hpg stability report

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States of fragility: stabilisationand its implications for

humanitarian actionSarah Collinson, Samir Elhawary andRobert Muggah

HPG Working Paper

May 2010


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About the authorsSarah Collinson is a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas DevelopmentInstitute. Samir Elhawary is a Research Officer with HPG. Robert Muggah is Research Director at the SmallArms Survey, and lectures at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva) and

Pontifcia Universidade Catlica do Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.

About the Humanitarian Policy GroupThe Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI is one of the worlds leading teams of independent researchers andinformation professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policyand practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondon, SE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

Tel: +44(0) 20 7922 0300Fax: +44(0) 20 7922 0399Website: www.odi.org.uk/hpgEmail: [email protected]

Overseas Development Institute, 2010

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODIrequests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG publications are availablefrom www.odi.org.uk/hpg
mailto:[email protected]://www.odi.org.uk/hpghttp://www.odi.org.uk/hpgmailto:[email protected]


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Contents

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................... 2Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................................ 2

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 32. Stabilisation: different things to different people ................................................................................ 53. Stabilisation in practice: coherent, complementary and coordinated ... or complex, contradictory and

competitive? ........................................................................................................................................ 94. Humanitarianism and stabilisation: uneasy bedfellows ..................................................................... 135. The humanitarian implications of nationally-led stabilisation campaigns ....................................... 176. The uncertain future of stabilisation and challenges for humanitarianism ........................................ 21References .................................................................................................................................................... 24


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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the case study authors (Tahir Ali, Adam Forbes, Jonathan Goodhand,Stuart Gordon, Marcia Hartwell, Ken Menkhaus and Gordon Peake) for their contributions to this study.Particular thanks to Dave Clemente for his research support, and to James Darcy and other colleaguesfor very helpful comments on an initial draft. Thanks are also due to the numerous policy-makers and

commentators who were consulted along the way, including participants in workshops held at ODI inLondon in 2009 and at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) in Geneva in2010. We are also very grateful to the donors who have supported HPGs Integrated Programme, whichfunded this work, and to the Bernadette Folke Academy for supporting the Geneva workshop. Finally,thanks to Matthew Foley for his expert editing of the paper.

Acronyms

ADB Asian Development Bank

AFRICOM United States African Command

CCAI Coordination Centre for Integrated Action

CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa

DFID Department for International Development

DPKO Department for Peace-Keeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP Internally Displaced Person

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

MOSS Minimal Operational Security Standards

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PHRP Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation

START Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force

SU Stabilisation Unit

TFG Transitional Federal Government

USAID United States Agency for International Development


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key regional organisations, and among a numberof governments in conflict-affected countries keento recast what might previously have been labelledcivil wars or political crises as legitimatestabilisation efforts (as illustrated by the casestudies from Colombia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).

The paper then considers the relationship betweenstabilisation and international humanitarianaction. The exchange between the two sectors ishighly uncertain and contentious, due not only tothe controversies that surround stabilisationpolicies, but also to deep-seated ambiguities atthe heart of humanitarianism. This is reflected incontinuing tension between a recognition thathumanitarian action cannot substitute for robustpolitical and security engagement to address thecauses of humanitarian crisis, and concern thathumanitarian action might be compromised or co-

opted by competing political and securityobjectives. Overall, the international humanitariancommunity remains highly diffident, defensive andsometimes openly hostile to much of what may beseen as falling under the banner of stabilisation.Anxiety within the humanitarian camp stems inpart from uncertainty about the goals ofhumanitarian action itself, and whether theseshould be at least partly related to the kind oftransformative interventions that stabilisationefforts might encompass. Although humanitarian

action is often cast as part of the broaderstabilisation puzzle, it does not make an easy fit.

The importance of looking beyond Iraq andAfghanistan is underlined by the fact that thesetwo interventions are unlikely to offer precedentsfor future international stabilisation interventions.The war on terror, preventive war and regime

change were viewed by their US advocates as partof a longer-term shift in US strategy, but a numberof factors including the sheer cost, lack ofevident success, waning domestic politicalsupport, international geopolitical constraints andstrategic overstretch, aggravated by the financialcrisis and economic recession are likely todissuade the leading Western powers fromundertaking further highly ambitious interventionsof this kind. This does not mean that stabilisationdoes not have a future, however, nor that it will notcontinue to impact powerfully on many of thecrisis-affected contexts that are of humanitarianconcern: the precise nature, scope and ambitionof stabilisation may change, but powerful statespolitical and strategic interest in stabilisingweaker states and contexts affected by war islikely to persist.

The concluding discussion considers whatstabilisation might mean for humanitarian actors.Despite their unease, many humanitarian actorsare involved in a wide range of activities thatpotentially overlap with various aspects ofstabilisation, including short- to medium-termrecovery, peace-building, development andhuman rights work. Any coherence betweenhumanitarianism and these other spheres will becontingent on whether humanitarians trust thepositive intent, impacts and outcomes of

stabilisation efforts. If the US and other Westerngovernments prioritise narrow security objectivesover basic human welfare, humanitarian actorswill almost certainly seek to resist albeittempered in some cases by continuing financialreliance on the donor governments leading thestabilisation charge.


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2.Stabilisation: different things to different peopleStabilisation, as it is currently articulated andimplemented by the US and other Westerngovernments, is premised on an assumption thatweak governance, instability, violent conflict and

associated poverty and underdevelopment are adirect threat to their strategic interests andinternational peace and security more broadly.This is because islands of instability are seen asconstituting regional threats and a source ofcontagion, particularly in their apparentassociation with international terrorism,transnational crime and other dangers (see forexample USAID, 2004; DFID, 2009; Muggah andKrause, 2009). While stabilisation is firmly rootedin security agendas focused on reducing or

eliminating perceived threats, evolving experienceof international intervention and engagement toend conflicts and foster peace and developmentover the past decade has emphasised the need tointegrate military, political, development andhumanitarian action (Brahimi, 2000; Macrae andLeader, 2000; OECD, 2006). In contexts as diverseas Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Haiti,stabilisation has therefore emerged as a keycomponent of a broader liberal, transformativepeace-building project. As such, stabilisationextends beyond short-term or conservativeobjectives to eliminate immediate threats or tostabilise situations of acute crisis to link actionacross a range of discrete policy spheres with theaim of reducing violence and establishing thepolitical and social conditions necessary forrecovery, reconstruction, development and alasting peace. As emphasised by UK DefenceMinister Liam Fox, the primary reason for sendingour armed forces to Afghanistan was one ofnational security But clearly, if we are to makethe long-term gains that will provide the stability

to maintain the momentum when our armed forceseventually hand over to the forces of the Afghans,we will require a long period of development inconcert with the international authorities, theNGOs, and our and other countries aidprogrammes.2

As a broader, transformative project, enhancingstability depends on pursuing a number of keyparallel and connected goals, including creating asafe and secure environment, establishing the rule

2. Liam Fox Calls for Afghan Mission To Be Scaled Back, TheGuardian, 23 May 2010.

of law, achieving stable (or at least good enough)governance and a viable market economy andpromoting social and psychological well-being.Stabilisation policies generally rest on the now

widely held assumption that counter-insurgencycannot be separated from politics (Kilcullen, 2009;Cornish, 2009) and that development and securityare mutually reinforcing (see Duffield, 2001). Assuch, developmental interventions are alsobelieved to bolster security by providing peacedividends and legitimising a host government orintervening force; security, in turn, creates thespace to foster the longer-term development thatis assumed to embed stability. This is premised ona liberal interpretation of war that views violence

and instability as resulting from a lack ofdevelopment and the order accorded by functionalstates (Cramer, 2006). The onset and severity ofcivil war are linked to poverty, inequality and anabsence of opportunities, and constitute a failureof development or development in reverse(World Bank, 2003; emphasis in original). Thelogical policy response is therefore to promote andsupport development as a means to reduceviolence and enhance peace and stability whatZoellick (2008) has labelled securingdevelopment and critical scholars describe assecuritising development (Duffield, 2007).

