how can i optimize the mv power of a cement plant_v3_2013

© 2013 Schneider Electric All Rights Reserved 1

How can I … Optimize the MV power of a cement plant?

System Technical Note Cement Industry


Important Information

People responsible for the application, implementation and use of this document must make sure

that all necessary design considerations have been taken into account and that all laws, safety

and performance requirements, regulations, codes, and applicable standards have been obeyed

to their full extent.

Schneider Electric provides the resources specified in this document. These resources can be

used to minimize engineering efforts, but the use, integration, configuration, and validation of the

system is the user’s sole responsibility. Said user must ensure the safety of the system as a

whole, including the resources provided by Schneider Electric through procedures that the user

deems appropriate.

Notice

This document is not comprehensive for any systems using the given architecture and does not

absolve users of their duty to uphold the safety requirements for the equipment used in their

systems, or compliance with both national or international safety laws and regulations.

Readers are considered to already know how to use the products described in this document.

This document does not replace any specific product documentation.

The following special messages may appear throughout this documentation or on the equipment

to warn of potential hazards or to call attention to information that clarifies or simplifies a

procedure.

The addition of this symbol to a Danger or Warning safety label indicates that an

electrical hazard exists, which will result in personal injury if the instructions are not

followed.

This is the safety alert symbol. It is used to alert you to potential personal injury hazards.

Obey all safety messages that follow this symbol to avoid possible injury or death.

DANGER

DANGER indicates an imminently hazardous situation which, if not avoided, will result in death

or serious injury.

Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.


WARNING

WARNING indicates a potentially hazardous situation which, if not avoided, can result in death

or serious injury.

Failure to follow these instructions can cause death, serious injury or equipment

damage.

CAUTION

CAUTION indicates a potentially hazardous situation which, if not avoided, can result in minor

or moderate injury.

Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.

CAUTION, used without the safety alert symbol, indicates a potentially hazardous situation

which, if not avoided, can result in equipment damage.


NOTICE

NOTICE is used to address practices not related to physical injury.

Failure to follow these instructions can result in equipment damage.

Note: Electrical equipment should be installed, operated, serviced, and maintained only by

qualified personnel. No responsibility is assumed by Schneider Electric for any consequences

arising out of the use of this material.

A qualified person is one who has skills and knowledge related to the construction, operation and

installation of electrical equipment, and has received safety training to recognize and avoid the

hazards involved.


Before You Begin

These equipments and related software are used to control a variety of electrical processes. The

type or model of equipment suitable for each electrical application will vary depending on factors

such as the voltage level, the control function required, degree of protection and safety required

standards and government regulations etc. In some applications more than one equipment may

be required when redundancy is needed.

Only the user can be aware of all the conditions and factors present during setup, operation and

maintenance of the solution. Therefore only the user can determine the equipments, the software

and the related safeties which can be properly used. When selecting automation and control

equipment and related software for a particular application, the user should refer to the applicable

local and national standards and regulations.

The National Safety Council’s Accident Prevention Manual also provides much useful information.

Ensure that appropriate safeties and mechanical/electrical protection have been installed and are

operational before placing the equipment into service.

All mechanical/electrical safeties protection must be coordinated with the related equipment and

software.

Note: Coordination of safeties and mechanical/electrical protection is outside the scope of this

document.

START UP AND TEST

Following installation but before using electrical control and automation equipment for regular

operation, the system should be given a start up test by qualified personnel to verify the correct

operation of the equipment. It is important that arrangements for such a check be made and that

enough time is allowed to perform complete and satisfactory testing.

Note: Coordination of safeties and mechanical/electrical interlocks protection is outside the scope

of this document.


EQUIPMENT OPERATION HAZARD

o Follow all start up tests as recommended in the equipment documentation.

o Store all equipment documentation for future reference.

o Software testing must be done in both simulated and real environments.


damage.

Verify that the completed system is free from all short circuits and grounds, except those grounds

installed according to local regulations (according to the National Electrical Code in the USA, for

example).

If high-potential voltage testing is necessary, follow recommendations in the equipment

documentation to prevent accidental equipment damage.

Before energizing equipment:

Remove tools, meters, and debris from equipment

Close the equipment enclosure door

Remove ground from incoming power lines

Perform all start-up tests recommended by the manufacturer

example). If high-potential voltage testing is necessary, follow recommendations in the equipment

documentation to prevent accidental equipment damage.

Before energizing equipment:

Remove tools, meters, and debris from equipment

Close the equipment enclosure door

Remove ground from incoming power lines

Perform all start-up tests recommended by the manufacturer


OPERATION AND ADJUSTMENTS

The following precautions are from NEMA Standards Publication ICS 7.1-1995 (English version

prevails):

o Regardless of the care exercised in the design and manufacture of equipment or in the selection and rating of components; there are hazards that can be encountered if such equipment is improperly operated.

o It is sometimes possible to misadjust the equipment and thus produce unsatisfactory or unsafe operation. Always use the manufacturer’s instructions as a guide for functional adjustments. Personnel who have access to these adjustments should be familiar with the equipment manufacturer’s instructions and the machinery used with the electrical equipment.

Only those operational adjustments actually required by the operator should be accessible to the

operator. Access to other controls should be restricted to prevent unauthorized changes in

operating characteristics. The following precautions are from NEMA Standards Publication ICS

7.1-1995 (English version prevails):

o Regardless of the care exercised in the design and manufacture of equipment or in the selection and rating of components; there are hazards that can be encountered if such equipment is improperly operated.

o It is sometimes possible to misadjust the equipment and thus produce unsatisfactory or unsafe operation. Always use the manufacturer’s instructions as a guide for functional adjustments. Personnel who have access to these adjustments should be familiar with the equipment manufacturer’s instructions and the machinery used with the electrical equipment.

o Only those operational adjustments actually required by the operator should be accessible to the operator. Access to other controls should be restricted to prevent unauthorized changes in operating characteristics.

WARNING

UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT OPERATION

Only use software tools approved by Schneider Electric for use with this equipment.

Update your application program every time you change the physical hardware configuration.


damage.


INTENTION

This document is intended to provide a quick introduction to the described system. It is not

intended to replace any specific product documentation, nor any of your own design

documentation. On the contrary, it offers information additional to the product documentation on

installation, configuration and implementing the system.

The architecture described in this document is not a specific product in the normal commercial

sense. It describes an example of how Schneider Electric and third-party components may be

integrated to fulfill an industrial application.

A detailed functional description or the specifications for a specific user application is not part of

this document. Nevertheless, the document outlines some typical applications where the system

might be implemented.

The architecture described in this document has been fully tested in our laboratories using all the

specific references you will find in the component list near the end of this document. Of course,

your specific application requirements may be different and will require additional and/or different

components. In this case, you will have to adapt the information provided in this document to

your particular needs. To do so, you will need to consult the specific product documentation of the

components that you are substituting in this architecture. Pay particular attention in conforming to

any safety information, different electrical requirements and normative standards that would apply

to your adaptation.

It should be noted that there are some major components in the architecture described in this

document that cannot be substituted without completely invalidating the architecture,

descriptions, instructions, wiring diagrams and compatibility between the various software and

hardware components specified herein. You must be aware of the consequences of component

substitution in the architecture described in this document as substitutions may impair the

compatibility and interoperability of software and hardware.

CAUTION

EQUIPMENT INCOMPATIBILITY OR INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT

Read and thoroughly understand all hardware and software documentation before attempting

any component substitutions.



DANGER

HAZARD OF ELECTRIC SHOCK, BURN OR EXPLOSION

Only qualified personnel familiar with low and medium voltage equipment are to perform work described in this set of instructions. Workers must understand the hazards involved in working with or near low and medium voltage circuits.

Perform such work only after reading and understanding all of the instructions contained in this bulletin.

Turn off all power before working on or inside equipment.

Use a properly rated voltage sensing device to confirm that the power is off.

Before performing visual inspections, tests, or maintenance on the equipment, disconnect all sources of electric power. Assume that all circuits are live until they have been completely de-energized, tested, grounded, and tagged. Pay particular attention to the design of the power system. Consider all sources of power, including the possibility of back feeding.

Handle this equipment carefully and install, operate, and maintain it correctly in order for it to function properly. Neglecting fundamental installation and maintenance requirements may lead to personal injury, as well as damage to electrical equipment or other property.

Beware of potential hazards, wear personal protective equipment and take adequate safety precautions.

Do not make any modifications to the equipment or operate the system with the interlocks removed. Contact your local field sales representative for additional instruction if the equipment does not function as described in this manual.

Carefully inspect your work area and remove any tools and objects left inside the equipment.

Replace all devices, doors and covers before turning on power to this equipment.

All instructions in this manual are written with the assumption that the customer has taken these measures before performing maintenance or testing.

Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.


The STN Collection

The implementation of an automation project includes five main phases:

Selection,

Design,

Configuration,

Implementation

Operation.

To help you develop a project based on these phases, Schneider Electric has created the Tested,

Validated, Documented Architecture and System Technical Note.

A System Technical Note (STN) provides a more theoretical approach by focusing on a particular system technology.

A Tested, Validated, Documented Architecture (TVDA) provides technical guidelines and recommendations for implementing technologies to address your needs and requirements, This guide covers the entire scope of the project life cycle, from the Selection to the Operation phase, providing design methodologies and source code examples for all system components.

These notes describe complete solution offers for a

system, and therefore support you in the Selection

phase of a project. The TVDAs and STNs are related and

complementary. In short, you will find technology

fundamentals in an STN and their corresponding

applications in one or several TVDAs.

Development Environment

Each STN has been developed in one of our solution centers using the Infrastructure BU

equipment and software catalogues, the Infrastructure PACiS solution and the project

management process from Infrastructure complemented by the equipments, software and

processes from the other Schneider Electric Bus

PACiS, the Electrical Management system from Schneider Electric, is a collaborative architecture

that allows Utilities, Industries and Building companies to meet their electrical Management needs

while at the same time addressing their growing energy efficiency requirements.


Table of Contents

1. Introduction 11

2. Selection 39

3. Design 45

4. Power management 84

5. Appendix 105

1 - Introduction


1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

For Cement industries maintain of the electrical power is a key feature of their process. Any short

or long power interruption may impose a long and costly process stop directly impacting the

Cement plant profitability.

During the last years, the increase of electrical energy needed for Cement industry has modified

the plant industrial grid especially in three main directions:

Migration from Low Voltage to Medium or High Voltage of the internal plant network

Need to have on site local generation capabilities able to cover partially or fully the plant electrical need in case of a Utility black-out

New intelligent Power Management system to optimize the Energy Efficiency Management

Figure 1: Cement plant

The Power Management System is one of cement industry targeted application. The present

document describes the major function required by Cement industry for the Power Management

of a MV plant micro-grid:

1 - Introduction


The Fast Self-Healing solution (FSH),

The Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS),

The MV cadenced load shedding & load restore.

The Schneider Electric FSH solution (PACiS) is made of

IEDs to acquire information (measures, position, status) from the micro-grid, control electrical equipment and run the FSH automation scheme,

Ethernet communication network to transfer all information and to survey and control the application

Software applications o to configure and set the applications in line with the industrial plan o to transfer and display information to the Plant operators

The purpose of this document is to describe and explain:

The various electrical grid architecture and the reason of the choice

The functional description of the PACiS Fast Self-Healing elements part of the Cement Power Management System,

How to define the PACiS architecture and how the key elements are configured, integrated and interfaced

1.2 Cement electrical Micro-grid architecture

In Cement Industry depending of the Electrical Power required by the plant, the architectures and

sizes of the Electrical grid are based on 2 main families:

The Cement plants with non secured electrical network

The Cement plant with secured electrical network

We have considered in this document, the cement application with a site power greater than 2

MW.

1.2.1 Non secure MV/LV micro-grid architecture

The non-secured MV/LV micro-grids are based on a non-redundant architecture, which consider

that the interruption of the Energy delivery to the site on inside the site to the local MV or LV

equipments is acceptable for the Plant process.

The most common and simple architectures for non-secured MV/LV Cement micro-grids is the

Simple radial architecture. MV Radial architecture

1 - Introduction


Any fault occurring at the Grid connection level (MV or HV Utility incomers) or on any point of the

internal MV lines/cables generates a black-out (total or partial) and the repower can only be

achieved after the fault repair. With these architectures, the availability of the Process is fully

depending of all elements part of the micro-grid (Circuit breaker, Transformers, Cable, Control

Units, etc…).

Figure 2: MV Simple Radial architecture

1 - Introduction


1.2.2 Secure MV/LV micro-grid architecture

Various structures of the MV micro-grids are possible to secure the power the cement plant. The

complexity and the architecture of the micro-grid mainly depend upon:

The process constraints (interruption level, time to repair, etc...)

The level of availability and safety required by the application.

The size of the site

The potential evolution of the process and of the electrical micro-grid.

Security is given by:

The redundancy of the physical support to transfer energy to the load (MV or LV), cable, transformer, etc...

The potential availability of multiple energy sources (independent Utility connection, local generation capability, energy storage units, etc…)

Manual or Automation management of the grid to redirect the energy flow on the available path with care of the electrical network stability

The most common electrical micro-grid architectures of secured HV/MV/LV architectures for

Cement applications are:

Dual Power Supply architecture

Open or Closed loop architecture

MV Dual power architecture

The MV/LV Dual power architecture is recommended when continuous power supply must be

maintained. This architecture is well adapted for simple network (less than 3 x MV/LV

substations) due to the cost of the lines/cables to inter-connect the different nodes of the network.

If any fault on the Grid connection or on the internal MV lines/cables occurs, the power is transfer

on the alternative incoming utility feeder on the back line/cable. The associated Automation

scheme for this transfer management is the ATS (Automatic Transfer Switch)

1 - Introduction


Figure 3: MV Dual Power architecture

The MV electrical power supply safety may be ensured using two Utility MV lines or a single MV

Utility line and a local MV generator.

Note: Depending of the electrical needs of the site and the required availability sub-process per

sub-process, a Cement plant micro-grid may combine some Dual Power Architecture schemes

(for sensitive process elements) and some Simple Radial Architecture parts. This choice is define

based on the site specificities and the cement customer requirements

1 - Introduction


MV Loop architecture

The MV Loop architecture is recommended for medium and large MV/LV network (equal or

greater than 3 MV/LV substations) where a high level of availability of the electrical power is

required by the industrial process.

