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BARCELONA BOGOTA BUENOS AIRES LIMA LISBON MADRID MEXICO CITY MIAMI PANAMA CITY QUITO RIO J SAO PAULO SANTIAGO STO DOMINGO

SPECIAL REPORT

How will the Latin American

electoral year play out in 2016?

Madrid, February 2016

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HOW WILL THE LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL YEAR PLAY OUT IN 2016?

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Latin America will experience a much less intense electoral year than in 2014 or 2015, but the year will be very significant and highly politically charged. There were seven presidential elections in 2014, only two in 2015, and three will take place in 2016 (Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua). There will also be municipal elections in Brazil and Chile, gubernatorial elections in Venezuela and in 12 Mexican states, as well as a referendum to decide whether Evo Morales may be eligible for reelection in Bolivia.

If political-electoral changes marked the elections of Argentina and Guatemala in 2015, the ruling parties are expected to continue in 2016, at least in the elections of the Dominican Republic, where the current president, Danilo Medina, is the favorite to win the presidential election. It seems that the status quo will also continue in Nicaragua, where the Interoceanic Canal, economic stability, Chinese investments, and the Sandinista political system led by Daniel Ortega have positioned the existing head of state (who has been President since 2007) as the strong favorite to remain in power.

Peru is the only country where change is expected because the ruling party does not have the option of a second round, and the favorites to win the election are the opposition Keiko Fujimori and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. In the case of the Andean nation, the reality is that change actually means continuity, because since the fall of Alberto Fujimori in 2000, none of the leaders have been reelected. And it seems that this lack of continuism will once again take place in 2016, as shown in Figure 1.

1. INTRODUCTION

2. IS LATIN AMERICA EXPERIENCING A CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL CYCLE?

3. 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

4. CONCLUSIONS

Figure 1. Ruling Parties in the Government of Peru

President Party

Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) Possible Peru (Perú Posible)

Alan García (2006-2011) Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA, Partido Aprista Peruano)

Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista)

Favorite candidates for the second round

Keiko Fujimori –Fuerza Popular, Fujimorist–Pedro Pablo Kuczynski –Alliance for the Great Change (PPK)–César Acuña –Alliance for Progress (APP, Alianza Para el Progreso)–Alan García (APRA)

Source: Compiled by author

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The pages that follow will first analyze the political situation (heterogeneous and in transition) of the Latin American region in general, and then study all the electoral processes in the three countries that will hold presidential elections in 2016 (Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua) as well as the nation with a referendum (Bolivia) that has a clear plebiscite focus.

2. IS LATIN AMERICA EXPERIENCING A CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL CYCLE?

The idea that has started to spread after the 2014 elections, and especially after the 2015 elections, is that there is a change in Latin America’s cycle and the region is experiencing a new shift, this time towards the right after the one to the left that took place before the last two five-year terms. However, this theory is not a true reflection of reality. Throughout Latin America, 2015 represented an island of change in the middle of the ocean of continuity that defined 2014 and will remain in place in 2016 to a certain degree.

In 2014, presidential elections were held in seven countries: Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, Panama, and Costa Rica. The opposition was only able to win in Costa Rica (with Luis Guillermo Solís) and Panama (with Juan Carlos

Varela). On the other hand, Brazil ratified the continuity of the Workers’ Party (PT) and Dilma Rousseff, Uruguay did the same with Tabaré Vázquez’s Broad Front (Frente Amplio), and so did El Salvador with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN, Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional), led by Salvador Sánchez Cerén, as well as Colombia by ensuring the continuity of Juan Manuel Santos.

2015 was a year of “changes” because it brought the opposition victories of Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Jimmy Morales in Guatemala, and the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de Unidad Democrática) in Venezuela’s legislative elections. However, in 2016, continuity (Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) will prevail over change (Peru).

In reality, as opposed to a uniform shift, what Latin America is experiencing is the combination of two elements. One has a homogeneous nature and a regional scope, in which the effects of a common background affect nearly all the countries (economic issues and social unrest). The other element is more heterogeneous because it includes the marked differences and the internal political-electoral dynamics that are taking place in each nation.

On a global (regional) scale, it can be seen how the world of

“2015 was a year of changes”

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politics is being affected by the economic downturn as well as by growing social unrest towards the party system and inefficient State systems that do not channel or offer an appropriate response to citizen demands in terms of providing quality public services as well as guaranteeing transparency in the fight against corruption.

This is a common reality in all countries, but when the analysis focuses on the specific circumstances of each one, the dynamics are in fact very heterogeneous in nations with a predominance of continuity as well as in countries that are shifting towards political change. The 2014 Latin American elections apparently showed signs of continuity, especially in South America where the ruling parties won in five of the seven elections and two presidents were reelected. There were also signs indicating that the most recent results in 2014 and 2015 are proof that the political cycle that began at the start of the last decade is entering the final stretch or a new era.

These signs, which appeared in 2014 and continued in 2015, are proof that the ruling parties are running out of steam, accentuated by a social and generational transformation, and so far it has not been possible to provide a response in the midst of a changing economic context:

RULING PARTIES ARE LOSING GROUND

The ruling parties struggled to win in 2014 and they were defeated in 2015. First, several of the ruling party victories in 2014 (especially in El Salvador, Colombia, and Brazil, as well as in Uruguay to a certain degree) were very close and in doubt until the final day of voting. In 2015, this dynamic was much stronger because the ruling parties have been defeated in four of the five elections that took place (the presidential elections in Guatemala and Argentina, and the legislative elections in El Salvador and Venezuela). Only the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional) was able to win Mexico’s legislative elections.

This increased the competitiveness of the elections and the difficulty that the ruling parties faced to win began in 2014. In El Salvador, for example, Salvador Sánchez Cerén won the presidential election by a difference of only 6,000 votes. The candidate for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN, Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional) received 50.11 % of votes, while the opposition Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA, Alianza Republicana Nacionalista), led by Norman Quijano, obtained 49.89 %, for a difference of only 0.22 points.

“There were also signs indicating that the

most recent results in 2014 and 2015

are proof that the political cycle that began at the start of the last decade

is entering the final stretch or a new era”

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In Colombia in 2014, Juan Manuel Santos did not receive the most votes in the first round, when he was surpassed by Óscar Iván Zuluaga, a supporter of Uribe. Santos won the election by only five points after strong vote mobilization efforts, especially in the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.