The fusion of security and development isreflected in a host of manuals and guidelines,including the United States Institute of PeacesGuiding Principles for Stabilisation and

Reconstruction. According to the GuidingPrinciples stabilisation aims to prevent therenewal of violent conflict; conflict-sensitivedevelopment seeks to enable a long-lasting peace(USIP and PSKOI, 2009: 3). The Rand Corporation

views stabilisation as incorporating efforts todevelop or redevelop institutions that foster self-governance, social and economic development(Bensahel et al., 2009: ix). These and otherstatements of doctrine are increasingly becomingreceived wisdom at the field level. In the case ofTimor-Leste, for example, Peake and Muggah showhow military and civilian actors frequently definethe objective of their development and peace-building interventions as bringing about stability(Peake and Muggah, East Timor case study).

Likewise in Haiti, Muggah observes how the UNStabilisation Mission (MINUSTAH) and initiativessupported by bilateral donors emphasise


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development as a core stabilisation objective(Muggah, Haiti case study).

Without testing or challenging these basicassumptions, Western states have moved swiftlyto incorporate development priorities andhumanitarian assistance into their evolvingmilitary doctrine on stabilisation. The most recentUS Army operations manual on StabilityOperations, FM 3-07, emphasises the need for themilitary to move beyond kinetic operations(military force) and engage alongside civilianexperts in promoting stability and reconstruction.It describes how the US must invest in rebuildinglocal institutions, helping to restore essentialservices and safeguarding or protectingvulnerable populations activities placed at thecore of military training, planning and operations(Department of the Army, 2008: 15). The UK

Ministry of Defence (MoD) has similarly stressedthe central position of development assistance inits recent stabilisation doctrine. Stabilisation isunderstood as a process that seeks to prevent orreduce violence; protect the population and keyinfrastructure; promote political process andgovernance structures and prepare forsustainable social and economic development(MoD, 2009: xv).

Although the term is rarely deployed in UN policy

debates, the UNs peacekeeping doctrine andbroader engagements in crisis contextsincreasingly integrate security, politics,development and humanitarian assistance (Eideet al., 2005). UN peace support missions are to besupported by a new doctrine (the CapstoneDoctrine) which reflects the fact that thesemissions are often required to play an active rolein peacemaking, including enforcement action,and may also be involved in early peace-buildingactivities (DPKO, 2008; Muggah, 2009a). As stated

in UN peacekeeping principles and guidelines,these missions core functions are to create asecure and stable environment whilestrengthening the States ability to providesecurity [and] facilitate the political process bypromoting dialogue and reconciliation andsupporting the establishment of legitimate andeffective institutions of governance (DPKO, 2008:23). Meanwhile, certain governments are pursuingtheir own domestic stabilisation campaigns: theColombian governments Presidential Directive 01of 2009, for example, seeks greater civilmilitary

cooperation in order to use development topromote security in unstable areas (Elhawary,Colombia case study). Brazil has started to initiate

a combination of strategies to pacify andstabilise fragile contexts that are of strategicinterest (Muggah and Carvalho, 2009).

Despite these converging trends, the coreobjectives of stabilisation and the ways andmeans by which these objectives might beachieved remain deeply controversial, reflectingthe competing mandates, priorities, interests andcapacities of the many different actors involved.Overall, approaches are divided between, on theone hand, prioritising security imperatives andtaking direct and immediate action to counterperceived threats such as insurgents or terrorists,or, on the other, pursuing wider peace-building,state-building and development goals. Wherecounter-insurgency has been the primary focus ofengagement, stabilisation discourse has tended tofavour a security first approach, as in the US-led

engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lindley-French, 2009). This focuses on the role of externalactors in enforcing a political settlement throughregime change and the defeat of an insurgency,with the aim of creating conditions for asubsequent government-led transition towardspeace. With security and stability as the primaryobjective, development and humanitarianactivities are seen as a means to achieve thesegoals and ultimately to legitimise the host stateand an internationally-sponsored political

settlement (Gordon, Afghanistan case study). TheBritish governments stabilisation discourse,however, has given greater weight to theimportance of politics in contributing to a non-violent political settlement or interimaccommodation (Stabilisation Unit, 2009). Thismay involve using military force to reduce violenceand protect people, assets and institutions, butthe central objective is supporting thedevelopment of a viable and legitimate state(ibid.). Yet the desire to build a state that is willing

and able to maintain stability and countertransnational threats may undermine thedevelopment of a state that is accountable andlegitimate. Whilst stabilisation efforts mightsucceed in putting the structures in place tomitigate a return to war or tackle a specific threatin the short term, they may depend on structuresthat are authoritarian in nature (Barnett et al.,2007).

A discourse that casts stabilisation as a means ofachieving or supporting liberal peace-building

objectives may obfuscate the core securitypriorities that underpin powerful actorsinterventions. Stabilisation has varied guises in


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different contexts, involving differentcombinations of military, political, developmentand humanitarian resources and action, andpursued with more or less conservative ortransformative aims and varying levels of financialand human investment and levels of success.Stabilisation is, in essence, about powerful statesseeking to forge, secure or support a particularstable political order, in line with their particularstrategic objectives.

Understood in this way, there is perhaps little thatis fundamentally new about contemporarystabilisation efforts. What has changed are thespecific strategic and tactical objectives beingpursued. In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era,these are likely to be articulated by Westerngovernments as broadly consistent with liberalpeace-building and/or the war on terror. Yet it is

nevertheless a particular type of peace andstability and a particular type of state that thesepowers are seeking through stabilisation. Asindicated by the pursuit of stabilisationobjectives by governments in countries such asPakistan, Colombia and Sri Lanka, the concept orlabel of stabilisation can be readily hitched todomestic counter-insurgency campaigns or civilwars without being tied explicitly to liberal peace-building objectives. These might involve adistinctly different mix of policies and

interventions, such as greater reliance on militaryaction and economic development without seriousefforts to reach an inclusive political settlement.

Again, the nature and durability of stabilityachieved through these campaigns will bedetermined in large part by the means andinterests underpinning them in the east of SriLanka, for instance, the government, supported bythe emerging powers and some Western donors,has so far sought to consolidate its control andgain stability through economic development andthe maintenance of a heavy security presence(Goodhand, Sri Lanka case study).

As witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan,international efforts to secure or support aparticular political order through stabilisationmay actually encourage conflict in practice, andmay not in the end achieve any kind of sustainablepolitical stability. Thus, whether thesestabilisation projects might be deemedsuccessful or not depends largely on the metrics

and time-frame of success that might be applied,which are far from settled among the key actorsinvolved in most stabilisation contexts. Thesuppression of an insurgency, the installation ofan elected government and the creation of newstate institutions, for example, may correspondbroadly with the type of political order that thestabilising powers seek to achieve, but that doesnot mean that the insurgency has been defeated,that the government is legitimate in the eyes of itscitizens or that the state institutions will function

effectively, all of which would have a crucialbearing on the nature and durability of thestability achieved.


