PROCESS.2 // SPATIAL ANALYSISThe spatial analysis autocorrelation tool was utilized in or-der to quantify how racial patterns in New Orleans have changed over time due to specific policies and mechanisms. This tool was able to quantify how likely it was that the Black population of New Orleans was distributed randomly, or not randomly, across the city, reflecting to what degree race may have impacted where people live. According to statistical analysis of 1950 census data, the distribution of the Black population of New Orleans relatively random. This reflects early integration within the city, prior to the codification of racialized zones through redlining and other mechanisms. However, 50 years later there is obvious ra-cial segregation. by the 2000 census, the statistical analy-sis indicated less than 1% likelihood that this patterning of the Black population could be the result of random chance. In 2010, the probability of randomness was even less. The shift from a random distribution of the Black population to a non-random pattern underscores the impact that racial policies, such as redlining, have had in organizing where different populations live and have lived in New Orleans.

HOW REDLINING PRACTICES HAVE WEATHERED THE STORM IN NEW ORLEANS, LA

We will examine how the racialized neighborhood redlining patterns established by the federal government in the 1950s align with social and economic indicators in 2000s and uneven recovery spending after Hurricane Katrina through 2010. This analysis will illustrate the impact of discriminatory practices on neighborhoods and their residents over 60 years.

RESEARCH STATEMENT

RUCKER ALEX | MAURA BALDIGA | GENEVIEVE POIST CP204C | SPRING 2014

The history of New Orleans, like other American cities, is characterizedby racialized policies which have upheld a segregated spatial orderingof the city. Policies of segregation were initiated and formalized earlyin the history of New Orleans, and were continually reinforced overtimethrough threats of violence, redlining, and movements of the White popu-lation. Explicit and implicit mechanisms continued to push Black low-incomecommunities into more precarious geographies with greater vulnerabilityto natural disasters. These same neighborhoods were sites of state disin-vestment, leading to high social vulnerability, including unemploymentand lack of car access.

Hurricane Katrina breached the levees of New Orleans on August 29,2005, ultimately causing 1,200 deaths and 200 billion dollars of damage(Congleton, 2006). These impacts were geographically and demograph-ically concentrated in particular communities within New Orleans, and73% of all those displaced from Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans wereBlack (Browne-Dianis & Sinha, 2008). Additionally, the average incomeof households in flooded areas was $38,000, significantly lower than theaverage income in non-flooded areas, which was $55,000 (Troutt, 2007).Hurricane Katrina’s disproportionate impact on the city’s Black, low-incomeresidents revealed how race continues to structure inequality andvulnerability in New Orleans.

It is with these historical conditions in mind that we examined the prolifer-ation of these discriminatory practices over time in New Orleans and the effects they have had on both pre-Katrina vulnerability and post-Katrina recovery.

SOURCES Congleton, Roger. “The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe.” Public Choice. 2006. Troutt, David. “Katrina’s Window: Localism, Re-segration and Equitable Redistribution.” Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers. 2007.

Browne-Dianis, Judith & Sinha, Anita. “Exiling the Poor: The Clash of Redevelopment and Fair Housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans.” Howard Law Journal. 51.3.2008.

Unfortunately, the red-lining does not encompass all racial and discrim-inatory issues in the city of New Orleans, as much of the city, including the Northern and Eastern portions that incurred some of the highest flood waters, had yet to be built at the time from which this red-lining map is dated. These areas did tend to have greater Black populations, as richer and whiter residents remained in the center of the city, pushing poor and discriminated residents to the newly-developed outskirts. Further, these new developments utilized the then-popular--and inexpensive--slab-style housing design, making these areas even more vulnerable to flooding, which is also not accounted for here. The proximity of some red-lined neighborhoods to more “desireable” or “now prosperous” areas may also have some effect on how well-recovered these areas are.

Further, the Road Home funding data does not account for the insiduous difficulties of Road Home funding. Namely, many homeowners were un-able to access Road Home funding because of the precarious and untra-ditional means by which they came to own their homes. Although these problems often plagued Black and lower-income residents the most, this particular discrimination is not captured in any of our data or accounted for in the Road Home spending we outline here.

Decennial Census: race, social factors; 1950, 2000, 2010.

USGS: boundaries, land cover, hydrography (levees); 2006-present.

LA Road Home: residential recovery data; 2006 - present.

Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, National Archives: redlining map; circa 1950.

New Orleans City Government: municipal relief funding/costs by neighborhood; 2006 - present.

Image Source: resilientdesign.org

ALL DATA IS PROJECTED WITH THE FOLLOWING:geographic coordinate system // gcs_north_american_1983

datum // d_north_american_1983prime meridian // greenwich

angular unit // degree

BACKGROUND

DATA SOURCES

B L AC K P O P U L AT I O N

RECOVERY

2010

VULNERABILITY

2000

PROCESS.3 // SUITABILITY ANALYSISPROCESS.4 // MAP ALGEBRATo determine social vulnerability we identified 6 social characteristics from 2000 New Orleans census data, outlined in the flow chart below. The maps reflect that the original redlined regions contain some of the most vulnerable residents, according to the 2000 data by census tract.

