horkheimer on religion

8/12/2019 Horkheimer on Religion

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The Critical Theory of Society:The Longing for the

Totally Other1

RJ. S

A

This essay is concerned with the religious and theological

dimension of Max Horkheimers, Theodor W. Adornos, and

Walter Benjamins and other theorists critical theory of society.

It aims at a new critical theory of religion, which would go

beyond the religious and theological concerns of the criticaltheory of society. The essay concentrates on the way, in which

the critical theorists of the first and second generation dealt

with the modern dichotomy between the religious and the sec-

ular, the sacred and the profane, revelation and enlightenment,

religious faith and autonomous reason, church and state. The

critical theorists have left behind the idealistic attempt to rec-

oncile the modern dichotomy of the religious and the secular:

e.g., that of Leibnitz, Hegel, Goethe, or Beethoven.The essay focuses on the critical theorists materialistic attempt

not to reconcile faith and knowledge, that is not possible at

this point in history but at least to prevent the modern con-

tradiction between monotheism and enlightenment to be closed

prematurely either fundamentalistically or scientistically and

positivistically. Adorno and Benjamin have initiated an inverse

theology, which presupposes a. that religion has indeed con-

tributed to the humanization of mankind, and b.that the sec-

ularization process cannot be stopped The inverse theology


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58 Siebert

from the depth of the mythos into the secular discourse among

the expert cultures sociology, psychology, anthropology, phi-

losophy and through it into communicative and political

action, in order thus to prevent the further rebarbarization of

the Western civilization. The inverse theology is a test in sofar as that semantic or semiotic material, which cannot be

translated into the profane discourse of expert cultures, can-

not be rescued and will be lost. One central semantic element,

which Adorno and Horkheimer intended to rescue, was the

longing for the totally Other than the slaughterbench, holo-

caust altar and Golgatha of history. In this longing for the

entirely Other is concretely superseded, i.e., criticized, but also

preserved and elevated and fulfilled, what once in the world religions and philosophies had been called: Eternity, Beauty,

Heaven, God, Infinite, Transcendence, Being, Idea, Absolute,

Unconditional. The critical theorists transform once certain

religious dogmas into longings. The longing for the totally

Other has been the fundamental motive and motivation of the

critical theorists, which gave them manifestly or latently energy

for almost a whole century, and which allowed them to sur-

vive two world wars, and fascism, and emigration, and to make

it possible for them on one hand not to regress into mythol-

ogy, and on the other hand not to fall victim to positivism as

the metaphysics of what is the case.

K: critical theory, philiosophy, religion, theology,

theodicy, Marxism, historical materialism, dialectics, fascism.

It is the goal of this presentation to trace and explore Max Horkheimerand Theodor W. Adornos notion of the longing and hope for the fun

damentally nameless and imageless entirely Other than nature and historyand the laws governing them, as the most powerful motive and moti

vation of their critical theory and praxis, as they developed them in theidiscourses and writings from the 1930s to the 1960s (Horkheimer 1972

1985, 1996; Habermas 2003; Solomon 1996). What the Left-Hegelian

critical theorists, Max Horkheimer, the initiator and spiritus rector of the

i i l h f i d h hi d di f h I i f S i


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1973b; Gadamer and Habermas 1979:9-64; Taylor 1983; Butler 1977

Kaufmann 1965; Fredrich 1954; Rosen 1995; Scheible 1989; Witte 1985Best and Kellner 1991; Noerr 2000; Arato and Gebhardt 1982; Wiggershau

1987; Jay 1981; Merton 1957:9, 280, & 328). As Hegel struggled to his

last days with Kant, so Adorno did with Hegel (Hegel 1986n:347-535Adorno 1966:293-351). As the critical theory determinately negates Hegelphilosophy, it does not only criticize it, but also tries to preserve and

elevate and fulfill some of it (Hegel 1986c: 72-75, 1986e:48-53; Horkheime

& Adorno 1969:29-51; Adorno 1966:135-206; Horkheimer 1986:483-492

1985b; Schmidt & Altwicker 1986; Adorno 1997a:247-382). Continuallythe critical theorists criticize Immanuel Kant through Hegel and Hege

through Kant, but nevertheless learn from both of them (Horkheimer1987b; 1985b:483-492). In this sense, not only Kants but also and par-

ticularly so Hegels philosophy remains the prototype for the critical the-

ory of society: that is not only true for his phenomenology of spirit, hisscience of logic, his philosophy of law and history and his aesthetics, but

also and especially so for his philosophy of religion. Here the critica

theorists notion of Otherness is mainly rooted (Hegel 1986n:329-344).

Purpose

The main purpose of Hegels philosophy of religion was the reconciliation

of the modern antagonism between the religious and the secular, between

faith and reason, between revelation and enlightenment (Hegel 1986m

9-88, 1986n:329-344, Findley 1958; Ch. Taylor 1983). This is still the

purpose of the critical theory of society, insofar as it is concerned withreligion and theology (Horkheimer 1985a:30-37). This is so, because

Hegels idealistic reconciliation between the sacred and the profane has

not succeeded: as little as that of Goethe or Beethoven (Hegel 1986n:329344). Of course, also the materialistic critical theory of society is not able

to reconcile the modern antagonism between the religious and the sec-

ular (Siebert 2002). But it tries at least to keep open this dialectic between

the sacred and the profane, and to prevent under all circumstances thait is closed prematurely either fundamentalistically or scientistically and

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60 Siebert

of history the slaughterbench, or the holocaust altar, or the Golgatha of world history was indeed the manifest fundamental motivation of the criticatheory of society of the first generation of critical theorists, and remain

that also at least latently for the second and third generation (Hege

1986k:29-55; Horkheimer 1985a:30-37, 1974; Adorno 2001:7-258Habermas 2002; Todenhofer 2003:2-11). This longing for the entirelyOther has prevented so far the critical theory of society from falling vic

tim to the dull positivism, into which the great bourgeois enlightenment

and sometimes even the Marxian and Freudian enlightenment, have

degenerated (Horkheimer 1988c; 1985a; Adorno 1970:7-80; Horkheimeand Adorno 1969:29-51; Adorno 1966:135-206; Marx 1972:18-20, 1964:43

44, 1961, 1953; Feuerbach 1957; Freud 1964:1-92, 1962:11-92; Jone1961; Benjamin 1978:671-683; Lonitz 1994; Kogon 1958a:392-402

Adorno 1997c:608-616). This longing for the totally Other alone guarantee

that the critical theory of society or the new critical theory of religionwill not turn into an uncritical one. The longing for the imageless and

notionless entirely Other is not the basis of religion, but rather the con

crete supersession of all the God-hypostasies present in the still living a

well as in the dead world religions in terms of what Ernst Bloch hacalled humanism as religion in inheritance. (Hegel 1986m, 1986n; Bloch1985, 1970:7-30). But the longing for the totally Other is indeed the

basis and the motivation of the critical theory of society as well as o

the dialectical theory of religion to be developed out of it, and remainsnecessary for their survival under the enormous identity and confor

mity pressure of a more and more globalizing late capitalist society

(Horkheimer 1985a; Adorno 1979:354-372, 578-587; Siebert 2002, 1989)

Redemptive Quest

The longing and the hope for the fundamentally imageless and nameles

totally Other as a redemptive quest for the rescue of the hopeless is the

main motive of the critical theory of society as well as of the dialectica

theory of religion to be developed out of it (Horkheimer 1985a; Sieber2002, 1989). This longing is to be translated into a post-Enlightenmen


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by a vision of alternative Future III the right or reconciled society

beyond the present antagonistic civil society, which is not as it ought tobe, measured by its own cultural closure values, and which daily con-

tradicts its own most noble institutions and aspirations (Horkheimer 1985a

Flechtheim 1976; 1970; 1962a; 1962b; 1966; 1959; Vilmar 1979:51-57Fromm 1973; Habermas 2001a; 2001b:9-10, 11-33, 34-125; 1991; 19981990: parts 1-5, 19). The critical theory of religion aims at the mitiga-

tion at least of the fast approaching alternative Future I the totally

administered, bureaucratized, computerized, robotized signal-society, a

the resistance against the arrival of alternative Future II the more andmore militarized society continually involved in conventional wars or civi

wars and preparing NBC wars (using nuclear, biological and chemicaweapons of mass destruction) and the consequent ecological catastrophes

and at the passionate promotion of alternative Future III a society, in

which personal autonomy and universal, i.e., anamnestic, present andproleptic solidarity would be reconciled (Horkheimer 1985a; Flechtheim

1976; 1970: chap. 1-9, 1962a, 1962b, 1966, 1959; Vilmar 1979:51-57)

Unfortunately, while alternative Futures I and II are not desirable, they

are, nevertheless, very possible and probable, and while alternative FutureIII is very desirable, it is under the present neo-conservative and neo

liberal conditions of advanced capitalist society less possible and probable

The movement toward alternative Future III the longig for and the

solidarity with the human other without loss of autonomy is not thesame as, but rather the necessary presupposition for the longing and

the hope for the totally Other than the slaughterhouse of nature and

history, in which almost everybody is programmed to eat everybody forthe purpose of self-preservation and self-maintenance (Siebert 2002, 1989)Theology cannot and must not be reduced to anthropology.