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3.Stabilisation in practice: coherent, complementary and coordinated ...or complex, contradictory and competitive?

In order to secure or support a particular politicalorder or dispensation, stabilisation efforts involve

the mobilisation of a combination of military,political, development and humanitarianresources and action. The highest-profileinternational stabilisation operations rely heavilyon direct international military and politicalintervention (e.g. Afghanistan); other stabilisationefforts have involved direct political interventionbut weaker international military engagement (e.g.Horn of Africa); and others have focused ondiplomatic and development engagementcombined with military aid to support nationally-led military campaigns (e.g. US policy in Colombia

or Western policies towards Pakistan). To makethese combinations work in practice, mostWestern governments and multilateral institutionsare calling for integrated, comprehensive orwhole of government approaches. This entailsthe explicit merging of disparate policy spheres ina range of hard and soft stabilisation measures.These integrated approaches demandcoordinated, coherent and complementaryaction at both policy and operational levels theso-called 3-Cs(Hoyos and Muggah, 2009). The

focus has traditionally been on the development,diplomatic and defence spheres what hasbecome known as the 3-Ds but there are alsoattempts to expand coherence to include otherfunctions, such as humanitarian action, justice,policing, trade and commerce.

Many Western countries, including the US, UK,Canada, Australia, France and Switzerland, haveestablished cross-departmental working groups orunits to identify cross-sector priorities, refine and

revise policy positions on stabilisation strategies(from arms control and disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration to security sectorreform and the deployment of peacekeepers) andalign domestic priorities with international orregional commitments. In the wake of itsinterventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example,the US government established the Office of theCoordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation(S/CRS). Consolidated in 2005, the S/CRS isexpected to promote inter-agency managementbetween the State Department, USAID, countryoffices and military commanders (Beik, 2007). Itcombines country-specific teams, integration

planning cells and civilian response capacity. 3

Inthe UK, the SU brings together the Ministry of

Defence, the Foreign Office and DFID, and has alsodeveloped a deployable civilian responsecapacity. Canadas Stabilisation andReconstruction Task Force (START), established in2005, assembles multiple governmentdepartments including the Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade, the CanadianInternational Development Agency, the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police, the Department ofNational Defence and the Department of Justice(START, 2006). Meanwhile, Australia hasannounced an Australian Civilian Corps to support

its humanitarian and development efforts andensure a smooth transition from one to the other(AusAid, 2010).

On the ground, these changes have led tosignificantly increased interaction betweenmilitary/security and civilian entities. InAfghanistan and Iraq, military and civilian actorswork together within Provincial ReconstructionTeams to provide relief and reconstructionsupport. In the Horn of Africa, the US Command for

Africa (AFRICOM) has created a Combined JointTask Force (CJTF-HOA) that provides humanitarianand development assistance in Muslimcommunities in Kenya (Bradbury and Kleinman,2010). In 2006, the Colombian governmentcreated a Coordination Centre for Integrated Action(CCAI) that seeks to combine military anddevelopment interventions in order to supporttheir counter-insurgency and counter-narcoticsefforts (Elhawary, Colombia case study).

Despite these important institutional innovations,policy targets are routinely poorly defined andconflicting, usually with little indication of whatkinds of stabilisation initiatives might or might notprove effective. As illustrated in Figure 1,stabilisation involves multiple and overlappingarenas of intervention and assistance; whilstthese institutional changes have sought topromote greater policy coherence andcoordination, the overlaps are often characterisedby competing objectives, priorities, timeframesand principles. Stitching together the variousactors and institutions and their different

3. See, for example, http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/.
http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/


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initiatives and approaches within a commonimplementation structure is often difficult. In thecase of Timor-Leste, for example, Peake andMuggah argue that it is hard to see how [thedifferent actors] are united by an over-archingconcept other than rhetoric; in light of therelatively small size and population of the territoryas compared to the other cases we looked at, anuncomfortable question arises: if integrationcannot succeed here, can it be doneanywhere?(Timor-Leste case study).

Part of the problem lies in the contradictionsbetween conservative and transformativeobjectives, and from the sheer breadth and scopeof ambition. As Paris and Sisk point out in respectof post-conflict peace-building, it is difficult toimagine a more complex and demanding task(Paris and Sisk, 2008: 1). Indeed, the

prescriptions of post-conflict stabilisation andreconstruction are arguably becoming socomplicated that they defy implementation(Ottaway in Cramer, 2006: 257). Under theheading of security alone, tasks may includesmall-arms control and disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration, justice andsecurity sector reform, involving armed forces,police and intelligence services, customsagencies, defence ministries, finance ministries,budget offices, audit offices and the judiciary;

political reform, encompassing moves to introducedemocratic institutions, new electoral laws andinstitutions, constitutional change and financingand training civil society organisations; andeconomic reconstruction and reform, includingrelief and support to refugees and the displaced,macroeconomic stabilisation and an almostendless array of reforms concerning everythingfrom the banking system to commercial codes(Cramer, 2006: 25758).

Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the ambitions ofstabilisation appear to have significantlyoutstripped achievements on the ground in mostof the countries in this study. According to Barnettand Zurcher (2008), the uncertainty andunpredictability of post-war stabilisation andstate-building is partly attributable to the fact thatthese missions take place in volatileenvironments; actions taken in one area have thepotential to generate unforeseen results in otherareas; and peace-building agencies have onlylimited knowledge of what is required to succeed.

In Timor-Leste, for example, stabilisation hasfailed to address the causes or drivers of conflict,including persistent political cleavages, ethnic and

community divisions and social and economicinequalities. Despite considerable investment reportedly as much as $3.6 billion in assistancebetween 1999 and 2006 and after several UNmissions and support from more than 14 otheragencies, the territory relapsed into crisis in 2006(Peake and Muggah, Timor Leste case study). InAfghanistan, the creation of an extreme and highlycorrupt rentier state fundamentally contradictsthe primary stabilisation objective of establishinga sustainable, legitimate and accountablegovernment (Suhrke, 2008). In Pakistan, USfinancial support to the military may well havefurther entrenched the militarys dominance inPakistani society and further weakened the civiliangovernments ability to carry out its functions andresponsibilities towards those affected by theconflict (Duplat and Rendon, 2010). In bothAfghanistan and Somalia, the international

community has sought stability throughuncertain and risky political bargains with a varietyof local and national actors, many of whom are orhave been involved in the very violence andcorruption at the heart of the insecurity and crisisstabilisation interventions are apparently seekingto counter (Gordon, Afghanistan case study; andMenkhaus, Somalia case study). Thus, in practice,key proponents of stabilisation may not all bepulling in the same direction at the same time.

