how many ways are there to think morally about war - yoder

8/7/2019 How Many Ways Are There to Think Morally About War - Yoder

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How Many Ways Are There to Think Morally about War?Author(s): John Howard YoderSource: Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994 - 1995), pp. 83-107Published by: Journal of Law and Religion, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1051625 .

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HOW MANY WAYS ARE THERE TO THINKMORALLY ABOUT WAR?John Howard Yoder*

I. TAKINGTRADITIONALUSTWAR THEORIESSERIOUSLYIn both political science and ethics, interpreters of the mean-ing of war have learned to use typologies to separate one mode ofevaluation from another. As a result of this diversity in moralevaluations of war, authorshave partlytalked past each other, with

all good faith accusingeach another of confused categories. Therehas not been an agreed upon definitional base-line for just war the-ories "out there," which would permit just war theorists to judgeother theories and communicate with each other.I propose to define more carefully the operative terms andkinds of argumentused in just war theory, to assist communicationon these topics. If we fail to clarify the variety of meanings andarguments,the result is imprecisionand confusion. Our need is fora more precise understanding of the diversity of the modes ofmoral reasoning on just war. By surveying recent developmentsand usage in the field, this article will make it possible for just warscholars to engage each other using a more adequate, morenuanced set of types. While these types are not identical with cur-rent dominant usage, they are reconcilable with its main lines andmore useful as instruments of interpretation than the simplersystems.This project assumes that the general notion of a "typology"isuseful in interpretingcomplex ethical issues, and drawingattentionto questions of the underlying logic of theories. Yet, a typology isa delicate instrument,easily abused. In using typologies, we needto be disciplined by the concern that they represent real issues oflogic, so that the categories represent real cases, and the differ-ences between them fairly render the substantial debates amongauthors.1

* Notre Dame University,Notre Dame, Indiana.1. The most adequate definition of the spectrumof available types will be the onewhich convinces all parties to the conversation that their special concern is fairly under-stood. The reason for seeking thus to locate correctlythe views one does not hold is oneexpression of nonviolent respect for the dignity of the adversary. Thus in one sense thebest typology will be "neutral." It should facilitate accurate understandingwhatever beone's own view, rather than tilting as some typologies do toward making one type more83


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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONNo unique discrimen is available to sort and filter an abstract

principle from outside the many sample cases within the story.One must ratherfollow the historians,letting our awareness of thetypical variations arise out of the experience of moral debate. Inthis process, it is importantto use ordinaryword meanings only asfar as they reach, rather than stretching usual usage to make apoint;2 and drawas much as possible on other historians'efforts todo the same (as I shall do here with the best known reporters,Bainton and Walzer).The exposition I have chosen is to let the panoramaof diversetheories unfold progressively,from the dialogue alreadyin process,rather than proceeding "foundationally"on the ground of whatsomeone might claim as "firstprinciples."3

A. Holy Wars and Just Wars: From One Nonpacifist Positionto TwoA generation ago Roland Bainton began fine-tuningthe typol-ogy of just war by separating the Christian "holy war" model hedeveloped to describe the Crusades from the concept of "justwar"properly so called (and sometimes referred to in this article as"JW.")4 Bainton was criticized for this effort by those whothought he was making a claim about medieval vocabulary or lan-guage usage. For instance, LeRoy Walters and others have ob-jected that this "holy"/"just"distinction is not clearlypresent in themedieval sources.5 Historically,of course, these critics are correct:

coherent than the others. Duane Cady,From Warism o Pacifism(Temple U Press, 1989)uses a strategyopposite to mine, squishingall the formsof nonpacifism ogether on a singlespectrum,within what he calls "warism."2. Forexample, I shall not follow JamesTurnerJohnsonin callingSully,a minister ofstate, a "pacifist,"when his way to "putan end to war" was to have France remake the mapof Europe, unselfishly but militarily. James Turner Johnson, The Quest for Peace(Princeton U Press, 1987). I consider it odd to call "utopian,"as Johnson also does, theserious projectsof real statesmen.3. The notion of recourse to "firstprinciples"as a way to bypass the difficultyofclosely reading particulardata might itself be a method mistake. The general approachtaken here drew gratefullyon some helpfulcounsel received in 1988 from Dr. Ted Koontz.This draftdoes not take account of all the possiblefurtherrefinements which he suggested.4. Roland H. Bainton, ChristianAttitudes TowardWarand Peace (Abingdon, 1960).What"properly o-called"means will be partof the unpackingwhich follows. The simplestmeaning of "JW" is that by applyingpoliticallyrelevant criteria one can distinguishbe-tween wars which are and those which are not morally justified.5. LeRoy Walters,The Just Warand the Crusade:Antithesesor Analogies? 57 TheMonist 584 (Oct 1973);also JamesTurnerJohnson,Ideology, Reason and the LimitationofWar at ch 5 (PrincetonU Press, 1975). Several other works by Johnson (compare below

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86 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol.11In contrast to the sacral combat, the justifiable war is dis-

cerned by applyingmultiple criteria,which are empiricallyauthen-tically political, most of them subjectto objective validation. As themajor moralists Vitoria and Suarez threw the light of day on theSpanishbehavior in the New World,they triggeredethical attemptsto sort out JW from "holy"types of wars. Indeed, they expresslyrejected the notion of a transcendent Christian justification foroverridingJW limits in the New World.Thus, though medieval writers did not make the distinctionclearly, Bainton is right: the conceptual distinction holds, and wenow have two formallydistinctnonpacifiststances toward war, the"just"and the "holy."10

B. Onward From Realism: From Two Types to ThreeThough Bainton's contribution was useful, he did not proceedwith the same typological finesse across the rest of the typologicalfield. For example, he did not theorize as ethicist about the alter-native which Vitoria's contemporaryMachiavelli was busy clarify-

ing,11 a type which Michael Walzer12 as established as "Realism,"the usage I propose to follow here.13 Grotius in hisThe Legacy of Israel's ExperienceWith Holy War, 19 Studies in Religion/Sciences Re-ligieuses, 345 (Summer 1989) and the works by Barrett and Lind cited there.10. A fully refinedspectrumwould need to attend to the furtherpoint made by Fred-erick Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge U Press, 1975) (see index;especially38, 119,252), namely that in the canonical sense "crusade"refers not only to thetranscendentvalue of the cause as God's, but also to the sanctionof ecclesiastical formali-ties. By Russell's canonicaldefinition a bishop or a council must promulgatea promise ofindulgencesfor those who serve in the cause. So within the "holy" categoryas a worldwideformal/anthropologicalpattern there would be the specific Christiansubset, distinct for-mally but not actually ethically, namely the "crusade"technically properly (i.e. canoni-cally) so called.11. Bainton did notice Machiavelli,but he did not dignifythat view as a type;Bainton,Attitudes at 122-27 (cited in note 4).12. Michael Walzer,Just and UnjustWars,at 4 and following pages (Basic Books,1977). He traces its history back to Thucydides(ca. 460 BCE). Walzer'suse of "scarequotes"around the word "realism" s important. It is one of the marks of those who thinkthat they are "realistic" hat they tend in fact to be less criticallyawarethan others wouldbe of their own biases. They identify "reality"with theirown readingof things,in additionto being more materialisticthan some others are in their understandingof what counts as"things".13. I previously used the secular metaphor "blank check" to designate this stance.That image describes well the posturewhichis asked of the citizen/subject,rather than thecriteria which the politicaldecision-makeruses. The "blank check"response has been ex-pected of the citizen/soldier,as his duty, by all of the above types, until very recently. Thenotion that the individualcitizen or soldier could or should have his own judgmentabout awar'srightnessis a relativelyrecent extension of the JW logic, which we now call "selectiveconscientious objection" (see below note 66).


