that

Upolu’s harbor facilities, road net, andseveral potential airfield sites made itreadily susceptible to base development.He found, on the other hand, that Savaiihad no safe major anchorages and that itslava-crusted surface did “not offer air-field sites that could be developed quicklyby the ,Japanese or anyone else.” ‘ On

his return to Tutuila, I,ieutenant ColonelBales reported to General I.&rSell that:

In its present unprotected state, WesternSamoa is a hazard of tirst magnitude for the de-fense of American Samoa. The conclusion isunescapable that if we don’t occupy it the Jap-anese will and there may not be a great deal oftime left5

h~aval authorities in 117ashin@on and

Pearl Harbor recognized the desirability

7LtCol W. L. Bales ltr to CG, 2d MarBrig,8Feb-A?, Rept on Recon in Western Samoa, 8.

“Ibid., 10.

90 PE-4RL HARBOR TO G~ADALCANAL

of occupying Western Samoa and ex-tended their interest to include Wallis(LTea) Island, a small French possession320 miles from Tutuila on the westernapproaches to Samoa. Negotiations wereentered into with New Zealand regardingthe defense of Western Samoa, and theFree French government in regard to theoccupation of Wallis. In March warn-ing orders were sent out to I,arsen’s bri-gade and both marine divisions to beprepared to furnish troops for the garri-soning of Western Samoa and Wallis.gh’egotiations for the use of land and otherfacilities in Western Samoa were com-pleted on 20 March when I,arsen and ah’ew Zealand representative signed anagreement giving the Americans responsi-bility for defense of all the Samoan is-lands. This group, together with Wa]lis,was now considered a tactical entity anda new Marine brigade was to be organizedto occupy the western islands.

.4s an advance force of this new garri-son, the 7th Defense Battalion was sentto Upolu on 28 March, and a small de-tachment was established on Savaii. Inthe States, the 1st Marine Division at NewRiver, North Carolina, organized the 3dMarine Brigade on 21 March with Briga-dier C~eneral Charles D. Barrett in com-mand. Its principal units were the 7thMarines and the 1st Battalion, llth Ma-rines. The 7th”s 3d Battalion and Bat-tery C of 1/11 were detached on the 29thto move overland to the west coast forfurther transfer to Samoa as part of thegarrison for Wal]is. General Larsenmeanwhile had been directed to organizethe 8th Defense Battalion on Tutuila, asthe major element of tile Wallis garri-

‘ CMC Serial 003A7S#2, 20iWn42, Defense ofWestern Samoa and Wallis Islnnd.

son. To exercise overall authority,“Headquarters Samoan Area DefenseForce was established on Tutuila. MajorGeneral Charles F. B. Price, who was ap-pointed to this command, arrived with hisstaff at Pago Pago on 28 April from theStates. On 8 May the 3d Marine Brigadeconvoy arrived off Apia and General Bar-rett assumed military command of lJTest-ern Samoa. At the end of the month, the8th Defense Battalion (Reinforced) un-der Colonel Raphael Griffin moved intoWallis.

More than 10,000 Marine ground troopswere stationed in the Samoan area by thebeginning of ,June, and reinforcements ar-rived in a steady flow-. Marine air wasalso well established. General Larsen’sinterest and pressure assured that Tu-tuila’s airfield was ready for use on 17March, two days before the advance eche-lon of MAG–13 arrived. The new airgroup, organized on 1 March at San Di-ego, was earmarked for Price’s command.Initially the group commander, Lieuten-ant Colonel Thomas J. Walker, Jr., hadonly one tactical squadron, TTMF-lll, op-erating from Tutuila’s airfield, but VMO-151, a--scout-bomber squadron, joined inMay with the arrival of the 3d MarineBrigade convoy. The amphibians of theNavy’s VS-1-D14 squadron were also putuncler Walker’s command and sent for-ward to operate from ITpoILl and Walliswhile the airfields projected for those is-lands were rusbec] to completion by navalconstruction battalions.

I,ike the rest of the garrison forces inthe South Pacific which were rushed outto plug a gaping hole in Allied defenses,General Price’s defense force was nevercalled upon to conduct the island defensefor which it was organized. Samoa might


m.-,

za

ii

“oN

o

0

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u


well nave become a target for enemy at-tacks, but, the decisive Battle of Midwayforced tl~e ,Japanese to curb their soaringambition.’[’ ,Samoa became a vast ad-vanced combat training camp instead ofa battlegrolmcl. Most of the units com-ing there after the arrival of the 2d Bri-gade drelv heavily on the recruit depots

for their personnel:’ and for these MR-rilles Samoan clnty was an opportunity

‘0Cattlpai.vn.s of the Puriik War, 3. See PrrrtV, “Decision rrt Midway” and especially Chap-ter 1, “Setting the Stage—Early Naval Opera-tions” for events leading up to the Midwaybattle.

“ At least 407. of the 3d MarBrig initial com-plement wrrs straight out of boot camp. 3d MarBrig AnRept, 6Sept42, 9.

for learning tile fundamentals of teanl-work in combat operations. As the needfor defense construction was met and thedanger of ,Japanese attacks lessened, Sa-moa became a staging area through whichreplacements and reinforcements werefunnelled to tl~e amphibious otiensives inthe Solomous.’2 Units and individualspaused for a while here and then movedon, ulore jungle-wise and combat ready,to meet the ,Japanese.

“ From Decerntmr 1942 to .July 1943 Samoaw:is the training center for all Marine replace-ment battalions raised on the east coast of theu. s. ~. lv. Condit, G. Dirrmond, and E. 1’.Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training inWorld War II ( Washington : HistJ3r, G–3,HQMC, 1956), 181–186.

PART III

The Defense of Wake

CHAPTER 1

Wake in the Shadow of War 1

In tile strategic context of 1940 and1941, the importance of lVake, both totile ITllited States and ,Japan, was con-siderable. <It this time the [-llited Statesltad not won its oceamgirdling l~et of 1’~~-cific bases, and, with the exceptions ofWake, Midway, and Guam, the islands be-tween the Hawaiians and the Phil ippineswere terra incognz’ta. Wake, a prying out-post north of the Marshalls and on theflank of the Marianas, would be a stra-tegic prize for ,Japan’s ocean interests anda corresponding embarrassment while itwas in the hands of the ~Tnited States.

These factors had been noted by the~T.S. in the Hepburn Report of 1938 whichrecommended a $7,500,()()() three-year pro-gram to clevelop the atoll as an advancedair base and al] intermediate station onthe air route to the Far East. .~cting 0]1these recorrlr]lel~d:ttiolls, initial develop-n~ent of Wake began early ill 1941.2 Baseronstrnction was given first priority, an(lby the time the tirst nlilitary contingentarrived on tile atoll a civilian contractor’screw of ill)proxinlately 1,200 n]en, underSllpervision of Mr. Daniel ‘l’et ers, was har(lat work.

‘ For ii r@snn@ of the lreviol~+ history ofWake, see ~cfcnsc of l~ukc, Appendix II, “Pre-war History of Wake, 13s6-1941 .“ C(1I Heinl’smonograph has been the principal source usedin compiling this aecouut; his ~rersion of the ac-tion has been followed closely,

‘ (;apt R. A. Dierdorff, USA-, “Pioneer Part~—Wake Island,” L’Nil’] Prore(’din.gs, .\llril 1943,502.

By 18 April 1941, Admiral Husband E.Kimmel. Commander in Chief, l:. S. Pa-citic Fleet, becan)e fearful that the de-fensive efforts had started too late. h~ astudy sent to the (’hief of N:Lval (.)pera-tions, Kimmel stressecl tile importance ofWake and asked tl~at work on defense begiven a higher priority than base comstruction. He also requested that a M:vrine defense battalion be assigned to theatoll.’

In 1941 the strengt]l of a typical defensebatt a]ion was 43 otlicers and 939 enlistedmen, and its two most characteristic at-tributes were balanced structure and a]~igb degree of strategic mobility. ~Llt

mobility disappeared at tlie batt alien’sdest inat ion. once its guns were in posi-tion, a defense battalion suffered from in-sufficient transportation and a shortage ofmPn.4

‘lh Pacific strategy of 1941 contem-plated rendering our bases relatively se-cure against air raicls, hit-ancl-run surfaceattacks? or even minor landings. FleetMarine Force defense battalions, or-ganized for defense against just sL~choperations, cou]d provide antiaircraft pro-tectiol~, could stand off light men-of-warand tral~sports, and in extreme emergency

could fight on the beaches with individualweapons in the tradition that every Ma-

‘ ~in(:l’ac ltr to CNO, 18.4pr41.‘ USMC, T/O’s, D–133 through IP155-D in-

clusive, 27Feb41 ; MGC ltr, 2&kug41, “Employ-ment of Defense Battalions. ”

9.5

96 PEARL HAREOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL

rine, first aucl last> is an infantrynml.~Within and ttbcmt the structure of sllc]llixhtly lleltl but secure bases, tl)e l’acificFleet would ply, awaiting tile nlonlentwhen battle could be joined witl~ el]enly]Mval forces—’bto get at naval forces witl~naval forces,’-~ as Admiral Kimmel putit—in decisive action for control of thesea.

;is tniglit be expected, the .Jap:lllese con-cept of strategy ill the (Yeutr:d l’acific wasto seize or neutralize tile few advancedITnited States bases west of the HawaiianIslands as quickly as possible after theolltset of war. For this ptqose ,Japaueseforcesi lltlle~larsl]alls: lllci(x:troli]les (the

FourthF?eet) were or~animd along linesresembling an -Imerican amphibious

force.’ Commanded by Vice .ldmiral,Nariyoshi Inouye, the Fourth fi’leet was

composed of ampl~ibio~ls ship])illg, n fewold cruisers, destroyers, submarines, shore-based aircraft, and a ,Japanese version ofOIW own Fleet Marine Force: the specialnaval landing force.g Fleet headquarters

were at Trnk, w]lere Admiral Inou-ye’s flagflew in the light cruiser Ku.~h{tna.9

The war missions of .idn~iral Iuouyeand his fleet had been decided gel~era]ly in1938 when the basic East Asia war plans

‘ Zi)i(?,“ CinCI’ae ltr to CNO. 1&kIm41, “Defense and

Development of Wake Island. ”‘ ATIS ( SWPA) Doc No. 17895A, “Full trans-

lations of answers to questions concerning attackon Wake Island,”’ hereinafter cited as WakeAttack.

‘ The special naval landing force ( SNLF, sonle-times contracted to S1,F ) ~~ere ,Japanese Navypersonnel organized for service and duties inlimited land oper:ltions similar to those per-formed by U. S. Marines. Throughout the war,they g$ve an outstilndiug account of themselves.

‘ Walic Attack,

had been prepared in Tokyo.’[’ But it v-asIlot until Noveulber lM1 tl~at detaile~l il~-stn~ctious for commanders within tile(’0/llb~)/<{?F/@@t ~~el’e fol’nllll:lted and iS-

suecl. I]] these instruetiolls, Iyake was(lismissed in a single phrase :

Forces of the I’ourth Fleet:

Defend the South Seas Islands. patrol, main-

tain surf ace c~(}llll)lllnieations, capture

Wake . . . .“

Wake would be strictly a local opera-tion. By .4dmiral Inouye’s scheme, 450

special naval landing force troops could,in a pinch, turn the trick.lz

FINAL PZLEPARATIONE,AUTUMN, 1941 ‘3

On 23 ,Ju!le 1941 the Chief of Navaloperations directed that, elements of the1st Defense 13attalion, FMF, be estab-lished at Wake “as soon as practicable.”This directive (as eventually modified)

‘0 USSBS(Pac), NavAnalysisDiv, lnterroga -ticws of Japanese O~ciat& 2 vols (Washington:GPO, 1946 ), “Japanese Naval Planning,” I, 176,hereinafter cited as 7,’SSBS’ Iwterroflations withsubject or interviewee.

“ Campaif7n8 of tke Pacific War, 47.“ USNBS I?lterrogafions, “Japanese Capture of

Wake Island,” II, 371, hereinafter cited as Cap-ture of Wukc.

“ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from CO 1st DefBnDet Wake,Rept to CMC, 18Mar46, hereinafter cited as

ZR’rcrcu.r Iik’pt;Col P. A. Putnam Rept to CMC,180ct45, hereinafter cited as Patnam Rept; ht-f(}rmal reports by key subordinates to Cols Dev-

erenx and Putnam on which the official reports

are largely based, hereinafter cited as (omccr’sMInbc ) Rept; ships’ logs of the U. S. naval ves-

sels concerned ; .L’ol ,J. P. S. Deverenx, !/’he Sto~~~of Wake Zstamd ( l’hiladelphia : J. P. Lippincott

(’ompany, 1947), hereinafter cited as Derc’re!{ch’tory.

WAKE IN THE SH.4DOW OF WAR 9’7

\“x

wxS

98 P1~L4RLHARROR TO GU~D.4LCANTAL

specified that, tile following units sbonldcompose the defensive garrison :

Four 3-inch antiaircraft batteriesThree fi-inch searoast batteriesApprolmiate automatic weaponsOae S(’R–268fire-c(jT~tr(~l radar, and one SCR-

270R search ra(ltir. (’

(UNO’S “as soon as practicable” was

trauslatecl into immediate action by the

Pacific Fleet. .%bout 1 .%ugust Y1ajor

l~wis .A. Holln with five officers and 173

enlisted Marines and sailors from the 1st

Defense llattalion commenced loading the

I~SS R~gu7us, a twenty-year-old “Hog Is-land” transport which would carry thebattalion advance detail to Wake. RegwZU.Ssailed on 8 August, and arrivecl offWake on 19 August. Weapons and campequipment, were lightered ashore, and bythe time the Regu7m departed on 22 Au-gust, a camp facing the lagoon had beenset up on a site near the west end ofJ1’ake+s west leg. To distinguish thiscamp from the one west of Heel Pointhousing the 1;200 Pacific Naval Air Basecontract workmen, the Marine camp wasdesignated as Camp One. The civilianestablishment became known as CampTwo. (See Map 4)

Wake, as it appeared to the Marines ofthe 1st Defense Battalion, was a Wshapedatoll composed of three islands: MTake Is-land prope~,” the body of the V; andWilkes and Peale, the two tipends. Itsland mass consisted of some 2,600 acresof sand and coral. offshore, heavy surfroared continually against a coral reefwhich surrounded the whole atoll at dis-

“ CNO Itr to C’inCPac, 23Jun41, “EstablislL-rnent of defensive garrison on Wake Island. ”

‘$ To prevent confusion, lVrrke IsIan(l, as dis-

tinguished from the entire atoll, }vill herein-after be entitled “Wake Island, ” wbererrs thesingle word, “Wake” will designate the atoll.

tauces varying from 30 to 1,000 yards.Tile beaches and much of tile terrain in-land were covered with coral boulders,some large enough to conceal several men.The interior lagoon, although atfordingsufficient surface and deptl~ for seaplanes,was studded w-itb coral heads and foulground which l~ad to be dredged beforesl~ips could enter the single channel be-tweel~ Wilkes and Wake Island. DespiteWake’s limited land area, its coastline ex-ceeded 21 miles. Au excellent vignetteof Wake in 1941 was given by Colonel13ayler:

Wake is by no means the bare sandy spit onethinks of when atolls are mentioned. Consid-erable areas of it are covered by woods, andthough the trees are small, their thick foliage

and the scrubby tangled underbrush providedadmirable cover . Walking in these jungleswas difficult but not impossible . .“

In August 1941, Wake was in rapidtransition from its past solitude to themechanized modernity of an outlying airbase. Patrol plane facilities and a con-crete ramp, the result of Pan American’spioneering, were already available onPeale.’i .Just inshore of Peacock Pointalong the west, leg of Wake Island a nar-row airstrip, 5,oOO by 200 feet, had been

chopped out of the dense growth. Amain roadnet of packed coral was takingshape rapidly as the contractor’s work-

‘“ Lt(’ol W. L. J. Bayler, Last Man ofl WakeIsland ( Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1!}13), 62,hereinafter cited as Last Man ofl W’alw Istund.

“ In 1933, with Savy cooperation, Pan Anleri-can .iirways began de~reloprnent of a staging andrefueling base on Peale to service its big clipperson the run to the Orient. .\t the time of thisnarrative m:ljor facilities included, in additionto those mentioned above, a powerful radio sta-tion, a pier, and a small but excellent hotel forovernight i]c{’[>llirl)o<l:lti(~n of passengers. Dierrlorff, op. cit., 501.

WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 9 9

men blasted, slashed, and dozed the ter-rain of Wake.

In spite of the need for haste, rigidofficial separation existed between the con-struction efforts of Marines and those ofthe contractors.18 Operating on a semi-private basis with their heavy equipment,supplies, and facilities the naval air basecontract workers were concerned withbuilding roads, shops, utilities, quarters,air base facilities, and the like. Theybuilt no defense installations. This con-struction fell solely to the Marines whohad little engineering equipment exceptpicks and shovels or the infrequent lux-ury of a borrowed civilian bulldozer.The Marines installed their heavy weap-ons by hand, hewed emplacements andfoxholes from the coral, and erected theirown living quarters. Understanding thisbasic difference in available means, theNavy’s construction representative, Lieu-tenant Commander Elmer B. Greey,l” andthe civilian general superintendent, Mr.Daniel Teters, did their best to assist theshorthanded and meagerly equipped Ma-rines. At no time, even after the out-break of war, did the contractor’s estab-ishment or workmen come under full mil-itary control.

On 15 October Major Hohn was relievedas Marine detachment commander by Ma-jor James P. S. Devereux, who until thistime had been executive officer of the 1stDefense Battalion. Major Devereux also

I8 Capt W. S. Cunningham, USN, transcript ofrecorded interview, “History of Wake Island De-fense,” 9Jan46, 3, hereinafter cited as Cunning-hanz Interview.

*’ “Resident Officer-in-Charge” was LCdrGreey’s official designation. With four enlistedNavy radiomen to maintain his communications,he was, until the arrival of Maj Hohn’s de-tachment, sole naval representative on Wake.

became Island Commander, an additionalduty which he would hold until relievedlate in 1941 by a naval officer, CommanderW. S. C’unningham, at this time still nari-gator of the USS Wright.

Major Devereux, as he saw Wake at thistime, describes it as follows :

When I arrived on the island, the contractor’smen working on the airfield near the toe of Wakeproper had one airstrip in usable condition andwere beginning the cross-runway. Five largemagazines and three smaller detonator maga-zines, built of concrete and partly underground,were almost completed in the airfield area. AMarine barracks, quarters for the Navy flierswho would be stationed on the island, ware-houses and shops also were going up on Wake.On Peale Island, work was progressing on anaval hospital, the seaplane ramp and parkingareas. On Wilkes, there were only fuel storagetanks and the sites of proposed powder maga-zines, but a new deepwater channel was beingcut through the island. In the lagoon, a dredgewas removing coral heads from the runways forthe seaplanes which were to be based at Wake.Some of these installations were nearly finished ;some were partly completed ; some were only inthe blueprint stage.20

To bring Wake’s defenses to the high-est possible state of readiness in the short-est time, Major Devereux found much tobe done. In addition, as senior repre-sentative of the armed forces on Wake, hewas confronted by other demanding prob-lems. To reinforce Army air strength inthe Philippines, B-17 “Flying Fortresses”were being staged across the Pacific 21through Wake, but no aviation groundcrews were available there to service thebig airplanes. Some 3,000 gallons of gas-oline for each of these planes thereforehad to be manhandled and hand-pumped

20 Devercux Story, 25.*’ Wwr Reports, 67.

100

by tile Marines.22 This they did in udcli-tion to their normal duties, and the fuelingtasks came at all hours of the day or uigl]t.It was ironic that many of these aircraft,which cost Wake so many man-hours ofvital defensive preparations, would betrapped on the ground by the initial .Japa-l~ese attacks on Clark and &Tichols Fieldsin the Philippines.

.Uthougb this servicing of .irmy planesrepresented the heaviest single additionalduty imposed Llpon the Marines, they werealso required to act as stevedores in thetime-consuming and exhausting process ofunloading ships which arrived at the atoll.This work was required lmt il the channel,berthing and turning facilities inside thelagoon could be completed. These ad(li-tional duties hampered defense work dur-ing the autumn of 1941; but fortunately

the detachment needed little combat train-ing because it contained a number of “ol(lMarines” of tile best type.” On 2 No-vember, two weeks after Major I)evereux’sarrival, the Wake garrison was augmente(lby a draft from tile parent ] st l)efenseBattalion. This group included 9 officersand 200 enlisted men who arri~~ed fronlPearl on board tl)e llSS (’a.ytor. Thisbrought the tot:l] ~f:~rille strength 011

Wake to 15 officers and 373 enlistedMarines.

“ Tankers would lnunl~bulk aviation gas intotank stornge ashore: 31arine working parties\vouldl)(~m~)this g:isf)line into 50-~allondrumsand transfer the drunis to dispersed fllel dUUIpS;finally, on arrival of l)lanes the same gasolinewould again be pnmlwd by the same means intoa lone tank-truck for delirery to the aircraft.When time pressed—as it usually di(l-31arinesreinfor(jed the truck by pumping directly fromtlo-gallon drums into the Fortresses.

2’ DeucreIIx Story, 27’.

PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL

During October ancl November prog-ress on and about the airstrip, by nowa going col~cern, indicated that there wasroom on Wake for the aviation compo-nent of fighters necessary to balance andround out the defense force. Commander,Aircraft Battle Force, had determinedthat this was to be Marine FighterSquadron 211, supported in its independ-ent, role by a provisional service detach-ment drawn from Marine Air Group 21,to which VMF-211 was assigned. To es-tablish the ground facilities required tomaintain this squadron, Major waiterL. J. Bayler from the staff of IMAG-21,together \vit]l a detachment of ~~ Ma.rines commanded by Second LieutenantRobert ,J. Condermany were dispatchedfrom Pearl on 19 November in USSW~ightj an aircraft tender which was alsobringing out, the prospective Island Com-mander and commanding officer of theNaval Air Station.

While the Wtiqht plowed westwardbearing VMF-21 1’s ground components,tile air echelon of that squadron, consist-ing of the squadron commander, nine of-ficers and two enlisted pilots,” had on the

“ This detachment, like a similar one organ-ized for the Marine air component at Midway.had been pro~isionally made up from key per-sonnpl representing each squadron in MAG-21,inasmuch as, at the time of organization, firmdecision hacl not been made as to which squad-rons fr[an thiit group would be assigned to whichislands. Wake aviation’s ground detachment,therefore, included personnel not only fron]VME’–211 but from H&S Sq–21 and VMSB-231and –232. (X3 NAG-21 Rept to (2}1(3, 23Dec41,

‘“ l’he I)ilots of VMF-211’S Wake detachmentwere: Maj I’aul A. l’utnam ( commanding),(’apts Henry T. Elrod, Herbert C. Frueler, Frank(’. Th:lriu ; 1stLt George A. Graves; 2dLts Rob-ert. .J. (“onderma]l (in command of advance(Ietail and grollrid Inaintenance, but also a pi-lot ), (.’arl R. Davidson, Frank J. Holden, John

WAKE IAT THE SHADOW OF WAR 101

afternoon of 27 hTovember received secretverbal warning orders to prel)are for enl-barkation on board a carrier. SLIA or-

ders had been expected by the squadroncommander (though not by the pilots, vir-tually all of whom carried little morethan toilet articles and a change of clothi-ng ), and few preparations were required.The squadron had only to fly tl~e 12 newF4F–3 (Grumman Wi]dcat ) fightersfrom 13wa Mooring Mast (as that air st a-t.ion was then designated) over to FordIsland, the naval air base in the middleof Pearl Harbor, for further transfer byair to the flight deck of the LTSS Eriter-

fwi.w. This was a routine operation forMarine pilots, and except for their un-familiarity with the new aircraft, and thefact that, one plane’s starter misbehaved,”the morning flight of 28 hTovember ontothe l?n.ter~~~~e went off without incident.”

The best description of VMF-21 1’s voy-age to Wake is contained in a personalletter, composed on the e~’e of the squad-ron’s debarkation, from Major Paul A.Putnam to Colonel Claude ii. Larkin w-hocommanded MAG-21, Excerpts arequoted:

&r SEA,December .?, 1.941.

DEAR C’OLONELLARKIN :It is expected that we will go ashore to-

morrow morning. l’he extreme secrecy underwhich we sailecl is still in effect and I under-

F. Kinney, l)avid D. Kliewer, Henry G, Webb;TSgt William J, Hamilton, and SSgt Robert O.Arthur.

‘o A hint as to the importance of the squad-ron’s mission might have been drawn at thistime from the fact that. ~vhen this starter trou-ble develolml, the pilot of this defecti~e planewas flown by a torpedo plane to the carrierwhere a brand-new F4F—3 from an E~/tcrpri!wsquadron was issued to him.

“ Maj. P. A. Putnam ltr to CO MAG-21,3Dec41.

stand is tf~ ren]ain so at least until this Forcehas returned to Hawaiian oI)erating area.Therefore I am sending this tirst report via guardnaiil (m this ship, rather than by air mail afterlanding . .

You t~ill recall that I left one plane at FordIsland. The Admiral at once gave me a planeto replace it, from VF–6 ; ancl he nia(le it plainto me and to the wl]ole ship that nothing shouldbe overlooke(l nor any trouble spared in order

to insure that I will get ashore with 12 air-l)lanes ill as near l)erfect condition as possible.In)mediatt=ly I ~vas given a full complement ofmechs and all htinds aboard have continuallyvied with each other to see who could do the]nt)st for me. I feel a bit like the fatted calfbeing groomed for whatever it is that happensto fatted calves, but it surely is nice while itlasts and the airplanes are pretty sleek andfat too. l’hey ha~e of course been checked anddouble checked from end to end, and they havealso heen painted so that all 12 are now ofstandard blue and gray .

The Admiral seems to be most determined to

maintain secrecy regarding the position and ac-tivity of this Force. There has been a continu-ous inner air lntrol cluring daylight, and a fullsquadron has made a long search to the frontand fl,anks earh morning and evening. They arearmed to the teeth and the orders are to attackany Japanese vessel or aircraft on sight in orderto pre~ent the discovery of this Force.

My orders, however, are not so direct. In factI have no orders. I ha~e been told informallyby lesser members of Staff that I will be givenorders only to fly off the ship and go to the land,and that there will be nothing in the way ofinstructions other than to do what seems ap-propriate at the moment. Of course I shall goand ask for orders and instructions, but itseems unlikely that I shall be given anythingdetinite . .

This is written Wednesday forenoon. Should

I receive any orders at variance with the fore-

~oing, I will add a postscript. Otherwise I

thiIlk of nothing further of importance or in-terest at this time. . .

When the Enterprise had reached a

point approximately 200 miles northeastof Wake, the squadron, from a materielstandpoint, was “as far as possible ready


for combat, service;’ according to MajorPutnam. However, he added, it was:

. . . seriously handicapped by lack of expt?ri-ence in the type of airplane then used. It isbelieved that the squadron was excellentlytrained and well qualified for war duty in ageneral sense, but it was unfortunate that thenew type of airplane, so radically different fromthe type in which training had been conducted,had been received too recently to permit fanlil-iarization in tactical flying and gunnery.ze

Onthe morning of 4Decemberthis force

was met by a h-av-y PEY sent out from

Wrake,” and the ~&lF-211 aircraft took

off from the Entwprk and followed thisplane to the atoll. Within less than twohours the last F4F–3 had pancaked on thenarrow strip at Peacock Point,.

Major 13ayler had arrived on 29 No-vember and already was busy setting upairbase communication facilities. com-mander Clmningharn had succeeded Ma-jor Devereux as Island Commander, andI.ieUkIlallt Conderman and his 49 head-quarters and service personnel were wait-ing to greet the squadron, but the aircraftoperating facilities at Wake were hardlyin a finished stage. The landing strip,although sufficient in length, was too nar-row to permit safe operation of more thanone airplane at a time. Takeoffs or land-ings by section were thus impossible.Parking was extremely restricted, and allareas about the hardstand mat were insL~chrough and unfinished condition that

= Putna?a Rept, 13.“On the day before, to the surprise of the men

on Wake, a 12-plane squadron of PBY’s hadglided down onto the lagoon, anchored, andcommenced a daily series of long-range airsearches to the south of Wake. These seaplanes,however, were recalled from Wake on 5 Decem-ber. The PBY which assisted VMF-211 with itsnavigation was from this squadron. La8t manoff Walce Island, 29.

passage of airplanes over them, even whenpushed by hand, could cause serious planedamage. Fueling still depended on handpLlmps and n~an power. No shelters oraircraft revetments existed, and the newplanes were somewhat puzzling to pilotsand mechanics who had no instructionmanuals. Major Putnam began imme-diately to negotiate for the constructionof revetments,30 and he also began a train-ing program to be carried on in conjunc-tion with the daily dawn and dusk pa-trols which started on the morning afterVMF-211 arrived.

These patrols, executed by four air-craft, circled the atoll approximately 50miles out, and pilots combined this dutywith navigation and instrument training.Instrument practice was particularly im-portant because Wake had no electronichoming or navigational aids suitable fortighter operations , and the atoll was asmall mark for pilots to locate through afloor of intermittent clouds.3’

Other changes had taken place since thearrival of the Wtight. Commander

3““Backed by a written request from the Com-mander, Aircraft Battle Force, a request wasmade through the Island CoInmander to the Ci-vilian Contractor’s superintendent on the morn-ing of 5 December, asking for the immediateconstruction of bunkers for the protection ofaircraft, and outlining various other works tofollow. Great emphasis was put on the factthat speed, rather than neatly finished work,was required. Howerer, an inspection thatafternoon revealed a young civil engineer la-boriously setting out stakes with a transit andthree rodmen. It required an hour of franticrushing about and some very strong languageto replace the young engineer and his rodmenwith a couple of Swedes and bulldozers.” Put-?Iarn Rpt, 6.

“ HistSec, HQiMC interview with lstLt J. F.Kinney, 23Ju145, 4, hereinafter cited as Kiowae~

In.tcrriew.

WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 102

Cunningham had brought with him Com-mander Campbell Keene, eight Navy of-ficers, and 58 bluejackets who comprisedtl~e initial detachnlent of the Naval AirStation. All these personnel, like the.irmy Air Force communication detach-nlent 32 of olle officer and four soldiers,

were without arms or field equipment.In spite of the eflorts, men, and equipmentconsigned to Wakej the situation wasstill grim 011 6 December 1941. Theground defenses, embodying the completeartillery of a defense battalion, had beenemplaced during 12-hour working days,and some protective sandbagging andcamouflage accomplished. But to manthese weapons the 1st Defense Battaliondetachment had only 15 otlicers and 373enlisted men, although the 1941 T/Ocalled for 43 officers and 939 men. Thismeant that one 3-inch antiaircraft bat-tery 33~,as elltirel~ Without personnel! and

that each of the other two batteries couldman only three of its four guns. Thusonly six of the twelve 3-inch guns on theisland could be utilized. Only BatteryD had its full allowance of fire-controlequipment. Battery E had a director butno height finder, and it had to get alti-tude data by telephone from Battery D.There were not half enough men to em-ploy the ground and antiaircraft machineguns. There was no radar, despite plansfor its eventual provision, and the search-light battery did not have sound locatorswith which to detect approaching air-

“ Commande(Lby Capt Henry S. Wilson, USA.This detachment manned an Army Mrways~ommuuication Service radio van to assist B–17’s en route westward.

‘3This was Btry F. For this battery, how-ever, the necessary fire control equipment hadnot yet arrived ; so, even with full gun crews,its effectiveness would have been slight.

448777 0—5s—s

craft. Only the crews of the 5-inch sea-coast batteries were at or near authorizedstrengths, and they also were devilled bylmending minor shortages of tools, spareparts, and miscellaneous ordnance items.”

l’eale Island’s base development and de-fensive organization were the most ad-vanced in the atoll. Although BatteryB, the 5-inch seacoast unit at Toki Point,had been fully organized only after thearrival of personnel on 2 November, itsposition was in good shape. Much thesame could be said of Battery D, 3-inchantiaircraft, set up near the southeast endof the island. All emplacements had notbeen completely sandbagged, but therewere adequate personnel shelters plus un-derground stowage for 1,400 rounds of3-inch ammunition. Telephone lines, al-though not buried, linked all positionswith the island command post. Work on

Wake Island was not far behind. Bat-tery A, the 5-inch seacoast unit at Pea-cock Point, was completely emplaced andwell camouflaged although it lacked indi-vidual shelters. Battery E, (3-inch anti-aircraft t), although working with only 43Marines, had completely emplaced, sand-bagged and camouflaged two guns and thedirector, and work on the third gun wasnearly completed by 6 December. Tele-

phone lines (with important trunksdoubled or tripled) connected all units onWake Island, but the wire was on thesurface.

“J$Tilkes Island was the least devel-oped,” reported Captain Wesley McC.Platt, the local commander:

. . . At the outbreak of war, weapons . .had been set W. All were without camouflageor protection except the .50 caliber machine

“’ File, dispatches received from Wake, 7–23Dec41. hereinafter cited as Wake File.


gUUS. which h:ld been emplaced. All brush eastof the new channel had been cleared. The re-maining brusl] west of the new channel wasthick and ils a result of . this [the]

. .50 caliber machine guns had been placedfairly close to the w’ater line. The beach it-self dro~)lwd abruptly from 2>fi to 4 feet justabove the high water mark.~’

In addition to four .50 caliber lY.A andfour .30 caliber machine guns, Platt hadtwo sezrclllights and one 5-inch seacoastbattery (I.) wl}icb was set up at KukuPoill~. The four 3-inch guns destined forBattery F were parked on I$rilkes with-out personnel or fire control gear. Wirecommunications were in between the is-land command post and all units.3’

Wake, intended primarily as a patrolplane base for P13Y’s, “the eyes of theFleet,” had no scouting aircraft after thePBY’s departed on 5 December, and onlythe most primitive facilities for any typeof aircraft operations. Its defendingfighter squadron was learning whileworking, and these planes had neitherarmor nor self-sealing fuel tanks. In ad-(Iition, their naval type bomb racks didnot, match the local supply of bombs.3i

Exclusive of the 1,200 civilian contractemployees, the military population ofWake (almost twenty per cent of whomwere without arms or equipment) totalled38 officers and 485 enlisted men: 3’

= LtCol w. }IC~, Platt reply to HistSec,HQMC questionnaire, 10Mar47.

‘“ Ibid., 2.

“’ (.’apt Frueler, squadron ordnance officer, atthis moment was devising homemade nmdiflca-tions of the troublesome bomb lugs. BY 8 De-cember two 100-pound bombs could be precari-ously swung onto each aircraft, though hardlyin any manner to inspire pilot confidence inclean release or assurance that return to basecould be accomplished without dangling armedbombs.

“ Devereux Rept.

1st Defense Battalion 13 officers, 373 enlisteddetachment :

VMLI-211 and attach- 12 officers, 4!) enlistedments:

U. S, Naval .\ir Sta- 10 officers, 58 enlistedtiou : (without arms ).

Army .\ir Corps : 1 officer, 4 enlisted(without arms).

USS !Z’ritOn : 1 enlisted (withoutarms, landed formedical attention).

TIIus there were only 449 Marines on theatoll W11Owere equippecl and trained forcombat.

Supplies on Wake, although aggravat-ingly short, in many particular items,were general]y adequate. The Marineshad a X)-day sL~pply of rations, and thecivil ian workers l~ad a six-month supply.h~o natural water supply existed, but asuilkient number of evaporators were inservice. Ammunition and aviation ord-nnllce supplies initially could supportlimited operations, but would not with-stand a protracted defense. Medical sup-plies were those normal for a remote,outlying station and could thus be con-sidered adequate.3g In addition to thenaval medical equipment and personnel onWake, the contractor’s organization oper-ated a fully-equipped hospital in C’ampTwo.’n

But since November, when dispatcheshad warned that the international situa-tion demanded alertness, the atoll was asready for defense as time and materialavailable permitted. Mrhen this warningarrived, Major Devereux, then the island

comnl:lnder, asked whether the civilian\vorkers should be turned to tasks dealingmore direct 1y with military defense, buthe was told not to revise work priorities.Small-arms ammunition was nevertheless

3’ Maj. W. L. J. Bayler Rept, 9-10.

‘0 C’unninqham Irt.terciew, 3.

WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 105

issued to individual Marines, and ready-service ammunition was stowed at everygun position. A common ‘l,J’’-line (so-cmlled) which augmented normal tele-phone circuits, joined all batteries, com-mand posts, observation posts, and otherinstallations with which the commandermight, need contact, cluring battle,’] andprimitive “walky-talkies” formecl a radionet established to parallel wire communi-cations between comnmnd posts on WakeIsland, Wilkes, and Peale. Atop the 50-foot steel water tank at CUmp One, thehighest point on Wzke, Major I)evereuxhad established a visual observation postlinked by field telephone to the commandpost. This OP, with a seaward horizon ofabout nine miles, was the only substitutefor radar.

4’ Maj W. 1,. J. Iiuglev h’cpt, 3,

On the morning of Saturday, 6 I)ecem-ber, Major Devereux found time to holdthe first general quarters drill for the en-

tire defense battalion. ‘T’all to Arms” wassounclecl, and all gun positions were mamned (to the extent which personnel short-

ages permitted ), communications tested,and simulated targets were “engaged.’> “The drill ran smoothly, and Major Deve-

reux granted his men an almost unheard-of reward: Saturday afternoon off, andholiday routine for Sunday.

His timing of this “breather” was betterthan he knew.

u Prior to the outbreak of war, no opportunityhad been found for test firings, calibration, orother gunnery exercises after emplacement ofweapons on Wake. The first actual firing wasin combat against the Japanese. Ctf??ninghornInterview, 3.

CHAPTER 2

The Enemy Strikes’

The Pmn American Airways PhilippineClipper which had spent the night of 7-8December at Wake re-embarked passen-gers shortly after sunrise on Monday ‘8 December, taxied into the calm lagoon,and soared toward Guam. Ashore break-fast was nearly over, and some Marineswere squaring away their tents prior tofalling out for the day’s work. MajorDevereux was shaving. In the Army Air-ways Communications Service radio vannear the airstrip, an operator was comingup on frequency with Hickam Field onOahu when at 0650 a frantic uncodedtransmission cut through: Oahu was underenemy air attack.

Captain Henry S. Wilson snatched themessage and rushed to Devereux’s tent.The major tried unsuccessfully to reachCommander Cunningham by telephone,and then called the base communicationshack. There, a coded priority 3transmis-sion from Pearl was being broken down.Devereux ptit down the telephone andordered the field music to sound “Call to

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in chap2 is derived from Devereux Rept; l’utnarn Re@;

( oflcer’s name) Repts; Bayler Rept; Deveveu%StOrg.

‘By east longitude date ; this was the same asSunday, 7 December east of the date line.

‘At this time relative priorities in dispatchtraffic were as follows : Urgent (to be used onlyfor initial enemy contact reports ), Priority,Routine, Deferred. Thus a priority dispatchpresented a considerably more important trans-mission than it now wo~ld.

Arms.’ Gunnery sergeants broke out theirmen and made sure that all had their am-munition. The Marines then piled intotrucks which rushed them to the batteryareas. By 0735 all positions were mannedand ready, the planned watch was estab-lished atop the water tank in Camp one,and defense battalion officers had held abrief conference.

The dawn air patrol was up before thenews came from Pearl,5 but aviation per-sonnel took hurried steps to safeguard thenew Wildcats still on the ground. ThePhilippine Clipper was recalled ten

minutes after its takeoff, and it circledback down to the lagoon. But in spite ofthese measures, things were not runningsmoothly at the airstrip. VMF-211 hadbeen on Wake only four days and couldhardly call itself well established. Air-craft revetments still being dozed wouldnot be ready until 1400 that day, and suit-able access roads to these revetments like-wise were unfinished. Existing parkingareas restricted plane dispersal to hazard-ously narrow limits. As Major Putnamstated it:

The Squadron Commander was faced with achoice between two major decisions, and in-evitably he chose the wrong one. 1~’ork was

4Cdr Cunningham, who immediately recalledthe Philippine Clipper, has since stated that itwas he who ordered the defense battalion to gen.eral quarters, but it appears that this action hadalready been taken prior to his issuance of anyorder. Cunningham Interl?iew, 4.

‘ Kinney Interview,, 3.

106

THE ENEMY STRIKES 107

t)rogressiug sinlultaneously on six of the ~aw-tective bunkers for the airplanes. and whilenone was available for immediate occulmncy, allwould be ready not later than 1400. Protectionand camoutlfa~e for facilities were not availablebut could be made ready within 24 hours. Fox-holes or other pre~ared positions for personneldid not exist but would be completed not laterthan 1400. To move the airplanes out of theregular parking area entailed grave risk ofdamage, and any damage meant the completeloss of an airplane because of the complete ab-sence of spare parts . . The Squadron Conl-mander decided to avoid certain damage to hisairplanes by moving them across the roughground, to delay movenlents of material untilsome place could be prepared to receive it, andto trust his personnel to take natural cover ifattacked.”

Thus VMF-211’S handful of pilots andmechanics spent the morning dispersingaircraft as widely as possible in the usableparking area, relocating the squadronradio installation from its temporary siteto a covered one, and arming and servic-ing all aircraft for combat.

Atl 0800, only a few hours after tileblazing and dying Arizona had broken outher colors under enemy fire at Pearl Har-bor, Morning (Volors sounded on Wake.Defensive preparations hummed. Trucksdelivered full allowances of ammunitionto each unit, tl~e few spare individual\wapolls in Marine storerooms werespread as far as they would go to the un-armecl Air C’orps soldiers ancl N“aval blue-jackets, and gas masks and helnlets ofWorld War I vintage were distributed totl~e battery positions. Watches were setat fire control instruments and guns, whilethe balance of personnel worked on fox-holes and filled the few remaining sand-bags. Tl~e 3-il~cll antiaircraft batterieswere specifically directed to keep one gun,pll~s :all fire control instrunlents, fully

“ Putnam Rept, 8.

manne(l. Marine units and the Islan{lCommander hastily set up command posts.Commander Cunningham located his CPin (’amp Two, and ~MF-211>s remainedill the squadron otfice tent. Aviation per-sonnel l~ad to stick with their jobs of belt-ing extra ammunition and transferril]gbulk fuel into more dispensable drums.

At 0900 the four-plane combat air patrolreturned to base. The planes were re-fueled while the four pilots 7 took a smok-ing break, and then clambered back intoF4F’s 9 through 12 and took off again toscout the most likely sectors for enemyapproach. Shortly nfter this the pilot ofthe Pht%pp;ne Cl~pper, Captain ,J. H.Hamilton, reported for duty to MajorPutnam at VMF-211’S headquarters, Helmd orders from the Island (’ommznderto make a long-range southward searchwitl~ fighter escort. These orders, how-ever, were later cancelled.s

While VMF-211’s combat air patrolmade a swing north of Wake at 12,000feet, 36 twin-engined ,Japanese bomberswere flying northward toward the atoll.This was Air Attack Force No. 1 of theZ’zwnty-Fow’th .+lir Flotilla, based at Roi,

720 miles to the south.’ As the enemygroup leader signalled for a gliding let,-

‘ There were: Capt Elrod, who had relievedMaj Putnam on statiop, and 2dIl Davidson inone section, and lstI.t Kinney and TSgt Hanlil-ton in the other.

8Orders were changed and the clipper tookoff for Midway at 12.10 that afternoon to evacu-ate certain PAA personnel plus all passengers.Mr. H. P. Hevenor, a government official whomissed the plane, was marooned on Wake andeventually ended up in Japanese hands. “Itstruck me m a rather drastic lesson in thewisdon~ of punctuality,” conunented Col Dere-reux. Dcvercaz Storg, 58.

“ Notes on Eneu)y Interviews, n. d., hereinaftercited as Enetny Notes.


down in his 10,000-foot approach, he noteclthat tl~e south coast of’ the atoll wasmasked by a drifting rain squall at about2,000 feet. The three ,Japanese divisions,in 12-plane VS, dropped rapidly down intothe squall and emerged a few seconcls lateralmost on top of the J?Take airstrip.First Lieutenant William W. Lewis, com-manding Battery E at Peacock Point, sawthese planes at 1150, and he grabbed a“J’’-line telephone to warn Devereux.,Just as the major answered, a spray ofbright sparks began to sail through the airahead of the enemy formation. One civil-ian thought “the wheels dropped off the~irplanes.” But the planes had not cometo lose their wheels. ,Japanese bombs werefalling on Wake.

Lewis, an experienced ant iaircraftartilleryman, had not only complied with

the commanding oflicer’s directive to keepone gun manned, but had added anotherfor good measure. Within a matter ofseconds he had two of Battery E’s 3-inchguns firing at the Japanesejlo and .50caliber guns along the south shore of

NTake quickly took up the fire. A tightpattern of 100-pound fragmentationbombs and 20mm incendiary bullets struckthe entire VMF-211 area where eightGrummans were dispersed at approxi-mately hundred-yard intervals. Whiletwo lfi-plane enemy divisions continuedto release bombs and to strafe CampTwo, one division broke off, and swungback over Camp One and the airstrip.

‘0 Battery E, it will be recalled, had no heightfinder but was supposed to rely for this dataon telephonic information from Battery D onPeale. Without waiting for word from Peale,Lt Lewis made a quick estimate of target alti-tude, cranked it onto his director, and had thebattery in action within a matter of seconds.

For a second time within less than tenminutes the airstrip was bombed mdstrafed. By 1210 the strike was over. Theenemy planes turned awmy and com-menced their climb to cruising altitude.“The pilots in every one of the planes weregrinning widely. Everyone waggled hiswings to signify ‘Banzai’.:’ 1’

The enerily attack burned or blastedseven of the eight F4F–3’s from propellerto rudder, and the remainil)g Wildcat sLls-

tained serious but not irreparable dam-age to its reserve fuel tank. A directbomb hit destroyed Major Bayler’s air-ground radio installation, mncl the wholeaviation area flamed in the blaze fromthe 25,000-gallon avgas tank which hadbeen hit in the first strike. Fifty-gallonfuel drums burst into flame. VMF-211’Stentage, containing the squadron’s suretystock of tools and spares, had been riddledand partially burned. Worst of all, 23 ofthe 55 aviation personnel then on theground were killed outright, or woundedso severely that they died before the fol-lowing morning, eleven more were woun-ded but survived. At one stroke, VMF-211 had sustained nearly 60 per centcasualties. Nearly 50 per cent of theground Cre}vmen }Tere dead. Three pilots

(Lieutenants George A. Graves, Robert <J.