In Brazil, Dilma Rousseff had to fight hard in the first and second rounds, with polls that were sometimes extremely adverse, and her final victory was the closest since the PT won in 2002. That year, Lula da Silva beat José Serra by 22 points, and in 2006 he defeated Geraldo Alckmin by 21 points. In 2010, Dilma Rousseff beat Serra by more than 12 points.

There were exceptions, such as Bolivia, where Evo Morales edged out his opponent, Samuel Doria, by 35 points; and Costa Rica, where the ruling party’s candidate, Johnny Araya, dropped out in the second round; as well as the Uruguayan election. However, by 2014, most of the ruling parties were starting to show signs of weakness and their opponents were closer than ever to victory. As pointed out by Daniel Zovatto, the regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean at International IDEA, “It is increasingly evident that ruling parties are finding it harder to win elections comfortably. This has happened in El Salvador and Colombia, as well as in Brazil. However, it is also

“Ruling parties arestarting to run out

of steam, especiallybecause they do not

connect so well withnew generations”

true that it is not easy for the opposition to defeat the ruling party, and efforts this year have failed in El Salvador, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, and probably also in Uruguay. Voters seem to be choosing a change in continuity as opposed to change, which can be understood as alternation. Ruling parties are being reelected, but voters are sending the message that they are dissatisfied with the current situation.”

This was the case in 2014, and the dynamic has been much more apparent in 2015 due to the fact that Kirchnerism has lost the presidency in Argentina and Chavism has lost legislative control. In both countries, the opposition has been able to bring together the scattered votes against the ruling party to end 12 years of the Kirchner administration and 15 years of Chavism absolute majorities in the National Assembly.

GENERATIONAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Second, as pointed out by Manuel Alcántara, professor at the University of Salamanca, ruling parties are starting to run out of steam, especially because they do not connect so well with new generations that have not experienced any authorities other than Lulism in Brazil and Kirchnerism in Argentina since 2003, Chavism in Venezuela since 1999, Correism since 2007, and Evo

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Morales since 2006. In addition, these governments did not fully channel the requirements of these sectors. According to Alcántara, “In normal circumstances, political cycles last between 12 and 15 years. Political cycles are biological or biopolitical, and they are linked to when the new generations reach the age of legal majority that allows them to vote.”

Ruling parties have weaker connections with the new generation of voters, and it is also becoming apparent that they struggle to channel the expectations of the heterogeneous middle classes that are emerging. These sectors have appeared thanks to the economic upturn of the last decade as well as to the public policies that have been implemented in the midst of economic prosperity. However, these middle classes have their own agenda (better public services, such as education, transportation, and security), and ruling parties were unable to properly respond when the region was at its peak. Everything seems to indicate that this is no longer the case now that the tailwind has ceased.

This can explain many of the votes for Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Jimmy Morales in Guatemala, and the anti-Chavism opposition in Venezuela. Urban votes (young, middle class) have clearly opted to support these alternatives. An article published by El País newspaper titled “Los jóvenes de la clase

media emergente que votan por el cambio” (Young members of the emerging middle class who vote for change) reflected this fact. Alexandre Roig, a sociologist, researcher, and professor at San Martín, one of the universities with the strongest growth during the 12 years of Kirchnerism, believes that “most voters under the age of 30” have not experienced Argentina’s neo-liberal government from 1989 to 2001, consisting of high unemployment and crisis, and this “opens the door for a right-wing government such as that of Macri,” who does not adopt that label and is defined as “developmentalist,” neither conservative nor liberal.

In addition, the strong movement against Otto Pérez Molina in Guatemala was led by the urban middle classes in Guatemala City that supported an “outsider” along the lines of Jimmy Morales, just like the middle classes that backed the growth of the Democratic Unity Roundtable in Venezuela’s legislative election.

THE END OF THE TAILWIND

Third, since 2013, ruling parties have survived without the tailwind of the economic boom that began in 2003 with the “Golden Decade,” a period based on a model that consisted of exporting raw materials at very high prices.

“The economic upturn that South American countries experienced in the last decade (that is currently winding

“Ruling parties struggle to channel the expectations of the heterogeneous middle classes that

are emerging”

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“Another symptom of this change in

the cycle is the rising unpopularity

trend that currently affects many

Latin American presidents”

down), the increased levels of consumption and employment, strong State interventions, and active social policies with a clear client-based focus in many cases (that brought millions of people out of poverty) are some of the main factors that explain the status quo trend of ruling parties,” explains Daniel Zovatto.

This explains the four straight terms of the Workers’ Party in Brazil since 2002, the three left-wing Broad Front (Frente Amplio) governments that have followed each other in Uruguay, the 12 years of Kirchnerism in Argentina, the three elections that Evo Morales has won in Bolivia, Correa’s victories in Ecuador, the 17 uninterrupted years of Chavism in Venezuela, Daniel Ortega’s decade of power in Nicaragua, and the dominance of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD, Partido de la Liberación Dominicana) in the Dominican Republic since 2004.

This model and the prosperity that accompanied it have reached their end with the slowdown of the Chinese economy and rising interest rates in the U.S. An economy that is slowing down, or is even immersed in crisis (as in the case of Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina), is already hindering governments that are losing margins for taking action and increasing or merely maintaining existing social spending and investments in human and physical capital. Andrés Malamud, a professor at the University of Lisbon,

points out that “in an article titled Mérito o suerte (Merit or Luck), Campello and Zucco identified the determining factors for votes in Latin America and reached a conclusion: voters reward or punish their presidents for causes that are unrelated to them. The study reveals that it is possible to predict the reelection of a president or the corresponding party without turning to domestic factors. It is only necessary to take into consideration the price of natural resources (in other words, the value of exports) and U.S. interest rates (in other words, the value of credit and debt). In academic jargon, ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’”

Therefore, the change in the economic cycle that Latin America is experiencing plunges the region into an era that is much more unstable and volatile in all areas, not just in economic terms.