This architecture provides at a reasonable cost a redundancy solution (open loop or close loop),

ensuring that in case of fault on the internal MV lines/cables or substation, the Power is redirected

on a safe part of the network.

Usually this architecture also integrates at substation levels (Utility grid connection and internal

MV/LV) the capability to have Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) scheme to increase power supply

availability.

This architecture is also adapted to potential extension (new MV/LV substations) at limited cost.

Figure 4: MV loop architecture

The MV electrical power plant safety may be done using two independent Utility MV lines or a

single MV Utility line and local MV generation capability.

1 - Introduction


1.3 Cement PMS functional elements

To perform the Power Management of the Cement micro-grid the following functions are

considered:

Protection of the MV & LV electrical networks

Instrumentation of the Electrical network

Monitoring and control of the Cement plant primary equipments (MV and LV) including all Fast Self-Healing automatic schemes

Operator interface to display, set, configure and perform any real-time and post-mortem analysis of the electrical network (optional)

Gateway to send and received data, measures and command from the cement plant Digital Control System

1.3.1 Protection devices

MV Utility delivery protection

The protection implemented on the Utility feeder incomes are usually defined by the Utility grid

code specific to each utility. This mainly applies to the protection setting and tripping

characteristics which impose in case of internal Cement plan micro-grid electrical fault an

immediate disconnection of the plant electrical network from the Utility grid (opening of the

associated CBs).

The typical protections required by Utility to protect this Utility incoming feeder are:

Over-current protection phase & earth(I>, Ie>)

Directional Over-current protection (Dir I>, Dir Ie>)

Over and/or Under Voltage protection (U>; U<)

Over and/or Under Frequency protection (f>; f<) if the plant generation can export energy to the Utility grid

Traditionally these protection relays are sealed and the setting can not be modified by the

Cement plant owner.

1 - Introduction


MV feeder protection

The protection devices for the different substations are of the following types:

Non Direction Over-current digital protection (I>, Ie>)

Directional Over-current digital protection (Dir I>, Dir Ie>)

The choice between the two types of protection is mainly linked to the MV earthing system

(isolated, direct, resistant or compensated) and to the presence and physical localization of

Generator if any.

All protection devices have two groups of settings which can be switched on operator command

or by electromechanical changeover switch.

The different loop cells and switch are fitted with current transformers (Protection class CT) and

for the Voltage Transformer (VT).

Note: Given the earth grounding by UTILITY (resonant earthed neutral system) the selectivity

study may impose the replacement of the Over-current (Ie>) digital protection devices and

Directional Over-current digital protection (Dir Ie>) with Sensitive Earth Fault protection devices.

A voltage reference (VT) must therefore be integrated into each MV/MV substation.

Due to the reduced short circuit power in the event of autonomous operation on generator sets,

the MV/LV transformer substation fuse switch cells are all been fitted with protection relays,

current transformers (CT) and a trip coil to be able to:

Ensure Earth protection of the transformers and between the cell and the transformer

Compensate for the fuse operating for too long in the event of reduced short circuit power (operation on generator sets) which would not allow total selectivity with the corresponding loop circuit-breaker

1.3.1.1.1 Phase Over-current protection (50/51, 67)

The phase over-current protection function is three-phased current protection operating at

independent time. For each threshold the instantaneous and time delay information is assign to

the tripping of the CB based on external security automation schemes.

1 - Introduction


1.3.1.1.2 Earth fault protection (50N/51N/67N)

The earth over-current protection function is based on the measurement of the zero-sequence

quantities of the protected line. It is selectable between the directional and non-directional earth-

fault current protection function.

The earth over-current protection time delay is selectable between the definite-time and all

standardized time dependent characteristics (IEC curves).

MV motor protection

The protection devices for the MV motors are of the following types:

Over-current digital protection (I>, Ie>)

Negative sequence digital protection (I2>

Thermal Overload digital protection (Ith>)



The different MV motor Circuit-Breaker cells are fitted with current transformers (Protection class

CT).

1.3.1.1.3 Phase Over-current protection (50/51)

The phase over-current protection function is three-phased current protection operating at

independent time. For each threshold the instantaneous and time delay information is assign to

the tripping of the CB based on external security automation schemes.

1.3.1.1.4 Earth fault protection (50N/51N)

The earth over-current protection function is based on the measurement of the zero-sequence

quantities of the protected line. It is selectable between the directional and non-directional earth-

fault current protection function.



1.3.1.1.5 Negative sequence (46)

1 - Introduction


The Negative Sequence protection is based on the detection of negative sequence current to

protection the MV motor against phase unbalance. This may result from unbalanced power

supply, phase inversion or loss of phase or phase current unbalance.

The protection threshold is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external MV motor security

scheme.

1.3.1.1.6 Thermal Overload (49)

The Thermal Overload Protection protects the MV motor against thermal damage caused by

overloads on machines.

The thermal capacity used is calculated based on:

Negative sequence current

current RMS values

ambient temperature (acquire by temperature sensors)

The protection threshold is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external MV motor security

scheme.

MV Generator protection

The protection devices for the Generator and their connection on the micro-grid are of the

following types:

Directional Over-current digital protection (Dir I>, Dir Ie>)

Under and Over Voltage protection (U>, U0>, U<, U0<)

Under Frequency protection (f<)

Note: We do not describe bellow the internal Generator protection such as Active & Reactive

Overpower, Neutral Voltage Displacement, Thermal Overload, etc...



The Generator Circuit-breakers are fitted with current transformers (Protection class CT) and for

the Voltage Transformer (VT).

1.3.1.1.7 Phase Over-current protection (67)

1 - Introduction


The Directional phase over-current protection function is three-phased current protection

operating at independent time. For each threshold the instantaneous and time delay information

is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external security automation schemes.

1.3.1.1.8 Earth fault protection (67N)

The Directional earth over-current protection function is based on the measurement of the zero-

sequence quantities of the protected line. It is selectable between the directional and non-

directional earth-fault current protection function.



1.3.1.1.9 Under-voltage (27)

The under-voltage protection function is three-phased and associated to each MV incoming

feeder. It detects the lack of voltage to enable the shedding of loads supplied by the associated

MV incoming feeder (and HV/MV transformer).

This protection function has two different under-voltage thresholds freely and independently

settable.

In order to prevent any fault in the LV circuit of the VT’s impacting the under-voltage protection

function or any other protection function dependant on the voltage values supplied by the VT’s,

integrate the capacity to detect that type of faults and the inhibition of the associated protection

functions is warranted.

1.3.1.1.10 Over-voltage (59)

The overvoltage protection function is three-phased, with two thresholds freely and independently

settable, operating at independent time. This function has the purpose of detecting situations of

abnormal voltage increase in the MV bus, triggering the timed trip of the incoming MV feeder

circuit breaker.

Overvoltage is taken into account for the inhibition of the orders to raise the automatic voltage

regulator.

1.3.1.1.11 Under-frequency (81U)

1 - Introduction


The under-frequency protection function has four to six thresholds operating at independent time,

with both Instantaneous and time delay information to be available

This protection level detects frequency decreases in the grid, later reporting the automation

function “load shedding due to lack of voltage/restoration due to voltage recovery” so that

selective disconnection of the substation loads can be performed.

Protection device selectivity

The protection devices implemented at all levels of the MV distribution, from the MV delivery

substation and GENERATOR SET MV substation to the Low voltage master distribution panels,

will be chosen and set such as to ensure total selectivity.

This selectivity will be ensured irrespective of the source used:

Utility delivery substation

Generator sets connected to the grid (transient coupling)

Generator sets in autonomous production

All types of selectivity may be used, including a combination:

Current selectivity,

Chronometric selectivity,

Logic selectivity,

Directional selectivity and differential selectivity.

The protection device relays are digital and communicating to be able to report all the information

necessary to running the installations to the instrumentation and control system.

The CBs and SWs positions and control are in parallel hard wired to the Automatic control

equipment (PLC) to accelerate the command and avoid any communication failure dependency.

The protection device relays have several trip thresholds, each corresponding to an available

power supply mode and short circuit power. There is at least one threshold corresponding to

operation on the MV network and one threshold corresponding to operation on generator sets.

1 - Introduction


The threshold and delay time setting for each protection device depends on the protection

drawing resulting from the execution studies and the characteristics of the equipment selected to

conduct the work (MV cells, transformers, generator sets, cable laying methods, etc.).

The selectivity study is based on the characteristics of the UTILITY earthing arrangement and the

Cement facility standard protection device performance selectivity requirements.

1.3.2 Fault Passage Indicator

The Fault Passage Indicator may be used over the Cement Plant micro-grid to provide an

indication of the electrical fault localization. Due to their characteristics, the FPI do not control

Circuit Breaker (tripping action on fault), they just give indication of the fault (local signal or

remote information) and the fault isolation action has to be done manually by an Operator action

or by the nearest protection + Circuit breaker.

The Cement plant design will define if the use of FPI is compatible with the expected Outage

management

1.3.3 Measurement & Power meter devices

All needed measures and quality data can be acquired by dedicated devices (measurement units

or power meters) or via the protection relays as long as the precision reaches the application

expectations.

Measurement devices

The measure units provide true rms metered values. Information provided include frequency,

temperature, current, demand current, voltage, real power, reactive power, apparent power,

demand power, predicted demand power, power factor, accumulated energy, accumulated

reactive energy, total harmonic distortion (THD) of each current and voltage, and K-factor of each

current.

The Circuit Monitors shall accept inputs from industry standard instrument transformers (120 VAC

secondary PTs and 5 A secondary CTs). Connection to 480Y/277 VAC circuits shall be possible

without use of PTs

1 - Introduction


Power meters

The category of the metering device generally depends on where it is installed in the electrical

network:

Metering devices installed at the MV substations allow:

o Analysis of cement plant power demand (load profile) and peak demand (value and duration)

o Verification of energy bills and penalties (reactive consumption and overload)

o Analysis of power quality such as harmonic distortion.

Metering devices installed LV switchboard feeder (or on MV side of MV/LV transformer) allow:

o Sub-metering (consumption monitoring of plant areas or processes) for cost allocation

o Consumption monitoring for plant utilities such as Air Handling Units, boilers, chillers or other major energy usages for:

Energy usage analysis

Plant benchmarking

Standards or certifications

Plant control optimization

Metering devices installed closest to the point of consumption allow:

o Energy use breakdowns

o Energy consumption monitoring for:

Energy usage analysis

Building management optimization o The number of operating hours of a machine or motor.

1.3.3.1 Primary equipment control & monitoring

Circuit breaker monitoring

The Cement Power Management System shall:

Count the number of Circuit Breaker operation,

Evaluate the electrical wear based on I2t

Evaluate an excessive operating time.

Each of the measurement shall trigger an alarm on the Operator local HMI/SCADA.

1 - Introduction


Trip circuit supervision

A trip circuit supervision per circuit breaker is needed to continuously monitor the trip circuit wiring

continuity whatever the position of the circuit breaker poles.

Instrument transformer supervision

Supervision of CT and VT is necessary done in order to detect the failure of one or more phases.

The CT supervision shall use the zero sequence current.

The VT supervision shall discriminate between the fuse failure and the circuit being dead. It shall be based on the negative phase sequence voltage.

MV Switchgear management

1.3.3.1.1 Circuit breakers

The following information is issued from the HV and MV circuit breakers for the control functions

and interlock management:

Status of the “On” / “Off” / “Unknown”/”Invalid” component;

SF6 gas pressure control (SF6 Gas Leak Alarm – level 1, and SF6 Gas Leak Alarm – level 2);

Rearming of the spring of the circuit breaker’s mechanical control;

Supervision of switching at the command circuits;

Failure in the open command circuit.

1.3.3.1.2 Circuit breaker positions

The position of the HV or MV CB (OPEN/CLOSE) is provided directly by auxiliary connections of

the CB. If the circuit breaker switched to the “Tripped” position and has opening or closure

permission, it will be possible to operate it by a voluntary order (issued locally or remotely). In this

case, automatic closure orders generated by the automation functions will be inhibited.

1.3.3.1.3 SF6 gas pressure control

When SF6 Circuit breakers are used, the amount of SF6 gas contained in the circuit breakers

must be controlled based on the information provided by the SF6 gas leak detection system:

SF6 Gas Leak Alarm, Level 1 – all the operating characteristic of the circuit breaker must also be ensured and an alarm signal must be generated and logged;

SF6 Gas Leak Alarm, Level 2 – must immediately trip the circuit breaker and interlock the closure orders.

1 - Introduction


1.3.3.1.4 Vacuum pressure control

When Vacuum Circuit breaker are used, the vacuumness must be controlled based on the

information provided by the Vacuum Leak detection system:

Vacuum Leak Alarm, Level 1 – all the operating characteristic of the circuit breaker must also be ensured and an alarm signal must be generated and logged;

Vacuum Leak Alarm, Level 2 – must immediately trip the circuit breaker and interlock the closure orders.

1.3.3.1.5 Switching device control

The operation of a CB is supervised after an Open or Close command has been ordered. If the

new position information is received after a pre-defined time, it can be consider as an indication of

a potential degradation of the switching device performance.

For each switching device (HV or MV) based on the manufacturer characteristics, a maximum

time delay between the order acknowledgment and new position is defined by the user. If this

time delay is crossed an Alarm is generated to inform the operator.

1.3.3.1.6 MV CB Internal arc fault

The Armored Metallic Switchboard of the MV circuit breakers and switches is designed to avoid

that any electric arc in a given compartment (due to the presence of faults in the materials

composing it, anomalous operating conditions and also as a result of false switching operations)

do not spread to other MV CB or SW compartments and do not compromise the safety of any

person present at the site.

To ensure these characteristics, Each MV CB or SW integrates a Protection System that monitors

the Internal Arc Flash, consisting of light-detecting optical sensors and default current

measurement control units.

These protection systems will eliminate in less than 10ms the internal arc fault by tripping the

faulty CB(s) and informed all equipments directly or indirectly to the faulty CB or SW.

1 - Introduction


1.3.4 Control devices

The control of the micro-grid MV primary equipment is done via dedicated IED (RTU/PLC). This

RTU/PLC ensures the following functions:

Communication on the Power Management System

Concentration of data received via the local communication from the various protection, measurement devices and power meters

Execution of the primary devices (CB, SW) order (Open or Close)

Distributed Automatic schemes (MV micro-grid Self-healing, MV generator management) IEC61131-3 based.