Negative Theology

While for Hegel the finite was the other of the Infinite, for the critica

theorists the Infinite was the Other of the finite: the totally Other of thefinite world as nature and history as gigantic sacrificial altar (Hege



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62 Siebert

The great Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich, the friend of Horkheime

and Adorno, had spoken of the Ultimate Reality (Tillich 1963, 1957)Talcott Parsons, the father of American structural-functionalism, the grea

positivistic competitor of the critical theory of society, took over Tlllich

theological notion (ODea 1966; Parsons 1965, 1964). Parsons openedup his system of human condition, and particularly his human actionsystem, embracing culture, society, personality and behavioral organism

upward through culture toward the Ultimate Reality, and downward

through the behavioral human organism toward nature. Horkheimer dis

covered, that Hegel did not only have a very well developed positivetheology, but also a negative one, which reached, of course, far back to

the Second and Third Commandment of the Mosaic Law, i.e., the prohibition against making images of the Absolute or naming it and thu

disclosing its nature and attributes; and into Jewish, Christian and Islamic

mysticism, and even to the scholastic Thomas Aquinas the greaChristian and Aristotelian counterpart to the Jew Moses Maimonides o

Rambam, and to the Muslims Alfarabi and Avicenna who stated openly

and clearly, that what God is we do not know; and to his great teacher

Kant, who forbid human reason to enter the intelligible realm, the thingin-itself, the sphere of God, Immortality and Freedom, and transformed

it into a set of postulates of practical reason, and beyond that counseled

to leave it to religious faith alone (Aquinatis 1937:8-14; Horkheime

1996c:101-113).

Inverse Theology

Likewise, Adorno and Walter Benjamin developed on the Island of Ibiza

in the early 1930s out of Hegels positive theology a new or an other, oan inverse theology, particularly in response to Franz Kafkas work (Witte1985:104; Adorno 1970:103-162; Scholem 1989:9-268). This new inverse

theology allows some religious and theological contents to migrate from

the mythos into the secular discourse of the expert cultures of psychol

ogy, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, etc., and through it into communicative and even political praxis, in order to stem the always new


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in Habermass universal pragmatic, theory of communicative action, dis

course or communicative ethics, discourse theory of the constitutionastate under the cover of his methodological atheism (Habermas 1990:9-181991). Habermas admittedly takes the Second and Third Commandmen

of the Mosaic law and the inverse theology so radically seriously, that unlike his teacher Adorno he never mentions the concept of the totallyOther, in spite of the fact that he knows very well its origins not only

in Hegel, but also in Kant and Sren Kierkegaard. Methodological athe-

ism simply means the formal exclusion of theological or metaphysica

presuppositions: e.g., the religious apriori of the Hebrew prophets, thatDivine Providence governs the world; or the metaphysical presupposi-

tion of the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras, that Reason rules nature andhistory (Hegel 1986k:19-29).

No Political Theocracy

Of course, the longing for the totally Other is not a moment of a post

religious political theocracy. Not only Benjamin, but also the other crit-

ical theorists learned early on from Ernst Blochs famous book Spirit ofUtopia, to deny and resist with all intensity at least the political significanceof theocracy (Benjamin 1977:262-263). The recent history of the NearEast has shown the horrible consequences of attempts to posit under

modern or post-modern conditions as the goal of national or world his-

tory a political theocracy, instead of a democracy, or the happiness o

the people: e.g., Islamic or other forms of clerico-fascism. The goal of

the happiness of the people may as Benjamin put it as the veryopposite of the goal of political theocracy, nevertheless support and pro

mote dialectically enough the most quiet approach of the Messianic

Kingdom (Benjamin 1977: chap. 11).

Agnosticism and Atheism

For the critical theorists, the totally Other is indeed unknowable in its

i I hi h f ll i K i I h i



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tical methodology, without which the critical theory would cease to be

critical: the methodology of radical, but nevertheless still determinatenegation of one life or thought form by the following one in term

of not only its critique, but also at the same time of its rescue, preser-

vation, elevation and fulfilment (Hegel 1986c:72-74, 1986e:48-53; Adorno2003, 1973). The critical theorists were anti-systematic, because theythought that in Hegels case his grandiose system, which was the result

of his positive dialectics, arrested and strangled it at the same time

(Horkheimer 1985b:483-492; Adorno 1973:300-360; 1963). The critica

theorists also saw, how the Soviet system of Eastern Europe arrestedits own dialectics. The result was the Stalinist red fascism. This undialec

tical red fascism was at least one of the main reasons for the successfulneo-conservative or neo-liberal counterrevolution of 1989, after the mis

erable failure of the earlier bourgeois counterrevolutions of the 1920s

and the 1930s, and most of all in the 1940s, which reached their cli-max with Hitlers criminal attack against the Soviet Union and his defea

in Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin. As the neo-liberal counterrevolution

overcame red fascism in 1989, it opened up to be sure unintention

ally the opportunity for a new beginning of a truly dialectical historical materialism (Habermas 1976a, 1990:179-204). In any case, because

of their experience of the anti-dialectical tendencies in philosophical or

political systems, the critical theorists insisted on an open, or even a neg-

ative dialectics (Horkheimer 1985b:483-492; Adorno 2003:7-262, 1973)This paper can not be less dialectical than its object the critical theory

of society, or the critical theory of religion: since otherwise it would miss

both of them entirely, as all the positivistic approaches continually doThis essay must, therefore, also share the critical theorys anti-systematicattitude, even if doing so it risks the appearance of fragmentation.

Positivistic Logic

Thus, this essay is not written in the more linear, developmental form

typical of writings in terms of the positivistic logic of the social sciencesdominant in late capitalist society as instruments of harmonization and



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66 Siebert

usually do not swim together. But they will ultimately be ordered and

prepared and come together in a magnificent bouillabaisse: a constellation. But neither of the two models may lead to the realization of tha

identity principle, which the positivistic reader has in common with the

great bourgeois enlightenment, and which he always desires to find, buwhich the dialectician can not deliver, because it is ideological: ideologyunderstood critically as false consciousness and as the masking of national

class and race interests, shortly as untruth (Hegel 1986n:329-344). Al

syntheses remain fragile: even already in Hegels most advanced system

which moves from one weak synthesis to the other: weak because theantitheses they contain tend always again to assert themselves in though

and even more so in reality. Only when antagonistic civil society wilchange its identity toward alternative Future III a reconciled society

peace can also be achieved in thought. Adorno sometimes expressed the

opinion, that dialectical thought could not at all be expressed in themedium of the English language. That was an exaggeration! Horkheimer

and Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm, and even Adorno himself have

proven, that dialectical thinking can express itself also in English, i

sufficient space and time is patiently and tolerantly given for its development through contradictions. It is hard, if not impossible, shortly to

sum up dialectical thought, as it is indeed possible in positivistic thinking

(Hegel 1986a:218; 1986b:10, 15, 55, 100, 101, 109, 111, 122, 161, 176

251, 403, 412, 435-453; 1986c:11, 14, 29, 31, 37, 38, 47; 1986d:10, 1051986e:21; 1986f:494; 1986g:339-514; 1986h: part I; 1986i: part II; 1986j

part III; 1986k:29-33, 107-115; 1986l:352; 1986m:249-442; 1986n

1986o:62; Adorno 2003, 1973: part I-III).

Attitude Toward Theology: No Apologetics

It is, of course, astonishing that the critical theorists, who have been much

more secularized than Kant or Hegel or even Marx, not to speak o

Kierkegaard, have, nevertheless, developed not only a critical but also a

positive relationship not only to the positive social sciences and philosophybut also to an admittedly radically transformed theology (Horkheime


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at least not ultimately. This is, of course, an originally Jewish as well as

Christian notion of theology. This critical as well as positive attitudetoward theology was not only present in the first, mostly Jewish gener

ation of critical theorists, e.g., Horkheimer, Benjamin, Adorn, or Bloch

but also still prevails manifestly or latently in the second generation, e.g.Habermas, Karl-Heinz Haag, or Alfred Schmidt. It is even so, that thecritical theory of society has itself a theological dimension in the sense

of the earliest forms of theology: namely a theodicy. Theodicy can indeed

serve as a lens for reading the critical theory of society in its totality

Theodicy, when taken together with the Mosaic Decalogue, particularlythe Second and the Third Commandment, i.e., the prohibitions against

making images of, or not only profaning, but even just naming theAbsolute, can bring into a new light something that has long been

neglected within the interpretation of the critical theory of society. That

the critical theory is a theodicy does, of course, not mean that it is anapologetical project. Precisely because the critical theory is a materialis-

tic, negative and inverse theodicy, no trace of apologetics is left. No

only Adorno, but also all the other critical theorists found to be repul-

sive any trace of apologetics in the contemporary philosophy, or posi-tive social sciences, or positive theology or reliology.