Another symptom of this change in the cycle is the rising unpopularity trend that currently affects many Latin American presidents. Instances such as Dilma Rousseff, whose popularity has reached single digits (9 %), Michelle Bachelet at nearly 25 %, and Tabaré Vázquez (this Uruguayan president ended his first term with a popularity level of more than 70 %, but his approval ratings these past nine months have plummeted from 78 % to 36 %) are good examples of this situation.

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3. 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

In this context of social unrest and the end of the tailwind, three presidential elections will take place in Latin America in 2016, and they will be a good instrument for measuring and verifying some of the statements that have been made to date regarding the political situation in the region.

PERUVIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (APRIL)

The Andean nation will inaugurate the 2016 presidential election period in Latin America on Sunday, April 10, to elect the president of the Republic, vice presidents, and members of Congress. If a second round is required, it will take place during the 30-day period following the announcement of the official counts, which tends to take place between the end of May and the first half of June.

The big question that is up in the air for these elections is who will accompany Keiko Fujimori in the second round. The Fujimorist leader is at the head of polls with more than 30 % of voting intention. Therefore, the battle is currently focused on who will be in second place. It could be the former Prime Minister Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who is second in terms of supporters, but César Acuña has been gaining ground in recent months. The former president Alan García (1985-1990 and 2006-2011) is far behind, as shown in Figure 3.

With this data, Augusto Álvarez Rodrich, an analyst at the La República newspaper, concludes that "it is almost guaranteed that Keiko Fujimori will move on to the second round, although it is uncertain who else will compete in that decisive race. This is where the GFK poll provides major revelations

Figure 2. Electoral outlook in Latin America for 2016

Figure 3. Voting intention for Peru’s presidential election

Country Presidential elections

Peru1st round (April)2nd round (May/June)

Dominican Republic1st round (May 15)2nd round (June 26)

Nicaragua November 6

Source: Compiled by author

Source: Perú 21

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“This situation has allowed Keiko Fujimori

to roll out a strategy for 2015/2016 that attempts

to gain mainstream center votes”

that can be summarized as follows: as Alejandro Toledo (3 %) continues to lose ground, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (9 %), César Acuña (7 %), and Alan García (6 %) are almost tied in the fight for second place. The rivalry is so close that anything could happen during the nearly five months until the first round.”

The next few months will be decisive for Fujimorism. They will require Keiko Fujimori to increase exposure and she will become the target for criticism from anti-Fujimorists, and certain internal tensions may arise between the old Fujimorism guard and the new generations that surround Keiko Fujimori. By the hand of its leader, Fujimorism aims to return to power and break away from its traditional classification as a far-right party. To do so, it has set out to conquer the mainstream center, without abandoning its popular (and populist) roots or its traditional voters in order to win the 2016 presidential election.

Keiko is aware that since her father’s fall in 2000, Fujimorism has held on to the support of extremely loyal voters who represent about 30 % of the population. This has been her minimum as well as her maximum. In 2011, it allowed her to move on to the second round, but it was not enough to beat Ollanta Humala because Fujimorism continued to have negative correlations

for much of the population as people still remembered the authoritarianism and corruption of the Alberto Fujimori era. “The candidate’s big mistake in 2011 was the fact that she did not separate herself from her father, and when she tried to do this between the first and second rounds, it was too late. Her efforts did not seem firm and voters were not convinced. This time, she is not waiting until January or February, when the campaign is more intense. Instead, she has already started to distance herself,” explains the analyst Luis Benavente.

This situation has allowed Keiko Fujimori to roll out a strategy for 2015/2016 that attempts to gain mainstream center votes, without losing the support she naturally obtains from the traditional right wing. Keiko already has a strong backing, and for years polls have positioned her as the most valued leader. In one of the latest polls, GFK has noted that the leader of the Popular Force is at the head of voting intention for the 2016 presidential election, with 34 %. This means that hard vote that longs for the old times of Fujimorism and a firm hand, will not abandon her. In parallel, she must connect with another type of voter who will allow her to reach 50 % and win the first round while dodging an anti-Fujimorist front in the voting process.

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“Peru has always been a scene that

favors surprises and the appearance of emerging political

figures”

This context has marked the change in her political discourse and the closer relationships with certain mainstream center political sectors. This change in strategy has been implemented through a number of actions. First, a speech at Harvard, where she was a guest in October and in which she was very critical of her father’s government. Second, there has been a purge within Fujimorism and some of the members of the 1990s regime are no longer candidates as representatives. And finally, she has not hesitated to support popular demands that are conceptually linked to the left wing, such as defending the idea of having the state-owned Petroperú operate Block 192.

In summary, as pointed out by the political scientist Steven Levitsky, “Keiko Fujimori has started to move towards the mainstream center. She knows that she lost in 2011 because Humala won over the mainstream center and she did not. As a result, Keiko will probably continue to moderate her position. Her repositioning and new alliances will spur a great deal of debate, as occurred with Humala in 2011. Will it work? Nobody knows. There are risks to moderation because it generates internal conflicts (even with her father) and it could lead to the departure of certain long-time Fujimorists. We currently do not know how it will affect her electoral base.”

Aside from this Keiko Fujimori favoritism, Peru has maintained a series of electoral trends throughout the years, and they could reappear in the 2016 election. Specifically, there are two.

First, since 2001, the party that was defeated in the previous election has always won. In 2001, Alejandro Toledo beat Alan García in the second round, and five years later, García beat Ollanta Humala in the 2006 election. Humala then defeated Keiko Fujimori in the next election, and she is now the favorite for 2016.

On occasion, an “outsider” candidate has been able to establish a strong presence at the ballot boxes.

Peru has always been a scene that favors surprises and the appearance of emerging political figures. First, because this is already a historical tradition. As noted a few years ago by the political analyst Fernando Tuesta, “For more than three decades, Peruvian elections have always brought surprises. It has become a tradition to expect them. This country is a cradle and developer of outsiders.” The Andean nation restored democracy in 1980 by establishing a party system that was based on APRA, which had new leadership in the 1980s (Alan García), and on the Popular Action (AP) party led by Fernando Belaunde Terry.