Operational mode management.

The RTU/PLC must have the capability to integrate:

All needed type of Logic Input boards (DIs), Logic Output boards (DOs), Analogue Input boards (AIs), Analogue Output boards (AOs) to be connected to the Electrical process

Legacy & Ethernet communication for upstream and downstream communications

Local display and management capabilities for the controlled substation and primary equipment

Local recording and archiving (Event, Measure, Alarm)

Fully comply with Environmental conditions of MV electrical application (IEC standards)

Note: the control of MV primary equipment is traditionally done using double point control (wired

or via communication) with 1 signal for Open control and 1 signal for Close control). In this case

the associated position is defined suing Double point status (wired or via communication).

1.3.5 Communication network

ETHERNET architectures

Ethernet network can be over Optical Fiber and/or Twisted pair. With or without Redundancy

solutions, Ethernet Network Redundancy is managed through Ring architecture or Redundant

Star architecture. The redundancy management standard selected must be in line with the

expected performances and standard constraint; typically the use of RSTP with IEC61850

GOOSE is not possible as the IEC standard requires no interruption greater than 4 ms (RSTP is

always greater than 200ms).

1 - Introduction


Ethernet IEC 61850

IEC 61850 is the IEC standard for Electrical applications based on Ethernet and provides fast

peer-to-peer and self-descriptive communication between IEDs... It includes general aspects

(project management, substation functions, etc.), detailed data model, configuration language

and conformance tests.

The ETHERNET IEC 61850 communication can be single or fully redundant to match the project

required availability level.

1.3.6 Operator control & monitoring HMI/SCADA

The local Operator HMI/SCADA application (local operator HMI) provides the local operator all

necessary views and tools to Supervise, Control, Archive and Maintain the entire HV, MV & LV

Cement plant micro-grid.

Main functions

The local HMI/SCADA application shall provide the operator supervision, control, archive and

maintenance functions.

1.3.6.1.1 Supervision

Display of the topological view of single line diagrams: general overview, voltage level view, detailed bay view. This shall include the position of the switchgear, the measurement values, operation counters, graphical alarm representation, etc... Spontaneous changes of a state, typically opening of a circuit breaker from a protection, shall have a specific color code.

Display in dedicated view the various load shedding prioritization table

Display the alarm list and enable acknowledgement and clearance.

Display the sequence of event list.

Display curves, either real time or based on archived. Invalid information shall be clearly marked. Curves shall manage the time shifts.

Display disturbance and power quality files.

Printing of sequence of event list, hardcopy and reports. The reports shall be freely configurable.

1 - Introduction


1.3.6.1.2 Control

Control of the primary devices, with dedicated pop-up windows enabling select before execute and direct execute sequences, the use of synchro-check for circuit breaker and interlocking forcing for switchgear (see below).

Forcing, substitution or suppression of information in order to cope with incorrect sensor delivery.

Control of the IED status: maintenance or run mode.

1.3.6.1.3 Archive

Storage of events, measurements, disturbance and power quality events.

Storage of all the system databases and component documentation.

The local archiving function is associated to a local printer to perform the legal Sequence Of

Event (SOE) recording with for each event data the complete information including the event

status, the time stamped at 1ms.

1.3.6.1.4 Maintenance

System database design and modification.

IED setting & database download.

Display of the system status, including the state of each high level component (RTU, HMI/SCADA, GTW, IED) and detail of it

Fast Self Healing application communication Ethernet network status and fault localization

HMI/SCADA General look and feel

The local HMI/SCADA application displays:

Single line diagrams, busbar or line sections between all switching devices could be colored. To distinguish the different states of a busbar or line section the following characteristic are used:

o energized section background and edge in primary color

o de-energized section background empty, edge in primary color

o undefined section background crosshatched, edge in primary color

o earthen section background yellow, edge green

The application alarms classified by importance and time

The event list classified by time and origin

1 - Introduction


Control procedure

A control shall be executed in “Select Before Operate” (SBO) or “Direct Execute” (DE). A control

acknowledgement pop-up is used to display negative control acknowledgement and to allow

users with appropriate rights to by-pass the interlocking or manual lock control verification. In this

case, the user can visualize the interlocking equation and get the reason of the control rejection.

Several parameters, defined during the configuration process of the substation, shall filter the

control:

Inter-control delay (time between two sequence in the same device)

Automation running for the micro-grid, a dedicated substation or a device

Synchro-check

Uniqueness control : only one control at a time for the device

Alarm management

Alarms shall be generated by a change of state of a digital point, a measurement threshold

violation or a system internal fault (e.g.: loss of communication, IED faulty).

Alarms shall be defined as immediate or differed (with an associated user-selectable delay) and

can have an associated audible alarm. The audible alarm could also being immediate or differed.

Alarms shall be associated to each state of event (open, close, jammed...) or to each a

measurement threshold (in case of violation) and may have a different gravity level (0 to 5).

Three types of alarm management shall be available and are user-selectable during configuration

process:

« State basis » alarm management: one alarm for each state is displayed

« Gravity level basis » alarm management: only one alarm for each gravity level is displayed. The previous one is replaced by the current one with same gravity level

« Data basis » alarm management: only the last alarm is displayed: the previous one is replaced by the current one

The alarms shall be displayed via the local substation HMI using dedicated windows displaying:

the chronologically sorted list of the alarms (with additional sorting criteria as geographic or functional)

1 - Introduction


the last N alarms (N being user-selectable during configuration phase) with different colors for each line of the previous lists, depending on the alarm state

graphic pictures defined during configuration phase, displayed in the different views, which can be associated to the presence and the states of alarms for a device, for a bay, for a voltage area, for the whole substation, etc.

An alarm shall be acknowledged by an operator, Independently of the alarm acknowledgement,

the audible annunciation shall be acknowledged by an operator or automatically after a user-

selectable delay

An alarm shall be cleared only if the reason of its apparition disappear (becomes inactive) and

was acknowledged by an operator. An alarm shall also be configured as « to be cleared

automatically » when it becomes inactive and is acknowledged.

Sequence of events

The sequence of events is printed and archived on the PC hard disk. It contains the following

information:

TimeStamp and synchronization status (the synchronized / not synchronized)

Origin - substation name, voltage level name, bay name, module name

ObjectName - Information name

Object Message - Information resulting state.

Archiving

The measures and associated mean values are archived in the local substation HMI database in

the following tables:

Daily table for the mean values of the day.

Monthly table for the minimum, maximum, mean and sum values, computed at a reference time (configurable) of a day.

Yearly table for the minimum, maximum, mean and sum values, computed at a reference time (configurable) of a month.

User rights management

Each local HMI/SCADA application user is defined with a log-in, a password and a profile. A

profile is an ensemble of user rights which define permission for all kind actions. User rights are

the rights related to a kind action.

User rights and user profiles are defined during database configuration and can’t be modified

online. Users are defined on line and can be modified.

1 - Introduction


The following user rights are available:

General rights including Administrator rights,

View rights: up to 32 levels for access to a specific mimic. These rights are defined on a per mimic basis,

Control rights: up to 32 levels for controlling & locking devices,

Acknowledgement rights: up to 32 levels for individual alarm acknowledgement and clearing.

These user rights are assigned to user profiles. Up to 20 user profiles can be defined during the

configuration phase.

1.3.7 Gateway for the Cement Plant DCS

All necessary information related to the MV micro-grid status and management must be

communicate to the Cement plant DCS. The choice of these information is defined by each

Cement plant manager based on it

1.4 Cement plant Power Management

To optimize the Power Management in the Cement plant various elements may be implemented

but the two simplest able to reduce in case of MV Electrical fault the impact and consequences

on the Cement production are:

The MV Fast Self Healing Automatic Scheme,

The MV Automatic Transfer Switch

The MV Load Shedding and Load Restore cadenced Scheme

1 - Introduction


1.4.1 Cement plant microgrid

For this project the Cement plant microgrid considered is has mention before a MV ring network

with

1 Main Utility grid MV substation (1 MV incomer)

1 MV Generator substation (1 MV incomer)

1 MV/LV Substation (Grinding SS)

1 MV/LV Substation (Kiln SS)

1 MV/LV Substation (Cooler SS)

1 MV/LV Substation (Mill SS)

Figure 5: Cement plant MV ring network

1 - Introduction


1.4.2 MV Fast Self-Healing

The aim of the Fast Self-Healing automatic scheme is to isolate any faulty part of a ring micro-grid

and repower the rest of the valid elements in the shortest time without any operator action.

The MV ring network is based on Utility delivery substation with one or more MV incomers

(alternative could be the use of a local generation power capability) and an MV ring network with

various MV/LV substations.

In normal condition the ring is open at a predefined point (in the figure below on A6). The different

MV switching devices can be Circuit Breakers (CB) or Motorized Disconnectors (SW).

The Utility incomer(s) is equipped with Protection relays (as define by the local Utility grid-code).

The other micro-grid CB or SW are detecting electrical fault using Protection relay or Fault

Passage Indicators (FPI).

Self-healing sequence

As stated, in normal condition the MV ring is open on B6. All other CBs/SWs are closed. MV Grid

incomer & MV generator CBs are equipped with protection relays (typically Overcurrent I>)

1. If a fault appears on the Cement plan internal MV network (between Substation 1 and 2), the MV Grid incomer protection will detect it and trip the associated CB. All Substations and associated LV networks no longer powered.

2. The protection relays/Fault Passage Indicators on A0, A2 & A3 detected the fault while A4, A5 and A6 don’t.

3. The Self-healing Automatic scheme defined based on the Normal condition topology that the fault is between A3 and A4 (electrical topology is known by all substation MiCOM C264 RTUs/PLCs. These two CBs/SWs are opened by the FSH automatic scheme (the faulty section is now isolated).

4. Then the FSH automatic scheme will close MV Grid incomer to repower Grinding, Cooler and Mill substations.

5. Finally, the FSH will close A6 to repower Kiln substation.

Depending of the used technology (primary switch devices), the complete cycle may be executed

in less than 500ms (CB opening time included)

After repair of the faulty element, manually or automatically, the Normal scheme is rebuild with

the open point on A6 (reclosing of A3 & A4 and opening of A6)

1 - Introduction


Note: Depending of the Utility Grid code, the initial fault may force the opening of the MV Utility

incomer CB. This imposes an action on MV Generator also to repower substations 4 and 5. This

is a typical adjustment of the FSH Automatic scheme

Self-healing sequence – Generator connection

If the electrical fault occurs at the Utility Grid connection (Busbar or Incomer) the connection to

the grid could not be rebuild. The use of an alternative local power source (MV Generator or MV

Power storage unit) is needed to maintain the Cement plant running. The sequence is similar to

the one describe previously except that the complete Cement plant micro-grid will be isolated

from the grid and act as an Islanded micro-grid.

Note: Depending of the Utility and National laws and registration, this mode may impose to have

in complement a internal dedicated MV Earth point to maintain the safety and security.

1.4.3 MV Automatic Transfer Switch

The Automatic Transfer Switch function is essential for all critical MV or LV applications when the

power can not be cut off for a certain time (> 5s). To avoid this risk, the solution is to have at least

2 potential sources available to be connected to the sensitive part of the network and be able on

a confirmed voltage drop to switch from one source to the other.

Two types of ATS exist:

The ATS with a short black-out. During the ATS sequence, for a short time a black-out is create between the 2 source switches (no parallel management)

The ATS without black-out. During the ATS sequence, for a short time the 2 sources run in parallel. This imposes a perfect synchronism (voltage & phase) between the two sources

The ATS Automatic scheme permanently considers the following information before starting any

switch:

The availability and the position of all involved switching devices (CB, IS or SW),

The different voltage and frequency levels and values

The voltage phases of each power sources (in case of parallel management)

1 - Introduction


1.4.3.1.1 ATS for substation without busbar coupling

The MV substation is based on two incoming feeder connected to two independent power

sources (could be grid connection or Generation plant) and the MV busbar is without isolator (no

capability to separate the busbar in two half sections). This scheme imposes that in Normal

condition only one incomer powers the MV busbar and the outgoing feeders.

Figure 6: MV substation with 1 Busbar

1. If a power failure is detected on the main source (A source) via a confirmed voltage drop, the associated CB or SW is open by the ATS (or by the protection relay if any)

2. The ATS check the coherency of the needed data (CB and SW position, availability of the B source voltage, completion of the voltage and frequency ranges, no fault on the outgoing feeders and associated networks)

3. The ATS send an order to all Outgoing Feeders CB or SW to open them one by one.

4. The ATS close the CB or SW associated to B source to repower the busbar

5. The outgoing feeder CBs/SWs that were before the transfer closed are reclosed, the one that were open remains open. This reclosing action is done one by one based on a pre-defined sequence.

Note: If MV motors or large number of LV motors are connected on the MV busbar, a fast

reconnection may create motor destruction. This comes from phase non-synchronization between

the motors and the power source which potentially create transitory or sub-transitory electrical

and mechanical events. To avoid such problem, the ATS will imposed a pre-define black-out time

(between 200ms and 1s depending of the motor size and number) to ensure that the remaining

busbar voltage value is bellow 25% of the nominal value. Alternative is to have a Minimum

Voltage protection relay (27R) which will block the ATS.

1 - Introduction


1.4.3.1.2 ATS for substation with busbar isolator

The MV substation is based on two incoming feeder connected to two independent power

sources (could be grid connection or Generation plant) and the MV busbar is sectionalized in two

half parts by an isolator.

Figure 7: MV substation with 2 x ½ Busbar

In Normal condition, the isolator is open and each ½ busbar section is connected to each A or B

sources.

1. If a power failure is detected on the one of the sources (A source or B source) via a confirmed voltage drop, the associated CB or SW is open by the ATS (or by the protection relay if any).

2. The ATS check the coherency of the needed data (CB and SW position, availability of the B source voltage, completion of the voltage and frequency ranges, no fault on the outgoing feeders and associated networks)

3. The ATS send an order to all Outgoing Feeders CB or SW of the ½ busbar section to open them one by one.

4. The ATS close the busbar isolator to repower the ½ busbar section

5. The outgoing feeder CBs/SWs that were before the transfer closed are reclosed, the one that were open remains open. This reclosing action is done one by one based on a pre-defined sequence.