Many interventions in fragile contexts includingstabilisation efforts are premised on empiricallyweak and poorly-grounded assumptions. Incounter-insurgency contexts, for example, quickimpact reconstruction and development projectsare regarded as useful tools to build up thelegitimacy of intervening forces and to win localsupport, thereby undermining support for theinsurgents. It is expected that these activitiesserve an important security function that will inturn enhance the space for longer-term

development. In Afghanistan, this is reflected inthe concentration of development funds ininsecure, fragile or so-called un-governed areasthat are the focus of stabilisation and counter-insurgency efforts. In 2007, half of USAIDsassistance programmes in Afghanistan was spentin four provinces in the south, where there is ahigh presence of insurgents (Wilder and Gordon,2009). Yet the relationship between developmentand security is almost certainly more complex thananticipated by supporters of this approach. Incases where the political settlement is contested,

development assistance can have the adverseeffect of creating instability by legitimising oneparty over another (Goodhand and Sedra, 2009).


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In Afghanistan, weak governance, high levels ofcorruption, competition generated by the influx ofaid resources and disillusionment with theimpacts of aid appear to have heightened publicresentment of the government and internationalforces and may therefore have had minimal or nostabilising effect (Wilder and Gordon, 2009).

Weaknesses in the evidence-base for manystabilisation strategies are compounded byweaknesses in human resourcing, particularly asregards the provision of expert knowledge andanalysis of the political, social and economiccontext in which stability operations are takingplace. In Helmand Province in Afghanistan, for

example, Gordon notes that the UK has sought tostimulate political engagement between localresidents and their provincial leaders. However,weak gubernatorial leadership between 2006 and2008, shortages of UK civilian personnel and therapid six-monthly rotation of both military andcivilian elements meant that stabilisation plannerslacked a sufficiently detailed knowledge ofHelmands political and tribal forces. For at leastthe first two years of British involvement, thismilitated against the development andimplementation of a detailed path to stability andan understanding of what support was necessaryto legitimise the Helmand authorities.

Figure 1. Overlaps between stabilisation and other policy spheres


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4.Humanitarianism and stabilisation: uneasy bedfellowsAccording to the UKs Stabilisation Unit, thedistinctions between stabilisation, humanitarianaction and development rest on the explicitlypolitical aims of stabilisation, the neutral aims ofhumanitarian action and the apolitical, poverty-

focused aims of development (SU, 2009). The SUrightly recognises that there may be tensions whenhumanitarian and stabilisation activities are beingcarried out simultaneously. However, this is notdue simply to a disconnect between the politicalambitions of stabilisation and the apparentlyapolitical or neutral role of humanitarianassistance. Nor is it necessarily due to thedifficulties and controversies that surroundstabilisation policies per se. The uncertainty andcontention also emanate from ambiguities within

the international humanitarian enterprise itself.These revolve around questions of whatprinciples, priorities and goals should guidehumanitarian actors in complex crises, and howhumanitarian action should relate to politics putcrudely, is humanitarianism about saving lives, oris it also about saving societies in order to savelives (Barnett and Snyder, 2008)? If it is the latter,do the goals and the means of humanitarianaction accord with those of stabilisation? If not,why?

The majority of international humanitarianorganisations espouse humanity, neutrality,independence and impartiality as fundamentalprinciples that underpin their humanitarian action.This posits an assumed or implicit dichotomybetween politics and humanitarianism, withimpartiality requiring agencies to deliver reliefaccording to need and without discriminationamong recipients; neutrality ensuring thatagencies refrain from taking sides; andindependence stipulating that agencies are

autonomous from any parties involved in theconflict or that have a stake in the outcome. Theprinciples embody the humanitarian ideal ofunconditionally alleviating suffering withoutulterior motives, and they are seen a guide toprotect humanitarian action from politicalmanipulation (de Torrente, 2004). This separationfrom politics is difficult to maintain in practice,however, as humanitarian action inevitablyshapes and influences the structures andprocesses that cause vulnerability and suffering:

humanitarian action has unavoidable politicalconsequences, irrespective of whether it haspolitical objectives at the outset.

In practice, few humanitarian agencies restricttheir activities to immediate and short-term life-saving and relief activities. In fact, the role andimportance of humanitarian assistance andbroader service delivery in stabilisation discourse

can be partly attributed to evolving debatesconcerning the relationship between relief, servicedelivery and development (Gordon, Afghanistancase study). During the 1990s, aid actorsincreasingly advocated for integrating relief anddevelopment interventions in protracted conflict-affected crises. This stemmed from the view thatrelief should not just be seen as palliative but as ameans for communities to recover and strengthentheir livelihoods (Macrae and Harmer, 2004). Thisargument did not gain significant traction due to

the bifurcated architecture of the aid system, thefact that it did not take into account the changingpolitical economy of protracted crises, the lowlevels of aid that were flowing to these contextsand the fact that relief was often used by donorgovernments as a means to avoid moresubstantial engagement in difficult contexts(ibid.).

The policy discourse began to shift significantly inthe early 2000s as donors began to focus theirattention on fragile contexts and on linking reliefmore actively with both development and securitypolicy (ibid.). At the same time, service delivery inareas such as healthcare, education and waterand sanitation were increasingly understoodwithin the development community as criticalbuilding-blocks in developing a states legitimacy(Pavanello and Darcy, 2008). Consequently,improving service delivery systems and outcomeswas conceptualised as a means to reduce fragility(OECD/OCDE, 2006) or to support broadertransformation, whereby improvements in service

delivery in one sector might have positive effectsin others. Assistance in service delivery, therefore,is widely understood as serving as a platform forthe initiation of long-term development activities(Pavanello and Darcy, 2008).

These debates have encouraged a more broadlydefined humanitarianism that seeks to addressthe causes or reduce the risks of suffering anddisaster among vulnerable populations. Indeed,as Barnett and Snyder (2008) observe, there has

been a decisive move among many of the largestand most powerful humanitarian organisationstowards engagement in comprehensive peace-


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building and post-conflict activities. Manyagencies have accepted the challenge ofattempting to engineer and transform societies,along with the political intentions that this implies(ibid.). In the wake of the Rwandan genocide,humanitarian actors have also increasinglyadvocated for states to take responsibility forprotecting civilians during conflict.

What has yet to emerge, however, is a coherenthumanitarian paradigm that incorporates political,military and development action to achievehumanitarian objectives. Instead, humanitarianaction is still largely defined in terms that excludeor even reject openly political, military,developmental or justice-led responses tohumanitarian crises. This, as Barnett and Weiss(2008: 5) suggest, reflects anxiety among manyhumanitarian actors over what defines

humanitarian identity, triggered by globaldevelopments including robust forms ofinternational military humanitarian interventionwhich have weakened once reasonably settleddistinctions between humanitarianism and otherareas of social life. Consequently, despite areasof potential cooperation, overall the relationshipbetween the humanitarian sector and agenciesengaged in international stabilisation efforts tendsto be marked by mistrust, suspicion or outrighthostility.

Efforts to maximise humanitarian space and thechances of achieving positive humanitarianoutcomes will demand strategic engagement witha wide variety of competing actors and institutionsinvolved in stabilisation and development efforts,or whose activities directly impact onhumanitarian space. It will require sophisticatedpolitical analysis and calculations based on theobjectives and aims that each agency is seeking toachieve. This political engagement does not

necessarily mean abandoning the core principlesof humanitarian action. As Leader suggests, insome, maybe many conflicts the best politicalstrategy may well be to assert, as loudly andconsistently as possible, that one is totally non-political (2000: 47). There is certainly nostraightforward positive or negative correlationbetween, on the one hand, stabilisation policies oroperations and, on the other, the protection ormaintenance of humanitarian space and theachievement of humanitarian outcomes.

