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Alternative Contexts of Political Behavior: Churches, Neighborhoods, and IndividualsAuthor(s): Robert Huckfeldt, Eric Plutzer and John SpragueSource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 365-381Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2132270 .

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AlternativeContexts fPoliticalBehavior:

Churches, eighborhoods,ndIndividuals

RobertHuckfeldtIndianaUniversity

Eric PlutzerIowaState University

JohnSpragueWashingtonUniversity n St. Louis

This paperexamines he politicalconsequences hat arisedue to multiple andsimultaneousbases of

socialexperience.Two alternativeontexts-those of neighborhoodsndchurches-provide an empiri-

calsetting for the effort;andthe analysis ocuseson twodifferentpoliticalattitudes-policy preferences

regardingabortionand partisanself-identification.Severalquestionsare addressed: n what manner

are the alternative ontextsof politicsdifferentand in what mannerare they similar?To whatextent

are churchesandneighborhoods einforcing n the politicalmessages hey convey,and to whatextent

do they serveas independentbasesof social experience?How do individualdifferencesand individual

discretionmediateand deflectthe impactof these alternative ourcesof political nfluence?

itizens live simultaneouslyn a varietyof socialworlds,any and all of which

might have importantpoliticalconsequences.At one and the sametime they are

rooted socially in neighborhoods,workplaces,churches,clubs, and associations.

Indeed,everycitizen lies at the centerof a social experienceproducedby a series

of intersecting,overlapping, ayeredenvironments.Eachof the environments, n

turn, has potentially mportantconsequencesfor politics becauseeach serves to

modify and deflect the opportunitiesand constraints hat circumscribe ocial in-teraction-social interaction hat servesas a vehicle for the transmission f politi-

cal information ndguidance.

Individualsand individualdifferencesare important oo-they arenot simply

artifactsof largersocialforces.Citizens payheed to someaspectsof socialexperi-

ence and they reinterpretothers.They areattracted o some environmentswhile

theyseekto avoidothers.In theseandotherways, ndividuallymotivated hoicebe-

comes animportant lement of the structuralbasis underlyingdemocraticpolitics.

This researchwas supported n partby NationalScience FoundationGrants:numberSES-8318899

to the Universityof Notre Dame, numberSES-8415572to IndianaUniversity,and SES-8319188to

WashingtonUniversity.Support was alsoprovidedby the SpencerFoundation to Iowa StateUniver-

sity), by the AmericanPolitical Science Association'sSmall Grants Program,and by the Office for

Researchand GraduateDevelopmentandthe Collegeof Arts and Sciencesat IndianaUniversity.

THEJOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 55, No. 2, May 1993, Pp. 365-381

C 1993 by the Universityof Texas Press








366 RobertHuckfeldt,EricPlutzer,andJohnSprague

And thus, politicalpreferencecan be seen as the productof interdependentciti-zens makingchoicesanddecisionswithina rangeof contextsoverwhichthey haveonlypartialcontrol(HuckfeldtandSprague1987,1991).

This paper s motivatedby concernwith the politicalconsequencesof the mul-tiple and simultaneousbases of socialexperience.Two alternativecontexts pro-vide the focalpoint forthe presenteffort-churches andneighborhoods.And twoattitudesareexamined-policy preferencesregardingabortionand partisanself-identification. everalquestionsareaddressed:Whatarethe politicalconsequencesof parishand neighborhoodcontexts?Which context mattersmost for what be-havior,underwhatcircumstances?How do individualdifferencesmediatethe im-pactof bothparishesandcontexts?

DEFINING SOCIALSTRUCTURE

Contextual heories of politics build on the argumentthat individualpoliticalpreference s not a simple functionof individualcharacteristics lone,but ratherthe complex productof an individual'sown characteristics n combinationwiththe characteristicsndpredispositions f othersurroundingndividuals.Thus, thepolitical consequences of being an Irish Catholic might differ dramaticallybetween Massachusettsand New Hampshire, not due to variation n individualcharacteristicsbut rather due to variations in social experience (Ennis 1962;Sprague1981).Correspondingly,he politicalsignificanceof beingan IrishCath-olic could only be understoodrelativeto a particularplaceand time. The centralmotivationfor contextualtheories of politics is the idea that patterns of socialinteraction are influenced by surroundingpopulation distributions (McPhee,Smith, and Ferguson 1963).To push the previousexample somewhatfarther, fthere are proportionallymore Democratsin Massachusetts han in New Hamp-shire,MassachusettsDemocratsmighthavea muchbetterchanceof encounteringotherDemocrats.And thus the likelihoodof receivingsocialsupportfora Demo-craticpreference,andsociallysupplied nformation ompatiblewitha Democraticloyalty,wouldbe higher n Massachusetts.

