hitler’s war machine

Hitler’sWarMachinepanzercombatreports

EditedandIntroducedbyBobCarruthers

This ebook edition published inGreat Britain in 2011 byCodaBooks Ltd,Unit 1,

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CONTENTSINTRODUCTION

1.VULNERABLESPOTSFORINCENDIARYGRENADESONGERMANTANKS

2.OBSOLETEGERMANTANKS

3.TANKSINTHESPOTLIGHT

4.GERMANMODIFICATIONOFFRENCHCHARBTANKS

5.GERMANTANKSFORUSEASAMPHIBIANS

6.OPERATINGTHEMARKIVTANK(German)

7.GERMANEMPLOYMENTOFTANKS,ANDTHEIRCO-OPERATIONWITHOTHERARMS

8.GERMAN75-MMASSAULTGUN

9.GERMAN150-MMSELF-PROPELLEDGUN

10.GERMANUSEOFTANKS

11.75-MMASSAULTARTILLERY

12.TACTICSUSEDBYPz.Kw.4’s(WITHSHORT75-MMGUN)

13.VULNERABILITYOFGERMANTANKARMOR

14.ARTILLERYWITHAGERMANTANKDIVISION

15.MARKIIITANK-THREEBASICDESIGNS

16.GERMANTANKMAINTENANCEANDRECOVERY

17.MAINTENANCEANDREPAIRSERVICEINGERMANARMOREDDIVISIONS

18.GERMANSELF-PROPELLED150-MMHOWITZER

19.OPERATIONSOFTHEGERMANTANKRECOVERYPLATOON

20.INCREASEDPROTECTIONONGERMANTANKS

21.TANKWARFAREINSTREETS

22.ENGINEERSUPPORTOFTANKS

23.GERMANMETHODSOFARMOREDATTACKBYSMALLUNITS

24.NEWAXISSELF-PROPELLEDGUNS

25.TACTICALEMPLOYMENTOFGERMAN75-MMASSAULTGUN

26.GERMANHEAVYTANK

27.FURTHERINFORMATIONABOUTGERMANTANKS

28.TANKRUSETODECEIVEARTILLERY

29.GERMANHEAVYTANK-PzKw6

30.INCREASEDPROTECTIONONPZKW3AND4

31.ENEMYSELF-PROPELLEDGUNS-ASUMMARYOFKNOWNEQUIPMENT

32.NEWSELF-PROPELLEDGUN

33.GERMANAIRSUPPORTOFTANKSINAFRICA

34.ARMORARRANGEMENTONGERMANTANKS

35.ATTACKAGAINSTGERMANHEAVYTANK-PZKW6

36.COOPERATIONOFGERMANINFANTRYANDTANKS

37.GERMANPzKw3PHOTOGRAPHS

38.GERMANTANKRUBBERANALYSIS

39.NOTESOFABRITISHARMOREDFORCEOFFICERONGERMANTANKEMPLOYMENT

40.DETAILEDREPORTONTHEGERMAN“TIGER”PZKW6

41.GERMANCOMMENTONENEMYTANKS

42.THEPZ-KW5(PANTHER)TANK

43.GERMAN128-MMSPGUN

44.POWEREDARTILLERY

45.USEOFTANKSWITHINFANTRY

46.NEWHEAVYTANK:THEPz.Kw.5(PANTHER)

47.VULNERABILITYOFTIGERTANKS

48.ARMORSKIRTINGONGERMANTANKS

49.GERMAN150-MMSPASSAULTHOWITZER

50.GERMAN150-MMSPFIELDHOWITZER

51.GERMANSMAKEUSEOFNEWGUNSIN‘INSECT’SERIES

52.BRITISHCOMMENTSONGERMANUSEOFTANKS

53.GERMANPRISONERSDISCUSSTHEPZ.KW.6

54.FERDINANDANDTHEPANTHER

55.GERMANTANKPLATOONSOPERATINGASPOINTS

56.FLAME-THROWINGPz.Kw.3

57.SMOKE-SHELLTACTICSUSEDBYGERMANTANKS

58.PANTIGER,AREDESIGNEDTIGER,NEWESTENEMYHEAVYTANK

59.GermansDisguisePanthers

60.GERMANTANKANDANTI-TANKTACTICS

61.ATANK-INFANTRYTEAMOBSERVEDINCOMBAT

62.“THEHEAVYMOBILEPUNCH”

ABOUTCODABOOKS

INTRODUCTIONAdolfHitlerwas,bynature,agamblerandinthecourseofalongcareermarkedbyaseriesofcalculatedriskswhich

spiralledupwardsfromthegambleofthe1923BeerHallPutschthroughthecarefullymeasuredandsuccessfulventuresintheRhineland,SudetenlandandAustria.ThedecisiontoinvadePolandwasthefirstinalonglitanyofmistakeswhichledtoGöterdämmerung,thesecondmainerrorwastheflawedlogicwhichculminatedinBarbarossa,theinvasionoftheSovietUnion,butsurelyHitler’sbiggestmistakeofallwastodragareluctantUSintoWorldWarII.

Evenafter the JapaneseattackonPearlHarbourHitler stillhad theoption tokeep theUSoutof thewar,but ina

typicalactofself-delusionHitler,on11thDecember1941,declaredwaronthelargestindustrialnationonearth.FromthatmomentonwardsthefateofNaziGermanywassealed.Ittooksomemonthstoawakethesleepinggiant,butoncetheUSJuggernautbegantorolltheendresultofWorldWarIIwasneverinquestion.

While theUSwas busy assembling its new armies, navies and air forces theUS IntelligenceServicewas already

beginningtocollateintelligenceonitsnewenemy.Thisinformationwasgatheredanddisseminatedtothetroopswhoneededit,intheformoftwomainmonthlyintelligencebulletins.ThesewereTacticalandTechnicalTrendswhichfirstappearedinJune1942andtheIntelligenceBulletinwhichbegantoappearfromSeptember1942onwards.

ThemainfocusfortheUSwasinitiallyonthewarwithJapanandagreatmajorityoftheearlyreportsareconcerned

with thewar in thePacific.However,asAmericabegan tocomeup tospeedUSforcesweresoonengaged inNorthAfrica followed by Sicily, Italy and finally Northern Europe. As the war progressed the requirement for goodintelligenceontheGermanPanzerwaffebecamemoreandmoreimportant,andinconsequencetherearemoreandmorereportsofGermanfightingvehiclesavailabletous.ThevastmajorityofthosereportsconcernedthefightinginRussiaanditisthosereportswhichformthebulkofwhatyouareabouttoreadhere.

The material for the two US intelligence journals was originally collected from British combat reports, German

newspapers,capturedGermandocuments,GermantrainingmanualsandSovietsources.Assuchthequalityofmuchofwhatwasprintedwashighlyvariable,somereportsareveryaccuratewhile,inothers,theprecisionoftheinformationisquestionabletosaytheleast,butthat’swhatmakesthesereportssofascinating.Regardlessoftheoverallaccuracythisisa priceless glimpse into how themen in the front lines learned about their enemy, and as such it presents uswith ainvaluable insight into the events of theEastern Frontwere perceived at the timewhen they actually unfolded. Thereports alsoprovideuswith ahostof informationconcerning theminor aspectsof the thousandsof tactical combatsbeingwageddayinanddayoutwhichexpandourknowledgeoftherealitiesofthefightinginRussia.

Thank you for buying this book. I hope you enjoy reading these long forgotten reports as much as I enjoyed

discoveringthemandcollatingthemforyou.OthervolumesinthisseriesarealreadyinpreparationandIhopeyouwill

decidetojoinmeinotherdiscoveriesastheseriesdevelops.

BobCarruthers

1. VULNERABLE SPOTS FOR INCENDIARYGRENADESONGERMANTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No22,April8th1943

InattackingenemytanksatclosequarterswithMolotovcocktailsorincendiaries,theairintakesareamongthemost

vulnerablepoints. It is important, therefore, that the locationof these intakesandoutletsbeknown,as the flameandfumesofagrenadethrownagainstanintakewhiletheengineisrunningwillbesuckedinside,butifthegrenadelandsonanoutlet,theywillbeblownclearofthetank.

Thebesttargetsaretheflattop-platesbehindtheturret.Sideintakesareinvariablyprotectedbyaverticalbaffle.The

accompanyingsketchesshowthe“softspots”inGermantanksPz.Kw.2,3,and4.

2.OBSOLETEGERMANTANKS

HandbookonGermanMilitaryForces,March1945

a.GENERAL.

ThePz.Kpfw.I,Pz.Kpfw.II,andPz.Kpfw.III,althoughobsolete,arediscussedheresince theystillmaybemetoccasionallyinthefield.

b.LIGHTTANK(Pz.Kpfw.I).

(1)General.Thiswas the first tank tobestandardizedby theGermans,and the firstoneswereproduced in1934.Threemodels(A,B,andC)andacommander’sversion(basedonmodelB)havebeenidentified,butmodelCneverhasbeenencounteredinaction.ThehullofthePz.Kpfw.Iwasusedasaself-propelledmountforseveraltypesofartilleryweapons,butitnolongerwillbemeteveninthisrole.

(2)Specifications.

*Sd.Kfz.istheGermanabbreviationforSonderkraftfahrzeug,meaningspecialmotorvehicle

c.LIGHTTANK(Pz.Kpfw.II).

(1)General.Thistankismannedbythreemen:acommander,whoactsasthegunner;aradiooperator;andadriver.Alargenumberofmodelsofthistankwereproducedbeforeitbecameobsolete.InaverymuchmodifiedformithasreappearedastheLuchs(Lynx)reconnaissancetankinWesternEurope.TheoriginalexperimentalmodelsofPz.Kpfw.IIwere producedbetween1934 and1936; it finallywas abandoned as a fightingvehicle in 1943.A flame-throwingversion,Pz.Kpfw.II(F),alsohasbecomeobsoleteandprobablywillnotbemetagain.ModelF,nottheflame-throwertank,was the latestmodel encountered. Themodified hull of the Pz.Kpfw. II is still in use as a self-propelled guncarriage,notablyinthecaseofthe15cm.s.I.G.33andthe10cm.le.F.H.18.

(2)Specifications.

d.MEDIUMTANK(Pz.Kpfw.III).

(1)General. This tank has appeared inmanymodels but has retained basic characteristics throughout. The latestmodels toappeararearmedwith the long-barreled5cmKw.K.39 (L/60),which in1942displaced the shorter5cmKw.K.(L/42).Theoriginalmainarmament,discardedlatein1940,wasa37-mmgun.ThePz.Kpfw.IIInowisobsoleteandrarelyencountered.Theexcellenthullandsuspensionhavebeenutilizedasthecarriageforself-propelledguns,anditisinthisformthatthevehicleremainsinproduction.ThePz.Kpfw.IIIhasbeenencounteredarmedwiththeshort7.5cmKw.K.(theoriginalarmamentofthePz.Kpfw.IV),andalsoasacommander’svehicle,asaflame-throwingtank,asawreckertank,asanarmoredammunitioncarrier,andasanarmoredobservationpost.

(2)Specifications.

3.TANKSINTHESPOTLIGHT

IntelligenceBulletin,September1942

LatelytheGermanshavebeenworkingtheirMarkIVtankovertime,especiallyinLibya.Itisamediumtankof22

tons, carrying a crewof five.Armedwith one 75-mm. gun and two lightmachine guns, it has been used chiefly asmobile,close-supportartilleryindesertwarfare.Thereportedsubstitutionofamorepowerful75-mm.gunmaysendtheMarkIVbacktoitsnormaltaskofservingasthechiefelementinabreakthrough.Itsbestpossiblespeedis31milesperhour.Instudyingthephotographforidentificationpurposes,notethattheMarkIVhas,oneachside,eightsmallbogiewheelsandfourtrack-supportrollers.TestingacapturedGermanMarkIVtank,theBritishhavediscoveredthatitcanbeblindedbyflame-throwerattack.Althoughtheflamesarenot likelytoenter theturretor thedrivingcompartment,theywillcoatwiththicksootalllookoutpoints,includingthetelescopicsightsonthegun.Asaresult,themeninthetankcannotfireeffectivelyuntiltheyhavechangedorcleanedtheirsights.

MarkIVtank

TheGermansalsomakewideuseoftheMarkIII,alightmediumtankof18to20tons(fig.3).Formerlyitwasarmed

withone37-mm.gunandtwolightmachineguns,butinmostcasesthe37-mm.hasbeenreplacedbya50-mm.Itsbestpossiblespeedis28milesperhour,butitismucheasiertomaneuveronthebattlefieldthantheheavierMarkIV.

MarkIIItank

ThewarinAfricahasproved,however,thattheAmericanM3,knowntotheBritishasthe“GeneralGrant,”hasthe

besttankarmorintheworld.“GeneralGrants”stayinthefightafterasmanyaseighttotenhitsby50-mm.andsmallerantitankweapons.Inatleastonecase,a“GeneralGrant”hascontinuedtoperformwellafter27hits.ThenewAmericanM4, known as the “General Lee,” is evenmore reliable. It has greater speed andmore power, and is excellent forreconnaissanceandpursuit.Amongotherimprovements,its75-mm.gunhasbeenplacedintheturretinsteadofontheside.Thischangegivesitanall-aroundfieldoffire.

MECHANIZEDWARFARE

The tactics used by the Germans in mechanized warfare are of interest to every American in the field. Germanmechanized tactics are likely to follow certain set patterns. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Germancommandersarecleveratchangingstandardtacticstofitthesituationathand.

Undernormalcircumstances,thefirstGermanmoveistoorderarmoredcarpatrols,supportedbyantitankguns,todo

athoroughjobofreconnaissance.Motorcycleriflemenalsolendsupportiftheterrainissuitable.Thesereconnaissancepatrols are drawn from the reconnaissance battalions of the armored division. The size and makeup of each patrolnaturallydependson themission ithas toperform.Sometimes theGermansevenaddanumberof light tanks.Thesereconnaissancedetachmentsnotonlyreportourmovementsandthoseoftheirownunits,butaresupposedtobestrongenough to put up a fight, if necessary.While the patrols are trying to find out our strength,German air and groundobserversaredoingtheirbesttodetectourartilleryandantitank-gunpositionssothatthesemaybedealtwithwhenthemainattackbegins.

Havingdecidedwheretostrike,theenemynextbringsforwardhistanks,supportedbymotorizedinfantry.Hecovers

thismovebyascreenofantitankgunsandtriestobringhisforwardelements,includingacompanyofMarkIVtanks,towithinabout2,000yardsofourownantitankgunsandartillery.Atthisstagehegenerallytriestorefuelhistanksundertheprotectionofhisforwarddetachments.

The Mark IV tanks direct their 75-mm. gun fire on our antitank guns and artillery. Meanwhile, Mark III tanks

assembleforbattle,andoftenchallengeourdefendedareaatdifferentpointsinstrong,closeformations.

Theenemythendecideswherehewantstobeginhismainthrust.Havingdonehisbesttoweakenthepowerofour

defenseby the fireofhisMark IV tanksandartillery,heopensa strongattackwithhisMark III tanks, followedbymotorizedinfantryandguns,andadvancesonhisobjective.

Inaddition,heoftendirectsatleastonecolumn(containingtanks,artillery,andmotorizedinfantry)onsomeimportant

localityinourarea,suchasatankrepaircenter.Theremaybemorethanoneofthesethrusts.Asarule,theGermanstrytodevelopthemintoapincermovement,withtheadvancecolumnspushingaheadtomeetatthefinalobjective.

Ifoneoftheenemy’sMarkIIItankcolumnssucceedsinpenetratinganypartofourdefensesandestablishingafairly

goodposition,motorized infantry is thenmoved forward towithina fewhundredyardsof theposition.The infantrydismountsandgoesintoaction,moppingupasrapidlyaspossibleandorganizingtheposition.Germanmachinegunsandantitankgunsfollowtheinfantryclosely.Everyeffortismadetoturnthecapturedpositionintoanarea,oraseriesofareas,capableofall-arounddefenseagainstanyformofattack.Inthislastoperation,speedisemphasized.

InLibya,theGermansoftenstarttheseattackslateintheafternoonsoastohavetheadvantageoffightingwiththe

sunbehindtheirbacks.Inthistheaterofoperations,theactionisusuallycompletedbynightfall.Eithersideislikelytocounterattacksoonafterdark.ExperiencehasshownthattheGermansespeciallydislikethisformofcombat,andUnitedNationscounterattacksbegunatnighthaveoftensucceededinrecovering,atsmallexpense,groundlostduringtheday.

Itmust be repeated that, although theGermans like to employ established and familiar tactics, they knowhow to

change themwhennecessary.Thebestexampleof this is thenewGerman techniqueofbringingupartillery inclose

supportoftanks,sothattanksareneverrequiredtofaceantitankgunsbythemselves.

4. GERMAN MODIFICATION OF FRENCH CHAR BTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No5,August13th1942

ItisreportedthattheGermansaremodifyingFrenchheavytanksoftheCharB(30-ton)type.

The75-mm.gunisbeingtransferredfromthehulltoanewturret.Thiswouldbealogicalimprovement.Thegunin

itspreviouspositioncouldonlyfireforward.Moreover,owingtothelowmountinginthehull,itcouldnotbefiredfromthedefiladedposition,andwhencrossingantitanktrenchesthegunbarrelwasapttobecomecloggedwithearth.

5.GERMANTANKSFORUSEASAMPHIBIANS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No6,August27th1942

TheGermanarmy,during1940and1941,stressedinterestinasmoothandsteadilyincreasedrateoftankproduction.

Immediately after the occupation ofCzechoslovakia, the decisionwas taken to continue production of the light tankPanzerkampfwagen38/T,manufacturedbytheC.K.D.(CeskomoravskaKolben-Danek)metal-worksfactoryinPrague.

Inprojecting thepossibilities for futureuseof the38/T tank(GermanmilitarymarkingPzKw38/T)foramphibian

operation,certainnewimprovementsovertheoldermodelweretobeincorporatedintothelatertype.Forexample,thePraguemanufacturersweretoldthatthesetanksmustbemadewaterproof,andprovisionmadeformountingthetankonafloatingdevicetoenablethevehicletosurmountwavesashighas13feet.Themaximumseagoingspeedwastobe8milesperhourat leastand the tankmustbecapableof runningat this speed for10hours.Furthermore, itwas toberequiredthat,evenwhilenavigatingthegun(inarevolvingturret)shouldbeabletofire.

Ability to climb twenty-degree beach slopeswas another specification to bemet. Therewas also the question of

findingawaytodiscardthefloatingmechanismuponreachinglandsothat thecrewneednotdismount.Thefloatingdevicewastoconsistoftwofloatsmadeofbalsawood.Thedriveafloatwastobeprovidedbytwopropellersdrivenbythetankmotorthroughthemediumofthetrackdrivesprocket.

Aprototypeofthisamphibiantank,deliveredinJanuary1941,hadthefollowingcharacteristics:

TherehavealsobeenreportsthattheGermanshavebeenexperimentingwithatankcapableofcrossingthebedofa

river.Oneversionisthatrubbercoversfortheturretandgunsarefittedforwater-tightness,airissuppliedtotheenginefromoxygenbottles,andthecrewisprovidedwithoxygenbreathingapparatus.

Anotherversionisthatthetanks,whileunderwater,obtaintheirairsupplythroughinletandoutlettubesconnectedto

afloatwhichistowedbythetank.

Both thesemethodsmaybepracticable for short rivercrossings.To travel longdistancesunderwater theproblem

might be solved as in a submarine, but practical difficulties of constructionwould be considerable if the tankswererequiredtowithstandpressureatmorethanmoderatedepths.Also,batteriesnecessaryforlongunder-waterendurancewouldbeverycumbersomeandheavy.

6.OPERATINGTHEMARKIVTANK(German)

IntelligenceBulletin,December1942

AcapturedGermantrainingpamphletcontainsthefollowinginformationregardingthedutiesofthecrewofaMark

IVtank,andthemeansofintercommunication:

1.DUTIESOFTHECREW

Thecrewconsistsoffivemen—acommander,agunner,aloader,adriver,andaradiooperatorwhoisalsothehullmachine-gunner.

Thetankcommander,whoisanofficerorseniornoncom, isresponsiblefor thevehicleandthecrew.Heindicates

targets to the gunner, gives fire orders, and observes the fall of shots. He keeps a constant lookout for the enemy,observesthezoneforwhichheisresponsible,andwatchesforanyordersfromthecommander’svehicle.Inaction,hegiveshisorderstothedriverandradiooperatorbyintercommunicationtelephone,andtothegunnerandloaderbytouchsignalsorthroughaspeakingtube.Hereceivesordersbyradioorflag,andreportstohiscommanderbyradio,signalpistol,orflag.

Thegunnerissecondincommand.Hefirestheturretgun,theturretmachinegun,orthemachinecarbine,asordered

bythetankcommander.Heassiststhetankcommanderinobservation.

Theloaderloadsandmaintainstheturretarmamentundertheordersofthegunner.Heisalsoresponsibleforcareof

ammunition,and—whenthecupolaisclosed—givesanyflagsignalsrequired.Hereplacestheradiooperatorifthelatterbecomesacasualty.

Thedriveroperates thevehicleunder theordersof the tankcommander, or in accordancewithorders receivedby

radiofromthecommander’svehicle.Sofaraspossible,heassistsinobservation,reportingovertheintercommunicationtelephonethepresenceoftheenemyorofanyobstaclesinthepathofthetank.Hewatchesthefuelconsumptionandisresponsibletothetankcommanderforthecareandmaintenanceofthevehicle.

The radio operator operates the radio set under the orders of the tank commander. In action, when not actually

transmitting,healwayskeepstheradiosetat“receive.”Heoperatestheintercommunicationtelephoneandwritesdownany radio messages not sent or received by the tank commander. He fires the machine gun mounted in the frontsuperstructure.Hetakesoverthedutiesoftheloaderifthelatterbecomesacasualty.

2.INTERCOMMUNICATION

Thefollowingmeansofintercommunicationareavailable:

External:Voiceradioandkeyradio,flagsignals,handsignals,signalpistol,andflashlight.

Internal:Intercommunicationtelephone,speakingtube,andtouchsignals.

Themaximumdistanceforsatisfactoryvoiceradiocommunicationbetweentwomovingvehiclesisabout33/4miles,

andforsatisfactorykeyradiocommunicationabout61/4miles.

Flagsignalsareused for short-distancecommunicationsonly, anda flashlight isusedatnight.Thesignalpistol is

usedforprearrangedsignals—chieflytootherarms,suchastheinfantry.

Theradioset, inconjunctionwith the intercommunication telephone,provides the tankcommander, radiooperator,

anddriverwithameansforexternalandinternalvoicecommunication.Thesamemicrophonesandtelephonereceiverheadsetsareusedinbothcases.

When the control switch on the radio is set at Empfang (receive), and that on the junction box of the

intercommunicationtelephoneatBordundFunk(internalandradio—thatis,intercommunicationtelephoneandexternalvoiceorkeyradio),thecommander,radiooperator,anddriverhearallincomingvoiceradiosignals.Anyofthesemencanalsospeaktotheothertwoafterswitchinghismicrophoneintothecircuitbymeansoftheswitchonhischest.

Forvoiceradiotransmission,theswitchontheradiosetisadjustedtoTelephonic(telephone).Thetelephoneswitch

maybeleftatBordundFunk.Eitherthetankcommanderortheradiooperatorcanthentransmit,andboththeyandthedriverwillhearthemessagestransmitted.Internalcommunicationisalsopossibleatthesametime,buttheconversationwillbetransmitted.

If the radio set is disconnectedor out of order, the telephone switchmaybe adjusted toBord (internal). The tank

commanderanddrivercanthenspeaktooneanother,andtheradiooperatorcanspeaktothem,butcannothearwhattheysay.Thisalsoapplieswhenaradioreceiverisavailable,butnotransmitter,withthedifferencethatincomingvoiceradiosignalscanthenbeheardbytheradiooperator.

Thesignalflagsarenormallycarriedinholdersontheleftofthedriver’sseat.Whenthecupolaisopen,flagsignals

aregivenbythetankcommander;whenitisclosed,theloaderraisesthecircularflapintheleftoftheturretroofandsignalswiththeappropriateflagthroughtheportthusopened.Flagsignalsaregiveninaccordancewithadefinitecode,themeaning of any signal depending on the color of the flag used andwhether the flag is held still ormoved in aparticularway.

Pistol signals aregiven through the signalport in the turret roof, through the cupola, or throughoneof thevision

openingsintheturretwall.Thesignalpistolmustnotbecockeduntilthebarrelisalreadyprojectingoutsidethetank.Itisnormallyusedonlywhenthetankisatthehalt.Themainfunctionofthismeansofcommunicationisthegivingofprearrangedsignalstotheinfantryorothertroops.

Whenthetankistravelingatnight,withlightsdimmedorswitchedoffaltogether,drivingsignalsaregivenwiththe

aid of a dimmed flashlight. The samemethod is also employedwhen tanks are in a position of readiness andwhenleaguered(inbivouac).

Orders are transmitted from the tank commander to the gunner bymeansof speaking-tube and touch signals.The

latteralsousedformessagesfromthecommandertotheloader,abetweenthegunnerandloader.

7. GERMAN EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS, AND THEIRCO-OPERATIONWITHOTHERARMS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No7,September10th1942

The article summarized below comes from a handbook that is used in the German army, especially by officer

candidates.Itiscalled“TacticalHandbookfortheTroopCommander”andwaswrittenbyGeneralvonCochenhausen.

MostoftheGermantanksareinthe“Panzer”divisions,butPanzerdivisionsareorganizedinmanyways.Somehave

oneandsomehave twotankregiments.The infantrymaybeariflebrigademadeupofseveralmotorizedbattalions,formingaregiment,inadditiontoaseparatemotorcyclebattalion.Thereareasmanyantitankandantiaircraftunitsasnecessary to meet the tactical situation. The whole organization depends on how many men or what equipment isavailable,onthetasktobedone,ontheterrainandthenatureofthehostiledefenses.

Generally the Panzer division contains a division staff; a brigade of two tank regiments, each with two or more

battalions of four companies each; a rifle brigade of onemotorized infantry regiment,which also has a battalion ofarmored assault artillery and a motorcycle battalion; a reconnaissance battalion; an engineer battalion with combatbridgingequipment;asignalbattalion;anantitankbattalion;anantiaircraftbattalion;anartilleryregiment;andallthenecessaryadministrative,supply,maintenance,andmedicaltroops.

InordertounderstandthistextitshouldberememberedthatthewaysinwhichtheGermansuseaPanzerdivision

varyaccordingtothemission,thecommander’sconceptionoftheterrain,andthenatureofthehostiledefenses.

TRANSLATION

“Theentireforceofourtroopsisconcentratedintheattack”—FredericktheGreat

1.PREPARATIONFORTHEATTACK.

a.General.Thetimebeforeanattackshouldbespent instudying the terrain,preparingpositions,andmakingarrangements to

workwiththeotherarms.Thestudyoftheterrainshouldcovertheareafromtheassemblypositionforwardtothefrontline, and then as far as possible into the enemy’s position.The tank force commander, or an officer chosen by him,should takepart in this study.Aerial photographs shouldbeused alongwith themap. It is important to findout thelocationofminesandthepositionoftheenemy’sdefenseweapons.

b.Surprise.

Surprise ismost important forasuccessfulattack.Therefore,allpreparationsmustbecarefullycamouflaged.Tankunitsshouldmoveatnight,andinthedaytimetheyshouldmoveonlywhentheycanbehiddenfromenemyairplanes.Thetimeofthetankattackmustbesetsothatitwillcomeasasurprise.Theenemycanbekeptfromknowingthatanattackiscomingbyengaginghiminafewlocalactions,aswellasbycamouflagingourradiocommunicationsorbykeepingtheradiosilent.

c.OrganizationoftheTankForce.Thetankforcecommandermustdecideineverycasewhetherheisgoingtoattackwithhistanksinlineorincolumn.

Anattackincolumnfacilitatescontrol,andmakesitpossibletomaneuvertanksinanydirection;toattackinlinemakestheenemystretchouthisdefense,andsupportstheinfantryattackoverabroaderfront.

d.Objectives.

Tankssetouttoattacktheenemy’sinfantryandinfantryheavyweapons,artillery,commandposts,reserves,andrearcommunications.Butbefore theycanget throughto these targets, theymustdestroytheirmostdangerousenemy, theantitankdefenses.Forthisreasontheheaviestandmostpowerfultanksmustleadtheattack,andtheymustbesupportedbytheotherarms,bothbeforeandduringtheattack.

Only after the antitank defenses have been destroyed can the tanks go ahead.After that, themost powerful tanks

should be directed to attack the points that are deepest within the enemy positions, such as artillery, reserves, andcommandposts.Thelightertanksattacktheinfantry.Eachechelonoftanksshouldbedefinitelyinformedconcerningitsmissionanditsobjective.

Tankforcesarealsoabletoseizeimportantpoints,suchasrivercrossings,andtoholdthemuntiltheinfantrycomes

up.

e.AssemblyPositions.

ThePanzerdivisionusuallypreparesforanattackinaposition,nottoonearthebattlefield,whichgivescoveragainst

observationandisbeyondtherangeoftheenemyartillery.Herethetroopsshouldbetoldwhattheyaretodo,suppliesshould be distributed, and fuel and ammunition issued. If the tank force by itself cannot protect the position, thecommandershouldseetoitthatthenecessarysupportingweaponsarebroughtup.

Thetankscangoto theattackmorequickly if thereareseveralroads leadingfromthepositionto thefront,andif

crossingsoverrailroads,highways,andrivershavebeenconstructedbyengineers.

Whentimeisthemostimportantfactor,tankunitsshouldremainintheirassemblypositionsforalimitedperiod,or

theyshouldmovedirectlytotheattackwithoutstoppinginthesepositions.

2.SUPPORTOFTHETANKATTACKBYTHEOTHERTROOPS.

a.Infantry.Theinfantrymustdirectitsheavymachinegunsagainsttheenemy’santitankdefenses.Theotherheavyweaponsmustfireattargetsoutsidetheareaofthetankactionsothattheywillnotdisabletheirowntanks.Signalsmustbearrangedinadvance(suchastracers,flags,andradio)sothatcoordinationisassured.

b.Artillery.Theartilleryfiresupontargetsinfrontandtotheflanksoftheareaofthetankaction.Itfiresbothhigh

explosivesandsmoke,andmustgenerallyregulateitsfirebytime.Adjustmentcanbeattainedthroughtheradioortheartilleryliaisondetail,which,ridinginarmoredvehicles,canaccompanythetanks.

c. Engineers. Engineers assist the tanks by strengthening bridges, building temporary crossings, and removing

obstaclesandmines.

d.SignalTroops.Signaltroopskeepupcommunicationswiththecommanders,withtheartillery,withtheservices,

andwithseparateunitsofinfantry,engineers,ortheairforce.

e.AntitankUnits. Antitank gunsmust follow the tanks as closely as possible so as to be able to enter the fightimmediatelyifenemytanksaremet.

f.Aviation.Aviationhas twoduties: it should serve as reconnaissancebefore andduring the time the tanks are in

action, and it should attack the enemy’s reserves, especially tanks and antitank defenses, before they can come intoaction.

g.RearServices. If a tank force does not have its ownmedical service, it should be kept in touchwith first-aid

stationsoftheassistingtroops.Duringthebattletheservicetroopsareheldinreadinesswelltotherear.

h. As soon as the tanks reach their objectives, they at once prepare themselves for a new mission. They send

reconnaissance to the frontand findouthowfar the infantryhasadvanced.Theydecide theirnextmovementon thebasisofthesefindings.

i.Afterthebattlethetankforceiswithdrawnbehindthelinesandreorganized.Thelongerithasbeeninaction,the

longertherestperiodshouldbe.

3.EXAMPLESOFCOMBATORDERSANDOPERATIONS.

a.General.Orderstothetankforcemustbekeptbriefandsimpleinallsituationsduringawarofmovement.Itisenoughiftheytell:(1)thelocationandstrengthoftheenemy;(2)thelocationandmissionofourowntroops;(3)themissionforthetankforce,toincludedirectionofattack,theobjective,andsometimesthehourthetanksaretoattackandtheiractionaftertheattack;and(4)whatsupportistobegivenbyotherarms.

ExampleNo.1(seefigureNo.1)illustratesanordertoaPanzerdetachmentintheadvance.

(1)TheOrder.TheMotorcycleBattalionhasencounteredtheenemyandhasdeployedoneachsideoftheroadin

frontofHill304.

Thecommanderofthe1stBattalion,1stPanzerRegiment,meetsthecommanderoftheadvanceguard(probablythe

motorcyclebattalioncommander)at theforester’shouse.Afterreceivingbrief informationabout theterrain,heissuesthefollowingorder:

“TheenemyholdsHill304.Hostileartillery,estimatedtobeonebattery,isfiringfromthedirectionsouthofFranken

Woods.

“TheMotorcycleBattaliondeploysforattackonbothsidesoftheroad.CompanyCisadvancinghereleftoftheroadagainstthesouthernedgeofHill304.

“The1stBattalion,movingnorthof the road,will attackHill304.Afterovercoming the resistance thereon, itwill

continueacrossBCreektoattacktheenemyartillerysouthofFrankenWoods.ItwillcontinuecombatreconnaissancetothefarendofFrankenWoods.Iwanttoknow:

a.WhenthecrossingoverBCreekbegins.

b.Whenthehostileartilleryhasbeenreachedandovercome.”

(2)TheEngagement.Thecommanderofthe1stBattalionthendrivestothecommanderofCompanyAandorders

him toadvancearound thenorthernedgeof thewoods just in frontofhimand toattackHill304.He thengives thenecessarycommandstotheothercompaniesbyradio.

WhileCompanyAisdeploying,CompanyB,withitsleftflankontheroad,advancesagainstHill304.CompanyD

supportstheattackfromthevicinityoftheforester’shouse.CompanyC,formingthesecondline,followsCompaniesAandB,andtheBattalioncommanderadvanceswithit.AssoonasCompanyAreachesHill304,CompanyDbeginstodisplaceforwardtothisposition.

Meantime,theartilleryhasbeendefinitelylocatedsouthofFrankenWoods.TheBattalioncommandernowissuesa

neworder toattack theartilleryandCompaniesA,B,andDproceedaroundHill304.CompanyC thenengages theremainingresistanceonHill304untilthemotorcyclistscomeupfromthesouthside.ApartofCompanyAcarriesoutthereconnaissanceonthefarsideofFrankenWoods.

c.AttackAgainstaPreparedPosition.Ifthetanksaretoattackaprepareddefensiveposition,thecommanderofthe

forcemustthencoordinateall thearmsinhiscommandtoassistthetanks.Therefore,everyarmmustbetoldexactlywhattodoinanactionwhichisintendedfirstofalltosupportthetanksagainsttheenemy’santitankweapons.

(1)Preparation.Thecommandertellsthetankforcecommanderaboutsuchmattersastheenemy,theterrain,andthe

planofattack.Thetankforcecommanderreportstheresultsofhisownreconnaissance,howhethinkstheattackshouldbecarriedout,andwhatsortofsupporthewants.Thecommanderthenmakeshisdecisionanddrawsuptheorder.Thetank force commander then informs his subordinates about the terrain and what he intends to do. The tank forcesadvancetotheassemblypositionontheroadsthatthecommanderhasassignedtothem.Theseroadsarekeptfreeofothertroops.

(2)TheTankForceCombatOrder.Theordershouldcontain:

(a)Informationabouttheenemy(hisposition,strength,andthelocationofknownorsuspectedantitankweapons)andthepositionofourtroops.Alllatermessagesfromthefrontthatcontaininformationforthetanksarepassedonatoncetothetankforcecommander.

(b)Ourownintentions,statedthus:

“Tank force –- in –-, echelons –- at (time) crosses the front line, attackswith the first echelon across –-, toward –-,advancing thence to–-.Thesecondechelonattacks–-.After theattack the tankswill–-. (Thisordershouldgive themissionandsupportfurnishedbytheinfantry,ifapartofthetankforceisnotplaceddirectlyunderaninfantryunitorattachedtoit.)

(c)Artillery–-.Smoke–-.

(d)Engineers–-.

(e)Aviation–-.

(f)SignalCommunications–-.

(g)RearServices–-.

(h)Commandpostofthehighercommanderisat–-(wherereportsaretobesent).

d.ExampleNo.2(seeFigureNo.2)illustratesatypicalproblemforthecooperationoftankswithotherarms.

(1) Situation.An infantry division, encountering increasing hostile resistance, arrived at the lineX—X at 1600

hours.Thedivision,supportedbythePanzerBrigade,willrenewtheattackthenextmorning.

(2)Operations.Inthemorning,afterabriefartillerybombardment,thewidelydeployedtanksbreakintotheenemy

line.The infantrypush through thebreak.Meantime, theartilleryadvances its fire to thevillage,Adolfburg, and theZwingCreekcrossings.Smoke troopsplace fireon thewesternedgeofOsterWood.Wherever theenemy’santitankweaponsarefound,theyareimmediatelyengagedbyheavyinfantryweaponsandbythetanks.HeavyartilleryfireiskeptuponAdolfburg.Thefirstechelonof tanks isnowadvancingrapidlynortharoundbothsidesof thevillage; thesecond echelon decreases its speed and attacks the enemy forces still resisting on the high ground on both sides ofAdolfburg.Theartilleryconstantlymovesitsfireforwardsoasnottohindertheadvancingtanks,beinginformedbyitsownforwardobserverswhoadvancewiththeleadingtanks.

Ontheright,theinfantryattackinthedirectionofOsterWoodhasbeenchecked.Guidedtotheplacebytracersand

flag signals, the second echelon of tanksmoves towardOsterWood.Meantime the commander of the first echelonreports:

“Haveovercomehostile artillerygroupsnorthofAdolfburg.Amcontinuing toward the artillerydiscovered farther

west.ReconnaissancetowardZwingCreekreportsthatthestreamispassable.”

ThesupportinginfantryhasbeenmoppingupAdolfburgandthehighgroundonbothsidesofthetown.Thisinfantry

nowproceedstoassistthetanksatOsterWood.ThentheheavyweaponsandartilleryarebroughtforwardtoAdolfburg.The enemy, retreating along the road, offers stubborn resistance, but is overcome by elements of the tank battalioncooperatingwith the advance infantry. ZwingCreek crossings are kept under the fire of tanks, artillery, and combataviation.

ENDOFTRANSLATION

COMMENT:

1.TheseinstructionsshowhowmuchemphasistheGermansputuponsurprise,whichisevenmoreimportantinanattackbytanksthaninaninfantryattack.Speedisnecessary,andsoisconcealment,butcarefulpreparationsarenottobe neglected.The approaches are carefully selected, traffic regulationsworked out, and reconnaissance and engineerunitsmakeeveryefforttosecurequick,unbrokenmovementofthetanksfromtheassemblypositionintocombat.Thesupplysystemisplannedtoavoiddelay.Because theGermansarewell trained, thesearrangementsareexecuted inabusinesslikemanner,whichmakesthemlooksimpleandeasy,thoughtheyareoftendifficultandcomplicated.

2. German tank attacks are based upon an accurate estimation of the opposing strength and defenses, and the

organization of their attacking force is determined by the situation. The tanks leave the assembly position in theformationstheywillholdduringtheattack.Indifficultterrain,thedetaileddeploymentsaremadejustbehindthelastcover before coming into the open. Careful scouting of the position, studies of maps and photographs, the plannedremovalofobstacles,andthepreparationofmaterialtobeusedinnegotiatingunforeseenobstaclesenablethetankstocomeupontheenemywithsurpriseandwithamassfireeffect.

3.Theheavytanksattackfirsttoclearthewayforthelightertanks,whichthenoperateagainstanyresistancelikelyto

holdupthe infantry.TheGermansrealize that tanksmustact inclosecooperationwith infantry,butat thesametimetheybelievethatthetanksshouldbefreetostrikehardbythemselves.Thereforetheyplanthingssothateachtankunithasadefinitegoaltoreach.

