Title: How to Measure Moral Realism Duration: 15 months Host Research Institution: Department of Psychology, College of Charleston Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Jennifer C. Wright, PhD

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Thomas Pölzler

Institute of Philosophy, University of Graz, Austria

How to Measure Moral Realism

Mag. Dr. Thomas Pölzler, MA University of Graz | Institute of Philosophy thomas.poelzler@uni-graz.at researchgate.net/profile/Thomas_Poelzler

Variants of Moral Realism and Anti-Realism The existence of objective moral truths can be affirmed and denied in several distinct ways:

Introduction Most people believe that it is wrong to torture puppies for fun. But would it still be wrong if you believed that it is not wrong, or if the culture in which you live dominantly believed that it is not wrong, or if people did not generally respond with disapproval to it? Are there - to formulate the question more generally - things that are morally right, wrong, good, bad, etc. independently of what anybody thinks about them?

Moral Realists answer this questions affirmatively. They believe that objective (mind-independent) moral truths exist. Moral anti-realists, in contrast, deny the existence of such truths.

Discussions about moral realism have traditionally focused on the philosophical issue of its correctness. However, the existence of objective moral truths may also be addressed from a psychological perspective. One may study what, if anything, people think about this matter.

In the last 15 years interest in the prevalence, causes and effects of people’s intuitions about the existence of objective moral truths has steadily increased. The main problem with existing studies on this issue is that they have mostly lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to (fully or exclusively) measure those intuitions that subjects have about the existence of objective moral truths.

Aims In my project I attempt to clarify and advance the methods of psychological research on folk moral realism. My project consists of three parts. (Part 1) Based on the analysis of existing studies, I first develop general guidelines for measuring intuitions about the existence of objective moral truths. (Part 2) Then I suggest a new experimental design meant to best satisfy these guidelines. (Part 3) Finally, I apply this design to academic philosophers and explore my findings’ metaethical implications.

Part 1: Guidelines My project begins by identifying issues that have decreased existing studies’ construct validity. I then propose general guidelines for how to avoid these issues.

As an example, consider an influential study by Goodwin and Darley (2008). In this study subjects were presented a number of moral sentences (such as “Anonymously donating a significant proportion of one’s income to charity is a morally good action”) and then (among others) asked the following question (2008: 1344):

How would you regard the previous statement? Circle the number. (1) True statement. (2) False statement. (3) An opinion or attitude.

Goodwin and Darley took “true” and “false” responses to indicate intuitions in favor of realism, and “opinion or attitude” responses to indicate intuitions in favor of subjectivism (2008: 1345). But this interpretation is problematic.

(P1) Moral realism and anti-realism are metaethical positions, i.e., they are not and do not entail judgements about what is actually morally right, wrong, good, bad, etc. By putting their question in terms of truth or falsity (rather than mere truth-aptness), however, Goodwin and Darley’s above answer options very likely prompted subjects to think about first-order moral issues. These first-order moral intuitions may hence partly explain their responses.

(P2) In order for a subject’s view about the truth-aptness of moral sentences to be indicative of intuitions about moral realism and anti-realism, the subject would have to understand the notion of moral truth in the sense that is relevant to this debate, i.e., in a robust correspondence-theoretic sense (for a moral sentence to be true means for it to correctly represent the moral facts). But did Goodwin and Darley’s subjects understand moral truth in this way? Their study does not provide any evidence for this assumption.

(P3) Goodwin and Darley’s interpretation is also based on inadequate metaethical assumptions. Taking a moral sentence to be “true” or “false” is not only consistent with realism, but also with subjectivism and error theory. Subjectivists believe that moral sentences are true or false depending on whether they correctly represent subjective moral facts. Error theorists believe that all moral sentences are false. Moreover, the “opinion or attitude” option should not appeal to subjectivists, but rather to non-cognitivists; for only the latter believe that moral sentences cannot be assessed in terms of truth or falsity at all.

Each of the above problems straightforwardly suggests a recommendation for future research on folk moral realism:

(G1) Avoid prompting first-order moral intuitions.

(G2) Test subjects’ understanding of moral truth (correctness, rightness, etc.).

(G3) Do not conflate moral realism/anti-realism with other metaethical positions, such as moral cognitivism/non-cognitivism.

Part 3: Metaethical Implications

In the final part of my project I will apply the new design developed in Part 2 to academic philosophers and explore these findings’ metaethical implications.

Analyses of the meaning of concepts should to some extent reflect our ordinary usage of these concepts. By revealing intuitions in favor of a particular variant of moral realism or anti-realism, research on folk moral realism may hence provide evidence for the semantic claim that is entailed by this variant (e.g., if ordinary people favored moral realism, for the claim that moral sentences purport to represent objective moral facts).

One potential objection against the above argument is that subjects’ answers in psychological studies on folk moral realism are unlikely to reflect their “robust” intuitions about the existence of objective moral truths. Maybe they use moral concepts incompetently. Maybe they did not pay sufficient attention. Maybe they do not have (robust) intuitions about the existence of objective moral truths at all.

My last experimental study focuses on a population whose responses are particularly likely to reflect their robust intuitions, namely academic philosophers. If academic philosophers could be shown to favor a particular variant of moral realism or anti-realism, this result would provide strong evidence for the semantic claim entailed by this variant.

Part 2: New Design The second aim of my project is to develop an experimental design that best meets the guidelines established in Part 1. Here is a first approximation:

Two persons disagree about whether [action] is [morally good, bad, etc.]. One person judges that [action] is [morally good, bad, etc.]. The other person judges that it is not the case that [action] is [morally good, bad, etc.]. Which of the following interpretations of this disagreement best fits your view?

(R1) One of the persons is right and the other one is wrong.

(R2) Both persons are right.

(R3) Both persons are wrong.

(R4) There is no such thing as being right or wrong with regard to the persons’ judgements.

The above question is followed by several further tasks (such as questions about subjects’ understanding of “right”/”wrong” and validity checks). In the end the responses’ interpretation will roughly look as follows: R1 = realism or non-individual subjectivism, R2 = individual subjectivism, R3 = error theory, R4 = non-cognitivism.

In order to further increase the validity of this new experimental design I will test and continuously refine it in an extensive series of (pilot) studies.

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