In practice, he demonstration f suchcontextualeffectson politicalbehavior sa complexundertaking, t least in partdue to the difficultyof identifyingrelevantsocialboundaries. n terms of sustainingDemocratic oyalties,is it more impor-tantto live in a Democraticneighborhood, o worshipat a Democraticchurch,orto drinkat a Democraticbar?Correspondingly,omemightargue hatthe demon-strationof neighborhoodeffects is not plausiblebecausemoderncitizens are nottied to their neighborhoodsany longer;or the study of parisheffects might becalledintoquestionbecausepeopledo not go to churchanylonger;and so on.

One way out of these difficulties s to adopt an egocentricdefinitionof socialstructure.That is, a socialstructuremight be definedrelative to each individualthat is uniqueto thatindividual's diosyncraticife space(Eulau1986;Burt 1987).Such a procedureunderliesmanyeffortsat social networkanalysis,wheresocialstructure is often defined according to the individual's own report of social








AlternativeContextsof PoliticalBehavior 367

relationships.Such an approachhasmanyvirtues and advantages,but it includes

shortcomings s well. Most important,t runs theconceptual iskof reducing ocial

structure o a manifestationof individualchoice by creatinga model of individu-

allymanufactured atternsof social interaction.Otheranalysessuggest that suchcontroloversocial nteraction s far fromcomplete: ndividuals xercisechoice dur-

ing processesof social nteraction,but the logic of choice operatesprobabilistically

rather than deterministically(Huckfeldt 1986). Put another way, decisions

to take a job or join a churchare not retakenevery daybut ratherevaluatedonly

periodically.In the meantime and on an everydaybasis, citizens make do with

whatgoes on at work,atchurch, n the neighborhood, nd so on.

Incomplete ndividualcontrolover patternsof socialinteractionpoints toward

the virtueof a multilevelunderstanding f socialstructureandthe politicalbehav-

ior of individualcitizens. The premise of a multilevelcontextualanalysis s thatsocial structure s imposedupon individuals.This does not mean that individuals

fail to exercise discretionover socialinteraction,but only that such control s con-

strainedand boundedby a set of interactionprobabilities hat are contingenton

contextuallydeterminedsupply (McPhee, Smith, and Ferguson 1963;Huckfeldt

1986). Such a perspectiverequiresthat individualpreference, ncludingprefer-

ences regarding ocialinteractionalternatives,be considered n light of surround-

ing populationsand the distributionof variouscharacteristicsand preferences

withinthe population.

The problems hus remain:How should the relevantpopulationsbe identified?Which population boundariesare most important? n short, how should social

structurebe defined relative o politicsand politicalbehavior? n the analysesand

discussionsthat follow we consider two separatecontexts-those of the parish

and the neighborhood.These twoboundary ets do not, of course,exhaustthe list

of politicallyrelevantcontexts,but they providea usefulcomparison orpurposesof the underlyingquestionsof theoryand measurement.

ALTERNATIVECONTEXTS IN SOUTH BEND

Although numerous studies have shown the importanceof a single context(e.g., Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990),very few studies have been designedto mea-

sure the effects of multiplecontexts. As a practicalmatter,this close relationship

betweenresearchdesign and the possibilityof studying variousaspectsof social

structurehastendedto fragment tudiesof social nfluenceandpolitics.Verylittle

seriouscomparisonoccurs between the alternative ontexts of politicsbecausefew

studies are equippedto supportsuch a comparison.Instead we see the develop-ment of a neighborhoodclique, a workplaceclique, a familyclique, and a parish

cliqueamongscholars nterested n contextual heoriesof politics.

The data thatserve as the basis for this paper'sanalysisweretakenfroma 1984electionstudyconducted n SouthBend,Indiana,and its surrounding rea.As partof this study, a three-wavepanelsurveywas conductedwhich includedapproxi-

mately 1,500respondents, upplementedat each wave to offsetpanelattrition,and








368 RobertHuckfeldt,EricPlutzer,andJohn Sprague

most analyses of this paper are based on informationobtainedfrom the third,

postelectioninterview. The study's samplingdesign is crucial to the analysesof

this paper.All 1,500 respondentswere selectedrandomly rom 16 neighborhoods,

with approximately qual numbers chosen from each neighborhood.The neigh-borhoodswerechosen purposefully,however, n an effort to maximizesocial class

variationacross the neighborhoodsand homogeneitywithin neighborhoods.In

this way we are able both to concentrateour samplewithin particularneighbor-

hoods and to insure wide variationacross the neighborhoods.The end product

is a randomsample of respondents iving within a purposefullychosen sample of

neighborhoods-a sample of neighborhoods hosen to reflect the range of living

conditionsamong SouthBendarearesidents.