Theology as Theodicy

However, while the critical theory of society has remained deeply rooted

in modern science and philosophy, it has contained in itself, neverthe-

less, a very precise more or less hidden theological idea: a theodicy(Horkheimer 1972, 1985a). The critical theory is no less a theodicy than

Hegels historical idealism, or Marxs historical materialism, or Sigmund

Freuds psychoanalytical philosophy (Hegel 1986k:28, 540; 1986m:881986o:248, 455, 497; Horkheimer 1970:37; Marx 1964:43, 44, 167-171

1972:18-20, 142; 1961: chap. 1, 15; 1953: chap. 3; Freud 1964:1-92; Fromm

1962:11-92; Jones 1961; Horkheimer 1985a). The critical theory embrace

in itself not only a theodicy in the sense of Max Weber (Weber 1963:chapIX; Horkheimer 1970:37). According to Weber, a theodicy was every



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ity of Hegels dialectical philosophy was nothing else than a gigantic

attempt to renew the theodicy after Kant had declared any philosophical theodicy to be impossible after his destruction of the cosmological

teleological and ontological proof for the existence of God (Kant 1981:105

124, 1965:485-572; Hegel 1986n:347-535, 1986k:28, 540, 1986m:881986o:248, 455, 497, 519). As little as the critical theorists could talkabout false consciousness or ideology critique without careful recourse to

Hegel, so little could they speak about theology as theodicy without ref

erence to him (Benjamin 1978a:682). After Auschwitz and all the hor

ror and terror this name stands for, the Jewish critical theorists had inspired by Hegel to remind the Christian theologians of the 20th cen

tury again that their theology had been originally a theodicy and thathey had forgotten their own origin and that it was time for them to

remember it again (Oelmller 1990; Neuhaus 1993; Schuster & Boschert

Kimmig 1993; Metz 1995; Greinacher 1986; Slle 1989; Hinkelmann1985). Of course, in the critical-theoretical perspective, after Auschwitz

and Birkenau, Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hegels instrumenta

theodicy is not possible any longer and is gone for ever: God instru

mentalizing the slaughterbench of history as sacrificial altar for the purpose of the achievement of the realm of freedom. Hegels gravestone in

the socialist Dorotheen Cemetery in Berlin still represents the holocaus

altar of the first and second Temple in Jerusalem. Up to the present

Jewish friends put little pebbles on Hegels gravestone. Certainly, in thisense for the critical theorists Hegels philosophical system, which was a

last gigantic theodicy attempt, has indeed broken down once and for all

The critical theory of society is an eschatological theodicy: what Hegehad called most realistically the slaughterbench or holocaust altar of history will not prevail.

The Concept of Infinity

While the critical theory had been a theodicy from its earliest poetica

beginnings implicitly, at least since Horkheimers essay Thoughts onReligion written and published in American exile, in the Internationa


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of the inalterable aloneness of men, and that it kept civil society from

indulging in a thoughtless optimism, an inflation of its own knowledgeinto a new religion. The critical theory is a theodicy also in the sense

of Horkheimer book Eclipse of Reason of 1947 (Horkheimer 1972:1291947). Here Horkheimer stated that without the thought of truth andthereby of that what guaranteed it, the Infinite, the Absolute, the totallyOther, there was no knowledge of its opposite, the abandonment of the

human beings for the sake of which the true philosophy had to be crit

ical and pessimistic. Without this thought of truth and what guaranteed

it, the Unconditional, there was not even sorrow, without which therewas no happiness. While Horkheimer never mentioned Adornos and

Benjamins negative, inverse theology, he nevertheless practiced it con-tinually as theodicy: which again was possible only because the theodicy

had been present in the inverse theology from its very start as well (Adorno

1970b:103-161; Lonitz 1994; Horkheimer 1970:9-53, 1985a: chap. 37).

Absolute Truth

Thus, Horkheimer did not negate the entirely Other, the absolute truth

abstractly, but it was rather itself the determinate negation of that wha

on earth was called the theodicy problem: injustice, human abandon-ment and alienation (Horkheimer 1970:37, 40-41, 1985a). According to

Horkheimer, without the thought of an unthinkable infinite happiness

there was not even the consciousness of the earthly transitory happiness

which in the face of its unchangeable transitoriness could never be with-

out sadness. The critical theory is a theodicy in so far as it remembersthe martyrs of our time (Horkheimer 1947: chap. IV, 1985a, 37-40; Sieber

1993). In the perspective of Horkheimer, the real individuals of our time

were the martyrs who have gone through infernos of suffering and degradation in their resistance to conquest and oppression: not the inflated

personalities of popular culture, the conventional dignitaries. These unsung

heroes consciously exposed their existence as individuals to the terroris

annihilation that others undergo unconsciously through the social processin civil society. The anonymous martyrs of the German and European



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70 Siebert

Semblance of Otherness

Horkheimer received the notion of the longing for the totally Other from

Adorno, who was the better Hegelian, not vice versa (Horkheimer 1985a)

Thus, it is not amazing that the theological dimension in the critical theory of society reaches its climax in Adornos conclusive work entitled

Negative Dialectics(Adorno 1973: parts 1-3, 2003). Toward the end of thiextraordinary book, which embraces the main accomplishment of hiwhole philosophical life work, Adorno speaks about the great Anselm o

Canterburys specifically Christian ontological proof for the existence o

God: that God is the highest Notion or Idea, which a greater one can

not be conceived, and which therefore must contain being or existencesince otherwise a greater one could be thought of: ergo God exist

(Anselm 1962:iii-xxvi, 1-9; Adorno 1973:402-405). According to Adorno

Hegel had in opposition to Kant tried to determinately negate, i.e. no

only to criticize, but also to resurrect dialectically, and thus to preserveand to elevate, and fulfill Anselms ontological argument for the exis

tence of God (Anselm 1962:xv-xx; Hegel 1986n:347-535). In Adorno

view, Hegel failed in his attempt to restore the ontological proof (Adorno1973:402-405). Adorno rather sides with the monk Gaunilon and Kan

against Anselm of Canterbury and Hegel: he denies the identity of theNotion, or the Idea, and being, and stresses their non-identity, and thu

negates Anselms proof once more, but still not merely abstractly, bu

rather determinately and concretely (Anselm 1962; xv-xx, 145-170; Hege

1986n:347; Adorno 1973:402-405). In Adornos perspective, in Hegel

consistent resolution of non-identity into pure identity, the notion becomethe guarantor of the non-conceptual. According to Adorno, Transcendence

captured by the immanence of the human spirit, was at the same time

turned into the totality of the spirit and thus abolished altogether.

Radical Objectivity

Adorno was truly and honestly convinced, that his negative dialectic withits emphasize on non-identity preserved and protected better the radica


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sense, so Adorno argued, the anti-historical Barthian theology of down-

right Otherness has its historical index. For Adorno, the question of the-ology and metaphysics was sharpened into the question, whether this

utter tenuousness, abstractness, indefiniteness of the Absolute was the last

already lost defensive position of theology and metaphysics: or whethertheology and metaphysics survived only in the meanest and shabbiestrefuse of the phenomenal world, whether a state of consummate insigni-

ficance will let it restore reason to the autocratic reason that performed

its office without resistance or reflection (Adorno 1973:402-405; Theunissen

1983:41-65; Habermas 1988:278-279). In Adornos view, theology andmetaphysics could possibly survive in the micrology of the smallest, shab-

biest, meanest detail of reality. While this micrology is certainly farremoved from any post-ontological proof for the existence of God, it is

nevertheless, almost a Judeo-Christian idea: to see the resemblance o

the entirely Other in the oppressed, exploited, tortured, hanged, shot, gassedcrucified, hopeless innocent victims of the what Hegel and Schopenhauer

had identified as the slaughterbench, or the holocaust altar of world-

history (Hegel 1986k:29-55, 1986n:50-95, 185-346; Horkheimer 1996c

chap. 4, esp. 76-78, 1974a; Adorno 1973:402-405; Habermas 1978:1195, 127-143, 1986:53-54; Oelmuller 1990; Neuhaus 1993; Schuster &

Boschert-Kimmig 1993: parts I-II; Metz 1995; Greinacher 1986; Slle

1989; Hinkelmann 1985). Hegel had also spoken of the little flowers, or

the foul existences, on which the powerful were stepping all the time (Hege1986k:29-105). While Hegel took already suffering into the dialectical notion

for the critical theorists the extreme suffering of the 20th century exploded

and shattered the dialectical notion altogether: the result was the negativedialectics (Hegel 1986f: part II, 1986n:185-346; Adorno 1973: parts I-IIIesp. 300-360). While Adorno stressed the non-identity between even the

highest notion and the smallest existence, micrology could at least stil

discover a semblance of the former in the latter (Adorno 1973:402-405)

Such semblance of the totally Other in the smallest existential detail o

nature, society and history is not entirely without consolation.

