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Hubristic leadership

Hubristic leadership: A review

Eugene Sadler-Smith*, Vita Akstinaite, Graham Robinson and Tim Wray

Surrey Business School

University of Surrey

* Corresponding author: Eugene Sadler-Smith, Surrey Business School, University of

Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UNITED KINGDOM. Email: [email protected]

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Abstract

Hubristic leaders over-estimate significantly their own abilities and believe their performance

to be superior to that of others, as consequence they make over-confident and over-ambitious

judgements and decisions. The fact that hubristic leaders tend to be resistant to criticism, and

invulnerable to and contemptuous of the advice of others further compounds the problem. In

this article we review conceptual, theoretical and methodological aspects of hubristic

leadership. We examine hubristic leadership from two standpoints: first, from a

psychological and behavioural perspective we review hubris in terms of over-confidence and

its relationship to core self-evaluation and narcissism; second, from a psychiatric perspective

we review hubris as an acquired disorder with a distinctive set of symptoms (‘Hubris

Syndrome’) the onset of which is associated with the acquisition of significant power. In

doing so, we draw distinctions between hubris and several related constructs, such as over-

confidence, narcissism, core self-evaluation (CSE) and pride. Methodologically we review

how hubris and Hubris Syndrome can be recognised, diagnosed and researched, and we

explore some of the unique challenges and opportunities hubris research presents. We

conclude by offering some directions for future inquiry and recapitulate the practical and

pedagogical significance of this vitally important but under-researched leadership

phenomenon.

Keywords: core self-evaluation; hubris; Hubris Syndrome; leadership; narcissism;

overconfidence; pride

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Introduction

Hubris is a potentially dangerous cocktail of over-confidence, over-ambition, arrogance and

pride (Owen, 2012; Picone, Dagnino and Mina, 2014; Sadler-Smith, 2016). It is a malaise of

the powerful and successful which, when allied to contempt for the advice and criticism of

others, causes leaders to over-reach themselves significantly (Hayward, 2007; Owen and

Davidson, 2009; Robinson, 2016). As a consequence hubris has the potential to destroy

careers, wreck organizations and wreak havoc on entire industries; if left unchecked, hubristic

leadership can undermine institutions, threaten societal well-being and destabilize global

security (Claxton, Owen and Sadler-Smith, 2014; Isikoff and Corn, 2006; Owen, 2012).

In demonstrating these perils we need look no further than George W Bush’s and Tony

Blair’s hubristic alliance which impelled them jointly into the reckless invasion of Iraq in

March 2003. The hubris of this act was displayed palpably to the world in Bush’s now

infamous ‘Mission Accomplished speech’ delivered on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier

USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1st 2003 “dressed like a Hollywood actor in flying gear”

(Owen, 2008, p.431). The Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University

estimated that this far-from-accomplished mission has so far cost $1.7 trillion and resulted in

the deaths of 134,000 Iraqi civilians. The political, economic, military and humanitarian

costs of the invasion of Iraq reverberate to this day. The former British diplomat Carne Ross,

in his personal testimony to Sir John Chilcot’s Iraq Inquiry (2016) stated that the leaders

responsible for the UK’s first full-scale invasion and occupation of a sovereign state since

World War 2 should exercise “greater humility to the complexity, intrinsic uncertainty and

unknowability of such endeavours, and eschew forever the hubris that states, ‘we know, we

understand, trust us’”1 (emphasis added).

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The consequences of unfettered hubristic leadership can be profound: stakeholders in

organizations, institutions and civil society - managers, educators, researchers, as well as

leaders themselves - need to be able not only to understand and recognise signs of emergent

and extant hubris, but also be able and prepared to take the necessary steps to prevent its

potentially dire consequences from materializing. In contributing to this endeavour the aim

of our article is to provide a review of how hubristic leadership has been conceptualized and

researched. Unlike phenomena such as charismatic or narcissistic leadership, hubris does not

yet have an extensively validated theoretical apparatus (see: Garrard and Robinson, 2016;

Picone et al., 2014). Moreover, even though hubris is perhaps the original destructive or

‘not-so-great man [sic]’ leadership concept, it has yet to feature prominently in mainstream

reviews of the leadership literature (e.g. Dinh, Lord, Gardner and Meuser, 2014; Hernandez,

Eberly, Avolio and Johnson, 2011). We seek to familiarise readers with the concept of hubris

as well as recent developments in hubris theory and research and, in doing so, contribute to

the establishment of hubris as a significant feature of the leadership studies landscape.

Our review is structured as follows. Following some general background we discuss

hubris from the psychological and behavioural perspective in terms of over-confidence and

its relationship to core self-evaluation and narcissism. We then turn to the psychiatric

perspective in order to review the concept of hubris as an acquired disorder (‘Hubris

Syndrome’) associated with the attainment of significant power,. We then transition into

methodological territory by considering how hubris can be identified, diagnosed and studied,

and discuss some of the unique challenges and opportunities hubris research presents to

leadership scholars. We conclude by offering some directions for future inquiry and

recapitulate the significance of this vitally important but under-researched leadership

phenomenon.

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Background

Hubris is catalysed by the intoxication of power and is fuelled by past successes (Owen

2012). It is perceived typically as being associated with a moment of failure precipitated

when leaders take over-ambitious and over-confident decisions with disregard for contrary

advice or criticism (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Li and Tang, 2010; Owen and Davidson,

2009; Roll, 1986). The relationship of hubris to nemesis (Némesis was the Ancient Greek

goddess of retribution who took revenge on any mortal who had the temerity to assume god-

like powers) is well-known. It is captured historically in events such as Napoleon’s

disastrous march home from his abortive attempt to take Moscow (see: Kroll, Toombs and

Wright, 2000) and allegorically in the Icarus and Dædalus episode in Ancient Greek myth. In

Ovid’s poetic account of the Greek tale the father (Dædalus) and his son (Icarus) acquired,

through Dædalus’ craftsmanship, the God-like power of flight:

“…all this adventurous flying went to Icarus’ head…he’d fallen in love with the sky, and soared higher and higher. The scorching rays of the sun grew closer and softened the fragrant wax which fastened his plumage. The wax dissolved; and…Icarus flapped his naked arms deprived of the wings which had caught the air that was buoying them upwards” (Metamorphóses, Book 8, lines 221-230).

Icarus plunged to his self-inflicted doom in the Icárian Sea. In modern times the post-

Falklands War political hubris of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher brought a

miserable, and arguably self-inflicted, end to her three-term premiership (Owen, 2012).

Hubristic leadership in business organizations has been implicated in the demise of Lehman

Brothers and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (Brennan and Conroy, 2013; Stein, 2013;

Wray, 2016). Hubris has also been mooted as an organizational- as well as individual-level

phenomenon: the Columbia space shuttle disaster (in which all seven crew members died)

and the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (current estimated cost $62bn)

have been attributed, at least in part, to ‘corporate hubris’ at NASA and British Petroleum

respectively (Mason, 2004; Ladd, 2012). In this review we will focus on the hubris at the

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individual level of analysis but acknowledge the potential significance of corporate hubris

and the need to develop this idea further.