The ATS can run between:

2 Utility grid feeders connected in the same MV substation,

2 Utility grid feeders connected in two independent MV substations,

1 Utility grid feeder and 1 local MV Generator (connected on not in the same MV substations

Note: If MV motors or large number of LV motors are connected on the ½ busbar section, a fast

reconnection may create motor destruction. This comes from phase non-synchronization between

the motors and the power source which potentially create transitory or sub-transitory electrical

and mechanical events. To avoid such problem, the ATS will impose a pre-define black-out time

(between200ms and 1s depending of the motor size and number) to ensure that the remaining ½

busbar voltage value is below 25% of the nominal value. Alternative is to have a Minimum

Voltage protection relay (27R) which will block the ATS.

1 - Introduction


1.4.4 MV cadenced Load Shedding & Load Restore

The MV cadenced load shedding & load restore Function is typically provided in Cement plant

electrical power systems to overcome transient instability conditions due to unbalance condition

between the load consumptions and the local generation or power line capabilities after a Fast

Self-Healing scheme.

A Loss of generation or grid fault creates an immediate instability condition which has a direct

impact to process rotating equipment (such as turbines/generators, pumps, fans, compressors

and motors, etc.). After the Fast Self Healing sequence, the brutal reconnection of all loads may

create instability over the network and inrush currents when all rotating machines try to

reaccelerate. The various motors (MV or LV) due to the loss of their power may create on the

various MV busbar voltages which blocked the voltage based protection functions. When the Fast

Self Healing sequence is initiated, the Load Shedding module will memorized the position of the

various MV CBs and automatically open all MV CBs to force the MV busbar value to zero.

The operator can manually via the local HMI/SCADA dedicate view, enable or disable the Load

Shedding function.

After the Load Shedding module execution, the Load Restore Automatic Scheme will

automatically reclose the various load CBs based on their position before the fault (memorized

status before the LS trigger condition). This reconnection is done as soon as the Power source

value is available and stable. The repower order is based on the priority table defined by the

Operator.

The operator can manually via the local HMI/SCADA dedicated view, modify the Load Restore

priorities based on the Cement plant process after the Load Shedding.

The Operator may also using the local HMI/SCADA dedicated view, do manually the Load

Restore program based on the Cement plant process after the Load Shedding.

Note: The Load Restore module integrates a protection against the Motor Starting inrush and

ensures that any new connection will not create instability of the micro-grid.

2 - Selection


2. Selection

This chapter presents the choices made for the hardware and software of the project developed

for this document.

The PACiS Cement PMS solution integrated all necessary elements (IEDs, Software,

Engineering) to achieve an optimized management of the cement plant HV/MV & LV micro-grid.

This includes as main features:

MV & LV protection relays or MV fault detector located in the various substation of the micro-grid (measurement values can also been acquired by the relays with their sensor precision),

Automation and control units located in the main substations of the micro-grid,

A communication network inside each substation and between them,

Gateway(s) to Cement plant Digital Control System or Process Control System,

A dedicated HMI/SCADA for local display, control, monitoring and setting of the application(option),

The Configuration and setting tools needed.

2 - Selection


Figure 8: Cement plant MV Power Management Solution

2 - Selection


2 Hardware

2.1.1 The MV protection relays

The choice of the MV protection relay to be used in the PACiS Fast Self Healing application has

to be defined between the two main ranges of the Schneider Electric catalogue:

Sepam relays

MiCOM P relays

Based on the typical Cement Plant required protection function, for the micro-grid the selected

protection models are:

MiCOM P relays

o MiCOM P111 (MV feeder)

o MiCOM P211 (MV Motor)

o MiCOM P123 (Utility incomer)

Sepam relays

o Sepam S24(MV feeder)

o Sepam M24 (MV Motor)

o Sepam S42 (Utility incomer)

2.1.2 Fault Position Indicator

For the present project, the choice of the project is not to propose a solution using FPI. This will

be part of a later evolution

2.1.3 RTU/PLC

MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC with highly integrated design and multiple capabilities is envisioned to

meet the changing supervisory control and digital substation control system needs in the power

process environment. It provides flexible, scalable and reliable integration of control, monitoring;

metering, power quality, fault recording and automation functions.

2 - Selection


MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC acquires and processes digital and analogue inputs and outputs; it

performs local automation and also works as a distributed I/O module taking part of the global

automation. It retrieves data from legacy and third party devices such as MV & LV relays, IEDs

and act as a gateway between the LAN upper and lower networks between multiple standards

communication protocols. It permits reduce system management costs.

MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is natively design to be fully IEC61850 compatible in the communication

aspect (Ethernet port) and also regarding it configuration and management. All Setting and

configuration of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC are based on the IEC61850 SCL description and

format

Figure 9: MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC

A serial printer can be directly connected to one of the four serial port and print following the

configuration of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC all change of states with their time stamped at 1ms

information.

2 - Selection


2.1.4 Metering units

For the present project, the choice of the project is to use for the MV element directly the

measurement and disturbance elements issued by the MiCOM or Sepam protection relays.

Integration of Power Meter units will be part of a future solution upgrade using the Ethernet or

Legacy communication network.

2.1.5 Ethernet switches

The choice of the project is to maximize the integration of Ethernet switches embedded in the

MiCOM C264 (SWR board). For the Gateway and local HMI/SCADA PC, a PCI board is available

with the same characteristics (MiCOM H115).

If necessary to connect any external Ethernet tool, free Ethernet port will be provide at MiCOM

C264 level and HMI/SCADA PC level.

2.2 Software

This section describes the software selected for this project and the minimum recommended

system requirements.

2.2.1 PACiS System

The global solution describes in this project is based on PACiS System. To ensure coherency

and consistency of the various elements part of PACiS, a global version is defined

Data Description

Version PACiS V4.x

Operating system Microsoft XP/7

2 - Selection


2.2.2 PACiS System Configuration Editor

PACiS SCE is used for the configuration of the PACiS application and all elements part of the

application as defined by the IEC61850.

The table below shows the data for this software.

Data Description

Version PACiS SCE V4.x


2.2.3 PACiS System Maintenance Tool

PACiS SMT is used for the Maintenance of the PACiS application and all elements part of the

application as defined by the IEC61850.


Data Description

Version PACiS SMT V4.x


2.2.4 Local HMI/SCADA

The Local HMI/SCADA used in this project is based on the one validated with the referenced

PACiS System version.


Data Description

Version PACiS HMI


3 - Design


3 Design

This chapter describes how the architecture and application are designed for the purpose of this

document.

3.1 Architecture of the solution

PACiS offers a flexible answer for electrical micro-grid Protection, Automation, Control and

Monitoring requirements. PACiS is designed for new and retrofit application cases with dedicated

features enabling an easy system extension.

PACiS is based on a unique configurable architecture, in term of functions, performances and

physical distribution within one or several substations.

The PACiS System architecture is based on a micro-grid IEC61850 communication Bus to which

is connected equipments used for the customer solution.

These equipments are:

the Computers MiCOM C264,

the local HMI/SCADA Operator Workstation.

The Communication network is based on the IEC61850 protocol, over an Ethernet / TCP-IP

network. Additional busses (called legacy busses) are also available in the PACiS System

architectures.

The standard PACiS solution is based on Schneider Electric range elements:

MiCOM :

o rack-based for MiCOM C264

o rack-based for all MiCOM Px10

o MiCOM A for PC-based GTW

Sepam :

o Rack-based for all Sepam

And third party devices:

PC for the local HMI/SCADA:

Printer for the SOE

PC or laptop for the Engineering tools

3 - Design


The typical PACiS architecture based on Schneider Electric elements ensures:

Maximize the functional integration through fast exchanges between devices (10/100 Mbps)

Allow a flexible distribution inside or between substations

integrate third party devices within the Digital Control System of the substation

PACiS offers connection with legacy communication networks (RS485, optical) in order to fully re-

use past investments with the new generation.

A full set of engineering tools used for the configuration, installation commissioning and

maintenance of PACiS complement the solution.

The purpose of the Cement plant Fast Self-Healing solution is to propose a high level of safety.

The distributed architecture is the one which ensures the high flexibility and combines with a

redundant ring Ethernet network provides the Cement plant the highest Power supply availability.

3 - Design


Figure 11: System architecture for Cement plant Power Management (Example)

3.2 The Power supply

All IEDs (Sepam and MiCOM) part of this application is powered by a secured DC power supply.

Voltage range can be chosen between the standard values:

24 Vdc,

30Vdc,

48Vdc,

60Vdc.

The Local HMI/SCADA PC and the Gateway are powered by a secured AC power supply.

Voltage range can be chosen between the standard values:

110 Vac 50 or 60Hz

220 Vac 50 or 60Hz

3 - Design


3.3 The communication network

The Cement plant Fast Self-Healing application network is based on two layers:

The Physical support for the communication

The protocol used to exchange data between the IED and perform the project functions

The main constraints considered to choose the Communication protocol for the Cement Plant

Fast Self-Healing applications are:

Standardized protocol (IEEE or IEC) and fully supported world-wide

Structured model for all application data

Dedicated for Electrical application

Long-term stability and back-compatibility

Standard communication link redundancy management

The PACiS system is based on a standard Ethernet communication network and the IEC 61850

standard. All devices are connected onto this network (SBUS) using Switches.

3.3.1 IEC61850 network

IEC61850 is an object-oriented communication language centered around automation and

protection aspects inside high and medium voltage substations; the standard’s guiding principle

of using modeling and common services to reduce technical functions into logical pieces (logical

nodes) has facilitated its branching out into many electrical infrastructure areas and introducing a

common language which can be used to exchange information which is manufacturer

independent.

IEC61850 seeks a unified approach, presenting a suite of protocols that are designed to multitask

efficiently and provide support for modern engineering workflows in the design, deployment and

operation of electrical utility systems

IEC61850 also provides other unique technical benefits which are superior to traditional

communication protocols. These include:

File based setup to allow archiving, maintenance and the potential for high-level engineering tools to enable repeatability and ease of deployment

3 - Design


Unified modeling of functions and a common dictionary of terms to provide vendor neutrality and support a strong basis for extension and expansion of the standard in the future

Self-description services for automated discovery and potential for system validation at the time of commissioning

IEC61850 standardized abstract services to exchange data between the IEDs

Read: reading data such as the value of an attribute

Write: for example writing the value of a configuration attribute

Control: controlling switching devices and other controllable objects using standardized methods such as “select before operate” or “direct operate”

Reporting: for example, event driven reporting after value changes

Logging: the local storage of time-stamped events or other historical data

Get directory: in other words, to read out the data model (important part of self-description)

File transfer: for configuration, disturbance recording or historical data

GOOSE: GOOSE is the acronym for Generic Object Oriented System Event and is used for fast sending of time critical information. A single GOOSE message can be sent by an IED and then read and used by several IEDs. GOOSE can be used for several purposes including:

– Tripping of switchgear

– Starting of disturbance recorder

– Providing position indication for interlocking

3.3.2 Optical Multi-mode Fiber for Ethernet network communication

The optical fiber must complain the following characteristics:

Multi-mode fiber, 62.5/125µm (50/125µm could be used);

Glass fiber

ST male connectors at each end.

The global optical attenuation must be equal or bellow 8dB.

Typical values:

0,8dB per connection

1dB per km

In complement the maximal distance between two switches must be equal or lower than 2 km.

3 - Design


3.3.3 Ethernet redundancy management

As the classical Ethernet basic redundancy standard (RSTP) is not compatible with the IEC61850

standard and the expected performances (RSTP redundancy time is always greater than 200ms),

the redundancy of the Ethernet network is based on a proprietary Schneider solution using a ring

network topology with optical multi-mode links and switches providing a complete and secure

solution against any failure of the Ethernet network elements.

With the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Automation redundant ring without or with ring default the all

switch on the ring sees no difference in the advance of the frame; no reset switch, no relearning

for the MAC address.

EP

RS

RP

ES

Primary fiber

Secondary fiber

A B C D E

1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 1184

switch switch switch switch switch

Figure 12: Nominal redundant Ethernet ring architecture

The typical redundancy time of the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC solution is 22 s with an Ethernet

100Mbps FO network, fully compatible with the no-data-lost principle which requires less than 1

ms.

3 - Design


EP

RS

RP

ES

Primary fiber

Secondary fiber

A B C D E

1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 1184

switch switch switch switch switch

Figure 13: Ethernet ring architecture after failure

Schneider-Electric Ethernet switches fully fit with the IEC/ANSI standards applicable for Electrical

installation environment.

The failure of the Ethernet network is managed using watch-dog contact in any of the embedded

switch and these are wired on the associated IED mainly MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC for Alarming

and Archiving in the Sequence Of Event database.

3.4 The Time Management

3.4.1 The Time Synchronization

For maximum time accuracy (1ms), all project devices connected with the Ethernet network are

be synchronized from a dedicated SNTP server connected on the Ethernet IEC61850 network.

The IED connected on MODBUS legacy network are synchronized by the MiCOM C264-

RTU/PLC they are connected on.

3.4.2 The Time-Synchronization device

The System time-synchronization is done by a GPS clock connected one of the MiCOM C264

acting as a SNTP server for all Ethernet IEDs. The GPS clock used in the Cement Plant project is

a HOPF 6870 with an external antenna.

The Power supply of the HOPF clock is 220 Vac.

3 - Design


3.4.3 The Time Distribution

PACiS solution uses time stamping at source in order to achieve the required accuracy. This

means that a reference time is dispatched to any IED on Ethernet. Changes in state are then

directly time-stamped by the different IEDs.

Consequently the system uses its communications networks to synchronize the different system

devices to a reference time source thus eliminating the need for a dedicated time distribution

system.

3.5 The IEDs

3.5.1 MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC

MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is available in three types of panel or rack mounting (40TE /60 TE, 84TE)

with graphical detachable display.

Height: 4 U (177mm),

Depth: 190mm,

Width: 40/60/82 TE ( 200, 300, 409mm),

Metallic Case, degree of protection: IP52 in standard

The MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC can be equipped with a simple LED front panel or with a graphical

display front panel which allows supervision, control and maintenance of the MiCOM C264

RTU/PLC and the managed primary equipments.