Positivism



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72 Siebert

once been initiated, was sacrificed by contemporary positivists. Adorno

gave credit to Wittgenstein for having pointed this out, however well hicommandment of silence may otherwise go with a dogmatic, falsely res

urrected theology and metaphysics, that could no longer be distinguished

from the wordless rapture of Heideggerian or Tillichian believers in Bein(Adorno 1997b:413-524, 1973:403). In Adornos perspective, what demythologization would not affect without making it apologetically available wa

not an argument. For Adorno, the sphere of arguments was antinomi

cal pure and simple. It was rather the experience that if thought wa

not decapitated, it would flow into Transcendence: down to the idea oa world that would not only abolish extant suffering, but revoke even

the suffering of the innocent victims that was irrevocably past (Adorno1970b: parts 1-2, 1973:403; Habermas 1978:11-95, 127-143, 1986:53

54). As Adornos micrology does not decapitate thought, it turns into an

other, inverse theology engaged in what his friend Benjamin had calledanamnestic solidarity with the innocent victims (Adorno 1970b: part

1-2, 1973:403; Benjamin 1977: chs. 10, 11; Habermas 1978:48-95). In

the perspective of a dialectical theory of religion, Adornos and Benjamin

inverse theology, which allows semantic potentials to migrate from thedepth of the mythos into the secular social scientific discourse, can

indeed mediate between monotheism on one hand and radical enlight

enment on the other (Adorno 1969:22; Habermas 1990:9-18, 1978:33

95). While we can not at this point in history reconcile the deepcontradiction between faith and knowledge, revelation and autonomou

reason, and must express it honestly and truthfully, we can at least poin

already the direction out of it in terms of an open dialectic.

Between the Religious and the Secular

After Auschwitz and Treblinka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and all the hor

ror and terror of the slaughterbench of the 20th century, which these

names indicate, the critical theorists could not share any longer with

Hegel the Jewish, Christian, Islamic prophetic presupposition, that DivineProvidence, Plan, Purpose, Law and Judgment govern the world as nature


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continuum between the religious extreme represented, e.g., by Gershom

Scholems mystical theology on one hand, and the secular extreme, represented, e.g., by Bertolt Brechts historical materialism and epical or dialec

tical theater, on the other (Hegel 1986m:9-88; Scholem 1957; 1977; 1973

Brecht 1961; Fuegi 1994). Being post-religious and post-metaphysical, thecritical theorists, nevertheless, do not fall victim to the dominant positivismin its many forms, by the dull conformity of which they are horrified

(Horkheimer 1974b:101-104, 116-117; Adorno 1970a: esp. 7-80, 1973:403)

Such positivism sometimes even creeps into the otherwise most critica

poetry of Brecht (Adorno 1970b:103-162; Benjamin 1978).

Radical Enlightenment

It is against the Hegelian background and prototype that this essay

explores the fundamental motive and motivation of Horkheimers and

Adornos critical theory of society, which were no longer constituted byfaith in the Kingdom of Heaven, Eternity, or Beauty as it had been pre-

sent in the old world-religions and world-philosophies, but rather by the

longing and the hope for the totally Other than nature, civil society

political state, or world-history ( John 18:28-40; Horkheimer 1985a, 1996

1985b:349-397, 439-440, 526-541, 593-605, 1981a:131-136, 145-155Schmidt and Altwicker; Kng 1978:540-542). To be sure, concerning

the deep and still further widening and globalizing modern dichotomy

between the religious and the secular, revelation and autonomous rea-

son, mythology and enlightenment the critical theorists stood decisively

on the side of radical enlightenment (Hegel 1986m:16-27; Horkheimerand Adorno 1969:9-49; Kogon 1958a:392-402; 1958b:484-498; Adorno

1997:608-617; Habermas 1990:14-15). As this had been true for the firs

generation of the critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno thus thisis still true today for the second and third and even fourth generation

For Horkheimer, the process of enlightenment was marked out in the firs

thought a human being conceived of (Horkheimer 1996b:446). According

to Horkheimer, of this same process of enlightenment Hegel had said inhis Phenomenology of the Spirit that if it had once started, it was irresistable



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74 Siebert

or in its pure essence. Therefore, there was no energy present in the

spiritual or intellectual life anymore, which would be beyond the enlightenment. It is the purpose of this essay to follow the critical theorists a

they as radical enlighteners and as being at the same time motivated by

their longing for the totally Other tried to mitigate at least alternativeFuture I the totally administered society, to resist alternative Future II the militaristic society, and to promote in theory and praxis alternative

Future III the right society, inside the wrong one the extremely

antagonistic late capitalist society (Horkheimer 1985a; Adorno 1979:354

373, 578-587; Flechtheim 1985:152-160).

The Notion of Dialectic

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, with the notion of dialectic or

determinate negation Hegel had emphasized an element which differentiated

genuine enlightenment from its positivistic and pragmatistic decay (Hege1986c:72-77, 1986e:48-53; Horkheimer and Adorno 1969:29-31). However

according to the critical theorists, as Hegel made finally the known resul

of the whole process of the determinate negation the totality in sys

tem and history after all into the Absolute, he violated the Second

and Third Commandment of the Mosaic Law the prohibition againsmaking images or naming the Unconditional as well as their secular

ization, i.e., Kants taboo against any excursion of the intellect into the

realm of the Intelligible, or the Thing-in-itself, or God, Immortality and

Freedom, and thus himself fell victim to the dialectic of enlightenmen

as Marx, Nietzsche and Freud after him (Exodus 20:4-7; Kant 1965:485572; Hegel 1986n:347-534; Horkheimer and Adorno 1969:30; Horkheime

1985b:349-416, 436-492, 487-605, 1989b, 1990, 1987a, 1987b:15-74, 75

148, 1990:152-168, 1987c:467-482; Zerin 1998:46-49). As the critical theorists determinately negated Hegels philosophy, they preserved its dialectica

form the process of determinate negation but uncoupled the latter

from the formers totality in system and history and in the strictes

obedience to the radicalized Second and Third commandment of theDecalogue and to Kants prohibition against any penetration of the realm


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Monotheism and Enlightenment

In spite of the fact that Horkheimer and Adorno were completely com-

mitted to enlightenment, there existed nevertheless for them a connection

between monotheism and radical enlightenment: the moment ofTranscendence, or the totally Other (Horkheimer 1996a: chap. 13; Adorno

1997c:608-616; Habermas 1990:14-15). This Transcendence or Othernes

granted to the ego, which was held captive in its environments, first oall the distance to its world in its totality and to itself and thereby opened

up a perspective, without which neither personal autonomy nor univer-

sal, i.e. anamnestic, present and proleptic solidarity were not possible

and could not be acquired (Habermas 1990:15; Siebert 1989). From thisconnection remained untouched Adornos conviction, that nothing of the

ological semantic or semiotic material or potential could continue unchanged

(Kogon 1958a:392-402, 1958b:484-498; Adorno 1997c:608-616). Each

theological content would have to pass the test to migrate from the depthof the mythos into the secular sphere. However, so his disciple Habermas

argued, this secularizing taking in of theological materials or potentials

into the universe of argumentative discourse and solidary and friendlyand helpful living together was the very opposite of a neo-pagan, this-

worldly-polytheistic cancellation of the majority of the subject and theconsequent ego-weakness and the neo-mythological regression behind tha

self understanding of autonomy and solidarity, which entered world his-

tory the first time through the teachings of the Jewish, Christian and

Islamic prophets (Isaiah 61:1-66:24; Revelation 21:1-22:21; Adorno

1993a:99, 1997c:608-616). The contemporary new mythologies claimabsolutely no similarity any longer with the Mythology of Reason, whichhad once been entreated, implored, invoked and evoked by Hegel and

his friends Friedrich Hlderlin and Friedrich W.J. Schelling in the con-text of his oldest system program of German idealism in Frankfurt a.M

in 1800 ( Jamme and Schneider 1984:11-14; Habermas 1990:15).

Theology and Agnosticism



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76 Siebert

chap. 37; Adorno 1970b:103-146, 1980:333-334). For the critical theo

rists, in the face of radical evil in the most murderous 20th century thereligious dogma of an all-powerful and all-benevolent God had become

almost unbelievable (Horkheimer 1985a; Zerin 1998:46-49). However, in

the critical theorists perspective the longing for the totally Other couldstill be concretized, expressed and preserved through commitment to ethical norms and the celebration of cultic or liturgical events in the con

text of the old world-religions (Hegel 1986m: part 1, 9-88; 1986n: parts

2 & 3; Horkheimer 1985a; Fromm 1976). As a matter of fact, according

to the critical theorists the world-religions could possibly continue to exisand survive for some time if they would be willing and able to trans

form their dogmatic interpretations of reality and orientations of actioninto such longing and hope for the totally Other as the source of uncon-

ditional meaning, ethical validity claims, and possible theoretical or a

least practical theodicy solutions (Horkheimer 1970:9-53, 1985a; Haberma1991: part 3). In any case, for Horkheimer and Adorno the reference

to the totally Other was no utopianism (Horkheimer 1996a:62-67). In

the critical theorists perspective, without an object in the theological sense

the very notion of theory became meaningless, archaic and obsolete. Anatheistic-communistic theory was a contradictio in adjecto: the pure con

templation of something, which did no longer exist.