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JUST WAR"Prolegomena"14 traced that view all the way back to "Carneadesthe Skeptic" (219-125)."Realism" is clearly another type of war theory, undeniablydifferent from both "just"and "holy"in qualitative way. It is notwithout its own kind of inherent logic and honesty, but this theoryexplicitly denies that other parties'rightscan be fully respected. InMachiavelli's age, this theory described the decisions of the"prince"whose interests were not subject to any moral accounta-bility in wartime. In ours, realism describes war in the "nationalinterest" (with benefits the nation's elites do not clearly define astheirs), which is assumed to be unaccountable beyond its borders.The logic of "realism" is the same from Machiavelli to Morgen-thau,15 nsofar as it overtly and honestly denies any accountabilityto or for other loci of value (communities,persons, tribunals,crite-ria, virtues) outside one's own nation.Yet, within the model of "realism"there is a deep further dif-ference between Machiavelli's theme justifying the sovereignty of"the prince"(over againstboth his own subjectsand other princes)and advocacy of the same self-justifyingautonomy for the modern"nation,"especially if it is democratic. If we want properly to dis-tinguish between "pure types", these two would have to be distin-guished. Advocates of "realism" in the context of the modern("democratic")nation would additionally have to recognize othersignificantlydifferent shadings of national interest war:1) Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, among others,would argue that "realism"is morally proper. At least this is amorally accountable position, albeit a paradoxical one. The para-dox was well rendered in the phrase once used to describeNiebuhr: [it is] "the best sin to commit."16 This moral theory ofrealism on war holds that it is rightthat "wrong"should be done inthe particularcase or set of cases.17 For this theory, the inevitable

14. Hugo Grotius, The Law of Warand Peace originally 1625; the "Prolegomena",translationby Francis W. Kelsey for the CarnegieEndowment, now in the public domain,was published as a pamphlet 1957 by Bobbs-Merrill,Indianapolis.15. The firstchapterof Hans J. Morgenthau,PoliticsAmong Nations (Knopf,Third ed1961) is entitled "A Realist Theory of International Politics." Yet Morgenthau did notphilosophize his realism claim as much as others have. Compare Michael Joseph Smith,Realist Thoughtfrom Weberto Kissinger(LSU Press 1986).16. The phrase is from a limerick attributed to Archbishop WilliamTemple. It cap-sules well Niebuhr'sredefinition of the notion of sin, in such a way that activitieswhich are(in some sense) sinful are at the same time morally imperative.17. One school of catholic moral thought simplifies or pigeonholes this paradox bydistinguishing"materialevil" (such as harm or pain) from "moralevil" (that which canoni-

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88 [Vol.11OURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION(moral) evil of compromisewith (material)evil can be mitigated bymaintaining humility (appealing to an Augustinian or Lutherandoctrine of grace) and self-criticism.

Paradoxically, then, the most moral position in internationalrelations is one which explicitly denies the directly binding rele-vance of ideal moral judgments, and makes only pragmaticjudg-ments about self-interest. That position is more honest, and morelikely to succeed, than its "idealistic"alternatives. To inject moralclaims in any other way18 eads to selfrighteousness and to impru-dent (i.e. counterproductiveand therefore immoral) wars.2) A slight variant of the moral theory of realismwould claimthat it is not so much wrong as it is silly, or impertinent, to injectmoral considerations into a realm where they have no claim. Onedoes not condemn an avalanche for obeying the law of gravity.That nations defend themselves is just as much a law of nature.One may or may not feel tragicabout it, but it will not be changedby making moral statements.3) Still other realism theorists refuse to affirm that realisticself-interest is in any sense, even paradoxically,morally to be ap-proved in the case of war. They rather argue that there is simplyno other recourse, no way to stop such self-interest, and that theinterplay of self-interests is in fact the way such matters do get de-cided, whether we like it or not.4) Yet others may be more directly cynical, in the descriptive-historical sense of the term. They may claim that the use of moraland legal language by the bearers of power, particularly as it is

used in the just war tradition, is insincere, just one more tool ofmanipulation. "Realism"of this cynicalmode may of course applynot only to war but also to much of the rest of politics.Despite the variations in their arguments, so far as the en-emy's dignity or the grounds for moral evaluation of war are con-cerned, these diversely nuanced realisms coincide. They agree inthe inapplicabilityof JW objective criteria,whose normal applica-tion will permit discriminating udgmentsbetween the licit and the

cally calls for penance). Sometimes "materialevil" is called "premoral,"with the thoughtthat moral evaluation must be a laterphase. Reinhold Niebuhr rejectedthis word play astoo easy. For him the wrong things we have to do should still be the objects of remorseand should drive us to draw on the Gospel's resourcesof pardon.18. The metaphor "inject" s fitting. It says that the political realm is self-contained,and that the moral claims are extraneous to its nature, being introducedfrom outside.


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JUST WARillicit, with the concrete result of defending the enemy against ourabuse of violence.

Thus, we now have three nonpacifist possibilities (one withseveral subtypes):-"justifiable;"-"holy;"-"realism,whether Machiavellifor the prince, divine right ofkings,19or Morgenthau for the national interest.C. From Realism to Rambo: Three Types to Four

As I have argued and most readers seem to agree, MichaelWalzer is right in identifying "realism"as a distinctive stance. Heproperly suggests with his scare quotes that its claim to read "real-ity" univocally is dubious.20Yet Walzer is less careful about givingphilosophical attention to one additionalreaction to conflict whoseexistence he does discern, even though he names it variously ashysteria, frenzy, insanity, intoxication .... (305ff).This "insanity"sort of reaction is not only a very possible andwidely documented kind of humanresponse to the problem of war;it is sometimes intentionally encouraged by politicians or officers.Indeed, it is dramatizedfor immense profitby Sylvester Stallone inhis Rambo manifestation. This reaction in fact has ancient prece-dents in Western experience, in the Islamic, Iberic, and Teutonicglorificationof the macho elan whose very honor resides in its dis-regard for rights and rules in favor of the autonomy of its owndrives. Of course, this reaction has analogies in other cultures be-sides Western.This "Rambo" position that conceives of violence and vali-dates its excess as proof of virility21might be called "honor" or