Researchers in business and management have conceptualised and analysed hubris in a

variety of ways. In this review we consider firstly the psychological and behavioural

perspective in which the causes of hubris are ascribed to various leaders attributes including

over-confidence, inflated self-evaluations, poor judgement, mis-calibrated performance and

hubristic (as opposed to authentic) pride (Claxton, Owen and Sadler-Smith, 2014; Li and

Tang, 2010; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Picone, Dagnino and Mina., 2014; Roll, 1986;

Sadler-Smith, 2016). Within this view, researchers have also framed hubris as a paradox

which has “bright and dark” sides (Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka, 2009, p.855) rendering it

“simultaneously good and bad” (Picone, et al., 2014: p.460). The roots of hubris as a

significant area of scholarly inquiry are to be found in the work of behavioural finance

scholars who studied senior leaders’ judgement in relation to merger and acquisition (M&A)

decisions. It is with this subject that we begin our review.

Hubris and over-confidence

The first prominent mention of hubris in the management and organization studies literature

is Roll (1986) and colleagues’ theory of why some CEOs take significant decisions to acquire

firms “despite abundant evidence” that the deal is unlikely to yield the “hoped-for results”

(Finkelstein, Hambrick and Canella, 2009, p.80). Roll attributed such behaviour to

overconfidence (a cognitive bias) and made this a central precept of his ‘hubris hypothesis’

(Roll, 1986). He proposed that financially unsuccessful corporate mergers and acquisitions

(M&As) can be motivated by acquiring executives’ hubristic overconfidence in their personal

judgement and decision making capabilities. CEO overconfidence thereby results in

upwardly-biased evaluations of the potential value to the acquiring firm of a proposed

takeover and results in larger premiums being paid. An extensive body of behavioural

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finance research exists which broadly supports the hubris hypothesis (e.g. Al Rahahleh and

Wie, 2012; Antoniou, et al., 2008; Brooke and Oliver, 2005; Brown and Sarma, 2007;

Pangarkar and Lie, 2004). For a review see: Sadler-Smith, 2016, pp.43-54.

Although offering important insights at the aggregate level, Roll’s theory is found wanting

if applied to several high-profile instances of hubristic CEOs’ mergers and acquisitions that

resulted in financial gain. This highlights the fact that hubris is a more complex phenomenon

than a mere over-confidence hypothesis suggests. For example, financial gains were made at

Lehman Brothers following corporate acquisitions in spite of the indisputable hubris of CEO

Richard Fuld (Stein, 2013). Before nemesis struck there was “little evidence to suggest [the

CEO’s hubris] damaged Lehman” (Stein, 2013, p.288) so much so that Fuld’s hubris may

have been assistive in stabilising and growing the company following its demerger from

American Express in 1994 (the hubris hypothesis research has tended to overlook the

paradoxical aspects of hubris, see below). Unresolved theoretical and empirical questions

remain regarding the veracity of the hubris hypothesis. More complex explanations for M&A

behaviour - including the effects of learning - have been proposed more recently by

behavioural finance researchers themselves (e.g. Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2011).

Although it is pertinent to hubristic leadership, and was ‘first-on-the–scene’, hubris

hypothesis research occupies a specific and fairly narrow behavioural finance niche (albeit

with a voluminous body of empirical work) within the more general hubris literature (Sadler-

Smith, 2016). Indeed with this restriction in mind Hayward and Hambrick (1997) argued that

any ‘hubris hypothesis’ ought to be broadened by defining the construct in terms that go

beyond over-confidence (which is a restriction of Roll’s theory) and test the effects of

hubristic decision making in domains beyond aggregate stockholder returns on acquisition

announcements.

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In addressing these two issues Hayward and Hambrick (1997, p.106) defined hubris as

“exaggerated pride or confidence often resulting in retribution”. They analysed the

relationship between three sources of CEO hubris (recent organizational success; media

praise for the CEO; CEO self-importance) and acquisition premiums (moderated in their

research model by weak board vigilance and the collapsing together of CEO and chairman

roles). They found positive relationships between recent CEO performance, media praise for

the CEO, CEO’s self-importance and premiums paid for firm acquisitions. Moreover these

effects were amplified by weak governance, i.e. where there were greater numbers of insider-

directors on the boards and where the CEO and chairman roles were consolidated. Hayward

and Hambrick (1997) concluded that CEO hubris can have a significant effect on the success

or otherwise of acquisitions. They also argued that one way in which firms can mitigate the

effects of CEO hubris is by having sufficient numbers of outside directors on company

boards and by having boards chaired by someone other than the CEO.

Over-confidence is a cognitive bias towards over-estimating the likely positive outcomes

of future events (Dowling and Lucey, 2013; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005) allied to an

“untenable faith in one’s ability to achieve target outcomes” (Picone et al., 2014, p.449). It

has been used as a convenient proxy for operationalizing and measuring hubris. However, as

is clear from the definition of hubris used in our opening remarks (combination of over-

confidence, over-ambition, arrogance and pride, allied to contempt for the advice and

criticism of others, catalysed by power and fuelled by success) we consider hubris to be more

than, and hence distinct from, over-confidence. For example, Owen (2012) considers

contempt to be “one of [its] more important signs” (p.145), and Picone et al (2014, p.449)

itemize three ways in which hubris manifests itself: overestimation of one’s abilities and the

probabilities of one’s being successful; over-precision in one’s own beliefs; and over-

placement of one’s own performance relative to that f others (see ‘better-than-average effect,

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below). To focus on overconfidence at the expense of other aspects of hubristic behaviour

will offer researchers only a partial view of the phenomenon.

From the cognitive perspective a further negative effect of leaders’ inflated self-

confidence occurs when rationality - long-recognized as a bounded but nonetheless an

important aspect of decision processes (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Simon, 1991) - becomes

diminished and there is a corresponding over-emphasis on the use of intuition. Hubristic

CEOs draw on intuitions rooted in past success (Picone et al., 2014). This can be an

advantage in high-velocity environments (Sadler-Smith and Burke-Smalley, 2015). However

when allied to over-estimates of one’s own capabilities and performance it can give rise to

reduced attention to strategy formulation and lack of concern for detail which can lead to

misguided diversification strategies, over-ambitious internationalization plans, over-reliance

on acquisition led growth, and excessive debt financing (Picone et al., 2014, pp.458-459).

In extreme cases intuition may take hold to the extent that it becomes an “unbridled and

dangerous” source of hubristic mis-judgement (Owen, 2016, p. x). Claxton, Owen and

Sadler-Smith (2014) point to the example of George W Bush’s rebuttals to those who

questioned his policy decisions relating to the invasion of Iraq: “‘instinct’ told him that ‘God’

had given him a mission to rid the world of Al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism, hence it

was acceptable to dispense with analysis and ignore inconvenient facts” (p.15). This is part

of what Blaug (2016) refers to as the “pathology of power” (p.85): a vicious circle of

cognitive simplifications and intuitive substitutions for effortful information processing. In

Bush’s case this escalated and manifested eventually as attributions to some ‘higher power’

thereby rendering his actions answerable to only history or God rather than the more

mundane court of “colleagues or public opinion” (Owen, 2007, p.2).

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Hubris, core self-evaluation and narcissism

To the extent that hubris research tends to focus on organizational elites, such as CEOs, it is

important to bear in mind that such extraordinary leaders “tend to be extraordinary in their

own estimation” (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005, p.297, emphasis added). Indeed, people in

general tend to consider themselves ‘above average’ on positive characteristics (e.g. a

majority of people will rate their driving skills as above average). This so-called ‘better-than-

average’ effect (Alicke et al., 1995) causes individuals to attribute successful outcomes to

their own actions (self-serving attribution) and attribute failure to factors such as ‘bad luck’

(Miller and Ross, 1975). This effect is compounded because CEOs’ estimates of their own

(seemingly extraordinary) abilities tend to be derived from comparisons to the population

average (e.g. the ‘average’ manager) rather than the average CEO. This error results in base-

rate neglect (i.e. placing too little weight on the base level); the effect is amplified in the

rarefied atmosphere of top management teams (TMTs) where there are few comparators

against which CEOs can make accurate self-evaluations. Hence senior leaders are especially

prone to overestimating both their own skill levels relative to others and the positivity of

outcomes stemming from their personal decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).