Separately, we applied map algebra tools to reveal and rasterize the areas at increased risk of floods: within 500 feet of levees and a ½ mile from natural water bodies. The map demonstrates that the orig-inal redlined regions contain some, but not all, of the areas most sus-ceptible to flooding

REDLINING1950

PROCESS.1 // GEOCODING

The initial step entailed georectifying and geocoding a 1950s Home Owner’s Loan Corporation map, found through the National Archives. This map used colors to indicate the government’s perceived level of security for the purpose of guiding real-estate investments and mortgages. The red ar-eas of the geo-coded map show the “hazardous” (or red-lined) neighborhoods. Now identified, we will continue to examine characteristic of the redlined areas through 2010.

BESTSTILL DESIRABLEDEFINITELY DECLININGHAZARDOUS (REDLINING)UNCATEGORIZEDCENSUS TRACTS

$4,103.35 - $19,728.55$19,728.56 - $34,442.71$34,442.71 - $48,866.72$48,866.72 - $69,050.28$69,050.30 - $105,584.43

$5,999,252 - $29,263,790$29,263,790 - $71,646,050$71,646,050 - $128,291,618$128,291,618 - $235,444,082$235,444,082 - $564,228,240

REDLINING

REDLINING

LIMITATIONS

19

50

s2

00

0s

20

10

s

0.0 - 0.0800.081 - 0.230.24 - 0.450.48 - 0.660.67 - 0.98

0.0022 - 0.190.20 - 0.480.49 - 0.700.71 - 0.890.90 - 0.99

0.011 - 0.240.25 - 0.520.53 - 0.740.75 - 0.880.89 - 0.97

-6-5-4-3-2-10

BOTH CONDITIONS< 500’ FROM LEVEE< 1/2 MILE FROM WATER

REDLINING

B L A C K P O P U L A T I O N DENSITY BY CENSUS TRACT

1 9 5 0

B L A C K P O P U L A T I O N DENSITY BY CENSUS TRACT

2 0 0 0

B L A C K P O P U L A T I O N DENSITY BY CENSUS TRACT

2 0 1 0

REDLINING

REDLINING

ORIGINAL REDLINING MAP

GOVERNMENT DESIGNATIONS OF NEIGHBORHOODS IN 1950s

S P A T I A L A N A L Y S I S

LIKELY TO BE RANDOM DISTRIBUTION (z-score = 0.33)

ROAD HOME FUNDING - INDIVIDUAL HOME REPAIRS LESS FUNDING IN REDLINED AREAS

LESS FUNDING IN REDLINED AREASCITY FUNDING FOR MUNICIPAL REPAIRS

“...the natural disaster of Katrina uncovered and exac-erbated existing man-made threats to fair and afford-able housing, which have been created by specific pol-icy decisions and years of neglect.” NAACP, Housing in New Orleans: One Year After Katrina (2006)

SOCIAL VULNERABILITY PRE-KATRINA

REDLINING

NATURAL VULNERABILITY PRE-KATRINA

REDLINING

UNDER MEDIAN POVERTY (33.1%)

GEOCODED REDLINING MAP

Most areas of greatest vulnerability fall within redlining patterns

On the other hand, redlined areas are NOT the most vulnerable to natural factors, save for the Lower Ninth Ward on the middle-right of the map

UNDER MED. 0 VEHICLES/HOUSE (255)

OVER MEDIAN UNEMPLOYMENT (4.9%)

OVER MEDIAN UNDER 18 POP. (610.5)

OVER MEDIAN OVER 65 POP. (278)

OVER MEDIAN RENTER TENURE (53.3%)

SOCIAL FACTORS500 FOOT BUFFER FROM LEVEES

1/2 MILE BUFFER FROM WATER BODIES

NATURAL FACTORS

S P A T I A L A N A L Y S I S

UNLIKELY TO BE RANDOM DISTRIBUTION (z-score = 5.77)

S P A T I A L A N A L Y S I SVERY UNLIKELY TO BE RANDOM

DISTRIBUTION (z-score = 11.18)

+

The above social factors were each weighted with (-1) to assess overall social vulnerability of census tracts. The natural factors above were also weighted with (-1) if the area fell into the buffer zone, and these zones were used to create a rasterized natural factor buffer layer that was overlayed with census tracts. Redlining was placed on top of both of these vulnerability maps to assess how precarious redlined areas were before the storm.

REDLINING+

Our spatial and data analysis demonstrates a concerning trend over the past 60 years of increasing racial segregation and vulnerability in the original redlined neighbor-hoods of New Orleans. Unfortunately, these patterns persist and may be getting worse.

We recommend that maps of the most vulnerable and the most racially discriminated neighborhoods be used to improve the distribution of the remaining Hurricane Katrina recovery funding. These types of vulnerability analyses can be used to target and de-sign preventative measures in the case of an upcoming storm, assessing not just natural but also social vulnerabilities in establishing storm safety guards and evacuation/recov-ery plans.

I M P L I C A T I O N S

R E C O V E R Y F U N D I N G REDLINING+

BLACK POP.DENS I TY REDLINING+