Conderman, and Frank J. Holden) werekilled, and another, Lieutenant Henry G.Webb, was seriously wounded. Threemore pilots, Major Putnam, CaptainFrank C. Tharin, and Staff SergeantRobert O. Arthur, had received minorwounds but remained on duty. In Camp

“Account by h’orio Tsuji, a Japanese observerduring the raid. ATIS ( S~PA), Enemy Pub-lications ATo.6, “Hawaii-~lalaya Naval Opera-tions,” 27N1ar43,27–3S, hereinafter cited asHatoaii-Malaw ATavOp8.


Two and the adj aceut Pan Americau area,the hotel and other Seill)l:lne facilitieswere afire, the PhiZi~~jine ~v7~]I]Mr hacl re-ceived a few stray machine-gun bullets,and some ten civilian employees of P.f.ll~ad been killed.” The el~enly did not losen sin~yle bomber altl~ough “several” weredamaged by antiaircraft fire.ls ‘1’he Ma-rine combat air patrol, well above tl~e raidand momentarily scouting to the north,had not made contact. These pilots re-turnecl for landing shortly after the at-tack, and by a final stroke of ill fortuneCaptain Henry T. El rod damaged his

propeller seriously on a mass of bombdebris.

Wake’s defenders were most concernedthat this first raid had struck almost be-

fore they knew that enemy planes wereoverhead. The rain squall had helped the,Japanese, but the atoll’s lack of early-warning equipment was almost as bene-

ficial to the enemy. The garrison neededradar, but none was avail able. Tllrougll-out the siege the ,Japnnese planes coll-t inued to elude the most vigilant visualobservation, and with the sound of theirengines drowned by the booming surf they}vould often have their bombs /lTy:lybefore

they were spotted.

Damage control began at the airstrip assoon as the, enemy departeci. ~’asualtieswent to the one-story contractor’s hos-pital which had been taken over as theisland aid station,l~ tile dead were placed

= Cun.ning7tawIntrrview, 5.“ JICPOA Item ATO4986, Professional note-

book of Ens T. Nak:unnra, LJA’, 1941-1943,2.3Feb44, hereinafter cited as 3~aka)}~ura A’otc.6001<.

“ The battalion surgeon of the 1st DefBnDet,Lt ( jg) Gustave M. Kahn (MC j, USN, was ably

in a reefer box at Camp Two, and mble-bodied aviation personnel turned theiratte,ntion to t lle airplanes and to the gaso-line tires. The three planes still able tofly were sent up on combat air patrol. Intl~e sky they would be safe from anothersurprise raid. Crews and officers re-organized and reallocated jobs. SeconclI.ieutenant John F. Kinney became engi-neering oficer to replace First I.ieutenantGraves w-ho had been killed.’5 Kinney’s

principal assistant was Technical Ser-geant William ,J. Hamilton, an enlisted

pilot, and these two men begin salvagingtools and parts from burned planes.Their etforts immeasurably aided futureoperations of VMF-211. Captain Her-bert C’. Freuler reorganized the ordnancesection, 1.ieutenant David D. Kliewer tookover tl~e radio section, and (“aptains Elrodand Tharin supervised construction of in-dividual foxholes, shelters, and infantrydefensive works ill the VMF-211 mea.Otl~er work included mining the airstripat 150-foot intervals with heavy dynamitecharges to guard against airborne land-ings. Furrows were bulldozed through-out tile open ground where such landingsmight take place, and heavy engineeringequipment was placed to obstruct the run-Way at all times when friendly planeswere not aloft. Plans called for continua-tion of the dawn and dusk reconnaissanceflights, and for the initiation of a nooncombat air patrol as well. It was hopedtlmt these patrols could intercept subse-quent enemy raids.

assisted by his civilian colleague, Dr. LawtonM. Shank, the contractor’s surgeon, whose cool-ness and medical efficiency throughout the siegewon high praise.

“ Iiinney Interview, 4,

110 PEARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAL

Elsewhere on the atoll new defensewoqk progressed just as rapidly.le Em-placements, foxholes, and camouflagewere improved at all battery positions.A Navy lighter loaded with dynamite sur-rounded by concrete blocks was anchoredin Wilkes channel to guard this dredgedwaterway. Telephone lines were re-paired, key trunk lines were doubledwherever possible, and every possible at-tempt was made to bury the most impor-tant wires.” Construction of more du-rable and permanent command posts andshelters began before the day ended in acold drizzle. Working that night underblackout restrictions, aviation Marinesand volunteer civilians completed eightblast-proof aircraft revetments. Theatoll’s four operational planes were thusrelatively safe within these. revetmentswhen 9 December dawned bright andclear, and Captain Elrodk plane also, wasin a bunker undergoing repairs to its pro-peller and engine.

General quarters sounded at 0500, 45minutes before dawn, and the defensecommander set Condition 1. This readi-ness condition required full manningof all phone circuits, weapons, fire con-trol instruments, and lookout stations.The four F4F-3’s warmed up and then

“ Approximately ten per cent of the civilianworkers volunteered for military or defensiveduties, and some attempted to enlist. Many ofthese men served with heroism and efficiencythroughout the operation.

“ “Surface lines could not seem to stand UPalthough they were all paralleled. We wanted tobury them, but we could not do so by hand . . .considering the scarcity of men to do the work.We could not obtain permission to use the ditchdiggers of the contractors. . .“ LtCol C. A.13arninger reply to HistSec, HQMG question-naire, l!3Feb47, 8-9, hereinafter cited as Barn-inger.

took off at 0545 over Peacock Point. Theyrendezvoused in section over the field andthen climbed upward to scout 60- to 80-mile sectors along the most probable routesof enemy approach. At 0700 the fightersfinished their search without sighting anyenemy planes and then turned back towardthe atoll. There the defense detachmentshifted to Condition 2 which required thatonly half the guns be manned, and thatfewer men stood by the fire control in-struments. This permitted Marines to getafter other necessary work around theirpositions. At the airstrip Lieutenant Kin-ney continued work on Elrod’s plane, andthe squadron’s engineering problem madeit evident that hangar overhaul andblack-out facilities had to be set up. Major Put-nam decided to enlarge two of his newplane shelters for this purpose. Entranceramps were cut below ground level, andthe revetments were roofed with “I”beams, lumber, and lightproof tarpaulins.These expedients allowed extensive over-haul and maintenance at all hours, andprovided maximum protection for planesand mechanics.

As the morning wore on, men began towork closer to their foxholes and to keepa wary eye skyward. A dawn takeofffrom the nearby Japanese-mandated Mar-shalls could bring a second Japanesebomber raid over Wake at any time after1100. This “clock-watching” was justi-fied. Disgustingly prompt, enemy planesfrom the Twenty-Fourth Air Flotilla atRoi arrived at 1145.” Marine GunnerH. C. Berth spotted them first from thewater tank OP, and he shouted the warn-ing over the “J’’-line circuit. Secondslater the air-ground radio (again in opera-tion with makeshift equipment ) passed

= Enerng Notes, 1.


this alarm to the combat air patrol, andbattery crewmen rushed to general quar-ters. Soon three bursts of antiaircraftfire, the new alarm signal, “ were explod-ing from all sectors, and Wake stood byfor its second attack of the war.

The leading ,Japanese planes ap-proached from the southeast at 13,000feet, and antiaircraft batteries on PealeIsland and Peacock Point opened fire justbefore the first bombs were released.Minutes earlier the combat air patrol hadmade contact with one flank of the ,Japa-nese planes south of Wake, and Lieu-tenant Kliewer and Technical SergeantHamilton managed to cut off a straggler.They shot it down despite hot return firefrom a top turret, and as the enemy planespun away in flames the ground batteries’3-inch shells began to burst among the,Japanese. The Marine fighters broke con-tact and withdrew.

The first sticks of bombs explodedaround Batteries E and A on PeacockPoint and damaged a 3-inch gun in the EBattery position and a range tinder at

Battery A. Other bombs crashed alongthe east leg of Wake Island and intoCamp Two. There direct hits destroyedthe hospital, the civilian and Navy bar-racks buildings, the garage, blacksmith

shop, a storehouse, and a machine shop.The falling bombs then straddled thechannel at this tip of Wake and began torain down on Peale Island. They madea shambles of the Nayal Air Station

}Thich was still under construction, and

“ Wake did not have an air raid alarm, andthis traditional three-shot signal was the onlyalternative. Defenders tried to make an alarmsystem with dismounted auto horns wired tostorage batteries, but it never worked. Last ManOff l~ake Island, 65, 122.

scored a direct hit on the radio station.This destroyed most of the Navy’s racliogear.’” Meanwhile the antiaircraft gunscontinued to fire into the tight ,Tapaneseformation, and five bombers were sn~ok-ing by the time Peale Island was hit. Amoment later one of these planes burstinto flames and blew up in the air. That,was Wake)s second certain kill. Theothers limped away still smoking.zl

The hospital burned to the ground—while the two surgeons saved first thepatients and then as much medical sup-plies and equipment as they had time to

salvage. Camp Two and the Naval AirStation were now as badly wrecked as theaviation area had been on the previous

day, and four Marines and 55 civilianshad been killed. But the defenders hadlearned some lessons, and the Japanese

were not to have such an easy time here-after. Major Putnam summed it up:

The original raid . . was tactically well con-ceived and skillfully executed, but thereaftertheir tactics were stupid, and the best that canbe said of their skill is that they had excellentflight discipline. The hour and altitude of theirarrival over the island was almost constant andtheir method of attack invariable, so that it wasa simple matter to meet them, and they never,after that first day, got through unopposed. . . .2’

Defenders spent that afternoon collectingwounded, salvaging useful items fromblasted ruins, and moving undamaged in-st allations to safer spots. These jobs wereto become painfully familiar on succeed-ing afternoons.

‘0 CO NAS lVake Rpt to CornFourteen, 20-Dec41, 1–2.

= A ,Japanese report indicates that 14 of thesebombers were damaged by antiacraft fire duringthis attack. Nakamura&’otebook.

* Putnam Rept, 10.

112 PEARL HARFK)R TO GUADALC’AN.4L

The ,JapaIwse attac~ on llattery 13 at

Peacock Point and along tile islal~d’s east

leg SUfZgeSted to ~~ajor Devereux thattl~e e]lenly wollld I)lal] tl~eir raids ill a

lo~ic:ll seqllell<e to pass over tile :ltO1l’S

long’ axis. 011 tile previous (lily they llacl

struck ~Vake’s aviation, and now they IIacl

bombed not only the NTaval -kir Stationbut the 3-inch battery w]lic]l lNid engagedthem so ]Jronlptly during that first raid.Thus peacock Point was particuhr]y vLl1-

llerable, and to protect liis remaining

antiaircraft weapons, Devereux ordered

Battery ~ to shift to a new site some six

llllnclred yards east and north, There the

battery could mauage its job equally well.

i~nd to make sure tl~at its fire power did

not suffer, tl)e battery drew one of tl~e

LlllLLSed 3-iIICh ~lLns assigned tO the ‘~Ph8l1-

tom” 13i~tteI~ F on J1’illies. This weapon

replaced the one damnged by bombs.

To provide new Ilospital facilities, mlI-

nlunition was cleared from the twomost \viciely-sel):lr:lte(i reinforced comcrete magnzine igloos, and these were con-~~erted into ul~derground medical centers.Each merrsured 20 by 40 feet and couldaccommodate 21 hospital cots. They metblackout requirements, and with lightsfurnished by two snmll generators coLIld

be operated Micielltly at lli,ght. Me(licalsupplies were divided between tile twoaid stations. I)r. Kahn was in charge oftile Marine hospital in the soutllerm shel -ter, and Dr. Shank maintained the N~:tvy-civilian facility at the nortl~ end of tilerow of magazine igloos. Both were in useby nightfall that day.

During the night Battery E displacedto its new position. Aided by contractor’strucks and almost 100 civilian volunteers,Marines moved the guns, sandbags (toovaluable and scarce to be left behind),fire control eqllipment, and ammunition.

Enlplacements were dug at the new site,sandbags refilled, and the guns readied foract ion. By 0500, just, in time for dawngeneral quarters, the battery was in posi-tion and ready to fire.” Dumnly gLIlls

were set up at the old position.On 10 I)ecember the. Japanese con-

firmed Devereux’s theory that they wouldmaintain certain patterns of approachand attack. At zbout 1045, 26 enemybombers appeared, this time from the east...kg-sill 17MF-211 intercepted, and some ofthe bombers were hit before the-y reachedthe atoll. Captain Elrod, leading thefighters, shot down two enemy planesafter the 3-inch guns began to fire.Bombs hit Battery E’s abimdonecl posi-tion at Peacock Point, but the new sitewzs not t]nwatene.d. On Peale IslandBattery D received two successive passesby one enemy flight division. The firstpass scored a damaging hit on the bat-tery’s power-plant, but the guns continuedto fire on barrage data. One plane burstinto flames.

on Wilkes Island, undamaged from theearlier raids, one stick of bombs litsquarely on a construction dump where125 tons of dynamite were cached west ofthe “New (’Handel. ”” The resultant ex-plosion stripped most of the underbrushotf Wilkes, detonated all 5- and 3-inchready ammun it ion at battery positions,25

‘3 I,t(Jol W. W, Lewis reply to HistSec, HQMCquestionnaire, 28 Feb47, 1, hereinafter cited asI.ewitr.

“ The “ATew Channel” was a partially-com-l)leted waterway through the center of Wilkes.

“ By this time the Btry F position was beingactivated. but it was not as yet in full commis-sion, Ilarine Gunner McKinstry, with naval per-sonnel and volunteer civilians. had started thatmorning to form an antiboat battery with thisunit’s three guns and the damaged gun inheritedfrom B try E.

THE EN’EMY STRIKES 113

and s~~ept~;atte~yIJ’Semp]~~ement dei~nof accessories, 1ight fittings a]ld othernlovable objects. Fortunately only oneMarine was killed. Four others werewounded, and one civilian sust aineclshock. But materiel-wise, Battery 1, wasin serious slmpe. All fire control instru-ments except tile telescopes on (hm 2 hadbeen blasted away ordamagedbeyondre-pair, the gun tubes were dented, firinglocks were torn off, and traversing andelevating racks were burred and distorted.Equipment loss at Battery F, organizingthat morning, was less serious. C)ne gunwas dmnaged from blast and flying de-bris. In adclition, the 60-inch searchlighton Wilkes hacl been knocked end over end.This seriously damageci the light’s deli-cate arcs, bearings, and electronic fittings.

.\fter this raid Major Devereux again

ordered Battery 1? to displace. This timeit would set. up north of tile airstrip andnear the lagoon in the crotch of Wake.Tile dummyguns at Peacock Point, dam-agedby this third raid, }~ere reflu-bishedduring the afternoon of 10 I)ecember, andBattery E’s unnla]illed fourth gun was de-tached for antiboat emplacement else-where. z’; Battery E’s new position wouldbe most :~ci~:~l]t:~ge(~l~s,the battery coln-lnander reasoned:

Most all bonlbing runs were nlade from theeast or west and the bon)hs ~vere dropped alon~the length of the island. In this l)osition theJapanese must make a ron for the battery aloneand most of the bombs would be lost in thelagoon.”

That, night the battery personnel sweatedthrough their second displacement, and

2’ This 3-inch gun, which figured conspicuouslyin the later defense, was located south of theairstrip and the VMF-211 area.

“ Leu%j 2.

by next morning they were in positionan(l agaiil ready to shoot.

GEi’Vl?i’lZ,Y OF THE RELIEFE.rPKI)lTIoN 28

After the Pearl Harbor attack, Presi-dent Roosevelt warned the American peo-ple to be prepared for the fall of Wake.Yet before the Arizona’s hulk stoppedburning, plans were underway to send re-lief to the atoll. But with much of thePacific Fleet on the bottom of Pearl Har-bor, little assistance could be provided.Wake, like other outer islands, }vouldstand or fall on its own Lmless it could beaugmented from the meager resourcesthen at Pearl Harbor. Marine forces onoahu included two defense. battalions, the3d and 4tl~~’ elements of the Ist DefenseBattalion, and miscellaneous barracks andships’ detachments. Any personnel sentto relieve Wake would have to come fromthese, units, and that. meant that other im-portant jobs would have to be slighted.There was a limited source of equipmentincluding radar and other supplies atPearl Ikbor in the, hands of the MarineDefense Force quartermaster; and fighter

= ITnless otherwise noted the material concern-ing the Relief Expedition is derived from a mag-azine article by LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr., “We’reHeaded for Wake,” MC Ga#ette, June 1946.

mThis battalion, which during 194–1943 ex-ecuted more overseas displacements than anyother defense battalion in the Fleet Marine~orce, plllled out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,

during late October 1941, moved secretly throughthe Panama Canal, and arrived at Pearl Harboron Monday 1 December. On 7 December the bat-talion manned a 3-inch battery at the INavy Yard,and also served some antiaircraft machine guns.Since it had just completed this oversea move-ment, and had its equipment ready for service,the 4th was a logical choice for its eventualrole in the attempt to relieve Wake.

PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCAATAL

aircraft, needed almost as much as radar,were already en route from San Diego onboard tl~e IJSS ,~aratoga.:+()

on 9 December ‘1 Admiral Kimrnel’sstaff decided to send relief to IITake in atask force built around this carrier, Cruis-er Division 6 (cruisers Aston”a, Mkneapo-

7Li, ancl ,Ymn Framwko ), the nine destroy-ers of Destroyer Squadron 4, the seaplanetender Tangier, wllicll would carry troopsand equipment, and the fleet oiler i17eC7WS.

These ships would comprise Task Force14, While it sailed for Wake, Task Force11 built around the USS Lexington,, wouldmake diversionary strikes in the vicinityof Jaluit some 800 miles south of Wake.A third task force, commanded by Vice.Idmiral Halsey in the carrier Enterprise,would provide. general support by comducting operations west of ,Johnston Is-land.32

Men and equipment to aid Wake wouldbe drawn from the 4th Defense Battalion,and on 10 December this unit wus alertedfor immediate. embarkation. The destina-tion was not announced, but it did not re-quire much imagination for rumor to cutthrough military secrecy. “l$re’re goingto Wake” was the word that circulated allday while the batteries prepared to mountout. By nightfall the personnel andequipment were squared away, and unitsgroped about in the blackout to assembletheir gear for loading. But in the midstof this work came orders to knock off and

~ These planes comprised VMF-221. The k’ar-

atoga had departed at maximum speed on 8 De-cember (9 December on Wake). Ship’s Log USSSara fogfr, December 1941, hereinafter cited asS(Ira togu log.

3’ Throughout this section dealing with the re-lief attempt, west longitude dates and local timesare used.

“ CinCPac OPlan 3941, 15Dec41, 2.

return to original battery positions. TheCinCPac statl wanted to make a completenew study of the Pacific situation beforeit sent, this relief off to Wake.33 Besides,the task force had to await the arrival ofthe 17anztoga.

Cin(7Pac finally decided to make theattempt to reinforce Waket and em-barkation of certain units of the 4th De-fense Battalion began two days later, on12 December. By this time the Wake de-fenders had sent, a partial list of their mostcritical needs, and Pearl Harbor supplyactivities filled this as best they COUIC1.l-’hese important items, which were loadedin the Z’~mgie/’ at pier 10 in the Navyl-ard, 3’ included an SCR–270 early-warn-ing raclar unit and an SCR–268 radar setfor fire control. Also stowed on boardwere 9,000 rounds of 5-inch ammunition,12,000 of the :1-incl~ shells with 30-secondtime fuzes, more than tlmee million roundsof belted ammmlit ion for .50 and .3o cali-ber machine guns, quantities of grenades,ammunition for small arms, barbed wire,antipersonnel mines, and additional engi-neering tools. (Nher equipment. would en-able the men at Wake to repair theirbomb-damaged weapons. This includedthree complete fire control and data trans-mission systems for 3-inch batteries,needed replacement equipment, for theatoll’s 5-inch guns, electrical cable, ord-nance tools, and spare parts.

Units of the 4th Defense Battalion em-barked for this expedition includecl J3at-tery F with ;J-inch guns, Battery B with5-inch guns, a provisional machine gun de-tachment drawn from Batteries H and I,

“ Notes of interview by Capt S. E. Morison,USNR, with RAdm C. H. McMorris, 13Jan47,hereinafter cited as McMorrt,Y l?Itw-wicw.

“ CSS Tangier log, December 1941.

THE Eh’EMl’ STRIKES 115

and a headquarters section (Irawl] fronlthe Headquarters aud Service Battery oftile defense battalion. First ,1.ieutenantRobert D. IIeinl, ,Jr., commanded thisforce when it completed emb~rkation oll13 I)ecember, but tile command passed to(;olol~el I1. S. Fassett jl~st l)riortothe de-partureof the task force two days later.”After loading, the Tan,gier moved to tileupper harbor W where Rear AdmiralFletcher’s Cruiser Division 6 waited forthe Sarcltogu. The carrier came into fuelon the 15th, ‘i and the task force sortiedlate that clay an(l set course for Wake.

.Idnliral Inouye, conm]andillg tile ,JalNl-llese Fow?fi F~eet at ‘rruk; had set numer-ous projects and operations ill nlotion on8 December. (Xurrellt war l)lalls callwlfor him to capture and develop Wake,

Guam, and certain Crilbert islands includ-ing Makln an(l Tarawa. By 10 Decel]l-her, wl~en Guam fe]l, Illouye could checkotl all these jobs ex(.ept tl~e o])e ilt Wake.’~”l)espite its small size this atoll was givingtile admiral all(l his peol)le at Truk al]dKwajalein some monlel~ts of \vorry. Tl~eother islands lmd fallen to tllenl witl~ little

“ Col Fassett was to beconle Island Convmander at ll”ake when the relief force arrivedat the atoll, (’onlFourteen orders to ~o] Fassett.lfil)ec~l.

‘“ Tan,qicr log, op. cit.‘7 The A’aratofla arrived in the Hawaiian area

(luring the nixht of 14 December, but she couldnot enter the harbor until next d:ly when theantisubmarine nets were oljened. Saratoga log,

““ Exvel)t as other~vise noted material in thisse(.tion (lealinx ~vith Japanese (}per:]tions is de-rived from t’([pf 1(I’c of Itra?ic; lf”al~c .1 ttcrk;

Yltkatrl vra A-otf’bool; ; Encolu A’otrx.

3’ C’amPu i~ns of tlt~ I’ocifi(’ War, 47.

trouble, bnt they knew that Wake’s de-fense was ill better shal)e. mey estin}ate(lthat this atoll was defen(led by abol~t1,000 troops and 600 laborers. Wakensfigl~ter planes wele aggressive, a]l(l tl~eflak from tile island was at least pronll)t:uld deternlined. Iletweell the Marineplanes anti tl~is flak tl~e l“~ren fy-FoT/tt?/

Air F70ti77a sILrely had lost five of its

planes, not counting four nlore “smokers”tl~at the Wake defenders fervently hopednever made it back to Roi.

This T(wnt,y-Fo(ot?~ .4 i~ F70ti71a wascon~posed of Aijz Attack- Fo?wes One andThree. Force Orw flew sllore-lmsedbombers, and Force Z’Atee operatedapproximately 15 four-engined patrolbombers (probably Kawanishi 97s).Force {)ne based o]~ Roi, while Fome~’?~we. which was also bombil~g or scout-ing I}aker, IIow1 alldl N“auru> and oceanIslands, flew out of Maj uro Atoll 840nliles south of Wake. The commanderof this air flotilla had the mission ofsoftening Wake for capture, and hewas going about it in a creditable fasl~-ion. First he struck the airstrip to clearol~t tl]e tighter plalles~ a]ld then l]e figuredto come back with the sky to himself andfinish otf his job. ~Subsequent targets hadbeen the Xaval .iir Station, seaplane f/l-rilit ies, allcl other installation. Withthese missions acconlplisbecl, the pilots oft l~e Z’(ren t~j-~ot[ttJt .Iit Floti17a couldsettle down to t lle nletl~odicxl bl~siness oftaking out tile antiaircraft ;Ind seacoastbatteries. Thus tile raid of 1(OI)ecemberconcentrated on Peale where poor lxnnb-ing and Battery 1)’s fire l~eld the ,Japaneseto no gains, and on lVilkes \vl~ere bombsset OHtile dynamite caelle.

~lfter tl~ose three strikes tile ,Japanesedecided Nrake v-as ri~)e for a lal~dillg, and

116 PEARL HARBOR TO GLIADALCANAL

the job went to Rear Admiral Kaj iokawho commanded Destroyer .qqucvlron 6in his new light cruiser I’ubari. Kaj iokaplanned to land 150 men on Wilkes Islandto control the dredged cl~annel, and 300men on the south coast of Wake Island tocapture the airfield. An alternate plancalled for landings on the north andnortheast coasts, hut the admiral hopedto avoid these beaches unless unfavorablewinds kept his men away from tl~e southside of the atoll. ‘llle ,Japanese expectedthat a landing force of only 450 menwould face a difficult battle at Wake, butthis force was tile largest that .kdmiralKajioka could muster at this early date inthe war. 13ut if things l~it a snag, de-stroyer crews could be used to help stormthe beaches. The naval force at AdmiralKaj.ioka’s disposal included one lightcruiser (the fl~gsl~ip ), two obsolescentlight cruisers for fire support and cover-ing duties, six destroyers, two destroy el-transports, two new transports, and twosubmarines.40 The l’qwnty-Fo~jrth .4iT

FlotWa would act as his air support.Wake was so small that the admiral didnot consider carrier air necessary.

The 450 men of the landing force comstituted Kaj ioka”s share of the specialnaval landing force personnel assiynedto the Fourth F/eet. It is probable thatthey were armed with the weapons typical

to a ,Japanese infantry unit of companyor battalion size, mld that their weapons

included light machine guns, grenadelaunchers, and possibly small infantry can-non. It is likely that assault troops wereembarked in the two old destroyer-trans-ports (Patrol pra~t 32 ad ,33), whilethe garrison and base development eche-lon was assigned to the medium-size trans-ports. The assault shipping from Trukarrived at Roi on 3 December, and on 9Decenlber 41t]le force sortied on a circui-

tous route for Wake.The ,Japanese expected no American

surface opposition, but they nonethelessscreened their approach with customarycaution. Two submarines scouted 75miles ahead of the main body, and theseboats were to reconnoiter Wrake prior tothe arrival of the task force.” Specifi-cally they would try to find out whetherthe atoll defenders had any motor torpedoboats. Behind these submarines, and 10miles forward of the main body, a picketdestroyer maintained station from whichit would make. landfall and conduct a fur-ther reconnaissance. Ships of the taskforce neared T$’ake on the evening of 10December. The weather was bad withhigh winds and heavy seas, but there wasadvantage even in this. The squalls pro-vided a natural screen behind which theapproach would surely remain unde-tected. Reports from the submarines andthe screening destroyer indicated that

Wake was not aware of the Japanese ap-proach, and zt 0300 on 11 December the

‘0 Yubari; !Z’atsuta and !l’cnrim (2 old lightcruisers, comprising Cruiser Division 18) ; Oitt’,Hayate, Mutst{ki, Iii.saragi, Morh izuhi andl’a~oi (6 older destroyers, comprising DestroyerDivision 29 and 30) : Patrol Ihmts 32 and 33,so-called (actually old destroyers converted intolight troop-carrying craft with missions similarto the American APD ) ; and firoago Mart{ andKonryu Mum, both medium transports.

4’ Capturo of Wake, II, 373 lists this date as 8December, but other dates from this authorityare consistently one day behind, and it is there-fore probable that the date of 9 December iscorrect.

4’ The submarines were scheduled to arrive atWake prior to dawn, and it is therefore notclear how they expected to make a visual re-connaissance that would be of much value.

THE EA’13MY STRIKES 117

task force made landfall and prepared todisembark the landing force. From Kaji-okz’s flagship Wake was barely visiblewhile the admiral led ]lis force to bonl.bardment and debarkation stations five orsix miles otf the atoll’s sollth shore.

THE .4 TTi?M P2ED L.4NDING311 DECEMBER

In spite of Wake’s black silent appear-ance to the ,Japanese, the atoll defendershad spotted the enemy, I~ookouts re-ported ships in sight just prior to 0300,and as the shadowy outlines drew closerDevereux decided they formed an enemyforce which included cruisers, destroyers,

and some auxiliaries. The g~rrison wentto general quarters, and Devereux orderedMajor Putnam to delay the takeoff of hisfour airplanes until after the shore bat-teries began to fire. And these batterieswere ordered to hold their fire ASl]ntil theyreceived orders to open up. Major Dev-ereux reasoned that, the enemy force couldoutgun his defense force, and thzt prem:t-ture firir)g would only reveal the locationand strength of the seacoast batteries androb them of a chance to surprise theenemy.

Meanwhile the enemy force was havingtrouble, with the bad weather that hadscreened its approach. Assault troopsfound it difficult. to make their transfer tosea-tossed landing craft, and some of thesecraft overturned or became swamped inthe high wales. By dawn at 0500, thefla@~ip Yuba.ri, still in the van, reached a

~ Cdr Cunningham’s postwar report statesthat Maj Devereux wanted to illuminate theenemy force with searchlights and to open firemuch sooner, but that this request was denied.CI/Y/)?i~/fllLa?n I}t trr~iru>, 7. Deyereaux deniesthis, and he is sapported by ~irtually all otherrecords of the action.

position :approxirnately 8,000” yards southof Peacock Point. There she turned west-ward and comn~enced a broadside run par-allel to the south shore of Wake. Theother enemy ships followed generallyalong this course but kept approximately1,()()o yards further to seaward. Al-though the ,Japanese were not aware of it,the Yutvzri was being tracked along thiscourse by the 5-inch guns of Battery B onPeacock I’oint. The camouflage had beenremoved from battery positions so thatthe gLIns could train.44

A few minutes later, the Yubccni and theother two cruisers ( Z’atwta and Ten.ryu.)

opened fire at area targets along tl~e southshore of Wake. These salvos laddered theisland from Peacock Point to the vicinityof Camp One. The high-velocity 6-inchshells w-llich hit near Camp One ignitedthe diesel-oil tanks between the camp andWilkes (’hannel, and only a repetition ofI)e~7ereux’s order to hold fire restrainedI~ieutenants Clarence A. Barniuger and,John A. McAlister, respectively com-manding the 5-inch batteries at Peacockand Kuku Points, from returning fire.The otl~er .Japanese ships, following thecruiser and destroyer screen, maneuveredto take stations for their various missions.

After completing l~er initial firing runthe Yuhuri, apparently accompanied bythe two destroyer-transports, reversedcourse in a turn which closed the range onWake. By this time it was daylight, andby 0600 these ships were some 3,500 yardssouth of Battery A on Peacock Point.45

4’ Baminger, 4.

4’ The range finders on the 5-inch guns ofBtrys A and L had heen rendered inoperative byprevious bombings, and ranges therefore had tobe estimated, This resulted in considerablevariance among the later reports of this action.These discrepancies undoubtedly were aggra-

118 J?EARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAL

Battery A, with no range finder, had esti-mated the. range to these ships, and therange section personnel were plotting thetarget while the gun section crews stoodby to fire. The order to tire came fromDevereux’s command post at 0615, and tileguns at Peacock I’oint opened tireoll theYubari and the ships witl~ her while Bat-tery L engaged the other enemy shipswithin range of Wilkes Island. BatteryA’s first salvo went over the ,Japallese flag-ship, and Lieutenant %rnin~~er orderedthe range. dropped 500 yards. This firefrom the beach caused the cruiser to veeraway on a zig zag course, and to concen-trate her fire on the Battery A guns. Hershots straddled the Marine positions ils shepulled away rapidly. Barninger adjustedas best he could for the evasive tactics ofthe ,Japanese ship, ancl his guns soonscored two hits. Both shells entered thecruiser at the waterline amidships on herport side, and the ship belcllecl steam andsmoke as she slackened speed. Two moreshells then caught her slightly :aft of thesefirst wounds, and she turned to starboardto hide in her own smoke. A destroyerthen attempted to lay smoke between thetroubled cruiser and the shore battery, butit was chased away by a lucky hit froma shell aimed at the cruiser. The Yubaricontinued to fire at Peacock Point untilher 6-inch guns could no longer reach theisland. Then, listing to port, she limpedsmoking over the horizon.4fi

Meanwhile Battery I. had opened upfrom Wilkes on the three destroyers, two

vated by the long dispersion pattern characteris-tic of these flat trajectory naval weapons.

a The Btry A conm)amter,whose conunentsarethe source of this account of action against ~dnlKajioka’s flagship,believes that his guns scoredtwo more hits on the cruiser before she got out ofrange. Barninger, 45.

transports, and the light cruisers Tatsutaand Terwyu which had broken off from theYubari at the west end of her first firingrun. These cruisers and transportssteamed north at a range of about 9,000yards southwest of Kuku Point while theclestroyers (probably Destroyer Division!29 consisting of the Huyate, (Xte, andeither the Mutszdi or Mochizuki)’7headed directly for shore and opened fire.At about 4,000 yards from the island theyexecuted a left (westward) turn, and theli?cryate lecl them in a run close along theshore. At that point Battery L openedfire. At 0652, just after the third two-gun salvo, the Hayate erupted in a violentexplosion, and as the smoke and sprccy(Irifted clear, the gunners on Wilkes couldsee that she had broken in two and wassinking rapidly. Within two minutes, at0652, she had disappeared from sight.”This prompted such spontaneous celebra-tions in the Battery L positions that aT’eteran noncommissioned officer had to re-mind the gun crews that other targets re-mained.

Fire then shifted to O;te, next in linebehind the Hayate. This destroyer wasnow so close to shore that, Major Devereuxl~ad difficulty restraining his .30 calibermachine gun crews from firing at her. A5-inch gun scored one hit before the omshore wind carriecl smoke in front. of thetarget. With this concealment, the de-stroyers turned to seaward away fromBattery L. Marines fired several moresalvos into the smoke, but they could notspot the splashes. Some observers onWilkes thought they saw the Oite transfer

“ Wake Attack.‘SPlatt, op cit., 3. The Ha@e thus was the

first .Japanese surface craft sunk during the warby C. S. naval forces.

THE EA-EMY STRIKES 119

survivors and sink, but reliable enemy rec-ords indicate only that she sustaineddamage.4g

Battery IJ now shifted fire to the trans-porw Kongo .V~ru and Kon~yu .Uuruthen steaming approximately 10,000 yardssouth of Wilkes. One shell hit the lead-ing tmnsport., and this ship LLISOturned toseaward ancl retired behind a smokescreen which probably was provided bythe two fleeing destroyers, Their coursewtrried them past the transport area. Bythis time civilians on Wilkes had joinedthe de.fensive eff ort.s as volunteer ammuni-tion handlers, and the battery next en-gaged a cruiser steaming northward 91000yards off the west end of the island. Thiswas either the Tenryu or the Tatsuta; butwhatever her identity, she hurried awaytrailing smoke after one shell struck hernear the stern. The departure of thisship, at about. 0710, removed the last tar-get from the range of Battery L. In abusy hour, this unit had fired 120 5-inchshells which sank one destroyer, damagedanother, and inflicted damage to a trans-port and a light cruiser. ~wo Marineshad sustained slight wounds.

Meanwhile the other half of the ,Jap-,anese destroyer force (D e.~troyer Division.~(~) ran into its share of trouble :LS it

moved west of Kuku Point on a north-westerly course. Led (probably) by theYuyoi, these three destroyers at 0600steamed within rat~ge of Battery II’s5-inch gLLns on Peale. The Marinesopened fire on t.l~e leading ship, and the.Japanese promptly raked Peale with re-turn salvos whic]l scored hits in and abouttile positions of Batteries B and D. Thisshelling destroyed communications be-tween Battery R’s gLms and the battery

4’ Enemy Notes, 1.448777 O—5~9

command post, and put. C~LmTwo out. ofaction with a {Iisabled recoil cylinder.Lieutenant. JVoodrow W. Kessler, the bat-tery conmlander, continued his duel withonly one gun, and used personnel fromGLm Two to help keep up the fire.. Tenrounds lilter a shell caught the Ya.yoi inher stern :Lnd set, her afire. Kessler thenshifted his fire to tl~e second ship whichwas maneuvering to lay a smoke screenfor the il]jured Y<~yoi. Under this con-cealment all three destroyers reversedcourse and retired southward out ofrange.

The Japanese force was now in fullretirement. .kt 0700 Admiral Kaj ioka or-dered iL withdrawal to Kwajalein. Badweather and ~cc~lrate Marine fire hadcompletely wrecked the admiral’s plan totake Wake with 450 men. But command-ers on the atoll took immediate precau-tions to guard against a dangerous relax-ation of defenses. They reasoned that the,Japunese might have carrier aircraftready to continue the attack which theships had started. and Major Putnam wasalready aloft with (Taptains Elrod, Freu-ler, and Tharin to reconnoiter the areafrom 12,000 feet. Wl~en this search lo-cated no enen~y aircraft or carriers, theMarine. pilots turned southwest to over-tnke the retiring ,Japanese task force.The fliers found the enemy little. morethan an hour’s snil from Wake.l and theyswept down to attack.

Captains E] rod and Tharin strafed andbombed two ships (probably the cruisersTen~yu and Tatsuta ) ,50 and got theirplanes damaged by heavy antiaircraft tire

‘0 The VMP pilots were not sure about theidentification of their targets, but a consultationof all available sources of information seems tosubstilntiate this ;~ccount of the action,

120

from these two targets. But the Terwyusuffered bomb damage to her torpedo bat-tery, and the Tatsuta.’.~topside radio shackwas hit. (Tnptain Freuler landed a 100-pound bomb on the stern of the transportKongo Maru, and saw his target flare upwith gasoline fires. After dropping theirtwo bombs each, the fliers hurried back toWake to rearm.

Two fresh pilots, I~ieutenant Kinneyand Technical Sergeant Hamilton, substi-tuted for two of the original fliers duringone of these shuttles between the atoll andthe enemy ships, and the air attacks con-tinued for a total of 10 sorties duringwhich the Marines dropped 20 bombs andfired approximately 20,000 rounds of .50caliber ammunition.51 The destroyerKisara.gi, probably hit earlier by CaptainElrod, finally blew L~pjust as LieutenantKinney nosed over at her in an attack ofhis own. One of the destroyer-transports

1a so sustained damage from the airstrikes.

This action was not all “ducks in a bar-rel’> to the Marine fliers, and any damageto the scanty Wake air force was a seriousone. ,Japanese flak cut. the main fuel linein F.lrod~s (3rumman, and although hemanaged to get back to the atoll he demol-ished his plane in a crash landing amidthe boulders along Wake’s south beach.Antiaircraft fire pierced the oil cooler andone cylinder in Captain Freuler~s plane.He returned to the field safely, but he fin-ished his approach on a glide with a deadengine that could never be repaired.

Accurate assessment of enemy losses inthis first landing attempt is not possible.,Japanese records indicate, however, that

PEARL HARBOR TO GU.4DALCAXAL

the destroyer Hayate was sunk by shorebatteries and the destroyer Kisamgi bythe VMF-211 bombs. Two more destroy-ers, the Oite and tl~e Yuyoi, were damagedas was a destroyer-transport. The trans-port Kongo M aru was bombed and setafire. .M1 three cruisers ( Yubati, Tatsuta,and Tenryu ) received injuries from air orsurface attacks.52

,Japanese personnel casualties can befixed only approximately. Assuming thatthe two sunken destroyers were mannedby crews comparable to those required bysimilar U. S. types (about 250 officers andmen per ship ), it would be logical to claimapproximately 500 for these two losseswith the fair assumption that few if anysurvivors escaped in either case. Person-nel losses on the other seven ships dam-aged are not known, but it must beassumed that casualties did occur .53

5’The widely-credited claim, originated ingood faith, that dive-bombing attacks sanli acruiser off ~J’akecannot be supported. Ml threecruisers returned to 11’akeless than two w+eekslater to support the tinal attack on the atoll.The officially established occasion of the lossof each is as follows : ~uhari {Philippine Sea,27Apr4A) : Tenr~u ( Bismarck Sea, by submarine

action, 18Dec42) ; Ta.tsuta (off Yokohama, bysubmarine action, 13May44). As indicated inthe text the violent explosion and sinking of theKisaragi, combined with recognition inexperi-ence, probably accounts for the cruiser claimed.OiW StatisticalSee, “Naval Losses of All Na-tions,” (located at NHD ), 5Feb46, Table VIII.

= In a letter dated 22Nov51, Capt TashikazuOhmae, leading Japanese naval student of WJ3TII, puts Japanese losses for this phase of theWake operation at “nearly .500,” Ohmae lettercited in Robert Sherrod, History of Marine

Carps Aviation in World War 11 (Washington:Combat Forces Press, 1952 ), 41, hereinafter

“CO VMF-211 Rept to CO MAG-21, 20Dec41. cited as Marine Air History.

CHAPTER 3

Wake Under Siege ]

,Scarcely had tile VMF-211 planes re-turned to the field before it was time forLieutenants Davidson and Kinney to flythe only two serviceable fighters on theearly midday combat patrol. It wasthen nearly 1000, almost time for the.Japanese bombers to arrive, and the

Marines soon spotted 30 of these enemyplanes coming out of the northwestat 18,000 feet. Davidson downed two ofthese aircraft, and Kinney turned a thirdhomeward with smoke trailing behind it.Then the fliers pulled away as the enemyformation entered tile range of tile Wakeguns .

This antiaircraft fire splashed onebomber in the water off Wilkes anddamaged three others. Bombs hit close toBattery I) on Peale, and others explodedon Wake. There were no Marine casual-ties, and damage was slight, but the pat-tern of the attack convinced I)evereux thatthe Japanese had spotted the position ofBattery D. As soon as the attack el~dedhe ordered this unit to displace from theneck of Toki Point to tile southeastern

end of Peale.z Marines and civilians be-

‘ L’nless otherwise noted the material in ~ha~)3 is derived from L)crereN.r Rcpt;P/(tnot>t Rcgt;

( oficer’s Nmnf, ) Repts. esl)ecially lstI,t ,1. F.A“intzey hk’pt, Major IV, L. ,T. ,?uylcr Rept,andLtCol B. D. God bol<i Ii’rpt; I)c7crvf(.r S’torfl,

2At 1700, just prior to Battery lJ’s dis-placement, a smoke bomb and a chain-flareof three red balls was sighted about two nlilesnortheast of Toki Point. This signal v’as re-

gan this displacement after dark. Sand-

bags nt the old position could not be re-claimed, and cement bags and empty arr-munition boxes had to serve this purposeat the Ilew locztion. The work wasfinished by 04L5, and Battery D againwas ready to fire.

On 12 December the Japanese came towork early. Two four-engine Kawanishipatrol bombers arrived from Majuro atabout 0500 and bombed and strafed Wakeand Peale Islands. Bombs hit the airstrip

but caused little damage. Captain Tharin,v-ho had just taken off on the morningreconnaissance patrol, intercepted one of

the big flying boats and shot it down.After this raid the It’ake defenders Went

on with their work. Reach defenses were

improved on l~illtes, and the ordnance of-

ticer, Gunner ~~arold C. ~orth, serviced

Battery L’s battered 5-inch guns. At the

ai rfielcl Lieutenant Kinney managed to

patch LIp one of T7X1F–%21’S cripples, and

this broug-ht the stren@h of the Tvake air

force up to three planes. Such work con-

tinued for the remainder of the day. To

the surprise of everyone on the atoll, the

peated twice in the next 20 minutes. The sig-

nificance of these signals has not been estab-

lished. Japanese submarines were operating in

the vicinity of Wake, however and it may be

that the signals had something to do with rescueoperations in which these boats were trying to

aid survivors from a bombing raid or from thesurf ace action.

121

122 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCAN.4L

enemy did not arrive for the usual noonraid.3

This freedom from attack was a wel-come and profitable interlude for the gzr-risen. Captain Freuler,wh ohadbeenat-tempting since the opening of the war todevise some means of employing welder’soxygen to augment the dwindling supplyfor the fighter pilots, finally managed, atgreat personal hazard, to transfer t,l~egasfrom commercial cylinders to the fliers’oxygen bottles. Without this new supplythe pilots could not have flown many morehigh altitude missions.

Another important experiment failed.Marines tried to fashion a workable air-craft sound locator out of lumber. It was“a crude pyramidal box with four un-curved plywood sides,” by Major Deve-reux’s description. It was too crude tobe of any value; it served only to magnifythe roar of the surf.

That evening IJieutenants Kinney andKliewer and Technical Sergeant Hamiltonreadied Wake’s three planes for the finalpatrol of the day. Kliewer drew a planethat was always difficult to start, 4 and histakeoff was delayed for nearly fifteenminutes. While he was climbing to over-take the other fliers he spotted an enemysubmarine on. tl~e surface some 25 milessouthwest of the atoll. He climbed to10,000 feet and maneuvered to attack with

3From 12 December until about 20 December,another day on which the enemy did not raidJVake, the recollections of surviving defenderssometimes are confused beyond any possiblereconciliation. This condition is acute for theperiod of 12–14 December inclusive. Sourcesreconstructing the events of those dates arriveat few compatible accounts. This volume at-

temps to draw the best possible compromise fromthese conflicts.

‘ Last Man off Wake Island, 120.

the sun behind him. He strafed the Jap-anese boat with his .5o caliber guns, andthen dropped his two bombs as he pulledout of his glide. Seither bomb hit., butKliewer estimnted that they explodedwithin fifteen feet of the target. Bombfragments punctured his wings and tailas he made his low pull-out, and while heclimbed to cruising altitude he saw theenemy craft submerge in the midst of alarge oil slick.’

After their various activities on 12 De-cember, the atoll defenders ended the daywith a solemn ceremony. A large gravehad been dug approximately 100 yardssouthwest of the Marine aid station, and inthis the dead received a common burialwhile a lay preacher from the contractorscrew read simple prayers.

Next, dn~7the ,Japanese did not botherWake at, all, and Marine officers thoughtit possible that Kliewer’s attack on theenemy submarine lmd brought them thisday of freedom. The. til~y atoll, fre-q(lelltly concealed by clouds, was a diffi-

‘ The fate of this submarine is not kno\~7n.Enemy records are not clear. But after the fallof l~>ake, Kinney and other pilots were ques-tioned by a Japanese officer who asked them ifthey knew anything about a Japanese submarinethat had disappeared in the vicinity of the atoll.This led Kliewer to believe that wmcussion fromhis bombs had finished off the submarine. TheJapanese list two of their submarines ( RO–66and ROP62 ) sunk 25 miles southwest of Wakeon 17 Dec 1941, RO–66 was lost not to enemyaction but, to disaster, the Japanese said. Thecause of the 10SS of RO–62 is not known, and ittherefore may be assumed that there was someconfusion as to the date. And since the WakeMarines had trouble remembering exact datesiu their postwar reconstruction of specific events,it may be that Kliewer’s bombs sank the RO–62 MilHistSec, SS, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Stud-ies in WWH No. 116, The I.JN in W’WII, Feb-ruary 1952 (located at OGMH ).