For the present Cement Plant MV power Management project, the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC

chosen is based on:

Model MiCOM C264 C

o Height: 4 U (177mm),

o Depth: 190mm,

o Width: 40 TE ( 200mm),

o Metallic Case, degree of protection: IP52 in standard

3 - Design


Figure 14: MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC front and rear views

The Power supply of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC and I/O boards is 48 Vdc

MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC Boards

The following boards can be integrated inside the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC rack based on the

customer application needs and the configuration elements

The MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC modularity depends of the case size (40, 60 or 82TE):

MiCOM C264 40TE : 6 available slots for I/O boards (DIU, AIU, DOU or CCU200) or Ethernet switch boards (SWR or SWD),

MiCOM C264 60TE : 10 available slots for I/O boards (DIU200, DIU210, DIU220, AIU201, AIU210, AIU211, DOU200 or CCU200) or switch boards (SWU20x or SWR2xx or SWD2xx),

MiCOM C264 82TE: 15 available slots for I/O boards (DIU200, DIU210, DIU220, AIU201, AIU210, AIU211, DOU200 or CCU200) or switch boards (SWU20x or SWR2xx or SWD2xx).

The available Inputs and Outputs board for the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC are:

BIU: Basic Interface Unit. This board includes the auxiliary power supply converter, the watchdog relay, 2 digital outputs/2 digital inputs for computer redundancy and 2 insulated RS485/RS232 interface,

DIU: Digital Inputs Unit each with 16 digital inputs,

DOU: Digital Outputs Unit each with 10 digital outputs for alarms,

CCU: Circuit breaker Control Unit each with 8 digital inputs and 4 digital outputs,

AIU: Analogue Input Unit each with 8 analogue inputs direct current,

AOU: Analogue Output Unit each with 8 analogue outputs,

SWR: Ethernet SWitch board for Redundant Ethernet ring with 4 electrical links and 2 optical links for the redundant ring,

3 - Design


TMU: Transducerless Measurements Unit board for direct CT/VT measuring acquisition with 4 CT and 5 VT

For the present Cement Plant MV Power Management project, the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC

chosen boards are:

BIU 48Vdc

SWR Ethernet redundant ring switch (4 optical fibers) + 4 copper ports

DIU 48Vdc (16 Logic Inputs)

DOU 48 Vdc (10 Logic outputs)

AIU (8 Analogue inputs)

MiCOM C264 WEB server

The MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC includes a WEB server able to provide all monitoring and

maintenance data using a standard WEB tool (such Internet Explorer or Firefox). This access is

password protected.

Figure 15: MiCOM C264 WEB page

3.5.2 Protection relays

The Protection relays used in this Cement plant Fast self-healing project are from 3 types:

3 - Design


MiCOM P111 or Sepam S24 as MV feeder OC protection relay install in all MV feeders of the site

MiCOM P123 or Sepam S42 as MV feeder OC protection installed in the Utility MV feeder incomer and in the Generator feeder

MiCOM P211 or Sepam M20 as MV Motor protection associated to the MV motors (Grinding & Cooler SS)

All protection relays key-information are hard-wired on their relevant Substation MiCOM C264-

RTU to reduce Self-healing time.

MiCOM P 111

The MiCOM P 111 is a universal MV protection - three phase and earth overcurrent protection

relay (50,50N, 51, 51N, 38), control and monitoring IED for industrial application. The MiCOM P

111 is housed in a 35mm DIN case for rail mounting (panel) or rack mounting.

The MiCOM P 111 provides the following functions:

1, 2, or 3-phase operation arrangement

Protection functions

o Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N)

o Breaker failure detection (50BF)

o Negative phase sequence overcurrent (46)

o Autorecloser (79)

o Output relay latching (86)

2 setting groups, selected from the relay menu, binary input or system

True RMS phase current value measurement within a frequency range from 10Hz to 1000Hz

Earth fault current value measurement within a frequency range from 40Hz to 70Hz

4 digit LED display

5 button keypad to input settings and configure the relay

Fault record for the 3 most recent trips

3 - Design


Figure 16: MiCOM P111 Universal protection

The Power supply of the MiCOM P111 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc.

MiCOM P211

The MiCOM P211 relay is designed for MV & LV motor supervision, protection and control

applications. The MiCOM P 211 is housed in a 35mm DIN case for rail mounting (panel) or rack

mounting.

The MiCOM P 211 provides the following functions:

1, 2, or 3-phase operation arrangement




o Number of starts limitation (66)

o Lost of Load/Undercurrent (37)

o Unbalance (46)

o Thermal overload (49)

o Start/Stalled protection (48)

o Speed switch (14)

o PTC input (38)





4 digit LED display

5 button keypad to input settings and configure the relay

3 - Design


Fault record for the 3 most recent trips

Figure 17: MiCOM P211 Universal protection


MiCOM P123

The MiCOM P123 is a Utility protection - three phase and earth over-current protection relay

(50,50N, 51, 51N), control and monitoring IED compliant with various Utility Grid codes. The

MiCOM P123 is housed in a 4U Metal case, 20TE large for rack mounting and can be sealed with

a restricted access to protection function to cope with the Utility security and safety requirements.

The MiCOM P123 provides the following functions:

Universal power supply (24-250Vdc; 48-240Vac)

8 output contacts + 1 watchdog (NC)

5 logic inputs


o 3-phase undercurrent (37)


o Broken conductor protection (46BC)

o Thermal protection (49)



o Restricted earth fault (64N)

3 - Design


o Autorecloser (79)





Disturbance recording (5 records), Event recording (up to 250 events time stamped); Fault recording (Up to 25 faults)

LCD display with 14 languages available

8 alarm and warning LEDs

7 button keypad for relay navigation and setting

Figure 18 MiCOM P123 Over-current Grid connection protection relay


Sepam S24

The Sepam S24 is a usual MV protection with three phase and earth overcurrent protection relay (50,50N, 51,

51N, 38). The Sepam S24 is housed in a plastic case for rack mounting.

Characteristics:


10 logic inputs

8 relay outputs





o Autorecloser (79)

3 - Design


Two 86-cycle records of fault recording, last trip fault values and 64 time-stamped alarms


3 types of UMI (Integrated advanced UMI, remote advanced UMI & basic UMI)


9 button keypad for relay navigation and settings

Figure 19 Sepam S24 usual overcurrent MV protection relay

The Power supply of the Sepam S24 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc.

Sepam M20

The Sepam M20 is a usual MV protection relay. The Sepam M20 is housed in a plastic case for

rack mounting.

Characteristics:


10 logic inputs

8 relay outputs




o Thermal overload (49)

o Start/Stalled protection (48)

o Number of starts limitation (66)

o Lost of Load/Undercurrent (37)

Two 86-cycle records of fault recording, last trip fault values and 64 time-stamped alarms

3 - Design






Figure 20 Sepam M20 usual overcurrent MV protection relay

The Power supply of the Sepam M20 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc.

Sepam S42

The Sepam S42 is a digital protection relays for current and voltage protection, control and

monitoring IED for Distribution Utility. The Sepam S42 is housed in a plastic case reduced depth

for rack mounting and can be sealed with a restricted access to protection function to cope with

the Utility security and safety requirements.

Characteristics:


10 logic inputs

8 relay outputs

Logic equation editor


3 - Design





o Directional phase and earth overcurrent (67/67N/67NC)

o Directional active power (32P)

o Under & Overvoltage (27/59)

o Negative sequence overvoltage (47)

o Under & Overfrequency (81)

o Autorecloser (79)

o Broken conductor protection (46BC)

2 protection setting groups



Detailed log of the last 5 trips and recording of the last 200 time-stamped alarms





Figure 21: Sepam S42 Utility MV protection

The Power supply of the Sepam S42 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc.

3 - Design


3.6 The local HMI/SCADA Operator Interface

3.6.1 The HMI/SCADA Hardware

The HMI/SCADA application for the Cement Plant Power Management project will run a Standard

Office PC compatible with the required performances:

Processor type Intel Core i5 4 Mo memory

Memory SDRAM DDR 1 Go or more

Hard Disk : Serial ATA 500 Go or more

Graphical card integrated with VGA, DVI-D and HDMI connectors

Screen Flat 20” or more with VGA, DVI-D and HDMI connectors

Keyboard and mouse

The Power supply of the HMI/SCADA PC and the screen’s one is 220 Vac

3.6.2 The graphical symbols

The following graphical symbols are issued from the IEC standards, documents and

recommendations.

The back ground color of all graphical view will be Blue Grey (RGB code: 162, 197, 205).

System icons & colors

The System icons and colors are used to present to the Operator the drawing of the Cement

Plant System including all IED and communication links using static and dynamic icons

(animation based on the IED status).

3 - Design


3.6.2.1.1 Communication Network link status

The table bellow presents the color code used for the various communication links used in the

Cement plant present project.

Figure 22 : Communication line colour codes

3.6.2.1.2 IED, Gateway and HMI/SCADA PC

The table bellow presents the various icons and associated colors used fro each IED, PC or

Gateway of the project. Display is based on the status information received from each device.

Figure 23: IED icons and colour codes

Link type Color

Optical fiber IEC 61850 Orange

ModBus Black

Ethernet RJ45 Blue

Coaxial Purple

3 - Design


Micro-grid primary equipment and cables icons and colors

The various graphical views of the HMI/SCADA application presents to the operator all primary

equipments based on Icons and color animations; in a static or dynamic icons (animation based

on the IED status).

3.6.2.1.3 Single line diagram colors

Based on the IEC standard the following colors are used in this project for the single line drawing

presented on the Local/HMI views.

Figure 24: Electrical line colour codes

The color of each line is dynamically managed upon the real value of the voltage on the line.

Note: the color is a convention and can be easily adapted to each country and customer uses and

regulations.

VOLTAGE LEVEL COLOR RGB

Energized 20kV Red 255.0.0

De-energized 20kV Green 0.128.0

Default Yellow 255.255.0

Unknown Grey 192.192.192

3 - Design


3.6.2.1.4 Primary connection devices

The MV Circuit-breaker, Switchgear and Disconnector icons are given in the bellow table with the

three main statuses (Open, Closed, Unknown)

Figure 25: MV switches icons and colour codes

3.6.2.1.5 Static icons

The other various primary equipment icons (Generator, Earthing, transformers, etc...) are

presented on the various HMI/SCADA graphical views using the symbols presented in the table

bellow; their status is animated based on the voltage level they are connected to

Figure 26: Primary equipment icons

3.6.3 Operator HMI/SCADA screen

3.6.3.1 General presentation

The operator screens are divided into 2 sections and 5 parts:

3 - Design


The HMI/SCADA information and control section (pre-defined)

o The Title banner

o The Control banner

The Application section (design flexible per configuration)

o The Alarm banner

o The Navigation banner

o The Display screen

Note: The relative position of each banner is flexible and defines with the customer for each

application; in the present project we will use the standard order from top to bottom (Title, Control,

Display, Alarm). The navigation banner is positioned on the right of the screen

Figure 27: Generic example of the Operator HMI/SCADA screen

Title banner

The title banner presents the main generic information listed bellow

3 - Design


Schneider

logo

Shows the substation name, the workstation

control mode and the name of active server

Shows the

time and the

date of the

system

Security information

regarding the user and the

associated profile

Customer logo

Figure 28: Title banner

Command banner

Figure 29: Command banner

Log In / Log Off button

Snapshot : Print full screen

Add/change password. This service is

subject to access right profiles.

States : display the states viewer

User profile access

Alarms : display the alarm viewer

Define the language

Access to log files

Associated engineering tool access

About : SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC copyrights

and license text

3 - Design


System Management Tool access

General HMI/SCADA stop

Figure 30: Command icons

Alarm banner

This banner present in chronological order the most recent and highest important alarms. This

banner does not allow acknowledging or clearing alarm. This has to be done in the Alarm page.

The number of displayed alarms is configurable from 3 to 7. For the present project we will use

the per-default value 5 Alarms.

Figure 31: Alarm banner

Each alarm is based on an event collected from the application via the IED or the system. An

Alarm line presents the following information:

Date and Time Origin Name Status Level

Date and Time: Date and Time of the Alarm appearance Per-default format "dd/mm/yy hh:mm:ss.ccc".

Origin : Describe the position of the data that have generated the alarm per default <Site Name/Substation name/Voltage level/Bay name/Equipment name)

Name : Long name of the datapoint

Status : Status of the event source of the alarm

Navigation banner

The Navigation banner allows the operator to access to any application screen by a simple click

on the chosen page.

Origine Nom Statut NiveauDate

15/ 02/ 2011 09:52:22:274 Site/ Système/ Réseau Ethernet/ Client OI Lien client OI Déconnecté 1

15/ 02/ 2011 09:11:58:781 Site/ Système/ Réseau Ethernet/ C264_HTA_ERDF Lien équipement Déconnecté 1

15/ 02/ 2011 09:11:58:781 Site/ Système/ Réseau Ethernet/ C264_GE Lien équipement Déconnecté 1

15/ 02/ 2011 09:11:58:781 Site/ Système/ Réseau Ethernet/ C264_BMT Lien équipement Déconnecté 1

15/ 02/ 2011 09:11:58:781 Site/ Système/ Réseau Ethernet/ C264_PME Lien équipement Déconnecté 1

15/ 02/ 2011 09:11:58:781 Site/ Système/ Réseau Ethernet/ C264_SCALPEL Lien équipement Déconnecté 1

3 - Design


The main pages are:

Electrical pages (could be multiple)

System pages

Alarm page

Event page

Status page

General information page

3.6.4 Application views and pages

In the present project the proposed standard application pages in line with the Cement plant

power management system are:

Electrical views

o Cement plant MV Electrical view (single line diagram)

o Detailed view of the Electrical substations (Utility Substation, Generator Substation, Grinding Substation, Kiln Substation, Cooler Substation, Mill Substation)

GIS Cement plant view

System view

Automation view

Alarm page

Event page

Status page

General information page

3.6.4.1 Electrical views

These views present the Electrical MV micro-grid of the Cement plant. They will allow with the

appropriate rights the operator to visualize and command any equipment of the MV micro-grid

and visualize any measure or status.

Note: for security and safety reason, the control of the various switching equipment (CB, SW, IS)

is only possible in the detail views.

3 - Design


Some examples of the Electrical views are given bellow

Figure 32: Cement Plant Micro-grid General view

3 - Design


Figure 33: Utility substation detailed view

3 - Design


Figure 34: Kiln substation detailed view

Figure 35: Generator substation detailed view

3 - Design


3.6.4.2 Geographical view

The purpose of the Geographical Information System view is to facilitate the localization of any

fault, alarm or event occurring in the Cement plant.