The Other Dimension

To be sure, the critical theory of society claims to be thoroughly scientific

and participates fully in the argumentative discourse among the positivesocial sciences (Horkheimer 1972, 1981a:33-46, 78-89, 145-155; Schmid

and Altwicker 1986; Habermas 1971, 1973c, 1973b; Habermas and

Luhmann 1971). However, it remains nevertheless deeply rooted in philosophy and even theology (Horkheimer 1970, 1972, 1987c: 345-408

1989a, 1981a:47-58, 68-116, 122, 155, 1985a; Schmidt and Altwicke

1986; Kng 1981). While the Hegelian philosophy contained the dimen

sions of nature, subjective, objective and absolute spirit including artreligion and philosophy and the structural-functionalist theory of the


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Horkheimer 1985a, 1985b:483-492, 1988a:65-157, 170-256; 365-375

1988b, 1988c; Adorno 1986, 1993b, 1997d, 1997e, 1997f, 1997g, 1998Benjamin 1977, 1988, 1983, 1985). While the Hegelian philosophy had

for its other dimension the absolute Spirit, and the Parsonian structural-

functionalism had for its highest sphere what Paul Tillich had called theUltimate Reality, the leading critical theorists, Horkheimer and Adornohad for their highest longing and hope the totally Other (Hegel 1986j:366

395; Parsons 1964; 1965; Tillich 1961: vol. 1, pp. 14, 24-25, 110-111

214-223, vol. 2, pp. 9, 14, 26, 30, 87, 116, vol. 3, pp. 102, 125, 130, 154

223, 283, 287, 289, 293, 349, 422; Horkheimer 1970:46, 1985a). Whileaccording to Hegel the finite realms of nature, subjective and objective

spirit had been the other of the Infinite, for Horkheimer and Adornothe Infinite was the entirely Other of man and society. It is precisely

through its determinate negation, or turning upside down, or turning

inside out, or concrete inversion that the critical theorists like Marxhad done before preserved in their social theory the Hegelian philos-

ophy: even some of its positive theology in the form of their other or

negative or inverse theology (Marx 1961: vol. 1, pp. 17-18; Hegel 1986e:48

53; Horkheimer 1985b:286; Adorno 1970b:103-125). While Hegels andMarxs philosophy and Horkheimers and Adornos critical theory of soci

ety were radical in the sense of penetrating to the very roots of things

i.e., to the dialectical notion as the universality, which alienated itself

into its particularity and reconciled itself with itself in its singularity in the things themselves, and thus discovered the relational conception

of bourgeois society as antagonistic totality, the contradictions of which

drive it beyond itself, the structural functionalists stay like all other pos-itivists consciously, intentionally and purposively at the very surface of thesocial reality and use entirely subjective concepts and are thus continu-

ally engaged in the harmonization of the fundamental dichotomies of

civil society and thereby in its stabilization and normalization, no mat-

ter how unjust its conditions may be (Hegel 1986f: part 2, 1986g:339

397; Horkheimer 1985b:131-222, 349-416, 436-541). While Hegels and

Marxs philosophy aimed at alternative Future III the realm of free-dom, and structural functionalism consciously or unconsciously, inten

i ll i i ll i d l i F I h ll



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78 Siebert

Structure of Thoughts

While the Frankfurt Schools critical theory of society is admittedly unsys

tematic, it is nevertheless a very methodological and rather organized

body of ideas, or structure of thoughts and categories, or connection oknowledge related to alternative Future III the truth of human society

(Horkheimer 1988a:19-157, 365-375, 1988b, 1988c, 1972:131; Lwentha

1989; Arato and Gebhardt 1982:vii-viii, ix-xxi, 3-25, parts 1-3; Wiggershau1986; Jay 1981). While contrary to all forms of positivism the critica

theory of society transcends facticity in terms of relational notions, like

e.g., the antagonistic totality of civil society, it is nevertheless derived

from the study of a large amount of psychological, social and culturafacts and data relating particularly to traditional and modern civil soci

ety: the relational essence of society which overshoots facticity is never

theless real only in its particular data (Adorno 1993a:37-92; Theunissen

1983:48, 50, 54 59; Schmidt 1981; Zerin 1998:46-49). The critical theory of society is not only the result of the study of psychological, socia

and cultural phenomena, but it is also to some extend the result of the

exercise of the dialectical method and imagination: of radical negativedialectics (Adorno 1966: parts 2-3). It includes in itself the knowledge o

several social sciences, particularly psychology and sociology, and artistic, religious and philosophical forms derived from such study of fact

and from such dialectical method and imagination. The critical theory

is a general body of assumptions and principles worked out already to

a large extend in Hegels Science of Logic as well as in its materialistic

inversion by Marx (Hegel 1986c:72-75, 1986e:48-53, 1986k:19-105, 439440, 483-492; 1986o: part I, p. 94, part II, p. 502; Marx 1953: chap. 3

4, 7-10, 1961:15-18; Horkheimer 1988b:326-327, 1985b:439-440, 483

492; Hegel 1986k; Adorno 1997b:293-351). The critical theory is as suchdialectically related to communicative and political praxis: directed toward

the modification at least of alternative Future I; the prevention of alter

native Future II; and the promotion of alternative Future III (Horkheime

1985a; Flechtheim 1970:152-160).


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20th century the critical theorists have formulated and constructed alway

new stages of the critical theory of subject, intersubjectivity, marriageand family, civil society, political state, history and culture, including art

religion and philosophy: responding from one station to the other to

always new historical situations. The critical theory originated mainly inthe experience of the bourgeois societies in Europe before World WarI, of the horror of World War I, of fascism, of the American exile, of

the terror of World War II, and of the Cold War period. Horkheimer

Benjamin, Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse

Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Leo Lwenthal, and other critical theorists of the

first generation tried to make sense out of the senseless war experience

be it in Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, Stuttgart, Paris, New York, Los Angelesor elsewhere in European or American civil societies. The critical theo-

rists were rooted in and stood on the shoulders of the enlightenmen

movements and the older critical theories of the 18th and 19th centuries(Schweppenhauser 1996:22-25; Gumnior and Ringguth 1973; Rosen 1995

part 1; Scheible 1989; Wiggershaus 1987; Witte 1985; Bolz and Reijen

1996; Reijen 1982: parts 1-2). They looked for support particularly in

the writings of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, MarxNietzsche, and Freud.

From Idealistic to Materialistic Dialectic

Already in 1942, Horkheimer had stated in American exile, that if one

thought through precisely Hegels teaching that the notion was the inte-

rior of the thing itself, then its execution, the idealistic dialectic, becamematerialistic all by itself (Horkheimer 1985b:289). For Horkheimer tha

was like with certain puzzle pictures: if one looked at them long enough

then they turned over into another form, which was likewise the imageas the previous one. Marxs attempt to put Hegel from his head on hi

feet was so cogent only, because he stood already on them in the firs

place. That became quite obvious from Benjamins Hegel quotation in

his final essay On the Notion of History of 1940, according to whichin 1807 Hegel had turned the idealistic sentence from the so called



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80 Siebert

The critical theorists were engaged in such inverse theology no less than

Hegel or Marx before. It is in its materialistic form that the religioutext is not only negated but also preserved, elevated and fulfilled.

Notion in Objectivity

According to Adorno, the original power of the Hegelian notion as in

its self-particularization self-alienating and in its self-singularization selreconciling universal, was to be sure a theological one (Hegel 1986f:243

300; Benjamin 1978a:672). At the same time the notion was not only a

matter of the thinking subject but also of the objective reality. Still alate as May 2, 1968, a year before his death, Adorno taught in his 4thLecture on his Introduction to Sociology at the University of Frankfurt

that in modern civil society as functional interconnection and exchange

process, in the totality of which everything was mediated with every

thing, one abstracted necessarily from the specific form of the objectwhich were to be exchanged with each other in terms of the average

social working time (Adorno 1993a:51-63). In the market place the

exchange-objects were reduced to a universal unity. However, so Adorno

argued, the abstraction did not lay merely in the abstracting thinking othe sociologist. It was rather so, that in the capitalist society itself such

an abstraction was present. There was present in the civil society as an

objectivity already something like a notion. According to Adorno, the

decisive difference between a positivistic and a dialectical teaching abou

society was that the latter, the critical theory, referred to the objectivity

of the notion which lay in the thing itself, while the former, the positivistic sociology denied the process or removed it at least into the back

ground and posited the formation of the concept exclusively into the

looking, watching, considering, contemplating, meditating, examiningobserving, ordering and concluding subject (Adorno 1970a, 1993a:51-63

Popper 1961, 1967: vol. I, 1973; Zerin 1998:46-47).

The Critical Notion


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82 Siebert

in both of them. For Adorno, on one hand there were in the social sense

no individuals, namely human beings, who could exist as persons withtheir own claim and particularly who could exist as those who were

working except in respect to the society in which they lived and which

formed them down into their innermost being. On the other hand, therewas for Adorno also no society without its own notion being mediatedthrough individuals. That was so, because the process through which

society maintained itself was finally the life process, the production proces

and the reproduction process, which was kept going through the single

individuals who were socialized in the society. That, precisely, constituted for Adorno the pressing and urging reason for the development o

a dialectical consideration of society: a dialectical sociology.