’ Kin t?oy I tt tc’rr-ictr, 4.’ On this date hot rations cooked in the con-

tractor’s gillley were delivered to all battery l)O-sitions by il “ChUt*li \VilgOIl." This service (em-tinuecl for as long :is lwssible thereafter. It wasone of Jlr. Teters’ 11lany contributions to the cle-fmse.

” Et,cttry Soft s. 1.

were killetl :\lltl one wounded, :1lld n directhmb llit in ail ;~iq)lniie Ye\-etiiielit fill-idled oti aiiotlier figllter pl:iiie, lea\-iiig tileatoll‘s a\-iat ioii niiit only one plane tliatc~ollltl f ly . !’ Lieutellant K i n n e y , I’MF-%I l‘s engineering ofker, spriiitetl for tilerevetinent where he w-as joined by Tech-iGal Sergeant TI:mlilton tint1 ,~GtionM:tchinist’s Mate F i r s t ( ‘ l a s s ,James F .Hesson, l’SS,10 his two assistants. Ik-spite tlie fireof the plane,

rear’ endislletl the

mbelierable feat of removing tlie unclain-aged engine fiviii tlie fuselage ;ii1d drag-ging it clear.

Thwiiig his iiiori!ing patrol fliglit of 15I)ec+eiiiher, Rlajor Putiinni sighted anothershnarine southwest of Wake. ISut it ap-J>eilre<l to llare orange markings, :lllcl Put-nam (lit1 llot :ltt:uak. He thought it nlight

served nurkings o f that color o n Thtclla i rp lanes i i i Hawaii in l a t e 1041. Pnt-i~ain‘s emniiintion of the craft cansed itt o slibiiierge, Ilowe\-ei*, :incl M a r i n e s late1t o o k sipiticxnt notice o f t h i s -\vllell t h eregular bonlbing raid did n o t arrive tlli\tth)-. This seeniecl to :itlcl credence to thetlieory that snbiii:ii~iiies m-eye pr*oricliiign:ivig:~tion:~l “k?illllS” f o r the bonlbcrs.

13nt the Kawa~iislii flying bOiltS I<el)t tlie

F o u r t o six o f thesefo~lI.-niotor,e~l l)lilllt’S ciiiiie over at :lhllt

1800, xiid one civilian was killed v-lien tlie1)lanes iii:\de il Stl’ilfillg 1’1111 illOllg tllf? :ItOll.

I” Ht~ss011 \YilS :I Xavy ariation instrnlllent lY’-~MiIYIli\II Wilt OYe’I to T’JIF-211 f1’0111 t h e K\‘;1T’:llAir Station after the f i r s t ilttZlC’l< ll;lcl l)l:ycedSllCll lli\\vOC UlllOIIg t h e t i g h t e r S(lllildrOII’S

ground 1)ersonnel. He turned out to be MI ont-StilIldiIlg general ;ir-iation Inaintemnce 11~111.


Their bombing was less etfective. Theyapparently tried to hit Battery D cm PealeIsland, but most of the bombs fell harm-lessly into the lagoon and the otherscaused no damage.

Meanwhile defensive \vork continuedduring every daylight hour not inter-rupted by such bombing raids. Anotheraircraft was patched up, personnel shel-ters for all hands had been completed inthe VMF-211 area, and at Peacock PointBzttery A now- had two deep under-ground shelters with rock cover three feetthick.” And before nightfall on 15 De-cember the garrison completed its destruc-tion of classified documents. This secur-ity work began on 8 December when theCommandant of the 14th Naval Districtordered Commander Cunningham to de-stroy reserve codes and ciphers at the hTa-val Air Stationllz but codes remained in-tact in the VMF-211 area. Now MajorRayler and Captain Tharin shreddedthese classified papers into au oil drumand burned them in a gasoline fire.”

On the l(lth tlie ,Japanese made anot]lerdaylight raid. Twenty-three bombersfrom Roi came out. of the east at 18,000feet in an attempt to bomb Peale Islandand C’amp Two. Lieutenants Kinney andKliewer, up on air patrol, warned thegarrison of this approach, but the Marinefliers had no luck attacking the enemyplanes. They did radio filtitude inforn~a-tion for the antiaircraft gunners, how

ever! and the 3inch batteries kl~ockeddown one bomber and damagecl fourothers. The <Japanese spilled their bombsinto the waters of the lagocmn and turnedfor home.

“ Wake File.

u Cunningham Intervieto, 4.‘3Last Uan Off Wake Island, 112,

But experience had taught the atoll de-fenders not to expect ~ rest after this day-light raid was over. The flying boats hadbecome almost as persistent as the shore-based bombers, and at 1745 that afternoonone of the Kawauisllis came down througha low ceiling to strafe Battery D on PealeIsland. Poor visibility prevented theMarines from returning fire, but the at-tack bacl caused little damage. The planedropped four hea~y bombs, but these felll~armlessly into the lagoon. Marines whowere keeping score—and most of themwere-marked this down as Wake’s 1(Mair raid.

After this attack Wake had an uneasynight. It was black with a heavy drizzle,and maybe. this put sentinels on edge justenough to cause them to “see things’’-al-though no one could blame them for this.At any rate lookouts on R7ilkes passed analarm at (E200 tl)at they had sighted 12ships, and everybody fell out for generalquarters. Nothing came of this alarm andpostwar ,Japanese and IT. S. records imciicate that there were no snips nt allaround Wake that night.

At 0600 on 17 I)ecember I,ieutenantI<inney reported proudly that his engi-neering mew had patched LIp two moreairplanes. This still left the atoll with afour-plane air force, but fliers and otheraviation personnel COU1d hardly have beenmore amazed if two new fighter squadronsl~acl just arrived. Major Putnam calledthe work of Kinney, Hamilton, and HES-

son “magical.” “

. . . With almost no tools and a complete lackof normal equipment, they performed all typesof repair and replacement work. They changedengines and propellers from one airplane toanother, and even completely built up new

“ Putnam Rept, 15.

WAKE L?NDER SIEGE 1!25

engines and propellers from scrap parts sal-vaged from wrecks. . . all this in spite of thefact that they were working with new types[of aircraft] with which they had no previousexperience and were without instruction man-uals of any kind. . . Their performance wasthe outstanding event of the whole campaign.”

“~n~illes hal,e been traded from plane

to plane, have been junked, stripped, re-

built, and all but. created,” another report

said of Kinney’s engineering work.16

.%t 131’7 that afternoon 27 Japanese

bombers from Roi came out of the soutli-

west tit 193000 feet. Their bombs ignited

a diesel oil tank on TVilkes and destroyed

tile defense battalion messhall as well as

mueli tentage and quartermaster gear at

Camp One. ~ bomb explosion also danl-

aged one of the evaporator units upon

which ltrtike depended for its water sup-

ply. The 3-incl~ guns bronglit down one

of these planes,

lJater that day one of the Kinney-

patched fighter planes washed out during

take-oflj and it had to be sent back to theboneyard. Then at I’i50 came the heavi-est raid the Kawanishi flying boats everput into the air against Wake.’i Eigl~t ofthese planes bombed and strafed the atollbut inflicted little damage.

As if the Wake defenders did not alreadyhave their hands full, construction author-ities in Pearl Harbor wanted to know howthings were going with the lagoon dredg-ing. They also asked for a specific date o]~which the atoll would have certain other

“ Ibid.

‘“CO VMF-211 Rept to C() MAG-21, 20 Dec41,2.

‘7 As an example of how memories can growdim, not a single defender remembered to men-tion this raid in accounts prepared after thewar ended. Yet there is no doubt that the raidoccurred, because the garrison reported it toPearl Harbor that same afternoon. Wake File.

improvements completed. The island com-mander prefaced his preliminary reply tothis query with an account of the latest airraid, and followed this with a damage re-port which summarized his battle lossessince the beginning of the war. Hepointed out that half of his trucks and en-gineering equipment had been destroyed,that most of his diesel fuel and dynamitewere gone, and that his garage! blacksmithshop, machine shop, and building supplieswarehouse either had been blasted orburned to the ground.

In a supplementary report sent later,Commander Cunningham told the PearlHarbor authorities that everybody onWake had been busy defending the atolland keeping themselves alive. They couldnot do construction work at night, hepointed out, and if they used too muchheavy equipment during the day theycould not hear the bombers approaching.Besides, he reiterated, much of his equip-ment had been destroyed by the bombingraids, and most of his repair facilities had

met the same fate. On top of all this, headded, civilan morale was bad. Cunning-ham said he could not promise a comple-tion date on anything unless the Japaneselet up the pressure.” The originator ofthis Pearl Harbor query might have founda pointed hint in this reference to a let-upof pressure. But at any rate Cunninghamnever again was asked how his construc-tion work was coming along.

The 18th of December was quiet.” Oneenemy plane was sighted in the vicinity of

‘8Ibid.

“ Likewise typical of the day-to-day confusionwhich exists in the Wake records and recollec-tions is the fact that contemporar-y records—the Wake dispatches and Maj Bayler’s officialnarrative report prepared in December 1941—

126

Wake, however, and the defenders con-sidered its activity ominolls. It lv!lS al-most directly overhead at about 25,000 feetwhen first sighted. Well beyond antiair-craft or fighter range, it flew northwwtalong the axis of the atoll, and then turnedsouth, presumably returning to Roi. De-fenders believed this to be ~ photo-recon-naissance flight.

Next morning the defenders continuedtheir routine work, trying to add to theirdefensive installations before the bomberswere due. This was a routine now fa-miliar to them. After being cleared frommorning general quarters, the men wentabout their work until the midday raidsent them to gun positions or to cover.After that raid was over, the men cleanedup after the bombs or went ahead withtheir other duties. Then late in the after-noon they had to take time out to dealwith the flying boats. At night they couldusually sleep when they were not on sentryduty, or standing some other type ofvwtch. Following this pattern, crewn~embers of the various batteries had com-pleted their sturdy emplacements, andeverybody had contributed to the con-struction of primary and alternate posi-tions for beach defense. They had builtmore beach positions than they could pos-sibly man, but many of these were to bemanned only under certain conditions.’OThe shortage of trained fighting men wasso critical that a well coordinated ,Jap-anese landing attack would require themto be everywhere at once.

indicate that the memories of the survivors havexhnost unanimously transposed the events of 17and 18 December.

‘“ LtCol A. A, Poindexter reply to Hist Sec.HQMC questionnaire, 8Apr47.


.it 105012’7 bombers from Roi came in

from the northwest at about 18,000 feet.

They worked over the VNIF–211 area

south of the airstrip, finished off the Ma-

rines’ messhall and tentage at ~amp Onel

and struck the Pan.Lir area. Batteries D

and F, hit four of these bombers, and ob-

servers on the atoll saw one of them splash

after its crew bailed out, over the water.

llomh damage at Camp One was serious,

but elsewhere it was slight, and there were

no casualties.