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“César Acuña seems to be the emerging

outsider and surprise for the upcoming

2016 election”

The two groups governed throughout the 1980s: AP with Belaunde between 1980 and 1985, and APRA with Alan García between 1985 and 1990. The failure of the two parties explains, in part, the crisis of the party system that Peru continues to experience today and that resulted in the appearance of individuals such as Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s and Ollanta Humala in 2011.

Because the AP and APRA lost a great deal of their prestige due to their inability to lead the country, the playing field opened up to other experiences and in 1990, the two parties battled face-to-face against two outsiders. One of them, Mario Vargas Llosa, who was supported by traditional center-right parties (AP and PPC), later explained his experience as follows: “I always say that it was an amazing experience. I was a candidate during a very difficult time in Peru. I am not a politician.” Alberto Fujimori appeared on the scene as the writer’s opponent and led a recently-created party, Cambio 90, with a motto that was well accepted by popular sectors: “Honor, technology, and work.” In the end, the unknown Fujimori defeated the APRA candidate to reach the second round, where he then beat the prestigious writer by attracting the votes of right-wing, left-wing, and APRA rivals.

The fall of the Fujimori regime in 2000 made it possible to reinstate the democratic party system. However, in the first elections, which took place in 2001, a new outsider appeared by the name of Alejandro Toledo. He had led the anti-Fujimori mobilizations between 1999 and 2000, and although he was not linked to the traditional parties, he became president by the hand of a recently created party known as Possible Peru (Perú Posible).

In 2006, the new outsider had different features: Ollanta Humala was an anti-system leader who won the first round of the election by denouncing the economic model and the political class.

As the noted by the political scientist Martín Tanaka, Humala channeled the votes of protest and discontent: “The anti-system discourse and the image of authority conveyed by the retired captain Ollanta Humala stirred up strong electoral support, and the geographic distribution of this support highlighted some of the nation’s social cleavages. The outsider, Humala, obtained the most votes in the southern Andes regions, in the most impoverished and abandoned areas, and in cities and towns where minority ethnic groups were present. García won in Lima and in modern cities that were integrated in the most dynamic economic circuits, located along the coast.”

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Source: Encuestasperú.com

César Acuña seems to be the emerging outsider and surprise for the upcoming 2016 election.

In the midst of a frozen scenario, in which Keiko is the favorite (but stuck at 30-35 %), followed by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (who has not been able to get off the ground), an individual has appeared who may alter this electoral map:

Figure 4. March 2016 Presidential Poll for the 2016 elections in Peru

Figure 5. Presidential poll for the 2016 elections in Peru

Source: Foros Perú

César Acuña. He is the leader of Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progreso), and he has moved up from sixth place (according to polls in early 2015) to third place after surpassing Alan García. Figures 4 and 5.

Acuña’s political ascent began in the last decade, but on a local scale.

He first built a business empire that has allowed him to take the leap into politics. He founded Cesar Vallejo University, which provides him with resources and a national structure that goes beyond a local level. He then delved into national politics. In 2006, César Acuña beat APRA in the municipality of Trujillo for the first time by defeating Moisés Arias Quezada in the election. César Acuña then became President of the Regional Government of La Libertad in the October 2014 election. He defeated José Murgia Zannier, the former Minister of Transport and Communication for Alan García, who was the mayor of Trujillo for more than 15 years. He has been working on winning the presidential election since 2015.

Acuña’s main disadvantage is that his background is somewhat tainted. He is currently facing two prison sentences (six years and three years) from the Trujillo district attorney. One is for alleged embezzlement crimes (misappropriation of public funds) and the other is for vote

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inducement. “I don’t know if Toledo and Acuña, who have between 7 % and 11 % of votes according to the polls, can restructure the center. For now, the second position is held by Toledo, who has a human face thanks to the minimal rejection he stirs up and because he is less questionable on a personal level. However, the electoral campaign is long, bad, and maleficent. Acuña will have to increase his exposure, absorb the serious accusations that are starting to be made, and answer in-depth questions about the economy, salaries, corruption, and security. For example, it will be interesting for him to explain how the quality of his education model will differ from the models of the universities he owns,” states the analyst Juan de la Puente.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (MAY)

The Dominican Republic will hold a presidential election on May 15, 2016.

The current president, Danilo Medina, hopes to be reelected and he is the favorite to achieve this thanks to his high popularity levels and because he has built an extensive coalition that supports him: Medina has been proclaimed as a presidential candidate for his own party, the PLD, as well as for the Dominican Workers' Party (PTD, Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos), the Popular Christian Party (PPC, Popular Cristiano), and

the Liberal Action Party (PAL, Acción Liberal). In addition, on September 7, 2015, the PLD and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano), which are the two major and historically opposing parties, signed an electoral alliance. Miguel Vargas, the president of the PRD, agreed to support Medina as part of this shared government of national unity as well as the programmatical agreements reached by both entities.

Polls confirm that Danilo Medina is the favorite over his top rivals. At the end of 2015, polls by CIES INTERNATIONAL showed that if the election was to take place at that time, President Danilo Medina would receive 45 % of votes, compared to 33 % obtained by Luis Abinader, the candidate for the Modern Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Moderno). In turn, Pelegrín Castillo, the candidate for the National Progressive Force (Fuerza Nacional Progresista), and Guillermo Moreno, of the Country Alliance Party (Alianza País), would receive about 7 % of votes. This is only an example of the strong advantage that Medina holds, and seven polls have proclaimed him as the clear favorite. These seven polls, of which five are international, predict a landslide victory for Medina, with an advantage of more than 30 % over Luis Abinader.

Figure 6. Voting intention for Danilo Medina

Source: Diario Hoy

“Danilo Medina, hopes to be reelected and he is the favorite

to achieve this thanks to his high popularity levels”

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“If Medina wins, he will govern the

country eight straight years (2012-2018)

after entering into office in 2012”

There is no doubt that Medina is the favorite, and although voting intention has fallen since September, at the start of the pre-campaign his numbers continue to be very solid and they have been unaffected by the corruption scandals that have touched his administration. There are three reasons that explain this situation:

• The political stability that the nation has been experiencing since the PLD’s dominance was consolidated in 2004, led by Leonel Fernández.

• Medina’s strong leadership that is backed by a structure, mostly client-based, in the hands of his closest circle and the PLD.