It has been argued that hyper core self-evaluation (CSE) corresponds “exactly to what is

colloquially referred to as hubris” (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005, p.306). Hyper CSE is

concerned with how individuals consider themselves in relation to their social context in

terms of self-efficacy (belief in one’s ability to achieve an objective), locus of control

(whether or not control over one’s destiny is controlled by internal or external factors),

emotional stability (control over and levels of anxiety and stress), and self-esteem

(perceptions of self-worth and self-acceptance). Hiller and Hambrick (2005) consider hyper-

CSE to be “largely shaped by genetic factors during formative years, then reinforced (or

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diminished) by long-term feedback processes, and finally, subject to further adjustments in

the face of recent life events” (p.306).

Individuals who have risen to senior executive levels in organizations tend to be

overconfident and hence may be prone to hyper CSE (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Picone et al.,

2014). CEOs who exhibit elevated levels of CSE have heightened feelings of emotional

stability (‘I am free from anxiety’), self-esteem (‘I am worthy’), self-efficacy (‘I succeed at

tasks’), and locus of control (‘Life’s events are within my control’). Hyper CSE may assist

executives in their pursuit of personal (e.g. career ambitions) and organisational (e.g. growth

by acquisition) goals see (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005, p.300) however the effects of hyper-

CSE are not always beneficial to the individual or the organization:

We agree that - up to a point – managerial confidence, and its fuller variant, CSE, are exceedingly beneficial for propelling action and motivating others: but we believe that beyond that point, or at some extreme, managerial confidence and hyper-CSE can bring about naïve and even foolish behaviours. (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005, p.313)

Hiller and Hambrick (2005) also delineate hyper CSE from narcissism, arguing that

executive CSE is related to healthy (optimal) narcissism but unrelated to unhealthy reactive

(destructive or excessive) narcissism. Two points arise from this. First, whilst hyper CSE

approximates well to certain aspects of hubris it does not subsume or negate hubris (see our

definition). Second, we delineate hubris from narcissism on the basis that the latter is “at its

most basic self-love” (of which most of us show some signs, and a certain amount of which is

necessary, see: Kets de Vries, 2016; Loch, 2016) which, in excess, may be an attempt to

compensate for an “unstable sense of self-esteem” (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005, p.302).

Hubrists are not the equivalent of narcissists in general or even reactive narcissists in

particular (i.e. narcissism in its pathological form). Narcissists are flagrant attention seekers,

they have a grandiose sense of self-importance, search persistently for admiration, lack

empathy, take advantage of and devalue others, and delude themselves that their problems are

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unique and exceptionally burdensome (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005; Kets de Vries, 2016).

Narcissism and hubris may be related to the extent that a less healthy narcissistic personality

may predispose a person to the psychiatric disorder Hubris Syndrome (Ghaemi, Liapis and

Owen, 2016, and see below) which could lead to hubristic behaviours in the workplace

(Brennan and Conroy, 2013). The relationship between hubris and core self-evaluation and

narcissism, as well as personality more generally, is an important area for further study.

Hubris exists as a distinct cognitive/affective and situated/contextual phenomenon in its

own right (i.e. it is not sufficient to distinguish between hubris versus narcissism simply on

the basis of ‘love-of-power’ versus ‘love-of-self’ respectively); it is further distinguished by

its association with a trajectory (or process, see below) of rise followed by “retribution”

(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997, p.106) rather than the “relatively stable individual

difference” of narcissism (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell and Marchisio, 2011, p.269).

Furthermore, in terms of the phenomenon’s temporal dynamics, Kets de Vries (2003) and

Owen and Davidson (2009) depict leaders as acquiring, succumbing, or sometimes being

overwhelmed by hubris at certain points in time or at particular stages of their leadership

careers. For example, Franklin D Roosevelt capitulated to hubris following the death of his

restraining voice and ‘toe-holder’ Louis Howe (Hoogenboezem, 2007; Claxton, et al., 2014).

Owen’s studies of how hubris arises and manifests in political leadership characterises it as

an ‘intoxication of power’ but which may abate once power is lost (Owen, 2012; Owen and

Davidson, 2009).

[TABLE 1 HERE]

These various observations point to distinctions between hubris and related constructs

such as narcissism, over-confidence, pride, and core self-evaluation (see Table 1). We

conceptualise hubris as upwardly-biased judgement and decision making associated with the

possession or acquisition of significant, and often unfettered, power. Furthermore, prior

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successes and the praise of influential third parties for hubrists contribute to weakly

grounded, and sometimes irrational and even foolish, judgements and decisions. Having

arrived at these various distinctions and observations from a psychological and behavioural

viewpoint we turn now to reviewing the study of hubris from a psychiatric perspective.

Hubris as an acquired disorder

Research into the careers of various British and American Prime Ministers and Presidents by

Owen and colleagues suggests that hubristic leadership could be a manifestation of an

acquired disorder which has been labelled ‘Hubris Syndrome’ (Owen and Davidson, 2009).

Hubris Syndrome is characterised by recklessness, contempt and a lack of attention to details,

it is associated with the intoxicating effects of holding power under conditions of largely

unfettered discretion. Succumbing to Hubris Syndrome is often preceded by a period of

“overwhelming success” (Owen and Davidson, 2009, p.1397) whereby self-confidence and

ambition which has thus far proven to be adaptive, may tip-over into hubristic and hence

maladaptive, over-confidence and over-ambition (see: da Silva Rosa, et al., 2004; Hayward

and Hambrick, 1997; Picone, et al., 2014).

Hubris Syndrome manifests in a leaders’ behavioural transformation (Owen, 2006; Owen

and Davidson, 2009) and is recognisable in terms of 14 symptoms, see Table 2. Five of the

symptoms of Hubris Syndrome are proposed as being unique to the condition whilst other

symptoms overlap with various Cluster B personality disorders as indicated by dramatic,

excessively emotional or unpredictable lines of thought and/or behaviours (specified in the

American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

[DSM]-V) such as Narcissistic, Antisocial and Histrionic Personality Disorders.2. Its

specification in terms of these behavioural traits allows Hubris Syndrome to be positioned

potentially as a psychopathology (International Classification of Diseases [ICD] 10, 1994;

Rodgers, 2011).

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[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

The symptoms of Hubris Syndrome are expressed in behaviours such as inflated self-

confidence and self-perception, arrogance, messianic manner, lack of humility, and contempt

(Owen and Davidson, 2009). They contribute to a leader’s ‘mental blindness’ and

irrationality (Owen, 2012). In order to diagnose Hubris Syndrome, Owen and Davidson

(2009) proposed: (1) that if three or more of the 14 symptoms are demonstrated continuously,

and with at least one symptom being unique to Hubris Syndrome (see Table 2), a person can

be classed as suffering from this syndrome; (2) provided that there are no other psychiatric

disorders or conditions that might affect the individual’s behaviour and cognition (e.g.

depressive illness, organic brain disease, bipolar disorder, substance abuse, etc.).