In order to fully appreciate the significance ofstabilisation policies for humanitarian agencies,it is crucial to first appreciate the different

meanings and understandings of the concept ofhumanitarian space. Most importantly, there isthe question of whether humanitarian spacemeans primarily the space for humanitarianagencies to operate safely and effectively on theground, or whether it relates to a wider social,political or geographical space within whichhuman welfare is preserved and promoted i.e.a space within which people can cope, surviveor find protection in the midst of crisis. Howhumanitarian action and stabilisation interacthas implications for each of these two aspectsof humanitarian space.

Stabilisation initiatives can impede humanitarianagency space, while at the same time having apositive impact on humanitarian outcomes. Thisoccurs, for example, where international militaryaction impedes neutral, impartial and

independent relief operations, yet providesvulnerable populations with assistance and somephysical protection and security. For example, inHelmand between 2006 and 2009 the UKsProvincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) engaged inidentifying and managing quick impact projectsprovided military medical assistance (Gordon,Afghanistan case study). Other types ofstabilisation interventions may contributepositively to agency space, but not necessarily tohumanitarian outcomes. This occurs, for example,

where military protection of relief convoys enableshumanitarian organisations to deliver materialassistance, but fails to protect civilians from widerviolence and victimisation (what became knownas the problem of the well-fed dead) (Keen,2008: 118).4

There are also many situations in which bothagency space and humanitarian outcomes may becompromised by stabilisation operations. This wasthe case with the Pakistan military offensive in the

North West Frontier Province, during whichhumanitarian access was severely restricted andvulnerable civilian populations were exposed tosignificant physical threats (Ali, Pakistan casestudy). In Somalia, key donor states and the UNSpecial Representative of the Secretary-Generalhave, since 2007, sought to channel humanitarianrelief through the Transitional Federal Government(TFG), in order to help legitimise it in the eyes ofthe Somali public. Yet the TFG is viewed by aidagencies as corrupt, incompetent and an active

4. See New York Times (1992) The Well-Fed Dead in BosniaOpinion 15th July 1992. At:http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/15/opinion/the-well-fed-dead-in-bosnia.html?pagewanted=1
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/15/opinion/the-well-fed-dead-in-bosnia.html?pagewanted=1http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/15/opinion/the-well-fed-dead-in-bosnia.html?pagewanted=1http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/15/opinion/the-well-fed-dead-in-bosnia.html?pagewanted=1http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/15/opinion/the-well-fed-dead-in-bosnia.html?pagewanted=1


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party to the ongoing war and to associated abusesof civilian populations. As Menkhaus observes, towork with and through the TFG in order to deliverhumanitarian assistance, in the name of thegreater good of state-building, would meanacquiescing in the overt politicisation of food aidand accepting the almost certain reality that theaid would never reach those in need; it would alsorequire surrendering any pretense of neutrality ina war in which the TFG was an active party, whichwould render the humanitarian aid agencies evenmore vulnerable to attacks (Menkhaus, Somaliacase study).

Finally, stabilisation operations maysimultaneously protect agency space andhumanitarian outcomes, for instance wherestabilisation efforts succeed in preventing orreducing violence and enable unimpeded access

for relief organisations. In Haiti prior to the 2010earthquake, MINUSTAH and the Haitian NationalPolice were deemed to have improvedhumanitarian access through security firstapproaches to stabilisation: a major emphasis ofstabilisation action in Haiti was on containing orreducing armed violence through so-calledcommunity security programmes, with MINUSTAHundertaking coercive actions in key urban areas,notably Cit Soleil and Bel Air in Port au Prince(Muggah, Haiti case study). While instability

remained a major preoccupation in Haiti, thesituation appeared to improve after 2007.Stabilisation efforts seemed to generate tentativegains, reducing violence and creating spaces forsocio-economic development, albeit contingent ona continued UN military presence. Humanitarianagencies, while initially suspicious, graduallyadopted a pragmatic approach, with mostrecognising that they had lacked any capacity tooperate effectively in areas affected by systemicviolence between 2003 and 2005 (Muggah, Haiti

case study). In Timor-Leste, the deployment ofinternational military and police forces in 1999and 2006 contributed to rapidly reduced levels ofviolence, paving the way for the delivery ofhumanitarian assistance (Peake and Muggah, EastTimor case study).

Humanitarian agencies have so far tended to focuson the military aspects of stabilisation. Yet oftenthe most significant opportunities, risks, threatsand failures associated with stabilisation arepolitical in nature. Identifying precisely how the

security and wider stabilisation agenda is definedby the most powerful actors core political andsecurity objectives, how local and national actors

and beneficiaries respond and the extent to whichthese accord or not with primary humanitarianpriorities is key to gauging the implications ofstabilisation for humanitarian organisations andthe broader humanitarian enterprise. In Somalia,humanitarian and stabilisation interests havebeen in direct conflict, with so much at stake onboth sides that space for compromise andconcession has been extremely limited. Thetransitional government is a party to the civil war,humanitarian actors reject state-building andprioritise neutrality, and humanitarian access iscompromised by state-building efforts in a zone ofactive counter-terrorism operations, which in turnhave created political conditions in which radicalgroups that are hostile to the US and otherWestern powers make no distinction between aidagencies and international security andintelligence operations. All of these factors

contribute to the exceptionally high degree ofdysfunctional relations between stabilisationinitiatives and humanitarian access (Menkhaus,Somalia case study).

A distinct set of challenges and opportunitiesconfront the UN and its specialised agencies instabilisation contexts. On the one side, the UN isseeking to engage in impartial and independenthumanitarian action, while on the other it alsoseeks to support stabilisation, state-building

and peace-building emphasising integratedapproaches. As noted by Ali, UN agenciestypically play both sides of the field, invokinghumanitarian principles in contexts of emergencyand post-crisis recovery operations whileemphasising the obligatory nature of theirresponsibility to work with and through the hostgovernment elsewhere. To varying degrees, henotes, all are organised and equipped for bothroles, which inevitably intermingle (Ali, Pakistancase study). As Jones (2004) observes, the UN

bureaucracy has no defined set of nationalinterests in a given country, which, for better orworse, makes it more difficult to establishstrategic goals in relation to any particular context.

Traditionally, the UNs only direct politicalinvolvement in crisis contexts was to negotiate anend to conflicts and deploy peacekeepingmissions to implement peace agreements.However, as the UN has moved towards moredirect involvement in peace-building and multi-dimensional peacekeeping, it has had to take on

more deliberate and sometimes forceful andpartisan forms of political engagement. Still, anddespite substantial institutional reform and


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innovation designed to improve the organisationsoverall role in crisis-affected states, considerableconflict, competition and confusion persist withinthe organisation, not least in its relationship withpolitical authorities and political processes (Jones,2004). In both Pakistan and Sri Lanka, forexample, the UN has found itself in a severelyconstricted political space. In Pakistan,sensitivities on the part of the government to anyinternationalisation of the crisis, the constraints ofstrict UN security protocols and the organisationsdesire to protect the investment it has made inpiloting the One UN approach all mean that theUN has, according to Ali, been cautious to thepoint of passivity in terms of its positioning on thecrisis (Ali, Pakistan case study).