4.Germanartillerygivesthetanksgoodsupport;toworkoutthissupport,artilleryofficersrideinthetanksandsignal

therangestotheguns.

5.TheGermansregardthetankasthedecisiveweaponandarrangeforitssupportbyallotherarms.

6.Note inExampleNo.1of thecombatorders that the tankbattalioncommanderdoesnotwaste timebygetting

togetherhissubordinatesandissuingacompleteorder.Instead,hegiveshisorderorallytotheofficersnearathand,andtotheothersbyradio.Whatlooksatfirstlikeapiecemealactionisactuallyaunitedeffortbytheentirebattalion.

7.InExampleNo.2notethatsmokewasusedalongtheedgeofthewoods;wherehostileantitankandotherweapons,

evenifobserved,wouldbedifficulttocombatwithtanks.

8.Germanantitankcrewsaretrainedtobereadyforactionatanymomentandtofireveryrapidly.

9.Notonlyarethetankunitssupportedbytheotherarms,buttheGermantankunitssupporteachother.Individual

tankswithintheplatoon,andplatoonswithinthecompany,willfirewhilehaltedinconcealmentinordertoprotectothertanksorplatoonsadvancingtopositionsfromwhichtheyinturnwillbeabletoprotecttheirformersupportinggroup.

8.GERMAN75-MMASSAULTGUN


This assault gun is a self-propelled gunmounted on a standardMark III tank chassis. In 1940 a relatively small

number tookpart in theBattleofFranceand itwas firstusedextensively in the summerof1941,when itplayedanimportanttacticalroleinthefirstbattlesontheRussianfront.

The guns are organized into independent battalions, although it is now possible that they are organic within the

motorizedandPanzerdivisionsandareattachedtofront-lineinfantrydivisions.Normallyonlydirectfireisused.

AnassaultguncapturedintheMiddleEastisdescribedbelow.

Thegunandmountweighabout20tons.

The gun itself is the short-barreled 75-mm tank gun originallymounted in theMark IV tank. The range drum is

graduatedforHEupto6,550yardsandforAPupto1,640yards.Elevationandtraversearehand-operated.Someotherdetailsarethese:

Itisbelievedthatthislow-velocitygunisbeingreplacedbyahigh-velocity75-mmgunwithareportedlengthofbore

ofabout43calibers.TheGermansarealsoapparentlymakingasimilarchangeinthearmamentoftheMarkIVTank.

Asstatedabove,thehullisthatofthestandardGermanMarkIIItankwithnormalsuspensionsystem.Theturrethas

beenremoved.Thelengthis17ft.9in.,height6ft.5in.,andwidth9ft.7in.Ingeneralthearmoris51mm.(2in.)atthefrontand32mm.(1.25in.)onthesidesandattherear.Anadded53-mmplateisfittedtotherearofthefrontverticalplate,apparentlybetweenthedrivingandfightingcompartments,andisbracedtothefrontplatebytwo31-mm.plates,oneoneachsideoftheopeningforthegun.Fordetailedarrangementofarmorplateseeaccompanyingsketch.

ThesidesofthehullarereportedtobevulnerabletotheBritish40-mmantitankgunat1,500yards,butthisguncan

penetratethefrontonlyatveryshortranges,andeventhenonlythedrivingcompartment.

The engine is a Maybach V-12-type rated at 300 horsepower. The gears provide for six speeds, and steering is

hydraulicallycontrolled.Thecapacityofthegasolinetankis71gallons,whichisconsumedattherateofabout0.9milespergallonatacruisingspeedof22milesperhour.Theradiusofactionisabout70miles,themaximumrateofspeedabout29milesperhour.

AsinGermantanks,thisvehicleisequippedtocarryextragasolineinarackontherearofthevehicle,whichshould

holdabout10standard5-gallongasolinecans.

Thecapturedvehiclecontainedmetalboxesfor44roundsofammunition,and40roundswerestackedonthefloorat

the loader’s station.Ammunition is also carried in an armoredhalf-trackwhich tows an armored ammunition trailer.Therewasalsoarackfor12stickgrenades,andtheusualsmoke-candlereleasemechanismfor5candleswasfittedtotherear.Forcommunicationthereweretworadioreceiversandonetransmitter.Forobservationascissorstelescopewasprovided.

Assparepartsthe11-mm.slopingplatesoverthetrackguard(seesketch)carriedtwosparebogiewheelsontheright

sideandoneontheleftside.Twosparetorsionrodswerealsocarried,oneineachsideofthehullabovethebogies.

Thecrewconsistsoffourmen—acommander,gunner,loader,anddriver.

9.GERMAN150-MMSELF-PROPELLEDGUN


Reports fromtheMiddleEast indicate that theGermansareusing, inaddition to the75-mmassaultgun(see issue

Number7,page9),a150-mmself-propelledgunonaMarkIIchassis.Previousreportsindicatethatanearlierversionofthisself-propelledartilleryconsistedofthesamegunonaMarkIchassis,butitseemsprobablethatthismountwasnotsatisfactory.

Thegunitselfistheregular150-mmheavyinfantryhowitzer,firingan80-lbshellamaximumrangeof6,000yards.

Theelevationandtraverseforsuchamountingarenotsknown.

ThearmoroftheMarkIIchassiswasformerlyabout15-mm.,butitisverypossiblethat,platesof15to20-mmhave

beenusedtoreinforcethefront.Detailsofthearmorprotectionforthegunanditscrewarenotknown.Maximumspeedonroadsisprobablyabout24milesperhour.

10.GERMANUSEOFTANKS


1.USEOFTANKS

AcapturedGermanmanualgives the following informationabout theuseof tanks and the supportgiven thembyotherforces:

a.TankObjectives

Tankssetouttoattacktheenemy’sinfantryandinfantryheavyweapons,artillery,commandposts,reserves,andrearcommunications.Butbefore theycanget throughto these targets, theymustdestroytheirmostdangerousenemy, theantitankdefenses.Forthisreasontheheaviestandmostpowerfultanksmustleadtheattack,andtheymustbesupportedby theother troops, infantryandartillery,bothbeforeandduring theattack.Theheaviest tanksshouldbedirected toattackthepointsthataredeepestwithintheenemypositions,suchasartillery,reserves,andcommandposts.Thelightertanksattacktheinfantry.Eachwaveoftanksshouldbegivenaspecificobjective.

Tanksarealsoabletoseizeimportantpoints,suchasrivercrossings,andtoholdthemuntiltheinfantrycomesup.

Thetankscangototheattackmorequicklyifthereareseveralroadsleadingtothefront,andifcrossingshavebeen

builtoverrailroads,highways,andrivers.

b.SupportbyOtherTroops

(1)Infantry.—Theinfantrymustdirectitsheavymachinegunsagainsttheenemy’santitankdefenses.Theotherheavyweaponsmustfireattargetsoutsidetheareaofthetankactionsothattheywillnotdisabletheirowntanks.Signals(suchastracers,flags,andradio)mustbearrangedinadvancesothatallunitswillworktogether.

(2)Artillery.—Theartilleryfiresupontargetsinfrontandtotheflanksoftheareaofthetankaction.Itfiresbothhigh

explosiveandsmoke.Adjustmentcanbeattainedthroughtheradioortheartilleryliaisondetail,whichcanaccompanythetanks.

(3) Engineers.—Engineers assist the tanks by strengthening bridges, building temporary crossings, and removing

obstacleandmines.

(4)AntitankUnits.—Antitankgunsmust follow the tanksas closelyaspossible soas tobeable to enter the fight

immediatelyifenemytanksaremet.

(5)Aviation.—Aviationhastwoduties:itshouldserveasreconnaissancebeforeandduringthetimethetanksarein

action, and it should attack the enemy’s reserves, especially tanks and antitank defenses, before they can come intoaction.

As soon as the tanks reach their objectives, they at once prepare themselves for a new mission. They send

reconnaissanceforcestothefrontandfindouthowfartheinfantryhasadvanced.Theirnextmovementsaredecidedonthebasisofthesefindings.

After thebattle the tank force iswithdrawnbehind the linesand reorganized.The longer ithasbeen inaction, thelongertherestperiodshouldbe.

11.75-MMASSAULTARTILLERY

IntelligenceBulletin,July1943

TheGerman75-mmassaultgunisaweaponcomparabletotheU.S.75-mmand105-mmself-propelledguns.The

gunandmountweighabout20tons.Themaximumspeedacrosscountryisabout7milesperhour;onroads,about22milesperhour.Itcanaverageabout15milesperhour.Onnormalroadsitsradiusofactionisabout100miles;acrosscountry, about50miles.Tomoveanassault-gunbattery100kilometers (about65miles) requires4,000 liters (about1,050 gallons) of gasoline. The range of the 75-mm short-barreled tank gun,withwhich thisweaponwas originallyequipped,isabout6,000yards.

ApparentlytherearenowthreetypesofGermanassaultgunsinservice:theshort-barreled75-mmtankgun,witha

bore23.5calibersinlength;thelong-barreled75-mmtankgun,withabore43calibersinlength;andanintermediategunwhichseemstobea75-mmgunwithabore30calibersinlength.Itseemsprobablethatthelong-barreled75,whichistheprincipalarmamentofthenewPz.Kw.4tank,maybeprimarilyanantitankweapon,whiletheintermediategunwilltaketheplaceoftheoldshort-barreled75asaclose-supportweapon.

A1940Germandocumentstatesthattheassaultgun“isnottobeusedforantitankpurposes,andwillonlyengage

enemytanks inself-defenseorwhere theanti-tankgunscannotdealwith them.”However,a1942Germandocumentstates that “the assault gun may be used successfully against armored vehicles and light and medium tanks.” ThisapparentcontradictioncanperhapsbeexplainedbythefactthatpriortotheinvasionofRussiain1941,thisweaponhadbeenusedin limitednumbers.ExperienceinRussiamayhaveshownthat itcouldbeusedsuccessfullyagainst tanks,althoughRussiansourcesrefertoitasaninfantrysupportweapon,essentially.PerhapsamorelogicalexplanationliesintwoGermantechnicaldevelopmentssince1940,namely:hollow-chargeammunition,whichisdesignedtoachievegoodarmor-piercingperformanceatrelativelylowmuzzlevelocities,andthereportedreplacementoftheshort-barreled,low-velocity75-mmwiththelong-barreled,high-velocity75-mmgunonsomeofthenewermodels.

The following information about German assault artillery is a condensation of a recent article in “Red Star,” the

officialSovietArmypublication,anddealswithonlyoneofthethreetypes—theshort-barreled75-mm.

TheGermansmakeextensiveuseofself-propelledgunsasassaultartillery.Theirmostimportantmissionistodestroy

theopposition’santitankandheavyinfantryweapons.TheGermanself-propelledmountunderdiscussionisaPz.Kw.3chassisarmedwithashort-barreled75-mmgun,whichhasasemiautomaticbreechblock.Thegun’straverseislimited.Thearmoronthefrontandsidesofthevehiclehasthicknessesof50mmand30mm,respectively.Thetopandrearoftheguncarriageisopen.Thespeedoftheself-propelledgunisabout31milesperhour,anditsrangeisabout84miles.Thegun’sinitialmuzzlevelocityisabout1,389feetpersecond.Theguncarries56rounds.Theammunitionisfixedandconsistsofthefollowingtypes:high-explosive,armor-piercing,andsmoke.

The gun crew consists of a gun commander, a gunner, a loader, and a driver. Two self-propelled gunsmake up a

platoon.Theplatooncommander’svehicleisequippedwithsignalflags,rocketpistols,atwo-wayradio,andaspeakingtubeforcommunicationbetweenthecommanderandhisgunneranddriver.Theradiusoftheradioisabout21/2mileswhenthevehicleisatthehalt,andfrom11/4toalittlelessthan2mileswhenitismoving.Thesecondvehicleintheplatoonhasonlyareceivingsetandsignalflags.

Therearethreeplatoonsinabattery,aswellasaseparategunforthebatterycommander,threearmoredvehicleswith

supplies,andanordinarysupplytruck.Inabattalion(thelargestunit)thereisaheadquarters,aheadquartersbattery,andthreefiringbatteries.Thebattalioncommanderhasagununderhisownpersonalcommand.AccordingtotheGermantable of organization, the battalion of assault guns is an independent unit and is part of theGHQartillery pool.Theassaultartillerybattalioncanbeplacedunderthecommandofaninfantrycommanderortankunitcommander,butnotunderanofficeroflowerrankthanregimentalcommander.Itisimportanttonotethatifanassault-gunbatteryhasthe

necessarysuppliestopermitittotakecareofitself,itmayassumeanindependentrole,apartfromthatofthebattalion.

Assaultbatteries,whichareassigneda limitednumberof targets,have themissionofsupporting theattacksof the

infantry,andofdestroyingtheopposition’sheavyinfantryweaponsandstrongpointsdisclosedduringthecourseoftheattack. In supporting tank attacks, the self-propelled artillery assumes someof thenormal tasksof theheavier tanks,includingthedestructionofantitankguns.

Theassaultartilleryneverservesasantitankartilleryinanattack;onlyinself-defensedoesitopenfireatshortrange,

shootingarmor-piercingshellsagainsttanks.Itsshellhasalmostnoeffectagainstheavytanks.

Thebatteryispartofthecombatechelon,andmarchesaheadofthetrains.Allsevengunsandthreearmoredsupply

vehiclesareinthisechelon.Indeployingforbattlethegunscomefirst,movingabreasttowardthefrontandreadyforinstantaction.Thegunsoftheplatooncommandersareontheflanks.Thebatterycommanderisstationedtotherear,inapositionwhichisdictatedbythetypeoffiringandtheterrain.Behindhim,thesupplyvehiclesmovebyboundsfromoneprotectedpositiontoanother.

Ifapositionlackscover,thesevehiclesfollowataconsiderabledistance,maintainingradiocommunicationwiththe

restofthebattery.

Incarryingoutitsspecialtaskoffacilitatinganinfantrybreakthroughintotherearoftheopposition’sdefenses,the

assaultbatterymayfollowoneoftwomethodsofmaneuver:thebatterymaytakepartintheinitialassault,oritmaybeheld in reserve and not committed until the hostile dispositions have been discovered. In all instances the batterycooperatescloselywiththesupportedinfantrybattalionorcompany.

Assaultgunsusedirectfire.Toachievesurprise,theymoveforwardstealthily.Insupportinganinfantryattackunder

heavyenemyfire,assaultgunshaltbrieflytofireontarget,whichofferthegreatestdangertotheinfantry.Theassaultguns fire a few times, and then disappear to take part in the battle from other positions.When an assault artillerybattalionisattachedtoaninfantrydivisioncooperatingwithPanzerunitsinanattack,thebattalion’sprimarymissionistodestroythehostileantitankdefenses.Ifthebattalionissupportingtanksinabreakthrough,itsbatteriesseekpositionspermittinggoodobservation.Inothercaseseachbatterymovesintotheattackafterthefirstwaveoftanks,andassoonas the latter encounters opposition, the assault guns cover themwith protecting fire. It is believed that theGermansregard close cooperation between the assault battery and the first echelon of tanks as essential in effecting a quickdestructionofantitankdefenses.

Ifhostiletankscounterattack,theGermanantitankgunsengagethem,andtheassaultartilleryunitseekstodestroythe

hostilegunswhicharesupportingtheattackingtanks.WhentheGermanantitankartilleryisunabletostopthehostiletanks,asalastresort,theself-propelledassaultgunsengagethetanks,openingfireonthemwitharmor-piercingshellsatadistanceof650yardsorless.

Inthepursuit,theassaultgunsgivetheinfantryclosesupporttostrengthenthelatter’sfirepower.

Themost important role of the assault battery in defense appears to be in support of counterattacks.However, in

specialinstances,theyhavebeenusedasartillerytoreinforcethedivisionartillery.Whenanassaultbatteryistosupporta counterattack, it is freed from all other tasks. The battery, knowing the limitswithinwhich the counterattackwilloperate,actsjustasitwouldinsupportinganinfantryattack.Assault-batteryofficersandinfantrycommandersjointlymakeacarefulreconnaissanceoftheareainwhichthecounterattackistotakeplace.

ThemostvulnerablepointsofaGermanself-propelledassaultgun,accordingtotheRussians,arethemovingparts,

therearhalfofthefightingcompartment,theobservationapparatus,andtheaimingdevices.

TheRussianscontendthattheirantitankriflesandalltheirartilleryguns,beginningwiththeir45-mmcannon,areable

tofightsuccessfullyagainsttheGermanassaultguns.Heavylossesofself-propelledguns,theRussianssay,havegreatlyweakenedtheGermanArmy’saggressivenessintheattackandtenacityinthedefense.

12.TACTICSUSEDBYPz.Kw.4’s(WITHSHORT75-MMGUN)


1.INTRODUCTION

AlthoughrecentmodelsoftheGermanPz.Kw.4mediumtankhavebeenfittedwithalong-barreled75-mmgun,theGermansarestillusingPz.Kw.4’smountingtheshort-barreled75-mmgun(seefig.1).Forthisreasontheinformationwhich follows should prove useful. It is based onGermanArmy documents which discuss the tactics employed byindividualPz.Kw.4’sarmedwiththeshort75-mmgun,bymediumtankplatoons,andbymediumtankcompanies.

Figure1.—GermanPz.Kw.4.MountingaShort-barreled75-mmGun.

2.TACTICSOFINDIVIDUALTANKS

a.Becauseonlyasmallamountofammunitioniscarried,thegunisnormallyfiredwhilethetankisatthehalt,soastoavoidwaste.TheGermansstatethatthemachinegunsmountedintheturretandhullcanbeemployedsuccessfullyagainstmasstargets—suchascolumns,reserves,limberedguns,andsoon—atrangesupto800yards.

b.Assoonasatargethasbeenputoutofaction,orassoonasattackingGermantroopsaresonearatargetthatitis

dangerousfortankstofire,thetanksmoveforwardbyboundsofatleast200to300yards.Whenchangingposition,thedriverstakecaretokeeptheircorrectpositioninthetacticalformation.

c.Singletanksmaybeusedforsupportingactionagainstpreparedpositions.Thetanknormallymovesfromaflank

undercoverofsmoke.Embrasuresareengagedwitharmor-piercingprojectiles,andneighboringdefensesareblindedbysmoke.Tanksusuallydonotfireonstaticdefensesatrangesofmorethan400yards.Theassaultdetachmentsworktheirway forward under this protection, and as soon as lanes have been cleared through the antitank defenses, the tankfollowsandengagesthenexttarget.TheGermanArmyrequiresclosecooperationbetweentankandassault-detachmentcommanders.Lightsignalsandothertypesofsignalsareprearranged.

TheGermansalsousesingletanksinwoodsfightingandfortheprotectionofrestandassemblyareas.

3.PLATOONTACTICS

a.Duringtheattack,mediumplatoonsmoveforwardinsupportofthefirstwave.Halftheplatoongivescoveringfirewhiletheotherhalfadvances.Thewholeplatoonseldommovesasabody.

b.The platoon commander directs by radio, and he can control fire either by radio or by firing guiding-rounds to

indicateparticulartargets.

c.Antitankweaponsusuallyareengagedbytanksatthehalt.Ifthenearestantitankweaponcanbedealtwithbythe

lighttankcompany,themediumplatoonengagesmoredistantantitankweaponsorattemptstoblindthem.Artilleryisengagedinthesamemannerasantitankweapons.TheGermansconsiderenfiladefireespeciallyprofitable.

d.Ifthelightcompanyencountershostiletanksintheopen,themediumplatoonsatonceengagethemwithsmoke

shellsinordertoallowthelightcompanytodisengageandattacktheoppositionfromaflank.

e.Movingtargetsandlightweaponsareengagedwithmachine-gunfireandbycrushing;mass targetsareengaged

withhighexplosive.

f. Against prepared positions, the procedure is that described in paragraph 2c, above.When thewhole platoon is

employed, theadvancemaybemadebymutual fireandsmokesupport.Theplatoonassists in theconsolidationofacaptured position by promptly laying down smoke and fire. Metal obstacles may be engaged with armor-piercingprojectiles. The platoon does not move forward again until all hostile weapons in the prepared position have beenknockedout.

g.Instreetfightingamediumplatoonmaybeusedinthesecondechelontolendsupport.TheGermansemploythe

tanks’gunsincleaningupnestsofresistanceinhouses;theyalsousethetanksthemselvestocrushlightly-builthouses.

h.Ifafront-linetankformationisorderedtoholdanobjectiveuntilthearrivalofinfantry,themediumplatoongives

protectionbytakingupapositiononhighgroundaffordingalargefieldoffire.

4.COMPANYTACTICS

a.Mediumplatoonsunderthecommandoflightcompaniesusethelatter’sradiofrequency.

b.Reservecrewsfollowimmediatelybehindthefightingechelon,andmovebacktojointheunittrainsonlyafterthe

beginningofabattle.Theycomeforwardagainassoonasthebattleisover.Reliefsaresupposedtobesoarrangedthatfirst-linedriversarethoroughlyrestedwhentheyleavetheassemblyareatotakeoverbeforeanaction.

c.Therepairsection,commandedbyanoncom,travelswiththecombatechelonuntilthebeginningofthebattle.

d.Thecompanycommandertravelsattheheadofhiscompanyuntiltheleadingplatoonshavegoneintoaction.He

thenestablishesa temporarycommandpostwithunimpededobservationof thebattlearea.Maintainingdirectionandcontactistheresponsibilityofcompanyheadquarterspersonnelwhilethecommanderisattheheadofhiscompany.

e.In the attack the normal formations are the broadwedge (Breitkeil)* or extended

order(geöffneteLinie).TheGermansbelievethateffectivefireonthepartof thewholecompanycanbeobtained if the rearelementsprovideoverhead fireor if they fillupor

extendthefrontoftheircompanytoformaline.

*Threeplatoonsareinvolved,formingahollowtrianglewithitsapexforwardf.Intank-versus-tankactions,thecompanyisemployedasaunit,wheneverpossible.Whenhostiletanksappear,they

areengagedatonce;other tasksaredropped.If timepermits, thebattalioncommanderdetachesthemediumplatoonswhichhavebeenattachedtolightcompanies,andsendsthembacktothemediumcompany.Atalltimesmediumtanksattempttofightwiththesunbehindthem.

g.During thepursuit themediumtankunitsareemployedwell forwardso that theycan takefulladvantageof the

longerrangeoftheirhigh-explosiveshells.

5.RECOVERY

Tankmechanicsmove directly behind the combat echelons. The recovery platoon is responsible for towing awaythosetankswhichcannotbeattendedtobytherepairsection.Therecoveryplatoonisundertheordersoftheregimentalworkshop(maintenance)companycommander,whohasunderhiscontrolallequipmentandspare-parttrucksofthetankcompanies.Thesefollowbyseparateroutesasprescribedbyhim.

13.VULNERABILITYOFGERMANTANKARMOR


BritishforcesintheMiddleEasthaverecentlycarriedouttestswithcapturedGermantanksinordertodeterminethe

effectivenessofBritishandU.S.weaponsagainstthem.

The30-mmfrontarmorof theoriginalGermanMarkIII tank(see thispublicationNo.3,page12) isapparentlya

plateofmachinable-qualitysilicomanganese.Theadditional30-or32-mmplateswhichhavebeenboltedontothebasic30-mmarmorareoftheface-hardenedtype.Thistotalthicknessof60to62mmstopstheBritish2-pounder(40-mm)APammunitionatallranges,breakingitupsothatitonlydentstheinnerplate.TheU.S.37-mmprojectile,however,withitsarmor-piercingcap,penetratesat200yardsat70°.Againstthe6-pounder(57-mm)APandthe75-mmSAP,thisreinforcedarmorbreaksuptheprojectiledowntofairlyshortranges,butthearmorplateitselfcracksandsplitsfairlyeasily,andtheboltssecuringitarereadytogivewayafteroneortwohits.If75-mmcappedshotisused,however,suchastheU.S.M61round,thearmorcanbepiercedat1,000yardsat70°.

SimilarresultsmaybeexpectedagainstthereinforcedarmoroftheMarkIV.

ThenewMark III tankhasa single thicknessof50-mmarmoron the front, and thiswas found tobeof the face-

hardenedtype.The2-pounderAPprojectilepenetratesbyshatteringthehardenedface,buttheprojectileitselfbreaksupintheprocessandthefragmentsmakeaholeofabout45mm.The37-mmprojectiledoesnotshatterduringpenetration,which issecuredat rangesup to500yardsat70°.The50-mmplate issofter than thereinforced32-mmplatesbeing530Brinellonthefaceand375ontheback.Thisplateisnotparticularlybrittleandthereisverylittleflaking.

In testscarriedoutagainst thesidearmorofboththeoldandnewmodelsofMarkIII tanks, itwasfoundthat this

armorshowedsignsofdiskingattheback.Thereisalsointernalpetaling.This,andtheconditionofthefront,whichisflakedbackat45°forashortdistance,indicatesthattheheattreatmentmakestheinnerandouterskinharderthanthecore.

VULNERABILITYOFGERMANARMORPLATE

TheMark IV has only 22mm of armor on the sides, but this is reinforced by an additional thickness of 22mm

covering the whole fighting and driving compartments. These additional plates are of themachinable type, and thehardnessofthisplatewasfoundtobe370Brinell.Theboltsholdingthisextraarmorinplaceareweak,anditwasfound

thatthethreadsstrippedeasily.

TheabovetableshowstherangesatwhichthedifferenttypesofGermantankarmorarepenetratedbystandardU.S.

andBritishweapons.Theanglesofimpactaredeterminedbythenormalslopeofthearmoronthetank.

14.ARTILLERYWITHAGERMANTANKDIVISION


The following is a digest of an articlewritten in theRedStar (Moscow) on the use of artillery in aGerman tank

divisionduringattack.Itisinterestinginthatitdescribesthecompositionofmarchcolumnsandattackformations,inadditiontodiscussingtacticalemployment.

TheorganicartillerywithaGermantankdivision,asusedagainsttheRussiansontheEasternFront,normallyconsists

oftwo105-mmbattalionsandone150-mmhowitzerbattalion,andisusuallyreinforcedbyoneortwobattalionsoflightartillery.

Onthemarch,thecommandingofficersoftheartilleryregiments,battalions,andbatteries,plusaminimumoftheir

respectivestaffsandcontrolunits,marchattheheadofthecolumn.Theartilleryreconnaissancepartymarcheswiththetankreconnaissanceunit.Batteryreconnaissancepartiesconsistoftwoarmoredcarsandtwomotorcycles.Incaseoneofthecarsisdestroyedtheothercancarryonthevitalreconnaissancework.

Artilleryobservers ride in armored carswhich are armedwithmachineguns. In each car there is anobserver, the

observer’s assistant, a radio operator, and a driver. There are two such observation vehicles per battery. The batterycommanderridesinoneandanotherofficerintheother.Thebattalionhasthreesuchobservers’cars.

Planesareassignedtoworkwiththeartilleryofthedivisionandaresubjecttocallbythecommandingofficerofthe

artillerywhoassignsthroughbattaliononeplaneormoreperbattery,dependingupontheamountofplanesavailable.Intheattack,onelightartillerybattalionnormallysupportsonetankregimentindirectsupportandthemediumbattalionisingeneralsupport.Butinthemajorityofcasesexperienced,theartilleryofthetankdivisionshasbeenreinforcedsothattwolightbattalionscanbeassignedtoaregimentinthefirstechelon,whichallowsonelightbattalionpertankbattalion.Onebatteryofeachbattalionsupportstherightelementofatankbattalion,anothertheleftelement,whilethethirdisechelonedtotherearandischargedwithsecurityoftheflanksandrear.

Observationposts,commandposts,andbatterypositionsareallmovedasfarforwardaspossible.Batteriesfirefrom

concealedpositions,asarule.

Precedinganattack,preparationfire isconductedfrom15minutes to1houronenemyartilleryandtankassembly

areas,andobservationpointsaresmoked.Enemyfront-lineinfantryisgenerallydisregardedduringthepreparation,astheirneutralizationislefttothetanks.Direct-supportbattalionsdonotalwaysparticipateinthepreparationfire,butareputinmarchorderwithfullsuppliesofammunition,readytojumpoffwiththetanks.

The battalion commanders and battery commanders of direct-support units remain at their observation posts in an

attackuntiltheheadtankpassestheirline,atwhichtimetheytakeuptheirpositionsintheattackechelons.TheGermangeneral-support artillerydoesnot change its position in an attackwhich isdesigned togono further than the enemyartillerypositions.However,inanattackwhichisintendedtopenetratebeyondenemyartillerypositions,theydomoveforwardwhenpracticable.IftheGermaninfantrylagsandisfinallyheldup,butthetanksbreakthroughandcontinueforward,thegeneral-supportartillerydoesnotmoveforward.

During theGerman break-through at the end ofOctober 1941, from the city ofOrel in the direction ofMtsensk,

GermantankunitssucceededinbreakingthroughtheSovietinfantrylines,buttheGermaninfantrysupportingthetankswascutoff and forced todig in.The support artillery couldnotmove forwardand, as a result, the tanks,havingnosupportfromtheirartillery,werecompelled,aftersufferingheavylosses,toreturntotheiroriginalpositions.

Comment

Theabovediscussionconfirmswell-knownGerman tactics. It is important, regardlessof thesuccessof theenemytanks in a break-through, to stop the infantry moving up in support of the tanks because the artillery is thereforepreventedfromadvancingandthetanksaredeprivedoftheirdirectsupport.Thetankscanthenbemuchmoreeasilydealtwith.

15.MARKIIITANK-THREEBASICDESIGNS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No10,October22nd1942

Close examination of a considerable number of photographs ofMark III tanks, together with those available for

examinationintheWesternDesert,indicatesthattheMarkIIIfighting-typetankisfoundinthreebasicdesigns.

Ofthese,thefirsthasanarmorbasisof30mm(1.18in)allaround.Thefrontsprockethaseightspokes,andtherear

idler,thoughhavingeightspokes,isalmostsolid.Thistypeisknownoriginallytohavebeenproducedmountinga37-mmgunandeitheroneor twomachinegunscoaxially in the turret,withonemachinegunfiringforward in thehull.Later,however,the50-mmwassubstitutedfortheoriginalprincipalarmament,andthismountinghasonlyonemachinegunmountedcoaxiallyintheturret,thehullmachinegunbeingretained.Oftheactualspecimensexamined,allmountedthe 50-mmgun (many are nowmounting the long-barrelled type), and in these there has invariably been aVariorexgearbox, the steering being hydraulically operated. This basic type, irrespective of armament, has not been found tocarryanyadditionalarmor,improvisedorotherwise.

Thesecondtypehasanarmorbasisof30mmallaroundwithadditional30-mmplatesboltedon.Thistypehasasix-

spokefrontsprocket,andtherearidler,althoughhavingeightspokes,ismoreopenthanthefirsttype.Anordinarysix-speedgearboxandhydraulicallyoperatedsteeringgeararefitted.Neitherphotographsnorspecimensofthistypehaveshownanyprincipal armamentother than the50-mmgunwithonecoaxialmachinegun.Moreover, every individualtankof this typehashadsimilaradditional30-mmplatesonthefrontandrear, thisadditionalarmornothavingbeenfoundonanyothertypeofMarkIIIfightingtank.Theinferenceis,therefore,thatthisadditionalarmorisactuallypartofthedesignofthetankandprobablyincorporatedduringmanufacture.Therehavebeennoindicationsthatthistypeoriginallymounteda37-mmgun,althoughthisremainsapossibility.

Thethirdtypehas50-mmarmoronthefrontandrear,with30-mmarmoronthesides.Noadditionalarmorhasbeen

foundonanytanksofthistype,andthearmamenthasalwaysbeenfoundtobethe50-mmgunwithacoaxialmachinegunandonemachineguninthehull.Thefrontsprocketandrearidleraresimilartothoseinthesecondtype,andanordinarysix-speedgearboxisfitted,thesteeringbeingoperatedbymechanicallinkage.Thedriver’sandhullgunner’sentrancedoorshavebeenchangedfromtheformerdoubledoorstosingledoorshingedattheforwardedge.Inplaceofthenormalmantletprotectingthehullmachinegun,amorehemisphericalmantletisfitted.

Thefollowingminordifferencesofdesignbetween these threebasic typeshavealsobeennoted.Originallyon the

firsttypethearmorprotectingthedriver’svisorconsistedoftwoplates,onebeingraised,andtheotherlowered,togiveprotection.Thethirdtype,andprobablythesecondtypeaswell,havehadasinglehingedpieceofarmorwhichcanbelowered to give protection. The third type has also had a slightly different design of the two shields protecting theexhaustsfromthesteeringtracks.Inthefirstandsecondtypestheairfilterswerelocatedbetweentherearbulkheadofthefightingcompartmentandtheengine,airbeingdrawnfromthefightingcompartment.Thesefilterswerebelievedtobeanoil-soakedgauzetype.Onthethirdtypethisarrangementsupersededbyfouroilbathfilters,installedoverthetopoftheengineblocks.

Thesuspensiononallthesetypeshasbeenthesame,thefamiliarsixsmallbogiewheelswiththreereturnrollers,a

frontsprocket,andarearidler.Twoearlytypes,however,areknowntohavehadrespectivelyfivelargebogiewheelsandeight smallbogiewheels.Both these typesmounteda37-mmgun.Nothinghasbeenheardofeither typeoveraconsiderableperiod,anditisprobablethattheywereprototypesonlyandnotproducedinsignificantnumbers.

ItisknownthatMarkIIIfightingtankshavebeenproducedinatleastfivemodelsdesignated‘E’,‘F’,‘G,‘H’,and

‘J.’ These models have consecutive chassis number blocks, and it is logical to assume that they are successivedevelopments.Thereshouldthereforebealinkwiththedevelopmentshownabove,butsofaritisnotpossibledefinitelytosaywhateachmodeldesignationrepresents. It is,however,knownthat thefirst typedescribedabovehas included

Model‘G’tanks,andthethirdtypehasincludedModel‘J’tanks.Allthreetypesareknowntohavebeeninexistenceearlyin1941,thethirdtypeprobablybeingatthattimeaverynewproduction.

Itshouldbespeciallynotedthat,indescribingGermanarmorthickness,roundnumbersarealmostinvariablygiven.

Careful measurement, has shown that these figures are frequently incorrect. 30-mm, for example, should almostinvariablybeupto32-mm.

16.GERMANTANKMAINTENANCEANDRECOVERYTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.10,October22nd1942

Someof themaintenanceunitsattachedtoGermantankregimentswerediscussedbriefly inTacticalandTechnical

Trends No. 4, p. 10.More information is now available on these units and is presented here in a summary whichinvolvessomerevisionoftheearliermaterial.

a.Organization

IntheGermanarmoreddivisions,themaintenanceandrecoveryunitsareordinarilyorganizedasfollows:

(1)CompanyRepairSection

Eachtankcompanyhasarepairsectionconsistingof:

1NCO(tankmechanic),sectionleader,

3NCO’s,tankmechanics,

13privates,tankmechanics,

2privates,tankradioelectricians,

1private,armorer’sassistant,

4privates,chauffeurs.

Total:4NCO’sand20EM.

Thisrepairsectionhasthefollowingvehicles:

1smallrepaircar(Kfz.2/40),

1mediumcross-countryrepairtruck,forsparepartsandtools,

2half-trackvehicles(Sd.Kfz.10)forpersonnel,capableoftowing1ton,

3motorcycleswithsidecars.

(2)BattalionandRegimentalRepairSections

Theheadquartersofeachtankbattalionandeachtankregimenthasarepairsectionconsistingof:

1NCO(tankmechanic),sectionleader,

3privates,tankmechanics(foratankregimentalheadquarters),

or

5privates,tankmechanics7foratankbattalionheadquarters),

1private,motorcyclist,tankradioelectrician,

1private,chauffeur,tankradioelectrician,

1chauffeur.

Total:forHq,tankregiment,1NCOand6men;

forHq,tankbattalion,1NCOand8men.

Thisrepairsectionhasthefollowingvehicles:

1smallrepaircar(Kfz.2/40),

1mediumcross-countryrepairtruck,forsparepartsandtools,

1motorcyclewithsidecar.

(3)WorkshopCompany

A captured German document gives the following detailed organization of a Panzer workshop company, as ofSeptember15,1941.Itisbelievedthattheorganizationgiveninthisdocumentisnotthatoftankunitsinaparticulartheaterbuthasgeneralapplication.

Thedocument sets forth the organizationof aworkshop company in aPanzer regimentwith six companies (as in

Libya),butmakesprovisionforaddedstrength(asnotedbelow)inregimentsofeightcompanies,andinregimentsofthreebattalions.

(a)HeadquartersPlatoon

1cross-countrytruck(Kfz.1)—1chauffeur,1companycommander(engineer),1officerforspecialduties(engineer),1clerk(draftsman).(Oneofthetwoofficersmaybeotherthananengineerofficer.)

1motorcycle—1motorcyclist(orderly).

1mediumtruck—1chauffeur,2menforsalvagingspareparts(M)[Here,andlater,wherethemeaningoftechnicalabbreviationsisnotcertain,theyaregivenastheyappearinthedocument.]

1lightpersonnelcar—1chauffeur,1official(K-motortransport),1NCOforspareparts,1clerk(asst.chauffeur).

1motorcyclewithsidecar—1motorcyclist(orderly),1foremanformotortransportequipment(MaybachSpecialist).

(b)1stand2dPlatoons

1motorbus(Kraftomnibus)

1chauffeur,4NCO’sforworkshopservice(Vorh.W.=craftsmen?)

1 tank electrician and mechanic, 1 tank electric welder, 1 saddler, 1 tinsmith, 1 carpenter, 1 painter, 7 tank motormechanics,3tanktransmissionmechanics,1automobilemechanic,1clerk.

5mediumtrucks,forsparepartsandassemblies

(each)1chauffeur,1tanktransmissionmechanic(asst.chauffeur),1automobilemechanic.

1mediumtruckforsparepartsandassemblies

1chauffeur,1NCOinchargeofspareparts,1depotchief(M).

1truckwithspecialworkshopandtrailerforarc-weldingapparatus

1chauffeur,1NCOforworkshopservice(vorhandwk),1tankelectricwelder(asst.chauffeur).

1heavytruck,toolsandequipment

1chauffeur,1tankmotormechanic,1blacksmith.

1workshoptruck(Kfz.19),withtrailerforheavymachineapparatus,SetA

1chauffeur,1foreman(leader),1turner.

(c)3dPlatoon(RecoveryPlatoon)

1lightcross-countryautomobile(Kfz.1)

1chauffeur,1officer(platoonleader),NCO(Panzer-Wart,tankmechanic)

1mediumcross-countrytruck(Kfz.100)fortowingapparatus,withrotatingcrane(3tons)[Anoteonthedocument

statesthatthisapparatuswillbedeliveredlater.]

1chauffeur,1asst.chauffeur(automobilemechanic).

1mediumhalf-trackprimemover(8tons)

1chauffeur,1assistantchauffeur(automobilemechanic).

2mediumhalf-trackprimemovers(8tons)withunderslungtrailers(10tons)

(each)1chauffeur,1asst.chauffeur(mechanic),and(foroneonlyofthesetrucks)1NCO(tankmechanic).

2vehicles (withapparatus) [Thedesignationof this apparatusand the vehiclemodel numberarenot clearon the

originaldocument.Theapparatusisdesignatedasnotyetavailable.Thevehiclesareapparentlyheavyhalf-trackprimemovers.](6tons,Sd.Kfz.41)

(each)1chauffeur,1assistantchauffeur(automobilemechanic).

5heavyhalf-trackprimemovers(18tons),withunderslungtrailers(20tons)

(each)1chauffeur,1assistantchauffeur(automobilemechanic),1steererfortrailer;oneprimemoverhasinaddition,anNCO(tankmechanic).

2motorcycleswithsidecars

(each)1chauffeur(tankmechanic),1NCO(tankmechanic).

(OneoftheNCO’sissecondincommand.)