• The positive economic situation that has made the Dominican Republic a leader in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of economic growth for 2015, with a 6.6 % rise in the GDP after a growth of 7.3 % in 2014.

If Medina wins, he will govern the country eight straight years (2012-2018) after entering into office in 2012. Medina’s victory will also confirm the end of Leonel Fernández’s authority, because although they are in the same party, they compete for its leadership. Fernández was also the nation's president from 1996 to 2012, except for the 2000-2004 period. In the 2015 battle within the party, Medina edged out Leonel Fernández, who had hoped to become president once again.

Polls show that Medina’s strongest opponent is the presidential candidate for the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM, Partido Revolucionario Moderno), Luis Abinader, who is also backed by the Broad Front and by Dominicans for Change (DxC, Dominicanos por el Cambio). Abinader’s great achievements are creating a new alternative –even if it is a party that revolves exclusively around him– and surpassing traditional forces –especially the PRD– as the main rival and opposition of the PLD. Other aspects in Abinader’s favor are some of the weaknesses that beset the ruling party’s candidacy:

First, the division between Danilists and Leonelists.

Leonel Fernández hoped to become president once again in 2016 since the constitution would not allow Medina to be reelected. However, the current president obtained enough support to reform the Magna Carta, allowing his reelection and defeating Leonel for the candidacy within the party. This has caused strong divisions inside the PLD. There are rumors that Leonelists are supporting Medina’s rival candidates, and even the Fundación Global Democracia y Desarrollo (FUNGLODE) –a Leonelist entity– has stated that the presidential candidate for the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), Luis Abinader, will be the most influential politician in 2016, beating

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“Corruption, insecurity, and

rising prices are three factors with a

strong social impact on the middle and

popular sectors”

out President Danilo Medina and former President Leonel Fernández. According to polls by the Dominican Political Observatory (OPD, Observatorio Político Dominicano), an entity affiliated with FUNGLODE, Abinader is at the top with 90.91 %, followed by Medina with 81.82 %, Guillermo Moreno (the presidential candidate for the Country Alliance Party) with 45.45 %, and Fernandez in fourth place with 36 % (in the group of leaders who will not be presidential candidates).

Second, Danilo Medina’s candidacy could be affected by growing citizen insecurity, the corruption scandals that have affected his administration, and the progressive rise in prices for basic products in the shopping carts of families, such as chicken. Corruption, insecurity, and rising prices are three factors with a strong social impact on the middle and popular sectors.

NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (NOVEMBER)

Latin America will end its year of presidential elections on November 6 in Nicaragua. This Central American nation will elect a president, vice president, 90 national representatives, and 20 representatives for the Central American Parliament.

Although the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN, Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) has not named him as its candidate, the

current president, Daniel Ortega, seems to be the ruling party's strongest contender, with 54 % of support according to a CID Gallup poll. Unlike his previous era as president (Ortega was at the head of the government from 1979 to 1985 as a member of the Board of National Reconstruction after the fall of Anastasio Somoza’s dictatorship, and then as president from 1985 to 1990, when he was defeated by Violeta de Chamorro in the 1990 presidential election), in this new period (2007-2016) he has been able to establish stability as well as overall social consensus regarding his role. A number of reasons explain this situation:

• Economic prosperity: Economic matters have been managed in an orthodox manner (unlike in the 1980s), and economic prosperity has accompanied his administration during Latin America’s “Golden Decade.” This has allowed Ortega’s government to boast of an achievement –reducing the nation’s poverty level from 45 % to 29 %–. This has been possible thanks to the positive economic situation that the nation and the region have experienced. This favorable situation, prudent macroeconomic policies, the support of Venezuela, the arrival of Chinese investments in the form of the Interoceanic Canal, and an effective client-based party system managed by the firm hand of Daniel Ortega, his wife,

16


“The Sandinista leader was elected in 2006 for a five-year term,

which he renewed in 2011 by eliminating a

constitutional rule that blocked consecutive

reelections”

and the government's second-in-command (Rosario Murillo) are the reasons behind his political dominance. If reelected, he will be president until 2021 and become the leader who has spent the most years in power since 1979, when Anastasio Somoza –the last member of the Somoza dynasty that ruled the nation for 45 years– was overthrown.

According to the 2011 analysis of Arturo J. Cruz Sequeira, the former Ambassador of Nicaragua in the United States, the characteristics of Ortega’s government in 2011 allow it to be defined as “responsible populism”: “It is responsible populism in the sense that Ortega has used Venezuela’s resources to address the nation’s immediate needs. At the same time, he has managed the economy very responsibly using his formal budget within the IMF program.” He concluded by highlighting that Ortega’s government has achieved “a balance between meeting the population’s immediate needs without losing sight of the macroeconomic future. He brought together the IMF and Chávez. We have the best of both worlds. Nicaragua receives Chávez’s dollars, with a very Chavist rhetoric, but the economic policies are in line with Washington’s consensus.”

• Institutional control: Another reason that explains Ortega’s consolidation lies in his control over institutions. The Sandinista leader was elected in 2006 for a five-year term, which he renewed in 2011 by eliminating a constitutional rule that blocked consecutive reelections. The latest constitutional modification that took place in 2014 has established indefinite reelections and also makes it easier to remain in power because the candidate with the most votes wins the election, as opposed to the candidate with 35 % of votes, thereby also eliminating the second electoral round.

Since he left office in 1990, and taking advantage of the weaknesses of governments like those of Arnoldo Alemán or Enrique Bolaños, Ortega strengthened his control over Nicaraguan institutions to reach the current maximum levels. Salvador Martí, an academic at the University of Salamanca, states that "the FSLN has a number of advantages. The Front has a strong following, the support of media outlets (especially radio and TV), the approval of business sectors, enough money from ALBA for the campaign, a single and unchallenged candidate (Daniel Ortega), control of the Supreme

17


Court of Justice and of the Supreme Electoral Council, and the support of organized social sectors that have benefited from focused social policies.”