December 20 dawned gloomily with

heavy rain, and ceilings viere low and visi-

bility poor all day. This wide weather

front apparently dissuaded the Japanese

from attempting their usual noon visit,

but it did not stop a U. S. Navy’ PBY

which arrived that day and provided

~~~ake with its first physical contact with

the friendly outer world since the start of

the war. This plane landed in the lagoon

at 1530 to deliver detailed information

about the p] tinned relief and reinforce-

ment of the atoll. These reports coll-

tained good news for nearly everyone.

~~11 civilians except. high-priority workers

were to be evacuated. fl Marine fighter

squadron (VhlF-221 ) would ff y in to re-

inforce VMF-211j which was aglin down

to a single plane. And the units from the

Ath Defense Battalion would arrive on the

T’angier to reinforce the weakened detach-

ment of the 1st l)efense 13attalion. The

rBY fliers had a copy of the I“ang$er’s

loa(ling plan,” and this list made the shipseem like some fabulous floating Christ-mas package that was headed for the atoll.

That night, Commander Cunningham,Majors Devereux and Putnam, and Lieu-

“ (’apt J\’. S. (lmniughmu, I-SN, ltr to CaptS. E. Morison, USNR, 7Feb47 ; Mc310rrti Inter-ricw, 2 ; (’inCI’ac 01’lan 3$41, 15Dec41.

WAKE L’NDER SIEGE 12’7

tenant Commander Greey prepared re-ports to seucl back to Pearl IIarbor.Major Bayler, his mission long since com-pleted, would carry the papers back as hecomplied with his orders directing him toreturn from Wake biby first available Gov-ernment air trallsl)o!>t:ltioll.” Mr. Heve-nor, the Bureau of the Budget oflicial whohad missed the Philippine Vlipper on 8December, i~lso planned to leave on theP13Y, but, someone pointed out that hecould not travel in a Naval aircraft, with-out parachute and Mae West, neither ofwhich w-as available. So Mr. Ilevenormissed another plane.

At 0700 next morning, 21 December, thePRY departe~l. Within less than twohours, at 0850, 29 ,Tapauese Navy attlckbombers, covered by 18 fighters, lashedclown at Wake through the overcast andbonlbed and strafed all battery positions.These were planes from (7urrier Division 2(Soryu and Hi,yu), called in by the ,Japa-nese to help soften Wake>s unexpectedtoughness.” Due to the low ceiling, theattack was consummated before the 3-inchbatteries could get into action, but the .50caliber antiaircraft machine guns emgaged the enemy. The attack caused littledamage, but its implications were ominous.

Only three hours later, 38 of the shore-based <Japanese.bombers arrived from Roi,and again they concentrated on Peale Is-land and (.hrnp Two. They approachedfrom the east at 18,000 feet in two mainformations, and the bombs from the sec-ond group plastered Battery D’s positionon Peale. This unit had fired 35 roundsin half a minute and had hit one bomberwhen a bomb fell squarely inside the di-rector emplacement, of the battery. Thisexplosion killed the tiring battery exem-

“ Capture of Wake, II, 372.

ti ve, Platoon Sergeant, Johnalson E.Wright, and wounded the, range officerand three other Marines.

NOW there was only one firing directorluechanisrn left. on the atoll, and it be-longed to Battery E located in tile crotcl~of Wake Island. But Battery E had noheight finder, although Battery I) still hadone of these. T]lus tile two ;l-incl~ batterieshad only enough fire control equipmentfor one battery. Because of Battery E’smore desirable location, and because. it hadescaped damage since its move to this spot,Major Devereux decided to maintain it ashis primary antiaircraft defense of theatoll. Thus by taking over Battery D’sheight, finder, certain other fire controlgear, one gu]], ancl the necessary personnel,Battery E became a fully manned and ful-ly equipped four-gun battery. Two otherBattery D gul)s ~vere shifted to a new po-sition on Peale Island where they couldassume beach-defense missions, and thefourth gun remzined at the original bat-tery position. Ihunmy guns also weremounted there to create the, impressio~lthat the battery was still intact. As a fur-ther measure of deception, Battery F onWilkes, also reduced to two guns, wouldopen fire by local control methods whene-ver air raids occurred. Battery D wasparceled out that uiglltj and by nextmorning the garrison 011Peale had beenreduced to less than 100 Marines and asmall group of civilians wl~o had beentraiued- by Marine noncommissioned of-ficers 10 man one of Battery 1)’s gulls.’:{

n of these civilians the Peale Island com-mander, Capt Godbold, later wrote: “The ci-vilians }vho served with this battery were ofiuestimahle value . under the capable leader-ship of Sergeant Bowsher, they soon were firingtheir gun in a manner comparable to the Marine-manned guns. Before the surrender of the is-

128

By 22 December VMF-211 again hadtwo airplanes capable of flight, and C’ap-tain Freuler and T~ieutenant Davidsontook them up for morningpatrol. David-son had been out nlmost an hour and wascovering the northern approaches to Wakeat 12,000 feet when he spotted enemyplanes coming in. He called CaptainFreu]er, who YVaSthen south of the atoll,and the Marines began independent ap-proaches to close with the enemy. TheJapanese flight consisted of 33 carrier at-tack planes (dive bombers) escorted by sixfighters, all from the Soryu-Hiryu carrierdivision. The fighters were at 12,000 feetand the dive bombers at 18,000. The fight-ers were of a sleek new type, the first Zerosto be encountered over Wake.

Captain Freuler dived his patched-upF4F–3 into a division of six fighters,downing one and scattering the others.Coming around quickly in a difficult op-posite approach, Freuler attacked anotherof the Zeros and saw it explode only 50feet below. This explosion temporarilyengnlfed the (2rumrnan in a cloud ofthunes and flying fragments. The Marineplnne was badly scorched, its manifold-pressure dropped, and the, controls reactedsluggishly. As tl~e captain turned to lookfor the atoll, he saw I,ieutenant Davidsonattacking the dive bombers. The lieuten-ant was diving at a retreating bomber, buta Zero was behind him closing on the Ma-

rine Grumman. This enemy fighter prob-ably downed Davidson, because the lieu-tenant did not return to the atoll.

Meanwhile a. Zero got on Freuler’s tailwhile he took in Davidson’s plight, and

lnnd, some of tl]ese men were slated to beewwnnted to Honolulu : however, the entire guncrew offered to stay on the island and ~er~e ~viththe battery. ” LtCol B. I). GOdb07d Rept, 1~,

PEARL HARBOR T() GUADALCANAL

tire from the ,Japanese plane wounded theMarine pilot in the back and shoulder.Freuler pushed his plane over into a steepdive, managed to shake off l?is pursuer, anddragged the shattered, scorched F4F intothe field for a crash landing. In the wordsof Lieutenant Kinney> whose shoestringmaintenance had kept VMF-211 flying forfifteen days: ‘(This left us with no air-planes.>’ In spite of the Marine squad-ron-s Iast blaze of heroism, the enemy divebombers came on in to strike at all batterypositions. But the atoll pilots were notmuch impressed by the work of the Jap-anese naval aviators. ‘(We who have beenused to seeing only the propeller hub are abit taken aback by their shallow dives andtheir inaccuracies,” Lieutenant Barningersaid. The Japanese bombs did not causemuch damage, and there were no casual-ties on the ground.

But now that, carrier air was beingbrought to bear against them, the Wakedefenders concluded that it would not belong before the Japanese came back with

a bigger task force and a better anlphib-ious plan. Ground defense preparationsintensified that afternoon. VMF-21 1’seffect ives—less than 20 officers and mell—were added to the defense battalion asinfantry, Peale Island completed its beachdefense emplacements, and Captain Plattdrew up final detailed orders for his de-fense of Wilkes. Platt ordered Marine

Gunner McKinstry, who commanded Bat-tery F, to tire on enemy landing boats aslong as his guns could depress sufficiently,and then to fall back to designated posi-tions from which his men would fight asriflemen. There these men from the 3-inchbattery would be joined by the personnelfrom Battery L. After that it would be

an infantry fight. “.All that can be done

WAKE VSDER SIEGE 129

is being done,” notecl one of the Wakeofhcers. “bl~t there is so little to do with.””~

K,VEMY PLANS .4ND .4 PTZOiVS.

11–21 DEOl?iJIBF.R 25

Wake defenders were correct in assum-ing that the Japanese soon would be backwith a stronger effort than the one whichlMd failed for Rear Admiral Kajioka. Theadnliral began to mull a few plans forhis next It tack while he withdrew towardKwajalein on 11 December, and he hadl]is statf in conference on 13 Decemberwhile his battered fleet still was anchoringill that Marshall atoll. Rear AdmiralKuniori Marushige, who had commanded(’~wit~er Division 18 (including the lightcruisers ~~Ltwta and ~erwyu as well astile flagship J’ubari), analyzed the causesof failure as follows: The landing attempthad failed, he said, because of the vigorousseacoast artillery defense, tighter oppo-sitiol~, adverse weatl~er> and because of imsutliciel~t ,Japallese f owes and means.

But, .idmiral Kajioka was more inter-ested in the success of the next operation,and so was Fowth Fleet CommanderInou-ye at Truk. While the ships remain-ing in Kajioka>s task force were beingpatched Ilp at Kwajaleill, Achniral lnouyesent destroyers A.wznagi and Yunagi overto replace the destroyers lost in the Wakeact ion. He also added the flboro, a muchmore powerful and newer ship of de-stroyer-leader characteristic which wasarmed with six 5-inch guns. zc The minelayer Tsugarw czme over from Saipan

“ LtC[)l C. A. Isumiit{]rrI{t’ltt.25rnless otherwise n~)ted the n)aterial in

this section is derived frolli Capture of W’ukc;I<ncm !1A’ot(’<?.2“ONI 222–J, “A Statistical Summary of the

Jalmnese Nay-y,” 20Ju1W, 56.

with the .Vaizaru Special Landing Forcei~um ber ThIo; and the transport Tenyo

Jlwu. and the float-plane tender Kiyo-li((.~()~ also joined the force. Troop re-]learsals began on 15 December, but Ad-miral Inouye still was not, convinced thatl~is force was large enough, and he askedthe Commander in Chief of the Combined

Fleet to send him more ships.Illouye’s sllperior officer, llo\v appar-

ently convinced that Wake would be hardto crack, sent to the Fourth F’?eet admiralthe fleet carriers ii’oryu and Hiwu of Crar-tiflr Z)ivi.vion ~, heavy cruisers Aobo? Fu-

tl[taka, Kako, and Kimugasw of (7rw%erI)ivision 61, heavy cruisers Tone and OhW-

urna of Crukr DiL*Lw?on 8, and a taskforce screen of six destroy ers.” The com-mander of the Combined Fleet assignedover-a]l command of this Wake task forceto Rear .$cbniral Koki Abe, commander ofCruisey” Lh’cixion 8. Rear Admiral Kaji-oka retained his command of the amphib-ious force.

Plans for the second attack against the.’lmerican atoll called for more softeningt~p than l~rake had received previous to

l<aj ioka’s first attempt to land troops

there. on 21 December, two days prior

L’] the proposed landing, the aircraft of

( ‘wrrier l)iLvi,YimI 2 would work over theatoll’s defenses to destroy first the U. S.air capability and then the shore batteriesam~ the antiaircraft weapons. Then themnphibious force would move up for thelanding, and in order that the atoll mightbe surprised 2’ there would be no pre-liminary naval bombardment on 23 De-cember.

To make sure that troops got ashore, thetwo destroyer-transports (Pdrol Craft

‘7 tbid,, 47, 49.

x Capture of Wake, II, 372.

130 PEARL HARBOR TO GU.4D.4LCAA’AL

32 and 33) would run aground on thesouth shore of the atoll near the airstrip,and the approximately 1,000 men of thespecial naval landing force ~“ lvoLdd tl~enbe carried to the beach in four to six lancl-ing bcrrges. T\~o of the~e woLdd land onWilkes Island, two on Wake Island be-tween the airstrip :uld (Uamp one, ancl theother two probably provided for wouldput their troops ashore just west of Pea-cock Point.’” If these special landingforce troops ran into serious trouble on theatoll, the naval force WOLIICIsend in 500men organized from ships’ lan[] ing forces.

.lnd if this combined force failed to sl~b-

due the at 011 clef enc~ersj more help woulcl

be sent, by means of an tI1tinlate rcncl des-

perate expedient. The clestroyers of the

task force would be beached, and their

crews would swarm nshore. ikclm irnl

Inonye W:LS determineci that this second

attack should not f ail.

The possibility of l.~. ~. na17al surface

intervention w-as taken irito consideration.

This possibility liad been clkimissed duril~g

planning for the attack of 11 I)ecember

because the ,Japanese reasoned tl~at tile

shock of Pearl Harbor would immobilize

llmerican surface ~l~erations for some

time. But now the tJapanese assumed that

[~. S. surface opposition was probable. To

guard against SLICIIthreat, the four heavy

cruisers of fltwi.wr Di/vMon 6 WOUIC1actas a covering force east of Wake. If amajor surface action developed, Rear .&{l-miral Abe would enter the tight with~’ruiser Divisio/2 $’ and conduct the battle.

As on the first attempt, submarines wouldprecede the invmion force to reconlmiter

“ Wake .4ttack, 2.

30HistSec, HQMC interview with CM J. P. S.Devereux, 12Feb47, 8, hereinafter cited asI)wx?reux Interview.

the island and to look out for L-. S. sur-face forces.

With these final plans issuecl, the in-vasion force well rehearse], and carriersSory71jand IFiryu on their way down fromnorth of Midway, the operation againstWake w:ls re:uly to go. At 0900 on 21December Aclrniral Kajioka cleared Roiwith t]le ships of his amp]libious force andlleaclecl back up toward the American-heldatoll.

Z’HE RELIEF ATTEMPT,1,5–t?.j DKIJEMRER “

Now the U. S. commanders taking helpto Wake were in a race with AdmiralKajioka, even if they did not know it..idmiral Fletcher’s Task Force 14 sortiedf 1om Pearl Harbor in two task groups on15 and 16 I)cwember,32 rendezvousedsouthwest of Oahu during the afternoono f t]lis second day, and sailed westward to-

ward Wake. Fletcher’s force was to ar-rive at tl~e atoll on 23 December (east]ongitude time). There the pilots ofMajor Verne ,J. McCaul’s VMF-221woLdcl fly in from the carrier ,~m’atogc~while tl~e Tangier anchored off Wilkeschan]lel to unload supplies, equipment,and the Marines from the W DefenseBattalion.’3 After taking wounded men

“ Prin(ilml sources bearing on the Relief Ex-pedition are: CinCPac OPlan 39-41, 1.5Dec47 ;Mc:Mf,rris Interview; Saratoga log; LtCol R. D.Heiul, ,Jr., “We”re Headed for Wake,” MO Ga-

wtte, .June 1943.‘“ l)atw in this section are either west or east

longitude as apI)licable to the location of eventsidentified by dates. Where confusion is Imssiblethe type of date will be indicated.

33Troolm and equipment would be transportedto the atoll on lighters, and if the !f’a??.qier wereseriously damaged by enemy action she would berun aground so the cargo would not be lost.

WAKK: I: XI)ER SIEGE 131

and certain civilians on board, these shipsthen would return to Pearl Harbor.

But the advance was aggravating]y slow.The old fleet oiler ,yecl~e.s, in the train withthe Tangier, could not manage more than12 knots, and the fleet’s zig-zag evasivetactics further slowed the rate of advance.To the Marines and seamen in this firstwestward sally of the war> the waters be-yond Oahu seemed very lonely and on~i-11OUS,and there was no contact, eitherfriendly or enemy, to vary the tensemonotony of the run. Each day on theTangier began with general quarters andthen lapsed into normal shipboard routine.Marines received sLlch training aud in-

struction as could be fitted into this sched-ule, and part of this educational programincluded lectures by the few radar techni-cians on board.

The few available maps and charts of

Wake received intense study. In antici-pation that Wake’s 3-inch guns might haveto deliver direct fire on ships or groundtargets, improvised sights were clesi~ned

and constructed in the ship’s machineshops. The oficer commanding the nKL-chine-gun detachment contrived with theship”s force to construct special slings withwhich his .50 caliber antiaircraft machinegLllIs could be hoisted from ship to barges

while remaining ready to ward off possible

enemy attacks during unloading. “ The 5-inch seacoast men stayed in practice bystanding their share of watches on theafter 5-inch gun of the Tangier. Al] M:~-riue antiaircraft machine guns were set upand manned on the superstructure.

On 18 December CinC’Pac ordered IT. S.submarines which were patrolling in thevicinity of Wake to move south out of thearea. These boats of Task Force 7 were

to patrol around Rongela]) in the Mar-shalls until tile relief exl)eclition reachedWake. (’in(xPac wanted to avoid any pos-sibility of one IT. S. force, conf[lsinganother for tile ellemy.:’-i Three days later,on the 21st, i]ltelligence information whichhad been arriving at Pearl Harbor indi-cated that a large force of shore-base(l,Japanese planes was building LIp h] theMxrsl~alls, and tl}at enemy surface forcesmight be east of Wake where they coulddetect tl~e approach of Fletcher’s TaskForce 14. Other reports indicated thepresence of ,Japanese carriers, includingpossibly the ,Yoryu, northwest of tile atoll.Fletcher’s mission, now about 650 mileseast of JVake, appeared to be growingmore hazardolls with eac]l hour. Qin~Pacordered the carrier I.ezington. ancl otherships of Task Force 11 over from thesout Ileast to give Fletcher closer support .~s

By 0800”on 22 Decenlber, Task Force 14was within 515 nliles of Wake, and .4d-n~iral Nlet,cher in the cruiser Astoria keptUp on the news about his race by n\onitor-ing the Cin(;Pac radio nets. ominous re-ports of .Japanese surface operationsaround the atoll continued to filter in atPearl Harbor, hut conditions at Wake were

unchanged. Fletcher decided to refuel.Although his destroyers still had a reason-able supply of oil, it might not be enoughif they llacl to fight. But this very act offueling, which took most of the day, keptthem out of the fight. By the time theU. S. ships moved on toward Wake, Ad-miral Kajioka was only about 50 milesfrom the atoll with his amphibious force.Fletcher had lost the race.

“ Paraphrased file of CinCPac dis~}atchescon-cerning wake relief, l)wen]her 1941.

“ IlJic7.

CHAPTER 4

The Fall of Wake’

.At Wake, 23 December began with inter-nlittent rain squalls, and shortly after 0100the defenders saw a succession of vivid, ir-regular flashes beyond the horizon northof Peale Island. Men on the atoll couldhear nothing above the rain and the boomof the surf, but it was obvious that theflashes were not signals or se:lrchlightscThey were too brilliant and irregular forthat. Olcl fleet-duty hands were remindedof night battle practice at sea. Was therea naval battle, or were the ,Japanese com-ing back ? Tile defenders conld onlyguess.

By this time the Marines were used toseeing lights, even though these were umuwml. But at 0145 came a more urgentalarm. The word over the “,J’’-line an-l~cnmced that the .Jctpanese were landingat, Toki Point on Peale. Major I)evereuxalerted all units and then telephonedLieutenant Kessler at Toki Point for ad-ditional information. Tl~e Battery IIcommander told Devereux that he couldsee lights in the distance but, that therewas no landing in progress. The beachpositions had been manned, Kessler adclecl,because boats were “believed” to be sonle-

‘ ~nless otherwise noted the niaterial in ~hall4 is deri~wlfron) ~)crercur RcPt; 1’/{t)la))lKrflt:(O~cer”s name ) Repts, especially LtCol W. McC.

P2att Rcpf, lstI.t .J. .L Mc.lli. $fcr Rcpt, M(: C. FL.

3[rKitl str?l Rcpt; Dc??rreft,r IH t<rricw; repliesto HistSec questionnaire by 0)1 (}. H. Potter,LtCol W. M{(7. I’latt, LtCol A. .+. Poinciester ;

Captllr(! of ~Va~~: JVal<c Attack; Hawaii-J[ala?/aATa@~.?; I)rrf’rc!(x fltor~!.

where offshore. By this time all unitshad sent their men to general quarters,and at (’amp one. ~Second I~ieutenantPoindexter loaded his scanty mobile re-serve unit of eight Marines 2 and four .30caliber machine gLms into their truck, re-ported his actions to the command post,and moved out, toward Peale Islancl. Butjthe word from Kessler lmd convincedDeve~eux that if the enemy were landing,they were not doing it on Peale Island.He pllt a damper on the genertcl a]arm,a]d ordered tl~at Poindexter be inter-cepted when his trnck passed t]~e com-mand post. He held the mobile reservethere to await developments.

I)evelopments were not long in coming.Admiral Ka j ioka’s amphibious force hadat last sighted the atoll’s faint outline,and the ships were reducing speed. Mo-ments later, in the worcls of a ,Japanese“combat corresponclent’> W11Owas movedto poetry by this amphibious venture,“The honorable., first order of ‘CHAR(+E’was given, and tl~e daring officers ancl men,with white sashes, bravely went down tothe surface of the sea. ” 3

2This unit. along ~vith a few Marines fromSU1)l)lY and a(lI1liIlistr:ltit)rl sections and 15 Xtivyenlisted men connn: anded by B31 lst(’1 .James F..Barnes. was also reslxmsible for the defense ofCamp One.

3This latter-day Masetield was Kayoshi Ibushiof the .Japanese A“a~al Information Section.

132

THE FA1,L OF WAKE 133

.ipprO~im:lte]~ 800”of the Af’i\’~~ t~oopswere distributed betlveell the tl}-o de.stroyer-trans]Jorts.4 The other 200” pre-sumably were enlbi~rked on board one ormore of the transl)orts or the float-planetender Kiyolawa, and the 500 sailors ofthe provisional reserve force apparentlywere to remain at their normal duties un-less calledto reinforce the landingeffort.’T’he 21aizutw Second ,Tpecial lVU ual Land-ing Force, now brought to full strength

by reillforcenlellts from Saipallj was es-sentially a ,Japanese version of the bat-talion landing team (13LT). Its threerifle companies had numerical design:~-tions but were more commonly identifiedby the names of their commanders. TILLSthe Ist (’ompany, comman(lecl by Lieu-tenant Kinichi (-cllida, NVWoften calledtile L7C11MCLut(it. Similarly, the W andJd ~otnp~fnie(~\\ere styled respectively tileTdwno unit and the Ztaya unit.

The Uchtia and Ztoya compamks wouldassault Wake Island while 100 “pickedmen’> of the Takmo unit seized Wilkes.O

“This reporter,’” as he later said of himself,“ . . . TY:lS able to ha Ye the honor of taking thefirst step al)on the island as a man of lettersthe cal)tnre of Jyake Island . . was so heroicthat e~en the gods wel)t. ”’ Ha waii-.![a~ayu X(I /.-

CJ[AS, 32.

‘ One :lccount says 300 ]aen of this force \vereon the two destroy er-translwrts. At this timeall SNI.F units attached to the Fourth l’leetwere com’entrated for the seizure of \v:ike inmuch the same manner that 1’. S. Fleet MarineForce units would have been employed.

5The exact nlunber of .Jal)anese troops whofon,ght on Wake 1]:1s not been determined. .kdmhlorison” (ites Marine estimates that “at least1,~()() tro{)l)s l:illded e:,rly ,)n the ~:+rd,j, ~~ndthat

others came ashore after the surrender. Risin.qS//}/i)) thc I’acilic, 245.

G Itaya’s male and that of his company ap-pears in one Japanese source as “Itatani.”Hawaii-Ma7ayu A“avOp.s, 28.

The balal~ce of the Tdwno company pre-sunmbly would back up the other twocompanies on Wake Island. At about thetime the premature landing alarm wassounded on the atoll, the amphibious forcewas putting landing craft over the side.The weather was giving them trouble, butat about 0200”the A’NLF troops clambereddown into these craft. “The hardships en-countered in lowering the landing bargeswere too severe even to imagine,;’ reportedcorrespondent Ibushi. ‘(Now we, the hTa-

val Landing Force, on the barges whichwe were in, must charge into enemy ter-ritory and carry out the final step of se-curing a landing point after touching theshore. ” r

As the landing craft pitched throughtl~e breakers, the destroyer-transportsturned to make their final runs onto thereef south of the airstrip. These vessels,Patrol ~oath 32 and 33, mounted the reefin a smother of breakers and foam, andwent aground near the west end of the air-strip. Two of the landing barges scrapedbottom as they approached the reef near(’amp one, and still there was no sign thatthe atoll defenders were ~wake. But sud-denly tracers pencilled from the beach atWilkes Island xnd .50 caliber slugs splat-tered through the gunwales of one barge.Then a searchlight from Wilkes flared onto silhouette the picked men of the Talca.nounit landing on that island. It was then0245, and the battle for Wake was on.(See Map 5, Iifap Section)

THE DEFENL3E OF~$7AKE ISLA,~D

since 0215 Marines had been confidenttl~at a landing against, tl~em was in prog-

‘ Ibid.

1:34 1’lMRL HARBOR T() GUADALCANAL

c-ess. l~iglltst’{}ulclbseell otkhorel~ortllof Peale Island and all along the southcoasts of Wake an(l Wilkes Island. Atabout 0230 3L~rines on Peacock Point,thought they could see the out] ines of twobarges headil~g iilong the coast towar{l theairfield, but these evidently were the pa-tlolcraftl lw~dillgi llto\v:lrclt llereef. Bynow Major Devereux, Major Potter, hisexecutive officer, a radioman, and aswitchboard operator in the defense de-tachment command post were swamped byreports of sounds, lights, and shapes. Asl~e collected this information and relayedreports to Commander (’unningharn,l)evereux saw that the greatest tllLX2ilt was

developing along the south coast of tileatoll, and he dispatcl)ed Lieutel)aut Poiwdexter>s eight-man mobile reserve to de-fensive positions betlveen (’amp one andtile airstrip.

Poindexter’s men had not left tl~e truck,and the lieutenant, had then) transporteddown the island and into position within15 minutes. The area into which the-ymovecl was just west of the road junction]lear the west end of the airstrip. Therethis small force commanded the southshore roacl as well as the critical beachsection south of the field. The ]ieutenantreported that this area was being bom-barded when he reached his defensive po-sitions, but there were no signs of alanding.

But at 02358 defenders on Wilkes re-ported that they coLIld near barge engines

8The Japanese list (MM as the official time oftheir landing, Statements of Marine officers donot. agree. Some say the landings came at about0130, while others place the time almost an hourlater. In his official report, Devereux givesthe time of landing on Wilkes at 0215, but hispublished narrative says 0120. Yet a subsequentstudy convinced him that the time of 0235 was

above tl~e surf, and Marine Gunner Mc-Kinstry opened fire with a .50 caliber ma-chine gun at, a dark shape near the beachbelow. Ten minutes later Captain Plattrequested permission to illuminate thebeach with his 60-inch searchlight., andthe landing was discovered. Two bargescould be seen on the beaches at Wilkes,the lights also revealed the patrol craftaground off Wake.

Neither of the 5–inch batteries whichcommanded the south approaches toWake’ could bear against the landings.Terrain masks likewise prevented themfrom firing at Patrol Craft 3.2 and 33 onthe reef}” The only weapon larger thana machine gun that could engage these de-stroyer-transports, already beginning tospew OLLttheir human cargo, was the 3-inchgun emplaced on the rise between the beachroad and VMF-2117S hard-stand parkingarea. But this gun was not manned.Realizing the importance of this weapon,

Second Lieutenant Robert M. Hanna, incommand of the antiaircraft machine gunsabout the field, gathered a scratch crewconsisting of one Marine, Corporal RalphJ. Holewinski, and three civilians” and

closer to the fact. Excepting the variances con-c,ernin~events during these dark early hours ofthe battle, ~larine accounts agree generally as toevents after daylight.

‘ Btry.4 (Peacock Point) andBtry L (Wilkes).‘0One of the advantagesof the Navy 5“/51 for

seacoast defense missions was that it had 360°train, as contrasted to the limited traverse ofthe l~~mmfield guns used bY the Army for thisrole. In this instance, however, terrain masks,slight thongh they were, prevented either A orL from bearing.

“ lstLt R. M. Ha?ma Rept to CO, 1st DefBnDet,lloct45, 2. Of these three civilians, two (PaulGay and Bob Bryan ) were subsequently killedin action, and the third, Eric Lehtola, waswounded. Hanna states that they fought with“exceptional gallantry.”

136 PEARL HARBOR TO GTJADALCANT.4L

raced to this gun. Major I)evereux alsorealized the critical importance of holdingthis area, and he ordered Major Putnamand the 20 men of VMF-211 to form aninfantry support. between the 3–inch gunand the enemy landing.

All defense units on Wake Island weredisposed to meet the enemy. Hanna andthe VMF-211 “infantrymen” held theleft flank south of the airfield parking area.To the west, and squarely in the path ofthe enemy’s initial rush toward the westend of the field, were Second LieutenantKliewer and three aviation Marines. Theyguarded one of the generators which waswired to detonate the mines buried in theairstrip. At the road junction fartherwest Poindexter’s mobile reserve wasalready firing its four machine guns east-ward along the beach at Patrol Craft 32ti’here the enemy troops had revealed them-selves by injudicious use of pyrotechnicsignals. At Camp One four .30 calibermachine guns were manned for beach de-fense by Battery 1’s gun shed crew and theNaval Air Station sailors who had beenserving as lookouts on the water tank OP.Behind this general line, two .50 calibermachine-gun sections (each of two guns)guarded the airstrip. One section heldthe west end of the. strip near Lieutenant,Kliewer’s generator, and the other sectionwas located on the east end of the strip.lzThese two sections could command thelength of the field, and could partially in-terdict movement across the field. other

“ ‘These two sections had been sited to provideantiaircraft fire as well as final protective firealong the airstrip. This conformed with defensebattalion practice, but the light of hindsightprompted Devereux to wish that he had movedthese sections closer to the beach where theycould have been tied in with the general line.

machine guns were in the Peacock Pointarea. At the battery positions gun crewsstood by their weapons and manned suchlo~i~l perimeter defenses as their meagerstrength permitted.

Lieutenant Hanna and his jury-riggedcrew quickly got the 3–inch gun into ac-tion. They laid the weapon by estimateand “Kentucky windage”;’ and fired theirfirst round at Patro7 ~~r(~~t J3 wllicb wasless than 500” yarcls away. The shell hitthe bridge of the destroyer-transport, andwounded the captain, the navigator, andfive seamen. Two other sailors were killed.While men of the Uchida and Ztaya unitsswarmed off the ship, Hanna and his crewfired 14 more rounds into the superstruc-ture and hull of the craft. Finally it burstinto flames, illuminating the landing area.“The scene was too beautiful to be a battle-field,” reported a ,Japanese observer onboard the cruiser Yubari.’4

Flames from this ship lighted PatrolCr[(~t 32 farther west along the beach, andHanna shifted his fire to this vessel.Three-inch shells hulled this transport-de-stroyer, and crews from both these shipsjoined the SNLF’ troops landing on theisland. This added possibly 100 extramen to the battle ashore, and Hanna>s gunalready was seriously threatened by thel~chida unit which had made the beachassault. Major Putnam’s aviators foughtofl these early attempts to silence the 3-inchgun, but the ,Japanese continued to attack.Alternating between creeping infiltrationtactics and screaming rushes, the Vchidatroops drove the Marines back on each side

‘3 These 3-inch Army antiaircraft guns wereequipped only for indirect fire at aerial targets,and they had no sights or other fire control equip-ment to facilitate direct sighting by local control.

‘4 Hatcaii-Malaya Na.vOp8, 33.

THE FAI.1, OF WAKE 137

of the gun until the defenders were in aposition whic]l T)evere(lx later describedas “a box-shaped tiling. ” Here they con-tinued to hold.

But farther west .Japanese troops hadreached the south shore road between themine field generator and I,ieutenant Poimdexter% small mobile reserve, and by thelight from the burning patrol craft l?oin-dexter could see these enemy cross the roadand disappear into the brusl~ beyond.The lieutenant was directing machine-gun fire into this brush area when hehem-d other firing from the direction ofCamp One. He left Gunnery SergeantT. Q. Wade in charge of the reserve forceand headed toward the camp. There hefound that two large landing craft hadgrounded on the reef some 30 yards off-shore southeast of the camp.’s Four ma-chine gLms from Camp One fired at thebarges, but the rounds ricocheted off. Thisfire evidently discouraged the craft fromattempting a landing at this point, how-ever, because they backed off the reef andnosed about as if seeking a better site.

While these, two boats floundered aboutin the surf, Lieutenant Poindexter formedtwo teams of grenadiers to move down tothe water;s edge and 10b hand grenadesinto the barges. One team consisted ofhimself and Boatswain’s Mate First (Yaw,James E. Barnes, while the other consistedof Mess Sergeant Gerald Cam, and a civil-ian, R. R. Rutledge, who had served as anArmy officer in France during lf70rldWar I. The machine guns, suspended fire,and the grenadiers attacked. By thistime the ,Japanese had 1anded a short dis-tance farther east, and Boatswain’s MateBarnes managed to throw at least onegrenade inside a barge just as the enemy

“ Lewis.

debarkiltiou commenced. The explosioninflicted llexvy cas~m]ties, hut some 7’5 to100 enemy splashed ashore and entered thelmderbrush east of (’amp One. This heavygro~vth llortll of t}le ro:~d soon bec:~nle :~

sort of no man’s 1and into which the ,Jap:~-nese continued to infiltrate and expandtheir beachhead.

All this Poindexter managed to reportback to Major Devereux in a final messagefrom Camp One before wire communica-tion was lost. But shortly after this apanicky civilian who had managed to pickhis way through the brush from Camp Oneto Devereux’s command post brought inreports-t ota]l y untrue-that Camp Onewas being overrun and that he had seen,Japanese troops bayoneting the machinegunners of the mobile reserve.

The loss of communications was notlocalized at Camp One. Devereux’s com-mand post had lost contact with Lieuten-ant, Hanna, the VMF-211 infantrymen,the CP of the .50 caliber machine-gun batt-ery near the airstrip, and Battery A atPeaccwk Point. The tactical line toWilkes Island also went out at this time,but the “J’’-line, which lay north of theairfield, still linked the defense battalionCP with that of Captain Platt on Wilkes.Nobody knows exactly what caused thiscommunications failure, but the nature oflhe trouble suggests that it might havebeen caused by a single break. The loca-tion of this major break, if there was one,must have been near the battalion com-mand post where lines were close together.But all Wrake survivors hold the opinionthat the Japanese cut the lines; and they

point out that the Wilkes “J’’-line did notgo out until some time after this failureof the line south of the field. Thus de-fenders believe that the lines were being

138 PEARL HAREMIR TO GUADALCANAL

cut as the enemy attack progressed in-land. Devereux tried tocontncthisN TakeIsland positions by radio, but this inter-island net, never had been reliable, and thesets characteristically failed to functionthat morning. ‘I’here were no comn~uni-cations personnel in the command post totrouble-shoot lines, ‘G and for the renmin-der of the battle Del’ereux had no com-munications with his defensive line alongWake’s south coast.

It was now obvious to De~ereux at his“blzcked-out” CP that fights were in prog-ress all along the west leg of Wake Is-land, and that he must sacrifice a defensiveunit, from some other area to reinforce hisefl’ort in the critical zone. LieutenantLewis’ Battery E in the crotch of WakeIsland could not be disbanded. It was theonly completely equipped and up-to-strength 17 antiaircraft, battery on theatoll. Battery B’s 5-inch guns’ on PealeIsland also should remain manned for pos-sible missions a~~inst enemy ships, ButCaptain Goclbold’s Battery D might beused as infantry. This unit had two 3-inch guns, but no fire control equipment;md Peale Island did not appear to bethreatened. Two officers and some 40 menfrom this battery became the atoll reserve,~l~dat 0300 Major Devereux ordered God-bold to send one gun section (about ninemen) from this reserve force to the aid

of Hanna% untrained crew. CorporalLeon Graves brought these men aroundfrom Peale Island in a truck driven by

‘e ~lSgt R, 31. .Junereply to Hk+tSw, HQNIc’,questionnaire, 11}1ar47,2.

“ “Up-to-strength” was a relative term on~’ake. The 1941 tables of organization alloweclsuch batteries two officers and 75 enlisted men..lt this time Battery E had two officers andabout 50 men.

one of the civilians, and Major Devereuxdirectecl them toward Hanna’s position.

By this time the Japanese had made atleast two penetrations through the Marine“line” along the south eclge. of Wake Is-land, and it is possible that the enemy wasalso landing inside the lagoon in rubberboats. Several defenders speak of seeingred flares rising from within the lagoon,and after the surrender Marine workingparties found rubber boats on these in-terior beaches. If these landings weretaking place, it is probable that they oc-curred on the north beaches of ~~TakeIs-land’s west leg.” From such sites the menlanding in rubber boats could join up withthose landing on the south beaches.

Captain (lodbold on Peale Island wasone of the defenders who saw these redflares inside the lagoon, and he lmd Bat-tery B at Toki Point send a two-manpatrol down the interior coast of thatisland to investigate. Godbold then senta three-nian patrol from his own batterydown the outer coast of Peale. These twopatrols met at the southeast end of theisland without encountering any enemy.The captain then established a three-manoutpost to cover the bridge between Pealeand Wuke Islands.

n Although Japanese sources do not mentionsuch interior landings the evidence to supportthem is generally convincing. The rubber boatsdid not enter the lagoon through the channel be-t\yeeIl ]Vilkes and JVake Island, beeause thisuarrow channel was covered throughout the bat-tle. Devereux surmises that the boats enteredthe lagoon at the open end of the atoll betweenKuku and Toki Points. Such landings wouldexplain, without necessarily ruling out infiltra-tion, the early presence of individual Japaneseat various points along the lagoon shore. OneJapanese source does mention that red rocketflares were to be used as a signal that “We havesucceeded in landing. ” Huwaii-,Vala~/u NarOps,

‘.’,

.5>,

‘rHE FAr,rJ OF JY.lKE 139

Bui interior landi Ilgs or 110, tile Wake(Iefendel’s lu~d tl~eir lMnds full. ,Japalwsecr~~isersbegan to bombard the atoll”s mainisland at about (1330. ‘1’he landings comtinued in spite of the fact that Battery F.l~ow tiretl ail’ bllrsts over the. beaches, andetlemy infantry colltil~ued to pless closerto Hanna’s ?-inch gun south of the air-strip. The VMF-211 troops still held,but their part ial perinlet er was being com-pressed tighter a]}d tighter around tilegun. This action was now little morethan a battle for ~jreservation of tileweapon and tl]e ~f:lrillesillvol~red. Majorl’l~tlmm’s men could l~ot check the ,Jap-

anese pelletratiojl farther to the west, norcould they prevent the enen]y fronl mov-ing behind them or into tl]e island tri -anxle above Peacock Point. .Ind the ,Jal}-al}ese Jvantecl to concentrate in this tri -al]gle so tl~ey could launch an attack u1)tl~e islal~d’s east leg. The ~IIF–211

troops coldd only hope to cling to theslight hillock of their positiol~j and staythere as long as possible.l!i

Meallwllile (Voporal (iraves and his de-t:lClld gllll S(~llit(l frolll Battery 1) weretrying to reach Htilllla~s 3-inch gun.Devereux had tol(l thenl to detruck at theroad jmlction sou)e 600 yards below tl~eel~d of tile strip a]ld west of PeacockPoint. From there they were to gothrough the llllderbrusll to the gun posi-tion. nut tile squa(l detlllcked consi(l-erab]y short of this jlll~ctioll—l)r~b:~blyless than 200 yarcls below the stril). Fronlthere the men struck out throug]l tile brushin the general directiol~ of the, H:lnl~:t-

~’MF-211 area. mley were SOO]lstopped,

“ Kinncu Intrrrirw, At about this time MajPutnam, already \Yf~un(le(l, told his men, “Thisis as fur as we go. ” Six hours later, when theisland fell, they still held.

however, by enemy nmcl~ine-gun a]~ds]ll:~ll-i~~ms tire which killed one Marineand l)illned C1O]VUthe others. zo .ifter atime (+raves witll(lrew his unit northwardtow:ud tile con~]tland post where it laterl)articilmted in defensive efiorts coln-mallded by Major Potter.

ItJ is not clear what sort of an enemyforce Corporal (irawxs encolmtered in tilePeacock triangle, or how the ,Japanese gotthere. There are indications that a land-ing n~lgl~t ha~~ebeen made in that area,with barges coming in on tile south coastbetween IIattery A o]) Peacock Point andtile IIann:~-TMF-211 position. Dev-ereux said after the war that, he believeda landing took place at this point, but theIIlatter never has been confirmed. $~ ome.Jalml~ese accou]lts, incllldiug those ofCaptain Koyama and a correspondent,”mention a landil~g “near the southeast tipof Wake” to overrun Battery A, whichnlust l~ave been l’el~~eulbered from the ac-tiol~ of 11 I)ecen~ber-especially by men

in the cruiser J’vbari. 13ut Captain Ko-yan]a also il~sisted that tl~e ,Japanese madeonly t\vo barge lal~dil~gs with a. total offour barges. .~ud these are accolmted forby the, landings l~ear Camp (he ZUC1at

lVilkes Island. l)iscoul~tillg a third bargelan(lingj this force nll~st have been builtup by tl~e rubber boat landings within thelilgoon, or by wholesale infiltration behinc]tl~e position held by Putnam and Hanna.

But at a]]y rate, T)everellx soon learnedfrom (’orpora] Graves tl}at there was an

‘“ C(J1 ])elereux suggests that some of thenlachine. gun fire ~vhich swel)t throuxh the I’ea-rock triangle might haye tome from friendlyWf3ilI)(JI]S. He points out that Marines had .30 or,fiO caliber machine gun sevtions on Yirtually theentire l)erimeter of the triangle.

“ Capture of Tfrul:r, 11, 372.

140 I’E.\RL H.\ I{ROR TO GU.kI).\LCAN.kL

euenly force in the triallg]e. And fronlthere the .Tapanese thretrtened the entireeilstel’11 rim of tile atoll. Ikttery E wasnow receiving light mortar and lollg-rxllgenlachil~e-gun tire, and Battery .~ likewisebegan to receive enemy mortar fire.” Inthe face of this, Captain Rarninger armecll~is range section with two .30 caliber n]:l-chine gu]~s and formed an infantry mlt-post line on the l~igl~ ground behind his5-inch guns.

The enemy fire against Battery Eseemed to come from the thick brush o]~tile other side of a]] inlet southwest of thebattery position. I)irect 3-inch fire intothis xrea silenced one automatic weapon,but this dicl not seem to ease tile pressllremuch. Lieutenant Lewis then sent i~patrol of approximately 10 men under,Ser~eant Raymon C~ragg to investigate.Gragg went out to tile road north of theairstri])l and l)atrolled to the soutl~westalong this lo:ld. Witllill 50 yards of tl~ebattery Gragg’s lx~trol ran ilito heavy.Japal~ese tire wl~icll fol’ced tlw lfaril~es to(leplo-y. .Inswering tile euwny fire, thepatrol held here until the surrender.

At about 0430 the .50 caliber nmchine-gwn section at tile east end of the airstrip,

still in co~l~l~l~illic:~tioi~\vitll Devereux, re-l)orted that the .Japanese \vere attacking incompany strength up the road from Pe:l-cock Point. ~orporal Winford .J. Mc-~lnally, in charge of the six MiLrilles andthree civilian volunteers at this l)ositionjwas trying to hold the ,Jal)anese south oftile airstrip. Fire from tl~e .50 caliber gullposition had halted the enemy a(lvance

“ Rarninger’s report also slm:lks tjf tx,c:lsi(jnalfire from 4’:1 small tield piece, ” Lt (’01 C. .1.Barninflfr I<(pt.6. This mrry have been ;i 70m]]Lhowitzer of the type or~rrnic to ,J’apanese infantrybtrttnlicms.

along tile road, bllt tile enenly now at-tempte(l to infiltrate around tile strollspoint. Mc:ina]ly contartecl another n~:bchine gun positim~ son~e 400 yal’ds to tilesouth on tile atoll’s f3ilSt shore, and thesetwo sections alternated in firing at the’enemy.

This .Japanese force probably was theZt([ya unit. This reinforced companyevidently infiltrated behind the Putnam-Hannz position at the 3-inch gun while tileUchid{t co~npatiy remained near the bearllto deal with that weapon which had firedon the patrol craft. The enemy at firsthad trollble ]ocating Mc.?Mm]ly’s gLm sec-tion, bllt before daylight they were allaround the position. Mc.Lnally’s nlen con-tinued to ]lold, how-ever, and the corporal’sreports to I)evereux gave the major hisonly link with tile action south of tile conl-nlancl post.

By 0500, a half hour before dawn, itwas clear that the Japanese had a superiorforce. firmly established on the atoll, andthat the enemy was free to infiltrate almostat will around and between the isolatedpositions of the defenders. At this timeCommander Cunningham sent his mes-sage, ‘tEnemy on island issue in doubt.>’ 23

But actually there was little doubt, al-though the defenders were far from ad-mitting it at that point. The 500 defend-ers on the atoll were then outnumbered ap-proximately two to one by the enemy; butwhat was worse., the Marines had theirmission and their own atoll against them.“1.ittle W:lke” has a vulnerable shore linei~bout !21miles in length, and the defendershad insufficient men to man even a mini-mtml of their antiaircraft and seacoastguns and at the same time the beach de-

fenses. (h Wake Island alone, nearly

“ wake File.

-— ... .-— 141THE FALL OK }\ .%KYj

half of the 200 defenders had to remain atBatteries A and E, and another 15 Ma-rines manned machine guns and search-lights at Heel Point where the island’s enstleg crooks toward Camp Two. T1lus OnlYabout 85 men could oppose the enemy land-ing force, and half of these were nmclline-gun crewmen. Marines serving as rifle-men against the enemy on Wake Islandnumbered between 40 and 45.

When Cunningham sent his message,Major Putnam still held the positionaround HannaJs .ggn, but the ,Japanese now-had these Marines surrounded. Here. thedefenders had sustained a number of cas-ualties, including the death of CaptainElrod.z4 Camp One also continued tohold, and Lieutenant Poindexter had re-

joined his small mobile reserve force nearthe road junction west of the airstrip.There at first dawn the Marines were takenunder heavy fire from the brush off theirleft (north) flank. Light mortar shellsbegan to fall around the gun positions, andone of the .30 caliber weapons was put outof action. In danger of being outflankedhere, Poindexter ordered a withdrawal to

Camp One where he would consolidate forhis final stand. The unit displaced by sec-tion in 150–yard bounds, and arrived at

Camp One shortly after daybreak. TherePoindexter organized his defenders along

a semi-circular line facing seaward andto the southeast. In this line he had about40 riflemen and 10 machine guns.

Lieutenant Kliewer and his three Ma-rines had survived the night beside themine field generator, but a heavy Japanese

attack threatened them just before dawn.

24The Japanese sustained at least 62 casualtiestrying to take this gun position, and one of themwas Lt Uchida, the company commander.

This was repulsed by close-in fighting withsubmachine guns and grenades, but the,Japanese came back again at dawn. Thistime the enemy made a shouting bayonetcharge against, the Marines, but againKliewer and his men, now aided by the .50caliber machine guns at the west end ofthe. airstrip, managed to halt the attack.

Enemy pressure against McAnally’s ma-chine-gun position east of the airstrip alsoincreased during the hour before dawn.The Marine strong point now had beenlocated, and the defenders were underheavy xttack by small-arms fire and gren-ades. McAnally’s gunners already hadbroken LIp a number of enemy rushes by

holding their fire until it would be most

effective, but these 10 men could not ex-

pect to hold out for long against the

reinforced company opposing them.

This was clear also to Devereux at the

command post, and at 0530 he directed

lIn jor Potter, who until now’ had assisted

in the command post, to assemble every

l~eadquarters, service, supply, or casual

~~arine in the command post a~a, includ-

ing (Xorporal Graves$ detached squad from

~~attery ~j and to form a final defensi~’e

line approximately 100 yards south of the

command post. This force of approxi-

mately 40 men would take up positions

astride the north-south main road. Dev-

ereux then telephoned Captain Godbold on

Peale and directed him to truck his entire

Rattery ~, plus the few .50 caliber gun-

ners, to the battalion command post for

immediate employment as infantry. With

these orders, the atoll’s final reserve, total-ling approximately 30 oficers and men,was committed.

By 0600 McAnally’s position was nearly

surrounded and under continual in fan-

142 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCANAL

try25 attack. Cnless he was to lose thesepersonnel, Major Devereux had no alter-native but to pull them back. This he didshortly after 0600, when McAnally wasordered to ~vit.hdraw northward and joinMajor Potter’s line.

After Captain Godbold’s reserve forceleft Peale Island, First Lieutenant Kesslerbecame commander there since his Bat-tery B was all that remained on the island.In the light of dawn Kessler could see onWilkes a line of .Tapanese flags across thecenter of tile island, and a large enemyflag waving from the approximate positionof Marine C~unner McKinstryk provi-sional 13attery F. This he reported toMajor Devereux, who could only concludethat Wilkes, which had been silent sinceabout 0300~had shared the f~te which nowappeared imminent for Wake Island.

Above the brush znd slight rise ofground which topped the west, leg of WakeIsland, Kessler could also see the super-structure of Patrol Craft 39. observingthat the ship appeared intact, Kessler at0600 requested Major Devereux’s pernlis-

sion to fire on it. Although the line offire and intervening partial mask 2e madethis hazardous, the request was approved,and on the first salYo Battery B shot away

the ship’s mainnmst. .1s a result of sulj-sequent adjustmel~t, tile ship was hit aboutthe superstructure and Ilpl)er null. Itfinally caught tire.

“ Among the ,Jalmnese killed before his positionat about this time were two flame-thrower oper-

ta ors. Although Ilse of flame is not recorded,this was perhalls the earliest tactical employ-Il)ent of this \veall{Jn in the I’aci tic island }var.

“ Kess16r lN({l t{} train the tfiit-trajectory3“/51 “s w as to tire O(N)SS Flil)pf’r I’{}illt an(l jUstclear the (rest {If Woke Isl:l]jtl. The line of tirepassed less than 23(1 y:lrds to the west of LtKliewer’s l)l)sition at the gentuator.

Meanwhile Second Lieutenant RobertW. Greeley had reached the command postwith the first 20 men from Battery D.There Major Potter, trying to piece outand extend his sparse line to the right(west), directed that the reinforcements beplaced on that flank around the edge of theclearing originally dozed out to preparefor the north-south leg of the airstrip.Captain Godbold arrived with other re-inforcements at about 0700,27 and thesemen joined those already emplaced byGreeley. This line now turned to the right(north) to refuse the flank along the edgeof the clearing. Potter’s line, now con-taining about the equivalent of a rifleplatoon, thus extended from near thebeach, across the two roads south of theCP, and to the airstrip clearing where itmade a northward turn. Thus a gap ofapproximately 450 yards existed betweenthe skirmish line and the shore of thelagoon. This gap the defenders wouldattempt to cover by fire.

By daylight the atoll defenders couldmake out the large task force which sup-ported the landing operations. Therewere then 13 ships at various positionsaround the island (the four cruisers of(‘~ utlser lli~<sion 6 were out of sight. east

of Wake), and all of them were keepinga safe distance from the 5-inch shore bat-teries. “Due to the previous experiencewith the American shore batteries,!> a

senior ,Japanese oflicer said l~ter, %ve did

“ I,ike so many other qnestions as to exactti]aes of events dnring the defense of Wake, thisone is snbjc-rt to conflicting testimony. MajPotter states that (;odhold reached the commandlmst at 0600.” Go(lbold gives 0715 as the time.other sOUIX’W, while not gi~ing times, put theilrrival (if Battery I J shortly after day brerak.B:dancing i~ll accounts against each other, 0700or shortly I)efore seems to be the best synthesis.

THE FALL OF WAKE 143

not want to come within range.”’s Inspite of this caution, however, the de-stroyer Mutsuli began at 0654 to lead twoother destroyers (probably the Yryoi andthe MocAizuli) in to}~i~rd Wilkes Island,possibly to fire shore bombardment mis-sions. But fire from Battery B on I’ea]equickly hit the Mutsuli, and the formationturned and scurried away. Obser~ers be-lieved that Kessler’s fire also hit the seconddestroyer in the formation after tile shipsturned, and that the M7Jtsuki later sank,but, Japanese records do not contirnl this.

Farther to the northwest the two ,Japa-nese carriers L$’ovyuand Iliv.yu headed ul}-wind with their cruiser and destroyerescort, 29 and at 0700 “the gallant Eagles

of the 3Tavy,:’ as the ,Japanese XTavalInformation Service styled them, ap-

proached Wake at 6,000 feet. As the for-mation wheeled over Peacock Point, Bat-tery E opened fire in what was the lastantiaircraft action of the battle. Tl~e for-mation split into component groups ac-cording to mission, and commenced umethodical and unceasing series of airstrikes in close support, of the speciallanding force. Wilkes, Peale, and WakeIsland were hit repeatedly.

Dive bombers now battered Kessler’s

5-inch gun battery on Peale Island, andthe air-supported enemy troops began tomove rapidly against Major Potter’s 1inesouth of the defense battalion commandpost. Battery E also was being attacke(lby the carrier planes, mnd Devereux be-lieved that Wilkes Island and most of the

= Hau:uii-Mala/ja IVuuop,?, 29.m In addition to the two carriers, this task

force was composed of the new 12,000-ton heavycruisers (’}?ikumu and Z’onr, and six destroyers,two of” which were T~niliuzr and [Tmkuze.

\vest leg of Wake Island already had fal-len to the Japtinese. Shortly after 0700the major called Commander Cunning-ham and told him that or~~nized resist-ance could not last much longer. ~~rasthere a chance that, the relief expeditionmight yet arrive ? No chance at all, Cun-ningham said..

And there was no chance, although upuntil two and a half hours earlier thanthis the men in Task Force 14 thoughtthere might be. During the night of 22-23 December (21–22 December at Hawaii)Vice Admiral William S. Pye, act-ing CinCPac pending the arrival of Ad-miral Nimitz from Washington, had beenin conference about, this relief force for

Wake. The officers at, Pearl Harbor knewthat Admiral Fletcher was running a closerace, and they were concerned that this

task force woLdd be lost, along with Wake,if the race ended ill a dead neat. At onepoint, they decided to order the Tangie~ tomake a solitary dash for the ato]l whilethe S“uwtoga, then some 425 miles short of

Nrake, 1aunched Ml jor McC’aul’s planesfrom that distance. But this order wascountermanded before Fletcher could be-gin its execution: aud finally at 0811 Ha-}~aiian time (some two and a half hoursbefore Wake was to surrender) TaskForce 14 ~~i~s recalled. The force spentmost of the day refueling its cruisers, andthat, night retired tc~ward Midway.

Commander Cunningham and MajorI)evereux decided that additional defenseefforts would be hopeless, and the islandcommander made. the decision to surren-

der. ~lct i1+1 on these orders, Deve.reux

carried a white flag out, of his ~P at 0730

:LI~rl wa]ked south nlong the shore road to

meet the ~Japanese.


THE -FIGHT OiV

WILKE,T [8LAND

“At this time,” states a Japanese report,“Wilkes Island was the scene of a fierceand desperate battle. ” 30 Here at 0245Gunner McKinstry fired the first shots inthe battle of Wake when l]e saw bargesapproaching to land at a point just westof the new channel. After this first burstfrom gun 10 (see Wilkes map) a Marinesearchlight flashed on to reveal the 100men of the Z’akano unit coming throug]lthe surf and onto the beach. But by tl~istime the Wilkes detachment was complete-ly disposed to repel a landing, thanks tothe earlier and erroneous report of a land-ing on Peale Island. (See Map 6)

When that false alarm sounded, Cap-tain Platt ordered two Battery I. gun sec-tions (each about the size of a rifle squad)to positions on the lagoon side of the is-land, and pulled the, remainder of BatteryL personnel back to defensive positionsalong the road near the new channel. Ex-tra ammunition i~ndgrenades were issued,and the Battery F personnel were in-structed to fire against any landing for aslong as they could, and then to pull backacross the road to join the men of BatteryIJ. Thus the Battery I. position, com-manded by I,ieutenant Mc.klister, waswell prepared when the ,Japanese bargeshit the beach near that defensive site.

The searchlight beam 1asted for onlya minute in the face of the ,Japanese at-