(d)ArmorySection

1mediumcross-countryautomobile(Kfz.15m.G.)

1chauffeur,2armorers(oneissectionleader),1armorer’shelper.

1motorcyclewithsidecar

1NCOarmorer(0),1helper.

3vehicles(notdescribed),forarmorer’stools

Onewith1chauffeur,1NCO,armorer(0),1tankelectricianandmechanic(asst.chauffeur);

Onewith1chauffeur,1tankelectrician(asst.chauffeur),1armorer’shelper;

Onewith1chauffeur,2armorer’shelpers(oneisasst.chauffeur).

1lightcross-countrycarforsupplyoftools

1chauffeur,1armorer’shelper.

(e)WorkshopsforCommunicationsEquipment

1 battery-charging truck (Kfz. 42) [According to the document, there is a trailer attached to this truck, but no

descriptionisgiven.]

1chauffeur,1NCOmechanic(leader),1mechanic.

1 communications workshop truck (Kfz. 42) [An ambiguous note suggests that this equipment had not yet been

delivered.]

1chauffeur,1mechanic(asst.chauffeur).

1lightcross-countrytruck

1chauffeur,1mechanic(asst.chauffeur).

(f)CompanySupply

1mediumtruckforrationsandbaggage

1chauffeur,1NCOinchargeofequipment(leader).

1motorcyclewithsidecar

1supplysergeant(K),1clerk(asst.motorcyclist).

1antiaircrafttruck(Kfz.4)

1chauffeur,1NCO(incharge),1machine-gunner.

2mediumtrucksforfuel

One,with1chauffeurand1tailor(asst.chauffeur);

One,with1chauffeurand1shoemaker(asst.chauffeur).

2mediumtrucksforlargefield-kitchenstoves

One,with1chauffeur,1NCOinchargeofrations(asst.chauffeur),1cook,1asst.cook;

One,with1chauffeur,1NCO(accountant),1NCO(cook),1asst.cook(asst.chauffeur).

1lightautomobile

1chauffeur(clerk),1mastersergeant,1medicalofficer.

(g)TotalStrengthofWorkshopCompany

3 officers, 5 officials, [Only one official is designated as such in the preceding breakdown of the company’sorganization. If the foremananddepotchief ineachof the1stand2dPlatoonsareofficials, thiswouldclearup thediscrepancy.]29NCO’s,158EM(total,195men)and1shopforemanformotortransportequipment(groupleader).

(h)Thedocumentmakesthefollowingprovisionsforenlargementoftheworkshopcompany:

(1)Fortankregimentswiththreebattalions,addoneworkshopplatoon(sameorganizationas1stPlatoonabove).AddtotheRecoveryPlatoontwoheavyhalf-trackprimemovers(18tons)with22-tontrailers,eachtohave1chauffeur,1asst.chauffeur(automobilemechanic),1 trailersteerer.This involvesadditionalpersonnelof1official,6NCO’s,49EM-total,56men.Theworkshopcompanythenhasatotalstrengthof251men.

(2)Fortankregimentswith4companiesinabattalion(i.e.,twobattalionstotheregiment),add:

Toeachof the1stand2dPlatoons—2mediumtrucksforspareparts,eachwith1chauffeurand1motormechanic(asst.chauffeur).

TotheRecoveryPlatoon—1half-trackprimemover(18tons)withtrailer(22tons),andpersonnelof1chauffeur,1asst.chauffeur(automobilemechanic),and1trailersteerer.

(4)LightWorkshopPlatoon

Accordingtopre-warorganization,atankregimentofthreebattalionshad(inadditiontotheworkshopcompany)aregimentalworkshopplatoon.Thisunitcomprised1officer,2officials,3NCO’s,and48EM;thevehiclesconsistedof1automobile,13trucks(5to7withtrailers),and3motorcycleswithsidecars.

Therehasbeenlittleavailableinformationontheworkshopplatoonsince1940.Itisbelievedthattheunithasbeen

enlarged.

AcaptureddocumentfromAfrica(1941)givesdetailedinstructionsforaworkshopplatoonina two-battaliontank

regimentof theAfricaKorps(whichnormallywouldnothavethisunit).In thiscase,anexampleof theflexibilityofGerman organization, the personnel assigned to the platoonwas obtained by breaking up the battalion headquartersrepairsectionsofthetwobattalions.Thisworkshopplatoonwassmallerthannormalandwastooperate,inplaceofthebattalionheadquartersrepairsections,undercommandoftheregiment.

Theplatoonwascomposedof:

•1sergeantmechanic(platoonleader),

•1Maybachspecialist(forenginesandVariorexgears),

•2NCO’stankmechanics(oneanenginemechanicandelectrician,theothertobealsoawelder),

•2tankmechanics,

•1carchauffeur,

•2motorcyclists(mechanics),

•3truckchauffeurs.

Theplatoonhadthefollowingequipmentinvehicles:

•1lightcross-countryautomobile(forplatoonleaderandMaybachSpecialist),

•2motorcycleswithsidecars(forthetwoNCO’s),

•1truckwithrepairequipment(for1mechanic,1tankfitter),

•2truckswithmaterialsandspareparts(eachfor1mechanic,1tankfitter),

•1lighttwo-wheeledtrailer,

•1trailerwithreserveofoxygenandacetylenecontainers.

(5) According to pre-war organization, each armored division had, as part of divisional services, 3 divisionalworkshopcompanies.Thesecompanieswould,onoccasion,presumablyaidtheworkshopunitsofthetankregiments,butinformationonthisfunctionisnotavailable.

b.FunctionsofTankRepairandWorkshopUnits

(1)Therepairsections(theavailableinformationapparentlyappliestobothtypesofrepairsectionmentionedabove)areresponsibleforthegeneralmaintenanceofthetanks,andoftheirarmamentandradioapparatus.

Incampandrestareas,theykeepacheckupontheserviceabilityofvehiclesintheunittowhichtheyareattached;

during this period, mechanics are given advanced training through attachment to the workshop company or undermaster-mechanicstransferredtotheunit.

Onthemarch,repairsectionstravelwiththetankunitsanddealwithanybreakdownsinvehiclesorequipment,inso

far as these repairs can be effected in less than 4 hours andwith field equipment. If a tank breaks down, the repairsectionleaderinspectsitanddeterminesthenatureofthedamage.Ifthedamagewarrantsit,thetankishandedovertothe recoveryplatoon tobe towedaway;otherwise,amotorcyclewithmechanicsstayswith the tank toeffect repairs,whiletheotherelementsoftherepairsectiongoonwiththecolumn.Inthisway,onevehicleafteranotheroftherepairsectionstaysbehind;ordinarilythemotorcycles,but,ifdamageisserious,ahalf-trackedvehicle.Therepairautomobilealwaysgoesonwiththecolumn,whiletherepairtruckalwaysstayswiththerepairvehicleleftfarthesttotherear.

In the assembly area, the repair sections thoroughly test all tanks and equipment as to fitness for battle. Any

breakdownsarereportedatoncetotheunitmotor-transportsergeant.

Inbattle,thecompanyrepairsectionsareundertheorderofthebattalioncommanderandaredirectedbyabattalion

motor-transportofficer.Asaruletheyfollowcloselybehindthefightingunitsandrangeoverthebattlearealookingforbroken-downtanks.Ifthetankcannotberepairedonthespotitismadetowableanditspositionreportedtotherecoveryplatoon(oftheworkshopcompany).

Inone tankbattalion inLibya,anarmor-repairsectionwasaddedto thenormalrepairsections.Thepersonnelwas

madeupofarmorermechanicsdetachedfromotherrepairunits,andincludedanarmorersergeant,anarmorercorporal,andsevenarmorer’sassistants.Theequipmentincludedanautomobile,amotorcycle,andtwotrucks.Thissectionwastofollowthetanksinbattleandtoworkwithrepairsectionsonweaponsandturrets.

Repair sections are not allowed to undertake the welding of armor gashes longer than 4 inches. In battle, the

regimentalheadquartersrepairsectionisattachedtoabattalion.

(2)Thearmoredworkshopcompanyoperatesasfaras15to20milesbehindthefightingtanksofitsregiment,except

thattherecoveryplatoonworksinthebattlearea,mainlytotowoutdisabledtanks.

Theworkshopcompanyhandlesheavier repair jobs,up to thoserequiring12hours.Repair jobsrequiringup to24

hoursaresentbacktorearrepairbases.

Theworkshop company has its own power tools, a crane, and apparatus for electricwelding and vulcanizing. Its

platoonsmaybeseparated,andmayoperateindependently.Accordingtoonecaptureddocument,aworkshopcompanydealtwith18tanksin17days,underconditionswheretherewasnoshortageofspareparts.

(3) The light workshop platoon in the Afrika Korps tank regiment (discussed earlier) replaced the battalion

headquartersrepairsectionsandoperatedundercommandoftheregimentasaconnectinglinkbetweentheworkshopcompanyandthecompanyrepairsections.Likethelatter,itwouldhandleworkrequiringlessthan4hours.Inattack,thisplatoonwouldfollowalongthecentralaxisofadvance,inclosetouchwiththerecoveryplatoonoftheworkshopcompany.

Theplatoonwas tocarryoutworkas follows:onbrakes,gears,andclutchesofMarkII (light) tanks;ondamaged

gear-mechanismofMarkIIItanks;andonvalvedefectsofalltypesoftruckandtankenginesexceptMarkIIIandIVtanks. They were to remove electrical and fuel-system faults; salvage and tow wheeled vehicles; make repairs onwheeledvehicles;performautogeneweldingandsolderingwork;andchargeandtestbatteriesandelectricalapparatus.

c.TankRecoveryMethods

Allobservers stress theefficiencyof theGerman recoveryandmaintenanceunits.The followingpointshavebeennoted:

(1)TheGermanswillusecombattankstotowdisabledtanksincaseofretirement;evenduringabattle,instancesarereported, both fromFrance andAfrica,where combat tankswere employedboth toprotect towingoperations and toassistinthetowing.Therecoveryplatoon,withitstrailers,isnotgiventhewholeburdenofthismainjobofsalvage.

(2) The same principle of cooperation prevails on repair jobs in the field. Tanks carrymany tools, spare parts, andequipmentforrepairwork,andobserversbelievethatthetankcrewsaretrainedtoassisttherepaircrewsaswellastoserviceandmaintaintheirownvehicles.

(3)NotonlyistherecoveryofGermanvehiclesveryefficient,butunitswilloftensendoutdetachmentstorecoverthoseoftheenemy.Forinstance,atankbattalionmaysendoutadetachmentconsistingofanofficer,oneortwoNCO’s,andsixoreightmen,transportedinoneortwocross-countryvehiclesandprotectedbyoneortwolighttanks,tosearchforandrecoverdisabledhostilevehicles.

17. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SERVICE INGERMANARMOREDDIVISIONSTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.11,November5th1942

The organization ofmaintenance and recovery units in tank regimentswas summarized in Tactical and Technical

Trends,No. 10, p. 24. In addition, theGerman armored division has repair units andworkshopswhich are assignedprimarilytotheserviceoftheelementsinthedivisionotherthanthetankregiments.However,it isworthnotingthatsomeof thedivisionalrepairsubsections(seebelowa.(2))mayincludetankmechanics; thissuggests thatsuchunitsmaybecalledupontoassistthoseassignedtothetankregiments.

The repair services for units other than tank regiments [These repair units are also found in German motorized

divisions, and the scheme of allotment which governs their services applies equally to the motorized division.] areperformedby:

a.RepairSubsections

(1)Repairsubsection“a”•1motortransportcorporal(insidecar),leader,

•1motorcycledriver(enginemechanic),

•1enginemechanic,

•1chauffeur(enginemechanic).

•Vehicles:Motorcyclewithsidecar,1smallrepairautomobile(Kfz.2/40).

This subsection is allotted tounits thathavenotmore than25motorvehicles (not counting trailers, or sidecars:4motorcycles count as 1 vehicle), except for those units (such as battalion headquarters) which are given repairdetachments (see below, b.) The companies in the armored infantry regiment,motorcycle battalion, and the antitankbattalionhavesubsectionsofthistype,ashaveartillerybatteriesofalltypes.[Thesourcesgivethetheoreticalprinciplesofallotmentofrepairunits;however,itwouldbedangeroustoassumethattheschemeisrigorouslyapplied.Thereisvery little difference in size between some types of repair units (especially the repair detachments); furthermore, theGermansmake flexibleapplicationofany theoreticalorganization,and theseorganizations themselvesare subject tofrequentmodification]

(2)RepairSubsection“b”

•1motortransportcorporal(insidecar),leader,

•1motorcycledriver(enginemechanic),

•6enginemechanics(ortankmechanics),

•1electrician(sparechauffeur),

•2chauffeurs(enginemechanics).

•Vehicles: 1motorcyclewith sidecar, 1 small repair automobile (Kfz,2/40), 1medium truck (3 tons), open, for sparepartsandpersonnel.

The principle of allocation of this subsection is not clear from the sources. It is definitely found in the armoredengineercompany,andmaybeassignedtothearmoredradiocompanyofthedivisionalcommunicationsbattalion.

(3)RepairSubsection“c”

•1motortransportcorporal(insidecar),leader,

•1corporal(tankmechanic),

•1motorcycledriver,

•12tankmechanics(6areenginemechanics),

•1electrician,

•2communicationequipmentmechanics,

•1chauffeur(enginemechanic),

•2truckchauffeurs.

•Vehicles:2motorcycleswithsidecars,1smallrepairautomobile(Kfz.2/40),1mediumtruck,fortiresandspareparts,1mediumcrosscountrytruck,forpersonnel.

Thissubsectionisallottedtoarmoredcarcompaniesinthedivisionalreconnaissancebattalion.

b.RepairDetachments

(1)Detachment“A”•1workshopforeman(official,middlegrade),

•1corporal(mastermechanicandenginemechanic),

•2enginemechanics(assistantchauffeurs),

•1enginemechanicformotorcycles,

•1blacksmithandwelder,

•1motorcycledriver(clerk),

•4chauffeurs(1isanelectrician,1anenginemechanic).

•Vehicles:1motorcyclewithsidecar,1lightautomobile,1smallrepairautomobile(Kfz.2/40),1mediumcrosscountrytruck, open, formotor transport repair equipment, 1medium crosscountry truck, open, for spare parts, tools, andtowingequipment.

Thisdetachment is allotted toheadquartersofbattalionswhichcontainnotmore than125motorvehicles; also, toheadquartersofallmotorizedinfantryregiments.

(2)Detachment“B”

AsforDetachment“A”,exceptthatthereare3enginemechanics(assistantchauffeurs)insteadof2.

This detachment is allotted to headquarters of battalions (including artillery) which containmore than 125motor

vehicles (examples: motorcycle battalion, armored infantry battalion, antitank battalion, engineer battalion,reconnaissancebattalion).

(3)Detachment“C”

AsforDetachment“A”,exceptthat

(a)Thereare5enginemechanics(ortankmechanics)insteadof2.

(b)Thereare5chauffeurs(ofwhom1isanelectrician,1awelder’sassistant,and1anenginemechanic)insteadof4.

(c)Thevehiclesincludeanadditionalopenmediumcrosscountrytruckfortires.

This detachment is allotted to headquarters of battalions (including artillery) where the main vehicles of the

subordinateunitsarespecialvehicles(armored,halftrack,etc.)andwhereallthesubordinatecompaniesarearmored.(Theonlycertainexampleisthecaseofthemediumartillerybattalion.)

c.SpecialAllotments

Onesubsection“a”isassignedtoeachofthefollowing:

Each company of a troop-carrying motor transport battalion (and to the battalion headquarters), motorized bakerycompanies,andmotorizedmedicalcompanies.

One detachment “A” and two subsections “a” are allotted to the headquarters of the motorized divisional supplyservices.

d.WorkshopCompanies

Each armored division [A motorized division has two workshop companies, organized as those in the armoreddivision.]hasthreeworkshopcompanies(notincludingthemuchlargerworkshopcompanyofthetankregiment).Eachcompanyincludesaheadquarters,twoworkshopplatoons,anarmorysection,andasupplysection.Thepersonneltotals102officersandmen(1officer,7officials,6NCO’s,88EM).Theequipmentinvehiclesis4automobiles,16trucks,1half-trackvehiclefortowing(andpersonnel),4trailers,and6motorcycles.

These workshops carry out all motor transport repairs on vehicles sent back by the unit repair subsections and

detachments,exceptingjobswhichrequiremorethan12hourswork.Thelattergotobaseworkshops.

18.GERMANSELF-PROPELLED150-MMHOWITZERTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.12,November19th1942

The150-mmmediumhowitzer,sFH13,hasbeenprovidedwithaself-propelledmounting,thechassisoftheFrench

tracteurblindé38L,madebyLorraine.

ThesFH13isequipmentofthelastwar,supersededinfirst-lineunitsbythe15-cmsFH18.Particularsofthegunare:

The particulars of the mount 38L are: length, 14 feet; width, 5 feet 2 inches; weight, 7 1/2 tons; engine, 70

horsepower;maximumspeed,22milesperhour.

Thesketchaboveshowsthefollowingdetails:

(a)Afixedgun-houseofnotverythickplate

(b)Alimitedtraverseofnotmorethanabout4degrees

(c)Aspadeontherearofthehullthatcanbeletdowntotakerecoilstresses.

Itisnotablethatinthiscaseanequipmentfiringa92-lbshelltoamaximumrangeof9,300yardshasbeenmounted

onahullweighingnomorethan71/2tons.

ThisisanothercaseinwhichtheGermanshaveutilizedastandardfieldguntomakeself-propelledartillery.Arecentpicture shows another 150-mmhowitzer, the 15-cm sIG33, on aGermanMark II chassiswith the gun on a specialmountingbuiltintothehull.Thereisathree-sidedshieldnohigherthanthenormaltank,insteadoftheveryhighbox-likestructurefortheself-propelledsFH13.

19.OPERATIONSOFTHEGERMANTANKRECOVERYPLATOON

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.12,November19th1942

British sources give recent information on the methods employed by the recovery platoon of (tank) workshop

companies.Thisinformationwasobtainedfromprisonersofwar.

The towing vehicles and trailers of the platoon are sent forward to regimental headquarters and operate under its

direction.

The principle now used is to have two or three recovery vehicles forwardwith the fighting units. These vehicles

advanceinthelineofattackandcruiseacrossthewidthofthebattlefront.TheGermansbelievethathostileforceswillbepreoccupiedwiththeGermantanksandwillnotbotherwiththerecoveryvehicles,nomatterhowclosetheyare.

Ifamemberofa tankcreworders thedriverofa recoveryvehicle to towhis tank to the rear, the formerassumes

responsibilityfortheaction—incaseitlaterprovesthatthedamageisnegligibleandcouldhavebeenfixedonthespotbytherepairsections.However,askingthatadamagedvehiclebetowedawayisalwayspermissibleifitisindangerofbeingshotup.

The towing vehicle usually goes forward alone and tows a disabled tank away by tow ropes. Towing is used in

preferencetoloadingonthetrailer,as this latteroperationmaytake20minutes(regardedbyaprisonerasgoodtimeunderbattleconditions).

Therecoveredtanksaretowedtoanassemblypointbehindthecombatarea,wheretheyarelinedupsoastoprotect

themselves as far as possible. Trailersmay be used to take back the disabled tanks from this point to theworkshopcompany.

Accordingtothisreport,however,trailersarebeingusedlessandless,andtheiruseisconfinedmainlytoroads.On

roads,theyenableahigherspeedtobemaintained,donotweaveasmuchasatowedtank,anddonotcutuptheroadsurface.Onthedesert,trailerswouldbeusedonbadgroundratherthanwherethereisgoodgoing.

ThePW’sreportedthatdriversofrecoveryvehiclesdidfront-linedutyforabout8daysatatime;thentheyworkedat

therear,betweenassemblypointandworkshop.

20.INCREASEDPROTECTIONONGERMANTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.14,December17th1942

RecentMiddleEastreportspointoutthattheGermansaretakingconsiderablepainstoprovideadditionalprotection

for their tanks. Thus far, the measures employed for this purpose may conveniently be considered under twomainheadings,namely,spacedarmorandimprovisedprotection.

a.SpacedArmor

Moredetailed information than that previously submitted on theMark III tank indicates the extent towhich theseimprovementshavegone.Theaccompanyingsketches,basedonactualphotographs,illustratetypicalarrangementsofspacedarmoronthistankandthrowsomelightonthesedevelopments.

Figure1illustratesthegeneralappearanceofthetankwhenfittedwithspaced-armor;figures2and3aresideviewsof

spaced-armor arrangements on the front superstructure and gunmantlet; and figure 4 is a perspective viewwith thespacedplateofthegun-mantletassemblyremoved.

Thearrangementofthespacedarmoronthegunmantletappearstobemoreorlessuniforminallthephotographsso

farreceived.Inallcasestheadditionalplateonthemantletiscurved,asshowninfigure3,andformsthefrontwallofaboxstructure,therearwallofwhichisconstructedofthe50-mmfrontshieldofthegunmantlet,andthesides,top,andbottomareformedbythinsheet-metalplatesarrangedasshowninfigure4.InoneexamplerecentlyexaminedintheMiddle East, the additional plate was 20-mm thick and was separated from the mantlet proper by an air space ofapproximately120mm(4.7inches),theairspacebeingsomewhatlargerthanthisatthetopandsomewhatsmalleratthebottom.

The spacedarmoron the front superstructure is arranged in at least twodifferentways, the sides for theair space

sometimesclosed,andsometimesopen.

Inthistank,thesidesofthespacebetweenthefrontofthesuperstructureandtheadditionalplatewereclosedbythin

sheetmetal,theonlypurposeofwhichwasapparentlytokeepoutthedust.Theadditionalplatewasfixedparalleltothe50-mmfrontplateof thesuperstructure, fromwhich itwasseparatedbyanair spaceof100mm(3.9 inches). Itwas20mmthickandofmachinablequality,Brinellhardnesstestsgivingafigureofabout350onbothsides.

Inanother tankrecentlyexamined in theMiddleEast, theairspace in thefrontsuperstructureassemblywasopen-

sided.Thespaceplate,whichwasagain20mmthickandofmachinablequality,wasboltedtoangleironsupportsatthetop andbottom; those at the topwerewelded to the roof of the superstructure, and those at the bottom, to the frontsloping topplateof thehull. In thiscase theadditionalplatewasarrangedatanangle to thebasicplateasshown infigure2;thespaceatthetopmeasuredhorizontally108mm(4.25inches),andatthebottom195mm(7.68inches).

Ineverycasetheadditionalplateonthefrontofthesuperstructureisformedwithtwoopenings,onetoaccommodate

thedriver’svisorandtheotherfor thehullmachinegun.It isreportedthat theseopeningsaresuchthat thefittingofspacedarmordoesnotseriouslyaffectthetraverseandelevationofthemachinegunanddoesnotinanywayimpairthedriver’svision.

Although,inthesetwotanks,theadditionalplatewasofmachinablequality,asamplefromathirdtankappearedtobe

face-hardened,theBrinellvalueofitsfrontsurfacebeing468,against359onitsrearsurface.

Sofar,spacedarmorhasonlybeenreportedontheJseriesMarkIIItankswith50-mmbasicfrontalarmorandthe

newlong50-mmgun.Since,however,thefittingofspacedarmorisprobablyatpresentinanexperimentalstage,itmaybefoundonothermodelsoftheMarkIIIorevenontheMarkIV.Ifitprovesasuccess,itwillnodoubtbestandardizedinduecourse.

b.ImprovisedProtection

MiddleEastalsoreportsthatGermantanksarenowfrequentlyprovidedwithimprovisedadditionalprotectioninthe

form of sand bags attachedwherever possible, and lengths of track secured over vulnerable parts. (SeeTactical andTechnicalTrends,No.13,p.33).

Itiscommonforsomeofthesandbagstobearrangedontheroofofthesuperstructureinfrontoftheturretsoasto

shieldtheturretjointandthespacebelowthebottomofthegunmantlet,andothersaroundthefrontandsidesofthesuperstructure.Precautionsaretakensoasnottoobstructthedriver’svisionorthefreeelevationandtraverseoftheball-mountedmachinegun.

Lengthsoftrackareusuallyattachedacrosstheupperandlowernoseplates.Theyhavealsobeenfoundsecuredonthe

frontofthesuperstructurebetweenthedriver’svisorandthemachinegun,aswellasdrapedoverthetopoftheturretandgunmantlet.

Thelengthoftrackacrossthelowernose-plateisgenerallyheldinpositionbymeansofatransversebarweldedtothe

plateatitsends,whilethatontheuppernose-platehasbeenfoundattachedbyShookstotheairinletcowlsofthetrackbrakecoolingsystem.

21.TANKWARFAREINSTREETSTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.14,December17th1942

ThefollowingcommentswerecompiledfromobservationsoftherecenttankbattlesinthestreetsofStalingrad.

TheGermancommanderheldthemassofhistanksintherearareas,throwingonlysmallgroupsoffromthreetofive

tanksdownanyonestreet.

Theaccompanyinginfantryprecedesthetanks,andonlywhenthesurroundingbuildingsareovercomedothetanks

advance.Thus,thebestdefenseagainsttanksinstreetwarfareistoplacethemostexperiencedautomaticriflemenoutinfront.

Itisnecessarytodeploytanksinthedefensesothattheywillformadensecrossfire,enfilade,andflankingfire.This

can best be obtained by controlling the street intersections. Infantry and artillery must be disposed in the intervalsbetween,andinfrontof,thetanks.

Itisdesirablethattanksheldinreservebeassemblednearintersections.

Tanksshouldbecontrolledbyradio.Messengerserviceistooslowandtelephonewireistooeasilybroken.

The infantry commandermustbe locatednear the tankcommander, and the commandersof the smaller rifleunits

mustbewith thecommandersof individual tanks.The riflecommanders locate targets for the tanks,andcorrectandchangetheirfirefromonetargettoanother.

22.ENGINEERSUPPORTOFTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.15,December31st1942

Experience inRussia andAfrica has indicated that tanks cannot operate successfullywithout the support of other

arms.SincetankshaveprobablybeenmoreextensivelyusedontheRussianfrontthananywhereelse,ofinterestisthefollowingsummaryofanarticlefromtheRussiannewspaperRedStarofJune7,1942,writtenbyaRussianlieutenant,onengineersupportoftankattacksonorganizeddefenses.

Duringtheattack,eachtankshouldcarryatleast2engineers.Theprincipalfunctionoftheseengineersisthelocation

andneutralizationofmines.Forpurposesofcoordination,acompletesetofvisualsignalsbetweentheengineers(whendismounted)andthetanksmustbearranged.

Comment:Theseengineersapparentlyrideoutsidethetankbehindtheturret.Inthisconnectionitshouldbenotedthat

theturretsofRussiantanksareusuallysetwellforward,therebyleavingarelativelylargeplatform-likeareabetweentheturretandtherearofthetank.Someprotectioncanthereforebeaffordedtomenridingbehindtheturret.TheRussiansalsouseinfantrymountedontanks(Desyanti).

23. GERMAN METHODS OF ARMORED ATTACK BYSMALLUNITSTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.16,January14th1943

The following report is from a lecture by aBritish colonelwho recently returned from theMiddleEastwhere he

commanded the artillery of a corps in theWestern Desert. His lecture was based on both personal experience andintelligencereports.

a.CompositionofGerman“Box”(MovingDefenseArea)

TheboxisthepartofthecolumnwhichisinsidethesolidlineinsketchC.Theboxvariesinsize,butifanarmoredbattalionisthebasicunit,itmightcontainthefollowingcombattroops,inadditiontotheserviceelements:

•Onebattalionofmotorizedinfantry,usuallycarriedinhalf-tracked,lightlyarmoredvehicles;

•Onebattalionof50-mmantitankguns;

•Onebattalionof88-mmantiaircraft-antitankguns;

•Onebatteryof150-mmclose-supportinfantryguns,sometimesonself-propelledmounts;

•Onebattalionoffieldartillery.

Onthemoveorintheattack,thegunswithintheboxaredisposedasshowninsketchC.Infantrygunsandfieldgunsareusuallykeptintheboxonlywhenthedefensiveisassumed.

Insize,theboxisapproximately2milesdeepandhasafrontof800yards.The88-mmgun,thoughithasproveda

veryeffectiveantitankgun,isprimarilyincludedintheboxtoprotectthelightly-armoredvehiclesfromairattack.

b.TheMethodofAdvance(seesketchA)

Onvery flat country, the distance between the reconnaissance unit and the leading echelons of tanks is from5 to10miles;thedistancebetweenthe1stand2ndechelonoftanksis1mile,andthedistancebetweenthe2ndechelonoftanksandtheboxis2miles.

Thewholeforceisdirectedtowardssometerrainfeature,which,ifcaptured,willforcetheenemytofightonground

chosenbytheattacker.

Overnormalterrain,eachportionofthecolumnmovesfromhighgroundtohighgroundbybounds.Eachechelonof

tanksissupportedbyartillerywhichmovesintherearofthetanks.

c.TacticsifAttackedontheMove

When British tanks are reported to be advancing to a fight, the box halts and takes up a position for all-arounddefense.AstheBritishtanksadvance,thereconnaissanceunitsfallback,andthetwoechelonsoftanksdeployonawidefront(seesketchB).Iftheenemycontinuestoadvance,theGermanscontinuetheretirementtopositionB(sketchB),andforcetheenemytoattemptabreakthroughagainstoneoftheflanksofthebox.

IftheenemydecidestoattacktheGermanleftflank,thetroopsontheleftoftheboxatpositionBfallbacktoposition

C.Theenemytanks,iftheypursue,arethennotonlyengagedfrontallybytheGermantanksfrompositionC,butare

caughtinflankbyATandAAgunsof theleftsideof thebox.Finally, thetankstotherightof theboxatpositionBswingaroundandengagetheattackersintherear.

Ifartilleryhasaccompaniedthetanksintheadvance,itmayeithercontinuetosupportthem,orentertheboxtostiffen

itsantitankdefense.

d.AttackLedbyTanksAgainstanOrganizedPosition

Ingeneral,theGermansassumethatthedefendershaveseizedandoccupiedthebestpositions;hence,theyattempttooverwhelmhimandtakeoversuchpositions.

The German commander usually launches a frontal attack against one center of resistance. The attack might be

developedinthefollowingway(seesketchC).

PhaseI: TheGerman commanderwill reinforce his reconnaissance unitwith tanks deployed on awide front and

driveinthecoveringforce,untiltheenemyisapproximately2,500yardsfromthemainlineofresistance.

PhaseII:Acarefulreconnaissancewillthenbecarriedoutbyaseniorcommanderinatank.

PhaseIII:TheGermancoveringforcedeploysasfollows:

Tanks,generallyMarkIV’s,takeupahull-downpositiononaridge,orhighground,andwiththefireoftheirmachine

gunsattempttopindownthedefenses.TheymayengageATgunsthatarevisiblewiththeir75’s.Undercoverofthisfire,50-mmATguns,heavymachineguns,andclosesupport150-mminfantrygunsarealsodeployedinanattempttoknockouttheATgunsofthedefense,ortokilltheirguncrews.

Underthecoveroffireofthiscoveringforce,theattackformsinrearasfollows:

(1)Threerowsoftanksabout50yardsapart,eachrowapproximately150yardsinrearoftheoneinfront.

(2)Whenthetanksareinposition,theboxformsupinrearasshowninsketchC,theinfantryallridinginvehicles.

PhaseIV:AtHhour,thewholeforcemovesforwardatabout15mph,dependingontheground.Astheypassthrough

theircoveringforce,thetanksbegintofire,notsomuchwithaviewtohittinganything,butforthepsychologicaleffectandtokeepthedefenderspinneddown.Onarrivalattheirobjectives,sometanksdrivestraightthroughtothefarsideoftheobjective,whileothersassisttheirinfantryinmopping-upoperations.Theinfantrydoesnotusuallydismountuntiltheyarriveattheobjective,whentheyfanoutandusetommygunsextensively.

PhaseV:Whentheattackissuccessfulthecoveringforcemovesforwardintothecapturedareatostiffenthedefense.

Thetanksareusuallywithdrawnandservicednearwhathasnowbecometheirreararea.

24.NEWAXISSELF-PROPELLEDGUNSTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.18,February11th1943

Owingtothebattlefieldmobilityoftanks,aswellastootherfactors,thetowedantitankgunisnotalwaysanadequate

antitankweapon.Tosupplement the towedgun, self-propelledantitankgunshavebeendevelopedandorganized intospecialunits:forexample, theU.S. tank-destroyerorganizations.Foraconsiderableperiodof timetheGermanshaveshown a tendency tomount a large number of guns on self-propelledmounts, the calibers varying from 20mm to150mm.RecentlythefollowingnewGermanequipmentofthistypewasreportedtoexist:

•German37-mmATgunonanarmoredpersonnelcarrier;

•Russian76.2-mmgunonGermanMarkIItankchassis;

•Russian76.2-mmgunonCzechlighttank(38)chassis;

•German75-mmtankgun(40)onGermanMarkIItankchassis;

•German75-mmtankgun(40)onCzechlighttank(38)chassis.

Oftheaboveweapons,thefirsttwoareknowntohavebeenpresentinNorthAfrica.Whetherthelastthreehavebeenissued to units is not known. The Germans are also reported to be developing 88-mm and 128-mm armored self-propelledguns.

TheItaliansareapparentlystillendeavoringtofollowtheGermansinthedevelopmentofself-propelledweapons.Itis

reported that theynowhavea90-mmself-propelledgun.While thisgun isknown toexist, it isnotbelieved tohaveappearedyetinaction.TheItalian75-mmself-propelledgun(seeTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.6,p.35)isreportedto have proved notwholly successful, and it is thought that Italy does not possess sufficient resources to allow freeimprovisationontheGermanpattern.

25. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF GERMAN 75-MMASSAULTGUNTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.19,February25th1942

TheGerman75-mmassaultgun (7.5-cmSturmgeschütz) is aweaponcomparable to theU.S.75-mmand105-mm

self-propelledguns.Thegunandmountweighabout20tons.Itsmaximumspeedcross-countryisabout7mph,onroadsabout22mph;itcanaverageabout15mph.Onnormalroadsitsradiusofactionisabout100miles,cross-countryabout50miles.Tomoveanassault-gunbattery100kilometers(about65miles)requires4,000liters(about1,050gallons)ofgasoline. The range of the 75-mm short-barrelled tank gun (7.5-cm KwK), with which this weapon was originallyequipped,isabout6,000yards.

It is reported that there arenowapparently three typesof assaultguns in service.Theseare: theStu.G.7.5-cmK,

mountingthe7.5-cmKwK(short-barreledtankgun—23.5calibers[Lengthofbore]);theStu.G.lg.7.5-cmK,mountingthe7.5-cmKwK40(long-barreledtankgun—43calibers);andathirdweapon,nomenclatureatpresentunknown,whichappearstohavea75-mmgunwithabore30calibersinlength.Itseemsprobable,therefore,thatthe7.5-cmKwK40,whichistheprincipalarmamentofthenewPz.Kw.4(MarkIVtank),maybeprimarilyanantitankweapon,whilethelatestintermediategunwilltaketheplaceoftheoldStu.G.7.5-cmKasaclose-supportweapon.

Whilesome technicaldetailsof thisweaponhavebeenknownforsome time, relatively little informationhasbeen

availableuntilrecentlyconcerningitstacticalemployment.TwoGermandocumentsonthetacticaluseofthisweaponhavenowbeenreceived.OneisdatedMay1940,theotherApril1942.Theseconddocumentisessentiallyidenticalinsubstance with the first, except that the second contains some additional information. Both documents have beencombined intoone for thepresent report,andsuchapparentcontradictionsasexistarenoted in the translationwhichfollows.

INSTRUCTIONSFORTHEEMPLOYMENTOFASSAULTARTILLERY

a.BasicPrinciplesandRole

The assault gun (7.5-cm gun on an armored self-propelledmount) is an offensiveweapon. It can fire only in thegeneral direction in which the vehicle is pointing [Traverse is limited to 20 degrees]. Owing to its cross-countryperformanceanditsarmor,itisabletofollowanywhereitsowninfantryorarmoredtroops.

Supportfortheinfantryinattackisthechiefmissionoftheassaultgunbyvirtueofitsarmor,maneuverability,and

cross-countryperformanceandoftherapiditywithwhichitcanopenfire.Themoralsupportwhichtheinfantryreceivesthroughitspresenceisimportant.

Itdoesnotfireonthemove.Inclosefightingitisvulnerablebecauseitssidesarelightanditisopen-topped.Besides,

ithasnofacilitiesfordefendingitselfatclosequarters.Asitisnotinapositiontocarryoutindependentreconnaissanceandfightingtasks,thisweaponmustalwaysbesupportedbyinfantry.

Insupportofaninfantryattack,theassaultgunengagestheenemyheavyinfantryweaponswhichcannotbequickly

oreffectivelydestroyedbyotherweapons.Insupportofatankattack,ittakesoverpartoftheroleofthePz.Kw.4,anddealswithenemyantitankgunsappearingonthefront.Itwillonlyinfrequentlybeemployedasdivisionalartillery,ifthe

tacticalandammunitionsituationpermits.Assaultartilleryisnottobeincludedinthedivisionalartilleryfireplan,butisto be treated only as supplementary, and to be used for special tasks (e.g., roving batteries). Its employment for itsprincipaltasksmustalwaysbeassured.

[The April 1942 document states that “The assault gun may be successfully used

against armored vehicles, and light and medium tanks.” The May 1940 document,however, states“It isnot tobeused forantitankpurposes, andwillonlyengageenemytanksinself-defenseorwheretheantitankgunscannotsuccessfullydealwiththem.”Thisapparentcontradictioncanperhapsbeexplainedbythefactthat,priortotheinvasionofRussia in1941, thisweaponhadbeenused in limitednumbersonly.Experienceon theEasternFrontmayhaveshownthatitcouldbesuccessfullyusedagainsttanks,althoughRussian sources refer to it as essentially an infantry support weapon. A more logicalexplanation perhaps lies in two German technical developments since 1940: namely,hollow-charge ammunition, which is designed to achieve good armor-piercingperformanceatrelativelylowmuzzlevelocities,andthereportedreplacementoftheshort-barreledlow-velocity75-mmwiththelong-barreledhigh-velocitytankgun(7.5-cmKwK40)onsomeofthenewermodels.]b.OrganizationoftheAssaultArtilleryBattalionandItsBatteries

The assault gun battalion consists of battalion headquarters and three batteries. The battery has six guns—threeplatoons,eachof twoguns.[TheApril1942document states thatabatteryhas7guns, theextragunbeing“for thebatterycommander.”]Thecommandvehicles forbatteryandplatooncommandersarearmored.Theymakepossible,therefore,movementrightuptotheforemostinfantrylinetodirectthefire.

c.PrinciplesforEmployment

(1)GeneralAssault gun battalions belong to GHQ artillery. For the conduct of certain engagements, battalions or separate

batteriesareattached todivisions,or tospecial taskforces.Thedivisioncommandershouldattachsomeorallof theassaultartillerybatteriesunderhiscontroltoinfantryortankunits;onlyinexceptionalcircumstanceswilltheybeputunder the artillery commander. Transfer of batteries from support of one unit to another within the division can becarriedoutveryquicklyinthecourseofabattle.Closeliaisonwiththebatteriesandwithinthebatteriesisofprimaryimportanceforthetimelyfulfillmentoftheirmissions.Theassaultartilleryfiresfrompositionsinopenground,hiddenasfaraspossiblefromgroundandairobservation.Onlywhenemployedaspartofthedivisionalartillerywillthesegunsfirefromcoveredpositions.

Splittingupofassault-gununits intosmallparts(platoonsorsingleguns) jeopardizes thefirepowerandfacilitates

enemydefense.Thisshouldoccuronlyinexceptionalcaseswhentheentirebattalioncannotbeemployed,i.e.,supportofspecialassaulttroopsoremploymentoverterrainwhichdoesnotpermitobservation.Ifemployedsingly,mutualfiresupportandmutualassistanceincaseofbreakdownsandoverroughcountryarenotpossible.