This samplingdesign providesa doublemeasurementbenefit: t can be used as

a measurementdevice both at the level of individualsand at the level of environ-ments. By aggregating t the level of neighborhoods, ny question ncluded n the

surveycan be used to measureneighborhoodpopulationcomposition.The neigh-

borhoodmeasuresemployedhereare takenfromthe third waveof the survey,and

thus are based on approximately1,500 interviewsequally spread across the 16

neighborhoods. n addition, one of the survey questions asked each respondent,

Whenyou go to services,where do you usually go? More than 20 parisheswere

named by 10 or more respondents, and the respondentschoosing one of these

parishes provide the subset of the survey used for most analyseshere. Such a

practice ntroduces wo biases into the sample.First, Catholicparishes end to belarger han those of other denominations,and thus Catholicsare overrepresented

in the resultingdataset. Second, all the respondents n theseanalysesname a par-

ticular congregation,even if they also report attending infrequently,and thus

a major portionof the population-those who do not name a congregation-is

unrepresented.'

The benefit of the resultingdata set is that it can be used to obtainaggregate

measuresof parishesas well as neighborhoods.Thus, the data set providesobser-

vation at three distinct levels-the neighborhood, he parish,and the individual.

The bulk of the analysis s conducted n terms of individuals,but foreachindivid-ualwe are ableto estimatethe attitudinal ompositionof the parishand the neigh-

borhoodcontexts withrespectto bothpartisanship nd abortionattitudes.

AGGREGATES,INDIVIDUALS,AND METHODOLOGICAL MPERATIVES

The theoreticalpremise being considered s that the behaviorof individuals s

contingenton the behaviorof otherswithin an individual's ife space (Huckfeldt

and Sprague1991).But this theoreticalpremise generatesseveralmethodological

'The first question asked: When you go to services,where do you usuallygo? The next question

was: Would you say you go to church/synagogueevery week, almostevery week, once or twice a

month, a few times a year, or never? A relatively mall numberof respondentsprovidean answerto

the firstquestionbut thenreport hat they never attend.









complications. First, it is potentially tautologicalto argue that individuals are

more likely to be Democratsor pro-life in environmentswhere more people are

Democratic or pro-life. This is an especially severe problemwhen the sample

within contexts s small, andwhen such a sample s used to infer both the behaviorof individualsand the aggregatepatternsof behaviorwithin the contexts.In such

an instance the behaviorof the individual-the phenomenonbeing explained-

has a pronounced ffecton the constructionof the compositionalproperty.Part of

the problem s resolvedif we can be assured that, as a matter of construction,the

behaviorof the individual s independentof the behaviorof the aggregate. n the

analysesconductedhere, the aggregatemeasuresare constructedto insure such

independence.In calculatingthe mean abortion attitude within a respondent's

parish,for example,the respondent'sown attitudeis excluded from the calcula-

tion, and the resultingmeasure s preciselyand only an estimateof the opinionssurroundinghe respondentwithin the parish.

Moreover,we takethe additionalprecaution n the analysesbelow of including

controlsfora varietyof individual evel factors Hauser1974). Thus, forexample,

we do not simply examinethe relationshipbetween holding a pro-life opinion and

attendinga church where others hold pro-life opinions.Rather,we ask whether

people who attendpro-lifechurches are more likely to be pro-lifewhen we take

accountof theirreligiousaffiliations,heirfrequenciesof churchattendance, heir

incomes, and their educations.As we shall see, includingcontrols such as these

makes t problematicwhethersuch a relationshipholds.A second problem n the analysis s less easily resolved.The insights of the Co-

lumbia school of political sociologists ead us to expect that the effects of various

dimensionsof socialexperienceupon politicalbehaviorshould be interdependent

(Lazarsfeld,Berelson,andGaudlet 1948;Berelson,Lazarsfeld, nd McPhee 1954).

Thus, the effect of the parishshould dependon the neighborhood,and the effect

of the neighborhoodshould depend on the parish. Unfortunately,such inter-

dependenteffectsaresometimesdifficultto sort out as anempiricalmatterdue to

excessivecollinearityamongthe variousmeasures.The standardprocedureused

to test for such a contingenteffect is to calculatea simple multiplicative nter-action term for the contextualmeasuresand enter it as a regressor n the estima-

tion procedure.Unfortunately or these purposes,the interactionvariable s often

highly correlatedwith one or the other of the component contextual variables,

thereby makingthe analysisproblematic.A major culprit in the productionof

such collinearity s a lackof variation n one or the other of the componentvari-

ables. These statisticalproblemsarenot without substantive orollaries.The vari-

ation in partisanshipand especially abortion attitudes2is particularly imited

across the Catholicparishesof our sample,and thus it is sometimes difficult to

2Partisan rientationsare measuredon the familiar even-point party dentification cale, where 0 isstrong Democrat and 6 is strong Republican.Abortionattitudes are measuredon a seven-pointscale

formedby summing the responses o six questionssoliciting whethera respondentbelieves that abor-

tion should be legal or illegal in particular ircumstances.A score of 0 indicates that the respondent