19. The simpler meaning of "divine right", the one rendered here, is that God hasplaced the king above anyone else's scrutiny. The term may however be used (and hasbeen used by some idealists) in another sense, namely to state the claim that the King isaccountable to a moral standard above himself which may make him listen less to hiscourtiersor his constituents.Then the JW disciplinewould be a partof the king'sdischarg-ing that right.20. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (cited in note 12). The first chapter is "AgainstRealism."21. A student more versed in watchingviolent films than I am claims than Rambo isnot the best exemplarof this stance. In favorof my understanding,which I think is that ofthe nonexpert viewer, I may cite the words with which Playboy explained their namingSylvester Stallone in 1987 as one of "Twenty-fivemost importantAmericans":"By show-ing in both Rocky and Rambo that the ordinaryAmerican could achieve the goals of jus-tice and dignityby the use of violence he changed the way Americansexpected problems

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION"manhood"in other Teutonic or Islamic versions. In the Hebraicsetting, it can claim as its patriarchLamech, Cain'sdescendant whoin Genesis (4:27) boasted that he had escalated his use of retalia-tory violence from the "sevenfold"threatened by JHWH (4:15) to"seventy-seven fold." In more modem times, Frantz Fanon, in asetting partly Freudian and partly Islamic, linked such "honor"with the function that bloodshed can have in the liberation of for-mer slaves.22Sometimes the focus of this "honor" position is ongoing down fighting as a hero; then we remember Masada or theWarsawghetto, the Alamo or Custer.23What these "Rambo" vari-ants have in common is that neither other parties in the conflictnorany principles above the fray have any moral standing. Value islocated in the dignity of the heroic self; violence validates itself.Some might say that the Rambo position is not a "moral"posi-tion at all; yet that would be to beg the question. The "Rambo"theory uses the language of obligation and guilt. It assigns praiseand blame. It mobilizes men collectively in enterprises of killingand dying which they consider imperative, sometimes heroic,sometimes riskyfor themselves. It gives those who follow it a goodconscience, or pride;it projectsshame. It fills our media and it sellsbooks. It is allegedly used in the training and motivating of elitefighting corps ...24 Thus,our conceptual enterprisewill be nearerthe real world we are seeking to describe in moral terms if we hon-estly name this view, rather than simply declaring it uncouth orignoring its presence or its power.We have now identified four nonpacifist stances; justifiablewar, holy war, "realism,"and "honor" (frenzy, passion, virility).They are all present and powerful in our culture. Yet oddly, only

to be solved - fromcompromiseandsubtletyto directness and force." But if thischaracter-ization is unfair to Stallone I am willing to substitute any other icon like ArnoldSchwartzeneggeror John Wayne.22. FrantzFanon, The Wretchedof the Earth(Grove, 1963).23. It may be that to be fair to the glorificationof the participantsof the heroic buthopeless clashes in the Warsawghetto or at Massadathey shouldrather be considered,as Inoted above, as subformsof the "Holy" category.24. One critic has suggested that analysisshould distinguishbetween what it takes tojustify a war morallyor politically(for example, to a legislature,or to a civil constituency,or in academicpoliticalscience), and what it takes to motivate men to fight. It might thenbe argued that once the justification of a conflict has been delivered by valid moralgrounds, it is all right then to motivate the soldiers (or the football players) to fight bymeans of the rhetoric of hatred. The distinctionis possible conceptually: I doubt that acommunitycan justify or implementthat bifurcation.

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JUST WARthe first is taken seriously, as the interlocutor of pacifism,25by aca-demic ethicists such as Paul Ramsey,26James Johnson,27JamesChildress,28Richard Miller.29Similarly, only justifiablewar is givenany notice by the Roman Catholic bishops' Challengeof Peace.30These spokesmen who dominate our public discourse mightjustify their blind spot by claimingthat the rest of the "types"(i.e.,"holy," "realist,"rambo") have a weaker moral claim than paci-fism, but that would be an odd excuse for not dealing with them,especially if, as I would claim, they influence more people thandoes pacifism. Admittedly, the types we have been adding to thelist have been strayed progressively farther from moral accounta-bility than "justwar,"properlyso called. Yet, in all of them, apolo-gists and combatants use the language of JW, sure that their causeis in some sense righteous, and that their prosecution of it not asdestructive as it might be.

D. Another Sort of Just War TheoryWe have not listed yet another different type of war theory,which is closer to JW ideals, without fitting the classical mold. Ittoo merits independent recognition. So far "justwar" has been de-scribed as if it were a single clear concept from which all the others("realism,"the "crusade,"etc.) differ. The matter is however muchmore complicated, in ways to which we must now turn.

25. For the purposesof this review,it has been justifiablethusfar to assume that "pac-ifism,"the polar alternativethat all these positions reject, is univocal,since the discussionwe are pursuingassumedthat. That is however not in fact the case, as we shall see below.26. Paul Ramsey's very last work,printedposthumously,was Paul Ramsey, Speak upfor Just War or Pacifism (U of PennsylvaniaPress, 1988). His priority concern was todenounce what looked to him like sloppythinkinglookingfor a place to standbetween JWand Pacifism,avoidingthe real differences.Yet in so arguing,as before, Ramsey continuedto ignore the existence of the other alternatives.27. James ThrnerJohnson, Can Modem War be Just?(Yale U Press, 1984); Ideology,Reason, and the Limitationof War(Princeton U Press, 1975);Just WarTraditionand theRestraintof War(PrincetonU Press, 1981);The Questof Peace (PrincetonU Press, 1987).28. JamesF. Childress,"JustWarCriteria,"most accessible in Thomas J. Shannon,ed,Waror Peace? at 40-58 (Orbis Press, 1980)but also in Childress'own MoralResponsibilityin Conflicts (LSU Press, 1982), see also 39 Theological Studies 427-445 (1978). Childresshas often been cited and anthologized, with his basically right thesis about the sharedstarting point of JW and pacifism;he too attends little to all the other positions present inthe culture.29. RichardMiller, Interpretations f Conflict(U of Chicago Press, 1991).30. National Council of CatholicBishops, The Challengeof Peace (US Catholic Con-ference, 1983).The Catholicbishops in fact pass over in silence the importantplace of thecrusades in Catholic history, as well as the many times when sovereigns baptized and in-vested by the Churchturned a deaf ear to moral concerns.