Ascompleteapictureaspossiblemustbeobtainedoftheenemy’sarmor-piercingweaponsandthepositionsofhis

mines; hasty employment without sufficient reconnaissancemight well jeopardize the attack. Premature deploymentmustalsobeavoided.Afteranengagement,assaultgunsmustnotbegivensecuritymissions,especiallyatnight.Theymust be withdrawn for refuelling, overhauling, and resupply. After 4 to 5 days in action, they must be thoroughlyserviced.Ifthisisnotpossible,itmustbeexpectedthatsomewillnotbefitforactionandmayfallout.Wheninrearareas,theymustbeallottedspacenearrepairshopssothattheyarereadilyaccessibletomaintenancefacilities,etc.

Troops co-operating with assault guns must give all support possible in dealing with mines and other obstacles.

Artilleryandheavyinfantryweaponsmustgivesupportbyengagingenemyarmor-piercingweapons.

Surpriseisessentialforthesuccessfulemploymentofassault-gunbattalions.Itisthereforemostimportantforthemto

moveupandintofiringpositionsundercover,andgenerallytocommencefirewithoutwarning.Stationarybatteriesfireontargetswhichareforthemomentmostdangeroustotheinfantry(especiallyenemyheavyinfantryweapons),destroythem,andthenwithdrawtocoverinordertoavoidenemyfire.Withtheallotmentofsmokeammunition(23percentofthetotalammunitionissue),itispossibletolaysmokeandtoblindenemyweaponswhich,forexample,aresitedontheflank. Assault artillery renders support to tanks usually after the hostile position has been broken into. In this role,assault-gun batteries supplement Pz.Kw. 4s, and during the fluid stages of the battle direct their fire against enemyantitankweaponstothedirectfront.Theyfollowverycloselythefirstwavesoftanks.DestructionofenemyantitankweaponsontheflanksofanattackwillfrequentlybethetaskofthePz.Kw.4.

Againstconcretepositions,assaultgunsshouldbeusedtoengagecasemateswitharmor-piercingshells.Co-operation

withassaultengineersusingflame-throwersisveryeffectiveinthesecases.

Assault guns are only to be used in towns and woods in conjunction with particularly strong and close infantry

support,unlessthevisibilityandfieldoffirearesolimitedastomakeuseofthegunsimpossiblewithoutendangeringfriendly troops.Assault guns are not suitable for use in darkness. Their use in snow is also restricted, as theymustusuallykeeptoavailableroadswhereenemydefenseissuretobemet.

(2)TacticalEmployment

(a)OntheMove

Vehiclesonthemoveshouldbekeptwellspaced.Sincetheaveragespeedofassaultgunsisabout15mph,theymust

beusedinleap-frogfashionwhenoperatingwithaninfantrydivision.Crossingbridgesmustbethesubjectofcarefulhandling.Speedmustbereducedtolessthan5mph,andtheassaultgunsmustkeepexactlytothemiddleofthebridge,withintervalsofatleast35yards.Bridgesmustbecapableofaloadof22tons.Thecommanderoftheassaultgunsmustcooperatewiththeofficerinchargeofthebridge.

(1)IntheInfantryDivision

Whileonthemove,thedivisioncommanderkeepstheassault-gunbattalionaslongaspossibleunderhisowncontrol.

Accordingtothesituationandtheterrainhecan,whileonthemove,placeoneassaultgunbatteryineachcombatteam.Theattachmentoftheseweaponstotheadvanceguardisexceptional.Ingeneral,assaultgunbatteriesareconcentratedintheintervalbetweentheadvanceguardandthemainbody,andaresubjecttotheordersofthecolumncommander.[According to theApril 1942document, the issue isonly10percent smoke. It isprobable that theammunition issuedependsontheparticularoperationsinvolved.]Onthemarch,thebatterycommanderandhispartyshouldaccompanythecolumncommander.

(2)IntheArmoredDivision

Onthemove,theassaultgunbattalionattachedtoanarmoreddivisioncanbeusedtobestadvantageifincludedinthe

advanceguard.

(b)IntheAttackwithanInfantryDivision

The division commander normally attaches assault-gun batteries to the infantry regiments. On receipt of orders

placinghimundercommandofaninfantryregiment,thebatterycommandermustreportinpersontothecommanderofthatinfantryregiment.Exhaustivediscussionbetweenthesetwo(astoenemysituation,preparationoftheregimentforthe attack, proposed conduct of the attack,main point of the attack, co-operationwith divisional artillery, etc.) will

providethebasisfortheultimateemploymentoftheassault-gunbattery.

Itisanerrortoallottothebatterytasksandtargetswhichcanbeundertakenbytheheavyinfantryweaponsorthe

divisionalartillery.Thebatteryshouldratherbeemployedtoengagesuchnestsofresistanceasarenotknownbeforethebeginningoftheattack,andwhich,atthebeginningorinthecourseofthebattle,cannotbequicklyenoughengagedbyheavyinfantryweaponsandartillery.Itisthespecialroleoftheassault-gunbatterytoassisttheinfantryinfightingitswaythroughdeepenemydefensezones.Therefore,itmustnotbecommitteduntilthedivisionalartilleryandtheheavyinfantryweaponscannolongerrenderadequatesupport.

Theattachedbatterycanbeemployedasfollows:

(1)Beforetheattackbegins,itislocatedsoastobecapableofpromptlysupportingtheregiment’smaineffort;(or)

(2)Thebattery isheld in the rear,and isonlycommitted if,after theattackbegins,aclearpicture isobtainedof theenemy’sdispositions.

Underbothcircumstancestheattachmentofthebattery,andoccasionallyofindividualplatoons,toabattalionmaybe

advantageous.

Thecommanderunderwhosecommandthebatteryisplacedgivesthebatterycommanderhisorders.Thelattermakes

cleartohisplatooncommandersthespecificbattletasks,andshowsthem,asfaraspossibleontheground,thetargetstobeengaged.Wheninactionthebatterycommander,togetherwithhisplatooncommanders,mustatalltimesbefamiliarwiththehostilesituation,andmustreconnoiterthegroundoverwhichheistomoveandattack.Thebatterywillbesodisposedby the platoon commanders in the sectors inwhich it is expected later to operate that, as it approaches theenemy,thebattery,undercover,canfollowtheinfantryfromsectortosector.Howdistantanobjectivecanbegiven,andyetpermitthecontroloffirebythebatteryandplatooncommanders,isdependentonthecountry,enemystrength,andenemy action. In close country, andwhen the enemyweapons arewell camouflaged, targets cannot be given to theplatoonsbythebatterycommander.Inthesecircumstances,firecontrolfallstotheplatooncommanders.Theplatoonsmustthenco-operateconstantlywiththemostadvancedinfantryplatoons;theyremainclosetotheinfantryandengagethenearesttargets.Thequestionofdividingaplatoonarisesonlyifindividualgunsareallottedtoinfantrycompaniesorplatoonstocarryoutspecifictasks:e.g.,foractiondeepintotheenemy’sbattleposition.

Inanattackby tanksattached toan infantrydivision, theassault-artillerybattalionengageschieflyenemyantitank

weapons.Inthiscasetoo,theassault-gunbattalionisattachedtoinfantryelements.Wellbeforethebeginningofthetankattack, the batteries are disposed in positions of observation from which they can readily engage enemy antitankweapons.They followup the tanks by platoons, and under special conditions—e.g., in unreconnoitered country - byguns,assoonaspossible.Inadeepattack,co-operationwithtanksleadinganinfantryattackispossiblewhenthehostileislandsofresistancehavebeendisposedof.

In the enemy tank counterattack, our own antitank guns first engage the hostile tanks. The assault-gun battalion

engages theenemyheavyweaponswhichare supporting theenemy tankcounterattack.Onlywhen theantitankgunsproveinsufficient,doassaultgunsengageenemytanks.Inthiscasetheassaultgunsadvancewithineffectiverangeoftheenemytanks,halt,anddestroythemwithantitankshells.

(c)IntheAttackwithanArmoredDivision

Insuchanattack,thefollowingtaskscanbecarriedoutbytheassaultgunbattalion:

(1)Supportofthetankattackbyneutralizingenemyantitankweapons;(and/or)

(2)Supportoftheattackbymotorizedinfantryelements.

Accordingtothesituationandtheplanofattack,thebattalion,completeorinpart,isattachedtothearmoredbrigade,

sometimeswithpartsattachedalsotothemotorizedinfantrybrigade.Withinthearmoredbrigade,furtherallotmenttotankregimentsisnormallynecessary.Asarule,completebatteriesareattached.

Tosupporttheinitialphaseofthetankattack,assault-gunbatteriescanbeplacedinpositionsofobservationifsuitable

groundisalreadyinourpossession.Otherwisethebatteriesfollowintheattackclosebehindthefirstwavesoftanks,andassoonastheenemyisengaged,supportthetanksbyattackingenemyantitankweapons.

Asthetankattackprogresses,itismostimportanttoputenemydefensiveweaponsoutofactionassoonaspossible.

Closesupportoftheleadingtanksisthemainessentialtothecarryingoutofthesetasks.

The support of themotorized infantry attack is carried out according to the principles for the support of the foot

infantryattack.

(d)IntheAttackasDivisionalArtillery

Intheattackofadivision,theemploymentoftheassaultgunbattalionaspartofthedivisionalartilleryisexceptional.

Inthisrole, theassault-gunbatteriesmustbekeptfreefortheirmoreusualmissionatall times,andmustenterbattlewithafullissueofammunition.

(e)InthePursuit

In the pursuit, assault-gun batteries should be close to their own infantry in order to break at once any enemyresistance.Veryclosesupportoftheleadinginfantryunitsincreasestheirforwardmomentum.Temporaryallotmentofindividualplatoons—underexceptionalcircumstances,ofindividualguns—ispossible.

(f)IntheDefense

Inthedefense,theprimarytaskofassaultartilleryisthesupportofcounterthrustsandcounterattacks.Theassemblyareamustbesufficiently far from the friendlybattleposition toenable theassault-gununits tomovespeedily to thatsectorwhichisthreatenedwithabreakthrough.Allotmentandemploymentarecarriedoutaccordingtotheplanoftheinfantryattack.Thepointofcommitmentshouldbearrangedasearlyaspossiblewiththecommandersoftheinfantryunitsallocated to thecounterthrustorcounterattack. In thedefenseas in theattack, theassault-artillerybattalionwillonlybeemployedinanantitankroleifitmustdefenditselfagainstatankattack.(Only12percentoftheammunitionissue is armor-piercing.) [15 percent according to the April 1942 document.] If employed as part of the divisionalartillery(whichisrare),thebattalionwillbeplacedunderthedivisionartillerycommander.

(g)IntheWithdrawal

Forthesupportofinfantryinwithdrawal,batteries,andevenindividualplatoonsorguns,areallottedtoinfantryunits.Byvirtueoftheirarmor,assaultgunsareabletoengageenemytargetsevenwhentheinfantryhasalreadywithdrawn.Toassistdisengagementfromtheenemy,tankattackscarriedoutwithlimitedobjectivescanbesupportedbyassaultguns.Allotmentofassault-gunbatteriesorplatoonstorearpartiesorrearguardsiseffective.

d.Supplies

AsGHQ troops, the battalion takeswith it its complete initial issue of ammunition, fuel, and rations.When it isattached to a division, its further supply is handled by the division. The battalion commander is responsible for thecorrect supply of the battalion and the individual batteries, especially in the pursuit. Every battery, platoon, and guncommandermustconstantlyhaveinmindthesupplysituationofhisunit.Itishisdutytoreporthisneedsinsufficienttimeandwithforesight,andtotakethenecessaryactiontoreplenishdepletedsuppliesofammunition,fuel,andrations.

26.GERMANHEAVYTANK

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.20,March11th1943

AsreportedinthepressandaspreviouslyindicatedinTacticalandTechnicalTrends(No.18,p.6)aGermanheavy

tankhasbeeninactioninTunisia.Sofarascanbedefinitelydetermined,thisisthefirsttimetheGermanshaveusedaheavytankincombat.Whetherornotit is thePz.Kw.6cannotbedefinitelystated.Atleastoneheavytankhasbeencaptured, andwhilecompletedetails arenotyet available, there is sufficient reasonablyconfirmeddata towarrant atleastapartialtentativedescriptionatthistime.

Thechieffeaturesofthistankarethe88-mmgun,4-inchfrontalarmor,heavyweight,andlackofspacedarmor.The

accompanyingsketchroughlyindicatestheappearanceofthetank,butshouldnotbeacceptedaswhollyaccurate.

Thetankhasacrewof5.Itisabout20feetlong,12feetwide,and91/2feethigh.Thegunoverhangsthenoseby

almost7feet.Itisreportedthattheweightis56tonsor,withmodifications,asmuchas62tons.

Thepowerunit isasingle12-cylinderengine.Aspeedofat least20mphcanbeachieved.Twotypesof trackare

thought to exist: an operational track 2 feet 4.5 inches wide, and a loading track which is just under 2 feet. Thesuspensionsystemconsistsofafrontdrivingsprocket,asmallrearidler,and24Christie-typewheelsoneachsidegivingitanappearancesimilartothefamiliarGermanhalf-tracksuspensionsystem.Thereare8axles.

Thereisnoarmorskirtingforprotectionofthesuspension.Thearmorplatingisasfollows:

•Lowernoseplate-62mm(2.4in),60°inwards

•Uppernoseplate-102mm(4in),20°inwards

•Frontplate-62mm(2.4in),80°outwards

•Driverplate-102mm(4in),10°outwards

•Turretsidesandrear-82mm(3.2in),vertical

•Lowersides(behindbogies)-62mm(2.4in),vertical

•Uppersides-82mm(3.2in),vertical

•Rear-82mm(3.2in),20°inwards

•Floor-26mm(1in)

•Top-26mm(1in)

Theturretfrontandmantletrangein thicknessbetweenaminimumof97mm(3.8 in) toa(possible)maximumof200mm(7.9in).Itappearsthatthearmorisnotface-hardened.

Thearmamentof the tankconsistsof an88-mmgunand two7.92-mm(.315-in)machineguns.The88-mmhasa

double-bafflemuzzlebrakeandfiresthesamefixedammunitionastheusual88-mmAA/ATgun.Asalreadyindicated,thegunoverhangsthenoseofthetankbyalmost7feet.Theturretrotatesthrough360degreesandisprobablypower-operated.Threesmoke-generatordischargersarelocatedoneachsideoftheturret.

Comment:Fromtheabovecharacteristics,itisapparentthatthePz.Kw.6isdesignedtobelargerandmorepowerful

thanthePz.Kw.4.Asfarasknown,aPz.Kw.5tankhasnotbeenusedincombat.ThenoteworthydifferencesbetweenthePz.Kw.4andPz.Kw.6areasfollows:

*Attainedbyattachingextraarmorplatetoprotectcriticalpointsonthetank.

**Basicarmorplate.Theturretfrontandmantletmaypossiblybe200mmthick.

A360-degreerotatingturretisusedinboththePz.Kw.6andPz.Kw.4.

The appearance of the Pz.Kw. 6 indicates that theGermans continue to see the need for a fully armored vehicle

equipped with a weapon capable of dealing with hostile tanks as well as with other targets that might hold up theadvanceofattackingelements.

Thistankisundoubtedlyaneffectiveweapon,butnotnecessarilyformidable.Inthefirstplace,avehicleweighing

from56to62tonspresentsmanydifficultlogisticalproblems.Also,itisreportedthatoneheavytankwasdestroyedbyaBritishsix-pounder(57-mm)antitankgunatarangeofabout500yards;outof20roundsfired,5penetratedthetank,1piercingthesideoftheturretandcomingouttheotherside,andanotherpenetratinganuppersideplateatanangleofimpactofabout15degrees.

27. FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT GERMANTANKS


1.ARMORARRANGEMENT

ThesketchesonthenextthreepagesshowthearmorarrangementandarmorthicknessesofthePz.Kw.3,Pz.Kw.4,andPz.Kw.6.Aquestionmarkfollowingafigureindicatesthatdefiniteinformationregardingthethicknessofacertainplateisnotyetavailable.Twofiguresenclosedinparenthesesindicatethepresenceoftwoplates,whichareseparatedtoform“spacedarmor”;thisarrangementoccursonlytwice,andonlyinthecaseofthePz.Kw.3.

Figure1

[ThisfigurecaptionwascorrectedinafootnoteofalaterissueofIntelligenceBulletinto:“Pz.Kw.3with50-mmgun(Kw.K.39)”.]

2.SUBMERSIBLETANKS

The delays and difficulties that the Germans have encountered in transporting tanks across the rivers of EasternEuropehaveincreasedtheenemy’sinterestinallpossibledeviceswhichmightenablestandardPz.Kw.tocrossstreamsandriversundertheirownpower.

Bythesummerof1941,theweightofthePz.Kw.3hadalreadybeenincreasedbyadditionalarmor,anditmusthave

been clear to the Germans that future developments in armor and armament would necessarily involve still furtherincreasesintheweightofthistank.Whilethetrendtowardincreasedweightwasadisadvantageinmanyways,itwasdefinitelyhelpfulinovercomingoneofthebiggestdifficultiesthattheGermanshadpreviouslyencounteredinadaptingstandardtanksforsubmersion—namely,thedifficultyofgettingenoughtrackadhesion.

It therefore is not surprising that the Germans, in the early stages of their campaign in Russia, were actively

experimenting with standard Pz. Kw. 3’s modified for submersion. It is reported that these experiments met with acertainamountofsuccess,andthatthemodifiedtanksmadeunderwaterrivercrossingsundercombatconditions.Themeasures employed are said to have included the sealing of all joints and openings in the tankwith rubber and theintroductionofaflexibleairpipe,thefreeendofwhichwasattachedtoafloat.Thesupplyofairforthecrew,aswellasfortheengine,wasprovidedbythisflexiblepipe,whichpermittedsubmersiontoamaximumdepthof16feet.Ittooktrainedcrews24hourstopreparethetanksforsubmersion.

Figure2

InApril1943,aPz.Kw.3(ModelM)examinedinNorthAfricawasfoundtohavebeenpermanentlymodifiedfor

immersion,ifnotforsubmersion.Althoughreportsonthistankdidnotmentionaflexiblepipewithfloat,suchapipemayhaveexistedandhavebeendestroyedbyfire.Theairlouvresfortheenginewereprovidedwithcoverplateshavingrubbersealingstripsroundtheiredges.Thesecoverplates,whichwerenormallyheldopenbystrongsprings,couldbelockedintheclosedpositionbyhooksbeforesubmersion.Aftersubmersion,thespringscouldbereleasedbycontrolsinside the tank.When the tank submerged, air for the carburetor and cooling fans was apparently drawn from thefighting compartment. Therefore, if a flexible pipe was used with this tank, no doubt its purpose was to supply“replacement”airtothefightingcompartment.Thetwoexhaustpipesledtoasinglesilencermountedhighonthetailplate,withitsoutletatthetop.Thisoutletwasfittedwithaspring-controlled,one-wayvalve,whichcouldbekeptinthefullyopenpositionduringnormaloperationonland.

More recently,documentsand reports fromRussiahaveshown that thestandardPz.Kw.6 (Tiger) isequipped for

submersiontodepthsofasmuchas16feet.Inthistankthereisprovisionforhermeticsealingofalljointsandopenings.Thedoorsandcoversareprovidedwithsuitablerubberseals.Theradiatorsareseparatedfromtheenginebyawatertightpartitionsothat,whenthetankissubmerged,theycanbecooledbywaterfromoutsidethetank,afterthecoolingfanshavebeenswitchedoff.Inthiscasecarburetorairisdrawnthroughaflexiblepipe,thefreeendofwhichissupportedbyafloat,butthereappearstobenoadditionalsupplyofairforthecrew.Asmallbilgepumpisalsofittedtodisposeofanywaterwhichmayleakintothehull.

Figure3

ItisclearthatthePz.Kw.6requiresonlyaslightamountofpreparationbyitscrewbeforesubmersion,andthatits

designmusthavebeeninfluencedbytherequirementthatitquicklybemadesubmersible.ItisquitepossiblethatthePz.Kw.3couldbesubmergedtoadepthofmorethan16feetifitwerefittedwithalongerairpipe.AlthoughthePz.Kw.6isnotmuchlargerthanthePz.Kw.3,itisnearlythreetimesasheavy,andtrackadhesionisthereforenotlikelytobeaseriousproblem.

28.TANKRUSETODECEIVEARTILLERY


U.S. artillerymen—and forward observers, in particular—will be interested in a ruse which was employed by a

GermantankunitinTunisia.ThistankforcewaslocatedbyaU.S.observer,whoimmediatelypreparedfiredatatorouttheenemy.Firepromptlygotunderway.Atthesecondvolley,theGermansputintooperationaplandesignedtoconfuseourartillerymen:

TheGermanscalculatedthetimeofflightoftheprojectiles,andthenlistenedforthereportofthethirdvolley.When

itcame,theyshrewdlytookthetimeelementintoaccountandfiredtheirowntankpiecestoconformwiththestrikeofourownartilleryfire.TheGermansdirectedtheirfirefirsttooneoftheirflanksandthentotheother,atvariousranges.Sinceourownartilleryfirefellsimultaneouslyinthesamegeneralarea,ourforwardobserverwasunabletodistinguishourfirefromtheenemy’sandthereforecouldnotregister.

Thiscontinuedforseveralminutes,withtheartilleryobserverfranticallytryingtofigureoutthecorrectdeflectionand

range.Then,bymeansofcloseobservation,hediscovered the technique that theGermanswereusing,andsoonhadthemontherun.

As aU.S. soldierwho took part in this action expresses it, “There’s one thingwe’ve always got to remember: in

fightingtheGermans,we’reupagainstacunning,imaginativeenemy!”

29.GERMANHEAVYTANK-PzKw6TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.24,May6th1943

ThistankhasalreadybeendescribedinTacticalandTechnicalTrends(No.20,p.7).Theaccompanyingsketchofthe

tankisbasedonphotographsofaPzKw6knockedoutontheTunisianfront.

Thesuspensionsystem,whichhasonlyverybrieflybeendescribedinTacticalandTechnicalTrends,isshowninthe

sketchbelow.Thetrackismadeofmetal.Tothefarrightinthesketchisthefront-drivesprocketandtothefarleft,therearIdler.TherearenoreturnrollerssincethetrackridesontopoftheChristie-typewheels,whicharerubberrimmed.Itwillbenotedthatthereareeightaxles,eachwiththreewheelstoaside,oreachwithonesingleandonedoublewheeltoa side. There are thus 24wheels, or 8 singlewheels and 8 doublewheels, on each side of the tank. The system ofoverlappingissimilartothesuspensionsystemusedonGermanhalf-tracks.

Thetankisprovidedwithtwotracks,awideone(2ft,4.5in)andanarrowone(justunder2ft).Thewidetrackisthe

oneusedinbattle,thenarrowbeingforadministrativemarchesandwheremaneuverabilityandeconomyofoperationtakeprecedenceovergroundpressure.Thedottedlineinthesketchofthesuspensionsystemindicatestheouteredgeofthenarrowtrack.Whenthenarrowtrackisused,theeightwheelsoutsidethedottedlinecanberemoved.

30.INCREASEDPROTECTIONONPZKW3AND4TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.25,May20th1943

ThehistoryofthechangesinthelightmediumPzKw3and4demonstrateshowfortunatetheGermanswereinhaving

abasictankdesignthatcouldbeimprovedasbattleexperienceindicated,forabasicdesigncanbeimprovedandstillremain familiar to theusers.Furthermore, theproblemsofmaintenanceandsupplyofpartsaregreatly reduced—andtheseproblemsareamajorfactorinkeepingtanksreadyforoperationaluse.

a.ThePzKw3

(1)GeneralTheGermansseemtobemakingagradualincreaseinthicknessofarmor-plateasthegunsusedagainstitincreasein

hittingpowerandrange.ThePzKw3mediumtankisillustrativeofthistrendintankarmoranddesign,andaffordsaremarkable example ofwhat can be done to improve the armor protection and fighting efficiency of a tankwithoutchangingitsbasicdesign.Thekeyofthisbasicdesignistheweldedmainstructurewhichallowsheavierplatestobeusedwhendesired.Also,operatingcomponentsofthetankarenothungontheplates,likelytobechangedtothickerones.

(2)Pre-War

TheearlymodelPzKw3(producedin1936-38)hadbasicarmorof.59-inchhomogeneousplate.Atthistimetherewereonly5bogiewheelsonasideinsteadofthepresent6.Thereisagapintheformationuntil1939,whenthetankappearedwith1.18-inchface-hardenedarmorontheturretandfront.Thismodelhad6bogiewheelsontheside.Thesidearmorwhichformsagreatpartof thechassiswasofsofter,machineable-qualityplate,duebothtonecessitiesofmanufactureandtotheundesirableweakeningeffectonhardenedplateofthenecessarysuspensionandbracketholes.Themodelalsohadimprovedapertureprotectionintheformofanexternalmovingmantlet,additionalarmoraroundthemachine-gun port, and an improved double-flap driver’s visor. It appears that these features were added with themodificationofbut2platesonthetank.

(3)1941Changes

In 1941, asmore powerful gunswere being used against tanks, 1.20 inches of additional armor platewas boltedagainst theplateson the frontof thesuperstructureandon theupperand lowernose-plates.The1.18-in.basicplateswereface-hardenedtoaBrinellhardnessof600to800and1.20-inadditionalplateswerethesame.Aboutayearlater,inJanuary1942, the tankappearedwithabasicarmorof1.96 incheson thefrontandback, theside-armor thicknessremainingunchangedat1.20inches.Thisarmorwasface-hardenedandperformedwellagainstmonoblocshot,butoncetheface-hardeningwaspierced,theshellfragmentspenetratedtheremainderwithease.

(4)1942

Therefore,inJune1942,a.79-inchadditionalplatewasboltedonthegunmantletandfrontsuperstructureasameanstodefeatashotwithapiercingcap.Betweenthisplateandthebasicarmorwasanairgaporspace,varyingfrom4to8inches.Theplateconformedroughlytotheshapeofthesectioncovered.Thespacedarmorseemstohavebeenafieldexpedient, resulting undoubtedly from the demonstrated fact that the spare section of track carried on the front ofGermantanksgaveadditionalprotection.Thismethodofaddingarmorwasofficiallyrecognized,as latermodelshadbracketsfittedforinstallingspacedarmorwhendesirable.

b.PzKw4

(1)EarlyModelsThePzKw4, a slightly heavier tank than the 3, has passed throughmuch the same line of development. Little is

knownaboutthemodelsA,B,andCofthistank,butModelDwasinuseduringthegreaterpartoftheperiod1940-43.SpecimensofarmorcutfromModelDhavebeenexamined.Ofthese,onlythefrontplateofthehullappearstobeface-hardened;thisplateiscarburized.Alloftheplateswerehigh-quality,chromium-molybdenumsteel,apparentlymadebytheelectric-furnaceprocess.

Thefirstincreaseinthearmorofthistankwasreportedin1941,whenitwasobservedthatadditionalplateshadbeen

boltedoverthebasicfrontandsidearmor.Theadditionalplatesonthefrontwere1.18inchesthick,makingatotalof2.36inches,andthoseonthesideswere.79inchesthick,makingatotalof1.57inches.Initsearlystages,thisadditionwasprobablyonlyanimprovisedmeasureforincreasingthearmorprotectionofexistingPzKw4modelsinwhichthethickestarmorwasonly1.18inches.

(2)ModelE

InModelE,whichhad1.96inchesofsingle-thicknessnoseplate,thefittingofadditionalarmoronthefrontofthesuperstructureandonthesidesofthefightingcompartmentwascontinued.Althoughthearrangementoftheadditionalsidearmoronthismodelappearstohavebeenstandardized,thatonthefrontsuperstructurewasbynomeansuniform.

ThreePzKw4tankshaverecentlybeenexamined.Ineachcase,extraarmorhadbeenfittedtotheverticalfrontplate

carryingthehullmachinegunanddriver’svisor.Ithadalsobeenaddedtothesidesofthefightingcompartmentbothaboveandbelowthetracklevel.Theextraprotectionabovethetracklevelextendedfromthefrontverticalplatetotheendoftheengine-compartmentbulkhead.Itwasthus110incheslongand15inchesdeep.Thepiecesbelowthetracklevelwereshapedinsuchawayastoclearthesuspensionbrackets.Theywere90incheslongand30inchesdeep.Allthisextrasideprotectionwas.97inchinthickness.

Theverticalfrontplatewasreinforcedinthreedifferentways.Ononetank,twoplateswereused;oneovertheplate

carryingthehullmachinegun,thisadditionalplatebeingcutawaytosuitthegunmounting,andtheotherplateoverthedriver’s frontplate, cut to shape toclearhisvisor.On the second tank, thearrangementaround thehullgunwas thesame,buttheextraprotectionaroundthedriver’svisorconsistedoftworectangularplates,oneoneachsideofthevisor,therebeingnoextraplateimmediatelyabovethevisor.Onthethirdtank,theonlyadditionalfrontarmorwastheplatearoundthehullmachinegun.Noadditionshadbeenmadetothedriver’sfrontplate.Inallcases,theextrafrontalplatingwas1.18inchesthick;thenoseplatewasunreinforced,butitwas1.97inchesthick,andtheglacisplatewas.97inchthick.The final drive casings ofPzKw4 tanks of this periodwere also sometimes reinforced by .79-inch protectingrings.Theadditionalplatesonthefrontwereface-hardened.

Itisprobablethatthereinforcedarmoronthefrontsuperstructureofthismodelwillcomparecloselywiththatonthe

correspondingpartsofthePzKw3of1941andthatthe1.96-inchnoseplateswillnotdiffersubstantiallyfromthoseonthemorerecentPzKw3’sofJune1942,knownas“ModelJ.”

Thereinforced(.79inchplus.79inch)sidearmorhas,however,nocounterpartinanyPzKw3model.Theadditional

platesareofhomogeneousqualityandhaveaBrinellhardnessofabout370onthefrontsurface.

(3)ModelF

Towardstheendof1941theGermansintroducedaPzKw4,ModelF,having1.96-inchfrontalarmor(gunmantlet,front superstructure and hull nose-plates) and 1.18-inch side armor. In this and many other respects, the Model FconformsmorecloselythanitspredecessorstothecorrespondingmodelofthePzKw3(inthiscasePzKw3ModelJ).Sofar,thearmorofthePzKw4ModelFhasnotbeenexaminedtoascertainitschemicalandballisticproperties,butthereisastrongprobabilitythatthesedonotdiffergreatlyfromthoseofthePzKw3,ModelJ.

(4)ModelG

Thismodelwhichmountsthelong75-mmgun,Kw.K40,wasfirstencounteredinJune1942.ItisreportedfromtheMiddleEastthatitsarmoristhesameasthatofModelF;namely1.96inchesonthefront,and30mm(1.18inches)onthesides.

31. ENEMY SELF-PROPELLED GUNS - A SUMMARYOFKNOWNEQUIPMENT

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.25,May20th1943

a.General

Self-propelledgunsrepresentoneofthetechnicaladvancesmadeinordnanceduringthiswar.Thefollowingaccount,from British sources, of German, Italian, and Japanese equipment shows the considerable interest which thisdevelopmenthasaroused.SeveraldescriptionsandsketchesofthesegunshavealreadybeenpublishedinearlierissuesofTacticalandTechnicalTrends.

WithreferencetoGermanself-propelledgunsthefollowinggeneralpointsareworthyofnote:

TherearenoknownGermanself-propelledheavyantiaircraftguns;

With regard toantitankguns,while therehavebeenmany local improvisations, thepresentGerman tendency is to

provideself-propelledmountsfortheheavierantitankweaponsonly;

Ineverycasestandardgunsandstandardchassis,whethersemi-orfull-tracked,areused;

Allself-propelledgunsareprovidedwithAPandHEammunition,andcan thuseffectivelyengageboth“soft”and

armoredtargets.

b.GermanAA/ATGuns

(1)20-mmAAATGun

Althoughprimarilyanantiaircraftgun,thispiececanalsobeusedagainsttanks.Mountedona1-tonhalf-track(see

figure1)withagasolineengine,itusuallytowsasingle-axleammunitiontrailer.Thearmamentisalong,thin-barreled,20-mm,high-velocitygun.Theweightinactionis4.5tons;thelength,15ft.7in.,thewidth,7ft.1in.andtheheight,6ft.7in.Onroads,theradiusofactionisabout137miles;crosscountry,about93.Thecrewissevenmen.

Thereare twoversionsof thegunitself,namely the20-mmFlak30andthe20-mmFlak38.Thegun,mounted in

front, may or may not be shielded. It fires 20-mm, .260-pound, high-explosive shells at a high muzzle velocity of2,950f/s,the.327-poundAPshellat2,625f/s,andthe.223-poundAP40shotat3,270f/s.Thefiringrateis120rpm.Thehorizontal range is5,320yards.Themountgivesanall-around traverseandanelevationvaryingfromminus12degrees to plus 90. At 400 yards, the AP shell will pierce .98 inch of homogenous armor at an impact angle of30degrees,and1.50inchesatnormal.At400yards’range,theAP40shotwillpierce1.46inchesat30degrees,and1.69inchesatnormal.

(2)20-mmFour-BarreledAA/ATGun

ThisisaVierling(quadruple)gunonan8-tonhalf-track(seeTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.4,p.4)22ft.6in.longby7ft.11in.wideand10ft.10in.high,weighing,readyforaction,11.5tons.Thegasolineenginedevelops140brakehorsepower,givingaradiusofactionontheroadof155miles,andabout62crosscountry.Thecrewisprobablyeight.Thearmamentis“aquadruple20-mmFlak38,withanall-aroundtraverseandanelevationstatedasfrom“minus10toplus100”(apparently10degreespastvertical—whichseemsodd,butmaybeusefulwhenfiringatplanespassingdirectly overhead). The range, penetration, and ammunition are substantially the same as for the Flak 30 and 38previouslynoted.

(3)37-mmAA/ATGun

While like the 20-mm primarily an antiaircraft gun, this 37-mm gun can be used for horizontal fire. It may beidentified by the long, slender barrelwith a conicalmuzzle brake (see figure 2), and it usually tows an ammunitiontrailer.Themountisa5-ton,half-trackedvehicle,witha130-HPgasolinemotorgivinga156-mileradiusontheroad,andabout62milescrosscountry(whichseemsrathersmall).Thelengthandbreadthare20ft.7in.by7ft.6in.;theheightis9ft.2in.Thecrewiseightmen.

Like the20-mm, the37-mmFlak36 isahigh-velocitygun,deliveringanHEshellat2,690f/sat themuzzle.The

horizontalrangeisslightlyover7,000yards,andtherateoffire,60rpm.Thereisall-aroundtraverse,andanelevationoffromminus5toplus85degrees.

(4)50-mmSelf-PropelledAA/ATGun

Thisweapon,the5-cmFlak41,isknowntoexist,butdetailsarelacking.Presumably,itmaybeadevelopmentofthestandard50-mmantitankgun(5-cmPak38)describedinTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.15,p.38,whichgivesareportedmuzzlevelocityof3,940f/stoanAPshotof2.025pounds,and2,740f/stoa4lb.9oz.APtracershell.

(5)88-mmSelf-PropelledMulti-PurposeGun

Aself-propelledversionofthe“88,”the8.8-cmFlak36Sfl, isknowntoexist.Atonetimethegunwassaidtobemountedona12-tonhalf-track,but thismountingisbelievedtohavebeenunsatisfactory.Variousothermountshavebeenreported,themostlikelyofwhichisthePzKw4(mediumtank)chassis.Inthiscase,thegunprobablyhasalimitedtraverseandcannotdeliverantiaircraftfire.Itfiresa20-poundHEshell,ora21-poundAP,withanarmor-piercingcapsurmountedbya“windsplitter”ballisticcap.At500yards theprojectilewillpenetrate4.33 inchesofarmorata30-degreeangle,and5.07inchesatnormal.Whentherangeislengthenedto1,000yards,penetrationfallsto3.30and3.93inches,respectively.Themaximumhorizontalrangeis16,200yards,butthesightisgraduatedto10,340yardsonly.Thepracticalrateoffireisfrom15to20rpm.Thenumberinthecrewisnotstated.

c.GermanSelf-PropelledAntitankGuns

(1)28-mmATGun,Model41Itmaybe that this gun is a local improvisation. Firing forward, it ismounted on a light half-track,with a coffin-

shaped,armoredbody.Thesmallweaponmaybeidentifiedbyitsprominentmuzzlebrakeandflat,doubleshield.Thechassisisthatofa1-tonhalf-trackedvehicle.Thebattleweightisabout6tons.Thedimensionsare15ft.6in.by6ft.by7 ft.; themotor is a 100-hpgasoline engine.Cross country, the radiusof action is about 75miles; on the road, 120.Varyingfromabout.39inchonthefront,thelightarmoris.32inchelsewhere.Thecrewisbelievedtonumberfive.

Theultra-modern,high-velocitygunisthe2.8-cm(1.1in)Pz.B.41.Itischoke-boredfrom28mmatthebreechto20

(.79in)atthemuzzle,andhasamuzzlevelocityof4,580f/s.At100yardsitwilldrivea.287-poundshotthrough2.72inchesofarmorat30degrees,andthrough3.31inchesatnormalangle.At100yardsthepenetrationsare2.09and2.56inches,respectively.Thetraverseis90degrees,theelevationfromminus5toplus45.

(2)37-mmATGun

Likethe28-mm,thisgunmaybealocalimprovisation.Theobsolete37-mmantitankgun,withorwithoutashield,fires towards the frontand ismountedona3-tonarmoredhalf-track;weight inaction is8.4 tons (see figure3).Thedimensionsare:length18ft.8in.,width6ft.10in.,heightabout7ft.6in.Thegasolinemotordevelops100hp.Ontheroad,theradiusis187miles,and81acrosscountry.Infront,thearmorisfrom.39inchto.59inchinthickness,andonthesides,.32inch.Thecrewnumbersthree.

Thisgunhasamuzzlevelocityof2,500 f/s for the1.68-poundAPshell and3,380 (estimated) for the .786-pound

AP40.TheHEweighs1.38pounds.At200yards,theAPshellwillpenetrate1.65inchesat30degreesand2.20inchesat normal angle; at 600 yards, 1.34 and 1.81 inches, respectively.TheAP40 at 100 yards pierces 2.68 inches at 30degrees and 3.11 inches, normal; butwith the lightAP 40 shot, at 400 yards, the penetration falls to 1.93 and 2.28inches.Theeffectiverangeis600yards.Themaximumtraverseis60degrees,andtheelevationvariesfromminus8toplus25degrees.

(3)47-mmATGun

Thispieceof equipment is theCzech antitankgunmounted in a three-sided shieldon the turretless chassis of thePzKw1ModelBtank.Itmayberecognizedbythefivebogiewheels(ofwhichtherearfourarepartiallyobscuredbyagirder),afrontsprocket,arearidler,andfourreturnrollers.Thegun-shieldisopenatthebackandtop.Thegunisfittedwithamuzzlebrake,andtherecuperatorisabovethebarrel.Theweightis7.5tons;thedimensions13ft.7in.,6ft.7in.,and7ft.A100-hpgasolineenginewilldrivethevehicleonaradiusofactionof70milescrosscountryand90ontheroad.Thecrewisthree.

TheSkodagunhasa30-degreetraversewithanelevationoffromminus8degreestoplus12.TheAPtracershell,

3.68pounds,hasavelocityof2,540f/s,penetratingat300yards2.32inchesofarmorat30degrees,and2.99inchesatnormalangle.At1,000yardstherespectivepenetrationsare1.85and2.44inches.AnHEshellof5.07poundsandanAP40shotof1.81poundsareused.Theeffectiverangeisnotstated,butisapparently1,000yards.About74roundsarecarried.