370 RobertHuckfeldt,EricPlutzer,andJohnSprague

sort out the importanceof being Catholicas opposedto the importanceof being

amongother Catholics-a problemof trulyancientlineagein the socialsciences

(Durkheim1897).Ourgeneralpracticehereis to includesuch an interaction erm

in modelswherethe evidencesupports t.Finally,to whatextent,andon what basis,do individualscontroltheirlocations

in churchesandneighborhoods?We choosea neighborhood orits schools,its ser-

vices, the house or apartmentwe find within its boundaries.We choosea church

because t is convenientto the neighborhood,becausewe like the pastoror priest

or rabbi,becauseour parentsraisedus in its tradition,becauseit offersa shared

communityof faith. This paperis less concernedwith these overt functionsof

parishesand neighborhoods hanit is with an important atentconsequence-the

roleeachcontextplays n structuring pportunities ndconstraintshatacton social

interaction,and thus the roleeachplaysin structuring ocialinfluenceon politics(Wald,Owen, andHill 1990).Of course,overt functionsand latentconsequences

inevitablybecome ntertwined, ndthus it is importanto consider he role of indi-

vidualchoiceas it affectsthe locationof individualswithinvariouscontexts.

Most peopledo not chooseneighborhoodsand churchesbasedon the abortion

attitudesand partisanorientationsof parishionersand neighborhoodresidents,

but even thoughthese locationalchoicesare predicatedon other bases,theybring

implicationsfor a whole range of surroundingpreferences-including abortion

attitudesand partisanorientations.At the same time, and perhapsmore impor-

tantly, individualcontrol does not end once an environment s chosen. Rather,individualsareableto controltheirexposureto manyof the environmentswithin

which they are located,and thus social influenceis rightfullyseen as an ongoing

giveandtakebetweenthe sourceand the recipientof a particular oliticalmessage

(Finifter1974;HuckfeldtandSprague1987, 1991).This interplaywill providean

important ocusforthis paper.

PARTISANSHIP N PARISHAND NEIGHBORHOOD

In the analyses hat follow, we considerthe partisanorientationsof individuals

within the contextsof parishesand neighborhoods. n view of the attitudinalho-

mogeneityacrossthe Catholicparishesof our sample,we havechosento conduct

feels abortion houldnever be legal. A scoreof 6 indicates hatthe respondent eelsabortion houldal-

waysbe legal.The completebatteryof questionsfollows:

There has been a great dealof talk aboutabortion n this electioncampaign.Under whichof

the followingconditionsdo you think abortion hould be legal?First, if a woman s marriedand

doesn'twant anymore children.Shouldabortionbe legalor illegalin this situation? f a woman

is not marriedanddoesn't wantto marry he man. If a familyhas a very low income andcannot

affordanymore children.If there is a strongchance thereis a seriousdefect in the baby.If thewomanbecamepregnantas a resultof rape. If the woman'sown health is endangeredby the

pregnancy.

A slightlydifferentversionof this questionwasused in a follow-up studythat askedclergyto provide

the positionsof theirchurchesregardingwhetherabortion houldbe legal.









TABLE 1

PARTISANSHIP N PARISHESAND NEIGHBORHOODS

Catholics Non-Catholics Both

Constant -1.09 6.36 -.94

(1.94) (1.77) (1.50)

Education .08 .28 .12

(1.72) (3.16) (2.78)

Income .15 -.06 .11

(2.38) ( .55) (1.89)

MeanNeighborhood .55 -2.90 .21

Partisanship (2.79) (2.62) (1.28)

Mean Parish .005 -1.76 .47

Partisanship (.03) (1.78) (3.48)

ParishMean X .80

NeighborhoodMean (2.61)

Catholic -.51

(1.99)R .12 .20 .18

N 430 142 572

MinimumTolerance .41 .02 .41

Source:1984 SouthBendStudy.

Note:Ordinary east squares; oefficient -valuesare in parentheses.

analysesseparately or Catholicandnon-Catholicrespondents,as well as for both

groupscombined.3Table 1 considersthe effects of neighborhoodand parishcon-

texts on individualpartisanship, ontrolling or individual ncomeandeducation,4and the results of the Catholicregression are shown in the first column of thetable. Two things areespeciallynoteworthyregarding he regressionamong Cath-olics. First, the model does not explain a high proportionof the variation n par-

tisanshipamong Catholicswith an R2 of only .12. Second, the only contextualattribute hatproducesaneffectamongCatholics s neighborhoodpartisanship.

Does this meanthatparishpartisanships unimportant o the individualparti-san attitudesof Catholics?Perhaps,but analternativenterpretationmight be that

3Byconductingthese analysesseparately or Catholicsand non-Catholics,andby restrictingatten-

tion to respondentswithin parisheswhere 10 or more respondentsattend, the samplesize for non-

Catholics n particular rows quite small.Thus, the resultsof this paperhave beenconfirmedusingall

respondentswho attendparisheswith morethanthree respondentsattending.This reanalysiswascon-

ducted usingordinary east squaresas well as weighted leastsquares o reflectthe small parishn-sizes

(Hanushekand Jackson1977), and these reanalysesproducedestimatesgenerally n keeping with the

resultsreported n this paper.