A key aspect of hubris as a substantial change in leadership behaviour is that it appears to

be triggered by an external factor – the acquisition and exercising of significant power –

which feeds the development of the syndrome over time (the precise length of time cannot be

specified accurately since each case is situation-dependent). The leader’s prior experience,

recent successes, and institutional and organizational environment (e.g. minimal constraints

on her or his behaviour) contribute to the aggravation of the condition which leads slowly to a

toxifying, ‘drug-like’ effect of positional power resulting eventually in weakly-grounded and

non-rational decision making, cognition and behaviours (Claxton, Owen and Sadler-Smith,

2014; Martin, 1999; Owen, 2012; Raven, 1993; Robertson, 2012). Moreover, the presence of

even mild positive illusion (i.e. the entirely normal, but illusory, sense of control and of being

more optimistic than circumstances warrant) in situations where power is held may

predispose leaders to developing hubristic behaviours (Ghaemi et al., 2016, p.35). Other risk

factors include: lack of realism; lack of empathy; mania/bipolar illness/hyperthymic

temperament; narcissism/antisocial personality/histrionic personality; drugs (amphetamines

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and corticosteroids); male gender; post-traumatic stress disorder; anxiety; psychotic

conditions (delusions) (Ghaemi et al., 2016, pp.18-21).

The intensity of Hubris Syndrome may fluctuate and can be catalysed or reinforced by

contextual factors and external events over-and-above the acquisition of power. Such factors

and events might include the removal of constraints, a record of successes, or the

precipitation of crisis situations involving pressing and complex decisions (e.g. Bush and

Blair’s geo-political decision making in the case of the Iraq invasion). However if the key

stimulant, power, is reduced or taken away Hubris Syndrome seems to react correspondingly

and becomes less marked, abates or disappears altogether (Owen, 2012). This is not

necessarily true in all cases; Owen claims that Bush and Blair appear to diverge in this regard

with hubris abating in the former but not the latter case.

Questions have been raised regarding the uniqueness of Hubris Syndrome and whether or

not it is a sufficiently distinguishable condition given the overlaps with relevant personality

disorders (see Table 2). Most of the psychiatric conditions for personalities classed under the

Cluster B category in the DSM-V3 tend to develop in childhood or adolescence and continue

throughout one’s life. However, Hubris Syndrome seems to arise in adulthood only when, as

noted above, an individual has occupied a position of power for a period of time (Owen and

Davidson, 2009). Hence it has the potential to emerge at any time during adulthood

contingent upon the acquisition of significant power. Hubris Syndrome is therefore different

“from personality disorders that appear in childhood or adolescence and continue into

adulthood” in that it “manifests in later life and should not therefore be seen as a personality

disorder but as an illness of position as much as of the person” (Owen, 2008, p.428). This

feature represents an important source of difference between Hubris Syndrome and relevant

personality disorders, and suggests that Hubris Syndrome is not merely a subtype of

Narcissistic Personality Disorder (Ghaemi et al., 2015).

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The acquisition of Hubris Syndrome has similarities with other acquired disorders, such as

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) which is trauma-related and stress-induced. Similar

to the exposure of a traumatic event in triggering PTSD, it is argued that exposure to power

triggers Hubris Syndrome in certain individuals (Owen, 2012; Owen and Davidson, 2009). It

should be noted, that although hubris is deemed to be a condition of adults and is triggered

mainly because of position of power, there has been some research linking hubris with

childhood experiences (i.e. traumatic life events in early life) that might predispose certain

people to hubris (Akstinaite, 2016) or alterations in brain function resulting in changes in

behaviours and cognitions indicative of an underlying neurological disorder (Garrard et al.,

2014). Further research might explore the antecedents of Hubris Syndrome, pre-dispositional

factors, the dynamics of the syndrome and the specifics of its relationship to relevant

personality disorders.

Hubris and context

Business management, as well as western culture in general, has long been fascinated by the

idea of the leader (charismatic, hubristic, or otherwise) as hero, villain, or tragically damaged

individual (Grint, 2010; Tourish, 2013). It is therefore unsurprising that hubris research has

focused on individual leaders, the influence they have, and the impact of their flawed

responses in the lead-up to damaging events (Hayward, 2007; Owen, 2012). However, the

over-individualizing of hubris can give rise to a neglect of important issues of relationality,

situation and context. In making sense of hubristic leadership by viewing leadership itself as

sensemaking (Pye, 2005) Weick’s axiom (1995 p.51) is apposite: “sensemaking is about

staying in touch with context”. We believe that paying attention to the wider, shifting and

frequently turbulent contexts within which leaders and their organizations and institutions

operate is significant since this may determine the nature and causes of hubristic leadership as

well as help in understanding how to mitigate its potentially destructive effects.

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When Hubris Syndrome was proposed it is noteworthy that Owen and colleagues

symptomatized it in terms of “disproportionate concern with image and presentation”,

“excessive confidence in the individual’s own judgement”, “exaggerated self-belief,

bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they personally can achieve”, “loss of contact

with reality; often associated with progressive isolation” (Owen and Davidson, 2009, p.1398,

emphases added). Implicit in Owen and Davidson’s symptomology for Hubris Syndrome is

the issue of how the strength of any particular hubristic behaviour translates into maladaptive

outcomes. This in turn begs questions such as: how much concern with image should be

considered ‘disproportionate’; how much confidence is ‘excessive’; how would we know that

our leader’s self-belief has become inappropriately ‘exaggerated’; or how broad is the range

and scope of the ‘reality’ with which we should expect our leaders to maintain contact?

In conceptualizing hubris a context-dependent, over-developed strength (see: Kaplan and

Kaiser, 2006) taking account of the setting in which the potential hubrist and the leadership

decisions she or he takes are situated is vital. Indeed in making recommendations for the

mitigation of hubris it is difficult to overstate the importance of acknowledging the context in

which leaders and the top management group (e.g. the board) take their decisions. We

believe that it is impossible to understand hubris, let alone mitigate its effects, without seeing

it as embedded within the organization’s executive and governance structures and the effects

this relationship has on performance (see: Tang, Crossan, and Rowe, 2011). Given that there

is a “swell of opinion” that boards of directors collectively are partly to blame for business

failures (Mellahi, 2005, p.261) it is not clear why boards themselves fail to detect warning

signals of the potentially damaging effects of CEO hubris and if, and when they do detect the

early signs of impending failure, why in many cases they appear to be passive.

There are parallels with, as well as lessons to be learned from, so-called high-reliability

organizations (HROs), i.e. “organisations that are able to manage and sustain almost error-

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free performance despite operating in hazardous conditions where the consequences of errors

could be catastrophic” (Lekka, 2011, p.v). For example, reports of air accidents occurring

during the nineteen eighties (Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm, 1999) identified a disturbing

number of fatal accidents that were consequence of erroneous decisions on the part of the

aircraft’s captain whose position power (Raven, 1993) in flight deck settings over-rode other

forms of power or knowledge. Of particular concern was that in several instances other

members of the crew had been aware of the errors being made by their senior officer but,

nevertheless, failed to question or challenge the captain’s decision. Helmreich et al. (1999)

concluded that this failure was largely down to the fact that ultimate and unquestionable

authority was assigned to the captain within a context of a strict ‘command-and-control’

culture. As a result it was extremely difficult for the captain’s formal authority to be

challenged even in circumstances where those crew members who were in a position

potentially to contest the captain’s view were fully aware that his actions were life-

threatening. Similar weaknesses have been observed in failures of leadership within hospital

crisis management centres (Sundar et al., 2007) where the most senior clinical or surgical

specialist has traditionally assumed command automatically, even when other specialists

have been present who were better qualified to deal with a specific crisis.