Critical Theory of Religion

The critical theory of religion was an integral part of the critical theoristsdialectical sociology (Adorno 1997c:608-616; Kogon 1958a:392-402

1958b:484-498; Horkheimer 1985a; Siebert 1979). In their dialectica

sociology of religion, Horkheimer and Adorno were interested in reli

gion in so far as it was situated in the antagonistic totality of civil soci

ety and at the same time transcended it. While the Lutheran Hegel hadcomprehended Christianity not only as the religion of becoming and

freedom, but also as the absolute religion, and as such as the end of the

history of religions, the Jewish critical theorists considered it to be a mos

advanced, but nevertheless only relative, positive world-religion situated

among other relative, positive world-religions: like magic or fetishismTaoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Judaism, or Islam (Hege

1986c:495-574, 1986m: part 2-3; Kogon 1958a:392-402, 1958b:483-498)

While Hegel had found the absolute goal of the history of religions inChristianity as the religion of freedom, the critical theorists foresaw and

promoted the determinate negation, i.e., inversion of its and all othe

religions semantic and semiotic materials and potentials into their own

secular critical theory of society, and beyond that into the likewise profane general discourse of expert cultures, and through them into eman


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Prima Philosophia

Adorno and his eleven years older teacher, colleague and friend Benjamin

had formulated the first time their notion of an inverse theology on the

Island of Ibiza in 1932/1933 (Adorno 1970b:103-125; Witte 1985:144)On November 6, 1934, Adorno wrote from Merton College, Oxford, to

Benjamin, that he saw in his Arcades Project truly that piece of primaphilosophia, which was given to the critical theorists as a task to be realized (Lonitz 1994:72-74; Benjamin 1985:45-78, 1983:1041-1066). Adorno

wished nothing else more than that Benjamin would now after such a

long and painful damming up be able to execute the Passagen Werk with

such power as the immense object made it necessary. If, so Adorno toldBenjamin, he was allowed to give to his Arcades Project some hope for

the way, without him taking it as immodesty or presumptuousness, then

it was that that some day this work would without consideration realize

everything of theological content and of literalism in the most extremetheses what had been in it from its very start as design and plan. Adorno

meant the consideration of objections from the side of the Brechtian

atheism (Brecht 1957: parts 1-3; Benjamin 1988; Lonitz 1994:31, 53, 7374). Someday the critical theorists may be called upon, to rescue Benjamin

friend Bertolt Brechts vulgar atheism in the form of their inverse the-ology. However, so Adorno insisted, under no circumstances should Brecht

atheism be received into the critical theory of society. Adorno told

Benjamin that he should very much abstain from the external commu

nication with Brechts Marxist social theory in favor of the original intent

of his Passagen Werk. That should happen because it appeared to Adornothat here, where the most decisive and the most serious was at stake, i

had to be expressed completely and fully and the total categorical depth

had to be achieved without leaving out theology. However, then Adornoalso believed that the critical theorists would in this decisive layer help

the Marxist theory the more, the less they would appropriate it by sub-

jugating it to themselves externally: here the aesthetical would intervene

and interfere in a revolutionary way incomparably more deeply into thesocial reality than the Marxist class theory as Deus ex machina (Lonitz1994 73 74 B j i 1977 251) Th i d b



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84 Siebert

dynamite. But so Adorno argued the deeper the dynamite was carried

into the depth the more it would tear and sweep things away. Adornowanted to act as advocate of Benjamins own intentions against a tyranny

which had only to be called by its name in order to disappear: the

despotism of Brechts Marxist atheism. Of course, the prima philosophia concern with the first things suggested by Adorno was rather anultima philosophia concern with the last things or an eschatologica

theodicy, which aimed in theory and praxis at the end of the Hegelian

as well as of the Brechtian, and any other form of positivism: ultimately

at the end of the hellish slaughterbench, Golgatha, and holocaust altaof world-history Shalom!

The Earthly and the Redeemed Life

In his letter to Benjamin from Berlin of December 17, 1934 Adorno

thanked him for his new essay on Franz Kafka (Benjamin 1988:chap19; Lonitz 1994:73-73, 83-85, 89-90). Never before reading Benjamin

essay on Kafka had Adorno become so perfectly conscious of the con

sensus between them concerning the philosophical center. Adorno

reminded Benjamin of his own essay on Kafka, which he had written

nine years earlier, in 1925 (Adorno 1997i:256-286; Lonitz 1994:89-90)Here Adorno had seen Kafkas work as photography of the earthly life

from the perspective of the redeemed one. On the photograph nothing

appeared of the redeemed life than a corner of the black cloth: a tip o

the Absolute, which is never mentioned (Lonitz 1994:90-91; Haberma

1988:278). At the same time the horribly distorted optic of the picturewas no other than that of the slantingly posited camera, Thus accord

ing to Adorno there was no need for any further words concerning the

consensus between him and Benjamin. That was true no matter how farBenjamins conception of Kafka pointed beyond Adornos interpretation

At the same time, according to Adorno, that concerned also and tha

in a very principle sense his and Benjamins position toward theology

Adorno had urged Benjamin toward such a theology already at the veryentrance to his Arcades Project. Therefore now it seemed to Adorno to


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Beyond Natural and Supernatural Interpretations

According to Adorno, Benjamin had formulated the first time in al

sharpness in his essay on Kafka the standpoint against the natural and

the supernatural interpretation at the same time (Benjamin 1988:chap19; Lonitz 1994:90-91). It seemed to Adorno that Benjamins standpoin

was precisely common to both of them. Adornos book on Kierkegaardwas concerned with nothing else than this standpoint (Adorno 1974). Inhis Kafka essay, Benjamin had expressed his scorn against the connec

tion of Blas Pascal with Kierkegaard. Adorno reminded Benjamin tha

in his book on Kierkegaard he himself had exposed the same disdain

against the connection of Kierkegaard with Pascal and with AugustineHowever, so Adorno argued, when he held on nevertheless to a rela-

tionship of Kierkegaard and Kafka then it was not at all that of Kar

Barths dialectical theology. For Adorno, the relationship between

Kierkegaard and Kafka lay rather precisely with the location where theformer spoke about scripture, script, or text (Adorno 1974; Lonitz 1994:90

91). Benjamin had said in a decisive way, that what Kafka meant as the

relic of the scripture could be understood better, namely socially, as itsprolegomenon. For Adorno, this was indeed nothing more or less than thecipher character of his and Benjamins inverse theology. However, inAdornos view, that his and Benjamins inverse theology broke through

in the latters Kafka essay with such immense force, was for him the

most beautiful guarantee for its philosophical success since he had seen

the first fragments of his Passagen Werk. Adorno regretted it somewhat

that Benjamin had admittedly expressed in his Kafka essay the invalid-ity and triviality of the official theological Kafka interpretation but tha

he had not fully explicated it. Adornos and Benjamins inverse theology

was neither naturalistic, e.g., like Freuds psychoanalysis, nor supra-nat-uralistic, e.g., like Barths and his disciples dialectical theology.

The Dialectical Image

Between August 2 and 4, 1935 Adorno wrote to Benjamin from Hornberg



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hell in his new design of the Passagen Werk and particularly of the inge

nious quotation concerning the gambler seemed not only a loss of splendor but also of dialectical correctness. Adorno did not want to deny at

all the relevance of the immanence of consciousness for the capitalist

society of the 19th century. But according to Adorno out of this imma-nence of consciousness could not be gained the notion of the dialecticalimage. It was rather so that the immanence of consciousness was itsel

as interior the dialectical image for the civil society of the 19th century aalienation. Here Adorno had to insist on the continuing validity of the

second chapter of his book on Kierkegaard(Adorno 1997: chap. 2; Benjamin1978a:673-683). According to Adornos book, the dialectical image was

not to be put into the consciousness. To the contrary, through the dialectical construction the dream would have to be externalized and the imma

nence of consciousness would itself have to be understood as a constellation

of the social reality. It would have to be understood, so to speak, as theastronomical phase, in which the hell travels through humanity. Only

so it appeared to Adorno, the star-map of such travel would be able to

open up the view on history as the primordial history of the 19th, and

20th, and 21st centuries.

The Oldest and the Newest

Adorno wanted to formulate this same objection against Benjamins new

design of his Arcade Project once more, but from the extremely oppo

site point (Benjamin 1978a:676-683, 1985:655-1066, 1977). According to

Adorno, Benjamin had constructed in his new design in the sense of theimmanent conception of the dialectical image the relationship of the old

est and the newest, which had already had a central position in the firs

design, as one of the utopian relationship to alternative Future III theclassless society (Marx 1961:873-874; Benjamin 1978a:674-675). Thereby

so Adorno argued, the archaic became a complementary added thing

instead of being the newest itself. Thus it was de-dialecticized. At the

same time, so Adorno criticized, Benjamin dated likewise undialectically the classless image back into the mythos, where it had come from



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88 Siebert

if it had been annihilated through catastrophes. Here and now, Adorno

wanted to say: thereby as primordial history. Precisely here Adorno knewhimself in agreement with the boldest and most daring location in

Benjamins book The Origin of the German Tragedy (Benjamin 1978b1978a:674).