Figure 36: Cement plant GIS view

3 - Design


3.6.4.3 System view

The System view displays the drawing of the Cement Plant System including IEDs and

communication links.

Figure 37: Cement plant System view

3 - Design


3.6.4.4 Automation page

The Automation allows the Operator to directly enable/Disable the Electrical Automation Scheme

and when it is possible modify their setting and timers.

Figure 38: Automation page

3 - Design


3.6.4.5 Alarm Page

This page presents in an ergonomic way all Alarms of the application. The Alarm is classified by

date and time of appearance. Color code defined during configuration help simple user

identification. With the appropriate rights, the operator can acknowledge and clear the alarm or

group of Alarm.

Navigation in the Alarm list is easy using the tree view organization on the right of the screen.

Filters can be applied to simplify the Alarm identification and treatment.

Figure 39: Alarm page

3 - Design


3.6.4.6 Legend Page

The Legend page presents to the Operator all Icons and Color code in a clear and simple

manner.

Figure 40: Example of General Information page

3.6.5 The HMI/SCADA Management functions 3.6.6 Alarms

3.6.6.1.Alarm generation

Any alarm is issued from an Event, it can be consider as an event specific quality. The event can

come from:

A logical Input single or double that state in a given alarming status.

A measurement threshold crossed.

Alarm can be automatically filtered upon external condition (Substation Mode management e.g.)

To each alarm per configuration, could be apply a configuration timer to ensure the stability of the

event. In this case the alarm is active only if after the given time the status of the data has not

change.

All alarm condition, attributes, qualities and treatments are define during System configuration

3 - Design


3.6.6.2 Alarm parameters

Any alarm can be generated:

When the event appears

When the Event disappears

When the Event status is unknown or in any define status (incoherent position for a double position e.g.)

To each alarm different treatments can be assigned:

Display or not on the Local/HMI,

Sound or Silent,

Immediate or delayed,

Automatic or Operator acknowledgment,

Automatic or Operator cleaning

3.6.6.3 Alarm color codes

For the Cement Plant Power Management project, the following colors have been assigning to

the Alarm status display on the HMI/SCADA Alarm page:

Figure 41: Alarm text & back-ground colours

3 - Design


3.6.6.4 Alarm acknowledgement and cleaning

The following scheme describes the Operator acknowledgment and cleaning actions and the

various alarm resulting states.

All acknowledgement and cleaning actions can be executed from the HMI/SCADA with the

appropriate operator rights individually or for a group of alarms.

AL-

Unactive &

Cleaned Alarm

Active Alarm not taken in account

Active Alarm taken in account

Unactive Alarm not taken in

account

Unactive Alarm taken in account

AL+

AL+

AL+ CLEANING

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AL-

0

1

4

2 3

AL+ : Alarm condition appears

AL- : Alarm condition disappears

Figure 42: Alarm Acknowledgement and Cleaning Cycle

3 - Design


3.6.7 The HMI/SCADA Communication functions

3.6.7.1. IEC61850

The local HMI/SCADA application id directly connected on the IEC 61850 network and act as a

Client for MiCOM C264 servers.

The link to the Cement Plant Power Management System is done via an embedded switch

compatible with the Ethernet redundant network (MiCOM H152 PCI board) on Optical fibers

3.6.7.2 Cement plant DCS gateway

The local HMI/SCADA will interface the IEC61850 network to the Cement Plant DCS based on

MODBUS protocol with the needed information; These information are defined by the Cement

plant DCS.

The link to the Cement Plant DCS is done via a RS 232 port on the PC.

3.7 Control management

The control of the primary equipment (CB, SW or IS) or any controllable equipment part of the

Cement plant micro-grid can be done with two methods:

A manual control done by the Operator using the HMI/SCADA interface,

An automatic control performed by one the Cement Plant Power Management Automatic Schemes

3.7.1 Manual control

Any manual control is always issued by an Operator action on the HMI/SCADA interface and has

full priority upon all Automatic controls.

Manual control can take place in all HMI/SCADA views where it is useful and configured. A

control pop-up can always be opened, assuming the operator has the view right on the mimic

which contains the pop-up.

The Operator manual control can be executed either in “Select Before Operate” (SBO) or “Direct

Execute” Mode. This mode is defined during the configuration process.

Furthermore, in Direct Execute mode different control pop-up can be used and even no control

pop-up but only a button.

3 - Design


The control pop-up can be closed during a control sequence: the sequence is not cancelled. So, if

the operator re-opens the pop-up during the control sequence, he will retrieve the current context

of the sequence. Only one control pop-up can be opened on an operator station at one time. The

unauthorized commands will be grayed in the control pop-up.

A control acknowledgement pop-up is used to display negative control acknowledgement and to

allow users with appropriate rights to by-pass the interlocking control verification. In this case, the

user can get the reason of the control rejection.

Some control conditions verifications are handled by the HMI/SCADA application; others are

verified at MiCOM C264 level

The control conditions verifications handled by the HMI/SCADA application are:

the operator user rights

the local / remote plant mode

the local / remote substation mode

3.7.1.1 Direct Execute Control

Direct Execute Control action is done by send from the HMI/SCADA application directly a

command to the IED without preliminary check of the IED and equipment availabilities. The

command can or not been completed by a command acknowledgement. The DE Control can also

be crossed upon a pre-define timer with the equipment or IED associated status to check if the

command has been correctly executed. An alarm can be associated to it.

Figure 43: Direct Execute Control pop-up

3 - Design


Select Before Operate Control

Select Before Operate Control mode is a control action based on two complementary phases:

A Select service

A Control/Operate Service

The Select service arms the SBO Control process and check the availability of the targeted

equipment. It also “locks” the device capability to receive any command from any other control

point during a pre-define time.

The Control service is only executed after a successful Select service on the same manner as the

pure DE Control.

The SBO control process is mainly used to control sensitive CB (Utility grid connection, Generator

connection, etc...) to secure the control process.

Any unsuccessful service generates an Operator message and usually an alarm, and cancelled

the SBO control command.

In addition the SBO pop-up allows the operator to abort the process if needed between Selection

and Control phase.

Figure 44: Select Before Operate Control pop-up

3 - Design


3.7.1.3 CB position discrepancy

If during any of the Cement plant Power management automatic scheme, an operator modifies

the position of any primary equipment involve in the Automation scheme, the position of the

equipment is consider as in Discrepancy. The equipment management is automatically excluded

from the Automatic scheme and control sequence until an Operator control acknowledgement or

return to the original position.

This security function is implemented in all MV CBs part of the Cement Plant Power Management

present project.

Interlocking conditions

The Interlocking equations are logical schemes that may block a control if the topological

conditions are not compatible with the control (e.g. Closing command of an MV CB if the earthing

switch is closed). All these interlocking equations are part of the Cement plant micro-grid safety

and security.

In the present project all CB part of the MV network management are with Interlocking conditions

which check before closing any CB on the MV micro-grid that the MV line and MV busbar voltage

are compatible.

3.7.2 Automatic control

Automatic controls are the result of the Power Management Automatic schemes and are

executed directly by the involved MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC.

These controls have less priority than the Manual ones issued by the Operator via the

HMI/SCADA Interface.

They are mainly coming from:

The Fast Self-Healing scheme,

The Automatic Transfer Switch function,

The MV/LV Transformer Load management,

The Protection setting group changes.

4 – Power Mgt auto. Schemes


4 Power Management automatic schemes

4.1 Introduction

The Power Management Automatic schemes are architecture in a distributed manner. This

means that the equations are split in all the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC of the Cement plant Power

Management application. This architecture improves the performances of the Power

Management functions and also strongly the global availability of the application.

The different automatic schemes are initiated by information coming from:

Logic Inputs hardwired on the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC,

Logic Inputs and Analogue Values calculated inside the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC using the known micro-grid elements (topology, voltage, current, active & reactive power, load, etc...),

Logic Inputs and Analogue Values received using the Ethernet IEC61850 communication network (GOOSE messages)

The three Power Management functions part of this Cement plant project are:

The MV Fast Self Healing Automatic Scheme,

The MV Automatic Transfer Switch

The MV Load Shedding and Load Restore Automatic Scheme

4.2 Operating modes

4.2.1 IED operating modes

The following operating modes could be applied to the IEDs (MiCOM C264, GTW, HMI/SCADA,

Protections) part of the Cement plant Power Management application:

On-Line Mode

Off-Line Mode

Special Modes

4.4.1.1 On-line Modes:

Normal

This is the nominal operating mode of the IEDs. In this mode the IED watchdog relay is activated

and all the functionalities of the IED are available. Nevertheless, detection of an error can lead to

the Downgraded mode, to the Faulty mode or to the Halt mode, depending on the nature and

the gravity of the failure.



From this mode a transition to the Maintenance mode can be requested by an operator from

HMI/SCDA (maintenance request).

From this mode a transition to the Test mode can be requested by an operator from HMI/SCADA

(simulation request).

In this mode, the operations that can be done on system configuration databases are the

following:

Download a standby database,

Swap the databases: then the IED automatically restarts,

Modify a database,

Display database information

This mode is display for each IED on HMI/SCADA screen.

Test

In Test mode, the IED works normally but output relays are not activated. This mode is entered

on operator request in order to simulate the functioning of distributed automatisms such as

interlocking. Instead of activating the output relays, the IED sends a “test OK” message to the

HMI/SCADA if the command is valid otherwise a “test NOK” message.

Note: to realize the tests, the operator has to manually create the testing conditions by forcing BI

or Measurements on different IED. Once the conditions are realized, he can generate a command

and see at the HMI/SCADA if the result corresponds to the expected one.

This mode is displayed on the IED and on the HMI/SCADA.

From this mode a transition to the operational mode can be requested by an operator from

HMI/SCADA (end of simulation).

Downgraded

This mode is entered in case of an anomaly. In this mode the general working of the IED is not

very disturbed because it involves the degradation of only few functions. The watchdog relay is

activated.

The downgraded mode depends on the hardware configuration of the IED, but we can define the

different kinds of downgraded modes that can happen:

Operation without DO on a board

Operation without DI on a board

Operation without AI on a board

Operation without communication with some IEDs



A combination of two, or more, of these previous items

When the cause(s) of the transition into Downgraded mode disappears, the IED returns to the

Normal mode.

4.2.1.2 Off-line Modes:

Maintenance

In Maintenance mode, communication on the Ethernet network between the IEDs is operational.

This mode is displayed on the local IED and on the HMI/SCADA.

The watchdog relay is de-activated.

In this mode the operator can manage the database:

Download a database

Swap the databases

Modify a database

Display database information

From this mode a transition to the operational mode can be requested by an operator from the

HMI/SCADA (active request).

Faulty

The Faulty mode is entered when a fault, that prevents the exploitation, happens. This mode can

be entered from any mode described above. This mode is also entered when a failure is detected

on DO boards and if the configuration allows this mode on DO faults.

The only way to leave this mode is an automatic reset or a transition to the Halt mode.

4.2.1.3 Special modes

Initialization

After power on or manual reset the IED enters the initialization mode and performs different types

of checks:

1° Vital hardware tests

Non-volatile memory test: in case of a problem the IED tries to repair this non-volatile memory. If

a vital hardware test fails, the initialization is stopped and the IED enters the Halt mode.



2° Non vital hardware tests

Non-vital hardware tests are only performed on present boards:

Inputs and outputs boards: o To determinate the number and the type of the present input and output boards

o To check the presence of the previously input and output boards and to be informed if a board is absent

o To check the good working order of the present input and output boards and to be informed if a board is out of order

Communication boards: this test is performed within the communication protocol.

Display (LCD, LED’s): the single test that can be done is the presence of the HMI board.

Peripheral devices (printer, external clock ...). Check of the presence of the devices by use of timeouts.

If any of these non-vital hardware tests fails the IED enters the operational/downgraded mode depending on the type of the fault.

3° Software tests (database coherency tests)

These tests are performed at each restart of the IED. The checks of the database guarantees that

the database is compatible with the hardware and the software of the IED and that it does not

contain incoherent data of configuration. The following checks are performed:

Check of the presence of a database and check of the DB/ software compatibility

Check of the DB/ equipment compatibility

Check of the validity of the data of the database

If any of these checks fails, the computer enters the Maintenance mode.

The initialization of the computer does not exceed one minute.

Halt

In this mode the IED doesn’t operate anymore. The watchdog relay and all the outputs relays are

deactivated. The only way to get out of this mode is to operate a manual reset.

The following diagram summarizes the different operating modes:



INITIALISATION

Power ON /

Starting

OPERATIONAL

Tests OK and setting

elements available.

MAINTENANCE

Tests OK and no

setting elements

FAULTY

Hardware major fault or

inconsistant settings

TEST

Operator

Request

Operator Request Hardware major

fault

HALT

Software major

fault

Automatic restart

Figure 45: Mode logic management

4.3 MV Fast Self Healing Automation Scheme - FSH

4.3.1 Introduction

For the present project, the Fast Self-Healing scheme considers the Cement plant MV micro-grid

with the following substations:

Main Utility Substation

Generator Substation

Grinding Substation

Kiln Substation

Cooler Substation

Mill Substation

The principle of the Fast Self-healing applied to the Cement Plant micro-grid is described in the

following chapters.

The Single Line Diagram (SLD) describe the MV micro-grid of the present project



Figure 46: Cement plant micro-grid with Fast healing Management

The standard Cement plant micro-grid is with the Utility connection closed (MV connection), an

open point on the loop (in Cooler SS) and the Generator not connected on the micro-grid.

Note: The choice of the open point of micro-grid has no major importance.



4.3.2 Automation Scheme modes

Four different Automation scheme modes have to consider offering the Cement plant a full and

efficient Power management function:

Normal: The normal mode is active when:

The Automation scheme is Enable (via the HMI/SCADA control)

AND at least one open point is identified on the micro-grid

AND all IED are in Normal mode

Any fault detection will launch the Fast Self Healing automation scheme, generate a micro-grid

reconfiguration with open and close cycles of the MV Circuit breakers and isolation of the faulty

section; the complete repower of the micro-grid will be done in less than 200 ms.