In such cases of leadership failure, situationally-specific social structures and

organizational processes and routines were found to have been unsuited to the circumstances

generated by rapid changes in the wider contexts within which leadership was being

exercised. In recent years airlines and hospital crisis management centres have modified

significantly their policies and practices giving greater emphasis both to team leadership and

collective accountability. This has enhanced HROs’ capability to respond appropriately in

situations of crisis and high uncertainty and thereby mitigate the hubristic behaviours of

leaders who hold positional power. A consequence of such modifications has been a

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significant reduction in accident and mortality rates (Helmreich et al., 1999; Sundar et al.,

2007).

We are convinced that the nature, causes and effects of hubristic leadership will be better

understood by taking into account the dynamics of the social and organizational contexts

within which the potentially hubristic leader is located alongside a focus on the individual

leader her or himself. However, while this contextualised approach is increasingly a feature

of, if not the norm, in HROs, it has yet to become general practice in business, political and

other institutions where operating conditions are not necessarily as hazardous nor are the

consequences of errors catastrophic for life.

Where the contexts within which leaders operate are, “dynamic, ill-structured, ambiguous,

unpredictable” leaders need to demonstrate greater “mindfulness” (Weick and Sutcliffe,

2001, p.93). This can be achieved by an orientation towards the subtleties of context through

leadership that: demonstrates willingness to accept situational complexity; resists the

temptation to simplify; displays a preoccupation with the possibility of error; maintains

sensitivity to operations against a background of deferring to expertise; commits to individual

and organisational resilience (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). These conditions for mindfulness

are at somewhat odds with the attributes of hubris as identified by Picone et al (2014) and

which result in a ‘cognitive inertia’ (see: Shondrick, Dinh and Lord, 2010) akin to a form of

‘mindlessness’, namely: reduced attention to strategy formulation, repetition of actions that

led to past success, not taking into consideration unlikely scenarios and alternative strategic

choices, and a perseverant (i.e. dogmatic) approach to choice and an unwillingness to change

even when change is what is needed (pp.454-456).

Risk is an unavoidable dimension of the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous

contexts in which business leaders operate, hence their orientation to perceived and actual

risk is an important determinant of leader behaviour (Bennet and Lemoine, 2015; Sitkin and

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Pablo, 1992). We know from Roll’s hubris hypothesis that hubristic CEOs are more prone to

risk-taking behaviours (see: Sadler-Smith, 2016). Hubris is associated with a low level of

risk perception for two reasons: first, hubris warps the leader’s recognition of the possibility

success and failure to such an extent that s/he over-estimates the likelihood of success;

second, hubris amplifies the perception of the anticipated gain whilst downplaying the

resource requirements for the implementation of ambitious plans (Picone et al., 2014).

However the extent to which this relationship between hubris and risk holds also depends

on the context within which the leader operates. In a study of over 2790 manufacturing firms

in China, Li and Tang (2010) observed that the positive relationship between CEO hubris

(over-estimations in subjective judgements of their firm’s performance) and risk taking

(decisions to invest in new technology) was strongest when a firm faced complex but

munificent market conditions, had less inertia (as in the case of younger firms) and more

intangible resources, and where the CEO was not politically appointed and the CEO did not

chair the board. Li and Tang (2010) concluded that a firm which allows too much discretion

to a hubristic CEO may be prone to undue risk-taking and that this can have deleterious

consequences for the firm’s performance.

An implication of the relationship between riskiness of the context and focal decision and

the hubris of the leader is that it is important that firms become vigilant towards this potential

problem and have the necessary governance structures that are capable of monitoring and

protecting firms from CEO hubris. There are many examples of firms, including Vivendi,

Enron, Tyco, World Com, and Long Term Capital, whose boards failed in their governance

function and exposed these businesses and their markets to the potentially damaging effects

of CEO hubris. Moreover, occasions on which boards have intervened to disempower a

hubrist are notable by their scarcity (Kets de Vries, 2016, p.95). These findings underscore

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the importance of the role played by the institutional context both in determining the nature

and causes of hubris and in mitigating its effects.

The media are a significant stakeholder in the leader’s context and have an important role

to play in, and it could be argued some responsibility for, the emergence of hubris. As noted

earlier, greater media praise for a CEO was associated with larger premiums paid for

acquisitions (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Relatedly, Malmendier and Tate (2009) found

that when CEOs attain ‘superstar’ status, for example through prestigious business awards,

they subsequently underperform both relative to their performance before the award and to a

matched sample of non-award winning CEOs. Award-winning CEOs also extract more

compensation from the firm following the awards, and spend more time on public and private

activities outside their companies, for example by taking seats on other boards, writing

popular management and leadership books, etc. (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Moreover, the

undesirable effects of media-induced superstar status appear to be strongest in firms that had

the weakest corporate governance further underlining the imperative for strong boards of

directors which are able to detect and are prepared to act on the early warning signs of CEO

hubris.

Paradox, retribution and process

Three thought-provoking aspects of hubris are its paradoxical nature (Cronin and Genovese,

2015; Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka, 2009; Picone et al., 2014), its association with nemesis

and retribution (Owen, 2006; Petit and Bollaert, 2012), and its trajectory through time (Wray

and Sadler-Smith, 2016).

The paradox of hubris

Hubris is a paradox in that it has contradictory yet inter-related elements (such as

confidence/overconfidence) that exist simultaneously, have underlying tensions, and persist

over time (see: Smith and Lewis, 2011). For example, although hubris is considered a

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‘greedy aspect’ of strategic leadership (Haynes, Hitt and Campbell, 2015) and hence a ‘dark-

side’ trait of leaders (alongside narcissism and Machiavellianism) it can also exhibit a

“bright” side (Picone et al., 2014, p.449). Looked at positively, the leadership strengths

which eventually turn hubristic may actually enable a leader’s emergence and subsequent

effectiveness in the bold pursuit of an ambitious vision.

This paradoxical aspect of hubris is reflected in Owen and Davidson’s (2009, p.1397)

argument that ‘Hubris Syndrome’ might develop from prior and less intensive hubristic traits

(or behaviours) which can “easily [be] thought of as adaptive” in certain contexts.

Leadership strengths, for example self-confidence, proper ambition, or decisiveness, may

become over-developed such that they reach a tipping point at which they become hubristic

weaknesses (i.e. over-confidence, over-ambition, or impulsiveness). For example, Tony

Blair’s healthy leadership energy metamorphosed into a messianic manner manifesting as

self-exaltation as in his description of the Labour Party’s 1997 election victory: “[we] had

swept all before us, conquered with ease, strode out with abandon. Hadn’t we fought a great

campaign? Hadn’t we impaled our enemies on our bayonet, like ripe fruit?” (Blair, 2010,

p.5).

In hubristic leadership the authentic strengths of self-confidence or identification with

one’s organization (Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, and Walumbwa, 2005) can transmute

into the hubristic weaknesses of over-confidence and over-identification. For example, Steve

Jobs considered himself not only as the leading light in Silicon Valley but he also identified

with the business to the extent that in his mind he was Apple. His dismissal from the

company in 1987 was catastrophic personally in as much as “what had been the focus of my

entire adult life was gone, and it was devastating” (Hayward, 2007, p.61). Other instances

point to hubris as an excess of legitimate leadership behaviours, for example Tesco’s proper

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ambition for growing the business turning into hubristic over-ambition in its failed attempt to

move into the US market with its ‘Fresh and Easy’ convenience food stores (see below).