(4)50-mmATGun

Theonlyevidenceofthisequipmentisaphotograph,whichshowedalong-barreledguninafixed,squareturretonanarmoredhalf-trackedvehicleofunconventionaldesign.There isa largemuzzlebrakeat theendof thegun,which isbelievedtobethestandard50-mmPak38.

(5)75-mmATGun,onaPzKw38(t)Chassis

Thisequipmentconsistsofthe75-mm(2.95-in)antitankgun(Pak40)mountedontheturretlesschassisofthelightCzechPzKw38(t).ThesuspensionconsistsoffourlargeChristie-typebogiewheels,tworeturnrollers(mountedabovethe spacebetweenbogiewheels1 and2, and2 and3, respectively), a front sprocket, and a rear idler. In action, theweightis10tons.Thedimensionsare15ft.3in.by7ft.by7ft.2in.A125-hpgasolinemotorgivesaradiusof143milesontheroad,103crosscountry.Aplateof.98-incharmorwith,possibly,anadditionalplateofthesamethicknessrivetedon,protectsthefront.Thesidesare1.18inchestowardthefront,and.59inchtowardtherearofthesidesandthebackofthehull.Thecrewisprobablyfour.

The gun is a 75-mm antitank piece, thought to have a performance similar to the 75-mm long-barreled tank gun

mountedinthelatestPzKw4’s.Thislattergunhasthemoderatevelocityof2,400f/s,givingapenetration(presumablywitha15-pound,cappedAPprojectile)of3.5inchesat500yardsata30-degreeangle,and4.25inchesatnormal.At2,000yards,theshellpierces2.44and3.03inches.ThereisanAP40shotsuppliedforthisgun,anda12.5-poundHE

shell.

(6)75-mmATGunonaPzKw2Chassis

This 10-ton assembly may be recognized by the long-barreled gun with the muzzle brake, as in the previousdescription,butthePzKw2chassishaseitherfiveorsixlargebogiewheels.Itslengthis15ft.2in.,width,1ft.4in.,andheight16ft.6in.Witha140-hpgasolineengine,theradiusontheroadis118miles,andcrosscountry78miles.Infront,thearmorvariesfrom.59inchto1.79inch,with.59inchonthebackandsides.Thecrewisprobablyfour.Thegunisthesameonedescribedinthepreviousparagraph.

(7)76.2-mm(3-in)ATGunona5-TonHalf-Track

Possibly another local improvisation, this piece of equipment consists of aRussian 76.2-mmgunmounted on thechassisofa5-tonhalf-trackinahigh,square,box-likerivetedstructureof.20-incharmor,Openatthetop(seefigure4).Thegunmaybeemployedbothinfieldartilleryandantitankroles.

Theweightisabout10tons.Themountis19ft.9in.long,7ft.3in.wide,and10ft.high.Themotorisa130-hp

gasolineengine,givingtheweaponaradiusofactionof160milesonroadsand70acrosscountry,carryingacrewofprobablysix.

The76.2-mmRussianfieldgunModel36(7.62-cmPak36(r))withalong,thinbarrelthrowsa14.8-poundcapped

armor-piercingshellattherelativelylowvelocityof2,200f/s,a14-poundHEat2,340f/s,andanAP40shotof9.25poundsweightat2,800f/s.Therangeisnotstated,butthefiringchartsincluderangesupto2,000yards,atwhichrangeitisclaimedthattheAPshellwilldrivethrough2.08inchesofarmorwitha30-degreeslope,and2.52inches,vertical.At500yards,thepenetrationisreportedtobe3.11and3.70inches,respectively.Theawkward-appearingmountgivesan unexpectedly large traverse of 60 degrees,with an elevation varying fromminus 5 to plus 45 degrees. (The gunmountiscapableofgiving75degreesofelevation,buttheshieldfoulsthefronttarpaulinrailat45degrees.)Sixty-fourroundsarecarried,approximatelyhalfHEandhalfAP.

(8)76.2-mmGunonTankChassis

This is the76.2-mmRussiangun justdiscussed,mountedon the lightCzechPzKw38(t) chassiswith4bogies asdescribedinTacticalAndTechnicalTrends,No.21,p.6(seefigure5);itisalsomountedonthePzKw2chassiswhichhas5bogiewheels.Bothchassisareratherlightforsolargeagun.Itseemsunlikelythateitherthetraverseorelevationonthesetankchassisisasgreatasonthe5-tonhalf-track.

d.GermanSelf-PropelledAssaultGuns

(1)75-mmAssaultGunAlowsilhouette,awell-armoredbody,andashortgunfiringforwardcharacterizethisassaultgun.(SeeTacticaland

TechnicalTrends,No.7,p.9.)ThemountisthechassisofthePzKw3.Thesuspensionconsistsofsixsmallbogiesoreachsidewiththreereturnrollers,afrontsprocket,andarearidler.Thevehiclewithitsweaponisheavy—nearly20tons. It is17 ft.9 in. longand9 ft.7 in.wide,butonly6 ft.5 in.high.Aradiusof102milesby roadand59crosscountryisattainedwitha300-hpgasolinemotor.Thecrewisfour.Probably,thismodelisnolongerinproduction.

Withitscasematemount,theshort-barreled75-mmgunhasatraverseofonly20degrees,andanelevationvarying

from minus 5 to plus 20. For HE shell, the gun is sighted to 6,550 yards; for AP, only 1,640. At 500 yards, thepenetration is1.81 inches in30-degreeslopingarmor,and2.16 inches invertical;at1,200, itdrops to1.57and1.89inches.TheHEshellweighs12.6pounds;theAPshell,withcapandballisticcap,14.81.ThereisanAPhollowchargeofunstatedweight,aswellasa13.56-poundsmokeshell.Inthebinsofthecarrier,44roundsarecarried,andabout40moremaybestackedonthefloor.Adozenstickgrenades(potatomashers)mayalsobecarriedclippedonarack.

(2)75-mmMedium-LengthAssaultGun

Thismachine isessentiallysimilar to theforegoing,except thatagun30calibers longmountedina largebox-likecasinghasreplacedthestubbypieceintheearliermodel.

(3)75-mmLongAssaultGun

Thethirdassaultgunmodelisalong-barreled“75”withaprominentmuzzlebrake.It,too,ismountedonthePzKw3chassis(seefigure6).Thevelocityhasbeenincreasedto2,400f/s,witharesultingincreasedpenetrationat500yardsof3.5 inches of sloping armor and 4.25 inches of vertical; at 2,000, the penetration is still formidable—2.44 and 3.03inches.Itisthoughtthatthisgunisprimarilyatank-destroyerweapon.

(4)75-mmGunMountedona3-TonHalf-Track

Probablyanotherlocalimprovisation,thisweaponismountedonanarmoredhalf-track.Themountingisthesameasthatusedforthe37-mmanti-tankgun,thedetailsofwhicharegiveninc(2)above.(Ifthe76.2RussiangunisalittleheavyforaPzKw2mount,a3-tonhalf-trackwouldseemextremelylightfora75-mmpiece.)

(5)150-mmInfantryHowitzeronPzKw1Chassis

Probably retaining its originalwheels and trail, thismedium howitzer ismounted on the semiobsolete PzKw 1-Bchassis.Thischassishasfivebogies(ofwhichtherearfourarepartiallyobscuredbyagirder),fourreturnrollers,afrontsprocket,andarearidler.Abovethechassisfloorisahigh,three-sidedgunshield,openonthetopandback.Theweightisabout9tons.Inlength,itis13ft.7in.;inwidth,6ft.7in.;andtheheightis11ft.Aradiusof95milesontheroadand70milescrosscountryisgivenbya100-hpgasolineengine.Frontandsidesareprotectedby.59-incharmor,andbackby.28inches,andthegunshieldisthoughttobe‘onlyabout.39inch.Fourmenmakeupthecrew.

Thepiece is thenormal150-mmheavy infantryhowitzer (15-cms.I.G.33)withamuzzlevelocityof790f/sanda

rangeof 5,125yards.The recuperator is underneath, and extends almost to the endof, the short barrel.On the fieldmounting,thetraverseis11degrees,andtheelevationfrom0to73degrees.Ammunitionweightsare83.6poundsfortheHEshell,and84.7forthesmoke.

(6)150-mmInfantryHowitzeronPzKw2Chassis

Aclose-supportpieceofgreatpowerhasbeenmadebymountinga150-mmhowitzerlowbehindathree-sidedshieldonwhatispossiblyaredesignedPzKw2chassis.(SeeTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.22,p.13,andNo.13,p.6.)Inplaceoftheusualfivelargebogiewheels,therearesix(seefigure7),suggestingthatthenormalPzKw2chassishasbeenlengthened,oranewchassisdesigned.Therearefourreturnrollers,afrontsprocket,andarearidler.Theweightisabout11 tons.The length isabout18ft.; thewidth is7 ft.4 in.;and theheighthasbeenkeptdown to5 ft.6 in.—aremarkablylowsilhouette.A140-hpmotorgivesaradiusofactionof118milesontheroadand78milesacrosscountry.The frontal armor consists of two plates, .59 and .79 inch thick. Sides, back, and shield have .59 inch, and thesuperstructure .39 inch.The crew is probably four.As in the previously describedweapon, the gun is a short heavyinfantryhowitzer,withtherecuperatoralmostaslongasthebarrel.

e.GermanSelf-PropelledMediumArtillery

(1)105-mmGunNothingisknownofthemountexceptthatitisarmored.Thegunisthoughttobethestandard10-cmK18ofwhich

the followingare someof theparticulars:muzzlevelocity2,660 f/s;maximumeffective antitank range, 2,060yards;penetrationwith34.6-poundarmor-piercingshellat500yards,30degreesslope,5.49inches,andvertical,6.46inches;penetrationsat2,000yards,4.39and5.22inches.Acapped,APshellanda33.5-poundHEshellarereported.

(2)105-mmGun-Howitzer

Nothing is known of themount, but the gun performances are believed to be as follows:muzzle velocity (super-charge),1,540f/s;range,11,640yards.Shellweightsvarybetween31.25poundsfortheAPtracerto35.9poundsforthehollow-charge.

(3)128-mmGun

Boththisgunandthe105wereprobablyproducedtodealwiththeheaviestRussiantanks.Nodetailsareavailableastothegunorthemount.

(4)150-mmHowitzeronFrench38LMount

AttentioniscalledtotheaccountinTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.12,p.15ofthis150-mmhowitzermountedonthe6-bogiechassisoftheFrenchtracteurblindé38L(seefigure8).Thehullisdividedinto3compartments:thedrivingcompartmentinthefront,theengineinthecenter,andadeep,well-protectedcockpitfortheguncrewintherear.Theassemblyislight(71/2tons).Itis14ft.longand5ft.2in.wide,witha70-hpenginegivingaspeedof22mph.Theradiusofactionisnotstated.Armorprotectionisfrom.37to.47inchinfront,.35inchonsidesandrear,and.24inchonthesuperstructure.Thefixedgunhousing,mountedinthefloorofthechassis,isofratherthinplate.Traverseislimitedtoabout4degrees,andarearspadeisprovidedtotakeuprecoilstresses.Thecrewisfour.

Whilethe150-mmassaultguns,previouslydescribed,are150-mminfantryhowitzersfiringan86-poundshell, this

mediumhowitzerhasalongerbarrel,whichgivesamuzzlevelocityof1,250f/sinsteadof790toashellof92.4poundsweight. The range is 9,300 yards as against 5,125.HE shells, and anticoncrete and smoke shells, are provided. It isnotablethatinthiscaseaself-propelledgunfiringa92-poundshelltosogreatarangehasbeendevelopedonaweightlimitof7.5tons.

f.ItalianSelf-PropelledGuns

(1)75/18Gun-Howitzer

This seemingly effective, self-propelled equipment is the chassis of theM13,mounting a 75/18 gun-howitzer (see

figure9).Theturretandpartofthesuperstructureofthetankareremoved,andanewverticalfrontplateisfitted,aswellasnewsideplateswithoutthehullentrance-doors.Thefightingcompartmentisroofedwith.39-inchplate.Readyforaction,thegunweighsabout11tons.Itis16ft.2in.long,7ft.3in.wide,andonly5ft.10in.high,presentingarathersquatappearance.Theunusualengineisa105-hpGasolio,burningamixtureofgasolineandfueloil.Ontheroads,theradius is about 120 miles. The cross-country radius is not stated. The armor is substantial: 1.69 inches on the gunmantlet,andtwoplates,1.46and.91inches,formingthefrontverticalplate.Sidesandtailplatesare.98inch.Thecrewisthree.

Thegunhasatraverseof45degreesandanelevationoffrom15degreesminusto25degreesplus.Itisan18caliber

weaponwithamaximumrangeof8,350yards.Theammunitionconsistsof13.9-poundHEshell,14.1-poundAPanda14.5-poundshrapnel.Storageforonly29roundsisprovided,butmanymorewillcertainlybecarried.

(2)The75/27Gun,Truck-Mounted

Ithasbeenreportedthatthereisinserviceasomewhatclumsyself-propelledmountcomprisinga75/27gunonthebackofanunarmored“S.P.A.”truck.Thestandardsmallshieldisretainedandasecondsmallshieldmountedinfrontofit;thetraillegsareshortenedandclampedtothechassis.Thegunfiresforwardoverthehoodofthetruck.

Thegunisratherbetterthanthe75/18,withamuzzlevelocityof1,675f/s.Theelevationisfromminus15toplus65degrees;thetraverseispractically60degrees.InadditiontotheHE,shrapnel,andAPshellalreadynoted,thegunfiresa13.79-poundstreamlinedHE,a15.9-poundcase-shot,*andahollow-chargeshell.

*Similartoshrapnel,forcloserange.

(3)75/27AntiaircraftGun,Truck-Mounted

Thisisanobsolete75/27KruppantiaircraftgunmountedonaCeirano50C.M.A.53-hptruck,oraFiat18BL40-hptruck.Bothare fourwheeled.TheCeirano truckhasa radiusof150mileson the road; theFiat,112.Thegunhas amuzzlevelocityofonly1,675f/s,withahorizontalrangeof6,600yardsandverticalrangeof15,200feet.Theelevationis70degrees,thetraverse160.A14.5-pound,time-fuzed,HEshellisfired.

(4)90/53AA/ATGun,Truck-Mounted

Thisisa90/53AA/ATgunmountedonafour-wheeled60-hpLanciaRotruck.Itisprobablethattheguncanbeusedonlyagainstgroundtargets.Theradiusofactionisabout150miles.

Amuzzlevelocityof2,756f/sgivesthe22.2-poundHEshellarangeof19,100yards.Thepracticalrateoffireisfrom

15 to 20 rpm. The elevation is from slightly below horizontal to 85 degrees, and the traverse, 360.AnAP shell ofunknownweightisreportedtopenetrate4.41inchesofplateona30-degreeslopeat500yards,and5.63inchesofplateatthevertical.At2,000yards,therespectivepenetrationsare3.15and4.13inches.

(5)90/53AA/ATGunonaTankChassis

Ithasbeenreportedthatthe90/53gunisnowfoundonamountofentirelynewdesigninthecenterofwhatappearstobeatankchassis,firingforward,witha40-degreetraverse.Themuzzleissaidtoslightlyoverhangthefrontofthechassis.ThechassisitselfisstatedtobeidenticalwiththatoftheearlierM13/40mediumtankasregardssuspension,armor,andappearance,buttheengineismorepowerful.Inordertofirethegun,thetracks,apparently,havetobelockedbythesteeringlevers.Onlyalimitednumberofroundscanbecarried.Thecrewisprobablysix.Whetherthechassisisusedforthe90/53self-propelledgunonly,oristhatofanM15tank,isatpresentobscure.

g.JapaneseSelf-PropelledArtillery

Information regarding Japanese self-propelledguns is entirely too indefinite towarrant any statement.However inOctober 1941, the British reported a Japanese self-propelled gun, of which but one has been seen, perhaps anexperimentalmodel.Itissupposedtobeaweaponofabout100-mmcalibermountedinthechassisofamediumtank.Thepieceissaidtobelong,andtohavenoshield.Thegunmaybethe105-mmhowitzer,Model“91”(1931),ofwhichthefollowingisknown:muzzlevelocity1,790f/s;maximumrange,either11,500or14,200yards;maximumelevationandtraverse(both),45degrees.Theammunitionisa35-poundHEshell.

32.NEWSELF-PROPELLEDGUN

IntelligenceBulletin,October1943

InRussiatheGermansareusinganewarmoredself-propelledgun,whichbearsatleastanoutwardresemblanceto

thePz.Kw.6,theGermantankoftenreferredtoasthe“Tiger.”Thenewself-propelledgun(seefig.1)mountsan88-mmcannoninafixedturret,andhasanover-allweightof70tons.Itsmaximumspeedisreportedtobenotmorethan12milesperhour.

Althoughthearmorofthenewweapon,especiallythefrontarmor,issaidtobehardertopiercethanthatofthePz.

Kw.6,theRussianshavefoundtheformereasiertosetafire.Theyhavenicknameditthe“Ferdinand.”

Figure1a.—NewGermanHeavySelf-propelledGun(frontview).

ARussianstaffofficermakesthefollowingobservationsregardingtheperformanceofthe“Ferdinand”ontheOrel

andBelgorodfronts,wheretheGermans,counterattacking,usedanumberofthenewheavyweaponsandPz.Kw.6’sasbatteringramsinanattempttoforcebreachesintheRussianlines.

Duringonebattletheenemyassaultedourpositionswith300heavilyarmoredvehicles,amongthemwereabout50

“Tigers”and“Ferdinands.”While thebattlewas takingplacealongour forwardpositions,12ofourownheavyself-propelledgunsremainedhiddenintheirearthfortifications.Whenabout,20“Tigers”and“Ferdinands”brokethroughourforwardlines,ourself-propelledartillerymovedoutfromtheirconcealedpositionsinordertofirebydirectlaying.Anambushwaspreparednearthethreatenedarea,andthepieceswerecamouflaged.

Fire against theGermanarmorwascommencedwhen the attackingvehicleswere about500yards away fromour

cannon.

Ourfirstroundsweresuccessful.At500yards“Tigers”sufferedgapingholesintheirturretarmorandsidearmor.At

300yardswepiercedtheirfrontalarmor,andblewtheirturretscleanoff.Hitsonthesidearmoratthisrangenearlysplitthevehiclesinhalf.Itwassomewhatdifferentwiththe“Ferdinands.”Theirarmor—thefrontarmor,inparticular—wasmoredifficulttopierce,buttheirtracks,suspension,andsideandturret,armorwerenohardertodamageanddestroythanthoseofthe“Tigers.”TheGermanslostattotalof12“Tigers”andsix“Ferdinands.”

Figure1b.—NewGermanHeavySelf-propelledGun(sideandrearview).

Inanotherbattlethesameheavyarmoroftheenemywasengagedbyourordinarymediumartillery,whichusedboth

specialandregularammunition.Threeofourpieceswereemplacedtoformatriang1e;theywerereasonablyfarapart.This triangulardispositionpermittedunusually effective fire against “Ferdinands.”Although the “Ferdinand’s” fire isveryaccurate,itsfixedturretdoesnotpermitittoshiftitsfirerapidly.Whentheguniscaughtinatriangle,itisvirtuallyhelpless,becausewhileitengagesonecannontheothertwotakepot-shotsatitsvulnerablepoints.Ifthepiecedirectlyinfrontofa“Ferdinand”doesnotdiscloseitspositionbyfiring,theothertwocanusuallydisposeofthebiggunwithnolosstoourselves.

Obviouslyitisnotalwayspossibleforustoarrangeabatteryinatriangle.Therefore,werequiretheclosestpossible

cooperationbetweenthepiecesofabatteryandalsobetweenneighboringbatteries.

Point-blank fire from ourmedium tanks in ambush armed onlywith the 45-mm cannon, has taken care ofmany

“Tigers”and“Ferdinands,”ashavelandmines,Molotovcocktails,andcannonfirefromourfighterplanes.

Itisalsoreportedthatthecircularholeintherearofthe“Ferdinand’s”fightingcompartmentisextremelyvulnerable.

This hole provides room for the recoil and the ejection of shells. Russian observers state that grenades orMolotovcocktailsthrownintothisopeningcanputthevehicleoutofaction.

Note: As the Intelligence Bulletin goes to press, further information regarding the “Ferdinand” has been made

available.

Itisreportedthatthecrewsconsistofsixmen:Aguncommander(usuallyalieutenant,whoiseitheratankmanorin

artilleryman),agunner,adriver-mechanic,aradiooperator,andtwoadditionalguncrewmembers.

“Ferdinands”areorganizedinbattalionscalled“HeavyTank-DestroyerBattalions.”Eachbattalionconsistsofthree

guncompanies,aheadquarterscompany,arepaircompany.andatransportcolumn.Eachguncompanyconsistsofthreeplatoonsof four guns each.The companyheadquarters has three guns,making a total of 14gunsper company.Thebattalionheadquarterscompanyhastwoguns,aPz.Kw.3,andfourmotorcycles.

Ontheoffensive,thebattalionmovesintwoechelons.Thefirstechelonconsistsoftwocompaniesabreast,witheach

companyinlineandwitha100-yardintervalbetweenguns.Thesecondechelonconsistsofthethirdcompany,alsoinline.Thedistancebetweenechelonshasnotbeenreported.

Althoughthegunitselfisexcellent,themountinghascertainpronounceddefects.

(1)Theguncanfireonlytothefront,andiseffectiveonlywhenstationary.

(2)Poorvisionfromthefightingcompartmentallowsmoremaneuverabletanksandantitankweaponstogetinclosetothegun

33.GERMANAIRSUPPORTOFTANKSINAFRICA

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.24,May6th1943

GAFaircommandsnormallydetailairliaisonofficers(Fliegerverbindungsoffiziere,or“Flivos”)totheheadquarters

ofArmydivisions and higher units, to ensure that army requests for air support and air reconnaissance are properlytransmittedtotheairheadquartersconcerned.

However, theexperience in theLibyancampaigns indicated thatproperlycoordinatedair supportof armoredunits

requiredtheassignmentofaGAFofficertoarmoredcombatechelonsbelowdivisionheadquarters.Suchanofficermustbe an experiencedpilot, capable of rapidly estimating theweight of air attacknecessary to support a particular fieldoperation,andcapableofdirecting theconcentrationof thisattackonanygiven targetat themomentwhich the tankcommanderdeterminestobemostadvantageous.

Inthisway,airstrengthcanbeutilizedtoitsmaximumeffectiveness,avoidingthedispatchoflargeformationstodeal

withsmalltargetsorofinsufficientnumberstocoverlargeandscatteredobjectives.Duringanattackagainstamovingtarget,aliaisonofficerwithflyingexperiencecanbestdirecttheaircraft.Hecontrolsthembyradiofromavantagepointwherehecanwatch,andifnecessary,followupthetarget.

In Tunisia, up to December, 1942, the GAF liaison officer had not operated directly with the armored combat

echelons,buthadbeendependingoninformationsuppliedbythecommandersofsubordinatearmoredunits.Sincethisinformationfrequentlyprovedunreliableforpurposesofeffectiveairsupport,theaircommanddecidedtoappointoneoftheirownofficersfordirectliaisonwiththecombatechelons.Thisofficerridesinaliaisontank,whichoperatesinthesecondwaveoftanks,nearthetankofthearmoredunitcommander.

Assuming,forexample, thatanattackingtankregimentofanarmoreddivisionisheldupbyenemyresistanceand

immediateairsupport isneeded, theprocedurewouldbeasfollows.Theregimentalcommanderconsultswiththeairliaisonofficer,andadecisionismadeastotheairsupportrequired.Therequestforairsupportisthentransmittedbyradio to the headquarters of the Fliegerführer (officer in charge of air operations in the area); this message issimultaneouslyreceivedattheheadquartersofthearmoreddivision.Themessageshouldincludethepositionandtypeoftargettobeattacked,theestimatednumberofaircraftrequired,thetypeandheightofcloudcover,andthepossibleoppositiontobeencountered.

TheFliegerführerthenorders,fromtheairdromenearestthesceneofaction,suchairsupportashethinksnecessary,

andnotifiestheliaisonofficerwhentheformationisabouttotakeoff.Directcommunicationbetweentheliaisonofficerandtheaircraftisestablishedaftertheformationisairborne.Theliaisonofficerdirectstheplanestothetargetbyradio.If,meanwhile,thetargethaschangedposition,heindicatesitsnewlocation.Radiocontactisalsomaintainedbetweentheliaisonofficer,thecommanderofthetankregiment,andtheothertanks.

Comment:TheaboveinformationseemstobearoutreportsfromothersourcesconcerningGermanpracticeinrecent

operations,andassuch,isconsideredtobeworthyofcredence.

34.ARMORARRANGEMENTONGERMANTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.29,July15th1943

The accompanying sketches show the armor arrangement on current models of the PzKw 2, 3, 4, and 6. These

sketchesarebelievedtobeaccurateandup-to-date.Armorthicknesses(circledfigures)aregiveninmillimeters;theirequivalentininchesmaybefoundinthearticlebeginningonpage30.Aquestionmarkfollowingsomeofthesefiguresindicatesthatdefiniteinformationisnotavailable.Wheretwosmallfiguresappearinparentheses,itindicatesthatthereare2platesatthispoint;inonly2instances,namelyonthePzKw3,arethe2platesseparatedtoformso-calledspacedarmor.

Thearmamentofthesetanksisalsoshown.

35.ATTACKAGAINSTGERMANHEAVYTANK-PZKW6

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.30,July29th1943

ConstructiondetailsaboutsomeofthefeaturesofthenewGermanheavytankhavealreadybeendescribedinTactical

andTechnicalTrends(seeNo.24,p.6andNo.20,p.7).

ThefollowingreportbyanobserverontheTunisianfrontfurnishessomecommentsasaguidetotraininginantitank

actionagainstthistank.

Itappears that thefirstof these tanks tobedestroyedin this theaterwereaccountedforbyBritish6-pounders(57-

mm).Anaccountofthisaction,asreportedbyaBritishArmyOfficer,follows:

“Theemplaced6-poundersopenedfireataninitialrangeof680yards.Thefirstroundshittheuppersideofthetank

atveryacuteanglesandmerelynickedthearmor.Asthetankmovednearer,itturnedinsuchamannerthatthethirdandfourth shots gouged out scallops of armor, the fifth shot went almost through and the next three rounds penetratedcompletelyandstoppedthetank.Thefirstcompletepenetrationwasatarangeof800yards,atanangleofimpactof30degrees fromnormal, throughhomogeneousarmor82-mm(approximately31/3 inches) thick.Ammunitionusedwasthe57-mmsemi-APsolidshot.

“OneelementofthisactioncontainsanimportantlessonthatshouldbebroughttotheattentionofallATelementsand

particularlytankdestroyerunits.

(a)“TheBritishgunnersdidnotopenuntiltheenemytankwaswellwithineffectiverange.

(b)“Inadditiontoopeningfirewiththeprimaryweapon—the57-mm—theATunitalsoopenedwithintenselightmachine-gunfirewhichforcedthetanktobuttonupandineffectblindedhim.HisvisionapparentlybecameconfusedandhewasactuallytraversinghisgunawayfromtheATgunswhenhewasknockedoutforgood.

(c)“Oncetheyopenedfire,theBritishgunnersreallypoureditonandknockedoutonemoreheavytankandsixPzKw3s.Also,forgoodmeasure,onearmoredcar.”

Theconclusionstobedrawnfromthisaction,accordingtotheBritishofficerquoted,are:

(a) “The unobstructed vision of the gunner in a tank destroyer gives him a very real advantage over his opponentsquintingthroughtheperiscopeornarrowvisionslitsofatank.

(b) “The tank destroyer unit must force the enemy tank to ‘button up’ by intense fire from every weapon he has,includingmachine-guns,tommyguns,andrifles.”

ThesizeandweightofatanksuchasthePzKw6presentmanyproblems.Ithasbeenindicatedfromunofficialenemy

sourcesthatextensivereconnaissanceofterrain,bridges,etc.,wasnecessarybeforeoperationswiththistankcouldbeundertaken.Bridgeshavetobereinforcedinmanycases,andsoilconditionsmustbegoodforitseffectiveoperation.Itcanthereforebeassumedthatitsfieldofoperationislimited.

Reports so far indicate that theuseof this tank ischiefly tosupportotherarmoredunits, includingemploymentas

mobileartillery.Asasupport tankit isalways inrearof lighterunits. Inonereportedskirmish inTunisia, the lighterunitsformedthespear-head;assoonasenemytanksweredecoyedintorangethelightertanksfannedout,leavingtheheaviertanksinthereartoengagetheenemyunits.

ThePzKw6isnowconsideredastandardGermantank.Presentproductionfiguresarebelievedtobeatamaximum

of800permonth.

36. COOPERATION OF GERMAN INFANTRY ANDTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.31,August12th1943

A tank exercise observed in Germany late in 1942 indicated that the Germans were developing a new type of

combined tank and infantry tactics.These tactics havenowbeen reported as standardGerman tactics on theEasternfront.AdescriptionofthesetacticsreportedthroughaBritishsourcefollows:

Fivemediumtanksaredrawnupinlineandimmediatelybehindthemtwoarmoredtroop-carryingvehiclescarrying

ninemeneach,armedwithautomaticweapons.Thecentertankleadsoff,followedbytheremainingfourtanksmovinginpairs;bringingupthereararethetwoarmoredtroop-carryingvehicles.Themomenttheleadingtanksopenfirethemeninthetroop-carriersdismountandadvanceatthedoubleinextendedorder.Thenfourverylargetruckscomeup,eachcarryingabout25riflemenwhodismountandadvanceinthree“waves”behindthetanks.

37.GERMANPzKw3PHOTOGRAPHS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.32,August26th1943

TheaccompanyingphotographsshowfourviewsoftheGermanmediumtankPzKw3.Figures2,3and4isthePzKw

3withthelong-barreled50-mmgun.Figure1isessentiallythesametankexceptthatitisequippedwithashort-barreled50-mmgun.

Figure1

Figure2

Figure3

Figure4

38.GERMANTANKRUBBERANALYSIS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.33,September9th1943

AnalysisbyBritishengineersofsamplesofnaturalandartificialrubbertakenfromthePzKw3tanksdisclosessome

interestingpointswhichareworthrecording.

Twoverysimilararticles,i.e.avisionforeheadpadandacupolapadofa1940modelofthistankprovedtobevery

differentwhen analyzed. The formerwasmade of natural rubber andwas secured to themetal by the brass platingprocess. The cupola pad, on the other hand, was made from synthetic rubber and was attached to the metal by anadhesivepaint.ThesesamplesconfirmtheprevioussuppositionthattheGermanshavenotyetlearnedhowtomakeanefficientjointbetweensyntheticrubberandmetal.

Themostinterestingsample,however,wasasectionofabogiewheeltirefromaPzKw3tank(probably1942).This

sampleprovedtobemadeofsyntheticrubber.ThisissaidtobethefirstevidencereceivedbytheBritishauthoritiesofthismaterialbeingusedbytheGermansforsolidtires.ItseemstoshowthattheGermanshavemadesufficienttechnicalprogresstoovercometheheatingdifficultiespreviouslyarisingwhensyntheticrubberwasusedforthistypeofwork.Themethodofadhesiontothemetalbandwasbymeansofanintermediatelayerofhard,probablynaturalrubber.

39.NOTESOFABRITISHARMOREDFORCEOFFICERONGERMANTANKEMPLOYMENT

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.34,September23rd1943

InTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.28,p.12,thereappearedatranslationofaGermandocumentissuedintheform

ofageneralorderbythePanzerArmyHighCommand,listingthe10rulesonthefunctionandemploymentoftanks.Acopyoftheserulesfollows:

1.The tank is adecidingweapon inbattle.Therefore, employment shouldbe limited to the“maineffort” in suitableterrain.

2.The tank is not an individual fightingweapon.The smallest unit is the tankplatoon; for largermissions, the tankcompany.

3. The tank is not an infantry supportweapon. It breaks into and through the enemy line, for the closely followinginfantry.

4.Thetankcantakeapieceofterrainandclearit,butitcannotholdit.Thisisaninfantrymission,supportedbyinfantryheavyweapons,antitankguns,andartillery.

5.Thetankisnottobeemployedasartillery,whichfightstheenemyforanextendedperiodfromoneposition.Thetankfightswhilemovingwithshorthaltsforfiring.

6.Themissionoftheinfantryistopindownenemydefensiveweapons,andtofollowthetankattackcloselyinordertoexploitcompletelytheforceandmoraleeffectofthatattack.

7.Themissionoftheartilleryistosupportthetankattackbyfire,todestroyenemyartillery,andtofollowcloselytherapidlyadvancingtankattack.Themaintaskoftheartillerysupportiscontinuousflankprotection.

8.Themissionofthetankdestroyersistofollowthetankattackcloselyandtogetintothebattleimmediatelywhentankfightstank.

9. The mission of the combat engineers is to clear minefields and to open gaps under tank, infantry, and artilleryprotection,inordertoenablethecontinuationofthetankattack.

10.Thetankisblindanddeafatnight.Itisthenthemissionoftheinfantrytoprotectthetanks.

ItisinterestingtoreportherethefollowingnotesbyGHQ,MiddleEastForces,basedonareportbyanexperienced

armoredforceofficer,whichreviewsthepointspresentedintheGermandocument.

(1)Itisconsideredthat,withtheexceptionofNo.‘s2and3,the“TenCommandments”aresoundcommonsense,basedonelementaryandfundamentalprinciples.

(2)No.2,however,isinteresting,sinceitreflectstheopinionsofvonArnim,vonThomaandStumme(nowallprisonersofwar)whofoughtinRussia,wheretheyacquiredthehabitofusingtheirtanksin“pennypackets”.

Aplatoonis5tanks,andacompanyis17PzKw3s,18PzKw4sor8PzKw6s.

Rommelwouldneverhaveagreedtothecompanybeingsplit,andwouldnormallyhavepreferredtousethebattalion,oreventheregiment,astheunitofattack,aswewouldourselves.

(3)No.3isdebatable.Againstweakantitankdefenseandnomines,thisrulewouldbetrue.Medenine*showedthatnowsinceweareaswellequippedwithantitankgunsastheGermans,theywillhavetorewritethisCommandment,andusetheirtanksinasimilarmannertotheirrecentemploymentbyEighthArmy.

(4)ItisinterestingtonotethatinNo.8themainantitankweaponisconsideredtobethetank-huntingplatoonandNOTthetank.Thisaccordswithourownviewsbutinthepasthasnotbeenalwaysunderstood.

*IntheMarethLineregion

40. DETAILED REPORT ON THE GERMAN “TIGER”PZKW6

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.34,September23rd1943

In theearlypartof1943 therewere repeated reportsofanewGermanheavy tank (Tactical andTechnicalTrends,

No.18,page6)andasthecampaigninNorthAfricaproceeded,moredefiniteinformationbecameavailable(TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.20,page7;No.24,page6;No.30,page7).ThefollowinginformationistakenfromaspecialreportcompiledinNorthAfricaafterextensivetestsononecarefullysalvagedPzKw6andpartsoftenothersscatteredaboutthebattlearea.

a.StructureandLayout

Thedimensionsaremoreorlessaspreviouslyreported,exceptfortheoverallwidth,whichis11feet9inchesandnot12feet8inchesashasbeenstated.Thehullisentirelywelded.Thehulldimensionsare:

•Widthtooutsideof281/2-inchtracks-11ft9in

•Widthofhullattop-10ft31/2in

•Widthofhullatnose-6ft4in

•Lengthfromnose-platetosilencer-20ft71/2in

•Lengthtrackonground-12ft3in

•Heightfromgroundtohulltop-5ft8in

•Heightfromgroundtohighestpointoncupola-9ft61/2in

•Heightfromgroundtotopofwadingairintake-15ft51/2in

•Heightfromgroundtosprocketcenter-2ft31/2in

•Bellyclearance-1ft3in

•Heightfromfloortoturretroof-5ft2in

The turret ismade up of a horse-shoe-shapedwallwith the circular part at the back. The turret bearing is of theverticaltypewiththestationaryraceinsideandthemovingoneoutside.Itisaballbearingwith1.6inchballsandnocage.Itcontainsavarietyofsealingarrangements;besidesthewaterseals,thereisafeltseal.Thetraverseringisinonepieceandthecleardiameteris6feet,2inches.Theturretseemstocomeoffveryeasily.

The turretplatform is4 feet9 inches indiameter, connected to the turretby tubular supports.Therearenobasket

sides.Thepowertraversehydraulicgearsitsinthemiddleofthis.Thereisatrapdoorattheloader’sfeet,whichwiththeturretat12o’clock,givesaccesstoanammunitionbinunderneath.Theturretdimensionsare:

•Heightfromhulltoptoturretroof-2ft81/2in

•Heightfromhulltoptotrunnioncenters-1ft31/2in

•Diameterofcupolainside-2ft4in

•Diameterofcupolahatch-1ft6in

•Diameterofturretring-6ft1in

•Diameterofturretplatform-4ft91/2in

•Numberofteethinring-204

•Widthofrack(turretring)-21/2in

Thefloorsurroundingtheturretplatformismostlyoccupiedbyammunitionbinsandkeptfairlyfreeofstowage.Atotalof92 roundsof88-mmammunition iscarried,dividedbetweennose-fuzeHEandAPCBC-HE[Armor-piercing(projectile)cappedwithballisticcaphighexplosive].

The layout of the crew space follows the normalGerman practice of driver and hull gunner-radio operator in the

forwardcompartment,totherearandoffsideofthetransmissionrespectively,andathree-manturret,thusmakingacrewoffive.

The88-mmgunisslightlyoffset totherightsideanditsrecoilguardextendsbackwardsuntil itnearlyreachesthe

turretring,thusdividingthefightingspaceintotwounequalparts.Thegunner’sseatiswellforwardandlowdownontheleftsideandthecommander’sseatimmediatelybehinditandhigherup;theyoccupythelargerofthetwoportionsofthechamber,butbotharerathercramped.

Theloader,havingthesmallerrightsidetohimself,hasmoreroom;theroundsofammunitionare361/2incheslong

and nearly 4 1/2 inches in diameter at the rim, so he needs every bit of space. The co-axialmachine gun is readilyaccessible.

b.ArmorandVulnerability

The figures already given for armor thickness are confirmed, but there are still doubts as to the quality. Armorthicknessesareasfollows:

Thesideplatingshowssurfacehardnessandbrittleness,withastrongtendencytocrackandflake.Thesideplateof

theturretalsoflakesbadlyontheinside.

Thelimitingangleforpenetrationofthe75-mmgunagainstthe3.23inchplateis17°,butitwillpenetratethelower

2.44inchplateat30°.

Thegunsusedwerethe75-mm(M.3)guninaShermantankandaworn6-pounder(Mk.III-57mm)inaChurchill

tank.Itisnotpossibletogiveevenanestimateoftheequivalentfullcharge.Therangeforthetestwasrestrictedto100yards.Thecastarmorofthemantletseemstobeofgoodquality,anddoesnotbreakuporcrackunderheavyattack.Noneofthoseexaminedhadbeenpenetrated.Themantletcoverstheentirefrontoftheturretandthereisnodoubtthatitgivesfarbetterprotectionthananinternalone.

Thereisnoprotectionfortheturretringotherthanthatprovidedbyraisingthedriver’svisorplate2inchesabovethe

hullroof.Thisisnotveryeffectiveandanadditionalweaknessisindicatedbythepenetrationoftwo75-mmprojectileswhichweredeflecteddownwardsontothehullrooffromtheloweredgeofthemantletandturretfront.

AtrialattemptwasmadeagainstthefrontofoneofthesetankswithPIAT[Projector,infantryantitank]projectilesbut

theyfailedtopenetrateeitherthemantletorthefront4.02inchplate.AGerman“beehive”magnetichollowchargewastriedoutonthe3.23inchsideplateandsuccessfullypenetratedit.