In the DRC and Somalia, the UN has openlyrelinquished any pretence of neutrality or

impartiality, even though it lacks the requisiteresources and structures to play a comprehensiveor clearly strategic stabilisation role, or aneffective humanitarian role. It is not clear what ithas achieved towards either short- or long-termstabilisation in these contexts. In Somalia,Menkhaus reports how, within the UN, officials inNairobi and New York went on a public relationscampaign in support of the TFG, pledging UNbacking to build up the governments capacity andurging donor states to provide rapid support.

Security protection for UN compounds across thecountry was strengthened to meet MinimalOperational Security Standards (MOSS), and theUN Special-Representative and the UN SpecialRepresentative on Human Rights pressed

humanitarian aid agencies to continue operationsin the country despite extraordinary levels ofinsecurity.5 Yet over the course of 2009 UN andinternational NGO staff presence declined. BySeptember, the UN had no international staff onthe ground anywhere in South Somalia, and mostof the 50 or so international UN staff members inthe country were concentrated in the relativelysecure north. Meanwhile, the 4,000-strongAMISOM force which remained in a few heavilyfortified areas of Mogadishu was subjected toserious attacks, including periodic shelling andsuicide bombings, prompting retaliatory strikesthat often produced significant civilian casualties,fuelling local anger at the continued presence offoreign peacekeepers in the capital6 (Menkhaus,Somalia case study). In February 2010, Al-Shabaab, which controls most of the south ofthe country, announced that it was stopping

WFP food operations, accusing the agency ofbeing politically motivated and damaging localfarmers.7

Beyond specific tensions in particular stabilisationcontexts, perhaps the greatest impediment toachieving greater coherence betweenhumanitarianism and stabilisation is growingdoubt on the humanitarian side as to the likelysuccess and outcomes or consequences ofinternational stabilisation efforts. As discussed

further below, humanitarian actors will remainextremely wary of tying themselves to anapparently faltering policy whose numerous andoften undeclared or ill-defined objectives theydistrust.

5. Somalia: International Community Failing UprootedSomalis, Says UN Rights Expert, All-Africa-com(21 October2009) http://allafrica.com/stories/200910211164.html6. Statement to the Somali People From Members of the

Somalia NGO Consortium (6 February 2009).7. http://english.aljaseera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010228132350935473.html
http://allafrica.com/stories/200910211164.htmlhttp://english.aljaseera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010228132350935473.htmlhttp://english.aljaseera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010228132350935473.htmlhttp://english.aljaseera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010228132350935473.htmlhttp://english.aljaseera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010228132350935473.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/200910211164.html


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5.The humanitarian implications of nationally-ledstabilisation campaigns

The tensions and uncertainties associated withstabilisation, and the implications forhumanitarian actors, are particularly stark in thecontext of nationally-led counter-insurgency andstabilisation campaigns pursued in countrieswith relatively strong but contested states, such asColombia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. In all threecountries, the political and military elite, throughvarious combinations of military, developmentand political interventions, is seeking to defeat orcontain insurgent or terrorist groups in order toconsolidate the states presence and authority andsecure a particular domestic political order or formof stability that is favourable to their interests.

These offensives have gained internationalsupport largely due to concerns that continuinginstability in these countries poses a threat tointernational powers strategic interests and/orbroader international peace and security. Beyondthe primary security objectives, these campaignsmay be deemed by the governments or elitesconcerned to benefit peace and development inthe longer term, or to be protecting citizens fromextremism, violence and crime. For example, theSri Lankan government has described its pursuit of

a military solution to the conflict there as ahumanitarian rescue operation (Keen, 2009);similarly, the Colombian governments democraticsecurity policy emphasises its commitment topromote human rights, protect civilians fromviolence and enhance their livelihoods throughrelief interventions (Elhawary, Colombia casestudy).

In Colombia, the government has adopted thecurrent Western model of stabilisation,

emphasising the need for a comprehensive orwhole of government approach (Elhawary,Colombia case study). As a result, there have beensome structural changes within the architecture ofgovernment, designed to increase coherencebetween different departments and institutions.CCAI was set up in 2004, with the aim ofdeveloping and implementing an economic, socialdevelopment and security plan to re-establishlong-term governance in insecure areas. The planis based on a clear, hold and build strategy;military offensives clear and hold areas of guerrillapresence, which creates the space to build stateinstitutions, deliver basic services and attractinvestment. These efforts have been strongly

backed by the US through Plan Colombia, a multi-billion-dollar aid programme to support counter-insurgency and counter-narcotic efforts, which hasbeen recently revised to include an emphasis onstate-building and development.

Despite the liberal or transformational discourse,however, these efforts are more concerned withextending the reach of a political dispensationwhich favours the interests of ruling classes, thanwith addressing the deeper causes of conflict andinstability. For example, there have been noattempts to reform agrarian policy, which hasentrenched land inequalities, denied restitution

and compensation rights to uprooted populationsand continues to favour the interests of largecommercial enterprises (Elhawary, Colombia casestudy). Overall, security objectives are prioritisedover development and humanitarian concerns. Asa result, success is often measured by gainsagainst insurgents and narco-traffickers ornumbers of demobilised combatants, rather thanprogress in building sustainable civilianinstitutions and enhancing respect for humanrights and humanitarian outcomes. For example,

the government emphasises the fact that 30,000paramilitaries have demobilised since 2003.Although this has had a considerable impact onlevels of violence, many have since remobilisedand there has been a failure to offer redress to thevictims of their crimes (ibid.). Furthermore, it isimportant to ask who benefits from establishingsecurity; since 2004 there has been a rise in levelsof displacement, in large part due to theintensification of military action by the state,crimes committed by remobilised paramilitaries

and the implementation of counter-narcoticprogrammes (ibid.). The positive implications forhumanitarian action are tenuous as thesestabilisation efforts do not seek to reconcilenarrow security priorities with a moretransformative and sustainable peace-buildingproject.

Stabilisation in Sri Lanka and Pakistan differs interms of both the combination of military, political,development and humanitarian resources andaction used and in the objectives pursued. InPakistan, whilst there is no formalcomprehensive approach the government andmilitary, as part of a wider US-led regional


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stabilisation effort, there is a clear, hold andbuild strategy in the Swat valley, in which militaryoffensives are followed by humanitarian anddevelopment interventions, combined with aconsiderable security presence and some state-building. Yet these efforts are not homogenouswithin Pakistan, with the military taking a moreambiguous approach to the militants in the borderareas with Afghanistan. This highlights a lack ofcoherence between US objectives and those of thePakistan military. Whilst the Pakistan military hassought to defeat the militants where they appearto pose a direct internal threat to the Pakistanstate, its stance towards those with regionalaspirations has been more accommodating orsupportive, despite the show of militaryopposition, due to its strategic interests inKashmir and its concern to promote a pro-Pakistanelement within the Afghan government (Gregory,

2009). Severing all ties and defeating militantgroups operating in Pakistan would undermine itsown vision of longer-term stability in the region.

The framing of certain national military and stateconsolidation or stabilisation campaigns underthe banner of the global war on terror hasprovided implied international legitimacy for whatare, in effect, narrow and security-focused nationalpolitical and military agendas. Westerngovernments are less inclined to prioritise human

rights concerns or favour interventionisthumanitarian action where this might be seen aschallenging to or destabilising of a particular stateauthority which is seen as an ally in the fightagainst terrorism and anti-Western extremism despite the still powerful international rhetoric of aresponsibility to protect and the spotlight thrownon these contexts by international human rightsand justice institutions and processes.