Disenchantment

If, so Adorno argued in his Hornberg letter, the disenchantment of the

dialectical image as dream, as Benjamin used it in the second design o

his Passagen Werk and psychologized it, then it fell precisely therebyvictim to the magic and spell of the bourgeois psychology (Benjamin1985:1041-1066, 1978a:674-675). Adorno asked, who was the subject o

the dream? He answered himself by saying that in the 19th century cer

tainly only the individual could be the subject of the dream. However

so Adorno argued, out of the individuals dreams neither the fetish character of the commodity nor the monuments could be read immediately

as reproductions. Therefore, so Adorno criticized, Benjamin had brough

in the collective consciousness. Adorno was afraid that in the presen

conception of the collective consciousness or unconsciousness as it appearedin the second design of the Arcade Project it could hardly be differentiated

from that of Carl G. Jung: who had been a fascist, but who had unlike

Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, or Mircea Eliade given up fascism after

World War II ( Jung 1933, 1990:7-56, 1958: parts 1-2; Benjamin 1978a)

In Adornos view, the collective consciousness or unconsciousness wa

open to critique from both sides. It could be criticized from the perspectivof the social process as it hypostatized archaic images where dialectica

ones were produced through the commodity character, just not in an

archaic collective ego, but in the alienated bourgeois individualsFurthermore, it could be criticized from the psychological perspective

that the mass-ego existed only during earthquakes and mass catastrophes

while otherwise the objective surplus value asserted itself precisely in indi

vidual subjects and against them. According to Adorno, the bourgeoipsychologists had invented the collective consciousness or unconscious


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Mythical Thinking

According to Adorno, the mythical-archaic category of the Golden Aghad fateful consequences also for the commodity category (Marx 1961:39

89; Benjamin 1978a:674-675). For Adorno, that was decisive particularlyin a social sense. If, so Adorno argued, in the dialectical image of the

Golden Age the decisive ambiguity, namely that in relationship to hellwas suppressed, then instead the commodity became as the substance othe bourgeois age the hell as such, and it was negated in a way, which

indeed may let appear as truth the immediacy of the primordial condi-

tion. Thus, in Adornos view, the disenchantment of the dialectical image

lead right away into a broken mythical thinking and, as Jung before, sohere Klages announced himself as danger. For Adorno, nowhere did

Benjamins second design of the Passagen Werk bring with it more reme

dies than at this place. Here would be the central place for the teach-

ing about the collector, who liberated the things from the curse to beuseful. Here belonged, if Adorno understood it rightly, Haussmann, whose

class consciousness initiated precisely through the completion of the com-

modity character in the Hegelian self-consciousness the explosion andblasting of the phantasmagoria.

Commodity as Dialectical Image

In Adornos perspective, to understand the commodity as dialectical image

meant also to comprehend it as motive of its going under and its super

session in the Hegelian sense instead of its mere regression towardthe older (Marx 1961:vol. 1, chap. 1; Benjamin 1978a:675-677). For

Adorno, the commodity was on one hand the alienated, in which the use

value withered and died. On the other hand the commodity was the sur

viving which having become foreign overcame and surmounted the imme

diacy. According to Adorno, in the commodities and not for the humanbeings the critical theorists had the promise of immortality. The fetish

was for the civil society of the 19th century a faithlessly last image asonly the skull. Thus Benjamin had already indicated it in his book on



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a jacket which was to be turned inside out (Adorno 1970b:103-161)

According to Adorno and Benjamin, theology was to be rescued if atall not as Scholem, or Karl Barth, or Paul Tillich, or other positive the-

ologians wanted to do it, but rather in the form of their negative as wel

as inverse theology of the totally Other, the entirely Non-Identical, theabsolutely New, which theology would contain historical materialism initself as its political instrument (Horkheimer 1985a, 1985b:483-492; Lonitz

1994:143-144, 323-330; Benjamin 1977:251).

Commodity Production

According to Adorno the restitution or rescue of theology as negativeinverse theology, which included in itself historical materialism, had to

be taken historically (Benjamin 1978a:676-677, 1977). In Adornos view

the commodity character which was specific for the antagonistic civi

society of the 19th century, i.e., the industrial commodity productionhad to be worked out much sharper materially than this had happened

in Benjamins Arcade Project so far. This was necessary for Adorno

because there had existed commodity character and alienation since the

beginning of capitalism, i.e., since the age of manufacture, since theBaroque. On the other hand, so Adorno had to admit, since that beginning

capitalism the Unity of modernity lay precisely in the commodity characteri.e., in the industrial commodity production, and to be sure continues

to do so throughout the 20th century and into the and 21st century

According to Adorno, only an exact determination of the historical com-

modity production as one, which has been historically sharply differentiatedfrom the older forms of production and reproduction, could deliver fully

theprimordial history and ontology of the 19th century. That precisely hadbeen the original intent of Benjamins Passagen Werk. In Adornos viewall relations to the commodity form as such would give to this primor-

dial history a certain character of the metaphorical, which could not be

tolerated in this serious case. Adorno assumed, if Benjamin would here

surrender himself completely to his mode of procedure, the blind mate-rial work, the greatest interpretation-results could be achieved. If, so



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92 Siebert

The Concept of God

In his essay Thoughts on Religion of 1935, Horkheimer stated, that the concept of God had been for a long time the place where the idea wa

kept alive that there were other norms besides those cruel ones, to whichnature and society and history gave expression in their operation

(Horkheimer 1988b:326-328). At the time, Horkheimer was known in

Germany and America as a Marxist and a revolutionary and as the initiator of a new form of the critical theory of civil society and as the

intellectual leader of the Institute for Social Research, formerly situated

at the Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Universitt in Frankfurt a.M. and

now at the Columbia University in New York (Horkheimer 1985a; Jay1981; Wiggershaus 1987; Wellmer 1971; Dubiel 1992; Arato and Gebhard

1982). Later on, in the development of the critical theory of society

Horkheimer and his eight years younger friend Adorno tried to con

cretely supersede i.e., not only critically to negate but also to preserveelevate and fulfill the concept of God as it had been and still is pre

sent in Judaism, Christianity and Islam into their own notion of the long

ing for the totally Other, which continually inspired and motivated thework of the critical theorists (Hegel 1986n:50-95; Horkheimer 1985a

Gumnior and Ringguth 1973; Scheible 1989; Kung 1978:539-541; 19701991; 1994). While the critical theory did indeed contain from its star

a more or less hidden theology as theodicy, its very center was only later

on called the entirely Other than the horror and terror of nature and

even more so of history (Horkheimer 1985a, 40; Kng 1978:540-542)

Dissatisfaction

According to Horkheimers essay Thoughts on Religion, the dissatisfaction

with their earthly destiny was for human beings always the stronges

motive for their acceptance of a transcendent Being (Horkheime1988b:326). If, so Horkheimer argued, justice resided with God, then i

was not to be found in the same measure in this world and its historyFor Horkheimer, religion was the record of the wishes, desires and accu


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1996; Wiggershaus 1987; Witte 1985; Bolz and Reijen 1996; Deschner

1998). The more that harmonization took place, the more the meaningof religion was perverted. Catholicism, so Horkheimer argued, regarded

already God as in certain respects being the creator of the extant earthly

order. Protestantism went even further and attributed the worlds coursedirectly to the will of the Almighty. Thus it had happened most pro-foundly in the heterodox Lutheran Hegels Philosophy of History, whichwas nevertheless in his terms determinately negated in the critica

theory of society (Hegel 1986c:72-75, 1986e:48-53, 1986k:19-105, 1986o:94

502; Horkheimer 1985b:439-440, 483-492; Adorno 1966:293-351). Not onlydid, according to Horkheimer, Christianity in its different paradigms

Greek, Roman, Protestant transfigure the state of affairs on earth aany given moment with the radiance of Divine justice. But it was rather

so, that Christianity brought down Divine justice itself to the level of the

corrupt relations which mark earthly life. In Horkheimers view, Christianityhad lost its function of expressing the ideal to the extend that it became

the bedfellow of the state (Hegel 1986m:236-245; Horkheimer 1988b:326

327). When Horkheimer criticized Constantinian Christianity in 1935

the Catholic Church had just concluded the Empire Concordat with theHitler Government in Berlin, which is still valid today in the German

Federal Republic (Lortz 1964:514-531, 551, 793, 799-800, 835, 862, 988

Matheson 1981; Goldhagen 2002a; Cornwell 1999; Kertzer 2001; Shandley

1998). The German concentration camps had just started and were sofar only camps for the acquisition of cheap labor and a correspondingly

high surplus value for the owners of German, and European, and American

industry according to the principle written over the camp-entrances, Workmakes free, of course, not the workers, not the slaves, but only the own-ers (Adorno 2001:278-281; Kogon 1965: v-xxiv; Higham 1983; Black