The hallmarks of hubristic leadership (namely overconfidence, over-ambition and

hubristic pride allied to an unwillingness to heed advice or listen to criticism) cause powerful

and successful leaders to over-reach themselves with negative consequences for themselves

and others. In virtue ethical terms hubristic leaders transgress the Aristotelian ‘golden mean’

of good moral character by failing to strike a virtuous (i.e. prudent) balance between

deficiency and excess in their behaviours (see: Bright et al., 2011; Cameron and Caza, 2002;

Crossan, Mazutis and Seijts, 2013; Sadler-Smith, 2012). The relationship between hubris and

virtue ethics is an area for further philosophical enquiry, for example might hubris be

considered a vice and its antithesis humility a virtue (see: McNamee, 2002)?

Hubris and retribution

In the mythological perspective (e.g. the Dædalus-Icarus myth, see above) hubris exists in

a duality with its contrastive, nemesis: “hubris calls for nemesis, and in one form or another

it’s going to get it, not as a punishment from outside but as the completion of a pattern

already started” (Midgley, 2004, p.148). Examples abound in history, popular culture and

business of hubrists who met their nemeses, from Xerxes and Napoleon Bonaparte to former

Royal Bank of Scotland Group CEO Fred Goodwin, and these are well documented

eslewhere, e.g. Kroll et al. (2000).

In a re-interpretation of the relationship between hubris and nemesis, Ronfeldt’s (1994)

report for the RAND Corporation (commissioned by the Office of Research and

Development at the Central Intelligence Agency) incorporated hubris into a so-called ‘hubris-

nemesis complex’. This complex becomes “blatant in moments of provocation or crisis”

(Ronfeldt, 1994, p. 13) but is muted at other times. The hubris-nemesis complex is exhibited

by powerful leaders who believe they are ‘God-like’ (hubristic); however not only do they

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exhibit a pretension toward an arrogant form of godliness themselves, but also in order to

maintain their status they seek through a vengeful desire to “confront, defeat, humiliate and

punish rivals” who themselves aspire to hubris (op cit., p.vii). In an effort to maintain power

the hubrist seeks to bring calamity on their similarly inclined rivals. This proposed complex

has “strange dynamics” that can lead to high-risk and destructive behaviour (ibid.).

Ronfeldt (1994) argued that attempts to deter, compel or negotiate with leaders who have

the hubris-nemesis complex (the examples given in the report were Fidel Castro, Slobodan

Milosevic, and Saddam Hussein) are likely to be “ineffectual or disastrously counter-

productive” if they are based on approaches better-suited to dealing with ‘normal leaders’

(ibid.). Ronfeldt’s (1994) remarks are prescient in that the very leaders, Bush and Blair who

sought to deliver nemesis upon Saddam Hussein in 2003 were themselves demonstrably

hubristic (Owen, 2012; Owen and Davidson, 2009). Each, in turn, met their own particular

forms of retribution: Bush is rated as 38th out of 41 in the best US Presidents ratings, and

Chilcot’s Iraq Inquiry delivered a nuanced but damming indictment of the part Tony Blair’s

leadership played in the invasion of Iraq.

It is conceivable, of course, that hubrists can escape retribution either by accident or

design. For example, a CEO who could have been labelled hubristic may exit the

organization before the negative outcomes of her or his behaviour fully materialize. A

potential case in point is Sir Terry Leahy, former CEO of Tesco, who arguably transgressed

acceptable levels of confidence with overly-ambitious and overly-optimistic plans to expand

into the US market with the ill-fated ‘Fresh and Easy’ small format grocery store chain. The

project was by all accounts a failure. It ended with the closure of the entire chain of 200

stores in 2013 at a cost to Tesco £1.2billion. Leahy left Tesco in 2011 largely with his

reputation largely intact. It is far from clear whether Leahy personally, the business itself, or

some toxic combination of factors was the source of the failure of the US expansion plans.

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Nonetheless, the admission in Leahy’s popular management book Management in 10 Words

that “hubris is a common fault and one I hope to avoid” (Leahy, 2013, p.3) was, in the light

of events, a telling observation. Leahy’s self-exhortation further bolsters the imperative for

developing viable means for recognizing and researching hubris in both its extant and nascent

forms (see below).

Hubris as a process

The shortcomings of traditional approaches whereby leadership is viewed as something

possessed or done by ‘the leader’ have led researchers to conceptualise leadership couched in

terms of a processual view (see: Hernes, 2014; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas and Van de Ven,

2013). Tourish (2014) mooted a processual and communicatively-oriented view of

leadership as a “fluid process of co-orientation and co-construction between myriad

organisational actors, whose ‘essence’ varies between each occasion of its occurrence”

(p.88). Likewise, building on complexity theory ,“a science of process rather than state, of

becoming rather than being” (Chiles, 2003, p. 289), Uhl-Bien et al (2007) argued that

leadership is an emergent event comprised of the interactions of heterogenous agents and

numerous forces. From a processual view leadership is not a process that is caused by

different ‘things’ (social entities or substances) with indicative attributes, rather it is a process

that evolves creatively through time as a result of intersecting activities and events.

Processual research has the potential to illuminate how phenomena such as leadership

achieve stabilities and form patterns through time (Langley et al, 2013). As such

processually-informed hubris research offers the possibility for novel insights into how

various forces and flows produce the temporal patterning commonly associated with hubristic

leadership. Such an approach would not focus entirely on the formally assigned leader (e.g. a

CEO) or their attributes; instead it would focus on all those involved in the process of

leadership. Theorising hubristic leadership as a processual phenomenon obviates the

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challenges of demarcating hubris from other substance-based constructs (e.g. over-

confidence, narcissism, or the ‘dark side’ of charisma), or with determining how to diagnose,

measure, or assess the level or state of a leader’s hubris.

Recognising and researching hubris

People can, if asked, often point automatically to examples of leaders in business (e.g.

Richard Fuld at Lehman Brothers), sports (e.g. Sepp Blatter at FIFA), or politics (e.g. US

presidential hopeful Donald J Trump) who through their contempt for others, exaggerated

self-belief and pride, vanity, over-confidence, and arrogance have exhibited palpable signs of

hubris. However, a more systematic and reliable approach than relying merely on subjective

judgements and gut instincts is required. In this section we review some of the issues and

challenges pertaining to hubristic leadership research.

A practical drawback of the identification of extant, rather than incipient, hubris is that its

harmful effects are already be present and, by virtue of the leader’s position, be difficult to

dislodge. All-too-often the power-driven acts of hubristic leaders bring about deleterious

effects before interventions can be made. Furthermore, although hubristic behaviours, acts or

language are widely recognised and known, they are often not monitored, left unevaluated

and, therefore, allowed to develop unhindered. Hubris is, therefore, to some extent a ‘rear

mirror’ phenomenon interpreted and analysed after-the-fact.

One consequence of this is that it militates against opportunities to consider the dynamics

of the phenomenon and the possible positive effects of confidence, ambition, pride,

determination, decisiveness, etc. Moreover, the study of the trajectory of hubristic leadership

rather than the hubristic end-state opens up the possibilities of understanding how hubris

unfolds over time and identifying the junctures at which adaptive leader behaviours (such as

confidence) ‘tip over’ into maladaptivity (e.g. hubristic over-confidence).

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The problems associated with hubris are compounded by the fact that certain hubristic

behaviours (such as confidence and ambition) may, as noted above, be associated with

desirable leadership traits and therefore selected for, tolerated and even encouraged. For

example, Steve Jobs at Apple and Jack Welch at General Electric both were charismatic and

hubristic leaders who drove their respective organizations to great successes. Before the

2007 financial crisis the CEO of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group was lauded in the media

as being perhaps the world’s best banker and made no less than a knight of the realm - ‘Sir

Fred Goodwin’ - but soon afterwards became a pariah in the eyes of the media. The practical

significance of this issue is exemplified, for example, in the case of current recruitment

practices for leadership positions which actively seek-out individuals who exhibit behavioural

traits which may be potential sources of hubris. With this issues in mind management and

organizational researchers might seek to develop valid and reliable tools and techniques in

order that the onset of hubris might be identified and diagnosed, and the potentially damaging

effects obviated or mitigated before they can take hold.