Ingeneral,itseemsthattheprotectionaffordedbythistankisverygoodandthatforeffectiveAPattack,agunofthe

17-pounder(3-in)classisneeded.Wehavereasontobelieve,however,thatthetracksandbogies,whichpresentalargetargetarea,areliabletodamagebyHEfromfieldandmediumartillery.

c.Armament

The88-mm(3.46in)isofthenormaltypewithsemi-automaticbreechmechanism;itcanuseantiaircraftammunitionwhichhasbeenprovidedwithelectricprimers.Thegunhastheusualelectricsafetydeviceswhichpreventitfrombeingfiredifthebreechisnotfullyclosed,orthegunisnotentirelybackinbatteryposition.

Thereisalsothepushbuttonswitchfortheloadertopresswhenheisreadyfortheguntobefired,whichcompletes

thefiringcircuitandlightsupasignallightinfrontofthegunner.Thetestsdisclosedthefollowingpertinentdataastothe88-mmgun:

•Lengthfrommuzzletotrunnioncenters-13ft61/4in

•Lengthfromtrunnioncenterstorearofbreech-4ft

•Elevation-15°

•Depression-8°

•LengthofHEround-3ft1/2in

•Diameterofcartridgerim-47/16in

•Thegunhassemi-automaticgearandrecoilguardwithdeflectorbag

Theco-axialgunisfiredmechanicallybymeansofapedalnearthegunner’srightfoot.Thetwomachinegunsareofthenormaltype,thehullgunbeingball-mountedintheusualfashion.Therearethreesmokedischargersoneachsideoftheturret.Theyarefiredelectricallybythreepushbuttonsoneachsideofthecommander’sseat.

The smoke generator is letteredNo.K.39. It is 3.8 inches in diameter. It is propelled by a charge of powder in a

transparentplasticcapsulewhichhasasmalldiameter, threadedextensionforscrewingintothebaseofthegenerator.Thechargeisfiredbyabrasselectricprimer,whichisscrewedintothebaseofthedischargerfromtheback.

Upthecenterofthegenerator,andheldinplacebythepropellantcapsule,isatubecontainingsomekindofigniter.

Theloadingofthesedevicescannoteasilybedoneintheheatofbattle.

d.LayingandSighting

The turret is provided with a hydraulic traverse, power driven through a vertical shaft in the center of the basejunction.Thegunnercontrolsthiswitharockingfootplatewhichgivesvariablespeedineitherdirection.Maximumrateof traverseappears toberatherslow.Thegunner isprovidedwithahand traversewhichcanbeassistedbyasecondhandwheeloperatedbythecommander.

Thedegreeoftraverseoftheturretisrecordedonadialinfrontofthegunner,andthereisalsotheusualtraversering

inthecommander’scupola.Bothdevicesaredrivenofftheturret-ringrackthroughjointedshafts.

Elevationisbyhandwheelgearedwithconsiderablereductionintoatoothedsector.Themuzzle-heavinessofthegun

withitsexternalmantletisconsiderable,andacompensatingspring,similartothatofPzKw4Specialisprovided.

Maximumelevationif15°anddepression-8°.Thegunappearsstifftoelevatebutdepressesquiteeasily.Anelevation

lockisprovidedfortravelling,bywhichthebreechcanbeclampedtotheturretroof.

Binocularsightingisprovided.Thisconsistsoftwoofthenormaljointedtelescopesmountedsidebysideinaframe.

The eye pieces are offset from the telescope center lines by the insertion of episcopic prism assemblies, (reflectinglenses)andinter-oculardistancecanbeadjustedbyrotatingtheminoppositedirections.Theyaregearedtogether,soastoensurethatthemotionissharedequally.

e.LookoutsandHatches

Thecommanderhasaraisedcupolaofthenormaltypewithfiveslitsbackedbytheusualsizetriplexblocks.Thefieldofviewisgood.Thefrontblockhassightbarsonitforlininguptheturret.

Therearetwolookoutsofthesametypeintheforwardpartsoftheturret,at10and2o’clock.Therearealsomachine-

gunportsat4and8o’clock,coveredbyaninternalrotaryshield.

The driver has the usual long triplex visor-block protected by an adjustable slit. He also has the regulation type

episcopicbinocular.Forvisiontohisown,theleftside,hehasaprismepiscopicsettolookabout30°forwardtothe

side.

Thehullgunnerhastheusualepiscopicsightingtelescopefittedtotheballmountingofhismachinegun.Healsohas

aprismepiscope,similartothatofthedriver,forlookingouttotheright.Boththeseepiscopesarefittedinthehatchdoors.

Thehatchinthecupolaandthoseabovethedriverandforwardgunnerarecircular,about18inchesindiameterand

springsupported;theycanbecloseddownagainstarubberringsoastobecompletelywatertight.

There is a rectangular hatch above the loaderwhich is also providedwith, a rubber sealing ring. The size of this

openingisabout20x14inches.Inonetanktherewasalargediameterescapehatchat4o’clockintheturretwall,inplaceofoneofthepistolports.

f.AmphibiousCharacteristics

The tankhasbeen initiallydesigned for total immersion inwater.All the crew’shatches areprovidedwith rubberseals andmultiple bolts. The engine compartment can also be sealed off; its cover is normally screwed down on tosealing strips and it can be isolated from the radiator and fan compartments on either side of it, drawing air from aspecial intakepipeover theenginehatch, the topofwhich is33/4 inches internaldiameterand151/2feet fromtheground,(seesketch).

Noattemptismadetoplugthecoolingairinletsandoutlets,sothattheradiatorsruntotallysubmerged,thefansbeing

disconnectedbyspecialclutches.Theonlyotheraperturerequiredisfortheexhaustandthisisdealtwithbyasimpleflap-valveontopofthesilencer,whichisnormallyheldopen.

Afreetranslationofaninstructionplateinsideoneoftheturretsisasfollows:

(1)Lockturretandgun.

(2)Freemantletsealingframe,pushforwardandsecurebymeansoflockingnuts.

(3)RemoveMGandfitinsealingrod.

(4)Drawbacktelescopes,turnsealingstopperupwardsandclampslidewithlockingnut.

(5)Plugguncradlebyturninghandwheelabovethegun.

(6)Pumpthesealinghoseintheturretraceupto2.5atmospheres.

(7)Openwater-draintube.

(8)Tightenthenutsonthevisionslitframes.

(9)Openthemachine-gunportsandfitsealingstoppers.

(10)Fitwater-tightmuzzlecap.

(11)Fitsealingcapontheventilatingfanexitintheturretroof.

(12)Closehatches.

(13)Tightenleversincommander’scupola.

(14)Intheeventofthesealinghosenotbeingtightandlettingwaterthroughthedraintube,closedraintubeandtighteninnersealingringintheturret.

(15)Tolayandfireafteremerging,sealings1to6and14,atleast,mustbeopenedup.

The resultof this is tomake it possible to immerse the tankcompletely,drawingair through the long intakepipe.

Allowingforacertainamountoffree-boardandthepossibilityofhavingtoclimbasteeplyslopingbeach,operationin14feetofwatershouldbepracticable.

Theintakepipeisinthreesections,whichnormallyrestinsideoneanotherinthehull,butcanbefittedtogetherand

erectedveryquickly.Thereseemsnoreasonwhyanextralengthshouldnotbeaddedifadditionaldepthisrequired.

Airentersanddischargesverticallythroughahorizontalgratingoneachsideoftheradiatorblockwhichisisolated

fromtheenginecompartment.InflammableliquidssuchasfromSIP(self-ignitingphosphorus)grenades,drawnswiftlythroughtheradiatorblock,arenotlikelytodoitmuchinjury.

g.Ventilation

The engine breathes from its own compartment and therefore keeps the air circulating through it. There are, inaddition,twopassagespassingthroughthesidewalloneachsideintothespacebetweenthefansandtheradiatorblock.Whenengagedinamphibiousoperations,thesepassagesareclosedbybutterflyvalvesactuatedbythesameleverthatdisconnectsthefanclutches.

Itisthought,thatwhenthetankiscloseddownforamphibiousoperations,airisdrawndownthelongtubeintothe

engine roomand part of it is diverted through the engine roombulkhead ventilator by the suction of the fan and soventilates the crew’s accommodation before passing to the engine. The only air exit found seems to be through theengineexhaust,andiftheenginestops,allventilationmustcease.

Fornormalevacuationofgunfumesetc.,twoelectricfansareprovided,oneintheturretroofbehindtheloader,and

one on the center line of the hull roof between the driver and forward gunner. These have ordinarymushroom typeoutlets,towhichwaterproofcoverscanbesecuredwhennecessary.

h.Engine

TheengineisaV-12,60°,Maybachgasolineenginedeveloping650bhp(brakehorsepower).Therearefourdown-draughtnon-spillablecarburetors,eachwithtwinthrottletubesandquadruplefloats.IgnitionisbytwoBoschmagnetosoftherotatingmagnettype,drivenofftheliveendfrompositionsabovetherockergear.

i.SteeringandFinalDrive

Theprincipalmethodofsteeringisbyhandwheel,andthisoperatesafullyregenerativesystemgivinggearedturnsofvarying radiuswith the same sortof “neutral swing”as theMerrittBrown transmission [Oneof two typesofBritishtransmission.]Inadditiontothistherearetwoskidbrakelevers.

j.SuspensionandTracks

Theinterleavedbogiesandindependenttorsion-barsuspensionsaresubstantiallyaspreviouslyreported.

Hydraulicpiston-typeshockabsorbersareprovidedforthefrontandrearsuspensiononly.Theyaremountedinside

thehull, thefrontonesbeingintheforwardcompartment.Thesetanksseemtohaveacertainamountoftroublewiththeir tracks; theringssecuring the trackpinsseemtobe tooweakfor their job.Thereareeight torsionbarsperside,threebogiewheelsaremountedoneachbar.Thisarrangementisforthe281/2-inchtrack.Theeightoutsidewheelsareremovedwhenthenarrow21-inchtrackisused.

k.Performance

Itisdifficulttoassesstheperformanceofthistank.Theweightappearstoliebetween50and60tons.Themaximumspeedisestimatedat15to18mph.Thecross-countryabilityisalsoamatterforconjecture.

l.Conclusions

ThereisnodoubtthattheGermanshaveproducedaveryformidabletank,andthatitmusthavebeenconceivedwiththeideaofmakingbeachlandingsontheshoresofBritain.Thewaterproofingfacilitiesarecertainlysuperiorindesignandexecutiontoanythingthatwehavehithertoimagined.

41.GERMANCOMMENTONENEMYTANKS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.35,October7th1943

AcriticalstudyofFrench,British,RussianandAmericantankswaspublishedon27June1943intheGermanweekly

newspaperDasReich.ItisinterestingtonotethattheauthordoesnotattempttominimizethemeritsofAmericantanks,particularly theGeneralSherman,and thatheconcedes thatGermansoldiers“knowthedangers representedby thesetankswhentheyappearinlargenumbers.”AtranslationoftheDasReicharticlefollows:

TheGermanHighCommandmaintainsamuseumofcapturedtanks—oronemightsayakindoftechnicalschool

wheresomeofourmosthighlyskilledengineersandanumberofofficersspeciallychosenforthepurposearetestingthosemonstersoftheenemy’sbattlecavalry,testingtheiradaptabilitytotheterrain,theirpowerofresistancetoattack,andtheirspecialqualitiessuitingthemforemploymentinattack.ThesetestsarecarriedoutinaforestregionofcentralGermanywheretheterrainup-hillanddown-hillisintersectedbyravinesandallmannerofdepressionsoftheground.Theresultsareembodiedinlongtabulationsnotunlikethosepreparedbyscientificlaboratories,andinrecommendationtothedesignersofGermancounter-weapons,whopassthemontothetankfactoriesandarmamentshops.Thetypeofcombat actually carried on at the front is reenacted here inmake-believe encountersworked out to the last point ofrefinement.

Theofficerinchargeoftheseexperimentshasdevelopedathesiswhichisextremelyinteresting,eventhoughhigher

headquarters are not, without exception, in agreement with him.He contends that the various types of tanks reflectpsychologicaltraitsofthenationsthatproducedthem.

TheFrenchhaveproducedanumberofunmaneuverablebutthicklyarmored“chars”embodyingtheFrenchdoctrine

ofdefense.Theyareconceivedassolidblocksofirontoassistthetroopsinrenderingthesolidifieddefensivefrontevenmore rigid. The Renault and Hotchkiss types of tanks have indirectly contributed toward stagnation of the militarysituation.ItwasoutofthequestionfortheseFrenchtankstoswarmforthinconquestintotheplainsofenemyterritory,dashingmadlyaheadfordistancesofhundredsofkilometers.Theircrewsnormallyconsistedofonlytwomeneach.Itwas impossible for these tanks to cooperate asmembers of a complex formation. Communication from one tank toanotherwaslimitedtotheprimitivemethodoflookingthroughpeepholesinthesecellsofsteel.

TheFrenchstillhave,fromtheperiodshortlyafterthefirstWorldWar,a72-tondreadnaught,theweightofwhichis

distributedoverthelengthofthreetofourrailroadundertrucks;itcarriesacrewofthirteen;butitsarmorisofatypethatsimplyfallsapart likesomuchtinunderfirefromamoderncannon.Aslateas1940therewerethoseinFrancewhodemandedincreasingnumbersoftheserollingdry-landshipsandwantedthemtobeofstrongerconstructionthaneverbefore. But German troops encountered these 72-ton tanks only in the form of immobile freight shipments not yetunloadedinthecombatzones.

Intheopinionofexperts,Englishtanksofthecruiserclasscomemuchnearertosatisfyingrequirementsofaproper

tank forpracticaluse in thepresentwar.Thename in itself indicates that thebasic ideawascarriedover fromnavalconstruction.Thesetanksareequippedwithagoodmotorandarecapableofnavigatingthroughlargeareas.Theamountofarmorwasreducedforthesakeofhigherspeedandgreatercruisingradius.Tacticallythesetanksaremoreorlessacounterpartof torpedodestroyer formations,outon theendlessspacesofocean.Theyarebestadapted—and this isquiteasignificantfactor—tothehotandsparselysettledareasoftheEnglishcolonialempire.TheEnglishtankisanAfricatank.Ithasanarrowtreadchain.ItdidnotcomemuchintotheforegroundontheEuropeancontinent.AtankforuseinEurope,apparently,issomethingforwhichtheEnglishdon’tshowsomuchtalent.

OnSovietterritorytheEnglishtankwasafailure;anditsharesthisfatewiththeNorthAmericantanks,whichwere

notappreciatedverymuchbytheSovietally.TheseNorthAmericantanksinclude,forinstance,the“GeneralStuart,”areconnaissance and rear-guard tank, bristling with machine-guns, as well as the “General Lee.” Although the latter

possessescommendablemotorqualities,itscontoursarenotwellbalanced,anditssilhouetteisbizarreandtootall.

Thiscriticismdoesnotapply,however,tothemostrecentNorthAmericandevelopment,the“GeneralSherman.”The

latter representsoneof thespecialaccomplishmentsof theNorthAmerican laboratories.With its turtle-shapedcrownrisinginonepieceabovethe“tub”andturretitmustberegardedasquiteapraiseworthyproductoftheNorthAmericansteel industry. The first things to attract attention are serial construction and fulfillment of the almost arrogantrequirementsoftheNorthAmericanautomobileindustryasregardsspeed,smoothriding,andstreamlinedcontouroftheensemble. It isequippedwithsoft rubberboots, that iswithrubberpaddingon the individual treadsof thecaterpillarmechanism.Itseemslargelyintendedforacivilizedlandscapeor,toputthematterintermsofstrategy,forthoroughlycultivated areas in Tunisian Africa and for the invasion of Europe. It represents the climax of the enemy’saccomplishmentsinthislineofproduction.ButwecannotgainquitetheproperperspectiveuntilweexaminealsothetankproductionoftheSoviets.

TheT-34usedbytheRussiansattheopeningofhostilitiesin1941wasatthattimethebesttankproducedanywhere

—withits76-mmlong-barrelledgunitstightfittingtortoise-shapedcap,theslantingsidesofits“tub,”thebroadcat’s-pawtreadofitsforgedcaterpillarchainscapableofcarryingthis26-tontankacrossswampsandmorassesnolessthanthroughthegrindingsandsofthesteppes.InthismattertheSovietUniondoesnotappearintheroleoftheexploitedproletarian, but rather as an exploiter of all the varied branches of capitalistic industry and invention. Some of theapparatuswassocloselycopiedafterGerman inventions that theGermanBoschCompanywasable tobuild itsownsparepartsunmodifiedintotheSoviet-constructedapparatus.

The Soviet Union was the only nation in the world to possess, even prior to the approach of the present war,

completely perfected and tried-out series of tanks. The Soviets had such tanks, for instance, in the autumn of 1932.Basingtheirprocedureonexperiencegainedinmaneuvers,theRussiansthendevelopedindependentlyadditionalnewseries,buildingtosomeextentonadvancesabroad,likethoseembodiedinthefastChristietank(speed90to110km.)oftheNorthAmericans.

LikeGermany and England, the Soviet Union thereupon hit upon a tank constructed for employment in separate

operationalunits.Groupsofthesetanksoperateinisolationinadvancedzonesofcombat,atincreasingdistancesfromtheinfantry.Onlyaminortankforceisthrownintoactionfortacticalcooperationwithinfantryforces.Such,atleast,wastheidea.Andinfact,theT-34wasfoundsuitedforthistypeofaction—thoughinmanyinstancesonlybywayofcoveringaretreat.Butevenforthistypeoftank,positionalwarfarehasinmanyinstanceshadtheresultofnarrowingthedesigner’sandthestrategist’soperationalconceptiontothenarrowerrangeoftacticalemployment.

TheSovietUnionalsohasconstructedanimitation—infacttwoimitations—ofanamphibiantankbuiltbyVickers-

Armstrong.AnothervariantofSovietthoughtonthesubjectcametotheforewhentheRussiansconstructeda52-tonland battleshipwith 3 turrets, a vehicle of quite impressive appearance but providedwith walls that were not stoutenough toserve thepurpose.Thefirstof thesemonstersbrokedownin themudashortdistancebehindLemberg, in1941.Afterthattheywerefoundmoreandmorerarely;andatlasttheydroppedoutaltogether.

Inorderproperlytoevaluatethemostrecenttankcreations,suchastheNorthAmerican“GeneralSherman”orthe

German“Tiger”,onemustlearntoviewatankasembodyingacombinationoffiringpower,speed,andresistanceor,toexpressthesameideamoreconcretely,asacombinationofcannon,motor,andarmor.Inthistypeofconstruction,theparadoxesinvolvedintheordinaryproblemsofautomobilebodybuildingareraisedtotheirhighestpotential.Amereadditiontooneoftheabove-indicateddimensions,letussaythemotorbyitselforthearmorbyitself,isnotapttobeofvalue.

Afast-movingtankmustnotweighmuch,andheavyarmordoesnotridewell.Thecaliberofthecannonaffectsthe

sizeandweightofitsammunition;andadifferenceinthelatterisusuallymultipliedaboutahundredfold,sincetanksusually carry about 100 rounds as reserve ammunition. Taking all these things into consideration,we look upon the“GeneralSherman”asembodyingatypeofstrategythatisconceivedintermsofmovement:itisa“running”tank,allthemoresincetheAmericansmost likelyexpectedtouse itonreadilypassable terrain, that isonEuropeansoil.Thecaliberofitsprincipalweaponisslightlyinexcessofthemaximumsofarattainedbytheforeigncountries.Itisspaciousinside. Its aeroplanemotor is of light weight. It is a series product, the same as its cast-steel coat, the latter being

modeled into an almost artistic-looking contour, in suchmanner as to offer invariably a curved, that is a deflectingsurfacetoanapproachingbullet.

InTunis,Germansoldiershavedemonstratedtheirabilitytodealwiththistank;buttheyknowthedangerrepresented

bythese tankswhentheyappear in largeherds.Animposinginnovationis thestabilizationequipmentof thecannon.Thisequipmentisconnectedwithasystemofgyrosandpermitsevenandsmoothlayingofthegun.Thissystemwastakenoverfromnavalartilleryandappliedtotheshocksincidenttoswayingoveruneventerrain,wherestabilization,ofcourse,representsafarmoredifficultproblem.Thisisthefirstattemptofitskindevertobemadeanywhere.

42.THEPZ-KW5(PANTHER)TANK

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.37,November4th1943

TheGerman tankseries1 to6hasnowbeen filled inwith the long-missingPzKw5(Panther)a fast,heavy,well-

armoredvehiclemountingalong75-mmgun.Itappearstobeanintermediatetypebetweenthe22-tonPzKw4andthePzKw6(Tiger)tank.ThePantherhasaspeedofaboutthirty-onemilesperhour.Itapproximates(correspondsroughlyto)ourGeneralSherman,atankwhichevokedcomplimentarycommentintheNazipress.

Thefollowingisadescriptionofthetank:(Itshouldbenotedthatpracticallyalldatacontainedinthisreportcome

fromRussiansources).

The75-mmgun isprobably thenewPak.41ATgunwithamuzzlevelocityof4,000 foot-seconds.Theestimated

armorpenetrationat547yardsis4.72inches,andthelifeofthebarrelfrom500to600rounds.Thegunhasdirectsightsto1,500metersor1,640yards.The75-mmhasanoveralllengthof18feet2inches.

ThePanthercanalsobeeasilyconverted for fordingdeepstreamsbyattachinga flexible tubewith float to theair

intake.Thereisaspecialfittinginthetoprearofthetankforattachingthistube.

Althoughprovidedwithsmallerarmorandarmamentthanthe6,thePantherhasthesamemotor,thusgivingithigher

speedandmaneuverability.Thistankisalsoprovidedwithlightarmorplate(notshowninthesketch)4to6millimetersthickalongthesidejustabovethesuspensionwheelsandtheinclinedsidearmorplate.

Panther tanksareorganized intoseparate tankbattalionssimilar to theTiger tanks.Manyof these tankshavebeen

usedbytheGermansduringtheJulyandAugustbattles.TheRussiansstatethatthistank,althoughmoremaneuverable,ismucheasiertoknockoutthanthePzKw6.Firefromalltypesofriflesandmachinegunsdirectedagainstthepeepholes, periscopes and the base of the turret and gun shield will blind or jam the parts. High-explosives and armor-piercing shells of 54-mm (2.12 in) caliber or higher, at 800meters (875yds) or less, are effective against the turret.Largecaliberartilleryandself-propelledcannoncanputthePantheroutofactionatordinarydistancesforeffectivefire.Theinclinedandverticalplatescanbepiercedbyarmor-piercingshellsof45mm(1.78in)caliberorhigher.Incendiaryarmor-piercingshellsareespeciallyeffectiveagainstthegasolinetanksandtheammunitionlocatedjustintherearofthedriver.

The additional 4 to 6 mm (.157 to .236 in) armor plate above the suspension wheels is provided to reduce the

penetrationofhollow-chargeshellsbuttheRussiansstatethatitisnoteffective.Antitankgrenades,antitankminesand“Molotovcocktails”areeffectiveagainsttheweakbottomandtopplatesandthecoolingandventilatingopeningsonthetopofthetankjustabovethemotor.

Thistankisstandardbutthequantityandrateofproductionisnotknown.

43.GERMAN128-MMSPGUN

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.39,December2nd1943

Abriefandnottoosatisfactoryaccountofabrand-new,rathermobile,German128-mmSPgunhasbeensuppliedby

analliedsource.Thegun-caliberisanewcomerinthelistofGermanartillery,andappearstobeoneoftheultra-modernlongweaponswhichhavebeen recently turnedoutby theRheinmetallCompany.No specifications areyet availableconcerningit.

Presentdataindicatethegun-and-mountassemblyisanimprovementontherathercumbersome,70-ton“Ferdinand”,

whichmountsonlyan88-mm(3.46in)weaponratherthanthenew128-mm(5.03in)piece,andcarriesmassivehullarmorrunningfrom4.33to7.87inches(seeTacticalandTechnicalTrendsNo.35,p.16)—aplatingheavierthanthatcarriedatseabymostheavynavalcruisers.Thehullarmoronthe128-mmgunvariesfrom30to45millimeters(1.18to1.38 in)over the fightingcompartmentand15 to30millimeters (.59 to1.18 in)on the lengthenedPzKw3hull andchassis. Theweight is thereby cut to about 35 tons and the speed has been stepped up from the 6 to 9mph of the“Ferdinand”toabout15.5.Whethertheaddedmobilityisjustifiedatthecostofstrippingdownthearmortoathicknessthatmaybepiercedbymanysmall-caliberantitankgunsisanopenquestion,andiscertainlyareversaloftrend.Perhaps“Ferdinand”wastoomassivetobethoroughlypracticalinmobilewarfare.Itisbelievedthatthe“128”maybeusedforthemostpartagainstfixedfortifications,inwhichcaseprotectionwouldbesuppliedbyothermeans,whichisfurtherindicated by the fact that nomachine gun is reported as part of the equipment.Only 18 rounds of separate-loadingammunition are carried.While the type of shell is not yet reported, mixed AP and anticoncrete projectiles may beexpected.Thecrewisfive.

44.POWEREDARTILLERY

RecognitionJournal,September1944

ManyGermanself-propelledgunsaremodifiedcapturedmaterial

Germanself-propelledgunshaveincreasedinimportancewiththeWehrmacht’swithdrawalonallfronts.RetreatingGermanarmoreddivisionshaveleftbehindhundredsofthesemobileassaultandantitankguns.

Germanmediumassaultgunisathick-barreled105-mm.gunmountonthechassisofthePzKwIIItank.Thisweaponlooksalmostexactlylikethe75-mm.Sturmgeschütz

LastDecember the Journalpublishedpicturesof theprincipalGermanself-propelledguns.Theseandmanyothers

havesinceconfrontedtheAlliesintheU.S.S.R.,ItalyandFrance.SomeofthegunsthatwecapturedinTunisiahavecontinuedtoappearinlargenumbersinEurope.Theyincludethe75-mm.and105-mm.assaultgunsonthePzKwIIIchassis,the75-mm.ontheCzechPzKw38chassisandontheFrenchLorrainechassis.

ThiscapturedCzechPzKw38chassisthatmountsa75-mm.isafavoriteGermanself-propelledweapon.Thegunishousedinatall,open-topped,slant-sidedshieldwelltotherear.

MorefamiliarversionofGerman75-mm.gunontheCzechchassishascone-shapedgunhousingsetwellforward.Czechsuspensionhasshortwheelbaseoffourlargebogies.

Soviettroopsfirstencounteredtheself-propelled88-mm.gun,Ferdinand,in1943;U.S.andBritishtroopsmetitin

Italy.Howtheydealtwiththe72-tonmonsterisshownonpage14.FerdinandremainstheonlyGermanself-propelledgunthatwasmadetoorderfromstarttofinish—anoriginaldesign.Theothershaveallbeenadaptations.

ThenewestGermanSPgunscontinuetobeadaptationsofpresentequipment.Theyillustrateatrendtowardgreater

firepoweronPzKwIVandVIchassis.

To pierce the Gustav Line, the Allied troops had to beat their way past many 75-mm. self-propelled assault guns on PzKw III chassis. These last-ditch defenders made the going tough for the Allies. A squat forwardsuperstructurehasreplacedthePzKwIIIturret.Itisclosedinontopandweldedtothechassis.HereontherightandtotheleftrearareviewsoftheSturmgeschütz.

Ferdinand,German72-tonheavyweight,has88-mm.gunand8-in.armoronitsbow.Pictureshowsoneofthecaptured121/2-m.p.h.vehicles.

LorrainetankchassismountsaGerman75-mm.gun.Ithassixbogiewheelsinpairswithfourreturnrollersandfrontsprocket.

Hotchkiss39tankwithacaptured47-mm.gunisanotherinstanceofGerman-usedFrenchequipment.Germaningenuitysalvagedtheweapon’susefulness.Hotchkiss39suspensionconsistsoftwoandahalfpairsofbogiewheelswith“wheelpants”andtworeturnrollers.

45.USEOFTANKSWITHINFANTRY


1.INTRODUCTION

Thecorrectandincorrectwaysofusinginfantrywithtanks,accordingtotheGermanArmyview,aresummarizedinanenemydocumentrecentlyacquired.InthisdocumenttheGermanslistthecorrectandincorrectmethodssidebyside.Thedocumentisofspecialvalueandinterest,notonlybecausethetextheaded“Right”indicatesproceduresapprovedbytheenemy,butbecausethereareimplications,inthetextheaded“Wrong,”ofcertainerrorsthatGermanunitsmayhavemadefromtimetotime.Extractsfromthedocumentfollow.

2.THEDOCUMENT

a.Attack(1)WrongAttacknotthoroughlydiscussedinadvance.

RightThoroughdiscussionsofreconnaissanceandterrainwilltakeplace.Riflemenandtankswillmaneuverjointly

asmuchaspossible,inadvance.

(2)WrongInadequatecoordinationbetweenarmoredandartilleryunits.

Right Themission of protecting armored elements not yet discovered by hostile forceswill be distributed among

artillery.(Flankswillbescreenedbysmoke.)

(3)WrongFailureofarmoredcarsandtankstomaneuverjointlyinadvance.

RightArmoredcarsusedforobservationwillmaneuverwithtanksbeforeanintendedattack.

(4)WrongDistributionoftoomanytanksinproportiontoinfantryusedintheattack.

RightTanksnotintendedforuseinanattackwillbekeptoutsidetherangeofhostilefire.

(5)WrongTanksdeployedanddistributedamongsmallunits.

RightForeffectiveresults,availabletanks—atleastanentirecompany—willbecombinedfortheassault.

(6)WrongTheuseoftanksinunreconnoiteredterrainwhenspeedisessential.

RightTerrainmustbe reconnoitered, especiallywhenan attack at great speed is contemplated.Facilities formine

clearancemustbeathand.Ifatankdetonatesamine,theremainingtanksmusthaltwhiletheminefieldisreconnoitered.Afterthis,theminefieldmusteitherbeclearedorbypassed.

(7)WrongAlltankcommandersabsentonreconnaissance.

RightAnumberoftankcommandersmustalwayswiththecompany.

(8)WrongTankslaunchedwithoutaclearstatementoftheirmission.

RightThemissionoftankswillbewidelyunderstood.

(9)WrongWhenasectorfulloftankobstacleshasbeentaken,tanksareorderedtocrossthissectorinfrontofthe

riflemen.

RightRiflemen cross the sector first and create passages,while the tanks provide covering fire frompositions on

slopes.

(10)WrongTanksadvancesorapidlythatriflemenareunabletofollow.

RightTanksadvanceonlyashortdistanceatatime.Riflemenadvancewiththetanks.

(11)WrongWhentwosuccessiveobjectiveshavebeentaken,tanksignorethepossiblepresenceofhostileforcesin

areasbetweentheseobjectives,eventhoughanattackonstillanotherobjectiveisnotcontemplatedatthemoment.

RightWhentwosuccessiveobjectiveshavebeentaken,theentireareabetweenthemmustbemadesecurebymeans

oftanks,artillery,assaultgunsorantitankguns,andheavyweapons.

(12)WrongTankswithinsightofpositionedhostiletanksadvancewithoutbenefitofcoveringfire.

RightResponsibilityforcoveringfireisdividedamongartilleryorheavyantitankguns.Ifthesearenotavailable,Pz.

Kw.3’sandPz.Kw.4’sprovideprotection.

(13)WrongTanksareorderedtoholdacapturedposition,eventhoughheavyweaponsareavailableforthispurpose.

RightAssoonasanobjectivehasbeentaken,tanksarewithdrawnandarekeptinreadinessforuseasanattacking

reserveorinthepreparationofanewattack.

(14)WrongRiflemenandlightmachinegunsremainundercoverduringownattack.

Right Riflemen andmachine guns cover the antitank riflemen, who have themission of destroying hostile tanks

whichmayattempttobypass.

(15)WrongTankstakeuppositionssoclosetohostileforcesthatearlydiscoveryisinevitable.

RightIfpossible,tankstakeuppositionsoutsidetherangeofhostileartilleryfire.Tankswhicharecompelledtotake

uppositionsinthevicinityofhostileforcesdosoaslateaspossible,sothatthehostileforceswillnothavetimetoadopteffectivecountermeasures.

(16)WrongTanksremaininactivewhenamissionhasbeencompleted.

RightWhenamissionhasbeencompleted,tankspromptlyreceiveordersastowhattheyaretodonext.

b.Defense

(1)WrongDistributionoftanksalongtheentirefront.

RightAll available tanks are kept together so that during an enemy attack prompt action can be taken against an

advantageouspoint.Tanks,assaultguns,andheavyantitankgunsmustbekeptatadistancewhilefiringpositionsarebeingprepared.

(2)WrongSubordinationoftankstosmallinfantryunitsforthepurposeofstaticdefense.

RightWhen tankshave fulfilled their task they arewithdrawnbehind themain line of resistance, and are kept in

readinessforfurtheraction.

(3)WrongAfterrepulsinganattack,tanksremaininthepositionsfromwhichtheylastfired.

RightAfterrepulsinganattack,tanksmovetoalternatepositionsassoonasheavyarmsorriflemenhavetakenover

theresponsibilityofdeliveringcoveringfire.

(4)Wrong Ashostile tanks approach, own tanks advance, having failed to take up advantageous firing positions

beforehand.

RightAfiringfrontiscreatedatatacticallyadvantageouspointintheareaagainstwhichtheattackisdirected.Tanks

deliversurprisefire—frompositionsonreverseslopes,ifpossible.

(5)WrongTankswhichhavenoarmor-piercingweaponsaresentintobattleagainsthostiletanks.

Right Tankswithout armor-piercingweapons are kept back, and are used for antiaircraft protection, aswell as in

establishingcommunicationsandinsupplyingammunition.

(6)WrongWhenhostiletanksapproach,Germanriflemenandtheirheavyarmsremainundercover,andleavethe

fightingagainsttankswithinfantrytoowntanks,assaultguns,andantitankgunsexclusively.

RightAllarmstakepartindefenseagainsthostiletanks.Infantryaccompanyingthetanksarekeptsomewhatapart,

however,sothattanks,assaultguns,andantitankgunsarefreetoengagethehostiletanks.

(7)WrongAllavailabletankreservesarecompelledtoremainoutofactionbecauseofminordefects.

RightRepairswillbearrangedinsuchamannerthatanumberoftanksarealwaysreadyforaction.

(8)Wrong Tankswhichmust remain in forwardpositionsdonotdig in, and therebyconstitute targets forhostile

artillery.

RightTankswhicharewithinrangeofhostileobservationmustbeduginasfastaspossible.Inwinter,theymustbe

hiddenbehindsnowwalls.

c.NotesonUseofAmmunition

(1)WrongWhenonlyafewhostiletanksattack,fireisopenedearly.

RightWhen only a few enemy tanks attack, it is best towait until they arewithin a favorable distance and then

destroythemwithasfewroundsaspossible.

(2)WrongAgainstasuperiornumberoftanks,fireisopenedatcloserange.

RightFireisopenedearlyonasuperiornumberoftanks,toforcethemtochangedirection.High-explosiveshellsare

usedatfirst.Sincetheearlyopeningoffiregiveawayownpositions,newpositionsmustbetakenup.

(3)WrongPz.Kw.4’swillfirehollow-chargeammunitionatrangesofmorethan750yards.

Right Tankswhich are short of 75-mmarmor-piercing shellsmust allow a hostile force to approach to a position

withinarangeof750yards.

d.PeculiaritiesofWinterFighting

(1)WrongTanksareplacedoutside“tankshelters”whenthesesheltersarebeingusedforotherpurposes.

Right“Tankshelters”aretobekeptfortheexclusiveuseoftanks,assaultguns,andmountedantitankguns.

(2)WrongIndeepsnow,tanksdonotadvanceonroads.

RightIndeepsnow,tankskeeptoroads.Anadequatenumberofmenaredetailedtoassistiffreshsnowfalls.

(3)WrongWinterquartersarelocatedsofarfromthesceneofactionthatthetanks,ifrequired,mayarrivetoolate.

RightWhenactioninappreciablydistantplacesisunderconsideration,arrangementsmustbemadeforthesmaller

units—ifpossible,neverlessthanaplatoon—toreachthesceneofactionatthepropertime.

(4)WrongWhen“tankshelters”aresnowedunder,departureispossibleonlyafterhoursofextralabor.

RightPaths leadingfrom“tankshelters” to thenearest roadsarekeptcleared.Snowfencesareprovided forexits.

Readinessoftanksisalwaysassured.

(5)WrongInwinter,tankstravelfreelyoverroadswhichhavenotbeenusedforaconsiderabletime.

RightBecauseofdangerfromlandmines,mine-clearancedetachmentsalwaysprecedetanks,especiallyifaroadis

seldomused.

(6)WrongInwinter,tanksareorderedtoattackdistantobjectives.

RightAllattacksconsistofanumberofconsecutiveattackswith“limitedobjectives.”Whentheseobjectiveshave

beenreached,theareaisclearedandreorganizationiscompletedbeforeanewattackislaunched.

46.NEWHEAVYTANK:THEPz.Kw.5(PANTHER)

IntelligenceBulletin,January1944

WhenthePz.Kw.6(Tiger)becamestandard,thePz.Kw.5(Panther)wasstillinanexperimentalstage.Nowthatthe

PantherhasjoinedtheGermantankseriesasastandardmodel,ageneraldescriptionofthisnewest“landbattleship”canbemadeavailabletoU.S.militarypersonnel.MuchofthedatapresentedherecomesfromRussiansources,inasmuchasthePz.Kw.5hasthusfarbeenusedonlyontheEasternFront.

ThePanther(seefig.1)isafast,heavy,well-armoredvehicle.Itmountsalong75-mmgun.Weighing45tons, the

newtankappears tobeofa type intermediatebetween the22-tonPz.Kw.4and the56-tonPz.Kw.6.[Withcertainalterations the Pz. Kw. 6 may weigh as much as 62 tons.] The Panther has a speed of about 31miles per hour. ItcorrespondsroughlytoourGeneralSherman,whichtheGermanshavealwaysgreatlyadmired.

ThefollowinginformationregardingthePz.Kw.5willbeofinterest:

•Weight-45tons.

•Width-11ft8in(sameasthePz.Kw.6).

•Length-22ft8in(1/2ftlongerthanthePz.Kw.6).

•Clearance-1ft8in(3.9inmorethanthePz.Kw.6).

•Motor-gasoline,640hp,inrearoftank(thegastanksareoneachsideofthemotor).

•Coolingsystem-water.

•Ignition-magneto.

•Caterpillar section -drive sprockets at front, rear idlers;8double rubber-tiredbogiewheels,33.5 in indiameter, oneitherside;torsionsuspensionsystem;hydraulicshockabsorbersinsidetank;metalcaterpillartread25.6inwide.

•Armor-frontofturretandcannonshield,3.94in;upperfrontplate,3.45in,57angleofslope;lowerfrontplate,2.95in,53angleofslope.

•Armament-75-mmgun,longbarrel;one7.92-mmmachinegun(MG42).

•Ammunition-75rounds(APandHE).

•Maximumspeed-approx31mph.

•Range-approx105mi.Crew-5.

It is believed that the75-mmgun is theKw.K. [Kampfwagenkanone—tankgun.] This tank gun is a straight-boreweaponwithamuzzlebrake,andhasanover-alllengthof18feet2inches.

Figure1.—NewGermanHeavyTank:thePz.Kw.5PantherTank

AlthoughequippedwiththesamemotorastheTiger,thePantherhaslighterarmorandarmament.Forthisreasonitis

capableofhigherspeedandgreatermaneuverability.ThePantherisalsoprovidedwithadditionalarmorplate,4-to6-mmthick,(notshowninfig.1)alongtheside,justabovethesuspensionwheelsandtheslopingsidearmorplate.

When a flexible tubewith a float is attached to the air intake, thePanther has no difficulty in fording fairly deep

streams.Thereisaspecialfittinginthetopofthetankforattachingthistube.