As a result, Daniel Ortega’s power is astounding. He holds the executive power and the Legislative Assembly of Nicaragua through the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), which has the absolute majority. The FSLN obtained 60.93 % of votes for national representatives and 60.75 % for departmental representatives. Sandinistas have also taken control of judicial powers. First, in 2000 by reaching an agreement for distributing positions with Arnoldo Alemán’s Liberal Party, and in recent years, without the need for agreements, resulting in the polemical failure of the Supreme Court in 2010 that allowed Daniel Ortega to run for reelection, despite the fact that consecutive reelections were banned by the Constitution. Sandinists are also able to influence the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), as pointed out by the analyst Carlos Salinas Maldonardo in the Confidencial newspaper: “The de facto judges of the CSE, who remain in their posts thanks to the decree 3-2010 issued by Ortega (in fact,

this was the first part of the machinery that guaranteed the fraudulent reelection), declared the leader of the Sandinista Front as the winner with 62.4 % of the votes.”

Not only does he control the Armed Forces and the Army, but he also holds judicial power and has established important alliances with business sectors that value his orthodoxy and the stability that the country has attained. Three names stand out in Ortega’s alliances: the Mexican business owner Ángel González, a communications magnate; José Adán Aguerri, Chairman of the Higher Council of Private Enterprise (Cosep, Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada); and the Chinese business owner Wang Jing, a multimillionaire who is behind the construction of the Interoceanic Canal megaproject in Nicaragua. The opponent Carlos Langrand defines Daniel Ortega’s presidency in the following manner: “Ortega is not the tripod: Cosep, Government, and unions. My theory is that Ortega is like an octopus seated on several arms: the army, police, a business sector that does not question institutional nature as the transparency of macroeconomic policies.”

“Daniel Ortega’s power is astounding”

18


The recent transfer of the channel 2 television network to the Mexican business owner Ángel González is the latest example of how President Daniel Ortega and González have built a duopoly in the country. The Nicaraguan journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro has drawn attention to this fact: “Democratic institutions have been demolished in Nicaragua,” including those that belong to the State and to civil society, with the creation of a duopoly under Ortega’s presidential family, “which owns four channels,” and the business owner and the leader’s partner, the Mexican Ángel González, “who owns another five.” The chairman of the Higher Council of Private Enterprise (Cosep), José Adán Aguerri, has become another chief supporter of the government. On a number of occasions, the business owner has highlighted the “economic achievements” attained thanks to the alliance between the Nicaraguan Government and the private sector. The other big ally is the Chinese business owner, Wang Jing, whose Interoceanic Canal project has finished consolidating the power of the Nicaraguan president.:

• Anti-Sandinista divisions: The rise of Sandinistas and their leader, Daniel Ortega, has taken place in parallel to a divided, embattled, and fragmented opposition. Running separately in 2006 led the anti-Sandinista sectors to lose the elections because Ortega obtained 38 % of votes, followed by the dissident liberal Montealegre (28 %), and the pro-Alemán liberal José Rizo (27 %). If they had joined forces, they would have defeated the Sandinistas. The 2011 reelection took place because of anti-Sandinista divisions and also because the opposition project did not seem credible: Ortega obtained 62 % of votes, compared to 32 % for Fabio Gadea (PLI) and 5 % for Arnoldo Alemán.

After what took place in Venezuela on December 6, 2015, when the united opposition defeated Chavism in the 2015 legislative election, it seems that anti-Sandinistas have taken note and learned their lesson. “Hope is the last thing to lose, and we must learn from Venezuela’s example, from Argentina, from the united opposition, without an ego or repressions,” stated the representative for the main opposition party, Alberto Lacayo. This path, which is not easy, has already started. Nicaragua’s

“The other big ally is the Chinese business

owner, Wang Jing, whose Interoceanic

Canal project has finished consolidating

the power of the Nicaraguan president”

19


“More than 35 opposition marches have been carried out

to demand free and transparent elections”

Sandinista dissidence joined the emerging National Coalition for Democracy (Coalición Nacional por la Democracia) led by the opposition Independent Liberal Party (PLI, Partido Liberal Independiente). The Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS, Movimiento Renovador Sandinista, center-left) led by Ana Vigil has joined the alliance with the PLI led by the representative Eduardo Montealegre. Liberalism also strives for reunification, and this is the path that Eduardo Montealegre, President of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), and Noel Vidaurre, presidential candidate for the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC, Partido Liberal Constitucionalista), have created through discussions to establish a united front. In addition, the example of Guatemala, with its major citizen mobilizations, has influenced Nicaragua and strengthened the opposition’s role. More than 35 opposition marches have been carried out to demand “free and transparent elections,” and these protests take place every Wednesday in front of the Supreme Electoral Council.

BOLIVIAN REFERENDUM (FEBRUARY)

Unlike Peru, the Dominican Republic or Nicaragua, Bolivia will not hold a presidential election in 2016, but a

referendum will take place that has become a plebiscite about the role and administration of Evo Morales and his government. The Bolivian president hopes that the February referendum will ratify the constitutional reform that will allow him to run for the fourth consecutive time in the election scheduled for 2019. Morales won the 2005 election and he was then reelected in 2009 and in 2014. The Constitution that was written in 2009 during his term of office does not allow another reelection. This led to the referendum in which Bolivians must decide whether they accept or refuse to change a paragraph in the Constitution to allow Morales and his vice president, Álvaro García Linera, to run again in 2019.

Regardless of the result, the event will affect the political agenda beyond 2016 as well as the 2019 presidential election, since it will not be the same with or without Evo as a candidate. It will also affect the ruling party, which must search for a new candidate if “No” is the referendum decision, as well as the opposition, since it will not be the same to face the candidate that has won all the elections since 2005 or not. Even if “Yes” is the referendum decision, it is one thing for there to be a landslide victory of 65/70 % and another for the results to be closer because this will indicate that the government is losing ground. For the sociologist María Teresa Zegada, the February referendum has “contaminated” the electoral

20


“The government has decided to

increase the degree of polarization and

convey a message that it hopes will reach the

popular sectors better”

scenario because it has a plebiscite nature in terms of how the government of Evo Morales and Álvaro García operates: “The referendum has prematurely contaminated the electoral scenario because although the vote is about a Constitutional reform, in reality the vote is for Evo Morales’ reelection.” She states that proof of this lies in the fact that the campaign being carried out by the ruling party and the opposition “is focused on Evo Morales’ administration, the offers that are being made, and the positive aspects of his efforts. As a result, it is impossible to separate the two concepts.”