Even where Western donor governments are

willing to take steps to seek to ensure respect forIHL and humanitarian space, this is oftencompromised by an inability to exert diplomaticpressure, in part because of their owncontroversial actions under the global war onterror. The Sri Lankan case highlights the primacyof domestic politics and cautions againstassumptions of influence and leverage by Westerndonor governments and other key internationalactors (Goodhand, Sri Lanka case study). Here,there have been significant tensions betweennational and international actors with regard to

whose version of peace and development shouldprevail (ibid.). Domestic elites have sought todistance themselves politically from international,

particularly Western, actors, in order to limit thepotential for nationalist challenges from below.Nationalists have tended to seek internal politicalcohesion by presenting external actors and theiragents (including international humanitarianagencies) as neo-colonial enemies of the state. Yetdomestic actors have also learnt to useinternational interventions for their own politicaland economic advantage. As stated by Goodhand,domestic elites have been able to play offdifferent donors and international actors with oneanother, exploiting their diverging interests andpositions (ibid.). At the international level, thereis some acceptance that Sri Lanka is in Indiassphere of influence, and hence Western attentionis sporadic and inconsistent. Those donors thathave sought to put pressure on the government onhuman rights, democracy and conflict issues havehad the least leverage, compared to actors such as

Japan and the Asian Development Bank (ADB),which have been willing to work around theconflict and are more respectful of statesovereignty (ibid.).

The lack of leverage (and, in some cases, resolve)among key international donors createsconsiderable challenges for humanitarian actors.The governments most recent campaigns todefeat the LTTE and stabilise the east and northof the country has had devastating humanitarian

consequences, including massive levels of forceddisplacement, forced returns and, in the north,siege tactics (including restriction of food aid andother relief), direct attacks and mass internment ofIDPs.8

8. Muggah, R. (2009b) A country spins out of control,Toronto Star, accessed at

Despite its reliance on internationalhumanitarian aid to assist civilians affected by thewar, the Sri Lankan government has been able topursue a well-orchestrated and highly effectivecontrol strategy and smear campaign againstinternational humanitarian actors, with relativelylittle cost to itself in terms of overall aid flows. As

reported by the European Commission in its May2008 Global Plan for humanitarian aid for SriLanka, this is reflected in a total lack of respectfor aid agencies, with government authoritiesdemanding more taxes, requesting agencies toredirect their aid, rejecting staff visa andprogramme applications, increasing approvalprocedures, checks and searches and evenexpelling agency staff from Sri Lanka (EuropeanCommission, 2008). During the 20082009military offensive in the north, some aid agencies

http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/306145
http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/306145http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/306145


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cooperated with the government in sending infood convoys, without publicly challenging theconditions under which these convoys wereundertaken. Public statements by the leadagencies have also tended to soft-peddle theirconcerns. But prioritising access and delivery ofmaterial relief has come at the cost of protection-focused advocacy. It has also failed to ensurecontinuing safe and effective access on theground, and has enabled the government andarmy to restrict or manipulate internationalassistance to support their own political andmilitary aims. In the face of the extreme politicalpressures associated with this kind of nationally-led counter-insurgency and post-victorystabilisation campaign, there is a risk ofinternational humanitarian actors themselvesplaying a role in facilitating the progressiveerosion of humanitarian space.

The variability, complexity and, at times, apparentincoherence of competing military and politicalagendas highlights the importance forhumanitarian actors looking beyond therhetoric to understand the nature of particularstabilisation campaigns or agendas, bothbetween and within different national contexts.Even where there seems to be a strongcommitment to building state institutions andsupporting humanitarian and development needs,

the means of achieving stability may underminethese in the short term. For example, after theSwat offensive, the Pakistan government had nocontingency plan for dealing with the massdisplacement and attendant humanitarian needs,partly because it did not want to give militantsadvance warning that an offensive was imminent(Ali, Pakistan case study). In Baluchistan, wherethe government faces a nationalist insurgency,humanitarian access has been heavily restricted,despite concern among international humanitarian

actors that there are considerable levels ofvulnerability. Humanitarian actors have beenreluctant to openly challenge the governmentspolicies and approach, particularly around the

militarys lead role in the response and thepotential conflict of interest betweensimultaneously responding to humanitarian needsand pursuing counter-insurgency objectives. Infact, the government was able to state in thePakistan Humanitarian Response Plan that thesuccessful implementation of this [reconstructionand resettlement] phase would go a long way inwinning over hearts and minds as part of theefforts to defeat the scourge of extremism andterrorism (PHRP, 2010; ix). The UN has been waryof speaking out for fear of provoking aconfrontation with the government that couldjeopardise its longer-term developmentcooperation (Ali, Pakistan case study).

These cases also invite closer scrutiny of theassumptions underpinning agencies and donorsengagement in the wake of government victory

over insurgents. The Sri Lankan government, forinstance, has been concerned to treat the east asa post-conflict context and has used this tojustify the accelerated resettlement of IDPs andthe transition into reconstruction/development.Goodhand reports how, at the request of thegovernment, which insisted that the war was nowover, ICRC closed its four eastern offices in July2009 (Goodhand, Sri Lanka case study). Between$500 million and $1 billion has flowed into theeast from donors since 2007, despite the fact that

the prevailing post-conflict environment is highlysecuritised and far from peaceful; for the US andother key donors, this assistance is intended tohelp stabilise the Eastern Province (ICG, 2009).Donors engagement appears to be based on theprobably flawed assumptions that state-buildingand peace-building are necessarily synonymousand mutually reinforcing, and that reconstructionand economic development will necessarilyameliorate long-standing ethnic grievances. Yetthe government is in effect seeking to enforce a

victors peace, an exercise in power-buildingrather than peace-building, which will haveprofound influence on the type of peace thatemerges (Goodhand, Sri Lanka case study).


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6.The uncertain future of stabilisation and challengesfor humanitarianism

As noted in the introduction, despite all theinternational attention focused on the US-led

stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, itis questionable whether these interventionsprovide precedents for future operations moregenerally. The costs (both human and financial),the lack of evident success, dwindling domesticpolitical support and financial and strategicoverstretch are likely to dissuade the leadingWestern powers from undertaking interventions ofthis kind elsewhere for the foreseeable future. It ispossible that in other places, and, indeed,potentially in Afghanistan itself in the years tocome, the deployment of Western military force

will be refocused on countering immediateperceived security threats, including terrorism, inmore limited ways. While the leading Westernpowers will find it difficult to retreat entirely fromcoordinated efforts at crisis management andpossible military intervention, changes in theglobal geopolitical landscape and the emergenceof new powers such as China, India and Russiaimply further uncertainty.