2001; Baldwin 2001; Ford 1920: vol. 1-4; Wernicke 1977; Bethel 1977

Schoenfeld 2003). At the time, these work camps had not yet turned

into death camps: which happened, when the European war became a

world war with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the American

declaration of war against Japan, and the German declaration of waragainst the USA. At the time, World War II was still four years away

hi h ld h li f 60 illi l i l di 26 illi



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94 Siebert

California, that the spearhead theory on anti-Semitism in the form in

which the critical theorists had formulated it so far seemed to him inadequate (Horkheimer 1996:466-468, 1996b). To Marcuse, this inadequacy

seemed to increase with the development of fascist anti-Semitism. According

to Marcuse, the function of this fascist anti-Semitism was apparentlymore and more the perpetuation of an already established pattern odomination in the character of men. Marcuse asked Horkheimer to notice

that in the German fascist propaganda the Jew had now become an

internal being. As such internal being the Jew lived in gentiles, as wel

as in Jews. The Jew as internal being was not even conquered throughthe annihilation of the real Jews. If the critical theorists looked, so Marcuse

argued, at the character traits and qualities, which the German fascistdesignated as the Jewish elements in the gentiles, they would not find

the so-called typical Jewish traits or at least not primarily but rathe

traits which were regarded as definitely Christian and humane. Thesetraits, so Marcuse explained, were, furthermore, those which stood mos

decidedly against repression in all its forms. Here, so Marcuse suggested

the critical theorists should resume the task of elucidating the true con

nection between anti-Semitism and Christianity. So far, so Marcuse criticized, this task had not been followed up in the critical-theorists

Anti-Semitism Project, which the American Jewish Committee had commissioned. What, according to Marcuse, was happening was not only a

belated protest against Christianity but also a consummation of Christianityor at least of all the sinister traits of Christianity. In fascist perspective

as Marcuse saw and understood it, the Jew was of this world, and thi

world was the one which fascism had to subject to the totalitarian terror. In the eyes of the critical theorists, the consummation of all the sin-ister traits of Christianity did not only prevent Christianity from solving

the theodicy problem but made it itself part of it.

Christianity as State Religion

On September 11, 1943, Horkheimer would write to Marcuse, that hefully shared his ideas on anti-Semitism and Christianity as expressed in


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Particularly Alexandria offered to Horkheimer interesting examples. Some

of these examples were astonishing parallels to the period of the ProtestanReformation. Both the extinction of paganism in Alexandria and the

Reformation were yielding to Horkheimer valuable clues for the under

standing of what was going on today in the Europe and America o1943. According to Horkheimer, with regard to the spirit of Christianitysuch periods of transition were more characteristic than the standpoin

of the Catholic Church. In Horkheimers view, her relation to the pre-

vailing powers defined the position of the Catholic Church after all apri-

ori. Horkheimer may have thought of the Lateran Treaty between theCuria and Mussolini and of the Concordat between the Vatican and

Hitler and of the silence of Pious XII concerning the deportation of Jewsfrom Rome, the fascist concentration camps in general, the saturation

bombings and the army chaplains not only in the allied armies but also

in the German army and even in the SS, who would bless the mosadvanced murder weapons (Cornwell 1999; Goldhagen 2002a, 2002b

Kertzer 2001; Erickson 1985).

Extinction of Paganism

Horkheimer reminded Marcuse concerning the extinction of paganismin the late Roman Empire of the circumstances of the death of Hypathia

of Alexandria (Horkheimer 1996b:470-473). She had been a Neo-Platonist

She taught Platonic philosophy in Alexandria. In 415 Hypathia was

stoned by fanatic Christians. Horkheimer reminded Marcuse of an inter-

esting figure, Schenute of Atripe or Sinutius. He was a Coptic Churchfather. Since 383 Schenute was the Abbot of the White Monastery nearAtripe in the Upper Egypt. He died in 446. According to Horkheimer

Schenute belonged to the other, not the pagan, but the Christian sideIn Horkheimers view, the sermons of this gentleman Schenute against

the worldly, materialistic, commercial Egyptians resembled precisely the

sermons of up to date Antisemic radio priests or German Jew-baiter

before and during the fascist period (Lwenthal 1990: parts 1-4; Adorno1997h:7-142, 431-435). As a courageous man, so Horkheimer remarked



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96 Siebert

of the rest was of course Greek. While the two ethnic groups went along

with each other very nicely and peacefully up to the middle of the firscentury there were serious anti-Semitic riots at that time. The Greek

who certainly were not genuine Egyptians called the Jews of Alexandria

aliens and intruders. It seemed to Horkheimer that the Jews were alienunder all circumstances. Certainly in the 20th century anti-Semitism hain the context of national and international fascism contributed more to

the theodicy problem than any other single factor (Elson 1977:88-92

1988:8-80).

Clerico-Fascism

It is very much possible that Schenute reminded Horkheimer of the

Canadian-American radio priest Father Charles Coughlin from Detroit

Michigan who spread a fascist interpretation of the Papal Encyclical let

ter Quadragesimo Anno, on American radio every Sunday at 3.00 .. to40 million listeners during the 1930s and 1940s (Adorno 1997h:38-42

F. Taylor 1983:6; Wilson 2001:21-56). Father Coughlin also sent a man

ager to Dr. Joseph Goebbels and Adolf Hitler in January 1939. Father

Coughlins manager told the fascist leaders in Berlin, that America wa

basically more anti-Semitic than they gave it credit for. The anti-Semiticradio priest wanted the fascist leaders to take a more positive attitude

toward Christianity. It would help the pro-fascist propaganda in America

Goebbels told Hitler about Father Coughlin. Hitler intended to touch

on the question of national socialist propaganda in America in his speech

to the Reichstag. Hitler planned to put out feelers to the Americans andgive an outline of Germanys general position. Goebbels believed, tha

Hitlers speech would be very important. When the clerico-fascist, Fathe

Coughlin, became too anti-Semitic, the Roosevelt Administration pupressure on the Cardinals to remove him from the radio. Father Coughlin

obeyed. After the war, Father Coughlin, who remained a fanatic anti

Semite as well as anti-Communist, called Father Teilhard de Chardin

the link between the Vatican and the Kremlin. He continued to publish his clerico-fascist books. During the 1970s, up to his death, in 1979


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Perfect Justice

According to Horkheimers programmatic essay Thoughts on Religion

the productive kind of criticism of the status quo which had found its

expression once in earlier times in the form of a religious belief in aheavenly Judge and a Last Judgment, today took the shape of a strug

gle for more rational forms of societal life (Horkheimer 1988b:326-327

1974b; Habermas 1986). But just, so Horkheimer argued, as reason afterKant, even though it knew better, could not avoid falling back into shat-

tered, but nonetheless recurring illusions, so too, ever since the transi-

tion from religious longing for God to conscious social praxis, there

continued to exist another illusion which could be exposed but not entirelybanished: it was the image of perfect justice. Horkheimer did not con

sider it possible, that such perfect justice could ever become a reality

within society and history. For, so Horkheimer explained, even if a bet-

ter post-bourgeois society would develop some day and would eliminatethe present disorder and anarchy in European and American civil soci-

eties, there would still be no compensation whatsoever for the wretched

ness of past ages and no end to the distress in nature. Horkheimer wastherefore, dealing here, like Freud before, with an illusion proper: with

the spontaneous growth of ideas which probably arose out of the prim-itive economic exchange process in the childhood of human kind (Freud

1964, 1962; Horkheimer 1988b:326-327; Marcuse 1962:65-66; Gorlich

Lorenzer and Schmidt 1980). For Horkheimer here following Marx

the principle that each human being must have his or her own share

and that each person has the same basic right to happiness, was a generalization of economically conditioned rules: their extension into the

Infinite (Horkheimer 1988b:326-327; Marx 1953; Fromm 1966). From

its very start in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research the criticatheory was a new form of historical materialism, which integrated into

itself most intensively and extensively the Freudian psychoanalysi

(Horkheimer 1988b:326-327; Fromm 1992, 1980; Marcuse 1962). Hork

heimers critical theory of society concretely negated the works of bothMarx and Freud, because they both had fallen victim to the dialectic

f li h (H kh i 1985b 172 183 294 259 398 416 436



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98 Siebert

limits set to its fulfillment. Erich Fromm likewise combining Marx and

Freud had from the very start of the critical theory in the FrankfurInstitute for Social Research spoken of the revolutionary or democratic

and the authoritarian or fascist personality type (Horkheimer 1988b:326

327; Fromm 1980:7-48). One of the most outstanding opponents of thecritical theory of society, Carl Schmitt, Hitlers jurist and political theologian, and according to J.B. Metz one of the fathers of neo-con

servativism as well as of deconstructionism, had differentiated between

the Epimetheus character and the Prometheus character inside and

outside of Christianity and had recognized and identified himself rightlyas an Epimetheus character (Horkheimer 1988b:30, 326-327; Mehring

1994; Groh 1998, Meier 1994). The outstanding fascist Catholic political theologian Schmitt was the by far superior teacher and role mode

of Father Coughlin.

The Authoritarian State

According to Horkheimers Thoughts on Religion, when the authori

tarian state seemed to engage in a histo

horkheimer on religion

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