Like thePz.Kw.6’s, thePz.Kw.5’s areorganized into separate tankbattalions.During the summerof1943, the

GermansusedmanyofthesenewtanksontheRussianfront.

AlthoughtheRussianshavefoundthePz.Kw.5moremaneuverablethanthePz.Kw.6,theyareconvincedthatthe

new tank ismoreeasilyknockedout.Fire fromall typesof rifles andmachinegunsdirectedagainst thepeepholes,periscopes,andthebaseoftheturretandgunshieldwillblindorjamtheparts,theRussianssay.Highexplosivesandarmor-piercingshellsof54-mm(2.12inches)caliber,orhigherareeffectiveagainsttheturretatrangesof875yardsorless.Large-caliberartilleryandself-propelledcannoncanputthePantheroutofactionatordinarydistancesforeffectivefire.Theverticalandslopingplatescanbepenetratedbyarmor-piercingshellsof45-mm(1.78inches)caliber,orhigher.Incendiaryarmor-piercingshellsaresaidtobeespeciallyeffective,notonlyagainstthegasolinetanks,butagainsttheammunition,whichislocatedjusttotherearofthedriver.

Theadditionalarmorplateabovethesuspensionwheelsisprovidedtoreducethepenetrationofhollow-chargeshells.

AccordingtotheRussians,itisineffective;antitankgrenades,antitankmines,andMolotovcocktailsarereportedtobeeffectiveagainsttheweaktopandbottomplatesandthecoolingandventilatingopeningsontopofthetank,justabovethemotor.

However, it shoulddefinitelybe stated that thePz.Kw.5 is a formidableweapon—adistinct assetof theGerman

Army.

47.VULNERABILITYOFTIGERTANKS


AnarticlerecentlypublishedintheSovietArtilleryJournalgavedetailedinstructionsfortheuseofantitankweapons

against theGermanTiger tank.Vulnerability of various parts of the tankwas cited in connectionwith directions forattack. The accompanying sketch shows vulnerable points and indicates weapons to be used against them.MaterialconcerningthevulnerabilityofGermantankswaspublishedinTacticalandTechnicalTrendsNo.8,p.46andNo.11,p.28.DetailedinformationabouttheTigertankwaspublishedinTacticalandTechnicalTrendsNo.34,p.13.

AtranslationoftheSovietArtilleryJournalarticlefollows:

“Themobilityoftanksdependsupontheproperfunctioningofthesuspensionparts—sprocket(smalldrivingwheel),

idler(smallwheelintherear),wheelsandtracks.Allofthesepartsarevulnerabletoshellsofallcalibers.Aparticularlyvulnerablepartisthesprocket.

“Firearmor-piercingshellsandHEshellsatthesprocket,theidlerandthetracks.Thiswillstopthetank.Fireatthe

wheelswithHEshells.Also,whenattackingatank,useATgrenadesandmines.Ifmovableminesareused,attachthreeorfourofthemtoaboardanddrawtheboard,bymeansofacordorcable,intothepathofanadvancingtank.

“There are two armorplates on each sideof the tank.The lowerplate is partly coveredby thewheels.Thisplate

protectstheengineandthegasolinetankswhicharelocatedintherearofthehull,directlybeyondandoverthetworearwheels.

“Fireatthelowerplateswitharmor-piercingshellsfrom76-,57-and45-mmguns.Whenthegasolinetanksarehit,

thevehiclewillbesetonfire.Anothermethodofstartingafirewithinthetankistopiercetheupperplatesonthesidesofthetank,thusreachingtheammunitioncompartmentsandcausinganexplosion.

“Thereararmorplateprotectstheengineaswellasgivingadditionalprotectiontothegasolinetanks.ShellsfromAT

guns,penetratingthisarmor,willdisablethetank.

“The turret has two vision ports and two openings through which the tank’s crew fire their weapons. The

commander’ssmallturrethasfiveobservationslits.Therearetwosightingdevicesontheroofofthefrontofthetank,oneforthedriver,theotherforthegunner.Also,inthefrontofthetankthereisaportwithaslidingcover.

“The turret is a particularly important and vulnerable target. Attack it with HE and armor-piercing shells of all

calibers.Whenitisdamaged,useATgrenadesandincendiarybottles(Molotovcocktails).

“Thereisa10-mmslitallaroundthebaseoftheturret.ATgunandheavymachine-gunfire,effectivelydirectedatthis

slit,willpreventtheturretfromrevolvingandthusseriouslyimpairthetank’sfieldoffire.Furthermore,hitsbyHEshellatthebaseoftheturretmaywrecktheroofofthehullandputthetankoutofaction.

“The tank’s air vents and ventilators are under the perforations in the roof of the hull, directly behind the turret.

Anotherairvent is inthefrontpartof theroof,betweenthetwoobservationportsusedbytheradiooperatorandthedriver.UseATgrenadesandincendiarybottlesagainstthesevents.

“Explodeantitankminesunderthetanktosmashthefloorandputthetankoutofaction.”

Accompanyingsketchshowsvulnerablepointsandindicatesweaponstobeusedagainstthem.

48.ARMORSKIRTINGONGERMANTANKS


FrombothAlliedandGermansources, reportshavecome inofadditionalarmoredskirtingapplied to the sidesof

German tanks and self-moving guns to protect the tracks, bogies and turret. Photographs show such plating on thePzKw3and4,where theplatesarehungfromabarresemblingahand-rail runningabove theupper trackguardandfromratherlightbracketsextendingoutwardabout18inchesfromtheturret.Whatappearedtobea75-mmself-movinggunwaspartiallyprotectedbysimilarsideplatesoverthebogies.Thisarmorisreportedtobelight—4to6millimeters(.16 to .24 in) — and is said to give protection against hollow-charge shells, 7.92-mm tungsten carbide core ATammunition,and20-mmtungstencarbidecoreammunition.Thisarmormightcauseahigh-velocityAPshotorshelltodeflectandstrikethemainarmorsidewaysoratanangle,butcoveringthebogiesorChristiewheelswouldmaketheidentificationofatankmoredifficult,exceptatshortranges.

49.GERMAN150-MMSPASSAULTHOWITZER


In Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 25, p. 42 et seq. three models of 75-mm self-propelled assault guns were

described.InissueNo.36adescriptionwillbefoundoftheGerman105-mmSPAssaultHowitzer42.Nowanotherandextremelypowerfulmodelof a150-mm(5.9 in) assaulthowitzer,mountedonaPzKw4 (8bogie) chassishasbeenreported.Adescriptionofthisweapon,believedtobetheBrumbear(GrizzlyBear)istakenfromaspecimencapturedontheEasternFront,andthedataarethoughttobereliable(seeaccompanyingsketch).

•Weight(probably)-29tons(US)

•Armament(probably)-150-mm(5.9in)15-cms.I.G.(heavyinfantryhowitzer)

•Ammunition-24rounds

•Armor:fightingcompartment-100-mm(3.94in)

•Armor:chassis-40-50-mm(1.58-1.97in)

•Maximumspeed-24.8mph

•Range-80.6miles

•Motor-320hp

•MaybachCrew-5

This howitzermount is designed for attacks against fortifications and accompanies both tanks and infantry in theattack.Althoughusedagainsttanksalso,ithasnotbeenreportedasveryeffective.ThegunisbelievedtobefurnishedonlywithHEshell.Additional4-to6-mm(.18to.24in)sidearmorplateisalsoprovidedonthismountforprotectionagainsthollow-chargeshells.

50.GERMAN150-MMSPFIELDHOWITZER

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.42,January13th1944

a.General

InTacticalandTechnicalTrendsNo.36,p.12, thisgunwas illustrated inerrorasa105-mmlightSPhowitzer.Acorrectionwasprinted inNo.39,and thesketch is reprintedherewith thecorrectcaption.Thegun isa150-mm,31calibermedium(although theGermannomenclaturecalls it“heavy”)howitzeronaPzKw4mount.Amuzzlebrakemay be fitted but whether or not this is standard equipment is still not definitely known. One German magazinephotographshowsagroupofgunswhicharethoughttobeofthistype,withoutsuchbrakes.

ThereportedGermannicknameisHummel,which is translated,“humble(US,bumble)bee.”Britishnomenclature

refers to it as simply the “Bee”. Another Germanmagazine also referred to the short assault howitzer described inTacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.41,p.16,astheHummel,althoughitiselsewhereknownastheBrumbearorGrizzlyBear.Hummel,orBee isprobably thecorrect title for the150-mmmediumhowitzerhere illustrated.TheSP-105—l.F.H.18(m)onthePzKw2chassis—isnamedtheWespeorWasp.

b.Description

The following are theparticulars for the15-cm s.F.H.18onPzKw4 chassis.The equipment is knownas15-cms.F.H.18/mSfl*IVHummel(150-mmmediumfieldhowitzer18/m,self-propelledmount4,theBee)i.e.theBumble-Bee.Thisshouldnotbeconfusedwiththe10.5-cml.F.H.18/mSfl.IIWespe(105-mmlightfieldhowitzer18/m,self-propelledmountPzKw2Wasp).

*Selbstfahrlafette—self-propelledmount

(1)Gun•Nomenclature(German)-15-cms.F.H.18

•Actualcaliber-149mm

•Overalllength-15ft71/2in

•Overalllengthincludingmuzzlebrake-17ft.41/2in

•MVcharge-61,020fs



•Maximumrange,charge-610,550yds

•Maximumrange,charge-712,140yds

•Maximumrange,charge-814,380gds

•Elevation-0°-39°

•Traverseeachside-16°

•Weightofbarrel-1.96tons

•Weightofbreechring-266lbs

•Weightofprojectile-95.75lbs

NOTE:Charge8mustnotbeusedwithoutthemuzzlebrake.

(2)Chassis

(a)Dimensions•Length-20ft41/2in

•Width-9ft41/2in

•Height-9ft4in

•Widthbetweentracks-7ft101/2in

•Lengthoftracksonground-11ft61/2in

•Widthoftrack-15in

•Groundclearance-153/4in

(b)Weight•Weightinaction-25tons(approx)

•Weightindraught-25.4tons(approx)

(c)Engine•Engine-MaybachmodelH.L.120/TRKM**

•No.ofcylinders-12

•HP-300

•Fuelcapacity-123.6gal(US)

•Fuelconsumptionroads-.79mpg,crosscountry-.55mpg

**Engineidentificationsymbol

(d)Performance•Maximumspeed-25mph

•Radiusofactionroads-96miles

•Radiusofactioncrosscountry-62miles

•Fordingcapacity-2ft71/2ins

•Gradient-330

51.GERMANSMAKEUSEOFNEWGUNSIN‘INSECT’SERIES

RecognitionJournal,September1944

GrizzlyBearherehaschassiswhichisrecognizableasPzKwIVwitharmoredskirting.Gunisheavy150-mm.howitzerwithshortthickbarrelsetinheavilyarmoredgunshield.Samefour-sidedcrewcompartmentappearssetbackfartheronWaspandBumbleBee.

InadesperateefforttocopewiththemobilityoftheRedArmy’sadvancetheGermanshaveturnedtoself-propelled

guns. In 1943 theywere using several obsolete tank chassis tomount their 75-mm. anti-tank gun.At that time theyintroducedthe88-mm.self-propelledgunFerdinand.SincethentheyhavebroughtoutaseriesofSPartillerymountedon the moderately fast PzKw IV medium tank chassis. This is the “Insect” series, so-called because each weapon,BumbleBeeandHornet,hasanicknamecompletewithstinger.Inthesameseries,despiteitsnameistheGrizzlyBear(above).AlsointheInsectseriesaretheWasponPzKwIIchassisandthenamelessvehiclebelowwitha128-mm.gunonamodifiedPzKwVIchassis.

Huge128-mm.gundisplayedhereismountedonamodifiedPzKwVIchassiswhichhastheusualoverlappingbogiewheelsandthreereturnrollers.Gunmantletswellsfromthefrontofrectangulargunshieldwithslopingtop.GrizzlyBearinbackgroundisdwarfedbycomparison.

Waspmountinga105-mm.lightfieldhowitzeristheonlyoneoftheinsectseriesthatdoesnotincorporatethePzKwIVchassis.PackingblocksaroundthegunbuffersuggestthisWaspneverhadtimetofireashot.FromitAmericantroopsinItalycarefullyremoveaboobytrap.

Germantankrepairunitrecoversabogged-downWaspfrommud.Bufferandrecuperatorofthe105-mm.howitzerprojectwellbeyond.

TheBumbleBeeistheNazinicknameforthe150-mm.heavyfieldhowitzermountedonamodifiedPzKwIVtankchassis.Thegunbarrelprojectsflushwiththenose.Superstructureisafour-sidedslopingshield.

BumbleBeeswerepartofNazicoastdefensesinsouthernGreece.Ventilatorsatside,nearfrontofthegunhousing,appearonmostnewNaziSPguns.Polesneartopofsuperstructureareflotationaids.

NaziWasp is refueled onRussian front. 105-mm. howitzer ismounted at the rear of the chassiswithin an open boxlike shield.Fighting compart-ment is open at the top and rear and has high silhouette. The flat-sidedsuperstructureoftheWaspresemblesothersoftheNaziInsectseries.

TheHornetisanewNaziweaponwhichadaptsthePzKwIVchassisasaself-propelledgunmountforthe88-mm.gun.Theengineisforwardinordertoprovidealargerspaceattherearforthefightingcompartment.The21-ft.gunbarrelextendswellbeyondthebowofthechassis.Thegunshieldistallwithslopingsides.TheHornetismorelightlyarmoredandhasalmosttwicethespeedoftheFerdinand.

52.BRITISHCOMMENTSONGERMANUSEOFTANKS

IntelligenceBulletin,January1944

IntheIntelligenceBulletin,Vol.I,No.11,pp.53-54,thereappearedatranslationofaFifthPanzerArmyordersigned

byLt.Gen.GustavvonVaerst,listing“tencommandments”fortheemploymentoftanks.ThismonththeIntelligenceBulletinagainpublishesatranslationofthese“commandments,”andaddsappropriatecommentsbyGHQ,MiddleEastForces,basedonareportbyanexperiencedarmoredforceofficer.

First,theGermanorder:

1.Thetankisadecisivecombatweapon.Therefore,itsemploymentshouldbelimitedtothe“maineffort”insuitable

terrain.

2. The tank is not an individual fighting weapon. The smallest tank unit is the platoon, and, for more important

missions,thecompany.

3. The tank is not an infantry supportweapon. It breaks into, and through, the opposition’s line, and the infantry

followsitclosely.

4.The tankcan take andclear terrain,but it cannothold it.The latter is themissionof the infantry, supportedby

infantryheavyweapons,antitankguns,andartillery.

5.Thetankisnottobeemployedasartillerytofighttheenemyfromasinglepositionforanextendedperiod.While

fighting,thetankisalmostconstantlyinmotion,haltingbrieflytofire.

6.Themissionoftheinfantryistoneutralizehostileantitankweapons,andtofollowthetankattackcloselysoasto

exploitcompletelytheforceandmoraleeffectofthatattack.

7.Themissionoftheartilleryistosupportthetankattackbyfire,todestroyhostileartillery,andtofollowcloselythe

rapidlyadvancingtankattack.Themaintaskoftheartillerysupportiscontinuousflankprotection.

8.Thetaskofthetankdestroyers(“Ferdinands”orotherself-propelledmountsequippedwithhigh-velocityweapons)

istofollowthetankattackclosely,andtogetintothebattlepromptlywhentankfightstank.

9.Themissionofthecombatengineersistoopengapsinminefields—undertank,infantry,andartilleryprotection—

andtherebyenablethetankattacktocontinue.

10.Atnight,whentanksareblindanddeaf,itisthemissionoftheinfantrytoprotectthem.

AndnowthecommentsbyGHQ,BritishMiddleEastForces:

Itisconsideredthat,withtheexceptionofNos.2and3,these“commandments”aresoundcommonsense,basedon

fundamentalprinciples.

Number 2 is interesting, however, since it reflects the opinions of vonArnim, vonThoma, and Stumme (all now

prisonersofwar),whofoughtinRussia,wheretheyacquiredthehabitofusingtheirtanksin“pennypackets.”Aplatoonconsistsoffivetanks,andacompanyconsistsof17Pz.Kw.3’s,18Pz.Kw.4’s.or8Pz.Kw.6’s.Rommelwouldneverhaveagreedtothecompanybeingsplit,andwouldnormallyhavepreferredtousethebattalion,oreventheregiment,astheunitofattack,justaswe[theBritish]ourselveswould.

Number3 isdebatable.Againstweakantitankdefenseandnomines, thismethodwouldbeeffective.However the

actionatMedenine,intheMarethlinearea,andallactionafterthatshowedthatweareaswellequippedwithantitankgunsastheGermansare.Becauseofthis,theGermanswillbecompelledtorewritetheirNo.3“commandment”andusetheirtanksmuchasourEighthArmyhasbeendoingrecently.

53.GERMANPRISONERSDISCUSSTHEPZ.KW.6

IntelligenceBulletin,April1944

1.INTRODUCTION

IndiscussingtheemploymentofthePz.Kw.6,or“Tiger”tank,twowell-informedGermannoncommissionedofficersrecentlymade a number of statementswhich should be of interest and value to readers of the IntelligenceBulletin.AlthoughthematerialcontainedinthissectionhasbeenevaluatedassubstantiallycorrectandinlinewithinformationalreadyknowntotheMilitaryIntelligenceDivision,itmustbetreatedwithacertaindegreeofreserve,asiscustomarywithmaterialobtainedfromprisoner-of-warsources.This,however,doesnotalter thefact that itcanbestudiedwithprofit.

2.THECOMMENTS

a. After Pz. Kw. 6’s have had to move long distances, and before they can then go into action, a number ofadjustmentsmustbemade.Forexample,bogiewheelsmustbechanged.Itisthereforeunlikelythatthetankswilloftenbesentdirectlyintoactionafteralongapproachmarchontracks.

b.Originally,itwasplannedthatPz.Kw.6’sshouldbesupportedbyanequalnumberofPz.Kw.3’stoprovidelocal

protection.ThelatterwouldmoveontheflanksofthemainbodyofthePz.Kw.6’sandcoverthemagainsthostiletankhunters attempting to attack themat close range.During an assault, thePz.Kw.6’swould attackhostile heavy tankbattalionsorheavypillboxes,and thePz.Kw.3’swouldattackmachine-gunnestsor lighter tanks.Thismethodwasaltered in Sicily, where ground conditions repeatedly kept tanks to the roads and limited their usefulness—therebydecreasingtheneedforlocalprotection.Atleastonebattalion,whichshouldhavehadnineofeachtypetoacompany,exchangeditsPz.Kw.3’sforthePz.Kw.6’sofanotherunit,afterwhichthecompanywasmadeupof17Pz.Kw.6’sonly.

c.AprisonerofWarstatedthatononeoccasionhisturret jammedinturning,makingit impossiblefor thecrewto

blowuptheirtankbymeansofabuilt-inexplosivechargewhichwassituatedunderoneoftheplates(possiblyforwardoftheturret)insuchawaythatitcouldbereachedonlywhentheturretwasdirectlyfacingtherear.

d.Theseprisonersremarkedthatina“model”attackbyaTigerbattalion,thestandardcompanyformationisawedge

oranarrowhead,withoneplatoonforward.Thisplatoonisgenerallyledbyanofficer,whosetankmovesinthecenterofthe formation.The company commander is forward, but not necessarily in the lead.Thebattalion commander is notforward,asa rule. Itmustbe remembered,however, that the“model”attackcannot take intoaccountsuchfactorsasvariable terrain and the strength of the opposition. Therefore, deviations from the “model” formation are not onlysanctioned,butareactuallycommon.

Theprisonersappearedtoconsiderfrontalattacksnolessusualthanoutflankingattacks.

e.AprisonerstatedthathisPz.Kw.6carriedover100shellsforthegun,“stowedeverywhere”;however,thestandard

ammunition load is 92 shells.According to him, although the 88-mmgun in thePz.Kw. 6 can fire up to 10,000 to12,000yards indirect, this typeoffiring isverydifficultand isseldomundertaken.Hedeclared that thebest range is1,000to2,000yards—“thenearerthebetter.”

f. Although one prisoner of war stated that the Pz. Kw. 6 carries a gyroscopic compass, hemaintained that it is

impossibletoattackatnightbecauseofvisiondifficulties.Theoretically,however,thegyroscopiccompassisverygood

forkeepingdirectionbynightandinsmokeorfog.

g.Accordingtoaprisoner,thechainofwirelesscommunicationisfrombattaliontocompanytoplatoon.Thelatter

linkisafrequencyonwhichallthetanksinthecompanyaretuned,buteachplatoonandheadquartershasacodenamebywhichitiscalledup.Forspecialoperations—forexample,long-rangereconnaissancepatrols—tankscanbenettedbyafrequencyotherthanthecompanyfrequency.However,thisentailsalteringthesets.Alternativelytankscanbegiventwosetstunedtotwofrequencies,butthisisseldomdoneexceptinthecaseofthecompanyheadquarterstank,whereitis thenormalprocedure.Allpriorityandbattlemessagesarepassedintheclear,but important tactical terms(suchas“attack,”“outflank,”“assemble”)havecodenames(suchas“dance,”“sing,”andsoon).Eachtankcarriesalistofthesecodenames.

In Russia, where German troops often were 4 miles or so from headquarters, Soviet troops made a practice of

interceptingtrafficbetweenbattalionandcompany,sothattheywouldhaveenoughtimetotakepreparatorymeasuresbeforecompanyorderscamethrough.

h.TheGermanstakegreatpainstocamouflagetheirPz.Kw.6’s,aprisonerremarked.Everyeffortwasmadebyone

particularbattaliontomaketheirtankslooklikethe3-tonpersonnelcarrier.Adummyradiatorandfrontwheelswerefittedtothefrontofthetank,thetopoftheradiatorbeingaboutlevelwiththetopofthetank’shull.Athinsheetmetalbodywasfittedovertheentiretank.Thismetalbodywassupportedbyametalprojectionfittedtothetopoftheturret,and was not in contact with the hull of the tank at any point. The gun projected through a hole. Apparently thecamouflagebodywas rotatedby the turret, anddidnothave tobe removedwhen thegunwas traversed.This ratherelaborateformofcamouflageexceededthedimensionsofthe3-tonpersonnelcarrierbyatleast3to6feet.

54.FERDINANDANDTHEPANTHER

RecognitionJournal,February1944

Morepicturesofself-propelled“88”andPzKwMarkVrevealdetailsofnewNaziweapons

LackofreturnrollerstotakeupslackintrackgivesmotivegearofFerdinandadilapidatedlook.Chassisbowislongbutgunbarrellonger.

TheGermanshavebeenhurlingtheirheaviestarmoredequipmentagainsttheRussians.Recentlysilhouettesandmore

pictures of the two newest Nazi armored threats encountered on the Russian front, Ferdinand and the Panther (seeJournalNov.andDec.),havebeenmadeavailabletotheJournal,areshownonthesetwopages.

Ferdinand is a tremendous 70-ton self-propelled mount which carries an 88-mm. gun on a chassis built to offer

maximum resistance to enemy firepower.The thickness of Ferdinand’s armor plate is asmuch as 8 in. on the front,intendedtomakethemountserveasabatteringramtoclearthewayforlighterarmoredvehiclesoftheNazianti-tankbattalions.Thereareusually44oftheseself-propelled“88’s”inoneheavybattalionandeachonecarriesacrewofsix.AlthoughthemightyfirepowerandarmorofFerdinandmakeitadangerousopponent, ithasbeenprovedtobequitevulnerable.Unwieldyandunderpoweredforitsgreatsize,itcantravelonly12m.p.h.onahighwayand6to9m.p.h.onroughground;tofire,itmustcometoafullstop.WhenFerdinandisattackedbymorethatoneopponentatatime,itsfixedweaponisagreathandicap.RussiansconcentratetheirartilleryattacksonFerdinand’smobilepartswhichbreakdownreadilyunderthegreatweightofthechassis;alsoontheguninstallationandonthegastanksinthecenterofthehull.GrenadesandMolotovcocktailshurled througha largeshell-caseejectionopening in therearof themountwillblastthetwinelectricmotorslocateddirectlyinside.

HugebowofPantherslopesuptoimposingheight.turrethasroundedforwardwallresemblingRussianT-34.Armorplateprotectssuspension

A new heavy tank in theGerman arsenal, the 45-ton PzKwMarkV series to bridge the gap between the 22-ton

MarkIVandthe60-tonMarkVI,Tiger.Thistank,whichiscalledthePanther,appearstobeafirst-classvehicle,fast,well-armoredandhard-hitting. Ithas theadvantageofbeingswifterandmoremaneuverable than theTigerbutat thesametimeiseasiertoknockoutbecauseoflighterarmorprotection.Itslong-barreled75-mm.gunwithdouble-bafflemuzzle brake is a newweaponwhich has a high velocity, considerable armor penetration, and direct sights up to adistanceof1,640yd.

LiketheTiger,thePanthercanbeconvertedfordeepstreamfording.Ithasaspeedof31m.p.h.andcarriesacrewof

five.Itsheaviestarmorplate,onthefrontoftheturretandthecannonshield,isabout3.94in.thick.Thetopandbottomofthetankarelightlyarmoredandareespeciallyvulnerabletogrenadefire.

RECOGNITION:Thehuge coffinlikegunshieldofFerdinand, setwell to rear, has sloping sides and top.Hull is

rectangularandstraight-sided.Sixlargeevenly-spacedbogiewheelssupporttrackapproximately21/2ft.wide.

ThePantherisbuiltclosetothegroundwithalowcenterofgravity.Itsturretsidesflowinslopinglineintothesides

ofthehull.Theturretisslab-sidedandsetslightlytotherearofcenterwithacupolaattheback.The75-mm.gunbarrelisextremelylong.Fromtheside,thePanther’shullissharplyundercutbehind.EightoverlappingbogiewheelsoneachsidewithdrivingsprocketinfrontaretypicalofGerman-designedsuspensionsystems.

55. GERMAN TANK PLATOONS OPERATING ASPOINTS

IntelligenceBulletin,June1944

ThissectiondiscussesthecompositionandemploymentofGermantankplatoonsoperatingaspoints.Althoughthe

informationinthisaccountcomesfromanunofficialsource,itisbelievedtobesubstantiallycorrect.

1.COMPOSITION

Thepointplatoonisgenerallymadeupoftheplatoonleader’stankandtwosectionsoftwotankseach.Theplatoonleadermayplaceeitherthefirstorsecondsectionattheheadofthepointplatoon,buthehimselfalwaysstaysbetweenthe two sections in order to observe his entire outfit.However, the composition of the point varies according to thesituation.

The strength of the point platoon may be increased in mountainous terrain. During the German invasion of the

Balkans,thepointamountedtoanextra-strongcompanyandconsistedofheavytanks,assaultweapons,tankswiththelong75-mmand50-mmguns,aninfantryplatoon,andadetachmentofengineers.AplatoonoffivePz.Kw.4’sledthepoint.Behindthemcameagroupofengineers,ridingeitheronthelasttanksinthepointoronothertanksimmediatelyfollowing.After thatcameaplatoonofself-propelledassaultguns (fourshort-barreled75-mm’s), then theplatoonofinfantry riding in armored personnel carriers, and finally a platoon of five Pz. Kw. 3’s. There were no motorcyclecouriers.

AtthehistoricThermopylaePass,inGreece,therewere22tanksinthespearhead,butonlythreeofthesegotthrough.

AresponsibleGermanofficer’scommentonthiswasthatitwasworthlosingthe19tanksinordertoachievesuccesswiththethree.

2.COMMUNICATION

a.WithinthePointPlatoonIncombat,communicationwithintheGermantankplatoonoperatingasapointisdonebasicallybyradio.Uptothat

time,liaisonismaintainedbyatleastoneortwomotorcyclecouriersattachedtotheplatoonleader.Assoonascontactwithahostileforceisestablished,thesecouriersscattertothesidesandlieinditchesuntilthewholeplatoonhaspassed.They thengoback to thecompanycommanderandreport tohimcontacthasbeenmade.After this,hecarriesonbyradio.

b.WithintheArmoredRegiment

Ashas been stated, there are five tanks in each platoon—two in each section and one for the platoon leader.Theplatoon leader and each section leader has a two-way radio; the two remaining tanks have receiving sets only.Regimentalcommandersandallthreebattalioncommandershavespecialradiocars,eachequippedwith100-wattsets.If thebattalions (or companies) attack together, theyhave radiocommunicationwith the regiment.When theyattackseparately,eachuses,inadditiontohistwo-wayradio(FunkGerät5),foursetscapableonlyofreceiving(FunkGerät2’s).Eachofthesereceivingsetsisusedforcommunicationwithoneofthefourcompanies.Moreover,eachcompanyisonadifferent frequency. In turn,eachcompanycommanderhasa two-waysetand tworeceivingsets,andcanspeakwiththebattalioncommander.

Each battalion, too, is normally on a different frequency. The platoon is on the same frequency as its companycommander.Eachplatoonleaderhashissecondreceivingsettunedtothefrequencyofhisbattalioncommander,incasehiscompanycommandershouldbecomeacasualty.

If the regimentattacksasaunit, thenetwork remainsunchanged.However, if thebattalionsact independently, the

regimentalcommanderhasnocommunicationwiththemexceptbymessengers,usuallymotorcyclists.

Codeisusedonlywiththe100-wattsets,frombattalionuptodivision.Duringtheattack,communicationis in the

clear, even up to the regimental commander. When battalions attack separately, however, they use code incommunicatingwiththeregimentalcommander.

The division commander alone authorizes messages in the clear. If the battalion commander cannot reach his

regimentalcommanderbyusingthetwo-wayFunkGerät5(whichhasarangeof6kilometers),heencodeshismessageandusesthe100-wattset.

3.ONTHEMARCH

a.CombatVehiclesItisaGermanprinciplethatthedistancebetweentherearofthepointplatoonandthecompanycommandermustnot

besogreatthatthelattercannotseetheformer.Itcanbe,butseldomis,asmuchas1kilometer.Thespacingdependsentirelyontheterrain.Allmovementismadebyroaduntilahostileforceisencountered.Thetanksthenscattertothesides.Evenwhenthereisdangerofairattack,thetanksremainontheroadbutkeepwellapart.Inmountainouscountry,whenheavytanksareusedinthepoint,themethodofadvancingonroadsisaltered.Twotanksadvancetogether,onebehindtheotherbutontheoppositesideoftheroad.

Thesectionsareeasilyinterchangeable;forexample,shouldthefirstsectionbeat theheadoftheplatoonandthen

leavetheroadtoovercomehostileresistance,thesecondsectioncanmovetothehead,allowingthefirstsectiontofallinbehindwhentheresistancehasbeenovercome.TheGermansbelievethatitisoftheutmostimportancetokeeptheplatoonmovingforward.

b.SupplyColumn

During the campaign inGreece, all supply truckswere placed at the rear. In any other position theywould havedelayed the movement, because of the twisting mountainous roads. Any truck that was damaged was immediatelyshovedofftheroadtokeepthecolumnmovingatallcosts.

Inmorerecentoperations,whenfacingthepossibilityofaguerrillaattackfromthefront(ratherthanfromtheflank),

theGermanshavebeenknowntosandwichelementsof thesupplycolumnbetween tankplatoonson themarch.Theimportant ration and fuel trucks have even traveled between tanks within a platoon. While this plan has not beenfollowedbyapointplatoon,ithasbeenemployedbytheplatoonsfollowingimmediatelyafterwardinthelineofmarch.ThesameplanhasoccasionallybeenusedbyGermanbattalionsonthemarch,butonlywhentherehasbeenadangerofattacksbyguerrillasorwhenroadconditionshavebeensobadthatsupplytruckshaveneededtankscloseathandatalltimes,foremergencytowing.

56.FLAME-THROWINGPz.Kw.3

IntelligenceBulletin,July1944

TheGermanflame-throwingPz.Kw.3(seefig.3)appearedforthefirsttimeduringtheearlyfightinginItaly.This

tankisastandardPz.Kw.3,ModelLorlater,withaflamethrowermountedintheturretinplaceofthenormal50-mmKw.K.,Model 39,which it resemblesoutwardly (see fig. 4). [Kw.K. (Kampfwagenkanone)= tankgun. ] The twomachineguns,onecoaxiallymountedintheturretandtheotherinaballmountinginthefrontofthesuperstructure,areretained.

Theflameprojectorhasalimitedelevation(from-10°to20°),whiletheturrethasthefull360°traverse.

Fuel (225gallons), contained in two tanks stowed internally, ispropelledbyacentrifugalpumpdrivenbya small

gasolineenginemountedintheenginecompartment.Usingfuelofthetypethusfarencountered,theflamethrowerisbelievedtohaveamaximumrangeofabout55yardsandaneffectiverangeofabout40yards.However,theyhavebeenusedmainlyatrangesof20to30yards.

Intheflame-throwingtank,thecrewisreducedfromfivetothree.Theflamethrowerisaimedandoperatedbythe

tankcommander,whohastwopedals—therightcontrollingfuelemissionandtheleftfiringthecoaxialmachinegun.Thegunnerandloaderaredispensedwith,andtheircrewspaceisoccupiedbytheflamethrowersfueltanks.

Figure3.—ComparisonofFlame-throwingPz.Kw.3withStandard,Pz.Kw.3

Asmightbeexpected,thenormalsmokeequipmentisretained—thatis,triplesmokepotdischargersoneachsideof

theturret.

ThefollowingisarecentinstanceofthetacticsofGermanflame-throwingtanksagainstU.S.infantry:

TwoGerman flame-throwing tanks, togetherwith threeother tanks, supportedaGermanplatoon in anattackona

forwardpositionoccupiedby a platoonofU.S. infantry.The attackwasprecededby an artillery andmortar barragewhichcontinuedfor1hour.

The tanksmoved forward,andshelledandmachine-gunned thepositionat a rangeof50yards.WhenU.S. troops

attempted towithdraw from the sector, the flame-throwing tanks then joined the action, using their primaryweaponagainst thepersonnel.InthisactiontheGermaninfantrymen,equippedwithmachinepistols,movedforwardwiththearmoredvehicles.The flame throwerswereused intermittentlyover a30-minuteperiod andwere reported tohave arangeof30yards.

Figure4.—Pz.Kw.3,ModelL,withFlameThrower.

57. SMOKE-SHELL TACTICS USED BY GERMANTANKS

IntelligenceBulletin,August1944

AsaruleGermantanksemploysmokeshellstoachievesurprise,toconcealachangeofdirection,andtocovertheir

withdrawal.Theshellsnormallyare fired to landabout100yards in frontofanAllied force.Therearenoreports toindicatethatsmokeshellsareusedinrangeestimation.

Inattackingavillage,Germantanksfiresmokeshells to layascreenaroundthevillageinaneffort toconfusethe

defendersastothedirectionoftheattack.Smokeshellsalwaysareusedtoconcealachangeofdirectionoftheattack,thewindpermitting.WhenaGermantankcompany(22tanks)wishestochangedirection,smokeshellsarefiredonlybyoneplatoon.Withthefiretanksofaplatoonfiringthreeshellseach,thetotalof15shellsissaidtoprovideenoughsmoketocoverthemovementoftheentirecompany.

If aGerman tank force knows the exact location of an antitank-gun position, it uses both smoke shells and high-

explosiveshells.Iftheforcedoesnotknowtheexactlocation,onlysmokeshellsareused.Whenasingletankrunsintoanantitankposition,itlikewisefiresonlysmokeshells,usuallytwoorthreerounds,tocoveritsmovements.

Smokeshellsarefiredfromthe75-mmgunsofthePz.Kpfw.IV’s[1],andalso,itisreported,from88-mmgunson

otherarmoredvehicles.SmokeshellsarenotfiredbythePz.Kpfw.II[2]or thePz.Kpfw.III[3],bothofwhichareequippedtodischarge“smokepots”witharangeofapproximately50yards.Thesepotsarereleasedelectrically,andareemployedchieflytopermitthetanktoescapewhencaughtbyantitankfire.

58. PANTIGER, A REDESIGNED TIGER, NEWESTENEMYHEAVYTANK

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.51,October,1944

Anew67-tonGermanheavytank—referredtovariouslyasPantigerandTigerII—hasbeenemployedagainsttheAlliesthissummerinFrance.ActuallyaredesignedTiger(Pz.Kpfw.VI),itmountsthe8.8-cmKw.K.43gun.Onthebasisofapreliminaryreport,thegeneralappearanceofthenewtankisthatofascaled-upPz.Kpfw.V(Panther)onthewideTigertracks.ItconformstonormalGermantankpracticeinsofarasthedesign,lay-out,welding,andinterlockingofthemainplatesareconcerned.Allsidesaresloping.ThegunislargerthanthePanthergun,andlongerthantheordinaryTigergun.ArmorisalsothickerthanthatoneitherthePantherortheTiger.Theturretisofnewdesign,withbentsideplates.InallrespectsthenewtankislargerthanthestandardTiger.

Principalover-alldimensionsoftheredesignedTigerareasfollows:

•Length-23ft.10in.

•Width-11ft.111/2in.

•Height-10ft.2in.

Mainarmamentisthe8.8-cmKw.K.43.Itisequippedalsowithtwomachineguns(MG34),onemountedcoaxiallyintheturretandonemountedinthehull.

•Armorthicknessesofthenewtankareasfollows:

•Glacisplate-150-mmat40°to45°.

•Hullside-80-mmvertical.

•Superstructureside-80-mmat25°.

•Hullrearplates-80-mmat25°(undercut).

•Superstructuretopplates-42-mmhorizontal.

•Turretfront-Approx.80-mm(rounded).

•Turretside-80-mmat25°.

•Turretrear-80-mmat25°.

•Turretroof-42-mmhorizontal;frontandrearslopedatabout5°fromhorizontal.

Thesuspensionconsistsoffrontdrivingsprockets,rearidler,andindependenttorsionbarspringing,withtwinsteel-rimmedrubber-cushioneddiskbogiewheelsoneachofthenineaxlesoneachside.Thebogiewheelsareinterleaved,andtherearenoreturnrollers.Contactlengthofthetrackonthegroundisabout160inches.

59.GERMANSDISGUISEPANTHERS

TacticalandTechnicalTrends,No.57,April1945

CleverlyImitateM10GunCarriage

Investigation of four German Panther tanks knocked out in the Malmedy area in the December breakthrough inBelgiumrevealedthatthetankswerecarefullyandcleverlydisguisedasU.S.M10gunmotorcarriages.

After inspecting the tanks and realizing the amount of time, work, andmaterials involved in order to imitate the

appearanceoftheM10,Ordnanceintelligenceinvestigatorsexpressedtheopinionthatthesedisguisedtanks,usedinthepropertacticalsituationandatthepropertime,wouldhavecausedconsiderabledamage.

BecausethefalsevehiclenumbersofthetanksknockedoutwereB-4,B-5,B-7,andB-10,investigatorsconcluded

thatatleasttensimilarlydisguisedtanksmighthavebeeninaction.

InsidetheonetankwhichwasnotblownuptoobadlytobeinspectedwerefounditemsofU.S.clothingsuchasa

helmet,overcoat,andleggings.Toheightenthedeception,U.S.starswerepaintedonbothsidesandalsoonthetopoftheturret,theentiretankwaspaintedO.D.,andU.S.unitmarkingswerepaintedonthefalsebowandrear.

IndisguisingthePantherthedistinctivecupolawasremovedfromtheturretandtwosemicircularhatchcoverswere

hingedin itsplace to the turret topinorder tocover theopening.Inaddition, itwasnecessary toremoveextrawatercans,gascans,therammerstaffcontainer,andotherexternalaccessories.

The tank thenwas camouflaged or disguisedwith sheetmetal, that used on the turret and upper bow being three

twenty-secondsofaninchthickandthatontimesidesofthehullbeingninesixty-fourthsofaninchthick.Thelowerpartof the falsebowwas thicker, possiblymadeofdoubleplates.Toaccomplish thedeceptivemodifications,whichpointedtoatleastfourthorfifthechelonalterations,theworkprobablywasdonebymaintenanceunitsratherthanatafactory.Theworkprobablywasdividedintofoursections:turret,bow,rear,andsides.