tack, but McKinstry continued to fire atthe landing craft he could see on the beach,and McAlister sent two men down towardthe beach to linrl grenades at the ,Japanese.ltl~enlv fire killed one of these men and.wounded the other. Battery F then began

to fire into the landing area with their3-inch shells cut for muzzle-burst, but theattack came on up the beach so rapidlythat these guns soon were unable to depresssufficiently to engage the ,Japanese.

Gunner McKinstry had crossed to the3-inch guns to direct this air-burst fire,but it soon became apparent to him thatthe position could not hold. The enemycontinued to expand their beachhead, anda strong force near Battery F was throw-ing grenades in among the Americans.The gunner removed the firing locks fromthe 3-inch guns, and then directed his mento retire to their designated infantry posi-tion on the right flank of McAlister’s linebeyond the road. ,Tapanese tried to pursuethis withdrawal, but McKinstry’s mendrove them back.

McKinstry and Mc.Uister now were ingood position to protect themselves and toguard tile road to Wake Island, but therewas little to st.ol) the ,Japanese from mov-ing farther west and spreading out overal1 of Wilkes Island unless fire from ma-th ine-guns 9 and 10 could aid the main de-fense line to keep the enemy bottled uparound the abandoned 3-inch guns. Gun9 was already delivering flanking fire:Lgainst these ‘,Japanese, and the enemyadvance was temporarily checked. TheTakallo troops now turned their attacksto knock out this machine gun, but its posi-t ion was well prepared and well camou-

flaged. .~]thOLlg]l nearly surrounded, theMarines on this gun continued to hold and

to repel attacks which kept up until dawn.Meanwhile (’aptain Platt, in his CP be-

l~i]ld the fornler I)ositions of Battery IJ,was haying tile same sort of comn3unica-

t ions trouble tl~atplagued Major Devereux011Wake Island. By 0300 the captain hadlost contact with every position except that


/

146

of the beleaguered men cm (;LIu 9. Fromthem he learned that the enemy were bnild-ing up pressure to extend their beachheadfarther inlancl. At about WOO CaptainI’latt moved out to the Gun 11 positionnear the beach, and from there he creptthrough the brushto a~’:lntagel~oil~texstof ~IL1n10. It was now about 0500, anclPlatt decided quickly thathemust mounta cou]lterzttack if the ,Japanese were to beprevented from staging daylight attackswhich ~vould enable them to overrun GLU19and spread out into the interior of theisland.

He hurried back to Gun 10 and orderecll’latoon Sergeant Raymond L. C’oulsonto round up the .30 caliber machine-gun(*rews ancl searchlight personnel fromKnku Point, plus anyone else he could1ay hold of, and assemble them at Gun 10for the counterattack. In 2,5 minutesCoulson was back with the two machine-gun crews ancl eight riflemen-about asq{md in al1. ‘1’hese men the capt aiu ledback through the underbrush toward the,Japanese.

‘1’he Marines crept and crawled to with-in 50 yarc]s of the ,Japanese. Platt thenplaced his two machine guns on each flankof ]lis line of departure, and ordered thegnlillers to fire their short bursts close tothe ground so this tire wo~lld not endangerthe Afr.ilister and M~Kinstry line fartherto the east. By this tinle dawn w-asbreak-il~g,and Platt quickly drew up his skirmish1il]e of eight Marines. He signalled tl~el~mclline guns to open tire, and then he ledhis riflemen forward against tile 100 n)enof tile TaAano unit.

At almut this time 01] tile other si[le ofthe .Ja]mllese position, I,ielltenant McAl-ister Ilad ol)serl-ed il six-nlan eneluy patrol]novi)~g tolvard his 31arilles, and lle or-

J?EARL HARROR TO Gl_’.kDALC.4NAL

dered his line to open fire. One enemywas killed and the others sought cover be-hind a large coral rock near the beach.Mc.%lister’s men continued to fire intothis area to keep the .Japanese pinneddown while Gunner McKinstry and Pri-vate First Class ~Villiam (’. Halsteadworked their way out to this rock and fin-ished oft the rest of the patrol.

Metinwhile Platt’s counterattack hadsurprised the other flank of the penetra-tion, and the Japanese at that point werein trouble. Obviously they had expectedno opposition from the west, and theirlight machine guns had been sighted forfire to the east against the Mc.klister-Mc-Kinstry line. Platt’s attack carried theMarines into the former position of Ilat-tery F, and the Japanese were driven backtoward the beach and toward the Marinedefense line by the island road.

It was now daylight, ancl Mc.ilistercould see this Marine attack on the farside of the ,Japanese position. When hismen finished mopping up the enemyi~~oulid the rock near the beach, the lieu-tenant gathered 24 Marines into a skirmishline of his own and launched a counter-att:lck from his side of the battlefield. Themen of the Ya.kono [andi~z,qjorve panicked.Organ ized resistance evaporaterl in frontof tile two Marine attacks, and the forcesof Platt and McAlister soon joined..~bout 30 .Japanese fled to sl]elter aroundtile Marine searc]digllt truck southeast oftl]e 13attery F gul}s, and there the Marinesunder l’latt ill](l M(:.~lister flnslled themout :I]ld killed tljenl. The T,(i’l(r{o ur?;t o~]l~il kes l)ad bee,) (lest royed.

Mc.ilister counted four officer and 90 en-listed bodies while his men policed up thebattlefield and removed the flags the Jap-anese had placed in the ground to mark

THE FAI,I, OF WAKE 147

their front lines. Two wounded Japanesewere captured. The other four Japanese—if the Talcano unit actually included aneven 100—were not accounted for. Ma-rines found several small maps of Wakein the effects of the dead Japanese, al~dMarine positions were marked accuratelyon these maps. The photographic missions over the atoll had obviously paid offwell.

By 0800 Captain Platt had reorgmizedhis Wilkes defenders, and he again triedto establish contact with Wake Island. Hewas able to contact the motor pool at CanlpOne where Poindexter’s force had nmn-aged to hold throughout the night, buthe cou]d not g-et through to Devereux Itthe defense battalion (3P. At about noonthe men on Wilkes observed Japanese land-ing boats headed for ~$rake Island and sev -ernl ships approaching toward Wilkeschannel. Platt ordered McAllister to gethis 5-inch guns into action against thesevessels, but the gun crews found that the~veapons were beyond use. The trainingmechanism on Gun 1 was wrecked, ancl theGun 2 recoil cylinder had been riddled bybomb fragments.

Wilkes had been under attack by the divebombers which had arrived over the atollat about ()’700,but sign language interroga-tion of the }vounded prisoners indicatedthat the enemy planned no more landingsagainst this section of the atoll. Platt de-cided to go find the enemy. He orderedYlc.klister, McKinstry, and (’oulson toro(lnd up all the men and to strike out east

toward the old channel. Dive bombersattacked this route. column as it, moved

down the island, and a destroyer moveclin to open L~pfrom 2,000 yards. one Ma-rine, Private First (“lass Robert I.. Ste-vens, was killed by this bonlhing, but tl~e

action against the Marines suddenlyceased.

Platt moved the men forward again in adispersed formation, and near the oldchannel he saw three men advancing fromthe other direction. Two were obviouslyMarines, Platt decided, but the figure inthe rear was a ,Japanese officer armed witha large sword. The captain moved for-ward and soon recognized Major Devereuxwho told him that the island had beensurrendered. It was then shortly after1330. Platt’s force did not get a chanceto help in the tighting on Wake Island, butit had given sL~cha good account of itselfin earlier action that a Japanese officer wasl)rompted later to make this estimate ofthe Wilkes fighting: “In general, that partof the operation was not successful.;’ 3’

TliE ,vL’lL’RK:TZ)K12 .I.VD AFTER

Prior to moving down the road towardthe Japanese, who were still receiving de-termined small-arms fire from the few Ma-rines south of the command post, MajorI)evereux passecl word of the surrender toall nnits in communication with his com-mand post. These were Batteries A andE on Wake Island, Battery B on Peale,and other small detachments includingthose at IIeel Point, and some of the .50calil)er positions on Wake Island. Com-munications with Battery A had been re-stored ilt about daybreak. All units wereordered to destroy their materiel as bestthey could prior to actual surrender.

These instructions were carried out withall possible thoroughness. At Battery Eat~attenlpt Ivas nla(le to damage tile ~;-inchantiaircraft gLIns b-y stuffing blankets intotl~e muzzles and then firing a round or two.Illen this failed to produce appreciable

148 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL

results, the firing locks were removed andsmashed, and grenades were rolled downthe muzzles to explode inside and damagethe rifling. .411electrical fire control datareceivers were smashed, electric cableschopped up, and the battery commanderfired twenty rounds of .45 caliber ammuni-tion through the delicate optical and elec-tro-mechallical parts of the height finderand director. After completing thesemeasures, Lieutenant Lewis assembled themen of Battery E and marched them undera white flag to the battalion commandpost.

At Battery A, the 5-inch firing lockswere broken and buried, and all gun tele-scopes smashed. The range keeper wasdamaged beyond repair. After that awhite flag was run up, and LieutenantBarninger ordered his men to eat as muchas they could hold. He then held his menon the position to await arrival of the Jap-anese. Elsewhere, the hard-pressed rifle-men stripped the bolts from their rifles andflung them into the brush.

It was after 0800 before all this had beenattended to, and the rifle fire of Potter’sline was still covering the final operationsof the command post. Major Devereuxthen tried to contact the Marine aid sta-tion located some 300 yards south of theCP. He believed that the <Japanese ad-vance must have reached this point, andhe wanted to instruct the battalion surgeonto contact the Japanese. But there was noresponse from the aid station, and it be-came apparent that a surrender party mustgo forward from the CP. Major Devereuxand Sergeant Donald Malleck, who car-ried a white rag tied to a mop-handle, thenmade their way down the road toward thefighting. At the Marine line Devereuxordered Potter’s men to hold their fire, and

he and Malleck walked on toward the,Japanese.

Near the hospital Devereux and the ser-geaut were halted by a Japanese riflemanwl~o motioned for them to throw downtl~eir arms and helmets. Then the soldiertook them to the hospital where the ,Jap-anese already were in charge. They hadkilled one patient and wounded anotherwhile capturing the hospital, and now theyhad all the patients outside trussed up withtelephone wire. Commander (hnning-]lam Arrived by truck while Devereux wasexplaining his mission to an English-speaking tJapanese officer, and the Marinemajor turned over his surrender duties tothe island commander. A <Japanese officerthen escorted Devereux and Malleck for-ward to pass the surrender order to Ma-rine units on the west leg of Wake Islandand on Wilkes Island.

They found the VMF-211 riflemen andHauna’s unit still holding around the3-inch gun in spite of continuing effortsby the ,Japanese. The Japanese, unableto advance, had taken up positions behindnearby plane revetments, and the fightingl~ere was a deadlock. Captain Tharin wastile only officer unwounded in the Marineposition, and he was directing the actionwhen Major Devereux contacted him at0930. There were now but 10 Marines sur-viving, and nine of them were wounded.

.\t 1014 Devereux reached LieutenantKliewer and his three men beside the mine

field generator. These men had been try-ing since 0900 to coax some life into thegasoline generator so they could blow upthe airfield, but the rain during the nighthad given it a thorough soaking and itwould not ol)erate. “Don’t surrender,lieutenant,” one of the men told Kliewer.“Marines never surrender. It’s a hoax.”


“It was a difficult thing to do,” Kliewerreported later, “but we tore down our gunsand turned ourselves over.?’ ‘+2

Shortly before 1115 the surrender party,now west of the airstrip, came upon therear of a Japanese skirmish line facingwestward and evidently engaged in a firefight against, Marines in the brush beyondthe west end of the strip. After some con-fusion during which the .Japanese tired onthe. surrender group, Major Devereuxpassed through the lines and made contactwith Lieutenant Poindexter. The lieu-tenant’s mobile reserves, in ignorance ofthe surrender, had retaken the ground be-tween Camp One and the west end of thestrip during the morning’s fighting. l}~henDevereux came L]pon Poindexter, the 30-odd Marines in this force had just com-pleted a steady eastward advance fromCamp One, fighting their way forwardalong the beach with the edge of the brushto their left. ‘+ “~ peclal naval landing forcetroops were in the thick brush to the north,but they had not attempted to attack theMarines. I)ivided into tlwee lo-lnansquads, Poindexter’s improvised platoonhad advanced with two squads in assault.one on the seaward side of the road andthe other north of the road. The supportsquad protected the exposecl left flank byadv:mcing in rear of tl~e left assault squad.

“ lstLt D. D. h“liewer Rept.

During the advance, particularly as heneared the airfield and retraced by day-light the scenes of IIis fighting during thelli~ht, I,iel~tenant Poindexter counted ap-proximately 80 enemy dead.

After assuring the surrender of thisforce, Major Devereux led the Japanesetoward Camp One, still held by nlachine-gun sections of Poindexter’s group. Therethe Marine prisoners watched a Japaneseclimb up the water tank and cut down the.Irnerican flag which had been flying therethrol~ghout the battle.

The surrender group, followed by ap-proximately 30 Japanese, then crossedWilkes channel by launch. No Marineswere to be seen when Devereux landed atabout 1300, and the party began walkingcautiously westward. At this time theenemy destroyer began firing on the island,but this fire. was soon checked by a Jap-anese signalman who flagged the ship tosilence. At 1330, almost midway betweentile new and old channels on Wilkes, MajorDevereux saw “a few grubby, dirty menwho came out of the brush with their riflesready . . .79 These were Platt’s Marineswho lmd almihilated the Z’akano landingtjarty on Wilkes and now were advancing

eastward to repel what they thought wasstill another landing. Thus all resistancehad been silenced, and Wake now was in

Japanese hands.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

The defense of Wake was the first war-time operation conducted by the MarineCorps in defense of an advanced navalbzse. It wasalsot.h efirst combat test ofthe Marine defense battalion, although thestrength of the Wake detachment wasgrently reduced. The main reason for thefall of Wake seems obvious. The enemy ingreatly superior strength, supported by

ample surface and air forces, was able toeffect a lodgement on the atoll and then toapply his ground superiority to over-whelm the dispersed defenders in detail.Had it been possible for U. S. surfaceforces to intervene, or for substantial re-inforcements to reach Wakej the resultsmight hnve been entirely different. Butmilitary lessons of some value still may bedrawn by a survey of certain specific rea-sons why the defense was handicapped.These factors were interacting, of course.No single one of them can be clearly iso-lated within the framework of eventswhich brought military defeat to the atoll,

,Japanese procedure for the reductionand seizure of Wake, if not executed withthe skill or standards that U. S. forceslater attained, was nevertheless orthodox.It consisted essentially of two phases, thepreliminary bombardment and the assault1anding. The enemy’s first landing plan

nnderestimated the amount of preparationrequired, and he paid for this miscalcula-tion in the defeat of 11 Decsmber. Butthis he corrected in his second attempt.

Lack of radar and other early-warningequipment. severely handicapped Marinesduring preliminary aerial bombardment,and it would be difficult to overstate theseriousness of this shortage. It enabledthe initial ,Tapanese raid to destroy overhalf of VMF-211’s fighters on the ground,and the same lack of early warning con-tinued to hamper the effectiveness of thosefighter planes which remained in opera-tion. Thus the VMF–211 pilots never hada chance to plan effective fighter intercep-tion against the enemy bombers, and the,Japanese could proceed quite methodicallywith their program for the aerial soften-ing of Wake.

This lack of early warning and theshortage of aircraft can be lumped to-gether as matters of air defense, and airdefense depends upon coordinated em-ployment of fighter aircraft, antiaircraftartillery, and the essential warning sys-ten~s. But, on Wake only the antiaircraftartillery-undermanned and partially op-erational though it was—could be consid-ered f~llly and consistently effective, andl~obody ever expected antiaircraft weaponsalone to defend an advanced naval basea~r<linst air attack. They were there toprovide close-in protection to the aviationfacilities; the planes were to be the in-lmrtant factor in keeping the enemy awayfrom an island base. Deternlil~ation andstl~bbornness of the fighter pilots could not,avert the final outcome. The fliers couldonly exact from the enemy a maximumcost for every bomb dropped. This was

1.50

CONCLUSIONS 151

done until the last (lrumman was cle-stroyed by massed enemy fighters on 22December. After that, landing oper:~-tions against lt~ake COLIMproceed.

Once tile ground combat began, the fumdamental weakness of the defense bat-talion concept as it then existed becamestarkly underlined. The unit had no in-fantry component to act as an effectivemobi 1e reserve. Most garrison personnelwere tied to weapons and battery positions,and Major Devereux could muster only afraction of his n]anpower against the ill-vac{ers even after enemy intentions becanleapparent. On Wake Island, for example,only about 85 of $200Marines were readilyavailable to check the assault landing ofa thousand ,Japanese. Militarily speak-ing, there is something pathetic in thespectacle of I,ieutenant Poindexter and his“mobile reserve>’ of eight men and fourmachine guns dashing by truck from onethreatened point to another in the face ofsLIch f ant ast ic odds.

True, at that time trained infantry wasalmost as scarce as radar. But the faultlay in the defense battalion tables of or-ganizat ion. Later this omission was cor-rected, and Midw:~y had both infantry and1ight tanks. Had even one Marine in-f ant ry company reinforced with tanksbeen on Wake, it is possible that the gal.-rison might have, thrown the ,Japaneseback into the sea. This is borne out bywhat happened on Wilkes Island, where

Captain Platt was able to annihilate twicehis numbers of the enemy by shrewd, co-or(linated counter-attack. And after clay-lig]lt On ~~:lke Is]zlld, Poindexter, with

tile makeshift defenders of Camp Oneadded to his “mobile reserve,” had :is-sumed the offensive, driven bi~ck the ,Jap-anese to his front, and regained most of

448777o—5~11

the ground given up during the confusedhours of darkness.

-ifter the ,Japanese had landecl in forceon the south coast of Wake Island, it ap-pears that the coast artillery and antiair-craft, missions of Batteries B and D, re-spectively, had become of secondary im-portance in light of the serious enemyground threat. The military reader mightwonder why all available personnel fromBatteries B and D, with whom Devereuxwas still in communication, were not earlyin the battle brought down to the vicinityof the airfield and employed, together withsllch few other available Marines, as a mo-bile reserve to ~C)Unterattack the main Jap-anese beachhead. This was partially ac-complished at 0530” on the final morningwhen (Taptain Crodbold was directed to

bring the personnel of his battery (D)to the command post for employment asinfantry. By this time, however, it wastoo late for such a small number to influ-ence the outcome of the battle. In thisconnection, Major Devereux later pointedout that because of the partial failure ofcommunications he never had anythinglike. a clear picture of the situation duringthe final ,Japanese attack. For severalhours he was in doubt as to the location ofthe main enemy landing and hence did notconsider himself justified in strippingPeale Islznd of LLlldefenders.

.4s alluded to above, another major les-son to be derived from this phase of theoperation was a re-emphasis of Admiral~Iahan’s famous dictum that “(~ommuni-cations dominate war.” The partial fail-ure of col~~l~lullic:~tiolls,which occurredshortly after the ,Japanese landing. isolat-

ed the defense detachment commanderfrom most of his subordinate units then inact ion. .is a result he not only lost control


over much of the battle, but he also-andperhaps more important to this case—be-came unavoidably deceived as to the prog-ress of the situation. In ignorance ofwhat happened on Wilkes or at Camp One,he surmised that all was lost in those areas.Buried telephone lines and reliable fieldradios would have prevented this failureof communication, and the surrender de-cision would not have been made at thatparticular stage of the action. The Wakegarrison, however, had neither the per-sonnel to dig by hand, nor the machineryto dig by mechanical means, the manymiles of ditches which would have beennecessary to bury the telephone lines.

Perhaps one. of the fundamental reasonsfor the state of the Wake defensesstemmed from the fact that base develop-ment had consistently received priorityover defense preparations. That the de-fensive installations were in as good a con-dition as they were when the Japanesestruck may be credited to the tremendousefforts of the small Marine garrison.

All things taken into account, however,the decision to surrender Wake was rea-sonable, especially when considered inlight of the civilian situation and the factthat relief was no longer in prospect. Ma-rines who fought through the Pacific cam -paigns would later see many examples ofa totally unreasoning enemy who neversurrendered but was always defeated. Atthe same time, insensibly, some might cometo believe that unyielding refusal to sur-render was the proper role of a defender.

Of course this was neither true nor logical.Wake had exacted a full and more thanhonorable toll from the Japanese, but itsdefensive resources had been exhausted.

No fighter aircraft remained. Only oneantiaircraft battery was effectively opera-

tional. Enemy dive bombers on 23 De-cember had completely disab-led one 5-inchbattery (Wilkes) and largely destroyedthe fire control instruments of the remain-ing two. Without airplanes, fire controlinstruments, radar, spare parts, and per-sonnel to bring the defense to full strengthWake could not carry on. The onlyanswer was surrender. This took placefifteen days after the initial attack, and itwas eleven hours after the fighting com-menced on shore before Wilkes Island sur-rendered.

During this period the Marines sus-tained almost. 20 per cent casualties, butthey exacted a heavy toll from the Jap-anese. Nearly 500 enemy had been lostin the abortive landing attempt of 11 De-cember, the defenders on Wilkes Islandaccounted for nearly 100 in their defeat ofthe Tahmno unit, and Poindexter countedapproximately 80 enemy bodies during hismorning attack from Camp One. Give theHanna-VMF-211 position credit for atleast 20 more kills, and this would bringthe Wake total to 700 enemy. Others musthave lost their lives on Wake Island land-ing beaches and elsewhere on the island,although the figure probably would not begreat. But in earlier action the atoll anti-aircraft and fighter plane fire had downed21 enemy aircraft and claimed credit fordamaging another 11;

Based on this record, Major Putnam’sfinal VMF-211 report of 21 Decemberwould truthfully state that “AN handshave behaved splendidly and held up ina manner of which the Marine Corps maywell tell. ”

‘ A Japanese source says that 51 planes, inaddition to those shot down, were damaged byflak over Wake. i?akamura iVotebook.

PART W

Marines in the Philippines

CHAPTER 1

China and Luzon

In the first few months after Pearl Har- I -”’ ..-. ,–, .- .,#. – ,.

bor, it seemed that nothing could stop theJapanese. One by one, the western out-posts in the Far East were overwhelmed.Allied ground troops, in desperately un-equal contests, were forced to retreat, fight,and retreat again; at sea and in the airthe pitifully few ships and planes whichhad survived the initial onslaught werehoarded against the surety of further en-emy advances. A grim holding battle wasjoined along a line protecting Australiaand N’ew Zealand and their South Pacificlifeline to the States. Yet, despite itsstrategic importance, this vital defensiveaction gave first place in the news to theoutcome of a hopeless struggle hundreds ofmiles behind the enemy’s forward posi-tions.

For almost five months, two names—Bataan and Corregidor—dominated theheadlines, taking fire in the minds of theAllied peoples as symbols of courage and

devotion to duty. To the Japanese, whorealized that they could starve out the em-battled defenders at little cost to them-

selves, it became imperative that the issuebe decided forthwith in battle. On theeve of the all-out offensive that brought theend on Bataan, the Japanese commander,

addressing his combat leaders, clearlystated the importance of the isolated strongpoints in the eyes of the world:

The operations in the Bataan Peninsula andthe Corregidor Fortress are not merely a localoperation of the Great East Asia War. This

uacue nas Iascea ror aDouL mree montns as com-pared with our speedy victories in Malaya, DutchEast Indies, and other areas in the Philippines.As the Anti-Axis powers propagandize about thisbattle as being a uniquely hopeful battle and thefirst step toward eventual victory, the rest ofthe world has concentrated upon the progress ofthe battle tactics on this small peninsula. Hence,the victories of these operations do not only meanthe suppression of the Philippines, but will alsohave a bearing upon the English and Americansand their attitude toward continuing the vvar.1

Lieutenant General Masaharu Hommawas right: the outcome of the battle didhave a direct bearing on the .411ied atti-tude toward vigorous pursuit of the war.Perhaps in no instance since the defenseof the .41amo stirred Americans in anothercentury did an unsuccessful battle carrywithin its waging and its ending the sourceof so much national pride and dedication.

THE AHAD OW OF TJTAR2

On 26 .July 1941, shortly after Japan oc-cupied military bases in Indo-China, Pres-ident Roosevelt authorized the mobiliza-tion of the Philippine Army. The War

1HistSec, G–2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studies inWW1l No. 1, 14th Army Ops, 2 vols., n. d. (lo-cated at OCMH ), 141–142, hereinafter cited asIi$th Army Rept.

2 Unless otherwise noted the material in

this section is derived from Adm T. C. Hart,Narrative of Events, AsFlt Leading UP to Warand ~rom 8Dec?41 to 5Neb42, written beforellJun42 (located at NHD), hereinafter cited asHart Narratirc; Adm T. C. Hart, SupplementaryNarrative to Hart Xarratiw, 80ct46 (located atNHD) ; Gen J. C. Wainwright, Rept of Ops of

155

156 PEARL HARBOR TO GIJADALCANAL

Department, which had requested thismove, followed through with a directi%reorganizing a new command, ~TSi4FFE(United States Army Forces in the FarEast), which included all American Armyand Commonwealth troops in the Philip-pines. To head USAFFE the Armycalled out of retirement its former chief ofstaff, General MacArthur, who had servedas Military .4dvisor to the CommonwealthGovernment since 1935. He was givenrank as a lieutenant general and with char-acteristic energy tackled the enormous jobof putting the Philippines into a state ofreadiness against attack.

The bulk of USAFFE’S troop strengthwas drawn from the Philippine Armywhich was, in July 1941, an army in nameonly. It consisted of the islands’ policeforce, the 6,000-man Philippine Constab-ulary, a token air force and inshore navalpatrol, and ten territorial reserve divis-ions. Since the start of the Common-wealth% defense training program in 1936about 110,000 Filipinos had received a fewmonths of basic military instruction, butmost of these reservists had no experiencewith crew-served weapons and only rudi-mentary knowledge of their own pieces.

~SAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands1941–42, 10Aug46 (located at TAGO), herein-after cited as VSAFFE-USFIP Rept; AnnexVIII to USAFFE-l?SFIP Rept, MajGen G. F.Moore, Rept of CA Cored and the Harbor De-fenses of Manila and Subic Bay, 19Feb41–6May42, 15Dec45 (located at TAGO ), hereinaftercited as Moore Rf’ut; BriGen S. L. Howard, “Re-l)ort of the operation, employment and supply ofthe old 4th Marines from September, 1941 to thesurrender of Gorregidor, May 6. 1942,” 26 Sep45,hereinafter cited as Howard Rept; Ihth Army

Rept; L. Morton, The Fall of the Ph itippines—

l~nited States Army in World War II (Washing-

ton : OCMH, DA, 1953), hereinafter cited as Fallof the Philippines; Ri8ing Sun in the Pacific.

The divisions had never operated as suchin field maneuvers and were scantily pro-vided with arms and equipment.. In orderto mold an effective fighting force fromthe Philippine Army, MacArthur neededjust about everything in the military sup-ply catalogs, but most of all he neededtime—time for training, time for materieland men to reach the Philippines from theUnited States.

The instructors and cadres needed fortraining the Philippine .4rmy were drawnfrom the, Constabulary and the regularArmy units available to US.4FFE. Mostof the 22,000 U. S. Army troops in theislands were serving in Coast Artilleryregiments, the Army .4ir Corps, or thePhilippine Division, sole regular infantrydivision in the islands. Over half of thesemen were members of crack Philippine

Scout units.s The regulars suffered, too,from a general lack of up-to-date weaponsand equipment,4 but they were well trainedto use what they had.

The Tt’ar Department supported Mac-Arthur’s requests for additional troopsand supplies to the fullest extent possiblein light of the country’s world-wide com-mitments; USAFFE received priority inalmost every man power and materielcategory. More than 7,000 men, mostlymembers of service and air units, and the

‘ The Philippine Scouts was a U. S. Armyorganization in which the enlisted men werenative Filipinos and most of the officers wereAmericans. The Scouts had and merited a highreputation for fielding units with good morale,excellent discipline, and a consistently superiorlevel of combat readiness.

4At the outbreak of the war, “the Philip-pine Division, less than two-thirds strength, hadonly three ( 3 ) new- 37mm automatic firing can-non, three (3) 81mm mortars per infantry regi-ment and no (0) 60mm mor tars...”US.4FFE- USFIP Rept, 94.

CHINA AND LUZON 157

major portion of the ~Tnited States’ heavybomber strength reached the Philippinesprior to the outbreak of war. Much morewas promised and planned, but the Jap-anese surprise attack effectively cut off theflow of reinforcement. It also forced a re-vision of MacArthur’s defensive strategy.

In view of his healthy reinforcementprospects, the USAFFE commander hadadopted an aggressive defense plan thatconceded the enemy nothing. He did notexpect the Japanese to attack before April19425 and by that time he considered thathis air and ground strength would be suchthat he could successfully hold his posi-tion against any attacking force. He wasconfident that the Philippine Army, whenadequately trained and equipped, wouldbe a match for the Japanese.

The Commander in Chief of the U. S.Navy’s Asiatic Fleet (CinCAF), AdmiralThomas C. Hart, was in substantial agree-ment with Mac.4rthur% philosophy of anaggressive defense. He recommended thatin the event of war his fleet units remainbased at Manila Bay and fight the Jap-anese in Philippine waters. The NavyDepartment, however, adhered to its long-

est ablished plan that the major ships ofthe fleet would retire to the south at theimminence of war, to a base of operationsin the h’etherlands East Indies or Malaya,where they could cooperate with Alliednaval units.’ Hart’s slim collection of

5Gen J. ~. l~ainwright, General Woinw>right’.sfi’tor~, R, Considine, ed. (Garden City, N. Y. :Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946), 13, here-inafter cited as Wa.inwright’s fltorg.

6 After the war, in supplementary comments tohis original report, Adm Hart agreed that theNavy Dept decision was the best that could havebeen made considering the situation at the time.He added, however, that if his original proposalof 270ct41 to continue to base at Manila had been

cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aux-iliaries, was certainly no match for theJapanese fleet, nor was it intended to be.The U. S. Pacific Fleet, based at PearlHarbor, was the American striking force,and war plans envisaged its fighting ad-vance to the Philippines if the Japaneseattacked.

The Asiatic Fleet’s major shore installa-tions were located at Olongapo on SubicBay and at Mariveles and Cavite withinManila, Bay. Since denial of Manila Bayto the enemy was a key point in war plan-ning, the activities of the 16th NavalDistrict (Rear .4dmiral Francis W. Rock-well ), the shore establishment supportingthe Asiatic Fleet, were closely coordinatedwith IJSAFFE’S defensive preparations.Contact mines were laid to connect withcontrolled mine fields of the Army’s har-bor defenses, completely closing ManilaBay. (h Corregidor, site of the prospec-tive command post for the defense ofLuzon, protected installations for navalheadquarters, a radio intercept station, anda torpedo replenishment depot were pre-pared and equipped. Large quantities offuel and ammunition stored at.Cavite weremoved to dumps away from the naval baseto lessen their vulnerability to bombing.

(See Maps 7 and 8, Map Section)If the Japanese attacked, the most dan-

gerously exposed elements of the AsiaticFleet were those stationed in China: seven

Yangtze River gunboats; Colonel SamuelL. Howard’s 4th Marine Regiment atShanghai; and the Marine embassy guarddetachments at Peiping and Tientsin.

turned down sooner he might well have made abetter dispositionof his fleet units; he had actedon the assumption that his proposal would beaccepted until it was disapproved in late No-vember.

158 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GIJADALCANAL

.kdmiral Hart had begun making informalproposals that his China forces be with-drawn early in 1941, and after. July, whenhe was “entirely convinced that the warwas coming,”’ 7 he followed up with em-phatic official recommendations that hismen be gotten out before it was too late.Japanese war preparations were so evidentby 1 September that the American Consul-General at Shanghai, the commander ofthe Yangtze Patrol, and Colonel Howardjointly recommended that all naval forcesin China be withdrawn. Hart naturallyconcurred and further recommended to theNavy Department that the troops be evacu-ated in late September when the transport17endemon made a routine call on Chineseports to pick up short-timers and otherreturnees.

Hart’s request was turned down as faras withdrawal on the Henderwon was con-cerned. He was told, however, that jointState-Navy conferences would be heldwithin a couple of weeks time to considerthe problem of a withdrawal and itseffect on negotiations for a settlement of

Japanese-American differences. DespiteCinCAF’s protest that this “was not, aquestion that could be delayed for weeksbut must be acted upon immediately,” 8he did not receive permission to withdrawthe gunboats and the Marines until 10 No-vember, “embarrassingly late” as he laternoted.g Five of the gunboats were able toreach Manila without hindrance onceclearance to leave was given.l”

‘ Adm T. C. Hart ltr to CLMC, 100ct56, herein-after cited as Hart Cow~menta.

‘ Quoted in Howard Rept, 1.‘Hart Na?-ratice, 29.

‘0 The smallest of the gunboats, the Wake, wasstripped and left at Shanghai to be used as a sta-tion ship and radio outlet for the remaining

Two President liners, the Machkon andthe Harrison, were chartered to transportthe Marines, attached naval personnel, andtheir supplies and equipment; provisionwas also made to evacuate some Americancivilians from Shanghai on the same ships.After it reached the Philippines and un-loaded, the Harrison was to return toNorth China and pick up the embassyguards and their gear at Chinwangtao.All signs pointed to the necessity for hastein the withdrawal.

The Japanese were replacing their sea-soned troops around Shanghai with re-cruits, and large numbers of specialarmored landing barges which had previ-ously been seen near the city disappeared;intelligence pointed to movement south-ward of both veteran units and landingcraft. Intelligence also indicated that the,Japanese .4rmy was eager to take over theInternational Settlement, by force if nec-essary, and that it was only being re-strained by the Nipponese Navy’s desirefor an “incident” which would seem tojustify such action. Several attempts weremade to manufacture incidents, but theMarines refused to knuckle under to thepressure, and Colonel Howard initiatedprompt action which kept the Americandefense sector clear. A copy of a Japanesewarning order was obtained which statedthat “in the event of war the 4th Marines

would attempt to break through [our]lines ;“ “ ample evidence of this belief wasseen in the increase in size and number ofthe patrols in the city and in the construc-

Americans; it was captured on 8 December. TheTutuila at Chungkiug was turned over to theChinese Nationalist Government under lend-leasesince it could not get downstream through theJapanese blockade.

“ Howard Rept, 3.

CHINA AND LUZONT 159

tion of concrete blockhouses on all roadsleading out of Shanghai.

Both the Madison and Harti~on neededto be converted to troop use after theirarrival at Shanghai, an{dthe first ship wasnot ready until 27 November. By 1600that date, the Madison with half the regi-ment and half its equipment on boardsailed for Olongapo. While this forwardechelon, the 2d Battalion and half of theRegimental Headquarters and ServiceCompanies, was loading out, a message wasreceived from CinCAF to expedite theevacuation. Even though the conversionwork on the Eation was three days shortof completion, the decision was made toclear Shanghai the following day with therest of the regiment and its remainingequipment.

Despite the short notice and the harass-ing tactics of the Japanese, 12 the Regi-mental R4 and Quartermaster, MajorReginald H. Ridgely, Jr., was able to loadall organizational gear, over 500 tons, by1300 on the 28th. At 0900 that morning,the regiment assembled at the 1st Batta-lion’s billet, formed up behind its band,and marched down Bubbling Well-Nank-ing Roads to the President Line’s dock onthe Bund. Thousands of cheering peoplelined the route of march, and the banks of

“ “All supplies had to pass through the Japa-nese Sector on the way to the Customs dock.About 3:00 p.m. ~ovember 27th they closedthe Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek to trafficand our trucks were delayed nearly an hourbefore contact could be made with the JapaneseAdmiral to get this bridge reopened to traffic.Customs officials ostensibly at the instigationof the Japanese were insistent that our suppliespass through the Custom House, but we @noredsuch orders and loaded them on lighters. TheJapanese instigated three strikes during thenight by the laborers loading the lighters.”Ibid., 4.

the river were alive with flag-wavingChinese as a power lighter took the Ma-rines downstream to their ship. At 1400the Harrison weighed anchor and sailedfor the Philippines, marking the end of acolorful era in Marine annals.

AS soon as the Ham”son cleared theWhangpoo River, machine guns werebroken out and manned for antiaircraftdefense, and blackout regulations were putinto effect.13 Flights of Japanese aircraftchecked the liner regularly as it movedout into the China Sea, but there were noincidents, and contact was made on the29th with submarine escorts dispatched by.Admiral Hart. On 30 November and 1December the two transports arrived atOlongapo where the troops disembarked.Only a few supplies were unloaded at thenaval station, ostensively because CinCAFhad issued orders that the ships must passthrough the mine field into Manila Bay bynightfall on the clay of arrival. Actually,Admiral Hart had given oral orders to hisstaff that the Marines were to be landedwith field equipment only, because it washis intention that:

. . . they would get into the field, near Olon-gapo, as soon as they could. We [Hart and hisstaff] all knew that they had been cooped up inShanghai through all those years where condi-tions for any sort of field training were verypoor—and we thought that not much time re-mained.1’

While the regiment’s heavy equipmentwas unloaded at Manila and trucked to

Olongapo, the Ha&on was readied fora return voyage to pick up the Marines

from Peiping and Tientsin. It was al-

UA’o special defensive arrangements weremade by the 4th klar elements on the President

Madisow. CWO C. R. Jackson ltr to CMC,100ct56, hereinafter cited as Ja@cson.

“ Hart Comment8.

160 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL

ready too late, however, to rescue theNorth China Marines. The Japanese warplans had been activated, and the carriertask force that would strike Pearl Harborwas at sea en route to its target. Thetroops, ships, and planes that would besent against the Philippines were concen-trated at Formosa, the Ryukyus, and thePalaus with orders to begin their attackon X-Day—8 December 1941 (ManilaTime) .’5

8 DECEMBER 1941”

When the dawn of the first day of thePacific War reached the China Coast, theattack on Pearl Harbor was over and thetroops in the Philippines had been alertedto their danger. At the Chinwangtaodocks, Second Lieutenant Richard M. Hui-zenga was supervising the stockpiling ofsupplies for the expected arrival of thePresident I?arrison. A truck driverbrought him word that the radio at hisrailhead, Camp Holcomb, was full of newsof Pearl Harbor. Although the Japanesemade half-hearted attempts to stop him onhis three-mile drive back to the camp,Huizenga was able to get through to hisunit. He found the 21 Marines of theloading detail surrounded, at a respectfuldistance, by a cordon of Japanese troops.The men, under Chief Marine GunnerWilliam A. Lee, were setting up a strongpoint amid the boxcars of supplies; two

‘5Carn~aignsof the Pacific War, 2G27, 50.

“ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Hart Narrative;US AFFE-USFIP Rept; l~th Army Rept; How-a rd Rept; 4th Mar Jnl and Rec of Events,8Dec41–2May42, hereinafter cited as ~th Mar

Jni; Capt A. F. Metze Rept to CMC, “Surren-der of U. S. Marine Forces in North China,”23Aug42; Fall of the Philippines; Rising Sun inthe Pacific.

machine guns and several Tommy gunsand BARs had already been broken outof their cosmoline packing. Despite theirclesperate situation the Marines wereready to fight.

Huizenga and a Japanese captain heldan armed parley where the lieutenant wasgiven time to communicate to his superiorat Tientsin, Major Luther A. Brown, theenemy’s demand that he surrender the de-tachment. Orders soon came back to offerno resistance and the Marines werestripped of their weapons. Later in theday they were returned under Japaneseguard to the Marine barracks at Tient-sin.”

The situation of the detachments atTientsin and Peiping was similar to thatof the one at Camp Holcomb; Japanesetroops surrounded their barracks instrength and demanded their surrender.Since the embassy guard was not requiredto maintain a continuous watch on Cin-

CAF’S command” radio circuit, ‘8 the firstword that the senior Marine officer, Colo-nel William W. Ashurst, had of the out-break of hostilities came from the Japa-nese. He was given till noon to make hisc1ecision whether to fight or not and wasallowed to communicate by radio with

CinCAF and by phone with MajorBrown. In a sense .4shurst had been givena Hobson’s choice: he could surrender orhe could let his troops, fewer than 200 of-ficers and men, be overwhelmed. If dis-cipline and spirit would have won the day,

“ MIS, G–2, WD, Escape Rept No. 665, CaptR. M. Huizenga, 12Ju145.

‘8 LtCol W. T. Clement Rept to CMC, “Dis-positions and employment of U. S. Marines onthe Asiatic Station during the initial stages ofthe war,” 6Apr42, hereinafter cited as ClementRept.

CHINA AND LUZON 161

Ashurst could have opened tire on the be-

siegers—his men had already demon-

strated at ~amp Holcomb that they were

willing to take on hopeless odds. But

there was no purpose in fighting if the end

result could only be useless bloodshed.

In the absence of instructions to the con-

trary, Colonel Ashurst took the only sen-

sible course open to him and ordered his

men to lay down their arms. A strongpossibility existed that if no resistancewas offered the embassy guards would beconsidered part of the diplomatic entou-rage, entitled to repatriation. As theinitial treatment of the Marines was rela-tively mild and they repeatedly receivedinformal assurances from the Japanesethat they would be exchanged, few at-tempted escape. JJThen these rumorsproved false, the opportunity hadpassed.lg

By the time Ashurst’s report of his de-cision to surrender reached Hart in Ma-nila, the Philippines were in the thick ofthe war. The first news of the Japaneseattack was picked up at 0257 by a radiooperator at CinC.4F Headquarters who,recognizing the technique of the sender,vouched for the reliability of the nowfamous message, “Air raid on Pearl Har-bor. This is no drill.” n The duty of-ficer, Marine Lieutenant Colonel WilliamT. Clement of Hart’s staff, immediatelynotified the admiral who sent a war alertto all fleet. units. Minutes later, by a com-bination of intercepted official and com-mercial broadcasts and the spreading of

the word by the first agencies notified, thereport had reached all major USAFFEheadquarters.

“ Huizenga, op. cit.; MIS, G–2, WD, EscapeRept No. 666, Capt J. D. McBrayer, Jr., 12Ju145.

mGlement Rept.

A cacophony of sound broke the still-uess at Olongapo when the alert reachedthe naval base at 0350; the bugler of theguard blew “Call to Arms ;“ the steamwhistle at the power plant blasted a recallsignal to PBY crewmen; and the ship’sbell at the main gate clanged continu-ously.” Companies immediately mus-tered in front of their wooden barracksand in the streets of tent areas and wereput to work setting up machine guns forantiaircraft defense and digging individ-ual protective holes. Colonel Howardinitiated the first moves in what was to bea hectic period of redisposing, reorgan-izing, and reinforcing the regiment whichlasted throughout the month of December.

When the 4th Marines arrived fromShanghai its strength stood at 44 officersand warrant officers and ’728 enlisted men;organic naval medical personnel raised thetotal strength to 804. The regiment “hadbeen permitted to dwindle by attrition” 22in China so that it consisted only of Head-quarters Company, Service Company, andtwo battalions—the battalions short one oftheir rifle companies and the companieseach short one of their three rifle platoons.By utilizing the members of the regimen-tal band and absorbing the Mwrine Bar-racks Detachment, Olongapo, Howardwas able to form some of the missing pla-

“ Capt E’. W. Ferguson, Personal Experiences8Dec41–6May42, n. d., hereinafter cited as Fer-guson.

u Howard Reptj 8. As the threat of war with.Japan increased, Adm Hart initiated a policy ofwithholding replacements from Marine units inChina. Almost all of the men held back wereassigned to the 1st SepMarBn at Cavite. Hartfelt that if by some mischance he was unableto get the -lth Mar out of China he “could atleast stop sending any more Marines there untilsomeone bawled us out most vociferously. Theynever did.” Hart Comments.

162 PDARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

toons. In keeping with previous ordersfrom Admiral Rockwell, he sent the 1stBattalion by tug, lighter, and truck toMariveles to relieve the Marine detach-ment there. The men of the Marivelesguard had been taken from the other ma-jor Marine unit in the Philippines, the 1stSeparate Marine Battalion at Cavite.

The battalion was organized to functioneither as an antiaircraft or an infantryunit, but its primary mission was the anti-aircraft defense of the naval installationsin the Cavite-Sangley Point area. Itsfiring batteries, 3-inch guns and .5o calibermachine guns, had been on partial alertsince 14 October and as the threat of wargrew stronger the guns and their crewshad reached a highdegree of readiness.On 4 December, the battalion’s one longrange radar set and the necessary operat-ing personnel were assigned toI; SAFFE’S control and moved to a posi-tion on the west coast where the radarcould scan the approaches to Manila fromthe south; 2’ the set was one of two operat-ing in the Philippines on 8 December.

When the battalion commander, Lieuten-ant Colonel John P. Adams, passed theword of the Pearl Hmbor attack there was

little left to be done but to “cut fuzes,going into the last stage of readiness.!’ ‘~

Rut the Marine guns were not to see ac-tion. The Japanese reserved their firstday of attack for their primary target,MacArthur’s Far East Air Force(FEAF). And when that day was over,tl~e ,Japanese figured that, their “supren~-

= LtCol H. L. Davis ltr to CMC, 310ct56.24lstLt If”. F. Hogaboom, Personal Experiences

140ct41–6May42, n. d., 1–2, hereinafter cited asHogaboom. This narrative was published in theMC Gazette, April 1946, under the title, “ActionReport—Bataan.”

:Lcy, at least in the air, was establishedconclusively.” 2’

Except for 16 B–17’s at Del Monte onMindanao, the bulk of FEAF’s strengthin first-line planes was stationed at fieldsin central Luzon. Dawn of the 8th foundmost of these planes airborne, waiting toengage or evade ,Japanese attackers. Butthe land-based naval fighters and bombersof the ,Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet,charged with making the main air assault,did not appear at dawn. The enemy planhad called for such a surprise attack,timed to coincide with the start of opera-tions in Malaya and at Pearl Harbor, butthick clouds and heavy fog delayed thetake-off from Formosa of the major attackformations. It was noon before the enemyplanes could reach their targets, Luzon’sairfields, and the ,Japanese pilots veryreasonably assumed that with the. loss ofsurprise they would be met in force.z~

But this was not to be, for “shortlyafter 1130 all American aircraft in thePhilippines, with the exception of one ortwo planes, were on the ground.” 27 Thefighters were refueling after their fruit-less morning patrols o; awaiting a warn-ing of imminent attack; the bombers were

arming for an offensive mission againstFormosa. By an incredible chain of cir-cumstances, compounded by poor com-munications, a woefully inadequate airwarning system, and a generous amount

“ HistSec, Japanese Research Div, GHQ, F13C,Japanese Studies in WWI1 No. 11, Philippines.4irOpsRec, lFeb52, 7, hereinafter cited asPhilippines AirOp8Rec.

w Ibid.“ W. S. Craven md J. L. Cate ( eds. ), Plans and

Early Operations’, January 195’9 to August19&-The Army Air Forces in World War II

(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1948),209.

CHINA AND LUZON 163

of pure bad luck, the Japanese were givena sitting target. After” a day of violentaction, when all concerned tried to makeup for what hindsight calls mistakes, thestrength of the FEAF had been reducedby half. The way was open for the Japa-nese to begin landing operations.2a

The enemy had in fact made his firstlanding by the time of the main air at-tacks. A small force came ashore at dawnon Batan Island midway between Luzonand Formosa and immediately beganwork to set up an air base on an alreadyexisting strip to accommodate the rela-tively short-ranged Army fighters. Thenext day elements of two fighter regi-ments of the Japanese 5ti~ .4ir Groupwere using the field and flying reconnais-sance and strike missions over northernLuzon, site of the next planned landings.

THE FIRST DAYS “

On 9 December only a few enemy bomb-ers attacked, but these planes filteringthrough the early morning darknessreached Nichols Field outside Manila un-scathed whew their bombs increased thedamage and added to the toll of Ameri-can planes. An all-out attack on the Ma-nila Bay area had been planned for the

~ See Graven and Gate, OP.cit., 201–213 andJ’all of the Philippine, 79-90 for an examina-tion of the contradietor~ statements and chro-nology of misadventures that marked what may

well have been the blackest day in the historyof the Army Air Corps.

n Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Hart Narrative;

i7LSAFFE-L7S171P Rept; Moore Rept; RAdmF. W. Rockwell, Narrative of Naval Activitiesin the Luzon Area, lDec41–19Mar42, lAug42(located at NHD ), hereinafter cited as Roclc-well Narrative; Howard Rept; -&?h Mar Jnl;

l~th Army Rept; Fall of the Philippines; Rising

Sun in the Pacific.

second day of the war, but fog overFormosa prevented the take-off. .41-though the weather was again bad on the10th, the enem~y naval squadrons were ontheir way to their targets by midmorn-ing.ao Radar and glound observersspotted the incoming flights, but to noavail. Mrhen the outnumbered Americaninterceptors rose to greet the raiders, theenemy fighters swarmed all over them, notgiving as good as they got, but more thanmaking up for their losses whenever theydowned one of the few remaining planesof FEAF.

The Japanese bomber groups were head-ing for the best protected area in the Phil-ippines; almost all of the antiaircraftunits in USAFFE were concentrated nearManila. But the gunners below had aninsoluble problem; they had plenty ofammunition, but very little of it was fusedso that it could reach above 24,000 feet.After a few false starts the enemy learnedthat they could bomb from heights of25,000 feet with relative impunity. Therewas a limited supply of mechanically-fused ammunition which could reach30,000 feet, but there were not enoughsuch rounds to materially increase anti-aircraft defenses.

The gunners of the 1st Separate MarineBattalion at Cavite scored a kill on 10December when they downed an over-eager dive bomber that strayed from thepack over Nichols Field, lured by the tar-get of two PBY’s taking off from SangleyPoint. But that was the end of it. Thethree-inch batteries turned back the firstflight of bombers, which came in too low,but all subsequent flights approaching the

MHistSec, G–2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studiesin WWI1 A-o. 13, A’avOps in the Invasion of thePhilippines, 15May46 (located at OCMH), 7.

164 PlOARLHARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

naval base stayed well out of range andthe gunners were helpless spectators to thedestruction that followed.”

Stick after stick of bombs rained downon the naval base as successive flights ofbombers criss-crossed the area laying a per-ceptible pattern. Fires sprang up every-where as small dumps of ammunition andgasoline were hit and the old town ofC’avite was soon a raging mass of flames.All the ships that could possibly get awayfrom the, yard headed out into the bay, butthe bombers caught and fatally damageda submarine and a mine sweeper. Every-one feared that the ammunition depot,which still had large quantities of powderand ammunition in it, would be hit, butthe bombers missed their most promisingtarget. Still, the fires being blown to-ward the depot from (%vite might touchit off,32 and the rescue parties searchingamid the flaming ruins for the hundreds ofcivilian casualties were in constant danger.Long after the raid was over, into thenight and the early morning of the nextclay, the fires raged and Admiral Rockwellordered all personnel to evacuate the base.Only a small group of men from Lieuten-ant Colonel Adams’ battalion and a fewManila firemen remained. These volun-teers localized the fire and were able tosave the commissary stores; the ammuni-tion depot soon was out of danger.33

Admiral Hart had watched the air at-tack from the roof of his headquartersbuilding in Manila and had seen the endof Cavite as a base of operations. Rock-well’s damage report confirmed his obser-

“’ Hogaboorn, 3.

3’LtCol J. V. Lyon ltr to CMC, 310ct5t3.‘8 LtCol J. W. Keene, Narrative and tactical

dispositions of the 1st SepMarBn at Cavite,*26Dec41, n.d.

T-ations. On the night of the 10th Hartordered most of the remaining ships of theAsiatic Fleet still in Manila Bay to sailsouth to comparative safety. The nextday he advised the captains of all mer-chant ships in the bay to get their vesselsout while they still could; fortunately,only one merchantman out of 40 wascaught, by enemy bon~bers.34 The strong-est element of Hart’s fleet, his 29 subma-rines, continued to operate from the bayfor a short while, until Japanese controlof the air made this base untenable. Bythe year’s end only the submarine tender(7anogws and a small collection of yardcraft, motor torpedo boats, and auxiliariesremained in Manila>s waters.