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONSome who claim to espouse the JW system's disciplineand useits classical vocabulary do not believe that there can be any pointwhen the resources of the JW tradition could say that a givencause, strategyor tactic stands condemned and should not be done,even at the cause of suing for peace. In short, there is no objec-tively discerniblepoint at which the JW doctrine would yield a con-crete negative imperative. These theorists claim to be expounding"justwar" discourse.31I propose to name this variant colloquiallythe "JustWar Tradition Without Teeth-JWT Without Teeth."In one variation on JWT Without Teeth, JW categories are

used as far as they reach, for justificationad bellum, but they areabandoned in bello on the grounds of necessity.32 Another "With-out Teeth" variation can be found in systematic arguments ofethicists like James Childress,who set aside decisiveness on morecomplex methodological grounds. Childress argues that since dif-ferent persons, different societies, have different theories of value,there can be no common "substantive" theory defining bottomlimits.33This JWT "WithoutTeeth" uses the rhetoric of JW, yet it re-jects the strict construction of JW theory and refuses to be judgedby whether it can produce concrete negative applications.What ac-tually happens in the field, when JWT "WithoutTeeth" discourse isused, really should be recognized as fitting one of the other lessrespectable categories previously described.34

31. In fact James Childress' "Just-WarCriteria,"found in Thomas A. Shannon, ed,Waror Peace at 40 (Orbis Books, 1980)claimsfor the firsttime to be makingsense philo-sophically of how just war reasoningworks.32. Compare John H. Yoder, When Waris Unjustat 40, and n 1 (Augsburg, 1984)."Necessity"in the JWTproperlyunderstoodmeans that even the damageone does withintherules must not be done unless it is indispensable."Necessity" n this looser sense meansyou may break rules "if you have to to win."33. Shannon, War at 40 (cited in note 31) does this. His argument is briefly cited,Yoder, When War at ch 5 and 68 (cited in note 32). To document adequately still otherargumentsagainstthe possibilityof a decisive"no"wouldtake us too far. Some create newborderlinecategories like "extreme emergency"or "distress."Some appeal to the classicdistinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, arguingthat in bello atrocities do notdisqualifya good cause.34. It would take us too far to seek to cataloguethe set of variantswhichseek or seemto stay on the knife's edge between "strict"and "toothless";they are numerous.Recentlyfor instance the PersianGulf Warwas called "imperfectly ust"by one Jesuit;"notjust butnecessary"by a bishop.

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83] JUST WAR 93Unlike the "WithoutTeeth"view, the "strictconstructionist"35or classical view of the JW ("withteeth") is recognizable36becauseit includes concrete negative possibilities:1) The moral theologian has the capacity and duty to con-demn particulargoals, like "unconditionalsurrender,"and particu-lar tactics, like massive city bombing.372) The conscriptcan selectively object to an unjustwar,38dis-obedience to unjust orders is incumbent upon the soldier, andpolitical opposition by the citizen when a war is unjust is required.(All of these phenomena have come to the fore increasinglyin our

age).3) Nations must sue for peace when a war cannot be wonjustly.394) The international community can prosecute as war crimesinfractions committed by individuals (Nuremberg, My Lai).5) Nations and individualscan denounce atrocities and infrac-tions committed by enemy armies.In summary, we find ourselves with six (6) structurally quite

distinct modes of nonpacifistdecision and justification.Though all35. This term is of course borrowed from another realm, namely from constitutionallaw. Its applicability is common sensically evident. I first saw the phrase used, as adesignationof one's own position, by EdwardA. Malloy,CSC, TheEthicsof Law Enforce-ment and CriminalPunishmentat 28 (U Press of America, 1982). As in law, one assumesthat most reasonablepeople would come to the same readingof the meaningof a text andits applicationto the facts of the case. The classicalstatementof the need for each criterionto count was Thomas' dictum: bonum ex integracausa, malum ex quocumquedefectu.36. My fullest description of the meaning of and the case for "teeth" is offered inLeroy S. Rouner, ed, CelebratingPeace at 33 (Notre Dame U Press, 1990) and in George

A. Lopez and Drew Christiansen,eds, Morals and Might in The Credibilityand PoliticalUses of the Just War Tradition(Westview, 1994). The point is made more briefly Yoder,When War(cited in note 32).37. John Courtney Murray,S.J. made both of these judgments very clearly and pub-licly, althoughonly after the fact in JohnCourtneyMurray,Remarkson theMoral Problemof War,20 Theological Studies40 (1959). Murrayrepresented(in his own mind) a kind ofrenaissance of JustWarthinkingafter generationsof neglect, accompaniedby Paul Ram-sey and followed by numerous ethicists. This contradictsthe picture painted by DanielDombrowski accordingto which the doctrine was effective until not long ago but has justnow died. The fact is ratherthat it was forgotten since the eighteenth century and is nowbeing revived by some.38. This is the point where US law unjustlyfavors the integral pacifistwho refuses allwars,over againstthe honest Catholic or Lutheran who applieshis communion's JW prin-ciples to reject a particularwar or a particulartactic. Comparemy document collectionThe Moral Responsibilityto Refuse to Servein an UnjustWar,Joan B. Kroc Institute forInternationalPeace Studies Working paper 3:WP:9(1993).39. CompareJohn H. Yoder, Surrender:A Moral Imperative,48 The Review of Poli-tics, 576 (Fall 1986). Murrayand Ramsey were among the few JW thinkers to face thisimplicationopenly.


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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONof them use "justice"language, as we understand each better, wemust note their diversity. Each is historically documented. Eachhas its own logic. Each makes sense of dying and killing in waysthat satisfy and motivate a large set of actors. The classical JW po-sition is only one of these, namely the most careful and the leastpopular. It is the one held by the most careful theologians, but it isnot the one applied by most bishops and priests over the centuriessince Ambrose and Augustine into modem times.

E. Is the picture sharper or fuzzier? An Appraisal ofNonpacifist PositionsAs we have made clarificationsalong the way and identifiedanother quite distinct type, we have made some progress in in-creasing the accuracyof our grid. As we have discovered that eachmode of evaluationwe have named differs in structurally mportantways from the others, it becomes clear that any simpler rosterwould do violence to the logic of one concrete historical reality orthe other.

Of course, these five nonpacifiistviews on just war40 annot bespread out along a simple spectrum.41To put them on a "map"would make not a scale but a complicated "sociogram." Eachwould sort out differently the parallels and differences between it-self and the others. Without addingto the list of variations, it maybe helpful to restate in other words where they differ and wherethey agree:1) The holy war proponentand the pacifistwould agree,overagainst heotherthree,to reject heimplicit onsequential-ism of the JWTin favor of intrinsicmoralimperatives.Boththusconsidermartyrdomnhonorable utcome.Both refusetoreducemoraldecision o pragmatism.2) Justwartheory(properly o called)andpacifismagree,against he otherthree,that war is intrinsicallyvil andneverprimafacie to be approved.They will also have occasion tomake commoncause in contemporaryolitics,whenthe integ-rityof bothdemandsopposition o less restrained olicies.42

40. I just said there are six; but for the purpose of the next paragraph"justwar with-out teeth" can be counted as a variantof "realism."41. This is a shortcomingof the argumentative actic of Cady, From Warism cited innote 1). The variations are multidimensional,rather than being spread across a singlescale.42. Attention to this possiblepracticalpoliticalcommonalitybetween JW and pacifismis present already in the foundationalwritingsof JamesThrnerJohnson and James Chil-

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JUST WAR3) Realism,pacifism, nd"honor" gree,against he othertwo, that it is an illusionto thinkthat militarykillingcan beregularlyand reliably subjectedto effective rational moralrestraint.