The use of symptomologies, as in the case of Hubris Syndrome (see above for a more

detailed discussion), offers potential for a ‘gold standard’ in the identification and diagnosis

of hubris. However as Russell (2011) suggests, some refinement and recasting of the

symptoms of Hubris Syndrome may be needed as follows: (a) the person should be in a

position of power and have been so for some time; (b) judgement should be made not in

terms of the broad range of behaviours encapsulated in the symptoms. Instead an assessment

should be made of whether the person is behaving in a dysfunctional manner which results in

unwise and risky decisions to the detriment of self and others; (c) there is deterioration in

behaviour that results in excessive reaction to stressful personal or professional events.

Some have probed the status of hubris as a medical syndrome. For example, Loch (2016)

argued that hubris is the “tail end of a normal psychological trait, status seeking and

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narcissism” rather than a medical syndrome by using the analogy that just like height is not a

medical syndrome but extreme height can cause medical problems (p.101). Although Owen

and Davidson’s (2009) symptomology has proven useful, criticisms have been levelled at the

abstractedness and indeterminacy of some of the 14 symptoms (see Russell, 2011). A further

issue stems from the fact that more than half of the symptoms overlap with other personality

disorders and this raises the question as to how particular combinations of the symptoms

capture hubris accurately and uniquely. An important step in the development of hubris

research is the empirical demarcation of hubris and Hubris Syndrome from similar and

related constructs, including overconfidence, core self-evaluation, pride and narcissism (see

Table 1).

Aside from the clinical approach, researchers have developed other means by which

incipient hubris may be recognised and thereby raised the possibility for intervention and

prevention. However, one of the methodological challenges that hubris (along with

narcissism) researchers face is the practical necessity of researching a phenomenon which has

its locus in small number of high-profile individuals who may be reluctant to engage in data

collection especially in relation to a phenomenon that is perceived to be negative. These

particular aspects of hubris mean that it may often only be possible to access it via ‘at-a-

distance’ measures.

Aside from traditional scaling and measurement techniques (e.g. Li and Tang, 2013) one

viable at-a-distance approach is based on the assumption that a leader’s behaviour and

cognition is predisposed by their personality which is then reflected in their natural language

use (Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer, 2003). Hence the “personality transition seen in

Hubris Syndrome” (Garrard, 2016, p.138) which results in hubristic behaviours, may become

evident in spoken and writen discourse utterances and manifest in various micro-scale

linguistic features (Amernic, Craig, and Tourish, 2010; Garrard Rentoumi, Lambert, and

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Owen, 2014). These so-called ‘linguistic markers’ (sometimes referred to as ‘bio-markers’,

see Garrard et al., op cit.) may be subtle to the extent that speakers themselves are unaware of

them (Garrard, et al., 2014). For example, one such linguistic marker aligns with Hubris

Syndrome symptom six “A tendency to speak in the third person, or use the royal ‘we’”

(Owen and Davidson, 2009, p.1398).

In operationalizing the use of linguistic markers for the identification of hubris, Garrard et

al. (2014) examined the transcribed spoken discourse samples of two British Prime Ministers

who are acknowledged as hubristic (Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair) and compared these

to a British Prime Minister who is generally considered to be non-hubrisitc (Sir John Major).

Garrard et al. (2014) observed differences between the hubrists and the non-hubrist in terms

of several important aspects of language use. Garrard et al. (2014) concluded that it is

possible to identify candidate utterances which may serve as linguistic (bio-)markers of

Hubris Syndrome, such as the ratio of first-person plural to first-person singular pronouns.

The use of such markers as potential indicators of hubris is important since their concealment

in written and spoken language by deliberate and consistent masking is to all intents and

purposes impossible (Garrard, 2016, p.152).

Outside of the political arena the use of linguistic markers for the identification of leaders’

hubris is less well developed. This presents opportunities for further research and

development and has significant practical implications in anticipating and mitigating the

deleterious effects of hubristic leadership (Amernic et al., 2010). Such approaches will help

to counter balance the commonly used cross-sectional and time-series methods which have

tended to dominate hubris hypothesis research (see Sadler-Smith, 2016). In furthering this

promising line of empirical inquiry Craig and Amernic (2014) used CEOs’ letters to

shareholders as a medium through which to assess leaders’ corporate communications in this

difficult-to-reach population at-a-distance. As an alternative to the information theory and

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mathematical techniques used by Garrard et al. (2014), Craig, Armernic and Tourish (2010)

explored the use of close reading and the use of software packages such as DICTION to

assess the culture of organizations and the intentions of top management teams as reflected in

their written utterances. Craig and Armernic (2014) also used DICTION in an attempt to

identify linguistic markers of hubris in the texts of CEO speeches (Lord Browne of BP and

Rupert Murdoch). From their admittedly mixed findings they highlighted the need for further

development in terms of the delineation of hubris itself, the theoretical linkages to language

use, and the application of measures such as those captured in software programmes (e.g.

DICTION).

In summary two issues stand out in relation to the use of these techniques in leadership

research. The first stems from the issue of the extent to which political and CEO speeches,

letters to shareholders, etc. are composed by persons other than the leader her or himself.

This potential problem should not be overlooked. Secondly, although some software

packages (i.e. DICTION) have shown initial promise, alternative software and analytical

techniques ought to be explored, e.g. Pennebaker’s Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count

(LIWC) (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). LIWC is based on a theory of natural language

use (Pennebaker, Mehl and Niederhoffer, 2003) and hence offers a viable theoretical basis for

the analysis of language use and the identification of relevant linguistic markers.

It is indisputable that there are significant access issues for hubris researchers. Hambrick

(2007) noted that executives “are notoriously unwilling to submit themselves to scholarly

poking and probing” (p. 337). Given the negative connotations of hubris this issue presents a

challenge for researchers. Hence, and as noted earlier, in common with narcissism research

hubris researchers are often compelled for practical reasons to deploy at-a-distance measures.

A corollary of this is that hubris research has proceeded without directly evidencing hubris in

situ. This limitation highlights a general need for in-depth qualitative studies of leaders’

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hubris using, for example, ethnographic techniques, participant observation, organizational

story-telling, case studies, and biographical methods.

There are a number of constructs that may serve as proxies for hubris. As noted above,

Hiller and Hambrick (2005) argued that hyper CSE is markedly similar to hubris and

therefore presents a means by which hubristic leadership might be accessed and measured. In

similar vein Tracy and Robins (2014) theorised pride in relation to hubris as having two

separate facets, hubristic pride and authentic pride. Authentic pride is a positive emotion felt

upon recognising one’s actual contribution towards a desirable outcome, whereas hubristic

pride (the “dark side” of pride, op cit., p.150) is associated with arrogance, conceit and self-

aggrandizement (Bodolica and Spraggon, 2011; Tracy and Robins, 2014). Pride is cross

culturally recognised and spontaneously expressed, moreover it manifests verbally and non-

verbally (Tracy and Robins, 2014), and therefore is accessible via both the verbal and non-

verbal channels of communication.