After a decade in power, this is the first time that polls are no longer in favor of the current president. Support for the reform represents 40 % of votes, while 54 % of voters are against the constitutional reform and in favor of a new presidential nominee, and 6 % of those

surveyed are undecided. This extremely polarized situation supports the idea that the referendum has become a plebiscite in favor of or against Morales and his administration.

The government has decided to increase the degree of polarization and convey a message that it hopes will reach the popular sectors better. The polarization can be noted in messages that attempt to divide the playing field into two competing areas and to identify a common enemy: the United States. “In politics there is only the left-wing or the right-wing; in politics we are either with the people or with the empire,” the leader has stated. However, what stands out more than anything is the discourse of fear, the fear of change. At a housing handover event, Vice President Álvaro García also conveyed this type of apocalyptic message on a number of occasions, making reference to the possibility of the right-wing being victorious: “The day that the right-wing returns to power, God save Bolivia. Protect what you have. They will even try to privatize the air we breathe. They will try to take away your homes and your public assistance vouchers. They will want to give our gas, oil, and lithium to foreigners. They will try to freeze and reduce local government coffers. The right-wing, the neo-liberals, those who sell our homeland. They only think of themselves. They do not think about the poor. They only think about a few families”.

Figure 7. Agreement and disagreement to change Bolivia’s Constitution

Source: Eju Tv

21


“For now, Evo Morales is lagging behind

in the polls”

The opposition has never had a chance like this to defeat Evo Morales at the polls. It believes that the Achilles heel in Evo Morales’s strategy has been found, and it hopes that the February 21 vote will become a trap that will seal the end of the current president’s rule. The opposition also hopes to convey its message through criticisms of the government and the use of popular symbols. The criticism attacks some of the government’s weaknesses, especially corruption. More than 200 individuals have already been accused and some have been arrested for the Indigenous Fund (Fondo Indígena) alleged corruption scandal. Bolivia’s Attorney General is investigating the use of $6.8 million for 49 Fondo Indígena projects that, until 2015, funded development efforts in remote areas, but some of the resources had been transferred to personal accounts. Those arrested include Julia Ramos, the former Minister of Justice and Rural Development, as well as Remy Vera and Melva Hurtado, union leaders linked to MAS.

The analyst Erika Brockmann wrote in the Página Siete newspaper that the corruption and hegemonic style of Morales and his party, MAS, are behind these unfavorable polls regarding the President: The slight drop in the support for “Yes” is noteworthy because the government decided to “pull out all the stops” for this initiative. Everything seems to

indicate that the multi-million propaganda campaign carried out by the robust institutional state media system is entering an era of declining results. The ability to seduce, especially in the case of voters with mid to high-levels of education and the middle layers, is falling. So much information and packaged propaganda has a saturating and muddled effect. On the other hand, the political and moral harm caused by the Fondioc scandal has not hit rock bottom yet. It overwhelmed the government’s ability to control. Today, in his desire to mitigate the damage, he approved punitive measures towards political scenarios that are higher in the hierarchy but politically “dispensable.” Despite the high political cost in terms of his indigenous vanguard of rural origin, the aim is to protect the Morales-García Linera team, who are usually immune to all types of earthly and mundane threats, from this contaminating tide.

For now, Evo Morales is lagging behind in the polls. He may be defeated or he may rise back and obtain the constitutional reform that will allow him to run for reelection in 2019. The one thing that is certain is that he will emerge politically weakened from this process, and this will be combined with the corruption scandals and economic downturn that are already affecting the government. In fact, another weakness that affects the government is the economic

22


“The 2016 Venezuelan elections will be the

most noteworthy because they will be

conditioned by the progress of an economy

that is experiencing a recession”

situation. In one year, the price of the natural gas that the nation exports to Argentina and Brazil fell between 47.5 % and 34.5 %. Natural gas was the key behind the economic boom that Bolivia experienced. Among other things, it explained the stability of Evo Morales’s government since 2009, the social improvements that the government has been able to implement, as well as the nation’s comfortable economic situation. Natural gas is the country’s main export product, and Brazil and Argentina are its top markets. Most of the benefits are received by the Bolivian product as a result of the nationalization of hydrocarbons in 2006, which was done at a time when exports grew and international prices increased.

Armando Méndez Morales, a Bolivian economist, explains that “the May 2006 nationalization of hydrocarbons meant that all oil companies operating in Bolivia must deliver their production to YPFB, who would handle the commercialization. It also stated that all hydrocarbon fields that produce more than 100 million square feet each day (large) must contribute 32 % of their revenue, in addition to the 50 % prior to nationalization, for a total of 82 %. In summary, the State would receive 50 % of oil revenues from small fields (which represent a small portion of the total production) and 82 % from large fields.”

As a result, in 2005, before the State took control of hydrocarbons, the country received $600 million in royalties, but in 2014, this amount was more than $6 billion. There is no doubt that the new economic situation, which can still be handled by the government, will complicate Evo Morales’s future efforts and damage his popularity because there will be fewer resources to support his social policies and the public investments in infrastructures.

LOCAL ELECTIONS IN MEXICO, BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND CHILE

In addition to the three presidential elections and the Bolivian referendum, there will also be local elections in four countries: Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile. The 2016 Venezuelan elections will be the most noteworthy because they will be conditioned by the progress of an economy that is experiencing a recession. It is expected that the GDP will fall by 7 % and inflation will increase by more than 200 %. They will also be affected by a political situation that is in the midst of an institutional crisis and a struggle for power (Chavist president vs. anti-Chavist legislative branch). The other elections will take place within a fairly standard political-institutional setting:

23


Local elections in Mexico

Mexico will experience a decisive political three-year period (2016-2018) in which there will be local elections (2016), a pre-campaign that is expected to be very challenging (2017), and a noteworthy electoral year (2018). The process for the new president will begin towards the end of this year. This means that as of a few months ago, the leading parties have started to implement their strategies for the 2018 presidential election, while keeping in mind the importance of what happens in 2016 and 2017. These years are vital in determining the parties and the pre-candidates that hope to make their way to the Los Pinos Palace in 2018.