F. The Picture Yet Fuzzier: Collapsing JW Criteria in Search ofSimplicityThe differences already observed within the JW family properbetween the "classical" or "strict" form and the "toothless" areonly begin to recognize the varieties within this family and theirramifications. Since JW is a multifactored mode of discernmentthat evaluates the facts of each case, the relative weights or priori-ties of JW criteria can vary so greatly as to produce fundamentallydifferent policy conclusions. In fact, the criteria not only differ insubstance;they also represent different modes of moral reasoning.Yet, many have attemptedto collapse these criteriain order to sim-ply just war analysis.Some JW criteria are matters of intrinsic evil or positive

obligation:-Innocent life maynever be directly ntentionallyaken-Lying is neverpermitted-The causemustbe just-International law and treaties one has signed must berespected-Victors mustintend to be mercifulaftertheywin.Moral philosophy calls this kind of reasoning "deontological" or"principled."It does not provide for exceptions.Another set of JW criteria are matters of proportionality."Proportion" s traditionally isted as a criterionunder discernmentboth ad bellum and in bello, representing the philosophical familywe call "consequentialism."43It assumes that all of the values atstake can somehow be weighed against one another, although sel-dom do theorists state verifiable coefficients that permit the vari-dress. It is popularized n NationalConference,TheChallengeof Peaceat 71 andfollowingpages, especially 74. It is analyzed at book-length by RichardB. Miller in his Interpreta-tions of Conflict (U of Chicago Press, 1991).43. Some preferthe term "teleological"rather than "consequential"as the alternativeto the "deontological"category. It is a broadercategorysince it includes taking credit forineffective intentions. When the FBI and Janet Reno said they "did not intend" to bumdown the compound at Waco, although that was the primafacie obvious outcome of theprevious steps they had authorized,this was a typicalseparationbetween "intention" andconsequences.

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONous values to be quantified so they can be accurately weightedagainst each other.Still other JW values are matters of procedure:-War must be declared-War mustbe the last resort-There must be reasonablehopeof success-Weapons must be discriminating-Even admissiblemeansmustbe usedonlyas necessary

Finally, other JW values are matters of positive law:-Treaties andinternationalaw mustbe respected-The legal system n effect determinesegitimateauthority-Available negotiatingaids determinewhen last resort isreachedBecause the principles, logic and styles of JW theory are soscattered, it is not surprisingthat some who consider themselvesfaithful to the JW discipline attempt to simplify matters by reduc-ing one set of criteriato the others. For instance, one set of think-ers such as William O'Brien would reduce the intrinsic values

(especially noncombatant immunity) to proportional terms. Stillanother set, which includes JohnArbuthnotFisher,George Orwell,and John Foster Dulles, has been ready to sacrifice proportion tothe certainty of victory.44Others who have attempted to reduce JW theory to a simplebase have eliminated or collapsed individual criteria. Arthur"Bomber" Harris expressly disregarded immunity.45 MichaelWalzer makes room for a very "supreme emergency" to overridethe in bello limits, while denying that "necessity", as it is moreoften and more easily appealed to by others, should count in thatway.46Michael Novak and George Weigel subordinate everythingelse to "just cause," apparentlypermitting infraction of the otherrules if the enemy is bad enough.47 One need not be a mathemati-44. CompareJohnH. Yoder,A ConsistentAlternativeView Within he JustWarFamily,2 Faith and Philosophy 112 (1985).45. Harris becomes a type representativein Walzer,Justand UnjustWar at 258 and323 (cited in note 12).46. Compareid at 360.47. Although MichaelNovak used the term "moralclarity"in Michael Novak, MoralClarity n the NuclearAge (Nelson, 1983)for his argumentagainstthe American Bishops'readingof the JWT in their The Challengeof Peace (1983), he does not actuallydefine hisdissentwith anycare in terms of the classicalcategories. It is not clear that he respectsthatmuch either the classical categories or the very notion of a careful casuistry. Novak listswhat he calls "gaps"or "unansweredquestions" n the JWtheory,but then goes on arguingas if the gaps did not matter. To make sense of his argument t would seem that he must be

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JUST WARcian to project the almost infinite permutations resulting as inter-preters of such a multi-factoralscheme weight differently the manycomponents of any situation.To review with more specific examples, we have before us thefollowing array of distinguishablemodes of reasoning,"Honor" Passion, renzy,hombria,hysteria,Fanon,Rambo)"Realism"as cynicism Carneades)as brutefact (Machiavelli)as paradoxicallymoral(Morgenthau)

Divine right of Kings (Rom. 13)48Holy war with variantsdependingon the god andthe guru:Mosesand Joshua or JHWHMuhammed nd the DjihadBernard/popes ndthe crusade:the specificcanonicaldefinition Russell)Marxandthe victoryof the proletariatMussolini,Hitlerand the victoryof fascismKhomeini,Khadaffi, ndthe AmericanSatanFalwell,Swaggart, nd ChristianAmericaNeo-crusades ombininghe vicesof all three of the aboveNationalsecurity tatesLikudApartheidIRAHezbollahJustifiablewara) acceptingwarevenif it does notmeetall the criteria i.e.no teeth);-on the grounds hat the definitionsarenot agreed-on the grounds hatsome criteriaoutweighothersb) acceptingwaronlyif it meets allthe criteria.e. thejusti-fiablewar n the standardensewhichstrictconstruction"opesfor;

holding to a "slidingscale,"such that a worse enemy makes a cause more just and a morejust cause outweigh the value of the other restraints.The same would seem to be the casefor George Weigel, who also gives The Challengea failing grade in George Weigel, Tran-quillitasOrdinisat 257 (and following pages) (Oxford, 1987), and Catholicismand the Re-newal of American Democracy at at 139 (and following pages) (Paulist Press, 1989), butwithout ever facing the challenge of showing that the JW tradition has teeth.48. Comparenote 19. One might suggest that as to political criteria "divineright"is"realist":as to legitimate authorityit is "holy".

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c) rejectingwar when it does not meet them,49 .g.:* absenceof legitimateauthority* unjust cause, intention* absenceof due process(declaration,ast resort)* disrespect or discrimination,roportion,mmunityII. JUSTIFYINGWAR WHILE READING THE REALITY OF THE

POLITICAL SYSTEM

We have probablycovered sufficientlythe available variationsthat justify war if we concentrate on the one question which themoral theologians ordinarilybegin with, namely: "is killing in warmorally acceptable?" Yet that question is not the only one thatmakes an importantdifference, as we shall see if we seek to under-stand better the differences between major thinkers in this moralfield.We must cope with another set of "reality"variables if we areto come to grips with the justification literature. James TurnerJohnson sets our agenda for this area of variables, by proposinganother typology which cuts across our inductively derived one.Johnson50dentifies a traditionwhich he calls "utopian pacifism,"acurrent he sees runningfrom Erasmus (or actually from Marsiliusof Padua and Dante, even earlierthan the Renaissance) all the wayto the present.51In Johnson's view, "utopian pacifism" projects the hope thatwar can be done away with, through proper organization of the

transnationalcommunity. Johnson quite correctly discerns that heis pointing to a coherent and distinctposition, real in history, signif-icantly different from the war justification positions previouslyidentified.We must, however, protest that it is inappropriate for Johnsonto call this "pacifism,"since the advocates of this vision regularlyjustify war:(a) in the absence of the desired future common order;

49. These latter two specimensare of course the same moralposition appliedto differ-ing cases.50. James TurnerJohnson, The Questfor Peace 109, 153, 176 (and following pages)(PrincetonU Press, 1987).51. My amateurcatalog of such designs lists over forty such designs in European his-tory from 1300 to WWI. Comparewith note 55 below.