TopviewofPanthertankdisguisedasU.S.M10guncarriage,showinghatchcoversusedinplaceofcupola.

TurretChanges

Theturretwasdisguisedbyusingfivepiecesofsheetmetal,twoofwhichwerecuttoresemblethedistinctivesidesoftheM10turretandthenwereflangedontheedges,benttoshape,andstiffenedwithsmallangleiron.ThegunshieldwascarefullyformedfromanothersheettotheexactshapeoftheM10shield,andaholewasmadetotherightofthegunholeintheshieldfortheco-axialM.G.34,aholewhichdoesnotexistintheM10shield.Twopiecesofsheetmetalmade up the rear of the turret, one representing the bottom slant surface of the rear and one representing thecounterweight.Thepiecesrepresentingthesidesandrearwerejoinedtogetherandbracedwithangleiron,andthewholewasattachedtotheturret.ThefalsegunshieldwasattachedtothePanthergunshield,andalltheliftingrings,brackets,extra-armorstuds,etc.,foundontheM10turretwerecarefullyduplicatedandweldedtothefalseturret.

Leftfrontviewwithturretreversed.Notefalsefinal-drivehousingatbottomofbowandfalsesideapron.

FalseBow

Approximatelyfourpiecesofsheetmetal,shapedtoimitateascloselyaspossiblethecontoursoftheM10bow,madeupthefalsebow,necessarybecausethePantherbowisbulkierthantheM10.ThefalsebottomwasshapedtogivethecharacteristicappearanceofthefrontdrivesprockethousingoftheM10,andthetopwasshapedcarefullyandvariouscomponentpiecesattachedtothefrontofthetank.Allthebrackets,liftingrings,towingdevises,etc.,oftheM10bowwerealsoimitated.AsquareopeningwascutinthefalsebowtopermittheuseofthebowM.G.34,butaremovablecoverattachedwithasmallchainwasmadeforthisopening.

Frontviewshowingplateovermachine-gunopening,falseliftingringsandbrackets,andmarkings.

FalseRearandSides

Thefalserearwasmadeofsheetmetal.ItwasafaithfulduplicateoftheM10rearexceptfortwoholestopermitthetwinexhaustelbowsofthePanthertoprotrude.

AnattemptwasmadetoimitatetheskirtingarmoroftheM10whichappearstohanglowerthanthesidearmorofthe

Pantherandisbevelledinatthebottom.Alongflatstripofsheetmetalwasattachedtothesidesparalleltotheground,andaverticalsheetstripwasattachedatrightanglestothisstriptogivetheappearanceoflowskirtingarmor.

Rearviewshowingfalsetailplate.Noteexhaustsanddummyfittings.

FeatureswhichaidinrecognizingdisguisedPanthersandwhichcannotbecamouflagedeasilyare:

1.ThedistinctivePantherbogiesuspension.(TheM18motorguncarriagenowhasasomewhatsimilarsuspension.)

2.Themuzzlebrakeonthe7.5cmKw.K.42.

3.ThewideanddistinctivetrackofthePanthertank.

60.GERMANTANKANDANTI-TANKTACTICS

IntelligenceBulletin,October1944

GERMANTANKTRENDS

Justwhat can be expected fromGerman tanks in the near future?Whichmodels aremost likely to be employedextensively?Arepresentmodelsundergoingmuchalteration?

A brief summary of the German tank situation at the moment should serve to answer these and other pertinent

questions.

ThereisgoodreasontobelievethattheGermantankswhichwillbeencounteredmostfrequentlyinthenearfuture

willbethePz.Kpfw.V(Panther),thePz.Kpfw.VI(Tiger),andthePz.Kpfw.IV.However,theGermanshaveanew88-mm(3.46-inch)tankgun,theKw.K.43,whichiscapableofanarmor-piercingperformancegreatlysuperiortothatofthe 88-mmKw.K. 36.According to reliable information, theKw.K. 43 is superseding theKw.K. 36 as themainarmamentoftheTiger.Anewheavytank,whichhasbeenencounteredonasmallscaleinnorthwesternFrance,alsoisarmedwiththeKw.K.43.Thisnewtanklookslikeascaled-upPanther,withthewideTigertracks.(FurtherinformationregardingthistankwillappearinanearlyissueoftheIntelligenceBulletin.)

DuringrecentmonthsboththeTigerandthePantherhavebeenfittedwithaslightlymorepowerful690-horsepower

engineinplaceofthe642-horsepowermodel.Theprincipalbenefitfromthisslightincreasewillbeabettermarginofpowerandimprovedenginelife.Themaximumspeedwillbeincreasedbynomorethan2or3milesperhour.

Face-hardened armor,whichwasnot usedon the earlyTiger tanks, has reappeared in certain plate of at least one

Panther.OnotherPantherswhichhavebeen encountered, onlymachine-quality armor is used.There is no reason tobelievethatface-hardeningwouldsubstantiallyimprovethearmor’sresistancetopenetrationbythecappedprojectilesnowinuseagainstit.

ItwouldnothavebeensurprisingifthePz.Kpfw.IVhadslowlydisappearedfromthepictureasincreasedquantities

ofPanthertanksbecameavailable,butactuallytherewasasharpriseintherateofproductionofPz.Kpfw.IV’sduring1943.Moreover, the, frontarmorof thePz.Kpfw.IVhasbeenreinforcedfrom50mm(1.97 inches) to80mm(3.15inches)bytheboltingofadditionalarmortothenoseandfrontverticalplates.Andthe75-mm(2.95-inch)tankgun,Kw.K.40,hasbeenlengthenedbyabout143/4inches.

All these developments seem to indicate that thePz.Kpfw. IVprobablywill be kept in service formanymonths.

Recentorganizationevidencereflectsthis,certainly.Intheautumnof1943,evidenceregardingprovisionalorganizationfortheGermantankregimentinthearmoreddivisionindicatedthattheaimwasaratioofapproximatelyfourPanthertanks for each Pz.Kpfw. IV.Now, however, the standard tank regiment has these two types in approximately equalnumbers.

Thepossibility thatTigerproductionmayhavebeendiscontinuedhasbeenconsidered.Althoughdiscontinuing the

TigerwouldrelievethepressureonGermanindustry,itisbelievedthatasufficientnumberofthesetankstomeettheneedsofunitsequippedwiththemstillisbeingproduced.

Tiger tanks constitute an integral part of division tank regiments only inSS armoreddivisions.However, armored

divisionsofanarmymayreceiveanallotmentofTigersforspecialoperations.

Earlyin1944anumberofPz.Kpfw.III’sconvertedintoflame-throwingtanksappearedinItaly.Nevertheless,it is

believedthatproductionofthistankceasedsometimeago.SomeofthefirmswhichinthepastproducedPz.Kpfw.III’snowaremakingassaultguns;othersarebelievedtobeturningoutPanthers.ItisextremelyunlikelythatproductionofPz.Kpfw.III’sasfightingtankswilleverberesumed,nomatterhowserioustheGermantanksituationmaybecome.

Inanefforttocombatattacksbytankhunters,theGermanshavefittedtheTigerwithS-minedischargers,whichare

firedelectricallyfromtheinteriorofthetank.Thesedischargersaremountedontheturret,andaredesignedtoprojectashrapnelantipersonnelminewhichburstsintheairafewyardsawayfromthetank.ThusfarthesedischargershavebeennotedonlyontheTiger,buttheGermansquitepossiblymaydecidetousethemonstillothertanks.

TheGermans take additional precautions, aswell. For protection against hollow-charge projectiles and the Soviet

antitankrifle’sarmor-piercingbulletwithatungstencarbidecore,theyfitaskirtingofmildsteelplates,about1/4-inchthick,onthesidesofthehull.InthecaseofthePz.Kpfw.IV,theskirtingissuitablyspacedfromthesidesandalsofromtherearoftheturret.Finally,theskirtingplates,aswellasthehullsandturretsofthetanksthemselves,are,coatedwitha sufficient thickness of non-magnetic plaster to prevent magnetic demolition charges from adhering to the metalunderneath.

Despite the recent introductionof thenewheavy tankwhich resembles thePanther andmounts aKw.K.43, it is

believedthatcircumstanceswillforcetheGermanstoconcentrateonthemanufactureandimprovementofcurrenttypes,particularlythePz.Kpfw.IVandthefamiliarversionofthePanther.

Evidence suggests that a modified Pz. Kpfw. II will shortly appear as a reconnaissance vehicle. Official German

documentssometimesrefertoitasanarmoredcarandsometimesasatank.

GERMANTANKSINACTION

AGermanprisonerobservesthatthefollowingarestandardtrainingprinciplesintheGermantankarm:

1.Surprise.

2.Promptdecisionsandpromptexecutionofthesedecisions.

3.Thefullestpossibleexploitationoftheterrainforfiring.However,fieldsoffirecomebeforecover.

4.Donotfirewhilemovingexceptwhenabsolutelyessential.

5.Facetheattackerhead-on;donotofferabroadsidetarget.

6.Whenattackedbyhostiletanks,concentratesolelyonthese.

7.Ifsurprisedwithouthopeoffavorabledefense,scatterandreassembleinfavorableterrain.Trytodrawtheattackerintoapositionwhichwillgiveyoutheadvantage.

8.Ifsmokeistobeused,keepwinddirectioninmind.Agoodprocedureistoleaveafewtanksinpositionasdecoys,and,whenthehostileforceisapproachingthem,todirectasmokescreentowardthehostileforceandblindit.

9.Ifhostiletanksaresighted,Germantanksshouldhaltandpreparetoengagethembysurprise,holdingfireaslongas

possible.Thereactionofthehostileforcemustbeestimatedbeforetheattackislaunched.

AGermanArmydocumententitled“HowtheTigerCanAid the Infantry”containsanumberof interestingpoints.

Thefollowingareoutstanding:

1.Thetankexpertmusthaveachancetosubmithisopinionbeforeanycombinedtank-infantryattack.

2.Ifthegroundwillsupportamanstandingononelegandcarryinganothermanonhisshoulders,itwillsupportatank.

3.Whenmud isverydeep, corduroy roadsmustbebuilt aheadof time.Since this requiresmanpower,material, andtime,theworkshouldbeundertakenonlynearthepointwherethemaineffortistobemade.

4.Tanksmustbedeployedtoconducttheirfirefight.

5.TheTiger,builttofighttanksandantitankguns,mustfunctionasoffensiveweapon,eveninthedefense.Thisisitsbestmeansofdefenseagainsthostiletanks.Giveitachancetouseitsuniquecapabilitiesforfireandmovement.

6.TheTigermustkeepmoving.Atthehaltitisaneasytarget.

7.TheTigermustnotbeusedsingly.[Obviously,thisdoesnotapplytotheTigerusedasrovingartilleryinthedefense.OnnumerousoccasionstheGermanshavebeenusingsingleTigersforthispurpose.]Themoremassyoucanassemble,thegreateryoursuccesswillbe.ProtectyourTigerswithinfantry.

HOWTOFIGHTPANZERS:AGERMANVIEW

An anti-Nazi prisoner of war, discussing the various methods of combating German tanks, makes some usefulcomments.Althoughtheyareneithernewnorstartling,theyarewellworthstudyingsincetheyareobservationsmadebyatankmanwhofoughttheUnitedNationsforcesinItaly.

German tanks undoubtedly are formidable weapons against a soft-shelled opposition, but become a less difficult

propositionwhenconfrontedwithresolutioncombinedwithaknowledgenotonlyoftheirpotentialitiesbutalsooftheirweaknesses.

WhendealingwithGermanheavytanks,yourmosteffectiveweaponisyourabilitytokeepstillandwaitforthemto

come within effective range. The next most important thing is to camouflage your position with the best availableresourcessothattheGermantankswon’tspotyoufromanyangle.

If these two factors are constantlykept inmind, thebattle ishalfwon.Movementof anykind is amistakewhich

certainlywillbetrayyou,yetIsawmanyinstancesofthisself-betrayalbytheBritishinItaly.Allowtheenemytanktoapproachascloseaspossiblebeforeengagingit—thisisoneofthefundamentalsecretsofantitanksuccess.InItalyIoftenfeltthattheBritishopenedfireontanksmuchtoosoon.Theiraimwasgood,buttherangesweretoogreat,andtheroundsfailedtopenetrate.Myowncaseisagoodillustration:iftheoppositionhadhelditsfireforonlyafewmomentslonger,Ishouldnotbealivetotellthistale.

By letting theGerman tankapproachascloseaspossible,yougainabigadvantage.When it ison themove, it is

boundtobetrayitspresencefromafar.Whereasyouyourselfcanpreparetofireonitwithoutgivingyourownpositionaway.Thetankwillspotyouonlyafteryouhavefiredyourfirstround.

Atankinmotioncannotfireeffectivelywithitscannon;thegunnercanplacefireaccuratelyonlywhenthevehicleis

stationary.Therefore,thereisnoneedtobeundulynervousbecauseanapproachingtankswivelsitsturretthiswayandthat.Everytankcommanderwilldothisinanattempttoupsethisopponents’tankrecognition.Ifthetankfiresnothingbutitsmachineguns,youcanbeprettysurethatyouhavenotyetbeenspotted.

Considertheadvantagesoffiringonatankatcloserange:

1.Inmostcasestheleadingtankisareconnaissancevehicle.Survivorsofthecrew,whensuchashortdistanceawayfromyou,havelittlechanceofescape.Thisisabigadvantage,inasmuchastheycannotrejointheiroutfitanddescribethelocationofyourpositiontothemainbody.

2.Anothertankfollowingitsleaderonaroadcannotrunyoudown.Inordertobypasstheleadingtank,ithastoslowdown.Then, long before the gunner can place fire on you, you can destroy the tank and block the road effectively.Earlierinthewar,aGermantankmanIknewdestroyed11hostiletanksinonedaybyusingthismethod.

VULNERABILITYOFTHEPZ.KPFW.VI

Atankissuchacomplicatedweapon,withitsmanymovablepartsanditselaboratemechanism,thatitisparticularlyvaluable to know its points of greatest vulnerability. Recently the Soviet Artillery Journal published a number ofpracticalsuggestions,basedonextensivecombatexperience,regardingthevulnerabilityoftheTiger.

Allweapons now used for destroyingGerman tanks— antitank guns and rifles, caliber .50 heavymachine guns,

antitankgrenades,andMolotovcocktails—areeffectiveagainstthePz.Kpfw.VI.

1.SuspensionSystem.—Themobilityof tanksdependsupon theproper functioningof the suspensionparts: the

sprocket (small driving wheel), the idler (small wheel in the rear), the wheels, and the tracks. All these parts arevulnerabletoshellsofallcalibers.Thesprocketisespeciallyvulnerable.

Firearmor-piercingshellsandhigh-explosiveshellsatthesprocket,idler,andtracks.

Fire at thewheelswith high-explosive shells.Use antitank grenades, antitankmines, andmovable antitankmines

againstthesuspensionparts.Attachthreeorfourminestoaboard.Placetheboardwherevertanksareexpectedtopass.Camouflage theboardandyourself.Asa tankpassesby,pull theboard in theproperdirectionandplace itunder thetrackofthetank.

[AGermansourcestatesthatthismethodwassuccessfullyusedonroadsandroadcrossingsinRussia,andthatitstill

is taughtintankcombatcoursesforinfantry.ThemineiscalledtheScharniermine(pivotmine).Itconsistsofastoutlengthofboard,8incheswideby2inchesthick,andcuttoalengthdependentonthewidthoftheroadtobeblocked.Aholeisboredatoneend,throughwhichaspikeorbayonetcanbedrivenintotheground,thusprovidingapivotfortheboard.Ahookisfastenedtotheotherendoftheboard,andaropeistiedtothehook,asshowninFigure3.Tellerminesaresecuredtothetopoftheboard.

Onemancanoperatethismine.Aftertheboardhasbeenfasteneddownatoneendwiththespike(inemergencies,a

bayonet)andaropetiedtothehookattheotherend,theboardislaidalongthesideoftheroad.Ontheoppositesideoftheroad,amanispostedinanarrowslittrench.Heholdstheotherendoftherope.Whenatankapproaches,thetankhunterwaitsuntilitiscloseenoughtothepivotedboard,and,attheverylastmoment,hepullsthefreeendoftheboardacrosstheroad.Theropeandslittrenchmustbewellcamouflaged.Agooddealofemphasisisplacedonthispoint.]

2.SideArmorPlates.—Therearetwoarmorplatesoneachsideofthetank.Thelowerplateispartlycoveredbythe

wheels.Thisplateprotectstheengineandthegasolinetanks,whicharelocatedintherearofthehull—directlybeyondand over the two rear wheels. Ammunition is kept in special compartments along the sides of the tank. Thesecompartmentsareprotectedbytheupperarmorplate.

Firearmor-piercingshellsfrom76-,57-,and45-mmgunsattheupperandlowerarmorplate.Whenthegastanksor

ammunitioncompartmentsarehit,thevehiclewillbesetonfire.

3.RearArmorPlate.—Thereararmorplateprotectstheengine,thegasolinetank,andtheradiators.

Useantitankguns.Aimatthereararmorplate.Whentheengineorthegasolinetanksarehit,thetankwillhaltand

willbegintoburn.

4.Peepholes,VisionPorts,andSlits.—Themainturrethastwoopeningsforfiringsmall-armsweapons,andtwo

visionports.Theturrethasfiveobservationslits.Therearetwosightingdevicesontheroofofthefrontpartofthetank—oneforthedriver,theotherforthegunner.Thereisalsoaportwithslidingcoversinthefrontarmorplate.

Use all availableweapons for firing at the peepholes, observation ports, vision slits, and the ports for small-arms

weapons.

5.Turrets.—Thecommander’sturretisanimportantandvulnerabletarget.

Firehigh-explosiveandarmor-piercingshellsofallcalibersatthecommander’sturret.Throwantitankgrenadesand

incendiarybottlesaftertheturrethasbeendamaged.

The tankcommander, the turret commander, and thegunner ride in the turret.The tankgunandmanymechanical

devicesarefoundintheturret.

Fireattheturretwith76-,57-,and45-mmshellsatrangesof500yardsorless.

6.TankArmament.—Theturretisarmedwithagunandamachinegunmountedcoaxially.Anothermachinegunis

foundinthefrontpartofthehull.Itprotrudesthroughthefrontarmorplate,onaballmount,andismannedby,theradiooperator.

Concentratethefireofallweaponsonthearmamentofthetank.Firewithantitankriflesattheballmountofthehull

machinegun.

7.AirVentsandVentilators.—Theairventsandtheventilatorsarefoundundertheslit-shapedperforationsofthe

roof of the hull, directly behind the turret.Another air vent is located in the front part of the roof, between the twoobservationportsusedbytheradiooperatorandthedriver.

Useincendiarybottlesandantitankgrenadestodamagetheventilatingsystem.

8.TankFloor.—Whenanantitankmineexplodesunderthetank,thefloorofthetankissmashed,andthetankisknockedoutofaction.

9.BaseofTurret.—Thereisa10-mmslitgoingallaroundtheturret,betweenthebaseoftheturretandtheroofof

thehull.

Fireatthebaseoftheturretwithheavymachinegunsandantitankguns,todestroytheturretmechanism,anddisrupt

thefieldoffire.Firewithhigh-explosiveshellsatthebaseoftheturretinordertowrecktheroofofthehullandputthetankoutofaction.

61.ATANK-INFANTRYTEAMOBSERVEDINCOMBAT


Foraperiodof36hoursinthelastdaysofJuly,anofficerofanAlliedarmygroupstaffhadanexcellentopportunity

ofobservingGermantanksandinfantryattackinganAlliedforceinFrance.Thefollowingnotes,whicharebasedonhisreport,describethetacticsthattheGermansemployed.

Thegeneralsituationwasfluidatthetimeoftheattack.TheGermansadvancedwestwardinthreeparallelcolumns,

eachconsistingoftanksaccompaniedbyinfantry.Thecentercolumnfollowedamainroad,firingrapidlyandmovingatabriskrate.Itwentfromhilltohill,withtheaccompanyinginfantrydog-trottingthroughthefieldsoneachsideoftheroadandoverthehedgerows.Theinfantrywasdeployedovernomorethanthewidthofasinglefieldoneachside.Thecenter column had a total of only about eight track-laying vehicles. At least three of these were tanks, one or twoprobablywereself-propelledguns,andtheremainderprobablywerehalf-trackpersonnelcarriers.

AlthoughthetotalGermanstrengthwhichhadbeensenttocaptureandholdanimportantcrossroadsatSt.Denisière

consistedoftwocompaniesofinfantryandprobablynotmorethantentanks,theAlliedofficerobservedonlythetrack-layingvehiclespreviouslymentionedandpossiblyaplatoonofinfantry.

TheInfantrymenMovedFast

Theleadingtankfiredits75rapidly,gettingbothgrazeandairbursts,whileitsmachineguns,supplementedbythoseofthevehiclesbehindit,sprayedthetopofeveryhedgerow.Thenoisewasterrific,andtheburstsintheshrubberyandthetopsoftreesandhedgerowswerecertainlyimpressive.Evenbeforetheshockofthegunsdischargedatcloserange,andthegarden-hosesprayofmachine-gunbullets,hadtakenfulleffect,Germaninfantrymenwereoverthehedgerowandintothefieldandwereadvancingtowardthenextfieldwithdeterminationandcourage.Theyknewwheretheyweregoing,andwenttherefast.

At night theGermans reacted forcefully, with fire and limitedmovement, whenever they detected any sign of an

Alliedapproach.TheGermantanksmovedslowly,andmadeverylittlenoise.Immediatelyafterfiring,eachtankmovedtoanewposition25to50yardsaway.ItshouldbeemphasizedthatthenoisedisciplineoftheGermantankcrewsandtheaccompanyinginfantrywassuperior.Therewasnotalkingorshouting;exceptformachine-gunandcannonfireandthestartingofmotor,nosoundcarriedfartherthan100yards.

Ontheotherhand,theapproachofU.S.tanksandthepassingofmostU.S.motorconvoyswasrapidlyidentifiableby

theloudshouting,talking,andissuingofordersbytheU.S.troopswhoapproachedorpassedthegeneralvicinityofaGermanposition.ThepropensityofU.S.tankdriversto“gun”theirmotorswasadeadgive-away,whereastheGermansalwayseased their tanks forward, traveled in lowgear, andwere remarkablyquiet inalloperationsexcept the firing.Theyused longburstsof their rapid-firingmachineguns todiscourageguests. Ifpressedatall, theysentup flares toobtainGermanartilleryandmortarfireontheirflanks.Thewaytheyhandledtheirtankswasboldandsure.Theyactedasiftheyknewexactlywhattheirdestinationwas,andbywhichroutetheywishedtoproceed.

AU.S.Tank“GottheWorks”

At0230,thedarkestpartofthenight,aGermantankmovedoutandheadedtowardthenorthernmostGermancolumn,makingaslittlenoiseaspossible.LateritturnedoutthataloneU.S.tankonreconnaissancehadpushedupagainstthenoseof the ridge that theGerman tankshadorganized,and theGermanswerequietly layingplans toplacea terrificamountoffireonit.Beforelong,itgottheworks.

BecausethereweresofewGermaninfantrymen,andbecausetheywereinterestedonlyinreachingandholdingthe

team’sobjective,theirmopping-upactivitieswerenegligible.Thus,oftheAlliedtroopsoverruninthisfashion,alargepercentagewasneitherkilled,wounded,captured,ormissingduringthefirst twoorthreedays.Theeaseandrapiditywithwhichthissmallattackingforcemadeitspenetration,reacheditsobjective,satontheobjective,andcuttrafficonanimportantroadisofmorethanordinaryinterest.Also,itisreasonabletoassumethattheGermanswillemploysmallgroupsforsimilarmissionsinthefuture.

62.“THEHEAVYMOBILEPUNCH”

IntelligenceBulletin,May1945

RecentlytheGermanshaveintensifiedtheireffortstoexploitarmor,inspiteofthedeterioratingsituation.Thesenotes

revealthetacticsofGermanarmoratthepresenttime.

AlarmedbythegrowingGermantendency,earlyin1945,tocommitarmorinsmallgroups,orevensingly,General

Student, Supreme Commander of a German army group, made a vigorous attempt to correct this practice. GeneralStudentwasshrewdenoughtoknowthatthereasonforsomuchdispersionofarmoredequipmentwithinhiscommandwastheverynaturalanxietyofhistroopstoobtainsecurityinalllocalities.Instressingthatstrongmeasureswouldbenecessary“tocombatthetendencyprevailingintheinfantrytosplitupassault-gunbattalionsandtank,assault-gun,andtank-destroyercompanies,”Studentpointedoutthatsuccessisachievedonlybycommitmentinabody—inbatteryorcompany strength, at least—at points of main effort. In effect, what he demanded was a return to normal Germandoctrine.

Whentanks,assaultguns,ortankdestroyerslosetheirfullmobilitybecauseofAlliedactionormechanicaldefects,

theGeneralobserved,itisfollytoretainsuchequipmentinthelinemerelysothattheirweaponscanbeutilized.

Inthelightofthesituationthenexisting,hedeclared,“Thefuelandspare-partssituationdoesnotpermitsomuchas1

meterofunnecessarytravel.”Asaresult,heallowedonlycorpsordivisionstodecideon,andsupervise,theshifting,routing,andothermovementoftankandassault-gununits.

Astocommitment,GeneralStudentorderedthatif,inabatteryorcompany,thenumberofweaponsreadyforaction

shoulddroptolessthanthree,theunitwastobecommittedonlyinconjunctionwithothertankorassault-gununitsuntiltheweaponscouldbebuiltuptotheirfullstrength.

“Iprohibitthepiecemealcommitmentoftanks,assaultguns,ortankdestroyers,”theGeneralordered.

Divisions which had tank, assault-gun, or tank-destroyer units assigned to them were to keep a reserve of these

weaponsinreadiness,preferablyincompanyorbatterystrength.Afteracommitment,suchareservewastoberestoredtofullstrengthasrapidlyaspossible.Forsecurityreasons,thesereserveweaponswerenottoremaininthemainlineofresistance.

Of timely-value, in connectionwith these problemswithwhichGeneral Student has had to cope, is some further

informationfromawell-informedandcredibleprisonerofwar.

TheprimarymissionofGerman tanks, as this source explains, is toprovide theheavymobilepunch.This iswhy

“piecemealcommitment”violatesthebasicGermancanonoftankwarfare.Anditalsoexplainswhytheenemyhasgonetosuchgreatlengthstoincreasethecaliberandmuzzlevelocityofhistankguns.Thebetterthegun,thebetterthetank,according to theGermanwayof thinking.Machine guns play a secondary role, and are used relatively little, exceptagainst tankhunters.Ahard-hitting tank that cancrush steel is theequipment inwhich theGermansnowplace theirfaith, believing, as they do, that such tanksmust clear theway for PanzerGrenadier elements to advancewith theirautomaticweapons.

ThisisthelatestmodelofthePz.Kpfw.Panther.

Conforming to this tacticaldoctrine, thePantherhasasuper-long75-mmgun.Pantherpersonnel,according to this

prisoner-of-warsource,aretrainedtoengageaShermantankwithouthesitationatarangeoffrom2,000to2,200yards.Theyaretaughtthatwhilethepreferablerangeof800to900yardswillimproveaccuracy,itwillnotaddgreatlytothepunch.Thegunhasanopticalsightwiththreegraduations:oneforhigh-explosiveshells,oneforarmor-piercingshells,andthethirdforthecoaxially-mountedmachinegun.Eachgraduationhasitsownrangesubdivision.Accordingtothesource,thegunisseldom,ifever,usedasindirectartillery.

Thissourcehadbeentaughtthat,intheapproachmarch,thetanksmovedincolumn,coveredbyeight-wheelarmored

reconaissance cars ahead. These vehicles, he states, are part of the reconnaissance platoon of each tank battalion. Ifcontact with hostile armor ismade, the tanks deploy and attack, echeloned in depth. However, in the battle aroundNoville onChristmasDay, these tacticswere not followed.ACaptainHingst, commandingofficer of a 1st (Germantank) Battalion, ordered all tanks to attack in a shallow skirmish line. The U.S. commander quickly sized up thesituation,andin45minuteshisShermanshadcompletelydestroyedsixPanthers.TheGermanswithdrew,andHingstwas replacedby aCaptainScheer, commandingofficer of the 2dBattalion.Whatwas left of the twobattalionswascombinedintoanimprovisedteam.CaptainScheerthentriedtobypasstheU.S.centerofresistance,butitwastootoughanutforhimtocrack.

An interestingprisoner-of-war disclosure confirms the existenceof aGermanorder to the effect that if a hopeless

situationdevelops,andifaunitisthreatenedwithcaptureorannihilation,allofficersandsergeantsaretowithdrawandreporttothenexthighercommand.Itisexplainedthatthismeasurewasadoptedtoreducetheheavybattlelossesinunitleaders.

63.THEGERMANMOUSE

IntelligenceBulletin,March1946

Super-Super-Super-HeavyTankBecameHitler’sWhiteElephant

One of the subjects of liveliest controversy during theAllied invasion of Francewas the heavy tank—the 50-tonPershing,the62-tonTiger,the75-tonRoyalTiger.Weretheseworththeirweight?Didtheygain—inprotectionandfirepower—asmuch as they sacrificed inmobility?AdolphHitler’smindwaspresumablymadeupon this point.Apetproject of his,which fewwere awareof, appears tohavebeen a superheavy tank thatwouldhavedwarfed even theRoyalTiger.DubbedtheMouse,thisbehemothofdoubtfulmilitaryvaluewastoweigh207tons,combatloaded.Twowereactuallybuilt,althoughtheywereneverequippedwiththeirarmament.

TheMouseisanamazingvehicle,withspectacularcharacteristics.Theglacisplateupfrontisapproximately8inches

(200mm)thick.Sinceitisslopedat35degreestothevertical,thearmorbasisistherefore14inches.Sidearmoris7inches(180mm)thick,withtherearprotectedbyplates61/4inches(160mm)thick.Thefrontoftheturretisprotectedby91/2inches(240mm)ofcastarmor,whilethe8-inch(200mm)thickturretsidesandrearwereslopedsoastogivetheeffectof9inches(230mm)ofarmor.

ARMAMENT

Forthemainarmament,apea-shooter likean88-mmgunwasignored.Selectedinsteadwasthepowerful128-mmtankandantitankgun,whichwaslatertobereplacedbya150-mmpiece38calibersinlength.(ThestandardGermanmedium fieldhowitzer 15 cm s.F.H.18 is only29.5 calibers in length.) Insteadofmounting a7.9-mmmachineguncoaxially, theMouse was to have a 75-mm antitank gun 76 calibers in length next to the 128- or 150-mm gun. Amachinecannonforantiaircraftwastobemountedintheturretroof,alongwithasmokegrenadeprojector.

In size, theMousewas considerably larger than anyGerman tank. Its lengthof 33 feetmade it nearly 50percent

longer than theRoyalTiger.Becauseof rail transportconsiderations. itswidthwaskept to12 feet (thatof theRoyalTigerandTiger).A12-footheightmadeitaconsiderabletarget.

ThisGermandrawingshowsasectionalizedelevationoftheMousehull.Thefollowingsalientfeaturesmaybediingtinguished:driver’sseat(20)andperiscope(14and18);radiooperator’sseat(12)andradio(21);radioantenna(28);airintakesformainengine(30);mainengine(3);generator(4);therightmotorofthetwoelectricmotorsdrivingthesprockets(9);auxiliaryfueltank(29).Thecoaxial75-mmgunisontherightoftheturret;itspositionrelativetothe128-mmgunisshownindottedoutline.

AsectionalizedplanviewoftheMousehullgivesanotherviewofmanyofthefeaturesshowninthefirstillustration.Thedriver’sandradiooperator’sseats(left)areflankedbythemainfueltanks.Justtotheirrearisthemainengine,flankedbyairpumpsandradiators.Furthertotherearisthegenerator,withammunitionstowageinthesponsonsoneitherside.Inthesponsononthefrontrightofthegeneratoristheauxiliaryengine,withstoragebatteriestoitsrear.Totherearofthehull,alsointhesponsons,arethemotorsfurnishingtheelectricdrive.Theactualtransmissionisinthedeeppartofhullbetweenthemotors,behindgenerator.

Inordertoreducethegroundpressuresothatthetankcouldhavesomemobility,thetrackshadtobemadeverywide

—all of 43.3 inches. With the tracks taking up over 7 of its 12 feet of width, the Mouse presents a very strangeappearanceindeedfromeitherafrontorrearview.Withsuchatrackwidth,andagroundcontactof19feet3inches,theMousekeepsitsgroundpressuredowntoabout20poundspersquareinch—abouttwicethatoftheoriginalTiger.

POWERPLANTS

Designinganenginesufficientlypowerfultoprovidemotivepowerforthemammothfightingvehiclewasaseriousproblem.ThoughtheGermanstriedtwoengines,botharound1,200horsepower(ascomparedtotheRoyalTiger’s590),neithercouldbeexpectedtoprovideaspeedofmorethan10to12milesanhour.TheMousecan,however,crossa14-foottrenchandclimba2-foot4-inchstep.

WhateverthemilitarypossibilitiesoftheMousemightbe,itcertainlygavedesignersspaceinwhichtorunhogwild

onvariousfeatureswhichtheyhadalwaysbeenanxioustoinstallintanks.Oneofthesegadgetswasanauxiliarypowerplant.Thisplantpermittedpressurizingofthecrewcompartment,whichinturnmeantbettersubmersionqualitieswhenfording,andgoodantigasprotection.Auxiliarypoweralsopermittedheatingandbatteryrecharging.

One of the fancy installations was equipment designed for fording in water 45 feet deep—a characteristic made

necessarybyweightlimitsofbridges.Besidessealingofhatchesandvents,aidedbypressurizing,submersionwastobemadepossiblebytheinstallationofagiantcylindricalchimneyortrunk,solargethatitcouldserveasacrewescapepassageifneedbe.Thetankswereintendedtofordinpairs,onepoweringtheelectrictransmissionoftheotherbycable.

TheMousewasasvulnerabletoclose-inattackasanyothertank,ifnotmoreso.Thelargehullopeningswereaparticulardisadvantage.Notetheirextent:thegrillsoftheengineaccesshatch,thegrilledairventswhichflankit,andthegrillsundertherearoftheturret,whichcooltheelectricmotors.Theauxiliaryfueltankontherearwasaconsiderablefirehazard.

ThesizeandweightoftheMousemadenecessaryextremelywidetracksinrelationtohullwidth.Thisviewalsoshowshalfoftheengineair-coolingsystem(left),andrearofrightfueltank,withanoiltankjusttoitsleft.

Theelectrictransmissionwasinitselfanengineeringexperimentofsomemagnitude.Thistypeoftransmissionhad

firstbeenusedonthebigElephantassaultgun-tankdestroyer in1943,andwasconsideredbysomeeminentGermandesignersasthebesttypeoftransmission—ifperfected—forheavytanks.

Another interesting feature of the Mouse from the engineering point of view was the return from torsion bar

suspension—suchaswasusedinthePz.Kpfw.III,thePanther,theTiger,andtheRoyalTiger—toaspringsuspension.AnimprovedtorsionbardesignhadbeenconsideredfortheMouse,butwasabandonedinfavorofavolutespringtypesuspension.

WHYTHEMOUSE?

JustwhytheGermanswantedtotryoutsuchamonstrosityastheMouseisaquestiontobeansweredbypoliticalandpropaganda experts. Whereas such a heavy tank might conceivably have had some limited military usefulness inbreakthroughoperations,itwasnoprojectforNaziGermanyexperimentationin1943,1944,and1945.FornotonlydidGermanauthoritieswastetimeofengineersandproductionfacilitiesonthetwotestmodels,buttheyevenwentsofarastoconstructaspecialflatcarforrailtransport.

Thedrawbacksinherentinsuchaheavytankarepatent.Weighnotonlydeniespracticallyeverybridgeinexistenceto

theMouse,but it impedes railmovementunless railwaysareproperly reinforcedatbridges,culverts,andotherweakpoints.Fordingto45-footdepthswouldhavesolvedmanyofthestream-crossingproblemsinEurope,butitseemsthattheMousecouldactuallycrossinwaternodeeperthan26feet.Thoughsittinginarollingfortress,thesixmenoftheMousecrewarepracticallyasblindasinanytank.Becauseoflowspeedandhighsilhouettetheirvehiclewouldbemostvulnerabletohits.Sinceitisreasonabletosupposethatheavilyfortified,staticpositionssuitableforattackbyaMousewouldalsobefittedwithveryheavy,high-velocitygunscapableofantitankfire,theevenoccasionalcombatvalueoftheMousecomesintoquestion.TheGerman128-mmPak44(alsoknowninmodifiedformsasthe12.8cmPak80)isreputedtobeabletopenetrate7inchesofarmorat2,000yards.SincetheGermansactuallyhadtheirPak44inservicein1945,whentheMousewasnotyetintheproductionstage,itwouldappearthattheGermanshadtheantidotebeforethegiant tankswere ready.Moreover, in the laterdaysof thewar, a rolling colossus like aMousewouldhavebeenalmostimpossibletoconceal,andwouldhavefallenaneasypreytoairpower.

TheMousewasdesignedtofordupto45feetofwater.Todoso,thetankwasmadewatertight.Atrunkwasfittedoverthehullescapehatch,andtrunkextensionsboltedovertheenginevents.Thetrunkcontalnedanescapeladder,andwasdividedintothreesections,thenumberusedvaryingwithwaterdepth.AsecondMousesuppliedelectricitytothefordingMousemotorsthroughacableattachedtotherear,asshown.

ThepsychologicalfactorthusappearstohaveplayedalargepartinthedemandforconstructionoftheMouse.The

GermanArmywouldneverhavedesiredsuchatank,especiallyin1942whenitsdesignwasapparentlyinitiated.Ontheotherhand,itwouldhavemadeluridheadlinesandSundaysupplementcopyinbothAlliedandGermanpresscircles.But whatever the public reaction might have been, it seems questionable that the Mouse could have exerted anypsychological effect on Russian, British, or American front-line troops unless the Germans possessed almostoverwhelmingstrength,as theydidwhen theycrushed theMaginotLine in1940. In1944-45 itwouldhavebeen tooeasyamarkforAlliedgunandplanesthefirstinstantitappeared.

Germanengineers,concernedovertheeffectofturnsupontrackperformance,madethiselectric-powered,remotecontrolled,large-scalewoodenreplica.

MICEOFTHEFUTURE

Theappearanceofsuchavehicleintheopeningphasesofafuturewarisnottobeentirelydiscounted.WhenRedArmy armored units counterattacked German forces advancing northward toward Leningrad in 1941, the Sovietseffectedasubstantialsurpriseandjustmissedobtainingaconsiderablevictorybythrowinginforthefirsttimeheavy46-tonKVtanksbackedby57-tonmodifiedKV’smounting152-mmtankgunsintheirturrets,

Thefirstdaysofawarareatimeofuncertainty.Thisisaperiodwhenpeacetimearmiesareprovingthemselves,when

theirpersonnelarestillanxioustodeterminethevalidityoftheirmatérielandtacticaldoctrines,whentheyareanxioustodiscoverwhattheenemyislike.Rumorsgrowfast,anduntriedmenarelikelytobeimpressedwiththemerereportofthe size and gun power of a superheavy tank.Officers and noncoms should therefore be aware of the possibility ofencounteringsuchcolossaltanks.Theyshouldseethattheirmenknowthedeficienciesandrealpurposeofoutlandishvehicles of the class of the German Mouse, and that they do not attribute to these vehicles capabilities out of allproportiontotheiractualbattlevalue.

Ahead-onviewoftheMousemodelaffordsanideaoftheformidableappearanceoftheoriginalMice.Notetheexceptionalwidthofthetracks.

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