4Education s measuredaccording o the years of schooling to a maximumof 17 years.Family in-

come is measuredaccordingto a scale that rangesfrom 1 to 8. In view of the previouslydiscussed

collinearityproblems, he minimumtolerance s shownforeachregressionmodelin this paper,where

the tolerance oreachexplanatory ariable s definedas (1-R2) forthe R2that is obtainedwhen one ex-

planatory ariable sregressedon all otherexplanatory ariables.








372 RobertHuckfeldt,Eric Plutzer,andJohnSprague

the level of variation n the strongly Democratic partisansignal coming from

Catholicparishes s not sufficientto explainvariation n individualpartisanship.

Viewedfrom one perspective his wouldmean thatthe levelof partisanship mong

parishionershas little consequencefor the partisanshipof Catholicswhen onlyCatholicsareconsidered.Viewedfromanotherperspective, hehighlevelof Demo-

craticidentificationamongthe Catholics n our samplemaybe due to the gener-

allyhighlevelsof Democratic upportwithinCatholicparishes.

These resultsfor Catholicscontrastsharplywith the resultsobtained n the sec-

ond columnof table 1 whereonly non-Catholicsare considered.Indeed,all three

of the contextualmeasures-neighborhood and parishpartisanship s well as their

interaction-yield at least marginal -values.Furthermore, he R2 for this model

is increased,explaining20%of the variationn partisanship mongnon-Catholics.

The best way to understand he patternof effects suggestedby the non-Catholicmodelof table1is to portray hemin the three dimensional raphsof figure1. The

two graphsprovidealternativeperspectiveson the samepatternof effects, where

the individual evel factorsareheld constantat intermediate alues,andmeanpar-

tisanship evelsin the neighborhood ndthe parishare allowed o varyacrosstheir

observedranges.We emphasizethat the two partsof figure1 providealternative

perspectivesof the same three-dimensional pace.The only difference s that the

orderingof the neighborhoodpartisanship xis is reversed, herebyproviding wo

differentvantagepointsfrom whichto viewthe three-dimensionalurface.

As figure 1 shows, the-highest level of Republican upportis found amongre-spondentswho are located n Republicanparishesand Republicanneighborhoods.

Perhaps ess intuitively,the highest level of Democraticsupportis foundamong

respondentswho are located in Democraticparishesand Republicanneighbor-

hoods. In such a situationit would appearthat the parishshields the individual

from the neighborhoodand even sustainsa reaction o it (Huckfeldt1986).If we

can assumethat people exercisemore controlover the choice of a parishthan a

neighborhood, hese dataare consonantwith the idea that people takerefuge in

protectiveenvironments churches)whichserve to shieldthem from politicalsig-

nalsover which theyhaveless control(Finifter1974;Coleman1964).How do these resultsrelate o the literatureon cross pressures?Whilethe cross-

pressureargumentwas put forwardby the Columbiaschool to explain various

aspectsof the vote decision, it can be appliedreadilyto partisan oyaltyas well.

Individualswhoreceiveconsistentcues should tendto be resolute n their political

loyaltiesas Democratsor Republicans,while individualswho receive conflicting

cues should be ambivalentn theirloyaltiesandmore likelyto adoptan indepen-

dentorientation.

The resultsof table 1andfigure1 do not fully supportsuch a direct translation

of the cross-pressuresargument.ConsistentlyRepublicancontextsdo encourage

strong Republicanloyalties, but the other results present a more complicated

pattern.ConsistentlyDemocraticcontexts do not producethe highest levels of

Democratic dentification. ndeed, the strongest evels of Democraticsupportare

producedwhen individualsattend Democratic parishesand live in Republican








FIGURE 1

INDIVIDUALPARTY IDENTIFICATIONBY MEAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION N THE

NEIGHBORHOODAND IN THE PARISH, FORNON-CATHOLICS.

Strong

Republican

Strong

Democrat

Strong

Republican

Strong

Democrat

Source:Estimated ornon-Catholics rom regression stimatesof table 1.









neighborhoods.Thus, the cross-pressures rgumentmust be modified by impor-

tant asymmetriesn the influenceof varioussocial structuralpropertieson various

politicalbehaviors-asymmetries producedthrough the complexintersectionsof

multiple and overlapping nvironmentswith individualchoice.The problem still remains:why does the same patternof effects fail to appear

among Catholics?One might arguethat it is a mistake to separateCatholic and

non-Catholicanalyses n the first place, but the problem s not easily or neatly re-

solved by combiningCatholic and non-Catholicrespondents n a single regres-

sion. In an alternativemodel, shown in the third column of table 1, the effect of

the parishcontext and the neighborhoodcontext are considered for the whole

samplewith a dummy variablecontrol for being Catholic.In this instance, only

the regressioncoefficientfor the parish context produces a statisticallydiscern-

ableeffect, perhapssupporting he earlierargumentregarding he importanceofDemocraticparishesamongCatholics.