In the judgment of a naval historian ofthis period the Asiatic Fleet was “sadlyinadequate>’ and therefore “unable to pre-vent the enemy from landing wherever hechose, or even to delay his efficient time-table of conquest.” 35 Nor were FEAFor the ground troops of 7JSAFFE able todo the job. In some instances there was atemporary delay when planes hit the land-ing forces, but nowhere were the Japan-ese stopped and forced to turn back. On10 December two combat teams from thegd For~no,ya Reginten,t of the J8th Divi8ion

came ashore at Aparri in northern Luzonand It Vigan on the northwest coast.Their mission, which was to secure air-fields for use by Army planes, was success-

ful. In a day the Japanese, despite theloss of several ships to American bombers,were firmly established ashore and in prac-tical control of the northern tip of Luzon.The one Philippine Army division in thearea, the llth, was responsible for the de-

3’ Hart Comments.= Rising S7un in the Pacific, 181.

CHINA AND LUZON 165

fense of the island north of Lingayen Gulfand was of necessity spread so thin thatit could offer no effective resist ante.

The same situation held true in south-ern Luzon where the defending forces, twoPhilippine Army divisions, were com-pletely unable to cover all possible landingbeaches. On 12 December, when a Japan-ese convoy carrying the advance assaultdetachment of the 16th Division, stagedfrom the Palaus, reached Legaspi in south-eastern Luzon, there was nothing to op-pose their landing. The troops wereashore, had taken their airfield objective,and were moving north by nightfall. Inall there were less than 10,000 enemy troopsashore at this time, but they had behindthem the rest of the Fourteenth Army andcommand of the SeLLand air to insure itsarrival on schedule.

The heavy air attacks of the 8th and10th were only harbingers of furtheraerial assaults. Reinforced by Armyfighters and bombers operating fromnewly-seized airfields, the naval planes ofthe Formosa-based l?leuenth AiT FZeetspread out over Luzon seeking new targets.The first turn of Olongapo and the 4thMarines came on 12 December, the daythat marked the end of effective U’. S. airsupport.

A flight of ,Japanese fighters followedthe PBY’s based at Olongapo into theiranchorage after the flying boats had madea fruitless search for a supposed enemycarrier task force. The enemy pilotscaught the seaplanes at their moorings anddestroyed them all. As the Japanesestrafed the naval station Marine machine

gunners attempted to bring them down;

Colonel Howard noticed that the tracersof Company H’s .30’s seemed to be CCbounc-ing off these planes indicating sufficient

armor plate to prevent penetration.)’ 38The enemy attacked again on the 13th,this time bombing from altitudes beyondthe range of the Marine automaticweapons. The few hits scored were all inthe town of Olongapo; there was no dam-age to the naval station and only a fewMarine casualties. The Filipinos who ig-nored the air raid warning suffered heav-ily; a bomb hit right in the midst of alarge group of townspeople who were‘(standing under a tree watching the per-formance,” 37killing 22 and wounding atleast as many more. Although alarmswere frequent thereafter, the Japanese didnot attack again until the 19th and thentheir aim was bad and they liberallyplastered the bay with bombs.

During this period, while the originalJapanese landing forces were advancingtoward Manila, top-level discussions wereheld between Hart and MacArthur andtheir staffs regarding employment of the4th Marines.’s On 2’0 December, Mac-Arthur formally requested that the regi-

ment be assigned to his command “as de-velopments of the Navy plan can make itavailable.” 3g Admiral Hart concurred

and directed Howard to report to

USAFFE for such employment as Mac-

= Houxzrd Rept, 9.

“ Jackson.38Although the -war plan for the Philippines

had long called for the available Marines to beassigned to the defending ground forces underArmy control, CSAFFE made no effort in thefirst few days of the war to contact CinCAFregarding his Marine forces. After a reminderfrom Hart, “there came back a request to sendone battalion into Manila City to guard USAFFEHeadquarters. Feeling that it would be a

wrong use of the best infantry available, [Hartissued] no order to that effect.” Hart Comments.

3’ Copy of CG, US&’FE ltr to CinCAF, 20Dec41,in ~th Mar Jrtl, 237; Cteme?tt Rept, 6.

166 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL

Arthur might deem necessary in the de-fense of Luzon.’” In a covering memo toRockwell, he pointed out that the assign-ment of the Mb Marines was the solecommitment that he had made and thathe had verbally made it clear that it washis policy that excess naval personnel beorganized and equipped and then “fed upinto the combat areas on shore with theFourth Regiment of Marines. A com-mand exercised over them by the Armywould normally be via C. O. FourthMarines.” 4’

The Kavy Department had directedHart on his departure from the Philip-pines to place all naval personnel, nluni-tions, and equipment at the disposal ofIJSAFF13. Rockwell, W11Owas to relieveHart as senior naval officer in the Philip-pines, nominally retained independe~tstatus, He adhered firmly, however, tothe principle of unity of command andcooperated closely with MacArthur.sheadquarters.

On 22 December, the reinforced ,Japa-nese 48th Dz%iaion landed in LingayenGulf. It was the logical landing pointfor any force whose objective was Manila,for the gulf stood at the head of a broad

valley leading directly to the capital. Thelanding was expected and it was resisted,but the combined eft’orts of .kmerican air,submarine, and ground forces could notprevent the ,Japanese from putting their

mAccording to the Hart Narrative, 45, oneplan considered for the employment of the 4thMm entailed the brigading of the regiment ( re-‘inforeed by a naval battalion from Marive]es )and a constabulary regiment under a Marinebrigade commander. The Marines were to fur-nish officers and XCO’S to the Constabulary unit,Time did not permit the execution of this scheme,

4’ CinCAF memo to ComSixteen, 22Dec41, in~th .tfar Jri 1, 239.

men ashore and effecting a juncture withJTigan-Aparri landing forces which haddriven down from the north. Resistance,althou:h sparked by the 26th Cavalry ofthe Phdlppine Scouts, was spotty and in-effectual, and the ,Japanese soon provedthat the partially-trained men of thePhilippine .4rmy were not yet a matchfor their troops. Covered by the Scout‘cavalrymen, the Filipino reservists fellback in disorder to reorganize in positionsbelow the ilgno River.

The enemy was ready to drive on Manilafrom the north.

On the 24th, the last major assault ele-ment of the Fourteenth Army, the 16thDivision from the Ryukyus, landed atLamon Bay only 60 miles cross-islandfrom Manila. Here the story was muchthe same as Lingayen Gulf. The enemyoverwhelmed scattered, ill-trained troopsand made good his beachhead. The Amer-ican South Luzon Force began to fighta delaying action along the roads lead-ing to Manila. The decision, however,had already been made to declare the capi-tal an “open city,>’ and the troops wereheaded for the 13ataan Peninsula.

13ataan, northern arm of Manila Bay,had long been considered the ultimatestronghold in a defense of Luzon. Whileit was held, and with it the fortified islandsacross the mouth of the bay, no enemycould use the harbor, and it was possibleto gain succor from friendly naval forceswhich might break through a blockade.MacArthur had rejected the concept of astatic, last-ditch defense when he tookover USAFFE and had expected with theforces underway to him from the Statesand trained Philippine Army divisions tobe able to repulse or contain enemy land-ing attempts. When the Japanese won

CHINA AND LUZON 167

control of the sea and air, however, he lostall chance for successful execution of hisorders to “attack and destroy” 42any land-ing force, and he was forced to adopt theonly course of action that would save hisarmy: a desperation withdrawal to Ba-taan. He made the fateful decision on 23December and the following day prepara-tions to effect it were begun.

Basically the withdrawal plan called forMajor General ,Jonathan C. Wainwright’sNorth Luzon Force to fight a series ofdelaying actions in the central island plainwhich would allow the South Luzon Force(Major General George M. Parker, Jr.)to reach the peninsula. Then Wain-wright’s units would pull back to 13ataan,join forces with Parker, and stand off theenemy. In the time gained by the delayi-ng actions, USAFFE would make everyeffort to augment the supplies alre?dygathered in scattered dumps on B ataanwith food, ammunition, weapons, andequipment from instdations in theManila area.

The role of the 4th Marines in this planwas laid out for Colonel Howard in aseries of conferences which took place inManila on 24 December. Admiral Hart,who was preparing to leave for Java thefollowing day, informed the Marine com-mander that the 1st Separate Battalionwould be added to his regiment as soonas it could clear Cavite and that he wasto report immediately to MacArthur forduty. At LTSAFFl? headquarters, amidstthe bustle attendant, on its move to Cor-regidor, Howard got a cordial welcome

from his new chief and then received

orders to moye the 4th to Corregidor andtake over its beach defenses. In a meeting

with Admiral Rockwell, after he had

42Wainlrrigli t’s Story, 28.

448777 o—!i~lz

made a final call on Hart, Howard was toldto destroy the Olongapo Naval Stationwhen he pulled out.

Mariveles at the southern tip of Bataanhad been designated the assembly area andtransshipment point for the Marine unitsand their supplies. The 1st Battalion hadalready spent two weeks in bivouac nearthe base weathering a series of air attacksand furnishing guard details, unloadingparties, and dump construction crews.Two men were killed and three woundedon 24 December during a bombing raidthat struck shipping in the harbor. Itwas an inauspicious portent for the recep-tion of the forward echelon of the regimentwhich left for Mariveles at 2200 that night.

Shortly after the truck convoy hadcleared Olongapo, Colonel Howard re-ceived warning from naval headquartersof an impending Japanese landing, and“sounds of motors could be distinctlyheard from seaward” 43in Subic Bay. Allavailable men manned beach defense posi-tions, but fortunately the report provedfalse and the motors turned out to be thoseof American torpedo boats. Early onChristmas morning a message from Rock-well’s new headquarters on Corregidorordered Howard to expedite evacuationand destruction lest the regiment be cutoff by advancing Japanese troops. ThePhilippine .krmy’s 31st Division hadpulled back to Bntaan from its coastalpositions northwest of Olongapo on the24th and the Marines’ north flank was nowopen; a threat also existed to seaward,since the Army’s coast defense troops werewithdrawing from Fort Wint in Subic

Bay. Motorcycle patrols ranging northof the base could find no sign of the enemy,however, and the movement of men and

“ Hotcard Rept, 11.


supplies was completed without unduehaste. .4t 1410 Howard’s new CP openedoutside Marive]es, and the fate ofOlongapo was left in the hands of a demo-lition detail under Captain (later Major)Francis H. Williams.

Using charges improvised from 300-pound mines, Williams set out with hisdemolition gang to do a good job of eras-ing the Naval Station from the face of theglobe.” “ They sank the hull of the oldarmored cruiser Rochester in the bay andblew up or burned everything of valueexcept the barracks which closely borderedthe native town.45 The last supplies wereloaded early Christmas evening, and therear echelon pulled out with darkness.

Christmas also saw the completion ofdestruction at Cavite where a Marine dem-olition party from the 1st Separate Bat-talion blew up or fired all remainingammunition stocks and destroyed the sub-marine damaged in the 10 December airraid. The naval radio station near Sang-ley Point was already a shambles, for ina raid on 19 December enemy bombersleveled the buildings and set afire largequantities of gas and oil scattered indumps throughout the surrounding area.”Lieutenant Colonel Adams received orderson 20 December to evacuate the Cavitearea, and for the next fe~v days men andsupplies were trucked to Mariveles; theChristmas day demolition detail was thelast element to leave.47

After darkness fell on 26 Decembw, thefirst Marines to move to Corregidor, 14officers and 397 men of Adams’ battalion,

UFergw$on, 3.

* The town’s natives later burned their ownhouses and the barracks was consumed in theresulting fire.

~ Hogaboom, 4.

4’Keene, op. cit., 10.

made the seven and a half mile voyagefrom Mariveles’ docks to North Dock on“The Rock.)’

THE FORTIFIED 11.!!LANDS ‘8

The four islands that guarded the mouthof Manila Bay were fortified in the decadeprior to J$’orld War I before air powerchanged the concept of coastal defense.Most of the powerful 14- and 12-inch gunswere sited in open emplacements for thepurpose of repelling an invasion from thesea. Disarmament treaty obligations anddrastically reduced defense expendituresin the period between the wars allowedlittle concession to be made to the threatof air attack. Some antiaircraft guns wereadded to the fort’s defenses, however, anda start was made toward providing under-ground bombproof shelters, especially onCorregidor (Fort Mills).

Corregidor was at its closest point justa little over two miles from the tip ofBataan Peninsula. The island was tad-pole-shaped, three and a half miles longand one and a half miles wide at its head.This wide area, called Topside, loomedhigh above the rest of the island, its 500-

foot cliffs dropping sharply to a narrowbeachline. Most of the coast defense bat-

teries and permanent quarters were locatedhere, and the only access routes to the topfrom the western shore were two ravines,.James and Cheney. East of Topside,

along the neck of land that connected thetadpole’s head and tail, was Middleside, aplateau which held several more batterypositions and permanent buildings. A

‘8 Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Moore Rep t; HowardRePt; ~tltMar Jnt; Philippine AirO@3ee; Fallof the p?L@@W8.

CHINA AND LUZON

third ravine, Ramsay, which led from the

southern beaches to Xliddlesidej was a crit-

ical clefensive point. (See ~~ap 8, Map

Section)

.4 logically-named third distinctive por-

tion of the island, Bottomside, consisted of

the low ground occupied by the industrial

and dock area and the native town of San

Jose. The nerve center of Luzon’s de-

fenses was an extensively -tunnelled hill,

Malint,a Hill, which rose directly east of

San Jose. The headquarters of Mac-

Arthur, Rockwell, and Major General

George F. lloore, commanding the forti-

fied islands, were all eventually located in

“the tunnels and laterals that spread out

beneath the hill. From Malinta the long,

low, narrow tail of the island bent away

to the east; a light. plane landing stript

Kindley Field, had been built along the

spine of the tail.

The other three island forts, Hughes,

Drum, and Frank, complemented the de-

fenses of Fort Mills, and Marines served

as part of the beach defense troops on all

but the last named. Caballo Island (Fort

Hughes), a quarter-mile square in area,

stood less than two miles from Corregi-

dor; its low-lying eastern shore rose

abruptly to a 3S0-foot height, which con-

tained most of the battery positions. Four

miles south of (laballo was the ‘(concrete

battleship,” Fort Drum. Tiny El Fraile

Island bad been razed to water level and on

its foundation a steel-reinforced concrete

fortress had been erected with sides 25-

to 36-feet thick, and a. top deck 20-feet

deep. Two case-hardened steel gun tur-

rets, each sporting a pair of 14-inch guns,

were mounted on the deck and the sides

of the fort boasted four 6-inch gun case-

ments. Its garrison could be completely

contained within its walls, and %he fort

169

was considered impregnable to enemy at-tack.” 4’ The island which seemed mostvulnerable to assault was Carabao (FortFrank) which lay only 500 yards from theshore of Cavite Province. However, sincesome of its guns were capable of firing in-land and most of its shoreline was ringedwith precipitous cliffs, the job of takingFort Frank promised to be quite a task.

General Moore later noted that “the fort-resses were not designed to withstand alanding attack from adjacent shores sup-ported by overwhelming artillery em-placed thereon ;“ 50and that of his big gunsonly the turrets of Fort. Drum, the 12-inchmortars, and two 12-inch long-range gunswere capable of all-round fire. A tabula-tion of the major coast defense armamentof the forts shows:

—-

Tspe

Mills——

14” guns. -..... -. —12” guns --------- 812” mortars. . . . . . 1010” guns --------- 28“ guns. . . . . . . . . . 26“guns ---------- 5155mm guns-. . . -_ 193“ guns ______ 10

h’umberof Guns

Hughes Drum Frank

2 4 2— . .

4 — 8— —— —

2 43 — 421 1 —

The forts had in addition a small numberof 75mm beach defense guns. For anti-aircraft defense, including tied-in bat -teries on southern Bataan, there were 17searchlights, 40 3-inch gunsj and 48 .50caliber machine guns.51

M:trilles fronl the 1st Separate Bat-talion ~vere able to add a few .50 caliber

“ .voorf,Rq)t,4.60Ibid., 9.5’ Ibid., Annex C.

170 PEARL HARROR TO GuADALCANAL

machine guns and a battery of four 3-inchguns taken from Cavite to the antiaircraftdefenses, but the primary function of thebattalion was now that of infantry. Itwas reorganized and re-equipped at Mari-veles to fill the role of the missing battalionof the 4th Marines; the formal change oftitle to 3d Battalion, 4th Marines cameon 1 January.

With the exception of Batteries A andC and the radar detachment of Adams’battalion which remained on Bataan, thewhole of the 4th Marines moved to Cor-regidor in successive echelons on the nightsof 27 and 28 December. Enough rationsfor 2,000 men for six months, ten unitsof fire for all weapons, two years supplyof summer khaki, and the medicines andequipment to outfit a 100-bed hospital ac-companied the move. Fortunately, theQuartermaster, Major Ridgely, dispersedthese supplies in small, scattered dumps asthey arrived and they emerged relativelyunscathed from the first Japanese air raidon Corregidor.

Many of the Marines in the bamboojungles surrounding Mariveles, who hadto shift camp constantly to avoid bombingand sleep “on the ground near a foxhole orsome convenient ditch into which [they]could roll in the event of an air attack>’ wlooked forward to moving to The Rock.They had “watched the Jap bombers steerclear of its antiaircraft barrages” and ithad been pointed out to them “that Cor-regidor’s antiaircraft was so good that theJaps had not even dared to bomb it—yet !’) 53 An additional lure of the island

w Statement of Lt ( jg) R. G. Hetherneck in CdrT. H. Hayes Rept on MedTactics, 4th Regt USMC,7Dec41-6May4’2, 15Feb46, 79, hereinafter cited asHayes Rept.

“ LtCol R. F. Jenkins, Jr., Personal Experi-ences 28Dec41-6May42, n.d., 1, hereinafter citedas Jenkins.

to some men was the vision of a Gibraltar,and they talked knowingly of the (non-existent ) intricate underground system ofdefenses.54

At 080029 December, Colonel Howardreported to General Moore for orders asFort Mills’ beach defense commander andthen started out to make a reconnaissanceof the island. His men, temporarilyquartered in Middleside Barracks, werestartled to hear the air raid sirens soundshortly before noon. No one paid toomuch attention to them as Corregidor hadnever been bombed, but soon their trust-ing attitude changed. “All hell brokeloose,” and as one 1st Battalion officerdescribed the scene, “there we were—thewhole regiment flat on our bellies on thelower deck of Middleside Barracks.” 55

The Japanese planes, 40 bombers of the5th Air Group with 19 covering fighters,attacked at 1154. For the next hour aparade of Army aircraft flew the longaxis of Corregidor dropping 200- and 500-pound bombs from 18,000 fret, and divebombers attacked the antiaircraft bat-teries, strafing as they plunged down. .&t1300, the Army planes gave way to the

Navy and bombers of the Ele~enth AiYFleet continued to attack until 1415. Noneof FEAF7S few remaining fighters, whichwere being saved for vital reconnaissancemissions, took to the air, but Corregidor’sgunners exacted a good price from theenemy—13 medium bombers fell to the3-inchers and the .50 calibers shot downfour of the dive bombers in a vivid demon-stration of the folly of flying within reachof these guns. But the damage done bythe enemy was considerable.

“ Ibid.= Ibid.

CHINA AND LTJZON 171

Almost all of the barracks and head-

quarters buildings and a good half of thewooden structures on the island were bat-

tered, set afire, or destroyed. .4 thick pall

of black smoke and clouds of dust obscured

the island from observers on 13ataan, andthe detail left to load out Marine supplies

wondered at the fate of the regiment inthe center of this maelstrom. 56 The

casualty score was miraculously low, onlyone man killed and four wounded. With asingle exception, bombs used by the Japa-nese did not penetrate all the way throughto the bottom deck of the concrete bar-racks, but, the building, shaken repeatedlyby hits and near misses, was a shambles.In all, the island’s defenders suffered about100 casualties, and 29 December markedthe end of “normal” above ground livingfor The Rock’s garrison.

As soon as the air raid was over, Howardassigned beach defense sectors to his bat-talions, and the troops moved out to theirnew bivouac areas before dark. The 1stBattalion, 20 officers and 367 enlisted menunder Lieutenant Colonel Curtis T.Beecher, dreti a possible enemy landingpoint—the East Sector which includedMalinta Hill and the island’s tail. Thebeaches of Ilottomside and most of Mid-dleside (Middle Sector), up to a line in-cluding Morrison Hill and Ramsay Ra-vine were occupied by Lieutenant Colonel:Idams’ battalion with 20 officers and 49omen. The defense of the rest of the shore-line of Corregidor was the responsibilityof the !ild Battalion (Lieutenant ColonelHerman R. Anderson) which mustered 18

otlicers and 324 enlisted men. A generalreserve of 8 officers and 183 men, formedfrom the Headquarters and Service Com-

panics, commanded by Major Stuart W.King,” bivouacked in Government Ravine,on the southern shore of the island belowGeary and Crockett Batteries.

h“ot all of Adams’ battalion was as-signed to the Middle Sector; besides theunits left on Bataan, the 3d Battalionfurnished most of the other special de-tachments. One platoon (1 officer and 28men ) with four .50 caliber machine gunsand a second ( 1 officer and 46 men) withfour .30’s left for Fort Hughes on the30th to bolster the antiaircraft and beachdefenses; the !i!dBattalion added ten menand four more .30 caliber machine gunsto the beach defenses on 3 January.s8 FortDrum got a section of 15 men and two .50’sto augment its crew. A third antiaircraftplatoon with six .50’s (1 officer and 35men ) was directly assigned to Fort Mills’air defenses and attached to a simila.rly -equipped battery of the 60th Coast Artil-lery which was emplaced near the Topsideparade ground.

By 1 January the pattern had been setfor the Marines’ duties on Corregidor.The men were digging in, stringing barbedwire, emplacing their 37mm7s, mortars,and machine guns, and tying-in for a co-ordinated and protracted defense. Aheadlay more than four months of waiting andpreparation for a battle, months in whichmore than one survivor likened life on

Corregidor to existence in the center of abull’s eye.

“ Hozta?”ti Rept, 14 lists Maj (then Capt ) MaxW. Schaeffer as commander of the regimentalreserve at this point; howe~~er, the contemporarymuster rolls at HQMC and survivors’ commentsindicate that Maj King held this position until17Feb4 when Maj Schaeffer took over and Kingbecame ExC) of the beach defense force at FortHughes.

“ Lyon ltr, op. cit.

CHAPTER z

Bataan Prelude

DRA WING THE B/l TTLE LINES ‘

The Japanese did not confine their oper-ations in the Philippines to Luzon, butDecember landings on Mindanao and JoloIslands were made primarily to securebases for further attacks against Borneo.Here again the hastily mobilized Philip-pine .irmy reservists and Constabularytroopers were no match for the assaultforces, and the enemy mzde good his lodg-ment. Offensive operations in the south,however, were limited by the fact thatGeneral Homma did not have sufficienttroops to press a campaign on two fronts.The main strength of the F’ouvteenthArm y remained on Luzon to win controlof Manila Bay.

The original Japanese operation planfor Luzon had contemplated its occupa-tion by the end of Janumy and had pro-vided for a mop-up force of one divisionand one brigade with a small air support

unit. Shortly after Homma’s troops en-tered Manila on 2 January, he receivedorders to expedite the withdrawal of the48th Divi,yioYt and the ~t]l Air Group

which were needed to reinforce stepped-upoperiitiolls against Java and on the -ksianmainland. In short return for these trooplosses Homma got the 65tA Brigude fromFormosa, originally assignecl to mop-up

and ~)olice dl~ties. The brigade, which

‘ [’nless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from (7SAFFE-1 “SWIP Rept;

1 ;tll .4 ~rjtu Bept; Fun Of the Philippine.

landecl on I.ingayen Gulf beaches on 1,January, was selected by Homma as hisBataan assault force and reinforced withan infantry regiment from the 16th Di-vision and tank, artillery, and servicetroops from army reserves. (See Map 7,Map Section)

The necessary reorganization of the65tA Brigcrde for combat and its movementinto jump-off positions gave MacArthurtime to establish an initial defense line.On 7 ,Jauuary he reorganized his forcesinto two corps and a rear area servicecommand. Jtrainwright was given I Phil-ippine Corps with responsibility for hold-ing the western front, and Parker became11 l?hilippine Corps commander with histroops manning defenses on the ManilaB:LY side of Bataan. More than /30,000men were now bottled up on the peninsulaal]d some 503000 held positions on or neartile il~itial defense line. These were im-pressi~’e figures, and in paper strengtht]~e Bataau c]efenders outnumbered theFowtem fh A?rny which had about, 50,000

troops under its command.Military superiority depends, however,

on many other factors besides relativetroop strength. The conglomerate Amer-ican-Filipino forces, completely cut offfrom effective relief, had limited suppliesof ratious, medicines, weapons, ammuni-tion, and equipment. By contrast, theenemy’s control of the sea and air gavethe ,Japanese an unmatchable resupplyand reinforcement potential. Even when

172

BATAAN PRELUDE 173

the Fourteenth. A~my’s fortunes were attheir lowest ebb, the enemy troops could

reasonably expect rescue and relief.

0115 eJaIILl:Wy &~aC.bthUL’, iLL ‘a move toconserve dwindling food stocks, had cut alltroops on Bataan and the fortified islandsto half rations.’ This order was un-doubtedly the most significant given inthe campaign. It prolonged the fightingfor weeks, until Ilataan’s defenses e~-entl~-ally collapsed. Men sapped by malnu-trition and its attendant diseases, forwhich there were no medicines, couldresist no more.

In launching their initial attack on Ba-taan the ,Japanese did not expect that thereinforced 65th Brigade would have muchtroub]e defeating the American-Filipino

forces. The enemy was flushed with hissuccesses and “completely ignorant con-cerning the terrain of Bataan Peninsula.>’ 3Homma’s intelligence otlicers had under-estimated Mac.irthur’s strength by half,had given their commander a distortedpicture of Filipino morale, and had formu-lated an altogether incorrect estimate ofthe c{efensive situation on ~ataan. TheFourteenth Army stafl had:

. . . optimistically presumed that, consideringits position relative to (’orregidor Island, theenemy would offer serious resistance at thesouthern end of the penins~,la with ~fariyeles as

a nucleus, withdrawing later to CorregidorIsland. Taking this for granted, the threat ofenemy resistance was taken lightly.4

Bataan Peninsula was an ideal positionfrom tile viewpoint of a force col~lmittedto a last-ditch stand. Thirty miles long at

2“Actnally, the tr(wl}s on Bataan recei~-edabout one-third ration. ” 1’A’.IFFE-US’FI1’ Rcpt,42

3 l~th .irnlyRcpt, 90.4Ibid., 91.

its deepest point and 25 miles wide at itsbase, the peninsula tapered to an averagewidth of 15 miles. Numerous streams,ravines! and gullies cut up the interiorand thick jungle growth blanketed every-thil]g. A spine of mountains runningl~orthwest to southeast split 13ataanroughly in half. The dominant. featuresin tl~e north were Mt. Natib (4,222 feet)and its companion Mt. Sih_mganan (3,620feet ), and in the south, Mt. Bataan (4,70()

feet ),, which commanded the Marivelesarea. .Ilthough numerous trails criss-crossed the peninsula, only two motorroads existed, one running along the coastand the other over t;:. saddle between themountain masses. The western coast linewas uneven with many promontoriesformed by mountain ridges; the easterncoast was more regular and open but be-came hilly and rugged in the south. (Seelisp 7, Map Sedion)

The final defense line selected byI“SAFFE was midway down the penin-sula, anchored on the towns of Bagac andOriol~, and generally along the trace ofthe cross-peninsula motor road. It wasthe necessity of covering the preparationof this area for defense and the need to usethe road as a supply route as long as pos-sible that dictated the occupation of theinitial defense line. Stretching across thepeninsula just above the point where itnarrowed, this position had a grave nat-ural \veakl\ess. The corps boundary ran

along the hTatib-Silanganan mountainmaw which pierced the defenses and pre-vented liaison or even contact betweenl~aillwright’s and Parker’s men. The.Japanese attempt to crack this defenseline eventually involved landings far be-l~ind the front ‘and brought the Marinesat Mariveles into action.

BATAAN PRELUDE 175

THE .NA VAL BA TTALZON ‘

Although the farthest distance from therear boundaries of the corps areas to thesouthern shore of Bataan was only tenmiles, the defensive problem facing Brig-adier C~eneral Allan C. McBride’s Service

Command was acute. J$’ith a relativelyfew men McBride had to guard over 40miles of rough, jungle-covered coast lineagainst enemy attack. A successful am-phibious thrust which cut the vital coastalsupply road could mean the prompt endof the battle for 13ataan. To protect theeast coast he had the newly-organized 2d(Constabulary) Division; on the westcoast he had a motley composite force ofservice troops and planeless pursuit squad-rons converted to infantry, backed up bya few elements of the 71st Division anda Constabulary regiment. Responsibilityfor the security of the naval reservationat Mariveles remained with the Navy.

In order to provide protection forMarive]es and support the Army in thedefense of the west coast, Admiral Rock-well on 9 January directed Captain JohnH. S. I)essez, commander of the sectionbase. to form a naval battalion for groundcombat. The senior naval aviator remain-ing in the Philippines, Commander Fran-cis ,J. Bridget , was appointed battalioncommander and he immediately set aboutorganizing his force. For troops he hadabout 480 bluejackets including 150 of hisown men from Air ~ .4siatic Fleet, 130

5Unless otherwise noted the material in thisSe(+tiOnis derived from RO~hwell Narrative; 16thNavDist War Diary, 8Dec41-19Feb42 (locatedat NHD) ; Clement Rept; Cdr F. J. Bridget Reptto CornSixteen, Action at Longoskawayan Point,9Feb42 (located at NHD ), hereinafter cited asBrid@ Rept; C’a!lt E. L. Sackett, USN, “History

of the USS Carmpus,” 28Apr47 (located at NHD),hereinafter cited as Cmop?Ls Hist; Hogaboom.

crewmen from the submarine tenderCanopus, 80 sailors from the Cavite NavalAmmunition Depot, and 120 generalduty men from Cavite and Mariveles.He was also assigned approximately 120Marines, members of Batteries A and Cwhich had remained behind on Bataanunder naval control when the rest of the1st Separate Battalion (now 3/4) hadmoved to Corregidor.

The men of First Lieutenant William F.Hogaboom’s Battery A had originallybeen slated to provide replacement and re-lief gun crews for Battery C (First Lieu-tenant Wrillard C. Holdredge ) whose 3-inch guns were set up in a rice paddybetween the town of Mariveles and thesection base. But on 5 January Hoga-boom had received instructions from aUSAFFE staff officer, “approved by navalauthorities on the ‘Rock’,” G to move hisunit to the site of MacArthur’s advanceCP on Bataan where the Marines wereto furnish the interior guard. This as-signment was short-lived, however, sinceCommander Bridget needed the men toserve as tactical instructors and cadres forthe naval battalion, and on 14 January hedirected Hogaboom to report back toMariveles. To replace Battery A,TTSAFFE detached two officers and 47men from the 4th Marines 7 and sentthem from Corregidor to Bat.aan wherethey guarded the advance headquartersuntil the end of the campaign.

The most serious problem Bridget facedin forming his battalion was the lack ofground combat training of his blue-jackets. As the commander of the Can-Opln, naturally an interested spectator,noted:

‘ Hogaboom, 5.‘ ~tb Mar Jnl, 26S.


. . . perhaps two-thirds of the sailors kuewwhich end of the rifle should be presented tothe enemy, and had even practiced on a targetrange, but field training was practically a closedbook to them. The experienced Marines werespread thinly throughout each company in hopethat through precept and example, their qualitieswould be assimilated by the rests

Even after the formation of the naval

battalion, the primary responsibility for

antiaircraft defense of Mariveles stillrested with the Marine batteries and onlya relatively fewmen, mostly hTCO’s, couldbe spared to help train the bluejacketcompanies. Holdredge’s 3-inchen re-quired at least skeleton crews and Hoga -boom’s unit, after its return fromL’SAFFE control, was directed to mountand man nine .50 caliber machine-gunposts in the hills around the harbor.Therefore, in both batteries the majority,of men available for ground combat weresailors; Battery A joined one officer and65 bluejackets on 16-1’7 ,Tanuary and aNavy othcer and 40 men joined Hol-dredge’s battery on the 18th and 19th?Throughout the naval battalion, trainingwas confined to fundamentals as Bridgetstrove to qualify his men as infantry. ASwas the case so often in the Philippines,the time for testing the. combat readinessof the jury-rigged battalion came. all toosoon.

LO NGONKA M7AYAN POINT ‘“

In opening his stack on Bataan, GeneralHomma committed the main strength ofthe 63th Brv”gad~ along the front ofParker’s II Corps, figuring that the moreopen terrain along the east coast gave hima greater opportunity to exploit successes.By 11 January the ,Japanese had devel-

8 Canopus Hist, 14.

‘ Col W. F. Prickett Itr to CMC’, October 1956.

oped and fixed Parker’s defenses and wereprobing for weak spots preparatory to anall-out assault. It was inevitable thatthey found the open and highly vulnerableleft flank. By 22 January Parker’s posi-tion along the slopes of Mt. Natib had beenturned and all reserves with the exceptionof one regiment had been committed tocontain the penetration. In order to pre-vent the defending forces from being cutoff, USAFFE ordered a general with-drawal to the Bagac-Orion defense line,to be completed by the 26th.

The enemy advancing along the moun-tainous west coast did not contact Gen-eral J$rainwright’s forward positions until15 ,January. By that date, Homma, im-pressed by the lack of resistance in thissector, had already ordered the $2(W In-~antry of the 16th Division to reinforceand exploit the drive, strike through tothe Bagac road junction, and gain the rearof Parker)s corps. Although I Corps hadbeen stripped of reserves to back up thesagging eastern defense line, Wainwright’sfront-line troops were able to stand off theinitial Japanese assaults. When Homma’s

fresh troops attacked on the 21st, however,they effected a lodgment behind the frontwhich eventually made withdrawal towardBagac mandatory. The local Japanesecommander, encouraged by his success, de-

‘0 Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is taken from USAFFE–USFIP Rept;

Ihth .lrmv Rept; hth Mar Jnl; Clement Rept;Bridget Itept; Ifogaboom; Btry A, US NavBn,Xarrative of events, 2Feb42; 2dLt M. E. Peshekltr to CO, 2/4, “Report of operation of MarineDetachment sent to Bataan on 25 January 1942/’2Feb42; GunSgt H. M. Ferrell ltr to CO, 1/4,“Temporary Duty of Mortar Platoon, vicinityof Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, from,January 25, 1942, to .Tanuary 30, 1942, inclu-sive, ” 31,Jan42 ; Fall of the Philippines.

IMT.4AN PRELUDE 177

tided on a shore-to-shore amphibious as-sault which would hit the Bataan coastalroad about four miles below Bagac.

Embarking after dark on the night of92–23 ,January, the enemy’s 900-man land-ing, force ($d Battalion, ZOth Infantry)started out for its objective. It neverarrived. En route two launches of thebattalion’s boat group were discovered andsunk by an American torpedo boat I’ andit is possible that these attacks were in-strumental in scattering the remainderof the landing force. In any event, theenemy boats lost their bearings completelyin the darkness. Instead of landing onthe objective, two-thirds of the unit landedat Q,uinauan Point, eight miles south ofBagac. The remainder of the battalion,7 officers and 294 men, came ashore atLongoskawayan Point, a finger-like prom-ontory only 2,000 yards west of Mari -veles. (See Map 7, Map Section)

The Longoskawayan landing force wasnot discovered immediately, and the enemyhad time to advance along jungle-mattedcliffs and reach Lapiay Point, the nextpromontory to the north. The Japanesepatrols headed inland from Lapiay forMt. Pucot, a 617-foot hill which com-manded both the west coast road and thelanding site, The first word of the pres-ence of the enemy in his defense sectorreached Commander Bridget at 0840 on23 ,January when the small lookout detach-ment he had posted on Pucot was drivenfrom its position by enemy machine-gunfire.

Bridget immediately phoned Hogaboomand Holdredge, directing both oflicers tosend out patrols. Hogaboom, closestto

“CoinhlTBron+, Rept of Act of ~’SSPT-34 onthe night of 22–23Jan42,27~eb42 (located atNH~), 1.

the scene of action, sent one bluejacketplatoon under Lieutenant (junior grade)Leslie .4. Pew- directly to Pucot while heled a second platoon himself in a sweepthrough the ridges south of the hill. Pew’splatoon deployed as it approached the hill-top, attacked through scattered rifle andmachine-gun fire , and secured the highground without difficulty. The Japaneseoffered only slight resistance and thenfaded out of contact.

South of the hill Hogaboom ran into aplatoon from Battery C which had had abrush with the Japanese and taken a coupleof casualties, but again the enemy haddisappeared. The story of light firingand no firm resistance was much the samefrom the rest of the probing patrols whichBridget ordered out on the 23d; the Japa-nese evidently were still feeling out thesituation and were not as yet disposed tomake a stand or an attack. At dusk thepatrols assembled on the mountain andset up a defense line along its crest and theridges to the south facing Lapiay andLongoskawayan Points.

During the day Bridget had called onthe Service Command for reinforcementsbut few men could be spared as most re-serves already had been committed to con-

tain the larger landing force at Q,uinauanPoint. For infantry he got the 3d Pur-suit Squadron and 60 men from the 301stChemical Company whom he put into aholding line above Lapiay Point and onthe north slope of Pucot; for fire sLLppOrtlle received one 2.95-inch mountain packhowitzer and crew from the 71st Division.BY nightfall the chemical company had

tied in with the pursuit squadron on itsright and with Battery A atop Pucot onits left; platoons from Battery C, the Air,Asiatic Fleet Company, and the Naval


Ammunition Depot Company held the restof Pucot?s crest and the southern ridgeswhich blocked off the landing area fromMariveles. ‘z None of the naval battalionunits was at full strength and none of theplatoons strung out along the ridges wasstrictly a Navy or a Marine outfit. Sailorspredominated but Marines were present allalong the line, mostly as squad leaders andplatoon sergeants. The composition ofthat part of the battalion which got intoaction became even more varied as thebattle shaped up, and eventually about athird of the men on the front-line weredrawn from the Marine batteries.

Bridget’s men got their first real tasteof the blind fighting of jungle warfare onthe 24th. Hogaboom led a patrol downthe bluff above Lapiay Point and ran head-on into an enemy machine gun firing from

heavy cover. Grenades thrown at the gunexploded harmlessly in a tangle of lushvegetation which screened it from view;

the men were being fired upon and theywere replying, but sound rather than sight

was the key to targets. When reinforce-ments arrived later in the day an attemptwas made to establish a holding line across

the point, but the Japanese opened up witha second machine gun and steady rifle fire.Then they began dropping mortar andhowitzer shells among Hogaboom’s group.

“ fin officer of 3/4 who knew many of the sur-vivors of this action, later wrote an article de-scribing the battle. He maintained that the Armydetachments mentioned never joined, althoughthey may have been assigned, and that the purelynaval companies were not ~med as such, Insteadthe sailors who could be s~)ared joined one of theMarine onits. While this story is quite credible,in this instance the conternl]orary llrid(~pt Repthas b?en used as a guide. See I,tcol W, F.Prickett, “Naval Battalion at ]Iariveles,’” Jff’Gawtle, ,June 1930, MM:].

The Marine officer ordered a withdrawalto the previous night’s positions.

The source of the mortar and howitzerfire was Longoskawayan Point where apatrol led by I.ieutenant Holdredge hadencountered the main body of Japanese.His two-man point had surprised an enemygroup setting up a field piece in a clear-ing and opened up with a rifle and a BAR,dropping about a dozen men around thegun. The Japanese reaction was swift,agreeing with the B.AR-man’s evaluationthat the surprise fire “ought to make themmadder’n hell. ” 1s The patrol fell back,fighting a rear guard action until it clearedthe area of the point’s tip, and then itretired to the ridges. After the day%action Hogaboom and Holdredge com-pared notes and estimated that they facedat least 200 well-equipped enemy troopsin strong positions; they informed Bridgetof their conclusion that it would take afully-organized battalion with supportingweapons to dislodge them.

(h the morning of 2!5 January,USAFFE augmented Bridget’s force bysending him a machine-gun platoon andan 81mm mortar platoon from the 4thMarines on The Rock. The two mortarsimmediately set up on a saddle northwestof Pucot and, with Hogaboom spotting forthem, worked over the whole of Lapiayand Ixmgoskawayan Points; direct hitswere scored on the positions where the,Japanese had been encountered the daybefore. A midafternoon patrol discoveredthat the enemy had evacuated Lapiay, butit was soon evident where they had gone.Holdredge led a combined force of severalplatoons against Longoskawayan Pointand ran into a hornet’s nest. He himselfwas among those wounded before the pla-

1’ Quoted in Hogatmom, 10.

BATAAN PRELUDE 179

toons could extricate theinselves. Againthe naval battalion occupied blocking posi-tions on the ridges east of the points fornight defense.

During the action of the 25th, USAFFEhad changed the command structure in therear service. area and given the corps com-manders responsibility for beach defensethroughout 13ataan. In addition, Mac-Arthur had granted permission for the12-inch mortars on Corregidor to supportBridget’s battalion. Shortly after mid-night, the giant mortars, spotted in by anobserver on Mt. Pucotj laid several roundson Ixmgoskawayan Point. The daylighthours were spent in light patrol actionwhile the battalion was readied for a full-scale attack on the 27th. General Wain-wright sent a battery of Philippine Scout75mm guns to support the drive.

At 0700 on 27 January the mountainhowitzer, the Marine mortars, the Scout75%> and Corregidor’s 12-inch mortarsfired :1 preparation on Longoskawaym,and a skirmish line of ‘:~bout 200 men, some60–75 of t,hem.Marines, started to advance.The enemy reoccupied his positions as soonas the supporting fire lifted, and thejungle came alive with bullets and shellfragments. T!le right and center of theline made little progress in the face ofheavy machine-gun fire, On the leftwhere the goiilj{ was a little easier a ~dp

soon opened through which Japanese in-

filtr:tt ing groups were able to reach the

reserve’s positions.

lltring the resulting hectic fighting, the

enemy opened up with mortar fire to

herald a counterattack; fortunately, the

4tb llarines> 81’s were able to silence this

fire, but it was soon obvious that the navalbattalion was in no shape to advancefarther or even to hold its lines on Longo-

skawayan. Bridget again authorized awithdrawal to the night defense lines onthe eastern ridges.

The solution to the problem of elimina-ting the Japanese beachhead arrived latethat afternoon. Colonel Clement, whohad come over from Corregidor to adviseBridget on the conduct of the Longo-skawayan action, had requested reinforce-ments from I Corps. Wainwright sent inthe regular troops needed and the 2d Bat-talion of the 57th Philippine Scout Regi-ment relieved the naval battalion, whichwent into reserve. The 4th Marines’ mor-tars and machine guns were assigned tothe Scouts to support their operations.The oddly-assorted platoons of Bridget’sbattalion were not committed to actionagain, but they had done their job in con-taining the Japanese though outnumberedand outgunned.

The Scouts spent 28 January in develop-ing the Longoskawayan position. On the29th they attacked in full strength withall the support they could muster, Themine sweeper Quail, risking an encounterwith’ Japanese destroyers, came out fromMariveles and cruised offshore while Com-mander Bridget spotted for the 12-inchmortars and the 75mm guns, The shipclosed from 2,200 to 1,300 yards firingpoint-blank at Japanese soldiers trying tohide out in the caves and undergrowthalong the shores of the point.14 Ashorethe Scouts, supported by machine-gun andmortar fire from the landing flanking thepoint, did the job expected of them andsmashed through the enemy lines. Bynightfall organized resistance had endedand the cost of taking Lapiay and Long-

“CO USS (Wail Rept of Act at LongoskawayanPt morning of 29Jan42, 30Jan42 (located atNHD) , 1.

180 PEARL HARROR TO GUADilLCANAL

oskawayan had been counted. Bridget’sunit had lost 11 killed and 26 wounded inaction; the Scout casualties were 11 deadand 27 wounded; and the Japanese hadlost their entire landing force.

During the next few days patrols, aidedby ship’s launches armored and mannedby crewmen from the Canopu-s, moppedup the area, killing stragglers and takinga few prisoners, but the threat to Mari-veles was ended. Similar action by ade-quately supported Scout units wiped outthe Quinauan Point landing force by 7February. The major Japanese attemptto reinforce the beleaguered troops onQuinauan was beaten back by the com-bined fire of artillery, naval guns, and thestrafing of the four P40’s remaining onBataan. Elements of an enemy battalionwhich did get ashore on a point of landjust above Quinauan on 27 January and2 February were also finished off by thescouts.

By 13 February the last survivors of theamphibious attempts had been killed orcaptured. The make-shift beach defenseforces which had initially contained thelandings had barely managed to hold theirown against the Japanese. They had hadto overreach themselves to keep the enemyoff balance and prevent a breakthroughwhile the troops of I and II Corps werefalling back to the Bagac-Orion position.(hce that line was occupied and Wain-wright could commit some of his best

troops in sufficient numbers and with ade-quate support, the Japanese were finished.Discolu-aged by their amphibious fiasco,the enemy never again attempted to hit thecoastal flanks of the .&merican-Filipinopositions.

At the same time the survivors of thelanding attempts were being h(luted down,

the Japanese offensive sputtered to a haltin front of the Bagac-Orion line. Theinitial enemy advance on Bataan had notbeen made without cost, ,and the casualtyrate now soared so high that the attack-ing troops were rendered ineffective. On13 February Homma found it necessaryto break contact, pull back to a line ofblocking positions, and to regroup his bat-tered forces. The lull in the Fmwteenz%Army’s attack was only temporary, how-ever, as Homma was promised replace-ments and reinforcements. When thesecond phase of the battle for Bataanopened, the scales were heavily tipped infavor of the Japanese.

The detachment of Canopus crewmen,the sailors from the Cavite Naval Ammu-nition Depot, and the majority of the gen-eral duty men, nine officers and *27 en-listed men in all, were transferred to the4th Marines on Corregidor on 17-18 Feb-ruary. Commander Bridget and his navalaviation contingent moved to Fort Hugheson the 30th where Bridget became beachdefense commander with Major Stuart W.King of the 4th Marines as his executiveofficer. Battery C of 3/4 remained atMariveles to man its antiaircraft guns,but Battery A rejoined the regiment, withmost of its men going to Headquarters(lornpany to augment the regimentalreserve.

The assignment of the sailors of the

naval battalion to Colonel Howard’s com-mand accentuated the growing joint-

service character of the Marine regiment.Small contingents of crewmen fromdamaged or sunken boats of the InshorePatrol also had been joined and over 700Philippine Army air cadets and their offi-cers were now included in the 4th’s ranks.These men, most of whom had never had

BATAAN PRELUDE .n.

any infantry training, were distributedthrollghout the companies on beach de-fense and in reserve where the experiencedMarines could best train them by exampleand close individual instruction. No com-pany in the regiment retained an all-Marine complexion.

The arrival of reinforcements on Cor-regidor and Caballo came at a time whenthe Japanese had stepped up their cam-paign against the fortified islands. On 6February, the first enemy shells, fired by105mm guns emplaced along the shore ofCavite Province, exploded amidst the.lmerican positions on all the islands,The reaction was swift and the forts re-plied with the guns that could bear. Thecounterbattery e x c h a n g e continuedthroughout February and early March,occasionally waning as the Japanese wereforced to shift. to new firing positions bygunners on Forts Frank and Drum. Thelimited number of planes available toHomma made enemy bombers infrequentvisitors during this period, and the Jap-anese concentrated on reducing the islanddefenses with artillery fire. In the firstweek of March, the American commanderon Fort Frank received a demand for itssurrender with a boast that the Cavitecoast was lined with artillery and that:

. . . Carabao will be reduced by our mightyartillery fire, likewise Drum ; after reductionof C’arabao and Drum our invincible artillerywill pound Corregidor into submission, batterit, weaken it, preparatory to a final assault bycrack Japanese landing troops,id

The surrender note was unproductive

for the enemy, but it was prophetic regard-

ing the fate of ~orregidor.

Until the Japanese were ready to renew

their assault on Bataan in late March, the

‘“ Quoted in Ui3’AFFE-USFIP Rept, 40-41.

151

severity of the enemy shellings from Cavitewas not great enough to be effective inhalting the construction and improvement

of beach defenses on Corregidor.Trenches and gun positions lined theshores of Bottomside and the ravines lead-ing to Topside and Middleside from thebeaches. Barbed wire entanglements andmine fields improvised from aerial bombswere laid across all possible approaches.The ordnance stores of the island weresearched to provide increased firepowerfor the 4th Marines;’ and guns were sitedto insure that any landing force would becaught in a murderous crossfire if it at-tempted to reach shore.

The thoroughness of the regiment’spreparations was indicative of its highstate of morale. The men manning thebeach defenses, and to a lesser extent theircomrades in the jungles of Bataan, nevercompletely abandoned hope of rescue andrelief until the very last days of theirordeal.ls Even when General MacArthurwas ordered to leave the Philippines to

take over a new Allied command in theSouthwest Pacific, many men thought thathe would return, leading a strong reliefforce. The senior commanders in thePhilippines and the Allied leaders knewthe truth, however, and realized that bar-ring a miracle, Luzon was doomed to fall.

Only a few key men could be taken out ofthe trap by submarine, torpedo boat, or

‘7One source of beach defense guns was thesub-caliber 37nlm’s which were used for practicetiring by Corregidor’s big guns. These were dis-mounted from the gun tubes and turned over tothe Marines. LtGen S. L. Howard interview byHistBr, G–3, HQMC, 26(M%3, hereinafter citedas How’ard Interview.

MMaj T. E. PU1OSltr to CMC, 300ct56.


plane; the rest had to be left to accepttheir fate,

On 11 March, the day before MacArthurand his party started the first leg of theirjourney to .4ustralia, he created a newheadquarters, Luzon Force, to control theoperations on Bataan and appointed Gen-eral Wainwright to its command. On 20March, the. War Department notifiedWainwright of his promotion to lieutenantgeneral and of the fact that he was to becommander of all forces remaining in thePhilippines. To take the place ofUS.4FFE, an area headquarters, United

States Forces in the Philippines(USFIP), was created.

To take his place on Bataan, Wainwright

appointed the US.AFFE Artillery Officer,Major General Edward P. King, Jr. King

drew an unenviable task when he took overT.uzon Force, for the volume of Japanesepreparatory fire on Bataan and on the

island forts indicated the start of a majoreffort. To meet this attack, King hadtroops who had already spent two weekson a diet of ~/8of a ration on top of twomonths of half rations; they were readyto fight but “with not enough food in theirbellies to sustain a dog.” “ The LTSAFFESurgeon General, on 18 February, had ac-counted Bataan’s defenders as being only5570 combat efficient as a result of “debil-ities due to malaria, dysentery, and general

malnutrition.?’ 20 These same men werenow a month further along on the road to—exhaustion and collapse and were destinedto meet a fresh and vigorous enemy assault.

“ W’ain~crifll~t’sStor~, 7& The ration was catto Y( On 2 jMarch according to [’S.~FFE’–t~~~’11’

RegM entry for that date.20Quoted in Diary of Maj .4. C. Tisdelle, Aide

to MajGen King, entry of 18Feb42.

The Fourteenth Amy set 3 April as D-day for its reuewed of~msive on Bataan,and General Homma foresaw ‘(no reasonwhy this attack should not succeed.;’ ‘2 Hecould well be confident since he had re-ceived the infantry replacements neededto rebuild the 16th Division and the 65t?~Brz’g(/de, and he ld been sent the lth Di-vision from Shanghai. In addition, InY-peria7 Headquarters had allotted him astrongly reinforced infantry regimentfrom the (!?Ist Division, originally slatedfor duty in Indo-China. His artillerystrength had been more than doubled andnow included far-ranging 240mm howitz-ers. Two heavy bomber regiments hadbeen flown up from Malaya to increase ma-terially his mastery of the air.

Once the enemy attack was launched, thepressure on Bat aan’s defenders was relent-less. In less than a week the issue had beendecided. The physically weakened Ameri-cans and Filipinos tried desperately tostem the Japanese advance, but to no avail.By 7 April the last reserves had been com-mitted. A growing stream of dazed, dis-organized men, seeking to escape the in-cessant bombardment at the front :u]d tileonrushing enemy, crowded the roads andtrails leading to Mariveles. Only isolatedgroups of soldiers still fought to hold the,Japanese back from the tip of the penin-sula. Under these circumstances, GeneralKing decided to seek surrender terms. Hisaide recorded the situation in his diary:

8th [April]. Wednesday. The army can notattack. It is impossible. Area is congested withstragglers . General King has ordered all

“ ~Tl,lessother~yise {Ioted the material in thissection is derived from 1’,S.4FFE-liSFIP Rept :

l~tll .Ar>ll y Rcpt: I’ll lt of tllr PI(ilippincs.

“ l~th .lrm?i l?rpt. Appendix 4, 17.

BATAAX PREL1’DE 183

tanks thrown [blown?] and arms destroyed, andis going forward to contact the Japanese and tryto avert a massacre.”

Near midnight on the 8th a severe earth-quake tremor was felt on Corregidor andl;ati~:~i~, and soon thereafter the Marivelesharbor was shaking violently from man-made explosions, as King’s orders to de-stroy all munitions dumps were carriedout. To an observer on The Rock it seemedthat:

. . . the southern end of Bataan was a hugeconflagration which resembled more than any-thing else a volcano in violent eruption . . .white hot pieces of metal from exploded shellsand bombs shot skyward by the thousands inevery conceivable direction. Various coloredflares exploded in great numbers and charged offon crazy courses much the same as a sky rocketwhich has run wild on the ground.z’

All night long the water between 13ataanand Corregidor was lashed with fallingdebris and fragments from the explosions.Through this deadly shower a procession

‘3Tisdelle, op. cit.“LCdr T. C. Parker, “’l’he Epic of Corregidor-

Bataan, December 24, 1941-31ay 4, ltM2~’ [~S’A”IProcccdinas, January 1943, 18, hereinafter citedas Parker.

of small craft dodged its way to the northdock of Bottomside. Everything thatcould float was pressed into use by franticrefugees. Some of the arrivals, however,such as the nurses from Bataan’s hospitals,were under orders to report to Corregidor.Specific units that could strengthen TheRock’s garrison, antiaircraft batteries andthe 45th Philippine Scout Regiment, hadalso been called for. Only the AAA gun-ners from the Mariveles area, includingthe 4th Marines’ Battery C, managed toescape. The Scout regiment was pre-vented from reaching the harbor in timeby the jammed condition of the roads.

By noon on 9 April, General King hadfound out, that no terms would be givenhim; the Japanese demanded uncondi-tional surrender. With thousands of hismen lying wounded and sick in open airgeneral hospitals and all hope of success-ful resistance gone, King accepted the in-evitable and surrendered, asking only thathis men be given fair trcmtment. Thebattle for Bataan had ended, and morethan 75,000 gallant men began the first ofmore than a thousand days of brutalcaptivity.

44s777 0—.5s-13

CHAPTER 3

The Siege and Capture of Corregidor

THE JAPAA7ESE PLANfl ‘

On 9 April the victorious FourteenthAmy paused on the shore of I%taan withits next target.—Corregidor—dead centerin its sights. Many enemy staff officers,both in Tokyo and on Luzon, wanted tolaunch an immediate amphibious attack,taking advantage of the army’s successon Bataan. The dearth of landing craftin Manila Bay, however, effectively servedto postpone the operation. Most of the.Japanew landing barges and boats werelocated in Lingayen Gulf or Subic Bayand had to he moved past Corregidor’sguns to the designated staging areas onthe eastern coast of Bataan. (See Map8, Map Section)

On the night of 14 April the first smallgroup of boats slipped by The Rock, hug-ging Bataan’s shore while the enemyshelled and bombed the island’s northcoast to prevent their discovery. 2 Becausethey were forced to follow this method ofmoving a few boats at a time and theseonly at night and behind a curtain of pro-tective fire., the tJapanese took more thanthree weeks to assemble the necessaryassault craft.

The need for extreme caution in makingthe risky passage into Manila Bay wasnot the only factor which acted againstrapid execution of the ,Japanese assault

‘ Unless otherwise noted the nlaterial in thissection is derived frwn Iltlf .irwu Rept; Philip-pit!e .4ir0p81tec; Pall of tile Pili/ippineLI

‘ ltl, Mar tJnl,W-1.

184

plan. In mid-April a severe outbreak ofmalaria in the ranks of the .@h Division,Homma’s chosen. landing force, severelyhampered attack preparations, but am-phibious training and rehearsals continueddespite the temporary decrease in thedivision’s effective strength. Emergencysupplies of quinine tablets were flown toLuzon in time to check the spread of thedisease and restore fighting trim.

The Fourteenth Army was obsessed, withthe need for deception and secrecy andstringent security measures were takento conceal the preparations for the attackon Corregidor. A consistent effort wasmade to create the impression that CaviteProvince was the Japanese amphibiousbase and that Forts Frank and Drum werethe targets. Landing craft maneuveredoff Cavite’s shores while the army’s airand artillery pounded the defenses of thesouthern islands. Two battalions of the16th D~v&wn feigned preparations for anattack on Frank and Drum, but there waslittle doubt at USFIP Headquarters thatCorregidor was the primary Japaneseobjective.

Every day in April, starting with theday Bataan fell, an increasingly heavierconcentration of enemy artillery piecesfound firing positions in the peninsula’sj ungled hills. At least thirty-seven bat-teries, whose weapons ranged from 75mmmountain guns to !MOmm howitzers, cov-ered Corregidor with a continuous patternof fire that reached every position andknocked out the major portion of the

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 185

island’s de fenses.s Nine Japanese bomb-ing squadrons, capitalizing on the gradualweakening of antiaircraft fire, were over-head to add their bombardment to the at-tack preparation.

The enemy Jth Divtiion was reinforcedfor the assault with two independent en-gineer regiments to man the transportand support landing craft as well asa tank regiment and three mortar bat-talions to provide additional firepower.The actual landing operation was to bemade in two stages with Colonel Gem-pachi Sate’s 61st Znfan.try Re@rnent (twoinfantry battalions, a tank company, amountain artillery battery, and mortarunits) designated the initial assault force.Sato was to land his unit in successivewaves, battalions a b r e as t along thebeaches between Infantry and CavalryPoints on the night of 5 May. After es-tablishing a beachhead, he was to send mostof his men against Malinta Hill while theremainder of the regiment drove across thetail of the island to isolate and contain thedefenders east of Infantry Point. Theplan called for the 61st Regiment to be inpossession of Malinta Hill by dawn, readyto support a second landing.

Twenty-four hours after Sate’s forcelanded, the division’s main assault effortwould strike beaches between Morrisonand Battery Points, near James Ravine,and at the neck of the island. This secondlanding force, four heavily reinforced in-fantry battalions, would have the assist-

‘ Many survivors and a number of accountsof this siege credit the .Japanese with havingas many as 400 artillery pieces firing on thefortified islands by 5 May. The figure of 37batteries (approximately 150 pieces ) representsonly the enemy artillery units listed in 14t/tArmul?ept, 187 as part of the Corregidor attackorganization.

ante of Sate’s unit which was scheduledto make a concurrent attack against Ram-say Battery hill. Throughout the wholeoperation the artillery on Bataan, op-erating under army control, was to deliverpreparatory and supporting tires, and indaylight hours the army’s air squadronswere to fly close support missions,

The _@h Division had three infantrybattalions in reserve for its attack but didnot expect that they would be needed. TheJapanese were confident that their prepar-atory bombardment had knocked most ofthe fight out of Corregidor. Every ter-rain feature on the island was plotted andregistered on artillery target maps andany signal for support from the assaultforces would call down a smother of ac-curate fire on the defenders. The enemyfelt certain that dusk of 7 May would seetheir assault troops in control of Cor-regidor.

LIFE OAT A BULL’S EYE 4

During the 27 days between the fall ofBataan and the assault on Corregidor,life on The Rock became a living hell. Themen in the open gun pits and exposedbeach defenses were subjected to an increas-ing rain of shells and bombs, It becamevirtually impossible to move about the

4Unless otherwise noted the material in ttdssection is derived from .!7S.4FFll-uSFIPlte~t;Moore Rept; lth Mar Jnl; Hayes Rept; Capt C.B. Brook, USN’, Personal Experiences 8Apr-6 May 56, n.d., hereinafter cited as Brook; MajH. E. Dalness, USA, “The Operations of the 4thBattalion (Provisional ) 4th Marine Regimentin the Final Counterattack in the Defense ofCorregidor 5-6 May 1942,” AdvInfOff Course194%50, The InfSch, Ft. Benning, Ga., herein-after cited as Da tn(’8.s; Ferfw 80n; ~cakin 8;

lstLt O. E. Saalman, IJSA, Personal Experiences12Apr-6May42, n,d., hereinafter cited asSaalman.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 18’7

island by daylight; enemy artillery spot-ters aloft in observation balloons on Ba-taan and in planes overhead had a clearview of their targets. The dense vegeta-tion which had once covered most of Cor-regidor was stripped away by blast andfragmentation to reveal the dispositions ofHoward’s command. The tunnels throughMalinta Hill, their laterals crowded withheadquarters installations and hospitalbeds, offered refuge for only a fraction ofthe 11,000-man garrison and the rest ofthe defenders had to stick it out ~ith littlehope of protection from the deadly down-pour.

Most of the escapees from Bataan wereordered to join the 4th Marines, thus add-ing 72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men to itsstrength between 9 and 12 April.5 Themajority of the Army combat veterans,however, “were in such poor physical con-dition that they were incapable of evenlight work,” ‘ and had to be hospitalized.The mixed collection of infantry, artillery,aviation, and service personnel from bothAmerican and Philippine units assigned tothe beach defense battalions was in littlebetter shape than the men who had beencommitted to the hospital under MalintaHill. The commander of 1/4’s reserve,First Lieutenant Robert F. ,Jenkins, Jr.,who received a typical contingent of Ba-

taan men to augment his small force com-mented that he:

. . . had never seen men in such poor physicalcondition. Their clothing was ra~~ed and

‘ The former sergeant major of 2/4 believesthat the reghnent joined substantially more menthan this figure which appears in the regimentaljournal. He recalls that the 2d 1% “picked upfor rations, and on the crudest rolls, at least 600men” and believes that the other battalions didthe same. Jac%xon.

‘ Wainuwight’s Story, 87.

stained from perspiration and dirt. Their gaunt,unshaven faces were strained and emaciated.Some of them were already suffering from beri-beri as a result of a starvaflon diet of rice forweeks. We did what we could for them and thenput them to work on the beach defenses.’

The sailors from Mariveles, mostly

crewmen from the now-scuttled Cizn.opus,

were kept together and formed into a new275-man reserve battalion for the regi-

ment, the 4th Battalion, 4th Marines.aNot only was the designation of 4/4 un-usual, but so was its makeup and its per-sonnel. Only six Marines served in thebattalion: its commander, Major FrancisH. Williams, and five NCOS. The staff,company commanders, and platoon lead-ers were drawn from the nine Army and 18

Navy officers assigned to assist Williams.gThe four rifle companies were designatedQ, R, S, and T, the highest lettered com-panies the men had ever heard of. An-other boast of the bluejackets turned Ma-rines was that they were ‘the highest paid

battalion in the world, as most of the men

‘ Jenkins,~~.* Most survivors of 4/4 refer to the battalion

as having had approximately 500 men in itsranks. Strength breakdowns of the 4th Marexist up through lNlay42,howe~er, and nowheredo they support the larger figure. The S–3 of4/4 is certain that the total strength of the bat-talion on 6 nay was no more than 350men. MajO. E. Saalmanltr to CMC, 220ct56, hereinaftercited as Smlrnan1956.

9Survivors of 4/4 are unable to agree on theidentity of the man who served as ExO of thebattalion; at least five Army or Navy officershave been mentioned. In addition,the possibilitythat a hlarine who was closely connected with4/4 was de facto ExO was brought out by oneof the NC(M who recalls that “Major WilliamsalwaYs considered Gunner Joe Reardon [QMClkJoseph J. Reardon] as his Executive Officer andAdjutant.” MSgt K. n’. Mize ltr to CMC, 1Nov56.


were petty officers of the upper paygra ales.” 1°

The new organization went into bivouacin Government Ravine as part of the regi-mental reserve. The reserve had here-tofore consisted of men from theHeadquarters and Service Companies, re-inforced by Philippine Air cadets andMarines from Bataan. Major Max W.Schaeffer, who had replaced Major Kingas reserve commander, had organized thisforce of approximately 250 men into twotactical companies, O and P. CompanyO was commanded by Captain RobertChambers, ,Jr. and Company P by Lieu-tenant Hogaboom; the platoons were ledby Marine warrant officers and seniorNCOS.

A good part of Schaeffer’s men had pri-mary duties connected with regimentalsupply and administration, but each after-noon the companies assembled in thebivouac area where the troops were in-structed in basic infantry tactics and theemployment of their weapons. Despitethe constant interruptions of air raids andshellings, the Marines and Filipinos hada chance “to get acquainted with eachotherl familiarize themselves with eachothers’ voices, ancl to learn [the] t,ean-work” 11 so essential to effective combatoperations. Frequently, Major Schaetierconducted his company and platoon com-manders on reconnaissance of beach de-fenses so that the reserve leaders would befamiliar with routes of approach and ter-rain in each sector in wllicll they mighttight .

While Schaeffer’s ul~it had had sometime to train before the ,Japanese steppedup their bombardment of the island in

‘“ Brook, 1.“ Ferga30n, lo.

late March, Williams’ battalion was organ-ized at the inception of the period ofheaviest enemy fire and spent part of everyday huddled in foxholes dug along thetrail between Geary Point and Govern-ment Ravine. *2 Any let-up in the bom-bardment would be the signal for smallgroups of men to gather around the Armyofficers and Mlrine NCOS for instructionin the use of their weapons and the tacticsof small units. Rifles were zeroed in onflcxating debris in the bay and for mostof the men this marksmanship training wastheir first since 11’avy boot camp. Whendarkness limited ,Japanese shelling toharassment and interdiction fires, thesailors formed eager audiences for theArmy 13ataan veterans who gave them aresum6 of enemy battle tactics. Everyman was dead serious, knowing that hischances for survival depended to a largeextent upon how much he learned. “Thechips were down; there was no horse-play.>’ ‘3

To a very great extent the record of the4th Battalion in the fighting on Corregidorwas a tribute to the inspirational leader-ship of its commander. During the try-ing period under enemy she]lfire andbombilig when the battalion’s characterwas molded, Major Williams seemed to beomnipresent; wherever the bombardmentwas heaviest, he showed up to see how hismen were weathering the storm. Whenon separate occasions Battery Crockett andthen Battery Geary were hit and set afire,lie led rescue parties from 4/4 into thel’esulting holocausts of flame, chokingsmoke, and exploding ammunition torescue the wounded. He seemed to have

‘2 Dr. (’, E, Chonn ltr to CMC, 12Nov56, herein-:Ifter cited as Chunn.

‘3 Dalness, 7.


an utter disregard for his own safety inthe face of any need for his presence.Survivors of his battalion agree withstartling unanimity that he was a giantamong men at a time when courage wascommonplace.

Raw courage was a necessity on the forti-fied islands after Bataan’s fall, since therewas no defiladed position that could notbe reached by ,Japanese 240mm howitzersfiring from Cavite and Bataan. Thebombers overhead, increasingly bold asgun after gun of the antiaircraft defenseswas knocked out, came down lower to pin-point targets. Counterbattery and anti-aircraft tire silenced some enemy guns andaccounted for a number of planes, butnothing seemed to halt the buildup ofpreparatory fires.

On 28 April Howard issued a warning tohis battalions that the next day would bea rough one. It was the Emperor’s birth-day and the Japanese could be expected to“celebrate by unusual aerial and artillerybombardment.”’4 The colonel’s prophecyproved to be a true one, and on the 29th oneobserver noted that even “the kitchen sinkcame over.”’5 The birthday celebrationmarked the beginning of a period when theenemy bombarded the islands without let-up, day and night. The men manning thebeach defenses of Corregidor’s East Sectorfound it:

. . . Imactically impossible to get any rest orto repair any damageto our positions and barbedwire. Our tield telephone system was knockedollt ; our water supply was ruined (drinkingwater had to be hauled from the other end of theisland in large powder cans) . . Corregidor wasenveloped in a cloud of smoke, dust, and thecontinuous roar of bursting shells and bombs.

“ ~tk Mar .Inl, 392.‘5Parker, 20.

There were many more casualties than we hadsuffered in the previous five months.la

About three days prior to the Japaneselanding, Lieutenant Colonel Beecher re-ported to Colonel Howard that defensiveinstallations in the 1st Battalion% sectorwere:

,.. practically destroyed. Very little defen-sive wire remained, tank traps construct~ withgreat difficultyhad been rendered useless, and allmy weapons were in temporary emplacementsasthe original emplacements had been destroyed.I told Colonel Howard at this time that I wasvery dubiousas to my ability to withstanda land-ingattack in force. ColonelHoward reported thefacts to General Wainwright, who, according toColonel Howard, said that he would never sur-render. I pointed out to Colonel Howard that Ihad said nothing about surrender but that I wasmerely reporting the facts as it was my dutyto do?f

The increase in the fury of the Japanesebombardment with the coming of May,coupled with the frequent. sightings oflanding craft along the eastern shore ofBataan, clearly pointed to the imminenceof an enemy landing attempt. The lastsuccessful effort to evacuate personnelfrom the island forts was made on thenight of 3 May. The submarine Spear#tshsurfaced after dark outside the mine fieldsoff Corregidor and took on a party of of-ficers and nurses who had been orderedout., as well as a load of important USFIPrecords and a roster of every person stillalive on the islands.’s The 4th Marines

“ Jenkin8, 15-16.“ BriGen C. T. Reecher ltr to Mr. G. J. Berry,

17Mar50 (deposited by Capt G. J. Berry, USMCR,in the USMC Archives, 300ct56 ).

“ Submarines were the beleaguered garrison’sonly contact with Allied bases outside the Phil-ippines during most of the siege. Although thesubs brought in rations, antiaircraft ammunition,and medical supplies on scattered occasions, the

190 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAATAL

sent out their regimental journal, its lastentry, dated2 May, the list of the five menwho had been killed and the nine who hadbeen ~vounded during the day’s bombard-ment.

To one of the lucky few who got ordelsto leave on the A’pear$sh the receding is-land looked “beaten and burnt to acrisp.>’ lD In one day, 2 May, USFIP esti-mated that 12 240mm shells a minute hadfallen on Correg-idor during a five-hourperiod. On the same day the ,Japaneseflew 55 sorties over the islands dropping12 1,000-pound, 45 500-pound, and 159200-pound bombs.’” The damage was ex-tensive. Battery Geary’s eight 12-inchmortars were completely destroyed as wasone of Battery Crockett’s two 12-inch guns.The enemy fire also knocked out of actiontwo more 12-inch mortars, a 3-inch gun,three searchlights, five 3-inch and three.50 caliber antiaircraft guns, and a heightfinder. Data transmission cables to the

guns were cut in many places and all com-~nunication lines were damaged. The

beach defenses lost four machine guns, a37mnl, and a pillbox; barbed wire., minefields, and rm~iboat obstacles were tornapart.

The logical landing points for an assaultagainst Corregidor, the entire East Sectorand the ravines that gave access to Topsideand Middleside, received a special workingover so steady and deadly that the effec-tiveness of the beach defenses was sharply

amount that they COU1(lcarry was only enoughfor stop-gap relief. For the interesting story ofthe diversified subn)arine actions in support ofUSAFFE-USI!’lP see, T. Roscoe, United S’tatcs~ubrrlrrri?le t>pf>ratio)(s in world Wcrr II ( An.

napolis: U. S. Na~-al Institute, 1949). 23-39,‘“ Parker, 22.

‘0 Philippine .iirOpsRcc, Plate 8.

reduced. Casualties mounted as the men’sfoxholes, trenches, and shelters crumbledlmder the fire. L-nit leaders checking thestrrte of the defenses were especially vul-nerable to the fragments of steel whichswept the ground bare. By the Japanese-itppointed X-Day (5 May) the 1st Battal-

ion had lost the commander of Company A,Major Harry C. I.ang, and Captain PaulA. Brown, commanding Company B, hadbeen hospitalized as a result of severe con-cussion suffered during an enemy bombingattack.” Three Army officers attached tothe Reserve Company, an officer of Com-pany B, and another of Company D had allbeen severely wounded.

Despite the damage to defenses it had solaboriously constructed, the 4th Marineswas ready, indeed almost eager, to meet a

,Japanese assault after days and weeks ofabsorbing punishment without a chance tostrike back. On the eve of a battle -whichno one doubted was coming, the regimentwas perhaps the most unusual Marine unitever to take the field. From an under-strength two-battalion regiment of lessthan 800 Marine regulars it had grownuntil it mustered almost 4,000 officers andmen drawn from all the services and 142clitlerent orgtmizations.zz Its ranks con-

tained 72 Marine officers and 1,368 enlisted

“ Beeeher ltr to Rerry, op. cit.“ The last complete contemporary breakdown

of strength of the 4th lMar by component units iscontained in -$th .11({wJ)tt, 390. It was correctedthrough 1 May. .4 slightly earlier list dated28Apr42, detached from the journal book but un-mistakably once part of it, has an interestingappendix which gives the units from which at-tached personnel originated. It shows that 26Navy, 104 American and Philippine Army, 9Philipl)ine Scout, and 3 Philippine Constabularyorganizations furnished men to the 4th Mar.


Marines, 37 Navy officers 23and 848 blue- The units that actually met the Japanesejackets, and 111 American and Philippine at the beaches—1/4, 4/4, and the regimen-Air Corps, Army, Scout, and Constabulary tal reserve—had such a varied makeup thatofficers with 1,455 of their men. it deserves to be recorded: 24

I 1

ServicecomponentHqCo I SerCo

——

off——- ——___. _—_— —__ . ——— ~

USMC &USMCR -------------------- 14USN (MC & DC)_____________________ 3USN---------------------------------USER. - . . . . . . . ---------------------- . . . . . .USA--------------------------------- 1Philippine Insular Navy ---------------- . . . . . .Philippine Army Air Corps ______________ 6Philippine Scouts ---------------------- ______Philippine Army ----------------------- ------Philippine Constabulary ---------------- ------

Totals ------------------------- 25

THE JAPAA7E8E LA NZ31iVG2’

The area chosen by the Japanese fortheir initial assault, the 4th Marines’ EastSector, was a shambles by nightfall on 5

“The five Marine officers, two Navy doctors,and 96 Marine enlisted men previously capturedin China and on Bataan have been omitted fromthese figures.

“The lMay42 listing of regimental strengthdoes not indicate the tactical breakdown of Hqand SerCos into Cos Oand P. The figures shown,

—— —En] Off Eal

—. ,——I

80 6 637 ------ 1

16 ______ 121 ------ . . . . . .

1 ------4 ______ _._:_.

83 ------ ------. . . . ..1......

— — —211 7 65

1stBn

off——

1631

26

7

1

53

.—Enl

344137830

286-----

2173322

1

1, 024

4thBn

off Enl

1 52 6

16 262--. -.— ------

9 2

28 1 275

May. Twodays earlier theregimental in-telligence journal had noted that:

There has been a distinct shifting of enemyartillery fire from inland targets to our beachdefenses on the north side of Corregidor thepast 24 hours.%

This concentration of fire continued and

intensified, smashing the last vestiges ofa coordinated and cohesive defensive zoneand shaping 1/4% beach positions into anirregular series of strong points where a

therefore, include a number of regimental staffofficers, probably two-thirds of the total, and a few machine guns and 37mm’s were stillfew enlisted men who did not serve in Maj in firing order. A pair of PhilippineSchaeffer’s command. One officer and five en-

. -.

Scout-manned 75mm guns, located justlisted men have been deducted from SerCo’sUSMC Strength and added to that of 4/4.

26cTn~eHs otherwise noted the material in this i94kFebruary 1947, hereinafter cited as BaM-

sertion is deri~-ed f mm U8AJ’FE- 1T8FIP Rept; win .Narratiw’; Fall of the Philippines; K. Uno,

Moore Rept; Ihth Army Rept; Howard Rept; Corvegidor: 181e of Delwion (China : Press Bu-

MG H. M. l?erreIl, Personal Experiences 5-6 reau, Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters,

May42, n. d., hereinafter cited as Frrrell; September 1942) ( located at OCMH), herein-

Jenkiws; H. W. Baldwin, “The Fourth Marines after cited as Isle of Delusion.

at Corregidor,” MP Gamtte, in 4 parts November m4th }far R–2 Jnl, 8Dec41–3May42, last entry.


east of North Point, which had never re-vealed their position, also escaped the de-structive tires. Wire lines to commandposts were ripped apart and could not berepaired; “command could be exercisedand intelligence obtained only by use offoot messengers, which medium was un-certain under the heavy and continuousartillery and air bombardment.”’7

Along the northern side of the hogbackridge that traced its course from MalintaHill to the bend in Corregidor’s tail, Com-pany A and the reserves of 1/4 waited dog-gedly for the Japanese to come. Therewas no sharp division between unit defensesectors, and the men of the various unitsintermingled as the bombardment demol-ished prepared positions. Along the bat-tered base and sides of Malinta Hill, aspecial target for enemy the, were the menof Lieutenant Jenkins’ Reserve Company.Next to them, holding the shoreline up toInfantry Point, was a rifle platoon organ-ized from 1/4’s Headquarters Company;Captain Lewis H. Pickup, the companycommander, held concurrent command ofCompany A, having taken over on thedeath of Major Lang. The Ist Platoon un-der First Lieutenant William F. Harrisdefended the beaches from Infantry toCavalry Points, the landing site selectedin Japanese pre-assault plans. MasterGunnery Sergeant John Mercurio’s 2d Pla-toon’s positions rimmed the gentle curveof land from Cavalry to North Point. Ex-tending from N’orth Point to the tip of theisland’s tail were the foxholes and ma-chine-gun emplacements of First SergeantNToble W. Well’s 3d Platoon.

Positions along the top of the steepsouthern face of the East Sector)s domin-ant ridge were occupied by the platoons

‘“ Ut+lAFFE-USFIP Rept, 77.

of Company B under First LieutenantAlan S. Manning, who had taken overwhen Captain Brown was wounded.2s Themachine guns and 37mm’s of Captain NoelO. Castle’s Company D wera emplaced incommanding positions along the beacheson both sides of the island; the company’smortars were in firing positions near Ma-linta Hill.

At about 2100 on 5 May, sensitive soundlocators on Corregidor picked up the noiseof many barges warming Llp their motorsnear Limay on Bataan’s east coast. Warn-ing of an impending landing was flashedto responsible higher headquarters, but thelack of wire communication kept the wordfrom reaching the men in the foxholesalong the beaches of the East Sector. Theydid not need any additional advice of en-emy intentions anyway, since the wholeregiment had been on an all-out alert everynight for a month, momentarily expectingJapanese landing barges to loom out ofthe darkness. The men of 1/4 had with-stood some pretty stiff shellings, too, asthey waited, but nothing to compare withthe barrage that began falling on thebeach defenses manned by Harris’ 1st Pla-toon at about 2245.

The Japanese had begun to deliver theshort preparatory bombardment designedto cover the approach of Colonel Sate’sassault waves which was called for in theiroperation plan. If Sate’s boat groupsadhered to their schedule they would ren-dezvous and head in for the beaches just asthe artillery fire lifted and shifted to thewest, walling off the landing area fromAmerican reinforcement efforts. The regi-ment would be ashore before the moon rosenear midnight to give Corregidor’s gun-ners a clear target. In two respects the

%LtCol R. F. Jenkins ltr to CMC, 300ct56.


plan miscarried, and for a while it. wastouch and go for the assault troops.

The artillery shoot went off on schedule,but Sate’s first waves, transporting most ofhis IstBattalion, were carried by an unex-pectedly strong incoming tide hundreds ofyards to the east of the designated landingbeaches. Guides in the oncoming craftwere unable to recognize landmarks in thedarkness, and from water level the tail ofthe island looked markedly uniform assmoke and dust raised by the shelling ob-scured the shoreline. The 61at Regiment’s2d Battalion, slated to follow close on theheels of the Ist,was delayed and disruptedby faulty boat handling and tide currentsuntil it came in well out of position andunder the full light of the moon.

When the Japanese preparatory fireslifted shortly after 2300, the troops alongthe East Sector beaches spotted the scat-tered landing craft of the Ist Batt&ion,61st heading in for the beaches at NorthPoint. The few remaining searchlightsilluminated the barges, and the island’stail erupted with fire. Enemy artilleryknocked out the searchlights almost as soonas they showed themselves; but it madelittle difference, since streams of tracer

bullets from beach defense machine gunsfurnished enough light for the Scout 75’snear North Point and 1/4’s 37’s to find tar-

gets. A Japanese observer on Bataan de-scribed the resulting scene as “sheer massa-cre,?’ 29but the enemy Ist Battalion came in

close enough behind its preparation to geta good portion of its men ashore. Althoughthe Japanese infantrymen overwhelmedMercurio’s 2d Platoon, the fighting wasfierce and the enemy casualties in the waterand on the beach were heavy. Colonel

“ Quoted in Isle of Delusion, 17.

Sate, who landed with the first waves,sorely needed his gd Battalion’s strength.

This straggling battalion which beganheading shoreward about midnight suf-fered much more damage than the firstwaves. The remaining coast defense gunsand mortars on Corregidor, backed up bythe fire of Forts Hughes and Drum,churned the channel between Bataan andCorregidor into a surging froth, whippedby shell fragments and explosions, Themoon’s steady light revealed many directhits on barges and showed heavily bur-dened enemy soldiers struggling in thewater and sinking under the weight oftheir packs and equipment. Still, somemen reached shore and Colonel Sato wasable to organize a drive toward his objec-tive, Malinta Hill.

Individual enemy soldiers and machine-gun crews infiltrated across Kindley Fieldand through the rubble of torn barbedwire, blasted trees, and, crater-pockedground to Denver Battery, a sandbaggedantiaircraft gun position which stood onrelatively high ground south of CavalryPoint. The American gunners, whoseweapons were out of action as a result ofthe bombardment, were unable to beat backthe encroaching Japanese who establishedthemselves in a commanding position withfields of fire over the whole approach routeto the landing beaches. Captain Pickup’sfirst word that the ,Japanese had seizedDenver Battery came when he sent one ofCompany D’s weapons platoon leaders,Marine Gunner Harold M. Ferrell, to es-tablish contact with the battery’s de-fenders. Ferrell and one of his men foundthe battery alive with enemy soldiers dig-ging in and setting up automatic weapons.Ferrell immediately went back to his de-fense area west of Infantry Point and


brought up some men to establish a line“along the hogsback to prevent the enemyfrom coming down on the backs of the menon the beaches.;> 30

Pickup came up shortly after GunnerFerrell got his men into position and con-sidered pulling Lieutenant Harris’ platoonout of its beach defenses to launch anattack against the enemy. After a con-ference with Harris the company com-mander decided to leave the 1st Platoonin position. ,Japanese landing craft werestill coming in , and the platoon’s with-drawal would leave several hundred yardsof beach open. The fact that enemytroops were ashore had been communi-cated to Lieutenant Colonel Beecher’s CPjust inside Maliuta Tunnel’s east entrance,and small groups of men, a squad or so ata time, were coming LIp to build on theline in front of Denver Battery. Theenemy now fired his machine guns steadily,and intermittent but heavy shellfire struckall along the roads from Malinta to Den-ver. Casualties were severe throughoutthe area.

By 0130 surviving elements of 1/4 on theeastern tip of the island were cut off com-pletely from the rest of the battalion.13eecher was forced to leave men in posi-tion on both shores west of Denver Batteryto prevent the enemy landing behind hislines. .411 the men who could be sparedfrom the beaches were being sent L~pto thedefensive position astride the ridgelinejllst west of Denver, but the strength thatcould be assembled there amounted to littlemore than two platoons including a fewPhilippine Scouts from the silenced anti-boat guns in I/4’s sector. No exact fiaguresreveal how many ,Japanese were ashore at

“0Fmvwll, 1.

this time or how- many casualties the 61stZn~an.try’s assault companies had suffered,but it was plain that the enemy at DenverBattery outnumbered the small force try-ing to contain them, and ,Japanese snipersand infiltrating groups soon began to cropup in the. rear of Pickup’s position.

The situation clearly called for the com-mitment of additional men in the East Sec-

tor. Colonel Howard had made provisionfor this soon after getting word of the

landing attempt. He alerted Schaeffer’s

command of two companies first, but heldoff committing Williams’ battalion untilthe situation clarified itself. There wasno guarantee that the ,Japanese would ac-commodate the 4th Marines by landing alltheir troops in the East Sector; in fact,there was a general belief among the menmanning the defenses which commandedthe ravines leading to Topside that theEast Sector landing was not the maineffort and that the enemy would be comingin against West and Middle Sectorbeaches.3] Complicating the entire prob-lem of command in the confused situationduring the early morning hours of 6 Maywas the fact that, only runners could getword of battle progress to Beecher?s andHoward’s CP. And any runner, or forthat matter any man, who tried to makethe 1,000-yard journey from the Denverline. to the mouth of Malinta Tunnel stooda good chance of never completing his mis-

sion. The area east of Malinta Hill wasit killing ground as Schaeffer’s men soonfound out when they made their bid toreach Denver Battery.

“ l{fr~c.’iRrpt, Statement of LCdr E. M. Wade,W. The ~e)tcrat existence of this belief wasquestioned by one surviror. ,Jach’son.


THE (’OMMITME,+’T OF

THE RE/SER VE 3’

In Government Ravine the 4th Marines’reserve companies Saw and heard the ma-chine guns along the East Sector beacheshammering at the Japanese landing craft.Major Sclmeffer’s command was alreadystanding by to move out, and near 2400Companies O and P filed down the trailand started for Malinta. There was littleconfusion, for the men had rehemsed theirmovements often. Crossing Bottomsideby means of a tank trap which protectedthem from enemy shellfire, they moved intoMalinta Tunnel where company and pla-toon commanders supervised the distribu-tion of machine-gun ammunition and gre-nades cached there for just such an emer-gency. Volunteers from the Navy andMarine headquarters installations joinedthe companies to serve as ammunitioncarriers “although they were neither offi-cially or morally obligated to do so.’? 33

Major Schaeffer reported to ColonelHoward and received his instructions; hewas to take his men out into the East Sec-tor and counterattack the Japanese posi-sion. At 0200 the companies began tomove out of the oppressive heat xnd foulair of the crowded main tunnel onto thedeeply cratered roads which led to Den-ver.3~ Lieutenant Hogaboom’s Company

3’ unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from lTS.4FFE-VS’FIP Rcpt;

l~th Army Rept: Howard I@t; Fer.qt(so~z; Fer-rcll; Hogaboom; ,Jt’nliin. q,. 13aldwin 1$’arrati~~;Isle of Dela8ima; Full of thr Philippines.

= Ferguson, 14.a By the time the Japanese landed, the only

road into the East Sector was that which ledthrough Malinta Tunnel. The road cut Gut ofthe side of the hill on the north had been com-pletely demolished, and Col Howard, looking foran alternate route of approach, had discovered

P was in the lead, following the left forkof the road behind its guide, CaptainGolhmd L. Clark, Jr., the 1st BattalionAdjutant. As the last platoon of the com-pany cleared the tunnel it was diverted toa vicious fire fight raging on the right ofthe Marine line by an officer who had comeback seeking reinforcements. Severalenemy machine guns had been set up nearthe base of a stone water tower forvardof Denver Battery and to the right frontof the Marine positions. The platoon, incommon with most of the rest of the unitsthat tried to reduce this strong point, waschopped to pieces by interlocking bands ofmachine-gun fire.

On Clark’s order, Hogaboom deployedhis remaining two platoons in line of skir-mishers once they were well clear of thetunnel, The. advancing line made contactwith Lieutenant Harris and the remnantsof Company A’s 1st Platoon holding theleft of the Denver defensive position andtied in with them. Hogaboom found thathis right flank was open; Captain Cham-bers’ Company O which was to have fol-lowed him out of the tunnel and come upon his right was not to be found.

Chambers’ men had left the tunnel allright, but almost immediately after thecompany column cleared the entrancebright flares were seen going up over the

,Japanese position. Chambers and his 1stPlatoon leader, (l,luarterrnaster ClerkFrank W. Ferguson, concluding that the

flares were a signal to the artillery onBataan, passed the word along the line to

look for the nearest shelter. The guess on

shortly before the landing that enemy artilleryhad blown a deep, ra~ine-like depression in thesouthern circling road that rendered it impassableto organized troop movement. Howard Inter-

%ieu~.

196

the flares was right, and Ferguson’s pla-toon was fortunate in taking its shelling inan area where the Japanese had provideddeep bomb craters. The platoon camethrough with only eight casualties. Assoon as the bombardment lifted, Fergnsonmoved toward Denver until he was forcedto deploy by heavy machine-gun and mor-tar fire. He looked for the 3d Platoon tocome up on his right according to plan, butonly its commander, Quartermaster Ser-geant John E. Haskin, and five men ap-peared, the rest had been lost in the shell-ing. Captain Chambers sent up the reserveplatoon, which was in even worse shape,having been caught in the open near thetunnel entrance. Quartermaster ClerkHerman L. Snellings had only four sur-\,ivors alive and unwounded.

Company O now contained but one pla-toon and had not yet made its attack.

Major Schaeffer established control overthe scattered groups of men from the 1stBattalion and the reserve and launchedthree separate counterattacks on the dug-inJapanese. Sometimes the men would getup the slopes leading to the battery gunpits, but they were always driven back,

fewer in number each time. On the rightflank, Sergeant Major John H. Sweeneyand Sergeant Haskin took advantage of

the water tower’s battered elevation to hurlgrenades down on the machine guns thatwere holding up the advance; Haskin waskilled trying to get more grenades up toSweeney, and Sweeney was picked offafter he had knocked out at least one ofthe guns. Ferguson, who knew and hadserved with both these long-time regulars,wrote their simple epitaph:

They were very close friends in life and it wasmost tltting that they should go out together.’s

“ ~w~wn, 18.


Many close friends died that morning in

the darkness and choking dust as the Jap-

anese and the Americans and Filipinos

faced each other from positions less than

forty yards apart. Some men cut off be-

hind the enemy lines still kept firing at

occasional landing craft that were coming

in to reinforce sate. Hogaboom could see

the tracers of a single .50 caliber and felt

that “the bullets smacking into the armor

of the barges sounded like rivet hammers

rattling away.” % 13very movement of the

Japanese botats which stood in number off-

shore was counted as an attempt at land-

ing, although many of them were impro-

vised gunboats whose mission was protect-

ing and supporting the landing craft. But

detachments of Sate’s force kept coming in

all night, and one enemy lieutenant, prob-

ably a member of one of the 61.~t’ssupport-ing units, gave a vivid description of thehelpless feeling of the men in the bargesas they were caught in Corregidor’s fire:

American high powered machine guns poureda stream of bullets on us from all directions.Rifle fire added to the hail of death. Our menwho were huddled in the center of the boat wereall either killed or wounded. Those who clung

to the sides were hit by shells that pierced thesteel plating. The boat had already sprung sev-eral leaks when we finally came within landingdistance of Corregidor. Desperately I gave the

signal and led the charge against the shore de-f enses. I don’t remember how many men re-sponded. 1 know I heard only a small chorus.In that mad dash for shore many were drownedas they dropped into the water mortallywounded. Many were killed outright . . . Ifit had not been for the fact that it was the darkhour before the dawn, pitch black, I doubt if anyof us would be alive today to tell the story.a’

However heavy the Japanese casualtieswere, they did not measurably weaken the

‘“ Hogaboom, 16.

‘7 Quoted in Isle of Delusion., 34.


firepower of the Denver position. Eachattack by Schaefferjs men thinned the Ma-rine line still more, Lost were officers andN(2OS whose leadership was vital to theoperations of mixed units such as thosewhich held the Japanese at bay. CaptainCastle of Company D was killed trying tosilence a machine gun, and many smallunit leaders who still held their place inline were badly wounded. The situationwas so desperate that Colonel Howardcould no longer hold his last reserves outof the action. He ordered the 4th Bat-talion to move into the East Sector andjoin the embattled defense line.

THE 4TH BATT.4LIOiVI,3J A 12TIOiV 38

Major Williams’ 4th Battalion had beenalerted early in the night’s action, and hehad ordered the issue of extra ammunition

and grenades. At about 0100 he got theword to move the battalion into MalintaTunnel and stand by. The sailors pro-ceeded cautiously down the south shoreroad, waited for an enemy barrage whichwas hitting in the dock area to lift, andthen dashed across to the tunnel entrance.In the sweltering corridor the men pressedback against the walls as hundreds ofcasualties, walking wounded and littercases, streamed in from the East Sectorfighting. The hospital laterals were filledto overflowing, and the doctors, nurses,and corpsmen tended to the stricken menwherever they could find room to lay a

‘*Unless otherwise noted the n]aterial in thissection is derived from USAFFE-L7SFIP Rept;l~th A?my Rept; Howard Rept; Brook; Dalnew;

SSgt C. E. Downing, Personal Experiences 5-6-May@ n. d. ; Perga.!+ on;Fcrrell; Hogaboom;Jenkins; Btzldwin Narrative; Isle of Delwsion;B’all of thc Ph ilippinrs.

man down. At 0430, Colonel Howardordered Williams to take his battalion outof the tunnel and attack the Japanese atDenver Battery.

The companies moved out in column.About 500 yards out from Malinta theywere caught in a heavy shelling thatsharply reduced their strength and tempo-rarily scattered the men. The survivorsreassembled and moved toward the fight-ing in line of skirmishers. Companies Qand R, commanded by two Army officers,Captains Paul C. Moore and Harold E.Dalness, respectively, moved in on the leftto reinforce the scattered groups of rifle-men from Companies A and P who weretrying to contain the Japanese in thebroken ground north of Denver Battery.The battery position itself was assigned toCompany T (Lieutenant Bethel B. Otter,USN), and two platoons of Company S,”originally designated the battalion reserve,were brought up on the extreme rightwhere Lieutenant Edward N. Little, USN,was to try to silence the enemy machineguns near the water tower. The blue-jackets filled in the gaps along the line—wide gaps, for there was little that couldbe called a firm defensive line left—andjoined the fire fight,

The lack of adequate communicationsprevented Colonel Howard from exer-

cising active tactical direction of the battlein the East Sector. The unit command-ers on the ground, first Captain Pickup,then Major Schaeffer, and finally Major

Williams made the minute-to-minute de-cisions that close combat demanded. Bythe time Williams’ battalion had reorgan-ized and moved up into the Marine for-ward positions, Schaeffer’s command was

“ Saalman 1956.

198 PEARL HARBOR TO GU~DALCANAL

practically nonexistent. Williams, bymutual consent ( Schaeffer was senior),took over command of the fighting sincehe was in a far better position to get thebest effort out of his bluejackets whenthey attacked.~

At dawn Major Williams moved alongthe front, telling his officers to be readyto jump off at 0615. ‘l’he company andplatoon command posts were right up onthe firing line and there were no reservesleft; every officer and man still able tostand took part in the attack. C)n the leftthe Japanese were driven back 200–300yards before Williams sent a runner tocheck the advance of Moore and Dalness;the right of the line had been unable tomake more than a few yards before thewithering fire of the Denver and watertower defenses drove the men to the deck.The left companies shifted toward Denverto close the gap that had opened whilethe men on the right tried to knock outthe ,Japanese machine guns and mortars.Lieutenant otter was killed while leadingan attack, and his executive, Captain Cal-vin E. Chunn, took over: Chunn waswounded soon after as Company T chargeda ,Japanese unit which was setting up afield piece near the water tower.” Lieu-tenal)t Little was hit in the chest andWilliams sent a Philippine Scout officer,First I,ieutenallt Otis E. Saalman, to takeover Company S.

The Marine mortars of 1/4, 3-inchStokes without sights, were not accurateenough to support Williams’ attack. Hehad to order them to cease fire when strayrounds fell among his own men, who had

closed to within grenade range of the Jap-anese, Robbed of the last supporting

‘0Mi2e ltr, op. cit.4’ Chl(nn.

weapons that might have opened a breachin the Denver position, the attack stalledcompletely. Major Schaeffer sent. War-rant officer Ferguson, who had succeededto command of Company O when CaptainChambers was wounded, to Colonel How-ard’s CP to report the situation and re-quest reinforcements. Ferguson, likeSchaeffer and many of the survivors of 1/4and the reserve, was a walking woundedcase himself. By the time Ferguson gotback through the enemy shelling to Ma-linta at 0900, Williams had received whatfew reinforcements Howard could muster.Captain Herman H. Hauck and 60 men ofthe 59th Coast Artillery, assigned by Gen-eral Moore to the 4th Marines, had comeup and Williams sent them to the leftflank to block Japanese snipers and ma-chine-gun crews infiltrating along thebeaches into the rear areas.

At about 0930 men on the north flank ofthe Marine line saw a couple of Japanesetanks coming off barges near CavalryPoint, a move that spelled the end on Cor-regidor. The tal~ks were in position to ad-vance within a half houI, and, just as themen in front of Denver Battery spottedthem, enemy flares went Llp again and ar-tillery salvoes crashed down just forwardof the Japanese position. Some men be-gan to fall back, and though Williams andthe surviving leaders tried to halt thewithdrawal, the shellfire prevented themfrom regaining control. At 1030 Williams

sent a message to the units on the left flankto fall back to the ruins of a concrete trenchwhich stood just forward of the entranceto Malint a Tunnel. The next thirty min-

utes witnessed a scene of utter confusionas the Japanese opened up on the retreat-ing men with rifles: mortars, machine guns,and mountain howitzers. Flares signalled


the artillery on Bataan to increase its fire,and a rolling barrage swung back andforth between Malinta and Denver, demol-ishing any semblance of order in the ranksof the men straining to reach the dubiousshelter of the trench. “Dirt, rocks, trees,bodies, and debris literally filled, the air,” 4’and pitifully few men made it back toMalinta.

Williams, who was wounded, androughly 150 officers and men, many of themalso casualties, gathered in the trench ruinsto make a stand. The Japanese were lessthan three hundred yards from their posi-tion and enemy tanks could be seen movingup to outflank their line on the right. TheMarine major, who had been a tower ofstrength throughout the hopeless fight,went into the tunnel at 1130 to ask Howardfor antitank guns and more men. But thebattle was over: General Wainwright hadmade the decision to surrender.

SURRENDER 4’

Colonel Howard had personally re-ported the landing of the Japanese tanksto General Wainwright at 1000. TheUSFIP commander, who had kept currenton the situation in the East Sectorthroughout the night’s fighting, made thefateful decision to surrender. He laterrelated that “it was the terror that is vestedin a tank that was the deciding factor,” forhe “thought of the havoc that even one ofthese could wreak if it nosed into the tun-nel, where lay our helpless wounded . . .’? 44He did not believe, nor did any other otTi-

“ ~alne8S,18.43Unless otherwise noted the material in this

section is derived from USAFFE-USFIP Rep t;

lJth Arn6g Rept; Howard Rept; Baldwin Nurra-tive; Fall of the Philippines; Wai?tWright’8 Story.

44Wain.wrigh t’s StoW, 119.

448777 0—58——14

cer he consulted, that the defenses outsideMalinta could last more than the remain-ing hours of the day, and he set the hour ofsurrender for noon in order %o avoid thehorrors which would have accrued had Ilet the fight goon until dark.” *

The order to surrender was passed to thetroops on Topside and Middleside alongwith instructions to destroy all weaponslarger than .45 caliber. The sickened menof the 4th Marines’ !2d and 3d Battalions,who had been forced to stand by helplesslyas they heard and watched the battle to theeast, carried the order even further, smash-ing their rifles against the rocks. Veteransof fighting in World War I and a dozen“banana wars” stood unashamedly cryingas they were told they would have to sur-render, Inside Malinta, Colonel Howardordered the regimental and national colorsof the 4th Marines burned, to prevent theirfalling into enemy hands. Two 1st Bat-talion officers, Captain Clark and Lieuten-ant Manning, a field music, and an inter-preter were selected to carry Wainwright’sflag of truce to the Japanese. .4s the whiteflag was carried out of the tunnel, MajorWilliams ordered survivors of the EastSector fighting to move inside the hill andtake shelter from the Japanese bon~bard-ment which still was falling.

Captain Clarks party passed the lastAmerican outpost; the music sounded offand Manning waved a pole which bore apiece of sheeting. The enemy infantry-men, who had been given special instruc-tions regarding the reception of flags oftruce, did not iire, and Clark was taken tothe senior Japanese officer on the islandwho cent acted Bataan and arranged fora parley on the peninsula with GeneralHomma. When Mrainwright, accompa-

4’Ibid., 186.

200 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LGANAL

denied by a few senior officers and aides,walked out of the tunnel and up the longslope toward Kindley Field, he saw deadand dying men on every hand, a grimrecord of the ferocity of the fighting in thepast 12 hours.

No complete figures exist for the casual-ties suffered by either side on 5–6 May;estimates of the Japanese losses rangefrom 900 to 4,000.* - The strait betwe~nBataan and Corregidor was heavily dottedwith enemy bodies, and American pris-oners on Corregidor estimated that ~heyhelped collect a~d cremate the remains ofhundreds of Japanese soldiers.” The de-tailed losses of the 4th Marines will prob-ably never be known because of the joint-service nature of the regiment at the timeof battle and the scarcity of contemporaryrecords. The casualties of Marines aloneare known, however, and they may be con-sidered indicative of the fate of soldiersand sailors who served with them. In thewhole Philippine campaign the regiment

MMost American survivors of the battle men-tion that they heard from the Japanese later inprison camp that the enemy had suffered almost4,000 casualties in trying to take Corregidor.However, Japanese officers commenting on Dr.Morton’s draft manuscript of The Fa.tl of the

PhUippine8 wrote that the total casualties of theJapanese in the Corregidor operation between14Apr-7May42 were 603. MilHistSec, SS, GHQ,FEC, Comments of Former Japanese Officers Re-garding “The Fall of the Philippines,” 19Apr42(located at OCMH), Chap XXXI, 3.

4’ Saalrnan1956. Saalman recalls having re-marked to Maj Williams shortly after daybreakon 6 May, “I believe we could walk from Corregi-dor to Bataan over dead bodies.” In light of thenumber of bodies that were collected and cre-mated, Saalman is convinced that the 903 figuresupplied by the Japanese in commenting on thedraft of The Fall of the Philippine reflects onlyenemy dead rather than total casualties.

4’ See Appendix D for Marine casualties.

had 315 officers and men killed, 15 missingin action presumed dead, and 357 menwounded; ~ the great majority of thesecasualties occurred during the battle forCorregidor.

The bloody battle for the island fortressdid not end with Wainwright’s decision tosurrender. The Japanese went right. aheadwith their assault plan and preparatorybombardments, paying no heed to thewhite flags displayed on all the islands inthe bay. Eighty-eight. tons of bombs weredropped on 6 May, a good part of themafter the surrender.” Wainwright, whohad released his southern Philippine com-manders to Mac.4rthurk control before heattempted to meet the enemy commander,tried to surrender only the fortified islandsto the Japanese. He was rebuffed coldlyby Homma’s emissary and told that theJapanese knew that he was commander ofall the forces in the Philippines and thatthey would not accept his surrender unlessit meant the capitulation of every man inhis command, everywhere in the islands.The American general, convinced that theJapanese would treat the men on the forti-fied islands as hostages, perhaps even mas-sacre them if the fighting continued in thesouth, finally acceded to the enemy demandand broadcast a surrender message at mid-night on 6 May to all his commandingofficers. There was considerable dissensionregarding this order, especially on islandswhere the Japanese had not made mucheffort to subdue the Philippine Armytroops, but eventually most of the organ-ized units of USFIP came out of the hillsto lay down their arms. Wainwright felt,as did most of his advisors at the time, thatthe Japanese were quite capable of slaugh-tering the men surrendered on the fortified

“ Philippine AirOp8Rec, Plate 8.


islands if he did not insure a completesurrender of all his forces.

The struggle for control of Manila Bayfinally ended on 7 May when the Japaneseoccupied the last of the island forts, butfor most of the captured men “the fightfor life had just begun.” 50 Thousandssuccumbed in the next three years to brutalmistreatment, malnutrition, and disease inJapanese prison camps in the Philippines,in the enemy home islands, and in Man-churia. Two hundred and thirty-nineoflicers and men of the 4th Marine Regi-ment died in enemy hands,

CONCLUSION

The battle for Corregidor was bitterand confused; relatively few men survivewho fought in the East Sector through thenight and morning of 5–6 May 1942.Hundreds of well-trained infantrymen inpositions within a mile or so of MalintaHill were only spectators and auditors ofthe fighting. The poorest-trained ele-ments of the 4th Marines constituted thevital mobile reserve. On the surface andin hasty consideration it would seem thatthe tactics of the beach defense left muchto be desired.

Corregidor, however, was not a fortresswith only one entrance. The beachesfronting the ravines defended by 2/4 and3/4 led directly to the island’s major de-fensive installations. The threat of am-phibious assault existed all around theisland’s perimeter, but especially along thenorthern and western shores. The Japa-nese. laid down preparatory fires all alongthe north side of the island, devoting asmuch attention to James Ravine and Bot-

tomside west of Malinta as they did the

50Jenkins, 19.

eastern beaches. Until the night of 5 Maythere was no compelling reason to believethat the East Sector would draw the firstassault. And even after the enemy landedat North Point the very present threat towestern Corregidor existed and could notbe ignored. To meet it, a number of .4rmyunits were alerted to back up the positionsof 2/4 and 3/4.51