Safe: The safe mode is active when:

The Automation scheme is Enable (via the HMI/SCADA control)

AND at least one fault has not been acknowledged (open or close of any CB impossible)

Faulty: The safe mode is active when:

One of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is Off-line or Special mode

OR One of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is managed on Local

OR One of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is not detected (missing)

OR one of the Protection relays is not detected (missing) or Off-line or Special mode

In Faulty mode, any electrical fault will launch a micro-grid self Healing process but the

Automation scheme will consider that the part supervised by the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC does

not exist and the associated substation is consider as a static element of the micro-grid.

Note: If faulty MiCOM C264 RTU/PC controls the standard opening point of the micro-grid, the

Fast Self Healing scheme is automatically switch on “OFF”.

Off: The Off mode is active when:



The Automation scheme is Disable (via the HMI/SCADA control)

OR the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC in the Utility SS is Off-line or Special mode

OR the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC in the Micro-grid open point SS is Off-line or Special mode

In Off mode, the Fast Self Healing automation scheme is inactive for any type of fault.

4.3.3 Simulation mode

In order to help the Operator micro-grid management, the Cement Plant Power Management

solution embedded a Simulator function. The FSH Simulator function allows simulating the impact

of any MV cable, MV substation or MV busbar fault.

4.3.4 Cable fault FSH scheme (Normal mode)

Step 0: The micro-grid is considered in it standard conditions (Utility connection, micro-grid open

point in Cooler SS), the Generator not connected.

Figure 47: Cement plant micro-grid SLD Step 0

Step 1: Fault appears on a cable B (between Grinding and Kiln SS), detected by the protection

relay of the Utility and in accordance with the Grid code it opens (green circle). This action is



directly done by the protection at Utility grid connection. All involved protections relays have seen

the fault (Instantaneous information)

All related events and alarms are generated, archived and display on the HMI/SCADA.

Note: Depending on Grid Code, the Utility grid connection can be only open partially (faulty

section) and the other section maintain powered.

Figure 48: Cement plant micro-grid SLD fault on B cable step 1

Step 2: The faulty section is isolated by opening of the surrounding CBs located in Grinding SS

and Kiln SS managed by the FSH automation scheme (green circles).




Note: If the fault occurs on the SS Busbar, the FSH automation scheme will open the CB in the

nearby substations.

Step 3: Reclosing of the Utility grid CB by the FSH Automation scheme (green circles). The faulty

cable is fully isolated. The Mill, Grinding & Cooler substations are repower using cables A, F, E &

D. Cable A et C and Kiln Substation are not powered


Step 4: To repower Kiln Substation, the original open point at Cooler SS is closed by the FSH

automation Scheme (green circle).




4.3.5 Utility Busbar fault FSH scheme (Normal mode)

In case of a fault affecting the Utility SS (e.g. Busbar), the security does not allow the have any

reconnection action to the Utility grid. This will impose to start the Generator and use it to power

the site.


point in Cooler SS), the Generator not connected (red circles).




Step 1: Fault appears In Utility Substation (Busbar fault e.g.), detected by the protection relay of

the Utility and in accordance with the Grid code it opens the incomer CB and the two associated

CBs (green circles). These actions are directly done by the protection relays at Utility substation.

All Cement plant protections relays have seen the fault (Instantaneous information)

All related events and alarms are generated, archived and display on the HMI/SCADA.

Figure 53: Cement plant micro-grid SLD fault on Utility SS BB step 1

Step 2: The faulty section is isolated by opening of the surrounding CBs located in Grinding SS

and Kiln SS managed by the FSH automation scheme (green circles).




Step 3: The Generator is started and as soon it reaches it minimum power and synchronism

condition, it is connected to the Cement plant micro-grid by the FSH Automation scheme (green

circles).

The substations Mill & Cooler are repower using cables E & D. Cable A, F, B & C and Kiln &

Grinding Substations are not powered.




Step 4: To repower Kiln & Grinding Substations, the original open point at Cooler SS is closed by

the FSH automation scheme (green circle).


4.3.6 Degraded modes

If some IEDs of the Fast Self Healing Automation Scheme are for any reason not in Normal

mode, some degraded actions are possible to continue to ensure a maximum safety.

4.3.6.1 MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC faulty

If a MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is not in Normal mode, the rest of the Fast Self Healing Automatic

scheme will continue to work, only the sub-function where it is involved will be inhibited.

If the faulty MICOM C264 RTU/PLC is the one managing the Utility grid connection, all the FSH

Automation scheme is switch on Faulty and Disabled. An alarm message is automatically

generated to inform the operator.

4.3.6.2 Protection relay faulty

If one of the MV protection relay is faulty (watch dog information), a dedicated alarm is generated

and the involved substation is switch as Inactive.



If the faulty protection is the one associated to the Utility Incomer, the Utility grid connection is

automatically open. The Cement plant micro-grid is islanded and can be powered by it own

generator.

4.3.6.3 HMI/SCADA faulty

If the HMI/SCADA application gets faulty, this does not impacted the Fast Self Healing

Automation Scheme. All alarms and events are generated and archived at MiCOM C264

RTU/PLC level (2000 event each). When the HMI/SCADA application is switched back to Normal,

the central archiving database is automatically rebuilt using these archived information. The

Gateway DCS continues to send information to the DCS as the two applications are fully

independent.

4.3.6.4 Gateway to DCS faulty

If the Gateway to DCS application gets faulty, this does not impacted the Fast Self Healing

Automation Scheme. The HMI/SCADA application will continue to receive and archive data.

4.4 MV Automatic Transfer Switch - ATS

In order to secure the Cement Plant power delivery, an Automatic Transfer Switch function is

implemented between the Utility grid feeder and the Cement plant Generator.

The ATS scheme uses two main information to initiate the function:

Detection of a lack of voltage on the Utility grid feeder or

Opening of the Utility MV feeder CB.

An ATS scheme is always based on two parts:

The switch between the normal power source and the back-up one,

The return to normal condition (site powered by the nominal power source)

4.4.1 ATS scheme (Utility Voltage drop)


point in Cooler SS), the Generator not connected.




Step 1: A lack of Voltage is detected on the Utility substation (detection made on the MV Busbar).

This measure is confirmed (time delay defined by the Utility Grid to avoid ATS running on Utility

feeder auto-recloser cycle e.g.).

The Generator is started and the Utility is disconnected from the Cement plant (Green circles)

Figure 58: Cement plant micro-grid SLD lack of Utility voltage step 1



Note: Depending of the Utility grid code, the disconnection with the Utility grid can be done by

opening the Utility feeder CB or the two internal Utility SS CBs

Step 2: The open point of the Cement plant micro-grid CB is closed (Green circle).


Step 3: The MV Generator reaches it nominal value and the associated CB is closed to repower

the entire Cement plant network (Green circle).




Note: A similar scheme is valid if the Utility grid feeder is open due to an external order (issued

e.g. by the Utility).

4.4.2 ATS scheme (Return to Normal mode)

Step 4: The Generator is stopped and its CB is open (Green circle). The entire Cement plant

micro-grid is powered off

Note: Depending of the Utility grid code, the parallel mode (Generator running while the Cement

plan is connected to the Utility grid may be accepted)

Figure 61: Cement plant micro-grid SLD Return to Normal step 4

Step 5: While the Cement plant micro-grid is powered off, the Cooler CB is open (Green circle) to

recreate the micro-grid open point.




Step 6: As the Utility Voltage is at nominal value and no faulty condition is detected, the Utility

connections are reclosed (Green circle). The Cement plant micro-grid is repower and back to

Normal management




4.5 MV cadenced Load Shedding and Load Restore Automatic Scheme

In order to avoid brutal inrush current when Fast Self Healing reconnection, a MV Load Shedding

and Load restore function is available.

The Voltage value is calculated based on the measurement mainly issued from the MV and LV

local sensors.

4.5.1 Load Shedding

The Transformer Load Shedding Automatic scheme is started systematically each time a MV

substation is switch off (no Voltage). The time delay before Load Shedding is defined at 100ms

lack of Voltage. A lack of Voltage greater than 100ms in any pre-defined substation generates the

load shedding of all associated Transformer. This time delay can be set per configuration.

The operator may Enable or Disable the function globally or per substation based on the Cement

plan production needs

4.5.2 Load Restore

The load restore of the MV substation transformers and motors is started as soon as the

substation value is back to a pre-defined value (settable per configuration) based typically on the

Voltage presence on the MV busbar

.

The logic restoration scheme and the associated timer are defined based on the Cement plant

micro-grid characteristics.

In the present project, the following values are considered to define the cadence of the load

reconnections:

Project Load restore Time delay per Substation and Transformer

Substation Transformer Time delay in ms

Mill Transformer 1 500



Transformer 2 2 500

Grinding Transformer 1 1 000

Transformer 2 3 500

Motor 1 2 750

Motor 2 3 000

Cooler Transformer 1 1 500

Transformer 2 4 500

Motor 1 3 750

Motor 2 4 000

Kiln Transformer 1 2 000

Transformer 2 5 000

Figure 64: Cement plant Project LR timing

The operator may Enable or Disable the function globally or per substation based on the Cement plan production

needs.

5 – Appendix


5 Appendix

5.1 Glossary

Acronym Meaning

AC Alternative Current

AccI Accumulator Input

ADC Analogue to Digital Converter

AI Analog Input

AIS Air Insulated Substation

Alarm An alarm is any event tagged as an alarm during configuration phase

AO Analogue Output Value corresponding to a desired output current applied to a DAC.

API Application Programming Interfaces

API Application program interface

ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange

ASDU Application Specific Data Unit Name given in OSI protocol for applicative data (T103, T103...)

ASE Applied System Engineering

AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator Automatism used to regulate secondary voltage by automatic tap changer control (see ATCC). Set of features can be added, see chapter C264 FD

Bay Set of LV, MV or HV plants (switches and transformer) and devices (Protective, Measurement…) usually around a Circuit Breaker and controlled by a bay computer.

BCD Binary Coded Decimal One C264 supported coding on a set of Digital Input that determines a Digital Measurement, then Measurement value (with specific invalid code when coding is not valid). Each decimal digit is coded by 4 binary digit.

BI Binary Input (or Information)

BO Binary Output

CAD Computer Aided Design Computer application dedicated to design like wiring, protective setting…

CB Circuit Breaker Specific dipole switch with capability to power on and break on fault current. Some has not isolation capability (nominal-earth at each side)

5 – Appendix


CDM Conceptual Data Modeling Is the modelization of system/devices data using a hierarchy of structured data (called object of class) with their attributes, method or properties and the relations between themselves. It maps common data to devices or components of devices, with guaranty of interoperability.

COT Cause Of Transmission

CR Change Request

CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check Coding result send with packet of transmitted data to guaranty their integrity. Usually result of a division of transmitted data by polynom.

CSV Character Separate Values Ascii values separated by predefined character or string like in Excel or ASCII Comtrade.

CT Current Transformer Basically the electric device connected to process and extracting a current measurement. By extension part of a device (C264) that receives this AC value and convert it to numerical measurement value. CT is wired in serial.

CT/VT (Conventional)

Current and Voltage transformers

DAC Digital to Analogue Converter Used to generate analogue signals (usually DC) from a digital value.

DAC Data ACquisition component of the GPT

DB DataBase Tool or set of data that define all configuration of a system or specific device like computer. Opposed to setting or parameter DB has a structure that can not be modified on line. DBs are always versioned.

DBI Don’t Believe It Term used for undefined state of a double point when input are not complementary. DBI00 is state motion or jammed. DBI11 is undefined.

DBID DataBases Identity Brick

DC, DPC Double (Point) Control Two digit and/or relays outputs used for device control with complementary meaning (OPEN, CLOSE).

DCO Double Control Output

DCP Device Control Point Located at device level (electric device or IED). It should have its own Remote/Local switch.

DCS Digital Control System Generic name of industrial process system based on numeric communication and devices, to be opposed to traditional electrically wired control.

DCT Double CounTer Counter based on 2 DI with complementary states (counting switchgear maneuver for example)

5 – Appendix


DELTA Phase to phase delta values

Device Term used for one of the following unit: Protective relays, metering units, IED, switchgear (switching device such as CB, disconnector or earthing switch), disturbance or quality recorders.

DI Digital Input Binary information related to the presence or to the absence of an external signal, delivered by a voltage source.

DI Device Identity Brick

DIAG Diagnostic Brick

DM Digital Measurement Is a measurement value which acquisition is done by DI and a specific coding BCD, Gray, 1 among N…

DNP3 DNP 3.0 is open and public protocol for Interoperability between substation computers, RTUs, IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) and master stations (except inter-master station communications) for the electric utility industry.

DO Digital Output Used to apply a voltage to an external device via a relay, in order to execute single or dual, transient or permanent commands.

DP Double Point Information/control derived from 2 digital inputs/output; usually used for position indication of switching devices (OPEN, CLOSE).

DPS Double Point Status Position indication of switching devices (OPEN, CLOSE).

DVP Design Validation Plan

Event An event is a time tagged change of state/value acquired or transmitted by a digital control system.

FAT Factory Acceptance Test Validation procedures execution with the customer at factory.(SAT)

FBD Functional Block Diagram One of the IEC61131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation).

FPI Fault Passage Indicator

FR Fault Report

Gateway Level 6 session of OSI, the gateway is any device transferring data between different networks and/or protocol. The RTU function of C264 gives a gateway behavior to upper level.

GHU Graphic Human interface Unit

GIS Gas Insulated Substation

GLOBE GLOBE Brick

GMT Greenwich Meridian Time Absolute time reference

5 – Appendix


GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event

GPS Global Positioning System Based on triangulation from satellite signal, that transmit also absolute GMT time used to synchronize a master clock

GPT Generic Protocol Translator software, supplied by ASE

Group Logical combination of BI (i.e. SP, DP, SI or other groups).

GTW Gateway

Hand Dressing Facility for an operator to set manually the position of a device (acquired by other means) from the HMI at SCP level; e.g. from OPEN to CLOSE (without any impact on the “physical” position of the electrical switching device).

HMI Human Machine Interface

HSR High Speed autoRecloser First cycles of AR

HTML Hyper Text Mark-up Language Used as standard for formatting web display

HV High Voltage (for example 30kV to 150kV)

IDMT Inverse Definite Minimum Time

I/O Input/Output

IS Interrupter Switch

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IED Intelligent Electronic Device General expression for a whole range of microprocessor based products for data collection and information processing

IRIG-B Inter-Range Instrumentation Group standard format B. This is an international standard for time synchronization based on analog signal.

