Human Security Principle

focusing on prevention

GROUP 3Fukasawa, Michiko / LEE, Chae won / CHOI,

Seungyeon

Prevention: the comparison ofOkirai and Okawa Elementary School

・ Near the river・ Had a large mountain behind the school buildings・ During class→ Prevention determined whether children could survive or not.

2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami

Case1: Okirai Elementary School

・ located on lower place than the municipal road

→ Parents complained to the school

→ Built a large emergency staircase

→ All children and teachers survived.

Case2: Okawa Elementary School

14:16 Earthquake convulsed the whole city

15:00 Teachers called the roll of students Started to discuss where they should take refuge at

15:25 Municipality bulletin warned of Tsunami The discussion finished

15:37 The river flooded Students were carried away while evacuating

Lessons:

① Assuming “the worst” is effective

② The administration should listen to

what people are anxious about

Hurricane Katrina

Prevention: Superdome and FEMA

Focusing on New Orleans,

i. Main causes those led to failure

ii. Timeline

iii. Evaluation

Hurricane Katrina-One of the most dangerous hurricanes in American history Yet New Orleans was not ready

New Orleans• Poor city• NO personal transportation

(20%)

Levees• Can endure up to Category 3 → Katrina: Category 5 • Worn-out

1st Cause

Timeline: August, 2005

FEMA(Federal Emergency Management Agency)

Until 9/11 After 9/11

Result

Originally belonged to the White House

Went under Homeland Security Department

(by Congress)

Lack of communication

Low Efficiency Blame Game

2nd

Cause

Lack of Consensus within Local Government

Conflict between Mayor and Governor Passive evacuation enforcement Did not connect itself firmly to FEMA and central

government

3 rd Cause

Evaluation Authorities did not tried their best on evacuation plan 3/5 Lack of communications between authorities 1/5 Levees: terribly mismanaged 2/5 Shelter: Superdome was nice try, but was not enough 3/5

Prevention: Less than 50%

2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami

Prevention: Buffer Zone Policy of Sri Lanka

100M landwards from the mean high water line in South coast

200M landwards from the mean high water line in East coast

Vary from 35M to 125M standards from the 1997 Coastal Zone Management

Plan

Timeline

Earth-quake

26 December 2004

Buffer ZoneMarch 2005

Buffer Zone Re-vised

February 2006

Tsunami Impact

Fishing communities forced to be displaced and livelihoods of the most vulnerable being threatened

Reconstruction and relocation scheme delayed until policy revision

Poorly assessed damages and arbitrary compensation

Buffer Zone Policy

Bigger confusion and uncertainty created

Buffer Zone Policy

Arbitrary policy without consultation with the victims and professionals

Local and village level officers (Grama Sevakas) ill informed of the policy

Lacking considerations on deep-rooted ethno-national tensions, intensifying security threats

Prevention policy threatening human security

ConclusionLessons for future preventive measures

Assuming the worst case scenario Promoting cooperation among government

sectors / between authority and people Understanding and considering vulnerability

created by social, political, economic and cultural forces

Not a simple work to go through

Prevention - ALWAYS IMPORTANT

Thank you