The problem which Colonel Howardfaced of when, where, and in what strengthto commit the reserves available to himwas a classic one for commanders at alltroop levels. If he committed all his re-serve at one time and in the area ofgreatest existing threat, he distinctly in-creased the vulnerability of other sectorsto enemy attack. If he committed onlypart of his reserve and retained the capa-bility of reinforcing against further at-tacks, he stood the chance of not usingenough men to have a decisive effect inany sector. The decision to commit thereserve piecemeal reflected the regiment’sestimate of the enemy’s capabilities andintentions in light of their actions.52 TheJapanese, although opposed by a rela-tively small force, did not or could notvigorously pursue their advance afterreaching the Denver position. The con-tinued presence of numerous small craftoff Corregidor’s north shore indicated apossible, even probable, early attempt ata. second landing. lTmjer these circum-

stances the East Sector assault might well

be a secondary effort which had stalled,

with the enemy’s main attack still to come.

Actually this was the Japanese plan, with

the difference that the second landing was

to follow the first after a day’s interval

“ Col F. P. Pyzick ltr to CMC, 300ct56- Howard Interview.


rather than as soon as the Marinesexpected.

In large part the 4th Marines’ reservestrength wasalready comrnitte don5 May,The ,Japanese preparatory fires, especiallythose which were laid on areas in plainsight of Bataan, made movement by anybody of troops extremely difficult-witnessthe fate of Company O. The bombard-ment had the effect of tying the regimentto its defenses. The trained infantrymenin its ranks were kept where they could dothe most to bolster the crucial beach posi-tions.53 If any sizable number of thesemen had been withdrawn from the beachesto forma reserve, it is questionable whetherthe remaining men could have withstoodany enemy assault. Once the Japanese be-gan to bombard Corregidor in earnestthere was no such thing as a strong beachdefense position; the very fury of the bom-bardment, destroying as it did most of theprepared defenses and demolishing themajor supporting weapons, placed a high

premium on having the best infantrymenat the point where their value would begreatest—the beaches.

The fall of Corregidor was inevitable;the garrison simply did not have enoughfood to hold out until relief could arrive.Although the enemy, primarily for pres-tige and propaganda reasons, choose to as-sault the island, they could easily havestarved its defenders into submission.When the Japanese did make their attackthey paid a high price for their haste,but extracted as great a one from the de-fenders. In the immediate tactical sense,however, the enemy artillery was the vic-tor in the siege and fall of Corregidor; nodefending force could have withstood its

devastatingly accurate bombardment.Although it was a defeat, the battle of

Corregidor is marked down in the annalsof the 4th Marines as a fight to be proudof. Those who fought and died in itsranks, whatever their service of origin,were, if only for a brief moment, Cor-regidor Marines.

PART V

Decision at Midway

CHAPTER 1

Setting the Stage:Early Naval Operations’

Early in January 1942 the U. S. PacificFleet ~~aslooking for a way to strike backat the Japanese; and advocates of the fastcarrier force, believing their case ironicallyhad been proven by tie Japanese at Pea~lHarbor, ~~ere read; to test-their theories.’But first there were some fences to mend.The all-important communications chainto Australia and New Zealand was rathertenuous, and the bulk of the Navy had tobe used for escort duty until reinforce-ments could be put ashore to bolster someof the stations along the route.

One of the most important links in thiscommunication chain was Samoa. The

worst was feared for this area when the

‘ Llnless otherwise noted the material in Part

V is derived from Rising Sun in the Pacific; S. E.Morison, Corul Seu, .llidwav and flabrnarine .4c-tion~, May 19~Z–.Lt{gust 1942: History of UnitedStates Naval Oprration.s in World Wor II (Bos-ton : Little, Brown and Company, 1949), here-inafter cited as Coral Sea a~bd Midwag; L7. S. &

Sea Power; M. Fuchida and M. Okurniya, .lfid-way: Thf Battle That Doomed Japan (Annapo-lis: (’. S. Xaval Institute. 1955), hereinafter citedas Battle That Downed Japarz; Marinc8 at Mid-UWV; “The Japanese Story of the Battle of Mid.way,” OIVI Rctiicw, May 1947, hereinafter citedas OIVI Rruiew.

‘ “There was still much difference of opinion[shout the effectiveness of the carrier strikingforce] until 7 Dee 1941 when the Japanese attacktook the controversy out of the laboratory class.,. Japan knifed us with our own invention.”Capt Miles R. Browning, USN, “The Fast CarrierForce,” MC Gazette, .June 1946, 19.

Pago Pago naval station was shelled bya Japanese submarine on 11 January whilethe 2d Marine Brigade (composed for themost part of the 8th Marines and the 2dDefense Battalion) still was en route to theislands from San Diego. But on 23 Jan-uary after the Marines’ four transportsand one fleet cargo vessel were deliveredsafely to Samoa, Vice Admiral WilliamF. Halsey’s Enterprk force, togetherwith a new fast carrier force commandedby Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcherand formed around the Ym%town, were re-leased for the raiding actions that the fleetwas anxious to launch.

While the 2d Marine Brigade unloadedat Samoa on 23 January, the Japaneselanded far to the west at Rabaul wherethe small Australian garrison was quicklyoverrun. Although the importance ofRabaul to the Japanese w-as not realizedat once, it was soon clear that from theBismarcks the enemy could launch an at-tack through the Coral Sea toward ALM-tralia and N’ew Zealand. This threattended to increase rather than diminishthe danger to Samoa. It was reasonedthat a Japanese attack there would precedea strike at Australia or h’ew Zealand toblock U. S. assistance to the Anzac areas.Japanese occupation of Makin Island inthe Gilberts seemed to point towardSamoa, and naval commanders held thatthe best insurance ag~inst subsequent

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SETTIh’G THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL 01’ERATIOA”S 207

moves would be a raid a~~inst the Mar-sballs, from which much of this ,Japaneseaction w asmounted. Halsey’s Entetp?iwforce therefore set out to strike W’otjeand Maleolap, seaplane bases in the Mar-shalls. while Fletcher prepared to attackMili and ,Jaluit (also in the Marshalls)plus Makin with his l’orlcto~cn group.(See Map 9)

A submarine reconnaissance found theMarshal]s lightly defended and spot-ted the largest concentration of Japaneseplnnes and ships at Kwaj alein Atoll inthe center of the island group. Halseydecided to add this choice target to hislist, and for the missions he divided TaskForce 8 into three groups. The Enterpm”.se

with three destroyers would strike Wot j e,Maloelap, and Kwajalein; Rear AdmiralRaymond .1. Spruance with the cruisersiVorthampton and ,Sa~tLake City plLMonedestroyer would bombard Wotje; andCaptain Thomas M. Sl~ock in USS(’hester, and with two destroyers, wouldshell Maloelap. The three southern atollsin the Marshalls group and Makin in thenorthern Gilberts would, be attencled to byFletcher in the Yonltown with his inde-pendent command ( TF 17) made up of thecruisers Lou{.y viJJeand ii’t.[.ouis and fourdestroyers.

The twin attacks struck on 1 February.Halsey began h~uncbing at 0443 under afull moon when his carrier was just 36miles from Wotje. Kwajalein, the mainobjective was 155 n~iles away. N’ine tor-pedo bombers and 37 dive bombers led offthe attack, the SBIYS striking Roi air baseon the nortl~ern end of the atoll and the tor-

pedo bombers bitt ing Kwaj alein Islanclacross the lagoon.

At Kwaj alein the hlu~ting was better;

but. in spite of the fact. that there was no

fighter opposition, and that the reportsbrought, back by pilots were enthusiastic,damage to the Japanese instaktions andshipping was slight. Five Wildcats shotdown two Japanese planes over Maloelap,and nine S13D’S that returned from Roilater sortiecl again and damaged some air-field installations. The surface bombw-d-ment, too, was disappointing, and thebombardment flagship, Chester, took alight bomb through her main cleck and losteight men killed and eleven wounded.

To the south, Fletcher had bad luck over,Taluit when his fliers found their targetsconcealed by thunder showers. Two ,Jkp-anese ships off ,Jabor Town were hit, butnot sunk, and the damage ashore w-asslight. A mine layer was hit at Makin,and damage at Mili was also slight.

Similar actions were continued in otherareas of the Pacific to harass the .Japmeseand to provide at least one outlet, for effortsto fight back at the enemy when the newsfrom all other fronts was gloomy. Mostnotable were strikes in early March agpinstVTake and Marcus Island, and the daringraid by planes of Admiral Wilson Brown’stask force over YTew Guinea’s 15,000-footOwen Stanley Mountains to hit the ,Jap-anese newly moved into Lae and Salamaua.lll~t in all cases actual damage to theenemy still failed, to measure LIp to ex-pectations, much less to the reports turner]in by overenthusiastic aviators.

Most audaciolls and unorthodox of theattacks, of course, was that which launchedI,ieutenant Co]onel ,James H. I)oolittle andhis Army raiders from the Hornet’s deckto tile 18 .Ipril Tokyo raid. Planned as“sonlething really spectacular”-a properretaliation for Pearl Harbor-the raid wasdesigned more for its dramatic impactupon morale than for any other purpose.In that it was highly successful.

SETTING THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL OPER.4TIONS 209

After security-shrouded planning andtraining, Doolittle’s 16 B–25’s left SanFrancisco on 2 April 1942 on board theHornet which was escorted by cruisersVincennes and Nashville, four destroyers,and an oiler. After a 13 April rendezvouswith the Enterprise of Halsey’s TF 16, theraiding party continued along the north-ern route toward the Japanese homeislands.3 Enemy picket boats sighted theconvoy when it was more than 100 milesshort of the intended launching range,and, with Doolittle~s concurrence, Halseylaunched the fliers at 0725 on 18 Aprilwhile the Howwt bucked in a heavy sea668 miles from the Imperial Palace incentral Tokyo.4

Much of the rai~s anticipated shockeffect on Tokyo was lost by the coincidenceof Doolittle’s arrival over the city at aboutnoon just as a Japanese air raid drill wascompleted. The Japanese, confused bythe attack which followed their ownmaneuvers, offered only light oppositionto the B–25’s which skimmed the city attreetop level to drop their bombs on mili-tary targets. One plane which struckKobe received no opposition, although twoothers over Nagoya and Osaka drew heavyfire from antiaircraft batteries; but nonewas lost over Japan.

Halsey managed to retire from thelaunching area with little difficulty, and

‘ Plans called for the bombers to land onfriendly Chinese fields some 1,093 miles fromTokyo, and completion of this trip for the planesloaded initially with four 500-pound bombs and1,140 gallons of gasoline required that they belaunched within 500 miles of Tokyo.

4 .klthough the picket boats were prompt witha warning, Japanese interception attempts weretardy. It was assumed that Navy planes, witha shorter range than B–25’s, were on the carrier,and that the force could not strike Japan untilthe ships steamed for another day.

both carriers returned to Pearl Harbor on25 April. Although the raid did more toboost American morale than it did todamage Japanese military installations,more practical results came later. It al-lowed a Japanese military group whichfavored a further expansion of their terri-torial gains to begin execution of theseambitious plans, and this expansion effortled directly to the Battle of Midwaywhich “. . . alone was well worth the ef-fort put into this operation by . . . [those]. . . who had volunteered to help even thescore.’> 5

The first of Japan’s planned expansionmoves in the spring of 1942 aimed forcontrol of the Coral Sea through seizureof the Southern Solomon Islands andPort Moresby on New Guinea as basesfrom which to knock out growing Alliedair power in northeastern Australia.Seizure of New Caledonia, planned as partof the third step in the second major seriesof offensives, would complete encircle-ment of the Coral Sea. This would leavethe LT. S. communications route to theAnzac area dangling useless at the SamoanIslands; and later ,Japanese advanceswould push the U. S. Pacific Fleet back to

Pearl Harbor and perhaps even to thewest coast.

Characteristically, the Japanese plan

called for an almost impossible degree oftiming and coordination. It depended forsuccess largely on surprise and on theIT. S. forces behaving just as the .Japanese

hoped that they would. But this secondelement was largely corollary to the first,and, when surprise failed, the Japanesewere shocked to discover that the U. S.fleet did not follow the script.

‘ Rising SW tn. the Pacific, 398.


The Japanese anticipated resistancefrom a U. S. carrier task force known to belurking somewhere to the south or south-east, but theyexpectedt ocornert his forcein the eastern Coral Sea with a pincersmovement of carrier task forces of theirown. Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi wouldskirt to the east of the Solomons with hisStriking Force of heavy carriers Shoha.kwand Zui?ca.ku and move in on the U. S. shipsfrom that direction, while Rear AdmiralAritomo Goto’s Coverv”ng Force builtaround the light carrier A’hoho would closein from the northwest. Destruction of thenortheast Australian airfields would fol-low this fatal pinch of the U. S. fleet, andthen the Port More.sby Inwzsion Groupcould ply the southeastern coast of NewGuinea with impunity.

But Japanese overconfidence enabledU. S. intelligence to diagnose this opera-tion in advance, and Fletcher’s Task Force17 had steamed into the Coral Sea where heall but completed refueling before the firstJapanese elements sortied from Rabaul.On 4 May Fletcher’s Lemington, Yorktown,screening ships, and support vessels werejoined by the combined Australian-Ameri-can surface force under Rear Admiral J. C.Crate of the Royal Navy.

On the previous day the Japanese hadstarted their operation (which they called~~fifo~~)like any other routine land grab.

A suitable invasion force, adequately sup-ported, moved into the Southern Solomons,seized Tulagi -without opposition b andpromptly began setting up a seaplane base.There Fletcher’s planes startled them next

“Tulagi, with which U. S. forces were to get

better acquainted, was the capital of the BritishSolomon Islands Protectorate. Officials andsuch garrison as existed had been amply fore-warned and evacuated several days earlier. SeePart VI of this volume.

day with several powerful air strikes onthe new garrison and on the Japanese shipsstill in the area. The U. S. carrier planesstruck virtually unopposed,7 but theycaused little damage in proportion to theenergy and ammunition they expended,This startling deviation from the “Mo”script caused the Japanese to initiate theremaining steps of the operation withoutfurther delay.

The Battle of the Coral Sea proved thefirst major naval engagement in historywhere opposing surface forces neither sawnor fired at each others Although bothwere eager to join battle, combat intelli-gence was so poor and aerial reconnais-sance so hampered by shifting weatherfronts that three days passed before themain forces found each other. But otherthings they did find led to a series of eventson the 7th that might be described as acomedy of errors, although there was noth-ing particularly comical about them to

those involved.Early that morning an over-enthusiastic

.Japanese search pilot brought Takagi?+ en-tire striking air power down on the U. S.fleet tanker Neosho and her lone convoying

destroyer, the USS Nimx, by reportingthem as a carrier and heavy cruiser re-spectively. This overwhelming attacksank the A!hnx and so damaged the A7~osho

‘ Experience to date had indicated to the Jap-anese that one of their landings constituted afait accompti which no enemy would dare dis-pute, and the na~al force supporting the landinghad departed in order to get on with the war.Takagi’s powerful Carrier Striking Force at thistime lay north of Rougainville to keep beyondthe range of Allied air search.

8 “SO many mistakes were made on both sidesin this new mode of fighting that it might becalled the Battle of Xal-al Errors. ” Coral Sea

anc7 Midmau, 63.

SETTING THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS 211

that she had to be destroyed four dayslater.

Not to be outdone, the Americans reactedsimilarly a short time later to a scoutplane’s report of two Japanese carriers andfour cruisers north of the Louisiades. Ac-tually these craft were a subordinate enemytask group consisting of two old lightcruisers and three converted gunboats.But more by good luck than good manage-ment, the attacking planes investigatingthe report sighted the Japanese coveringForce, then protecting the left flank of theI>ort M ores by in.vasion Group, and con-centrated on the Nfioho to the virtual ex-clusion of her consorts. Against 93 air-craft of all types, the lone light, carrier hadno more chance than Task Force Neosho-A’im.s had against the Japanese, and, herdemise prompted the morale-boostingphrase, “Scratch one flattop !” g

As a result of these alarms and excur-sions, both commanding admirals hadmissed each other once again. By mid-afternoon, however, Takagi had a prettygood iclen of the LT. S. carriers’ locationand, shortly before nightfall, dispatched abomber-torpedo strike against Fletcher.Thanks to a heavy weather front, theseplanes failed to find their target, andAmerican combat air patrol interceptedthem on their attempted return. In theconfusion of dogfights, several Japanesepilots lost direction in the gathering dark-ness and made the error of attempting to1and on the Yor?ctoum?o

9“Scratrh one flattop ! Dixon to Carrier,Scratch one flattop !“ Voice radio report LCdrR. E. Dixon to USS I,e.rinqtoti, quoted in Coralk’ea and Midway, 42. Action against the tlltoho

was U. S. Navy Air’s first attack on an enemycarrier.

‘0 Six planes in two groups of three each. Al-though they were recognized and fired on, all but

Early the following morning, U. S.search planes finally located the Japanesecarriers at about the time the Japanese re-discovered the U, S. flattops. At last thestage was set for the big show.

Loss of the flhoho had cut the Japanesedown to size. The opponents who sluggedit out on 8 May 1942 were evenly matched,physically and morally, to a degree rarelyfound in warfare, afloat or ashore?’ How-ever, at the time the battle developed, theJapanese enjoyed the great tactical advan-tage of having their position shrouded bythe same heavy weather front that hadcovered the U. S. carriers the previousafternoon, while Fletcher% force lay inclear tropical sunlight where it could beseen for many miles from aloft.

The attacking aircraft of both partiesstruck their enemy at nearly the same time(approximately 1100), passing each otheren route,’2 The two Japanese carriers andtheir respective escorts lay about ten milesapart. As the Yorktown’s planes orbitedover the target preparatory to the attack,the Zuikaku and her screening force dis-appeared into a rain squall and were seen

one escaped. In this action the Japanese lost 9planes in combat and 11 attempting night land-ings without benefit of homing devices, againstU. S. loss of 2 fighters.

“ A lucid summary of the several factors in-volved occurs in Coral Sea and Midway, 48.Fletcher’s potential marked advantage in surfacescreening strength had been dissipated when,early on 7 May, he had dispatched Crate’s force ofcruisers and destroyers on a dash westward tointercept the enemy transport convoy expected toround the southeastern tip of New Guinea thenext morning en route to attack Port Moresby.For analysis of this perhaps ill-judged move andits results, see Ibid., 37–39.

“ “The story current shortly after the battle,that the Japanese and American planes sightedbut paid no attention to each other when passingon opposite courses, is not true.” Ibid., 52n.


no more during the brief action that fol-lowed, thereby escaping damage. So allU. S. planes that reached the scene concen-trated on the Shokaku, but with disap-pointing results.

The Yorktown7.s torpedo bombers wentin first, low and covered by fighters. Butfaulty technique and the wretched qualityof U, S. torpedoes at this stage of the warcombined to make this attack wholly in-effective: hits (if any ) proved to be duds,the pilots launched at excessive ranges,and the torpedoes traveled so slowly thatvessels unable to dodge had only to out-run them. The dive bombers, followingclosely, scored only two direct hits. Butone of these so damaged the. Shokaku’sflight deck that she could no longerlaunch planes, although she still wascapable of recovering them. Many of theLexington planes, taking off ten minutesafter those from Yorktown, got lost in theovercast and never found their targets.Those that did attack made the same mis-takes the Yorktown fliers committed. Thetorpedoes proved w%olly ineffective, andthe damaging bomb hit on the ,S”hokwkuwas something less than lethal despite the

pilot’s enthusiastic report that she was

“settling fast.:”s

The ,Japanese did considerably better,

thanks to vastly superior torpedoes and

launching techniques. Two of these

powerful “fish” ripped great holes in the

Lexington’s port side, and she sustained

two direct bomb hits plus numerous nearmisses that sprang plates. The moremaneuverable York to /r71 dodged all of thetorpedoes aimed at her and escaped allhilt one of the bombs. l]ut this was an800-pounder, and it exploded with sLlch aspectacular display of flame and smoke

“ Ibid.,51.

that the .Japanese pilots may be excusedtheir claim that they had sunk her.

These events made up the Battle of theCoral Sea. It was all over by 1140.

Preoccupation of both forces with theflattops left opposing escort vessels un-scathed, although the Japanese claimed tohave left burning ‘Lone battleship orcruiser.” ‘~ The Americans had sustainedfar the heavier damage and casualties, buthad inflicted the greater tactical blow inknocking the .S’hokaku. out of further of-fensive action while both U. S. carriersstill were operational. Even the crippledLemh,gton had put out fires, shored uptorpedo damage, and was capable of sus-taining 25-knot speed and conductingnearly normal flight operations an hourafter the battle ended.

The ,Japanese had lost the greater num-ber of planes: 43 from all causes against33 for the Americans. Their command,accepting at face value the ecstatic reportsof their pilots that they had sunk both 17. S.carriers, started the beat-up S’hokahw forhome, and in the afternoon commencedwithdrawal from the area on orders from

Rabaul. Admiral Takagi concurred withhigher authority that it-would be unwise

to risk the vulnerable transport convoy inthe narrowing waters of the western CoralSea in face of the Allies’ Australian air-fields under cover of the whittled-downair complement of the single operational

carrier. So the Port Moresby [n.vasionGroup was ordered back to Rabaul.

But the final, tragic act of the drama re-

mained. The gallant old Gzin.gton, herwounds pat ched up anc1 aplmrently fit toreturn to Pearl H;~rbor for permanent re-pairs, w-as suddenly racked by a terrible

“ Ibid., 56.

SETTIXG THE STAGE: EARLY XAVAI, OPERATIONS 213

exl)losion. This res(dted only indirectlyfrom enemy :~ction: relezsed gasolineflmles were ignited by sparks from a gen-erator sonleone hacl carelessly left running.This set off lvhat anlounted to a chain re-act ion. The best elforts of her crew avatlednothing, and at 1707 her skipper gave theor(ler to abandon ship. This movementwas carried out in the best order, Ivithoutthe loss of a man. At about 2000, nearlynine hours after the ,Japanese had with-drawn from the battle, torpedoes of her

own escort put her under the wavesforever.

I.oss of the Leiw%gton gave tactical vic-tory to the Japanese. 13ut by thwartingthe invasion of Port Moresby, principalobjective of the entire operation, theL“nited States won strategic victory. Atthe time the enemy regarded this merelya postponement of their invasion phms;but events would prove that. no ,Japaneseseaborne invasion ever would near PortMoresby again.

CHAPTER ~

Japanese Plans: Toward Midwayand the North Pacific

Apparently ignoring this setback in theCoral Sea, Japan next turned toward theCentral and North Pacific to launch thesecond complicated operation on her sched-ule. Admiral Yamamoto’s two-prongedthrust at Midway and the Aleutians wouldautomatically wipe clean the Coral Seareverses and extend the outer perimeterof defense a safer distance from the homeislands. And in the bargain, Yamamotohoped, these attacks would lure forth theremainder of the L’. S. fleet so that hecould finish off the job he started on 7December?

The admiral accepted his aviators’ re-ports that they had destroyed both U. S.carriers in the Coral Sea, and he there-fore reasoned that the tT. S. could bringno more than two flattops against him any-where in the Pacific. Actually the PearlHarbor yard had put. the Yorktoum backinto operation in less than 48 hours so thatthe U. S. had three carriers, including theEnterprise and the Hornet. But againstthese Yamamoto had seven, and four sea-plane carriers as well. His force also con-tained 11 battleships, including three ofthe latest type.’ The U. S. had no battle-

‘ Battle T?Lot Doomed Japan, Chaps 4 and 5,pu.wirn. The Aleutians phase was intended onlyas a diversion and to protect the northern flankof the Midway thrust, the plan being to with-draw the landing troope in September. Ibid., 79.

~Adm Yamamoto flew his flag in the Ymnuto,the largest, fastest, and most heavily armed ( 18”guns) ship in the world.

ships+r at least none in position for thisupcoming battle.3 And Yamamoto alsohad a substantial edge over the U, S. incruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Butthe Japanese admiral squandered this lop-sided advantage by dispersing his armadain widely scattered groups and openedhimself for defeat in detail by the inferiorLT.S. Pacific Fleet.’

This Japanese fleet, divided for thecomplicated plan into five major forces,with some of these split into smallergroups, steamed eastward independentlyto carry out the various phases of the sec-ond step in this strategy for 1942. Planesfrom two light carriers in the Second Mo-Me Force would strike Dutch Harbor,Maska on 3 June to confuse the U. S. com-

‘ Although some of the battleships knockedout at Pearl Harbor had been put back in serv-ice, and three others had been brought aroundfrom the Atlantic, these ships were operatingfrom the west coast as a final defense for theu. s.

‘ In view of subsequent developments, Morisondescribes Yamamoto’s disposition as “cockeyed.”Coral Sea and Midwag, 77–79. See also BattleThat Doomr’d Japan, 73–78. These Japaneseauthors, although sometimes carefully kind toYamamoto (who was killed later in a SolomonIslands air action ), are most often highly criticalof the Japanese Navy and of war plans in general.Although the work is valuable and serious (n. b.the final two paragraphs of the book, at pages247–248), the authors sometimes sound like menon the morning after, ruefnlly surveying the nightbefore.

214

J.4PANESE PLANS : TOWARD MII)WAY AND THE NORTH PACIFIC 215

mand and to cover diversionary Japanese.landings in the western Aleutians by theOccupation Forces for .&dak-Attu andKiska. Next the (’omier Striking Fome,commanded by Vice Admiral ChuichiNagumo, would soften Midway with theplanes from the big fleet carriers Akagi,Kaga, Hiryu, and floryu,5 and would thenmove on to strike the first blow at,the U. S.Pacific Fleet if it challenged in a sortiefrom Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Yamamoto’s Main Body, in-cluding three battleships and a lightcruiser of his force plus the .47eutian.Screening Force of four battleships andtwo light cruisers, then would go in forthe kill against the U. S. Fleet. This en-gagement would be followed, after dark-ness on 5 ,June, by Vice Admiral NoblltakeKondo moving in to shell the U. S. basefor two days. Then Kondo’s conroyedTransport Oroup would approach to landthe Midway Occwpction Force of 5,000ground troops. While crossing the Pacific,Yamamoto remained some hundreds ofmiles to the rear with his Main, Body,awaiting word from the .4dvcmce Expe-ditionary Force of large fleet submarinesalready manning stations on the ap-proaches to Pearl Harbor to warn aboutsorties of the American ships.

This ambitious plan might have worked,even though it was over-intricate. Butagain the ,Japanese had allowed their opti-

5Absent members of the original Pearl Harborstriking force were the Shokxzlcu and the Zu ikaku,the former undergoing Coral Sea damage rel}airs,and the latter reforming its air groups batteredin that same action. Presence of these big car-riers at Midway might well hare been decisi~e.

mism and overconfidence to cast the U. S.Pacific Fleet in the role of a timid char-acter actor cued for a vulnerable “walk-on”part. They begged the question of tacticsbefore their plan moved to the operationalstage. The U. S. Fleet, according to Japa-nese plans, would be steaming for theSecond Mobile Force in the Aleutians, orwould be vacillating in Hawaiian waters,until the strong (7arrier Stm”king Force hitMidway and revealed the target of themain effort.G In either event nothing butthe small Marine garrison force wouldstand in the way of the occupation of Mid-way, and the Japanese would have an airbase of their own there before the U. S.Fleet could reach them.

But, as at the Coral Sea encounter, theU.S. Fleet already had sortied to await the,Japanese. For more than a month Nimitzhad been aware that something like thiswas in the wind, and he bet nearly every-thing he had that the strike would hit Mid-way. The weakened Pacific Fleet stoodsome 300 miles northeast of Midway, thereto refuel, before the Japanese picket sub-marines took position. As a result, theseboats sighted no U. S. ships and radioedno reports, and Admiral N’agnmo discov-

ered the presence of the U. S. carriers in amost unpleasant manner.

e Fuchida and Okumiya state that Japaneseplans “calculated that the enemy naval forceswould be lured out by the strike on Midway Islandand not be fore.” Battle That L)oemed Japan, 128.

But in this calculation their overconfidence musthave beeu tempered somewhat, else why the di-version into the Aleutians? Morison discussesthis faulty Japanese strategy, probably more real-istically. Coraz Sea and Midwav, 74-79.

44s777 0—58—15

CHAPTER 8

Midway Girds for Battle’

Even before these Japanese plans weremade, and long before Admiral Yamamotosortied eastward, all U. S. military plan-ners recognized the vulnerable position ofthe Midway Atoll.’ Especially was thisposition clear in the light of early Jap-anese successes elsewhere in the Pacific,and none w-as more keenly aware of thegrim situation than the atoll’s small gar-rison force. The 12 PBY>S of VP-21 weresoon withdrawn, and little help w-as ex-pected from the crippled fleet. But on 17December, while the 6th Marine DefenseBattalion worked to improve existing de-fense installations, 17 SB2U-3’S (Vindi-cators) of Marine Scout-Bomber Squad-ron 231 ( VMSB-231 ) flew in unexpectedlyfrom Hawaii. Led by Major Clarence J.Chappell, Jr., and assisted in over-waternavigation by a PBY, the obsolescent craftmade the 1,137-mile hop in nine hours andtwenty minutes.’ Other reinforcements,

‘ Editor’s Note: Material contained in Chap-ters 3 and 4 is derived mainly from Chapters IIIand IV of the historical monograph Marines atMidwaV by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl,Jr., published by Headquarters, L’. S. MarineCorps, in 1948. This has been extensively re-written and checked against sources subsequentlybrought to light.

2See Part II for a description of the geographyand history of Midway.

3This was then the longest massed flight ofsingle engine landplanes on record, and it hadbeen carried out with no surface rescue craftavailable. CO MAG-21 serial 1173 to MGC,19Dec41. The flight took off from Hickam sinceEwa’s runways were too short for the heavily-laden planes to use with complete safety.

including about 100 officers and men ofBatteries A and C of the 4th Defense Bat-talion, left Pearl Harbor on 19 Decemberwith the old Navy 7-inch b and, the 3-inchguns which had been shipped to Pearl Har-bor for Midway prior to the outset of war.(See Map 10, Map Section)

This force, on board the USS Wright,arrived on Christmas Eve, and LieutenantColonel Harold D. Shannon, who com-manded Marine defense forces on the atoll,turned over to Battery A (Captain CustisBurton, Jr. ) the mission of installing andmanning the 7-inch and 3-inch batteriesto be emplaced on Eastern Island. BatteryC (First Lieutenant Lewis A. Jones) wasassigned the job of setting up its 3-inchbattery on Sand Island.’

Next day Midway received anotherChristmas present: 14 Brewster F2A–3’s,the air echelon of Marine Fighter Squad-ron 221 ( VMF-221 ), flew in from the USSSarotoga which was retiring from theabortive attempt to relieve Wake Island.This squadron immediately began a dailyschedule of air search and patrolling. C)n26 December the 1?SS Tangier brought in

4These 7-inchweapons had been removed frompre-World War I battleshipsandstored in reserveat naval yards. K, J. Bauer, “Ships of the Navy,1775–1945,” (}1S available from the author).

5Interview with LtCol ~. Burton, Jr., 26Sep47,hereinafter cited as llur;on. The two EasternIsland batteries were located side by side on thesouth shore of the island, near the western tip,and the SandIsland battery was set up along thenorth shore of Sand Island.

216

MIDWAY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 217

Battery B of the 4th Defense Battalion(First Lieutenant Frank G. Urnstead) ;additional machine gunners and 12 anti-aircraft machine guns from the SpecialWeapons Group of that same battalion;an aviation contingent of three oflicers and110 enlisted Marines constituting theground echelon of VMF-221; aviationsupplies; additional radar; and much-needed base-defense artillery material.Umstead;s 5-inch battery, along with theisland’s other 7-inch battery, were set upsouth of the radio station on Sand Island.By New Year’s Day of 1942 Midway wasgarrisoned by a strongly-reinforced de-fense battalion, and one fighter and onescout-bomber squadron.

A major air base took shape on EasternIsland under the direction of LieutenantColonel Wrilliam J. Wallace who on 9,January became commanding oflicer of theMarine Aviation Detachment. Individualaircraft. bunkers and underground person-nel shelters were built, emergency fuelingexpedients devised, radars calibrated, andinexperienced operators trained to usethem properly. Colonel Wallace was as-sisted by Major Walter L. <J.Bayler, theMarine aviation oflicer who had been sentback from Wake with that atoll’s lastreports.’;

The first test of this defense came on25 ,January during twilight general quar-ters when a Japanese submarine surfacedabruptly and opened fire on Sand Island,apparently trying to knock out the radiostation. Battery D opened up with its;Lincb guns and forced the enemy craft to

crash-dive three minutes after it had sur-faced. Sand Island and the adjacentlagoon had received from 10 to 15 indis-

6LtCol W. J. Wallace ltr to (3o1 C, .4. Imrkin,18Jan42.

criminate hits, and Captain Buckner’sBattery D had expended 24 rounds.

The next action against the atoll cametwo weeks later, on 8 February, when an-other submarine appeared less than 1,000yards south of Sand Island and openedfire on the radio towers. Captain LorenS. Fraser’s Battery A opened fire on thisboat, and it submerged after Marines hadreturned two rounds. The enemy had hita concrete ammunition magazine, but for-tunately the small arms ammunition wasnot detonated. Two days later anothersubmarine-or the same one—surfacedalmost directly below two Marine fighterplanes flying the sunset antisubmarinepatrol. The submarine got off two roundsbefore First Lieutenant John F. Careyand Second Lieutenant Philip R. White,the fliers, could launch a diving attack.Both rounds from the submarine splashedin the lagoon, and then the boat wasdriven under water by the air attack justas the batteries of the 6th Defense. Bat-talion were going into action. This wasthe last time for a number of months thatMidway was troubled by enemy sub-marines.

.1s the winter wore on, Midway’s air armbegan to profit from the general expansionof Marine Corps aviation, and the twosquadrons and their small provisionalheadquarters on 1 March became MarineAircraft Group 22 (MAG-22). On 20:~pril Lieutenant Co]onel Wallace was sLlc-ceeded in command by Major Ira L. Kimes,and at the same time Major Lofton R.Henderson took command of VMSB-241,(the new designation of former VMSB-231). This was a busy time for MAG-2Z2,which was then converting Eastern Islandfrom a small advanced air base to a majorinstallation capable of handling as manysquadrons and aircraft types as could


physically be accommodated and protectedthere.

On 10 March, during the work and re-organization, the Marine fliers got theirfirst test against enemy aircraft. Radarpicked up a Japanese four-engined“Mayis” (Kawanishi 97) approximately45 miles west of Midway, and 12 fightersunder Captain Robert M. Haynes vectoredout to intercept. They made contact withthe enemy flying boat at 10,000 feet andshot it down.

Although the enemy plane did as well asit could to fight off this attack, this contactwas more important as intelligence forNimitz’ staff in Pearl Harbor than as a testfor the Marine. fliers. Two aircraft of thistype had tumbled four bombs into the hillsbehind Honolulu on the night of 34March, and Nimitz already believed thatthis portended an offensive toward Hawaii.Now this new sighting near Midway gaveadded weight to his estimate, and this in-formation went into the CinCPac intelli-gence “hopper” which shortly thereafterreached the considered opinion that theJapanese attack would strike Midway.By this time the Japanese code had beenbroken, also.’ Thus were the fragmentspieced together into Nimitz’s May 1942decision which caused him to -wager nearlyevery ship he had in an early sortie fromPearl Harbor to the position 300 milesnortheast of Midway from which theJapanese could be intercepted.

It was a bold, even though w-ell-calculated, wager. The many ships onSouth pacific convoy duty had to be lefton their important jobs; Halsey’s Enter-pri,~e and Hornet bad rushed from theDoolittle launching area part way to the

‘ Battle That Doomed ,lapan, 131 ; U. S. & Sea

Power, 686.

Carol Sea and back again to Pearl Harborwhere they were placed under a new com-mander, Rear Admiral Raymond A.Spruance; Fletcher’s Yorktown had justlimped in from the Coral Sea needing anestimated 90 days of repair work; and allthe Fleet’s battleships were on the westcoast where they could not be used (partlybecause Nimitz felt he did not haveenough air strength to protect them, any-way ). But h’imitz was convinced that hisintelligence estimate was correct, and thatthe stand had to be made,

For the engagement Nimitz gaveFletcher, in over-all tactical charge: directcommand of Task Force 17 which includedthe Yorktown, (rushed into shape in twodays rather than 90), two cruisers, and sixdestroyers. Spruance commanded TaskForce 16 which included the Enterpriseand Hornet, six cruisers, and nine destroy-ers. Four oilers and 19 submarines alsowere assigned to the area, and, in addition,a h’orth Pacific Force was formed of fivecruisers and ten destroyers to screen theAleutians. The Japanese had him out-numbered on all counts, and Nimitz knewthat the enemy would be gunning for thethree U. S. carriers. But his carriers like-wise were his only hope, and the admiralordered his subordinates to apply the ruleof calculated risk when they went in withtheir air groups to stop the Japanese.

WThile Nimitz readied this receptioncommittee? the ,Japanese completed theirMidway plans and polished the rough op-erational edges with carrier training and

SFletcher was senior to Spruance, and thus be-came Officer in Tactical Command. But as itturned out, Spruance exercised practically an in-dependent command during the critical days of*6 June, and this probably was fortunate be-cause Fletcher had no aviation staff while Spru-ance had inherited Halsey ’s.

MIDWAY GIRDS FOR B.4TTLE 219

rehearsals. By the last week of May, all,Japanese fleet elements were underway,and on decks Imperial sailors sunbathedand sang songs—vocal eruptions of whathas been described as the “VictoryDisease.”’

Meanwhile on Midway, the focal pointfor these vast efforts, Marines got theirfirst inkling of all this attention whenNimitz flew in on 2 May to see their senioroflicer, Lieutenant Colonel Shannon, andthe atoll commander, Commander CyrilT. Simard. The admiral inspected the in-stallations, and then directed Shannon tosubmit a detailed list of all supplies andequipment he would need to defend theatoll against a strong attack. Nimitzpromised that all available items requestedwould be forwarded immediately, andwithin less than a week men and materialwere being embarked in Hawaii to bolsterthe island strength.

Three more 3-inch antiaircraft batteriestotaling 12 guns, a 37mm antiaircraft bat-tery of eight guns, and a 20mm antiaircraftbattery of 18 guns were temporarily de-tached from the 3d Defense Battalion atPearl Harbor; and two rifle companies ofthe 2d Marine Raider Battalion, togetherwith a platoon of five light tanks, also weresent along to Midway. For M.AG–22, stillflying Brewster fighters and Irought Vin-dicator dive bombers, there would be 16SBD-2 dive bombers and seven relativelynew Grumman F4F–3 fighters.

Shortly after his return from Midwayto Pearl Harbor, A’imitz arranged “spot”promotions to captain and colonel respec-tively for Simard and Shannon, and de-scribed to them in a joint personal letter

SBattle That Doomed Japan, 245. “. . . thespread of the virus was so great,” the authors say,“that its effect may be found on every level of theplanning and execution of the Midway operation.”

the steps being taken to reinforce theiratoll against the anticipated attack.Japanese D-Day, the admiral predicted,would be about 28 May. On the day theyreceived this letter, Simard and Shannonconferred on their final plans for defense,and that evening Colonel Shannon as-sembled his key subordinates and warnedthem of the impending enemy attack..Additional defensive measures and priori-ties of final efforts were outlined, and allrecreational activities suspended. May 25was set as the deadline for completion ofthe measures ordered.

On the 25th, however, came two wel-comed changes for the picture. First,

Nimitz passed the word that the Japaneseattack was not expected until early June,andj second, the first reinforcements ar-rived. On this date the USS St. Louiscame in with the 37mm antiaircraft bat-tery of the 3d Defense Battalion plus thetwo companies of raiders. Four of the37’s were emplaced on each island whileRaider Company C (Captain Donald H.Hastie ) went to Sand Island, and Com-pany D (First Lieutenant John Apergis)to Eastern Island.

Next day the aircraft tender Kittyhawkarrived with the 3d Defense Battalion’s;~-inch antiaircraft group commanded byMajor Chandler W. Johnson, the lighttank platoon for the mobile reserve, andthe SBD–2’S and the F4F–3’s. In thefollowing week additional Army andNavy planes arrived, and by 31 May therewere 107 aircraft. on the island.l”

MBy this date the daily aviation gasoline con-sumptionof planes based on Eastern Island was&5,000gallons, and the following numbers ofplanes were based there: U. S. Army—fourB–26’s and 17 B–17’s; U. S. ~avy—16 PBY–5A’sand six TB~’s; U. S.Marine Corps-19 SBD–2’S,17 SB21~–3’s,21 F2A–3’s, and seven F4F–3’s.


For the ground forces and key civilianworkers who had remained behind to helpdefend the island, the week was equallybusy. Reinforcing weapons were in-stalled, tanks tested in the sand, all defen-sive concentrations registered in, and theemplacing of an extensive system of ob-stacles, mines and demolitions completed.Sand Island now was surrounded with twodouble-apron barbed wire barriers, and allinstallations on both islands were ringedby protective wire. Antiboat mines ofsealed sewer pipe, and obstacles of rein-forcing steel lay offshore; the beaches weresown with homemade mines of ammuni-tion boxes filled with dynamite and 20-penny nails; cigar box antitank mines cov-

ered likely beach exits; and bottles ofmolotov cocktail stood ready at every posi-tion. A decoy mockup airplane (a ,JFU—Japanese fouler-upper) was spotted prom-inently on the seaplane apron, and all un-derground fuel storage areas on SandIsland were prepared for emergency de-struction by demolition.’l

“ The demolition system worked, too. On 22

May a sailor threw the wrong switch and blew

up a good portion of the aviation gasoline. Thesupply was so critical after this that the pilots

who arrived on the Kittvhawk did not get aprebattle chance to check out in their SBD–2’S.

Pipe lines also were wrecked in the blast, and

MAG-22 thereafter had to refuel all planes by

hand from 55-gallon drums.

CHAPTER 4

Midway Versus4-5 June 1942

the Japanese

A Midway PBY spotted the approach-ing Japanese first, at about 0900 on June3:- and tracked them long enough to re-port eleven ships making 19 knots east-ward. These vessels were probably thetransport and seaplane groups of the Occu-pation Force, and they were attacked at1624 by nine B–17’s which Captain Simardsent out following the PBY’s contact re-port. The pilots reported having hit “twobattleships or heavy cruisers’s and twotransports in the group then 570 milesaway from Midway, but the fliers weremistaken in both ship identification andin calling their shots, for they actuallyhit nothing. A Catalina scored on one ofthese oilers later that night in a moon-light torpedo run.

This was enough to convince Fletcherthat the battle would soon be on, and hechanged course from his station 300 mileseast-northeast of Midway to gain a newposition about 200 miles north. Fromthere he could launch his planes the fol-lowing morning against the Japanese car-rier force which was expected to come infrom the northwest. U. S. intelligencestill was good. .Nagumo continued to steamin from the northwest while his transportswere under attack, and near daybreak on4 June, when the Yorktown launched anearly-morning search and while 11 PBY’s

‘ ~lidway (Zone plus 12) time and West Longi-tude date.

were going up to patrol from Midway, hehad reached a position approximately 250miles northwest of the atoll. There at0430 the Japanese admiral launched 36“Kate” torpedo planes and 36 “Val” divebombers, plus 36 escorting Zeros, for thefirst strike against the atoll.

At 0545 one of the Midway PBY’ssighted these planes about 150 miles outfrom the island, and a short time lateranother PBY reported visual contact withtwo enemy carriers and the balance of theJapanese Curvie~ Str+king Fo~ce some 200miles from Midway. Enterprise inter-

cepted this report, but. Fletcher wanted to

recover his search planes and sift further

intelligence before launching his strike,

and so he ordered Spruance to take the van

southwesterly and lead off the attack

ag-ainst the enemy carriers.

Yleauwhile the Midway Marines were

ready for the first shock of attack. Ground

force defenders at general quarters manned

every weapon and warning device, and

MilG-22, which already had fighters up to

cover the sortie of the PBY’s stood by for

orders. lit 0555, shortly after the second

P1;Y report had fixed the position of the

,Japanese Striking Force, the 6th Defense13attalion radar logged a report of “manyplanes,” and the NTavalAir Station raisedsimilar blips almost simultaneously. Airraid sirens began to wail, Condition Onewas set, and the NL4G-22 pilots mannedtheir planes. 130th squadrons were in the

221

MIDWAY VERSUS THE JAPANESE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 223

air in less than 10 minutes, VMF–221heading to intercept the enemy planes andVMS13-241 off to rendezvous station 20miles east where the dive bomber pilotswould receive further instructions.

The VMF fliers under Major Floyd B.Parks sighted the Zero-escorted Val divebombers at 0616 about 30 miles out fromMidway, and Captain John F. Carey,leading one of Parks’ divisions in anF4F-3, launched the attack from 17,000feet. The Marine fliers were hopelesslyoutnumbered, and they found that theZero fighters could “fly rings aroundthem.” They had time for only one. passat the bombers, and then had to turn theirattention to the swarm of Zeros, from oneto five of which got on the tail of eachMarine fighter. Only three of the original12 Marine pilots survived this brawl, andalthough the damage they inflicted on theenemy has never been assessed, it is be-lieved that they splashed a number of thebombers and some of the Zeros. OtherZeros were led into the Midway antiair-craft fire.

Meanwhile another group of 13 Midwayfighters under Captain Kirk Armisteadcame in for an attack against the enemyair formation. Again the damage inflictedupon the enemy was undetermined, butfewer Marine pilots were lost. For betteror for worse, however, the fighter defenseof Midway had been expended, and theproblem now passed to the antiaircraftguns on the atoll.

The first Japanese formation attackedat about 0630 from 14,000 feet. Antiair-craft fire knocked down two of these hori-zontal bombers before they could unload,but 22 came on through to drop theirbombs. And just as these initial explo-sions rocked the two islands, 18 planes ofthe enem y’s second wave came over for

their strike. Since each of these Japaneseformations had left the carriers with 36planes, it is possible that the Marine fliersscored some kills.z

The Kaga aircraft group in the firstwave, assigned to attack the patrol planefacilities on Sand Island, dropped nine242-kilogram bombs on and about the. sea-plane hangars, setting them aflame andstarting a large fire in the fuel oil tanks500 yards to the north. The Akagi planesplastered the north shore of EasternIsland to destroy the Marine mess hall,galley, and post exchange. These the re-turning enemy fliers described as hangars>Other targets of the Japanese divebombers included the already-flaming fuelstorage at the north end of Sand Island,the Sand Island dispensary, and the East-ern Island powerhouse which suffereddirect hits from two 805-kilogram bombs.These hits virtually destroyed the entireplant. And at the very end of the strike,the 6th Defense Battalion’s F,astern Islandcommand post received a direct hit whichkilled the Marine sector commander,Major William J$’. Benson, and woundedseveral other men. After these bomberscompleted their runs, the Zeros came infor strafing attacks. This one and onlyair strike on Midway was over shortlyafter 0700.

‘ Maj W. S. McCormick, an experienced anti-aircraft officer, counted the 22 ; and Capt M. A.Tyler, a VMSB-241 pilot with a grounded plane,counted the 18. CO, VMF-221 Rept to CO, MAG-22, 6Jun42, 1. However, Battle That DoomedJapan, 155, reports that “not a single hit” was

sustained by the Japanese bombers until they

struck in two waves of 36 planes each. Thisseems highly improbable in view of eyewitness

accounts and damage sustained.‘ ONI Review, 4.5-48. Information on ground

defense from CO, 6th DefBn Rept to CO, N.&S,Midway on action of &5 Jun42, 13Jun42, 1–8.


Marine defense batteries fired through-out these attacks, and one source creditedthis antiaircraft fire with 10 kills,’ Re-ports from Marine flyers would appear torequire an increase of this estimate, how-ever, since returning Midway pilots de-scribed enemy planes falling out offormation and others floundering into thewater.5 But ,Japanese authorities claimthat only six of their planes—three levelbombers, two dive bombers, and a fighter—failed to make it back to the carriers.’This controversy probably will never be re-solved, for regardless of how many of these,Japanese planes made it back to their car-rier decks, Fletcher and Spruance—with acertain unintentional assistance fromNagumo-initiated action which resultedin the destruction of all these planes,anyway.

N“agumo’s mistake was a natural one fora commander who believed himself to beunopposed on a “field” of battle of his ownchoice. Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, theflight officer who had commanded the firstattack wave against Midway, radioed dur-ing his return flight that “There is need fora second attack wave.’; Meanwhile, withNagumo still ignorant of the U. S. fleet’spresence in the vicinity, six AmericanTBF’s and four B–26’s from Midway came.in to attack his ships. This convinced the,Japanese admiral that Tomonaga wasright, and he sent below to hangar spacesthe 93 planes he had kept spotted forstrikes against possible surface opposition.These planes were to be re-armed withbombs for the second strike. ThenNagumo called in the returning planes to

arm them for the new attack of the atoll.While his men were involved in this workon the flight deck and in hangar spaces,Nagum.o got the bela~ed word from a Tonesearch plane that U. S. ships, including atieast one carrier, were in the area. Thiscaused another change of mind, and theadmiral ordered the planes’ ordnancechanged again, from bombs back to tor-pedoes with which to attack the surfaceships. But this decision was just tardyenough to allow Spruance to catch himwith his planes down, and with torpedoesand bombs strewn in great confusion aboutthe hangar deck.7

Meanwhile, as Nagumo vacillated, ..Ad-miral Nimitz’s orders for Captain Simardto “go all out for the carriers,” whileMarine antiaircraft batteries worriedabout Midway, were under execution.VMSB-241, like the fighter squadron, haddivided into two striking units, the firstcomposed of 16 SBD–2’S led by MajorLofton Henderson, and the second of 11SB2U–3’S commanded by Major BenjaminMT.Korris. Henderson’s group climbed to9,OOO feet to locate the enemy carriers,which were then undergoing the attackfrom the TBF’s and the B–26’s. Fliers ofthis group sighted the ,Japanese. ships at0744, but as the SBD’S spiralled down theywere set upon by swarms of Nakajima 97’sand Zeros flying air cover, which weresoon reinforced by more fighters from thecarriers below. Henderson and severalothers were shot down (only eight of theseplanes got. back to Midway) and the strikescored no hits although some wereclaimed. s

‘ OXI Reciex, 72.

‘ CinCPac Rept to CominCh on the Battle ofMidway, 8.

6Bottle That Doomed Japan, 156.

‘ ONI Review, 17–19, 44-45.

‘ Statement of Capt E. G. Glidden, 7Jun42, 1.Japanese sources disclose, however, that no hitswere scored in this attack. The ~uadalcanal

MIDWAY VERSUS THE JAPANESE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 225

Next came an attack by 15 B-17’s led byLieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney,USA, but again claims of hits were opti-mistic. And as these Flying Fortressespulled away, Major Norris came in withhis 11 Vindicators which had taken offwith Henderson. Beset by the Zeros,Norris turned to the nearest target at hand,and the Marines crowded their ancientplanes into a standard glide rnn almoston top of the .Japanwe battleshipHcu-ww—previously claimed as an ArmyB–17’s victim off Luzon. Some of thefliers also went after the Kirishirna, whichwas nearby, but neither attack managedany hits. Three Marines were shot down,and the group was credited with splasilingtwo enemy fighters, plus two probables?

By 1100 all surviving Marine aircrafthad made their way back to the atollwhere all hands grimly assessed the battle’sdamage and prepared for subsequent ac-tion. Of the VMF-221 fighters which had

airfield: captured two months later, was namedin }Iaj Henderson’s honor. Rear gunners of thisstrike group are credited with four enemy killsplus two additional probables.

9 ONI Review, 19; USSBS Intcrrogatiorw, NavNO 2, Capt Susumu Kawaguchi, IJN,I,6. Seealso Coral Sea and Midway, 111, for Adm Mor-ison’s dismissal of damage claims by land-basedfliers.

gone in against the attacking Japaneseplanes, only 10 returned, and of this num-ber only two were in shape to leave theground again. Thirteen F2.4–3’s and twoF4F’s were missing, along with the eightcraft lost from the Henderson group andthe three shot away from the Norris force.Slick black smoke from oil fires billowedup from the islands, and ruptured fuellines left more than two-thirds of the avia-tion fuel temporarily unavailable. Craso-line had to be sent to the field from SandIsland, and hand-pumped from drums.The Marine ground defense force had sus-tained 24 casualties, and four ordnance-men of VMF-221 had been lost to a directbomb hit.

.4t 1700 a burning enemy carrier was re-ported 200 miles northwest of Midway,and Major Norris prepared VMSB-241>Ssix operational SBD–2’S and five SB21J–3’Sfor a night attack. The planes took offat 1900, but could not find the carrier.Major Norris failed to return from thismission, although the other pilots managedto home by the light of oil fires andthe antiaircraft searchlights which wereturned up as beacons.’” Meanwhile, theBattle of Midway had been decided at seain a fi~ht of carrier aircraft.

‘“ V~lSB–241Rept of Gombat,7Jun42,3.

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