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JUST WAR(b) in a police role once the world order is established;52(c) in some views, in order to establish that order in the firstplace.Given these caveats, the "utopianpacifist" positions set asideany real restraint on war in the present international economy.The position that war can be used to establish a future commonorder can, as Bainton already noted, become a kind of holy war,justified by its intention to impose a righteous "peace."Similarly, Johnson's designation of this view as "utopian" is

misleading.53 n ordinaryusage, which Johnson sometimes but notalways seems to share, the term "utopia"functions perjorativelytodesignate an ideal goal, in fact unrealizable, yet which someonewrongly projects as if it were possible. Those who are "utopian"inthis sense deceive others and perhaps themselves.The "utopian"view Johnsondescribesstands in direct contrastto any of the primary descriptive meanings which the term "uto-pian" has ordinarilycarried. For instance:1) When Thomas More gave the name to the genre, Utopia[i.e., latin for "no place"] was not at all a place to go to. It was aconstruct which served to critique by contrast More's own society,yet without any programfor getting from here to there. The sameis the case for Butler's Erewhon [no where].2) When neo-marxists argued for the positive functions ofutopia, or when Reinhold Niebuhr elaborated on the morally posi-tive role of "illusion,"54here was no deception or confusion aboutthe attainabilityof that "goal."3) When WilliamPenn envisioned a "holy experiment"in thenew world, or when nineteenth-centuryvisionaries founded volun-tary residential communities at Oneida and New Harmony, therewas nothing otherwordly or unattainable in principle about theirprojects, though the designs were flawed and the execution moreso.

52. Some advocates of this view would say that militaryaction to defend the peace,especiallyif authorizedby some higheragency,shouldbe called "policeaction"ratherthanwar.53. Johnson,Questat 254 (and following pages) (cited in note 50) grantsthat "utopia"usually has other meanings.54. Compare Reinhold Niebuhr: "The truest visions of religion are illusions, whichmay be partlyrealized by being resolutelybelieved. For what religionsbelieves to be trueis not wholly true but ought to be true;and may become true if its truth is not doubted."Reinhold Niebuhr, MoralMan and ImmoralSocietyat 81 (CharlesScribner'sSons, 1932).

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONThe characterizationof "worldorder visionaries"as "utopian"

is also mistaken in that the vision of a viable agency of world orderhas often been the work of professional politicians, from the fif-teenth-century King of Bohemia to John Foster Dulles and Doug-las MacArthur.55That work does not dream or promise somethingunthinkable or unheard-of. It rather extrapolates to a higher levelthe vision of federal union which has shown itself viable in Switzer-land and the USA, and which is increasinglyappealing to most ofEurope.As an ideal, these so-called "utopianpacifists"promise to "doaway with war,"and thus they have been dubbed "abolitionist"bysome. However, since that term is however also used by radicalpacifistswho do not share that optimistic view of international or-der56 I suggest that they might more accurately be designated"worldorder visionaries"or if one insists "worldorder pacifists."57

Worldorder visionaries simply extend to intercommunitycon-flict the principles of covenanting, co-operation and adjudicationwhich are already well-oiled in domestic experience. These princi-ples have already been successfullypracticedinternationallyin therepression of piracy and crime, in combating disease and circulat-ing the mails, regulating exchange rates and defending the ozonelayer.58 Such world order principles are the stated normative vi-sion of Roman Catholicism at least since Benedict XV, accordingto Papal and conciliar statements.59

55. See Sisela Bok, Early Advocatesof LastingWorldPeace: Utopiansor Realists?inLeRoy S. Rouner, ed, CelebratingPeaceat 52 (Notre Dame U Press, 1990);SylvesterJohnHemleben, Plansfor WorldPeace ThroughSix Centuries U of ChicagoPress, 1943);JacobTermeulen,Der Gedankeder IntemationalenOrganization n seiner Entwicklung Nijhoff,1917).56. Note the "New Abolitionist Covenant"enunciatedand circulatedjointly ca. 1980by five organizations: he Fellowshipof Reconciliation,the New Call to Peacemaking,PaxChristi USA, Sojourners,and WorldPeacemakers. The term "abolition"was chosen bythese people not at all because of confidence in the peacemakingpotential of the UnitedNations, nor because of any intent to impose peace on othersby force, but as an appeal tothe moralpower of the American movement againstslavery(whichthey differfrom me inconsideringto have been a success).57. Here one mightuse Ceadel'sterm"pacificism,"MartinCeadel, Pacifismin Britain1914-1945 (ClarendonPress, 1980).58. The fact thatco-operationof such kindsis in fact growinglysuccessfulgives the lieto those who wouldcall thisview particularly"idealistic".JWthoughtis also idealistic,if itcounts seriouslyon sovereigngovernmentsto make objectivedecisions ad bellum,and onbelligerent governments and societies, and even on soldiers in the heat of battle, to bescrupulousin bello.59. CompareWorldOrderin Catholic Teaching,paragraph235 and following in Na-tional Council of CatholicBishops The Challengeof Peace, 1983.

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Rather than taking our signal from Johnson's misleadingchoice of "utopian pacifism"language, we shall be better advisedto ask what really distinguishesthis way of evaluatingwar from theothers. Because they share a distinctreadingof reality, world ordervisionaries merit a special place in our attention, and therefore onour roster. They are not literally "pacifist"according to any nor-mal meaning of the term,just as "nuclearpacifism" s not pacifism.To locate them on our previous array, we should speak of worldorder visionaries as a subset of the JWT.Johnson quite rightlydiscerns that world order visionaries are

to be distinguishedboth from real pacifistsin the ordinarysense ofthe term and from other non-pacifistsby their more optimistic vi-sion of the nature of social relations. Moreover, they redefine thenotion of "legitimate authority."60Yet that purely formal descrip-tion undervalues its uniqueness.The so-called "utopian pacifists"share the strong moral pre-sumption in favor of peace, which is held by both JW thought andthe pacifists (and rejected by the holy, cynical, and franticmodels).Yet they may become impatient with the pacifist/JWdebate, be-cause preventing war is in their minds more urgent than decidingwhether to fight once war is upon us. They assume that interna-tional society is domestic society writ large:that the fabric of com-mon humanityis damagedtragicallybut not irreparably. Thus theycan assume that it is possible to find orderly ways to resolve in-tercommunityconflictsbetween nation-states that are analogous tothose discovered on intra-nationallevels. They can trust that trea-ties will be respected, and that due process will operate in hardcases. They are most at home with the theory of internationalrela-tions sometimes designated as "the interdependence school."61Our encounter with Johnson has thus made us aware that"views of political reality"are a distinctvariable in the justificationof war, and not reducible to "views of the morality of war." Thisinsight enables us to better describe yet other developments whichare likewise largely new in our century. There is room for them onthe arrayof justificationtheories we have created, but only recent

60. These visions vary as to the actual political form they envision. It might be anideal central government,or a federation,or a looser decentralizedcollaborationof theo-retically independent entities living with mutualrespect and recognition and many inter-locking relationships.61. Comparethe writingsof Robert C. Johansen,like Towarda Dependable Peace:AProposal for an AppropriateSecurity System(Institutefor WorldOrder, 1978).