JAMMED Invalid state of a Double Point: Occurs when the two associated digital inputs are still in state 0 after a user-selectable delay (i.e. when the transient state “ motion ” is considered as ended).

L-BUS Legacy Bus Generic name of Legacy or field networks and protocols used to communicate. Networks are based on (RS232,) 422, 485. Protocols are IEC 60850-5-103 (T103 or VDEW), Modbus Schneider or MODICON

LCD Liquid Crystal Display

LD Ladder Diagram One of the IEC1131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation).

LED Light Emitting Diode

LF Low Frequency

5 – Appendix


Local / Remote Control Mode

When set to local for a given control point it means that the commands can be issued from this point, else in remote control are issue for upper devices.

LV Low Voltage

MC Modular Computer

Measurements Values issued from digital inputs or analogue inputs (with value, state and time tag).

Metering (non-tariff)

Values computed depending on the values of digital or analogue inputs during variable periods of time (time integration).

Metering (tariff)

Values computed depending on the values of digital or analogue inputs during variable periods and dedicated to the energy tariff.

ModBus Communication protocol used on secondary networks with IEDs. 2 versions exist with standard MODICON or Schneider one.

MOTION Transient state of a Double Point Occurs when the two associated digital inputs are momentarily in state 0 (e.g. position indication when an electrical device is switching). The concept of “ momentarily” depends on a user-selectable delay.

MPC Protection Module for Computer

MV Medium Voltage

NBB Numerical Busbar Protection

NC Normally Closed (for a relay)

NO Normally Open (for a relay)

OBS One Box Solution Computer which provides protection and control functions with local HMI. The prime application of this device is intended for use in substations up to distribution voltage levels, although it may also be used as backup protection in transmission substations. Likewise, the OBS may be applied to the MV part of a HV substation which is being controlled by the same substation control system.

OLE Object Linking and Embedding OLE is a Microsoft specification and defines standards for interfacing objects.

OMM Operating Mode Management

OPC OLE for process control OPC is a registered trademark of Microsoft, and is designed to be a method to allow business management access to plant floor data in a consistent manner.

Operation hours Sum of time periods, a primary device is running under carrying energy, e.g. circuit breaker is in Close-state and the current is unequal 0 A.

OSI Open System Interconnection Split and define communication in 7 layers : physical, link, network, transport, session, presentation, application

PACiS Protection Automation and Control Integrated Solution

5 – Appendix


PLC Programmable Logic Control Within the PLC-programs are defined the configurable control sequences or automations taken into account by the application Systems.

POW Point On Wave Point on wave switching is the process to control the three poles of an HV-circuit breaker in a way, to minimize the effects of switching.

PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network

PT100 Probes of temperatures providing analogue signals (non-linear captor).

RCC Remote Control Center

RCC Remote Control Computer

RCP Remote Control Point Name given to the device or part used to control remotely several bay or sub-station. Usually associate with Remote/Local sub-station control. It is a remote interface managed by the system through Telecontrol BUS. Several RCP’s can be managed with different protocols.

RCP Remote Control Point

Remote Control Mode

When set for a given control points it means that the commands are issued from an upper level and are not allowed from this point.

Remote HMI Remote HMI is a client of the substation HMI server. The client may provide all or part of functions handled by the substation HMI.

RI Read Inhibit This output indicates the availability of an analogue output (e.g. during DAC converting time)

RRC Rapid ReClosure

RSVC Relocatabled Static Var Compensator

RTU Remote Terminal Unit : function that correspond to the data acquisition and transmitting to RCP or the local HMI/SCADA . RTU link is the TBUS.

SAT Site Acceptance Test Validation procedures executed with the customer on the site.

SBMC Site Based Maintenance Control mode A bay in SBMC mode does not take into account the commands issued from RCP; moreover, some of its digital points and measurements (defined during the configuration phase) are not sent anymore to the RCP (they are “ automatically ” suppressed).

SBO Select Before Operate A control made in two steps, selection and execution. Selection phase give a feedback. It can be used to prepare, reserve during time, configure circuit before execution. Controls are done into a protocol, or physical (DO select with DI Select then DO execute).

S-BUS Station Bus

5 – Appendix


SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition

Equivalent to RCC in Utility application Equivalent to local HMI application in Industry & Building applications

SCE System Configuration Editor (PACiS software application)

SCS Substation Control System

SCT Single Counter

Setpoint (analogue)

Analogue setpoints are analogue outputs delivered as current loops. Used to send instruction values to the process or to auxiliary devices.

Setpoint (digital) Digital values sent on multiple parallel wired outputs. Each wired output represents a bit of the value. Digital setpoints are used to send instruction values to the electrical process or to auxiliary devices.

SFC Sequential Function Chart One of the IEC1131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation).

SI System Indication Binary information that do not come from external interface. It is related to an internal state of the computer (time status, hardware faults…). It is the result of all inner function (AR, …), PSL, or ISaGRAF automation.

SI Status Input Single Bit

SIG Status Input Group

SIT Status Input Double Bit

SOE Sequence Of Events Other term for the event list.

SP Single Point

SPC Single Point Control

SPS Single Point Status

SSD Software Specification Document

ST Structured Text One of the IEC1131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation).

STN System Technical Note

Suppression (Manual)

A binary information can be suppressed by an order issued from an operator. No subsequent change of state on a “ suppressed information ” can trigger any action such as display, alarm and transmission.

SVTF Software Validation Test Folder

SW Switchgear The Switchgear is a combination of electrical disconnect switches, fuses or Circuit Breaker used to control, protect and isolate LV or MV electrical equipment.

T101 Term used for IEC60870-5-101 protocol.

5 – Appendix


T103 Term used for IEC60870-5-103 protocol

T104 Term used for IEC60870-5-104 protocol

TBC To Be Completed

TBD To Be Defined

T-BUS Telecontrol Bus

TC TeleControl

TCIP Tape Change In Progress

TG Telecontrol Gateway

TIU Transformer Input Unit

TM TeleMesure

Topological interlocking

Interlocking algorithm, based on evaluation of topological information of the switchgear arrangement in the HV or MV network, the switchgear kind and position, and defined rules for controlling this kind of switch (e.g. continuity of power supply)

TPI Tap Position Indication (for transformers) Frequently acquired via a Digital Measurement

TS Telesignal

TVDA Tested, Validated, Documented Architecture

UPI Unit Per Impulse Parameter of counter to convert number of pulse to Measurement value.

UTC Universal Time Coordinates (or Universal Time Code) Naming that replace GMT (but it is the same)

VDEW Term used for IEC60870-5-103 protocol

Voltage level Set of bays whose plants and devices are dealing with the same voltage (e.g. 275kV, 400 kV).

VT Voltage Transformer Basically the electric device connected to process and extracting a voltage measurement. By extension part of a device (C264) that receives this AC value and convert it to numerical measurement value. VTs are wired in parallel.

WYE 3 phases + neutral AI values

5.2 Bill of materials and software

The following table summarizes all of the selected hardware:

Description Reference Firmware or software

version

Function

MiCOM P111 MV Feeder protection

5 – Appendix


MiCOM P211 MV motor protection

MiCOM P123 MV Feeder protection

MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC

Sepam S24 MV Feeder protection

SEPAM M20 MV motor protection

SEPAM S42 MV Feeder protection

PACiS SCE V4 System configuration

PACiS SMT V4 System Management tool

PACiS HMI/SCADA Local HMI/SCADA

MiCOM H15x Ethernet embedded switch

in PC (supporting

HMI/SCADA)

5.3 Referenced documentations

The following table is a list of documents you might want to refer to if you needs more details.

Document title Reference

SEPAM Installation Assistance guide (1) SEPED309035EN

SEPAM 20 user manual (1) PCRED301005EN

MiCOM P111 user manual


5 – Appendix


Document title Reference


MiCOM C264 user manual

PACiS V4. user manual

PACiS SCE user manual

PACiS SMT user manual

PACiS HMI/SCADA user manual

MiCOM H15x user manual

5.4 Applicable standards

5.4.1 Environment standards

All these standards are applicable to any elements (local HMI, RTUs, IEDs).

Type Test Name Type Test Standard Conditions

Insulation Resistance IEC 60255-5 100 M at 500 Vdc (CM & DM)

Dielectric Withstand IEC60255-5

IEEE C37.90

50 Hz, 1mn, 2kV (CM), 1kV (DM)

50 Hz, 1mn, 1kV (CM)

G 1.4 & 1.5 500V CM

G 6 :1,5 kV CM

High Voltage Impulse Test

IEC 60255-5 5kV (CM), 3kV (DM)

2kV (CM)

Groups 1 to 6 :5 kV CM & 3 kV DM(1)

Not on 1.4 & 1.5 : 5 kV CM & 3 kV DM(1)

Free Fall Test

Free Fall Packaging Test

IEC 60068-2-31

IEC 60068-2-32

Test Ec : 2 falls from 5cm

Test Ed : 2 falls from 0,5m

2 falls of 5 cm (IED not powered)

25 falls of 50 cm (1) (2) (Packaging IED)

5 – Appendix


Vibration Response –

Powered On

IEC 60255-21-1 Class 2 :

1g from 2 to 150Hz

Class 2 :

Acceleration : 1g from 10 (1) to 150Hz

Vibration Response – Not

Powered On

IEC 60255-21-1 Class 2 :

2g from 2 to 500Hz

Class 2 :


Vibration Endurance – Not

Powered On

IEC 60068-2-6 Class 2 :

1g from 10 to 150Hz

Class 2 :


Shocks – Not Powered On

IEC 60255-21-2 Class 1 :

15g, 11 ms

Shocks – Powered On

IEC 60255-21-2 Class 2 :

10g, 11 ms

Bump Test – Not Powered

On

IEC 60255-21-2 Class 1 :

10g, 16ms, 2000/axis

Seismic Test – Powered On

IEC 60255-21-3 Class 1 :

Axis H : 3,5mm – 2g

Axis V : 3,5mm – 1g

Class 2 :

Acceleration : 2g

Displacement : 7,5mm axis H

Acceleration : 1g

Displacement : 3,5mm axis V

Damp Heat Test - Operating IEC 60068-2-3 Test Ca :

+40°C / 10 days / 93% RH

5 – Appendix


Cold Test - Operating

IEC 60068-2-1 Test Ab :

-10°C / 96h

Test Ab : - 25°c / 96 H

Cold Test - Storage

IEC60068-2-1 Test Ad :

-40°C / 96h

Powered On at –25°C (for information)

Powered On at –40°C (for information)

Dry Heat Test – Operating

IEC 60068-2-2 Test Bd :

55°C / 96h

70°C / 2h

70°c / 24 H

Dry Heat Test – Storage

IEC 60068-2-1 Test Bd :

+70°C / 96h

Powered On at +70°C

Enclosure Protection IEC 60529 Front : IP=52

Inrush current (start-up) T < 1,5 ms / I < 20 A

T < 150 ms / I < 10 A

T > 500 ms / I < 1,2 In

Supply variation IEC 60255-6 Vn 20%

Vn+30% & Vn-25% for information

Overvoltage (peak withstand)

IEC 60255-6 1,32 Vn max

2 Vn during 10 ms (for information)

Supply interruption

IEC 60255-11 From 2,5 ms to 1 s at 0,8 Vn

50 ms at Vn, no malfunction (for information)

40 s interruption IEC 60255-11

Ripple (frequency

fluctuations)

IEC 60255-11 12% Vn at f=100Hz or 120Hz

12% Vn at f=200Hz for information

Supply variations IEC 60255-6 Vn 20%

5 – Appendix


AC Voltage dips & short

interruptions

EN 61000-4-11 2ms to 20ms & 50ms to 1s

50 ms at Vn, no malfunction (for information

Frequency fluctuations IEC 60255-6 50 Hz : from 47 to 54 Hz

60 Hz : from 57 to 63 Hz

Voltage withstand 2 Vn during 10 ms (for information)

High Frequency Disturbance IEC 60255-22-1

IEC 61000-4-12

IEEE C37.90.1

Class 3 : 2.5kV (CM) / 1kV (DM)

Class 2 : 1kV (CM)

Electrostatic discharge IEC 60255-22-2

IEC 61000-4-2

Class 4 :

8kV contact / 15 kV air

Radiated Immunity IEC 60255-22-3

IEC 61000-4-3

Class 3 :

10 V/m – 80 to 1000 MHz

& spot tests

IEEE C37.90.2 35 V/m – 25 to 1000 MHz

Fast Transient Burst

IEC 60255-22-4

IEC 61000-4-4

IEEE C37.90.1

Class 4 :

4kV – 2.5kHz (CM & DM)

Class 3

2 kV - 2,5 kHz MC

Class 3 :

2kV – 5kHz (CM)

Surge immunity IEC 61000-4-5 Class 4 :

4kV (CM) – 2kV (DM)

Class 3 :

2kV (CM) on shield

Class 4 :

5 – Appendix


4kV (CM) for information

Class 3 :

1 kV MC

High frequency conducted

immunity

IEC 61000-4-6 Class 3 :

10 V, 0.15 – 80 MHz

Harmonics Immunity IEC 61000-4-7 5% & 10% de H2 à H17

Power Frequency Magnetic

Field Immunity

IEC 61000-4-8 Class 4 :

50 Hz – 30 A/m permanent – 300 A/m short time

Class 5 :

100A/m for 1mn

1000A/m for 3s

Power Frequency IEC 61000-4-16 CM 500 V / DM 250 V via 0.1 F

Conducted emission EN 55022 Gr. I, class A and B : from 0.15 to 30 MHz

Radiated emission EN 55022 Gr. I, class A and B : from 30 to 1000 MHz, 10m

5 – Appendix


PACiS™, MiCOM™, Sepam™, Easergy™ and ION™ are trademarks or registered trademarks of

Schneider Electric.

Other trademarks used herein are the property of their respective owners

Schneider Electric Industries SAS

Head Office

35, rue Joseph Monier

92506 Rueil-Malmaison Cedex

FRANCE

www.schneider-electric.com

Due to evolution of standards and equipment, characteristics indicated in texts and images in this document are binding only after confirmation by our departments.

Version 3 - 02/2013

NRJED313442EN

how can i optimize the mv power of a cement plant_v3_2013

Documents