Why do we see differentpatternsof effects?A clue lies in the rangeof variation

andinterrelationships resentamongthe socialworldsinhabitedby Catholicsand

non-Catholics. n particular,he relationshipbetween the partisan ompositionof

the two contexts is very strong amongCatholics R2= .50) but nonexistentamong

non-Catholics R2= .02). In short, the Catholics n our sample are less likely to

experienceneighborhoodsand parishesthat emit divergentpolitical signals,and

hence it is more difficultto uncover the patternof interdependent ffectspresent

amongnon-Catholics.The level of diversity n the social worldsof Catholicsandnon-Catholics s not

simply a methodological ssue. Being Catholic (or not being Catholic)is much

more than an intrinsic, idiosyncratic haracteristic f individuals.Being Catholic

(ornot being Catholic) s a determinant f socialexperience,and the consequences

extend farbeyond systemsof beliefs to include the realitiesof dailylife. The roots

of these differentpatternsof existenceare historicaland institutional.First, as a

matterof history, manyof South Bend's Catholicsare the descendantsof Eastern

European mmigrantswho came to Indiana ate in the nineteenthandearlyin the

twentiethcenturies.That commonhistoricalexperienceproduceda Catholic,eth-nic communityin South Bend with strongDemocratic roots (Stabrowski1984),

and even thoughthe communityhasbeentransformed n a continualbasis,a his-

toricalresidue s still evident.Second, as a matterof institutionaldesign,Catholic

parishesaregeographically ased-individuals areassigned o nearbyparishes.As

a result these two elements of social structure-parish and neighborhood-tend

to traveltogether.The substantive andtheoreticalandmethodological)esson we

takefromthis analysis s that the partisan ffects of parishandneighborhood on-

texts are betterunderstoodrelative o the religiousgroup n question.

ABORTIONATTITUDES IN PARISH AND NEIGHBORHOOD

The politicalreachof social influenceextends farbeyond partisanship. n the

following analyseswe considerthe consequencesof neighborhoodsand parishes









for the abortionattitudes of individual respondents.The initial question thus

becomes: Does the structure of social influence vary as a function of the be-

havior being influenced?If citizens live simultaneously n a variety of social

worlds, do all these social worldshave similar politicalconsequencesacrossdif-ferentbehaviors?

Using table 1 as a point of reference,a differentpatternof contextualeffects is

demonstratedwhen the neighborhoodand parisheffectson abortionattitudesare

consideredin table 2(a). In this instance no contextual effect is present among

Catholics.The neighborhood ffect amongnon-Catholicsdisappears,but a parish

effect is sustained-non-Catholic respondentswho attendpro-choiceparishesare

more likely to hold pro-choice attitudes.Both models demonstratean effect for

church attendance hat is especiallypronouncedamongCatholics:peoplewho at-

tend more frequentlyappear o be morepro-life in theirattitudes.In summary, he evidence suggeststhat the neighborhood s relevant or some

behaviorsbut not forothers, amongsome respondentsbut not amongothers. In a

similarvein, parisheffects are present for both partisanshipand abortionatti-

tudes among some people but not among others. At least among non-Catholics,

it would appearthat social influenceis specializedand structuredby the multi-

dimensionalnatureof socialexperience.Peoplelook to differentplacesfor differ-

ent cues regardingdifferent behaviors. Coreligionistsmay be more influential

regardingpolitical ssues that involve faith and morality.Secular settingsmay be

more importantas sources of influenceregardingsecularmatters-politics andpartisanship.

When the model is estimated for a combined sample of Catholicsand non-

Catholics with a dummy variablefor Catholics (third column of table 2a), the

non-Catholic patternof effects is maintainedbut the magnitudesof the parish

effect and its corresponding -value are substantiallyreduced. And thus adding

Catholicsto the analysistends to attenuatethe parisheffect. Why do we fail to

find a parisheffect among Catholics?Or do we fail to find an effect? Recallthat

the variation n abortionattitudes is restrictedacrossCatholicparishes.In other

words,to attenda Catholicparish s to be exposedto a context wherepro-lifeatti-tudes prevail.The differenceamong Catholicparishesmay not be sufficientto

providestatisticalpurchase,but this is not the same as saying thatthe parishdoes

not matter.

An alternativeway to addressthe importanceof the parish s in terms of indi-

vidualexposure.Recallthe strongeffect of church attendanceamongCatholics.

At least two interpretationsmight accountfor this effect. First, it may simplybe

the case that regularattendersare more religious,and religious people are more

pro-life.Alternatively,t maybe the case that regularattendersexposethemselves

morefrequently o the normative tanceof theircongregations egardingabortion(Sprague 1981).We cannoteasilychoosebetween these two alternatives orCath-

olics because here is relatively ittle parishvariationn abortionattitudes.That is,

we cannot observethe consequenceof Catholicsattendinga pro-choiceCatholic

parish.