Whether the new generation of UN peacekeeping

operations succeeds depends at least in part onresources and support from member states, whichhave so far been insufficient and uneven. It alsodepends on the ability of the UN Security Counciland Secretariat to develop approaches to the useof force that bridge the gap between traditionalpeacekeeping and peace enforcement and effortsby regional institutions. Uncertainty andinconsistency in relation to the impartiality of bothhumanitarian assistance and UN peacekeepinghave been aggravated by a lack of funding and

capacity. There is risk of failure in eastern DRC,Sudan and elsewhere, coupled with key problemsincluding overstretched military and civilianresources, a lack of political will and an absenceof international consensus to support the UNsmandates and objectives in these contexts. Thelarge size, complexity and character of the newmissions mean that they require moresophisticated military capabilities, which canoften only be supplied by developed states whichat present are most notable by their absence inthese missions. In contrast to the majorinternational coalition-led interventions in Iraqand Afghanistan, most current UN operations aretaking place in unstable situations of lesser

strategic importance to the major Western powers,with fragile ceasefires and peace agreements,

periodic or endemic violence and general stateweakness or collapse, and are supportedpredominantly by troop contributions fromdeveloping countries (Mayall, 2008). The failure toaddress these shortfalls is likely to create furthertension with the humanitarian components of theUN, which are already uneasy about greaterintegration.

To the extent that both seek positive change,humanitarianism and stabilisation (at least at itssofter end), potentially have much in common.

There is also potential for humanitarian action tobenefit directly from military and otherstabilisation operations in certain contexts atcertain times, if these help to maintain or protecthumanitarian space and support positivehumanitarian outcomes. Yet manifest disquietwithin the humanitarian camp remains over themeans and possibly the objectives of internationalstabilisation in contexts such as Afghanistan andSomalia. These concerns are only going to beamplified if stabilisation operations lose their

tenuous grip on broad-based peace-building andbecome more explicitly synonymous with thepursuit of hard security and strategic interests.With state-building and peace-building runninginto severe problems in Afghanistan, and waningcommitment among Western governments topositive and sustainable transformation there andelsewhere, the narrower counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency agenda may be in theascendant.

Humanitarian agencies are likely to face verydifferent challenges according to the differentfaces of stabilisation in different politicalcontexts. These include situations wherestabilisation is pursued by affected statesthemselves, whose human rights andhumanitarian credentials may be questionable, orby poorly resourced and faltering regional or UNpeacekeeping and peace-building missions.Alternatively, these contexts will include situationsof acute fragility, such as Somalia, where theestablishment of governing authority at any levelrequires all international actors to assumecomplex political risks and seek uncertain politicalbargains with a variety of local, national and


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international political actors. There are also,perhaps exceptionally, a minority of improvingsituations, sometimes at the sub-national level,where the stabilisation task is in concert withprogressive indigenous political and economicforces for change and international resources aresufficient to achieve progress towards stability,transition and improved human welfare.

The level and nature of the political and strategicambition among key international and nationalactors will prove crucial in all respects, includingfor humanitarian actors and humanitarian space for example, whether international powers areaiming for rapid social and political transformationunder international military occupation, orbacking a decent winner (Barnett and Snyder,2009) in countries with relatively capable andlegitimate governments, or otherwise supporting a

slower or more conservative trajectory towards anuncertain peace, with varying or patchy regionaland international peacekeeping and peace-building support. Location, both geographicallyand geopolitically, will decisively affect the natureand extent of the most powerful actorsstabilisation ambitions. The US and its key alliesare only likely to pursue stabilisation action inareas where their own interests are most directlyat stake, usually in association with a key regionalorganisation, but are likely to leave it to the UN

and regional organisations to handle crisissituations of lesser strategic priority, and to lead inthe protracted and inherently difficult business ofpost-conflict recovery and reconstruction (Mayall,2008).

However well executed and in tune with thehumanitarian priorities of aid agencies, experienceto date suggests that stabilisation and peace-building efforts are unlikely to prove reliable indelivering tangible positive humanitarian

outcomes. Indeed, even where positive social andpolitical change appears possible, there may beheightened potential for further violent conflict,associated with the establishment of newstructures, the demise of established institutionsand associated interests and the forging of newrelations and balances of power. It is perhaps notat all surprising that stabilisation in Afghanistancontinues to depend on a substantial combatoperation to defeat opposing political forceswithin the country. Where stabilisation means theconsolidation of state power in countries with a

capable but contested government, state-buildingmay not equate with peace-building, sinceconsolidation of government power may only serve

to reinforce or exacerbate the causes of theoriginal crisis. In these contexts, as witnessed inSri Lanka, Colombia and Pakistan, humanitarianagencies will continue to face very tough choicesconcerning presence and the possibility that theirengagement might be serving the interests of thestate, rather than humanitarian or liberal peace-building objectives.

Against this highly uncertain political and strategicbackdrop, and with a range of new political andmilitary actors expanding their involvement inhumanitarian action, many humanitarian agenciesmay seek to retreat back to the apparent ethicalsafe zone of a conservative humanitarianism. Inthis way, they can affirm a positive identity inopposition to others who appear to have moredubious humanitarian credentials andquestionable motives. This tendency is likely to be

particularly pronounced in the face of perceivedpolitical and military failure in Afghanistan,Somalia and other key sites of internationalstabilisation engagement, and will be facilitatedby the safeguarding of humanitarian donorfunding, which, backed by principles of goodhumanitarian donorship, should continue tosupport humanitarian action that is explicitlyneutral and impartial in its intent. The danger, ofcourse, is that by retreating into a principled butconservative humanitarianism, humanitarian

agencies will face a return to the extreme moralhazards associated with restricting assistance toshort-term material relief or de facto servicedelivery in complex environments where peoplesbasic safety and security is not protected.

Or, indeed, humanitarian agencies may face aforced retreat from these environments entirelydue to insecurity and lack of effective access. Thisis likely to be the case where international ornational actors see little utility in allowing

humanitarian agencies to operate freely (Hartwell,Iraq case study). Yet independence and neutralityare not always respected in insecureenvironments, and where there is little opportunityto engage hostile actors in dialogue humanitarianagencies can easily become a target, along withthe populations they are trying to help (Stoddardet al., 2009). Either way, humanitarian agenciesrisk marginalising themselves from the real worldof politics that lies at the heart of humanitariancrises in these countries, while simultaneouslyremaining exposed to political manipulation and

physical threats from state and non-state actorswho will continue to treat them as importantelements of their political and military strategies.


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Despite the all-pervasive rhetoric of coherence,cooperation and comprehensive approaches,then, the likely reality is continuing fragmentationand the reassertion of rhetorical boundariesbetween humanitarianism and other policyspheres, at least in those settings where the goinghas been particularly tough for the stabilisers,such as Afghanistan, Iraq, the DRC and Somalia.Ironically, it is perhaps where the explicit rhetoricof coherence has been weakest that policyagendas may have the greatest chance of coheringin practice, owing simply to a lack of high-levelcompeting and conflicting strategic interestsamong the key players involved.

Everything hinges on the delivery, or not, ofpositive change. Sceptical humanitarians will onlyendorse a comprehensive and transformativepeace-building agenda if it really does seem to do

what it says on the label. The language of quick

wins has so far generated mainly negativereactions among humanitarian actors, exposingdeep ambivalence towards the inherentpragmatism of stabilisation. Saving lives to savesocieties (Barnett and Snyder, 2008) may beenseen as justified if everyone agrees that thesociety really is being saved: some may see thedistortion of neutral, independent and impartialhumanitarianism as justified if it is part of agenuine and effective effort to transform societiesin ways that are likely to improve human welfare inthe future. But recent experience in Afghanistan islikely to fundamentally weaken even the morewilling and pragmatic aid agencies associationwith comprehensive stabilisation and peace-building, not least because these agendas havenot delivered the kinds of improvements inhumanitarian space and humanitarian outcomesthat they consider paramount.


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