Finally, studying hubristic leadership from the processual perspective presents its own

methodological challenges. With its intrinsic focus on generating temporal insights (see:

Langley, et al., 2013) such research is likely to draw on longitudinal case study research

designs and analysing chronologically ordered data pertaining to inter-linked leadership

events. Such data are rendered interpretable by means of techniques such as temporal

bracketing which permits the “decomposing” (Langley, et al., 2013, p. 7) of the process into

conceptual phases that exhibit observable consistencies within themselves and

inconsistencies at their frontiers. This method caters for comparing inductively generated

insights regarding the processes that constituted each phase (for example the strategic or

social processes that contributed to a rising phase), and how the events of one phase shaped

those of the next (Langley, 2009). Additional analytical techniques include providing a

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narrative account of how the process evolved in the form of visual mappings to illustrate key

actions, decisions, and events in the timeline of the process.

Future directions and concluding remarks

Picone et al. (2014) itemized several lines of inquiry for a proposed hubris research agenda,

namely: antecedents of hubris; relationship between hubris and judgements, decisions and

risk-taking; factors mitigating the impact of hubris; hubris and strategy and performance. To

add to this, and in addition to the directions for future research identified in the main body of

our review, we also conclude by noting that most hubris research to date has been

conceptualised at the individual level of analysis and the vast majority of hubrists who have

been studied happen to be male. This raises three areas for future research: relationality,

corporate-level hubris, and gender.

First, leadership researchers might investigate hubrists in their dyadic relationships. These

have been well-documented in studies of hubristic political leaders (e.g. Bonar Law as a toe-

holder for Lloyd George and William Whitelaw’s constraining influence on Margaret

Thatcher) have had an important role in buffering hubris’ maladaptive effects. These

relationships have been conceptualised in various ways, for example ‘foils’ (Hayward, 2007),

‘alter egos’ (Kroll et al., 2000) and ‘sage fools’ (Kets de Vries, 1990). The micro-

interactions within these dyads are worthy of study outside of the political context not only to

understand their dynamics but also how the constraining role can be enacted to mitigate the

effects of incipient or extant hubris.

Second, the concept of ‘corporate hubris’ or ‘collective hubris’ (Owen, 2011), although

alluded to in various researches (e.g. Ladd, 2012; Mason, 2004) pertaining to specific events

for example in NASA and at BP, is largely undeveloped. Hence there is a need to study

relevant aspects of corporate culture that may predispose an organization towards developing

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a collective hubris, and the relationship between corporate hubris and that of individual

leaders, and cf. ‘collective pride’ (see: Sullivan, 2014).

Third, hubris syndrome appears to be positioned more often than not as a ‘male

phenomenon’ with hubristic female leaders being few and far between (Margaret Thatcher

and Carly Fiorina are two notable exceptions). Picone et al (2014) highlighted several

gender-related issues, for example men are more over-confident than women, and higher

educated males tend to have a “higher certainty level than their less educated counterparts”

(p.452). Ghaemi et al. (2016) noted that corticosteroid hormones affect risk-taking

behaviours, high levels of testosterone are associated with increased opportunity seeking, and

high levels of cortisol lead to more risk-avoiding behaviours (see also: Coates and Herbert,

2008). Ghaemi et al (op cit.) speculated that increased levels of testosterone in men “might

predispose male political leaders to succumb more easily to Hubris Syndrome after coming

into office” (p.20). More generally, questions arise as to whether the lack of research into

female hubrists is due to too few women occupying the appropriate leadership positions in

the first place. This excludes them from the possibility of succumbing to the intoxicating

effects of power and its catalysing effect on hubris. To what extent is the nature and the

dynamic of the phenomenon (and leaders’ power more generally) fundamentally different for

female leaders?

Finally, there are educational implications emanating from an enhanced understanding of

hubris. As Collinson and Tourish (2015) observed ruefully, the charismatic and heroic

models of leadership passionately embraced by business schools in educating the next

generation of CEOs may serve, albeit unintentionally, as incubators for hubris whilst

simultaneously overlooking the virtue of its antithesis, humility. In the absence of any

acknowledgement of the powers of authenticity and the perils of reckless overconfidence and

over-ambition (and even worse, the contempt these engender), the management education

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system might be poised to propagate further hubristic excesses and thereby create the

potential for derailment amongst the next generation of leaders (see: Collinson and Tourish,

2015; De Haan, 2016; Ladkin and Taylor, 2010). A more commendable, responsible and

sustainable pedagogical stance is the promulgation of the skills of critical analysis and

reflexivity as potential safeguards against the palpable threat posed by the emergence of

hubris in the upper echelons of business organizations.

Acknowledgement: the authors are grateful to The Dædalus Trust for the support it has given

to ‘The Hubris Project’ at Surrey Business School.

34


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43


Table 1. Distinctions between hubris and related constructs

Construct Description

Hyper core self-evaluation (CSE)

Excessive levels of self-efficacy, locus of control, emotional stability and self-esteem (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005)

Hubris Overestimation of one’s own abilities resulting in overconfident, overambitious judgement and decision making, associated with the acquisition of significant power, invulnerable to and contemptuous of the advice and criticism of others

Hubris Syndrome Behavioural transformation of a leader’s personality associated with the acquisition of significant power, recognizable in terms of 14 symptoms, five of which are unique to the condition (Owen, 2006; Owen and Davidson, 2009)

Narcissism Relatively stable individual difference consisting of grandiosity, self-love and inflated self-views (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell and Marchisio, 2011, p.269)

Overconfidence Cognitive bias towards over-estimating the likely positive outcomes of future events (Dowling and Lucey, 2013) based on over-estimation of one’s abilities and over-precision in one’s beliefs

Pride Authentic pride: positive emotion felt upon recognizing one’s actual contribution towards a desirable outcome

Hubristic pride: negative emotion associated with arrogance, conceit and self-aggrandizement (Bodolica and Spraggon, 2011; Tracy and Robins, 2014).

44


Table 2. Symptoms of Hubris Syndrome (Owen and Davidson, 2009)

1. A narcissistic propensity to see their world primarily as an arena in which to exercise power and seek glory

2. A predisposition to take actions which seem likely to cast the individual in a good light—i.e. in order to enhance image

3. A disproportionate concern with image and presentation

4. A messianic manner of talking about current activities and a tendency to exaltation

5. An identification with the nation, or organization to the extent that the individual regards his/her outlook and interests as identical*

6. A tendency to speak in the third person or use the royal ‘we’*

7. Excessive confidence in the individual's own judgement and contempt for the advice or criticism of others

8. Exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they personally can achieve

9. A belief that rather than being accountable to the mundane court of colleagues or public opinion, the court to which they answer is history or God

10. An unshakable belief that in that court they will be vindicated*

11. Loss of contact with reality; often associated with progressive isolation

12. Restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness*

13. A tendency to allow their ‘broad vision’, about the moral rectitude of a proposed course, to obviate the need to consider practicality, cost or outcomes*

14. Hubristic incompetence, where things go wrong because too much self-confidence has led the leader not to worry about the nuts and bolts of policy

* Symptoms unique to Hubris Syndrome

45

1 http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96098/2010-07-12-Statement-Ross.pdf#search=hubris. Accessed 12.07.2016. m2 The latter also appear in another widely recognised manual for health disorders, the ICD-10 (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems), with the exception of NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder) which is listed as a provisional condition with uncertain clinical and scientific status (ICD-10, 1994).3 DSM-IV-TR has been updated to the Fifth Edition, DSM-V, on May 18, 2013. There are no changes in terms of symptom descriptions or classification for Narcissistic, Antisocial and Histrionic personality disorders between DSM-IV-TR and DSM-V.

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