TABLE 2

ABORTIONATTITUDES IN NEIGHBORHOODSAND PARISHES

A. Effects of neighborhood ndparishcontexts


Constant 4.12 5.32 3.97(3.17) (1.76) (3.23)

PartyIdentification -.07 -.07 -.07(1.31) ( .76) (1.43)

ChurchAttendance -.66 -.29 -.58(7.85) (2.02) (7.96)

Education .07 -.01 .06(1.34) ( .01) (1.30)

Income -.01 .08 .004(.18) (.69) ( .07)

MeanNeighborhood .31 -.59 .16Attitude (1.03) (.82) (.58)

MeanParish -.07 .53 .23Attitude (.30) (2.42) (1.43)

Catholic -.53

(2.01)R2 .16 .14 .18N 348 108 456MinimumTolerance .71 .71 .64

B. Contingenteffectsof parishcontexts,dependingon attendance.


Constant 4.58 13.72 9.18(1.56) (4.42) (5.08)

PartyIdentification -.06 -.02 -.07(1.17) ( .25) (1.54)

ChurchAttendance -.57 -2.99 -1.69

.86) (4.12) (4.43)Education .08 .003 .06

(1.46) (.04) (1.21)Income -.002 .12 .02

(.04) (1.13) (.36)MeanParish .09 -2.22 -1.08

Attitude ( .10) (2.94) (2.28)AttendanceX -.03 .67 .33

ParishAttitude ( .14) (3.77) (2.97)Catholic -.76

(2.80)R2 .16 .24 .20N 348 108

456MinimumTolerance .01 .03 .03

Source:1984SouthBendStudy.Note:Ordinary eastsquares; oefficient -valuesare in parentheses.









A far differentsituationexists among non-Catholics,however.The composi-

tion of their parisheswith respectto abortionattitudesshows much more varia-

tion, andthus a directtest is available orthe two previouslystatedalternatives. f

attendance s importantbecause it exposes church members to the climate ofopinionwithinthe parish, hen we shouldexpectthat:(1) the effectof the climate

of opinionshoulddependon attendance,and (2) the effect of attendance hould

dependon the climateof opinion.

These expectationsareset againstevidencein table2(b), wherea simplemulti-

plicative nteractionvariables included n the regressionmodels.This interaction

variable s calculatedas the productof individualchurch attendancefrequency

and the mean parish abortionattitude. Not unexpectedly,given the restricted

rangeof mean abortionattitudesamongCatholicparishes, his additionalvariable

fails to provideexplanatorypurchaseamongCatholics.Amongnon-Catholics, ncontrast,all three variables-church attendance,parishabortionattitudes,and

the interaction-produce crispt-valuesandsubstantial oefficients.A similarpat-

tern is presentfor the sampleas a whole in the thirdcolumnof the table,but the

magnitudeof the coefficientsandtheir t-valuesarediminished.

Once again, the interactioneffect among non-Catholics is best considered

throughthe use of three-dimensionalprojections(see figure 2). As before, the

figureis displayedfrom two differentperspectives n this instance accordingto

alternativeorderingsof the attendancefrequencyaxis. Carefulexaminationof

figure2 showsthat:1. Increasedattendancen pro-lifeparishes s related o pro-lifeattitudes.

2. Increasedattendance n pro-choiceparishes s relatedto pro-choiceattitudes.

3. Peoplewho attendregularlyaremorelikelyto havepro-lifeattitudes f theyat-

tendpro-lifechurches.

4. Amongthosepeoplewho attend nfrequently,an inverserelationship xistsbe-

tween individualattitudesand the parish-individuals aremore likelyto have

pro-choiceattitudes f theybelongto pro-lifeparishes.

The first three effects aredirectlyinterpretable,but the fourtheffect requiresmore carefulconsideration.We maybe witnessinga situation n whichnonatten-

danceserves as a shield againsta parishcontext which the individualfinds to be

disagreeable.Thus, attendance ervesto exposeindividuals o the climateof opin-

ion of the parish,but parishionerscontrol their own attendancepatterns.And

thus theymaychoosenonattendance san articulated r unarticulated esponse o

an environment hat is at variancewith their own viewpoint(compare o Finifter

1974).

In summary,parishesmattermore than neighborhoodswith respect to influ-

encing abortionattitudes.The effect of parishes s, however,mediatedby expo-sure. Regularattendersare more likely to be affectedthan infrequentattenders.

Thus, we see a patternof effects in which the structureof socialinfluencevaries

acrossattitudesandindividuals n systematicways.








FIGURE 2

INDIVIDUALABORTIONATTITUDE BY MEAN ABORTIONATTITUDE IN PARISH AND

INDIVIDUAL ATTENDANCEFREQUENCY,FORNON-CATHOLICS.