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONdevelopments have made them historically (numerically)important.Although the idea that a particularwar or a weapon can bemorally disqualifiedis intrinsic to the JW mode, only our centuryhas seen numerous real instances of focus on a particular weaponor a war. Here too, the "descriptionof political reality"is a majorpart of what has changed. Intrinsicallyand ideally, JW theory issupposed to "haveteeth"-to be able to yield a negative reading atany point on its roster of criteria. In fact, only the massive bomb-ing of cities has thus far in real life evoked strong negative judg-ments; thus, the popular term, "nuclear pacifism."62 Thisrepresents a new reading, not on the morality of killing but on thepossibility of discrimination in how killing is done. What haschanged, in this one instance, is how the world is described.Another authentically new development in war evaluationthat we should recognize, claims new, politically effective potentialnot for agencies of world order created from above but for nonvio-lent pressure tactics from below. Although this development be-gan in practicebefore it reached theory, at least as early as RichardGregg,63theorists have seriously argued that Gandhian tactics ofsocial strugglecould be effectively extrapolated beyond the ad hocexperiences where they had been developed, beyond the cultureand spiritualitywhere they had arisen, and beyond the unpremedi-tated phenomena of effective resistance64 o programmaticprojec-tion and planning.65

62. In fact the principleof rejectingmassivecity bombingon firmmoralgroundsarosebefore Hiroshima;it is therefore anachronisticto call it "nuclear". The argument wasmade by Bishop George Bell of Chichesterin 1944 in the House of Lords, and by Jesuitmoral theologian John Ford in a 1944journal article. The argumentwas still older thanthat; it was the topic of a dissertationby John Kenneth Ryan accepted by the CatholicUniversity of America in 1934,JohnK. Ryan, Modem Warand Basic Ethics (Bruce, 1940).But why does the same kind of negative logic not attach to other atrocities?Whydo we nothave "genocide pacifism"or "concentrationcamp pacifism"or "rape pacifism"?63. Richard Gregg, The Powerof Nonviolence (J. P. Lippincott,1934). Compare myreview of the theme in my The "Power"of Non-Violence PaperG:WP:2available from theJoan B. Kroc Institutefor International Peace Studies.64. When the argumentbegan it seemed that the Gandhianexperiences stood alone.With time however there developed the awarenessthat there had been manysuch episodesin earlier history:William R. Miller, "NonViolence"A ChristianInterpretation GeorgeAllen & Onwin, Ltd, 1964) and then with time many more cases could be analyzed;com-pare Gene Sharp, The Politicsof NonViolent Action (PorterSargent, 1973).65. Sir Stephen King-Hall,Defense in the NuclearAge (FellowshipPublications,1959)began the pragmaticargumentfor nonmilitarydefense strategies. Gene Sharphas devel-oped institutions to promote research and education:the Albert Einstein Institution andthe Civilian-BasedDefense Association. Compare George H. Crowell, The Casefor Non-

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JUST WARA third conceptual innovation of our century is the focus onthe individual's choice: that is, that the citizen called to armsshould (and should be permitted to) make his own personal deci-sion about whether to answer the nation's call, to refuse service orto disobey an illegal order in the armed services. Although thischoice has been implicitly present in JW theory as such from thebeginning66),what is now called "selective conscientious objection"only became quantitatively important with America's Viet Namwar.67If the personal responsibility of one under military command

to disobey an unjust order is not a new idea, its criminal enforce-ment, for example, against Axis soldiers through the Nurembergtrials, and against a few US soldiers in the My Lai trials, is rela-tively new. Disobedience of an unjust order and selective refusalof incorporation are juridicallydifferent but morally parallel. Yet,they both involve a "descriptionof reality"-an independent eval-uation of the data in the conflict,based upon political realities, andmeasured by the JW rules as the individual sees them.If we insert these newly labelled distinct modes of "describingreality"within the previously developed arrayof justificationposi-tions, recognizing their distinctivenessby setting them in italics, weare left with the following array:"Honor""Realism"Holy war depending on the God and the spokesmanNeo-crusades mixing all three of the aboveJustifiablewar

violent Civilian Defense Against ExternalAggression,PloughsharesWorking Paper 90-94Waterloo, Ontario, 1990. Ronald J. Sider, Non-Violence;the Invincible Weapon?(WorldPublishing,1989). New data have come in from the political changes in Manila 1986, andin Eastern Europe in 1989. When seen in relation to the JW grid these new resourceschange the "lastresort" line. They also represent,of course, anotherspecimen of "waysofseeing the world." Sider alludes to the "Emperor'snew clothes" syndrome. The discoveryof the power of nonviolence debunks the mythicaltrustin the power of lethal weaponrytobring about deep change.66. In Yoder, When Warat 87 (and following) (cited in note 32), I cited Martin Lutheron the subject. CompareYoder, The Moral Responsibility o Refuse to Serve in an UnjustWar available from the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (WorkingPaper3:WP:9). As was said in note 38 above, it is an injusticeof the US legal system that ithonors "absolute"but not "selective"conscientious objection.67. One estimate said that 70,000 young men went from the USA to Canadain orderto avoid service in Viet Nam.

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION-accepting warwhen it meets all the criteria(strictconstruc-

tion in the affirmativecase)- accepting war even if it does not meet them all(JWTWT)-rejecting war when it does not meet them, i.e., strict con-struction in negative cases, for example:** absence of legitimate authority** unjust cause, intention** absence of due process (declaration, last resort)** "nuclearpacifism":provoked by disregardfor discrimina-

tion, proportion, immunity** selective objection:justified by the absence of any one ormore of the above;** disobeying an unjustorder:against infractions in bello** making war unnecessaryby the use of nonviolent means, bymoving back the "last resort" threshold;Abolishing war by means of agencies of world order: "worldorder 'pacifism';"pushingback the thresholds of legitimate author-

ity and of last resort.III. As FOR PACIFISM....

As we expand our grid in a less controversial direction, weneed to returnto the awarenessthat theories of "pacifism"need tobe subdivided as well.68 "Pacifism" n the ordinary sense meansthe consistent rejection of war. In this sense I have already argued(above) that the usages "utopianpacifism"or "nuclearpacifism,"to designate what are really variants of JW reasoning, are confus-ing, although for present purpose I have yielded to it.Yet, within pacifism more properly socalled, significantvaria-tions have also been pointed out in recent debate. The most widelyagreed-upon difference was arguedby Reinhold Niebuhr, who dis-tinguished for the purposes of his argumentthree different stances,only two of them morally coherent in his view:68. This was said in note 25 above. Here, too, Cady, From Warism(cited in note 1)spreads the several kinds of pacifismalong a single confusing spectrum. Cady is right indiscerningmore varieties than the three main streamsI distinguishhere. Two recent well-arguedpresentationsof the case for pacifismare Robert L. Holmes, On Warand Morality(Princeton U Press, 1989), and Daniel A. Dombrowski, ChristianPacifism (Temple UPress, 1991). Each also uses type distinctionssomewhat like mine, but does so in the ser-vice of his own advocacy,and neither of them seeks to interpretwith understandingall theother views.