On June 5, 2016, there will be elections in 12 of Mexico’s 32 states, including important regions such as Veracruz, Puebla, and Oaxaca. At play is who will be at the head of each entity, and especially, the strength of each party to face the 2017 pre-campaign and the 2018 campaign. The key to understand what happens in Mexico in 2016 is to know to what degree the PRI will be strengthened or weakened. Peña Nieto’s party governs 10 of the 12 entities where the governor will be elected and he is the favorite in most, although victory is not guaranteed. He is also facing the threat of the PAN-PRD alliances and of the “independent” candidates.

In this regard, Pascal Beltrán del Río, an analyst at the Excelsior newspaper, points out that if "the Institutional Revolutionary Party wins 9 of the 12 state governments that will hold elections in 2016, the party will make firm progress towards its attempt to win the 2018 presidential election. Why? Because recent electoral statistics show that when the PRI is in power, its results in federal elections improve on average by 3 %.”

As a result, the left-wing PRD and the center-right PAN have decided to join forces for some of these elections, such as in Zacatecas and Durango, and to remain in power in Puebla and Oaxaca, in order to defeat the PRI. The 2016 elections will also be very important in order to assess the implementation of MORENA (Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s party) throughout the nation and to know whether new “Broncos” appear. For AMLO, these elections are only a test run for his attempt to defeat the PRD as the top left-wing reference. As far as independent candidates, it seems that the strict legislation of each state will obstruct the appearance of new players along the lines of Jaime Rodríguez Calderón (alias “El Bronco”), the current governor of Nuevo León who won the election as an independent candidate while competing against the traditional parties.

“These years are vital in determining the parties and the

pre-candidates that hope to make their

way to the Los Pinos Palace in 2018”

24


The 2016 elections will not determine the name of the party or candidate who will win the 2018 presidential election, but they will provide clues or establish certain trends that could be decisive. Ultimately, the 2016 elections will be a test for the 2018 presidential election because this year will be followed by a biennium that will be pre-election, election, and post-election. During this time, the pre-candidates and the candidates for the 2018 presidential election will appear.

Local elections in Brazil

The effects of the political, economic, and institutional crisis that Brazil has been experiencing since 2013 will play a role in the 2016 local elections that will be held in October to choose the mayors of all the municipalities in Brazil for the next four years. The corruption scandals and Dilma Rousseff’s weakened government could lead the PT (the ruling party) to lose a great deal of power, especially in the big cities (the PT controls 15 of the 83 most important mayor’s offices in Brazil, cities with more than 200,000 voters). Other unknown aspects are whether the opposition, especially the PSDB, will be able to bring together the anti-PT votes, and whether the local authority that the PMDB has experienced to date will be damaged or weakened. (The PMDB is Dilma Rousseff’s top supporter but it is currently divided, and one of its factions, led by

Eduardo Cunha, is driving the impeachment initiative against the president as she faces corruption scandals). The situation in São Paulo is key because most of the big cities governed by the PT are located in the Brazilian state with the largest population. Eight states have more than 200,000 voters, including the capital, where the mayor is the former Minister of Education Fernando Haddad. The mayors have the option of running for reelection in five of these eight states.

Local elections in Chile

The municipal elections will be held in October, and the two biggest coalitions (the Nueva Mayoría center-left and the Chile Vamos center-right) are experiencing similar situations of internal doubt and transition.

The ruling party is immersed in strong tensions between its moderate wing (Christian Democratic Party and sectors of the Socialist Party (PS)) and its far-left wing (part of the PS, the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Social Democrat Radical Party (PRSD, Partido Radical Socialdemócrata), and the Communist Party. This means that the New Majority will compete with at least two lists of city councilmen/councilwomen. One list will be made up of the PS and PDC, and the other will consist of the PPD, PRSD, and PC. There will be a third list made up of left-wing candidates for the IC and MAS.

“The corruption scandals and Dilma

Rousseff’s weakened government could

lead the PT (the ruling party) to lose a great

deal of power”

25


The right wing parties are also redefining their strategies and messages after the 2014 defeat forced them to leave La Moneda. The main challenge faced by the new center-right coalition, Chile Vamos, is to win the upcoming municipal elections so this may serve as a springboard to subsequently regain control of the government.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Latin America has entered a new stage in its history. It has done so from an economic perspective at the end of the “Golden Decade” (2003-2013) and the start of a new era of weaker growth and the risk of recession if more aggressive economic reforms are not implemented in order to make the region more competitive, productive, and innovative, and less dependent on exporting raw materials with a low added value. The economies must be diversified in terms of export products as well as markets, and investments must be made in human capital (education reforms) as well as in physical capital (infrastructures).

This is also the end of an era from a political perspective because social unrest and the corresponding economic challenges have a political translation. Ruling parties will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their dominance over long periods of time, and this is what took place in Argentina and Venezuela in 2015. Election results will be much closer and hard-fought,

“Ruling parties will find it increasingly

difficult to maintain their dominance over

long periods of time, and this is what took

place in Argentina and Venezuela in 2015”

just like what happened in Brazil and Colombia in 2014, or in Argentina in 2015. Governments will have to withstand long periods of difficulty (especially in terms of the economy), strong social pressures (the 2015 mobilizations in Guatemala are a good example of this), and tremendous political instability with weak leaders and occasional institutional clashes (legislative opposition vs. president, which is currently happening in Venezuela and Argentina).

In this common background, each country will have its own dynamics and characteristics, so it is not advisable to discuss homogeneous shifts to the right, although this trend could primarily be in the short term. The political situation will be very heterogeneous and volatile, marked by growing social unrest and an increasingly complex governability that will put political institutions to the test. If the structural reforms aimed at improving competitiveness, productivity, and innovation are the pending task for matters related to the economy, then strengthening institutional aspects is the pending task in the area of politics. The aim is to update and adapt the party system to this new era, and to design States that are more effective and efficient, not co-opted by corruption and patronage, and capable of channeling and addressing the demands of the new middle classes that want better public services.

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UNITED STATES

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ANDES’ REGION

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