Pro-choice

Pro-life

CC *eCv'

Pro-choice

-5

Pro-life

Source: Estimated for non-Catholics from regression estimates of table 2b.









THE SOURCE OF PARISH INFLUENCE

We may,of course, be witnessingthe waggingtail rather han the barkingdog.

What is the source of the parisheffect on parishioners?Do they respond to com-

monly held beliefs among theircoreligionists,or do their own opinions-and the

opinions of other parishioners-respond to the theological positions of their

churches?Four yearsafter the original South Bend study, a team of interviewers

conducted a follow-up study in which they interviewed the pastors of many

parishesattendedby the respondents.In some instances,of course, the inter-

viewed parish pastor (or priestor rabbi) s not the samepastorwho was in place

fouryearsearlier.For present purposes,however,this does not pose a significant

problem.

Ourgoalis to assess the theologicalpositionof the respondent's hurchregard-

ing abortion.Each pastorwas askedto providehis or her own interpretation f the

church'steachingon the abortion ssue relativeto the same set of circumstances

regardingwhich the respondentshad been askedto give their positions.Thus, we

have the judgmentof a well-informedobserverregarding he theologicalposition

of the church which the respondentreports attending-a judgmentthat is likely

to be quitestableacross ime and acrossclergywithin the same church.

The initial question becomes: how well do the theological positions of the

churchescorrespond o the attitudes of the parishioners?They correspondquite

well for the sampleas a whole (n = 514), generatinga correlationof .44. The cor-

relation s dramatically educed,however,when Catholicsand non-Catholicsare

considered separately:.04 among Catholics (n = 371) and .14 among non-

Catholics(n = 125). This means that the theologicalposition of the church ex-

plains,atmaximum,2% of the variationn parishioner ttitudes.

The weak correlationamongCatholics s due at least in partto the extremely

restrictedrangeof variation n the interpretedpositionsof church teaching pro-

vided by Catholic clergy. A different situation prevails among non-Catholics,

however, where church teachings vary from consistently pro-choice to consis-

tently pro-life.The prevailingattitudesof parishionersend to be more moderate

than the positions of their churches. Parishioners n pro-life churches tend to

be more pro-choicethan the clergy interpretedposition of their churches, and

parishioners n pro-choicechurches tend to be more pro-life. Thus, while the

non-Catholic parishionersgenerallytake the theologicalcue of the church, the

slopeof the relationships fairlyflat,and there are substantial ggregatedeviations

even from this modestrelationship.

Finally,which factordoes a betterjobof explaining ndividualattitudesregard-

ing abortion: he theologicalpositionof the individual'schurch or the positions

held amongotherparishioners?n analysesnot shownhere, the modelsof table 1

and table2 were rerunwith the clergy-supplied heologicalposition substitutedfor the meanparishattitude,and the results were much less impressive.The cli-

mate of opinionmeasureprovidesmuchmorestatisticalpurchase han the clergy-

reported heologicalposition.









CONCLUSION

People locate themselves in neighborhoods,churches, workplaces,clubs, and

associations. They make these locationalchoices for good reasons on rational

grounds, but in the processthey also define-even if indirectlyand unintention-

ally-the dimensionsof their social experience.This social experiencehas rele-

vance far beyond the basis of the original choice. In particular, t defines the

compositionof politicalpreferences o which the individual s exposed.

As a matterof convenienceand necessity, contextualstudies of politics have

typicallysummarized ocial experience n terms of geographical nits-precincts,

neighborhoods, ounties,states. All too frequently hesemeasurementprocedures

have obscuredthe multidimensionalnature of social experiencethat is produced

by the separate lementsof social structure.Each structural lement carrieswith it

political implications hat are potentially mportant.In some instances,for some

behaviors,one structuralelement is importantwhile another s not. In other in-

stances, multiplestructural lements must be seen as being interdependentn the

constructionof a politicallyrelevantsocialexperience.In still other instancesthe

importanceof particular tructural lements is best seen as the result of individual

exposure,and individualexposure s best seen as a furthermanifestationof indi-

vidual choice.

In summary,social influencein politics is structurallybased, but it frequently

dependson multipleelements of socialstructure.It imposesitself on individuals,

but individualchoice playsa majorrole in determiningwhich individualsare ex-

posedto whichpoliticalcues andviewpoints.The emergingview is one in which

social nfluence s structurally eterminedbut in which the social nfluenceprocess

cannot be understoodaccording o any simpledeterministic ogic (Boudon 1986).

Ratherthe end resultof social influence n politics is createdby the points of in-

tersection between individualchoice and the multiplebases of social experience.

Manuscriptubmitted3 April 1991

Finalmanuscripteceived 6July 1992

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RobertHuckfeldtis professorof politicalscience, IndianaUniversity,Bloom-

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Eric Plutzer is assistantprofessorof political science, Iowa State University,

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JohnSprague s professorof politicalscience,WashingtonUniversity,St. Louis,

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huckfeldt_alternative contexts of political behavior

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