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JUST WAR1) "nonresistance" fter the model of the sixteenth-centuryAnabaptistsor Tolstoy.Thispacifisms ready,for the sake ofsimpleobedienceto the way of Jesus,to let evil go on in thewiderworld.Thispositionhasinternalntegrity,butit is sociallyirresponsible.2) liberalpacifism, hat believes that war can be done awaywithbya simpleactof politicalwill,without acrificingndispen-sablejusticevalues. Thisviewis morally onfused, orNiebuhr,becauseit readsthe real worldwrongly.It also overlapswith"worldorderpacifism."3) nonviolentactivismn the modeof Gandhi.Thistoo maybemorallycoherent,andfor some socialgoalsit maybe the bestweapon,but it is a formof conflictandcoercion,not nonresis-tance.Its warrants effectiveness,not obedienceto the way ofJesus. It mayworkwell for Americannegroes69 ut it will notstopHitler.70Niebuhr had a stake in maximizingthe distance between thefirst and thirdpositions which he considered coherent, because thefarther apart they were, the easier it was to make the invalid sec-

ond position, his main adversary,fall into the crackbetween them.Niebuhr's setting-the late 1930's which saw American Christian-ity being slow to acknowledge the need for a "responsible" re-sponse to the Nazi threat-was the uniquely right context for hisargument to be cogent.Niebuhr's argument against pacifism provoked some criticalresponse from some of those he criticized,71but they did not makea structuralargument against Niebuhr's typological definition. In-

deed, pacifist journalist William Robert Miller accepted theNiebuhr definitionsas the principleof organizationof his landmarkbook.72 And Mennonites, both conservative ones73and accultur-69. Niebuhr did in fact suggest, earlierand more perceptivelythan many, that Gand-hian methods would work in the Americansetting;Niebuhr,MoralMan and Immoral So-ciety at 252 (and following pages) (cited in note 54).70. One enormous change in the picturesince Niebuhr'stime has been the growth inthe awarenessof the positivepowerof nonviolent actiontactics,arguedacademically n themany works of Gene Sharp, The Politics (cited in note 64) and popularly in Ronald J.

Sider, Non-Violence(cited in note 65). It is too simple to say a priori that very evil powerscan never be stopped.71. AbrahamJ. Muste, Pacifismand Perfectionismreprintedin Nat Hentoff, ed, TheEssays of A. J. Musteat 308 (and followingpages)(Bobbs-Merrill,1967);GarthH. C. Mac-Gregor, The New TestamentBasis of Pacifism(Fellowship,1960).72. CompareMiller, Nonviolence (cited in note 64).73. John R. Mumaw, Nonresistanceand Pacifism(Herald, 1944).

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JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGIONated ones,74used the Niebuhr typology to explain how they couldhold to their traditional form of pacifism (for Niebuhr, theologi-cally consistent and a correct reading of Jesus, although morallyirresponsible) while the liberalvariantwas collapsing under the re-alities of WWII.Niebuhr's dichotomy may be criticized on various grounds.75In situations less drastic than the 1930's, the contrast betweennonresistance and nonviolent resistance will be less disjunctive.In-stead of a clear chasm between them, the two positions may inmany settings be the two ends of a spectrum with many positionsbetween them. "Nuclear pacifism" in the face of the nuclearthreat, or "world order pacifism"in settings where internationalconciliation is realistic may permit authentic "pacifist"coalitionsthat do not require adherents of any of these positions to betraytheir varied roots.

Beyond this situational critique, there are perspectives fromwhich one might also challenge the theological axioms underlyingNiebuhr's argument.76However, for present purposes the distinc-tion must be accepted, since it has become part of the establishedvocabulary.77

IV. CONCLUSIONTo repeat once more, we have finally come to the followingarrayof positions on the justificationof war or opposition to war aspacifism:"Honor;"

74. Don E. Smucker,A MennoniteCritiqueof the PacifistMovement,XX MennoniteQuarterlyReview 81 (1946);comparealso FranklinH. Littell, TheInadequacyof ModernPacifism,SpringChristianityand Society 18 (1946).75. I speak here of descriptive accuracy; . e. whether Niebuhr's characterizationsofTolstoy or of Gandhi or of Jesus are right. A moral argumentabout the substance of anyof their views, or of his, would be somethingelse, not belongingin this survey,but touchedon by Muste and MacGregor(cited in note 71).76. John H. Yoder,ReinholdNiebuhr and ChristianPacifism,XXIX Mennonite Quar-terly Review 101 (1955). Compare Duane Friesen, ChristianPeacemakingand Interna-tional Conflict;A Realist PacifistPerspective(Herald, 1986), who refuses to yield to theNiebuhrians that their claim to be "realistic" s correct.77. One furthereffort to change the landscapeis the term "pacificism".It is in somedictionaries. It means somethingmore positive than "antimilitarism".The British scholarMartinCeadel, Pacifism(cited in note 57) seeks to make it a distinctcategory. I have usedthis term myself in the past, as a way to describe the stance of the popes. I abandoned itbecause most readers confused it with pacifism,and because most such views can be moreprecisely characterized as strong subsets of the more restrainedmode of the "justwar"stance.

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JUST WAR"Realism;"Holy war;Neo-crusadesmixingall threeof the above;Justifiablewar"without eeth;"Justifiablewarproperly o-called1) acceptingwar when it meets all the criteria,and2) rejectingwarwhen it does not meet them,e.g.:* absenceof legitimateauthority* unjust cause, intentionabsenceof due process"nuclearpacifism:" rovokedby disregard or discrimina-tion,proportion,mmunityselective bjection:ustifiedbytheabsenceof anyone of theabove;

disobeyingan unjustorder:against infractions in bello Mak-ing warunnecessary y the use of nonviolentmeans,"WorldOrderPacifism""Pacifism"roperly o-called;"nonresistance;""nonviolent ction"As this article has suggested, each of these positions is differ-ent from each of the others in important ways. In some circum-stances, they may find the possibility for coalitions, with commonadversaries. Yet with careful analysis the differences will surface;and any pretense of shaping the moral argument which tries tomake the debate seem simpler will be shown to be deceptive.The lay of the land in ecumenical conversation is seriouslymisunderstood when, as so often happens,78conversation partners

assume that the most important adversaries in the field are strictJW theory and pacifism. As a result, many who think they are"mainstream" nterpretersof the JW traditionwill spend more en-ergy tilting against a harmless minority of pacifists on their "left"and neglect their responsibilityto challenge the realists, crusaders,and rambos on their "right"who in fact are shooting up the world.

78. Mostrecently n Miller,Interpretationscitedin note 29) and in PaulRamsey,Speak up for Just War or Pacifism(PennsylvaniaState U Press, 1988).

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how many ways are there to think morally about war - yoder

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