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Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical

Infrastructure Communications Networks

November 2005

UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks

© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 2

Copyright 2005 United Telecom Council

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical

methods, without prior written permission of the United Telecom Council.

The United Telecom Council is a global organization serving all corners of the world and virtually every community in the United States. Our ongoing mission is to create a favorable business,

regulatory and technical environment in which all members and stakeholders will thrive. We do this through a variety of advocacy, compliance, technology, information, and education programs.

We invite you to explore our web site at www.utc.org and let us know how we can be of further service to you.

The United Telecom Council represents electric and gas utilities, water companies, energy

pipelines, and other critical infrastructure companies, as well as their technology partners and other corporate telecom/IT users � all united in their commitment to ensuring the best, most reliable systems and networks critical to their core business and the customers they serve.

United Telecom Council

1901 Pennsylvania Ave, NW 5th Floor

Washington, DC 20006 202.872.0030

�The information contained herein is general in nature and is not intended, and should not be construed, as professional advice or opinion provided to the user. This document does not

purport to be a complete statement of the approaches or steps, which may vary according to individual factors and circumstances, necessary for a business to accomplish any particular

business goal. This document is provided for informational purposes only; it is meant solely to provide helpful information to the user. This document is not a recommendation from of any

particular approach and should not be relied upon to address or solve any particular matter. The information provided herein is on an �as-is� basis.�



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 Executive Summary ..................................................... 2

2.0 Background .................................................................. 4

3.0 Survey Questions and Results .................................... 8

3.1 Communications Systems Performance ..................... 8

3.2 Land Mobile Radio, Backbone Survivor .................... 10

3.3 Utility Fiber Networks Benefited from Pre-planning. 12

3.4 Microwave Systems Stood up to the Storms............. 13

3.5 Utilities and Public Safety Need Better Coordination 14

4.0 Summary of Utility Communications Performance Issues from 2005 Hurricanes ..................................... 16

APPENDIX � QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES ......................... 20



1.0 Executive Summary The hurricane season of 2005 resulted in immense damage and tragic loss of life to Florida and the Gulf Coast of the United States. Storms Katrina, Rita and Wilma also pointed out the weaknesses in many of our critical infrastructures, including telecommunications networks, some of which are still recovering months later. However, in sharp contrast to many commercial wireless, landline telephone and other telecommunications networks, the private, internal networks (radio, microwave and fiber) of electric, gas and water utilities for the most part continued to function throughout and immediately after the storms. In some cases, it was utility communications networks that provided the only reliable communications among emergency responders and other officials during the first few days after the storms. The reliable performance of these internal systems was neither unexpected nor unusual; utility communications systems are constructed specifically to withstand major disasters. The United Telecom Council (UTC), the international trade association representing the telecommunications interests of critical infrastructure industries,1 has conducted informal polling of its members after such emergencies as a major Northeast ice storm in 1998; the huge electric blackout of August 2003; and the hurricanes of 2004, with similar results. However, given the magnitude of this year�s disasters and resulting national discussions concerning the survivability of communications networks, UTC felt it imperative to undertake a formal survey of Gulf Coast electric, gas and water utilities of all sizes, to generate data that would quantify our anecdotal information. Overall findings: ! 86% of impacted CII entities responding reported that their

communications networks generally survived the hurricanes and continued to operate well throughout restoration efforts;

! Private land mobile radio (LMR) networks provided critical communications

among crews; however, the huge number of responding entities from around the country taxed capacity or could not operate on local systems, pointing up the need for CII interoperability;

1 UTC�s membership consists primarily of publicly-held, municipal and cooperative electric, gas and water utilities and gas pipelines, and Federal power authorities. Through affiliated association members, UTC reaches out to other Critical Infrastructure Industries (CII) as defined by the FCC in Section 90.7 of its Rules (47 CFR § 90.7), including petroleum and oil pipeline companies and railroads.



! Utility fiber and microwave systems survived and generally continued to function; however, this was due in part to built-in redundancies, robustness and recovery mechanisms that would be cost-prohibitive for a for-profit network designed to serve the general public. Therefore, CII entities will continue to require private networks to meet mission-critical needs for the foreseeable future, along with the ability to expand them as needed to meet system growth requirements.

! Unfortunately, there was little or no formal coordination with state or local

agencies or public safety organizations during or after the storms. Given the opportunities for improved response communications offered by robust CII systems, and the presence of CII personnel �on the ground� in nearly every disaster scenario, this lack emphasizes that CII MUST be included in emergency response planning at the Federal level.

We believe these findings should be of significant importance to Congress and to Federal agencies charged with communications-related Homeland Security responsibilities, such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Homeland Security. UTC and its members look forward to discussing these findings and their implications with policymakers and others.



2.0 Background During the months of August, September and October of 2005, the Gulf Coast of the United States and both coasts of Florida were belted by a series of three devastating hurricanes: Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Katrina put much of New Orleans under water; trees were flattened as well as homes, public buildings and communications towers by Category 4 winds. Loss of life from this storm was tragic, and unusually high. Rescue and restoration effort were severely hampered by the loss of public switched network (PSTN) landlines and wireless carrier communications. Scores of individuals were isolated without power in unsanitary conditions, desperately in need of help, without the means to request it. Still recovering, Gulf States were again pelted by Hurricane Rita just weeks later and then by Wilma in October. While these storms were not quite as severe as Katrina, the rapid succession tested the limits of overstressed public safety and utility repair personnel. It became clear as response efforts continued that the recovery of nearly all other infrastructures was dependent on electric power restoration. Moreover, all people have a vital need for safe drinking water and public health demands reliable wastewater facilities. Within these industries, as always, coordination of repair crews, rapid restoration and interaction with public safety personnel depends upon working communications channels. As days passed, stories from the utility companies in the area emerged in which it became apparent that the performance of private CII networks was markedly different from the more-publicized state of communications networks in the commercial and public safety sectors. Residents of the Gulf Coast and Florida are served by a wide variety of electric, gas and water utilities, including many small regional cooperatives and municipal power/water authorities whose service territories lie within those of larger entities. These include large, investor-owned electric power companies, electric generating companies and natural gas utilities. The utility service territories most severely impacted by the storms fall around the hurricane storm tracks depicted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA):



http://alt.ngs.noaa.gov/katrina/KATRINA0000.HTM On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, with 140 mph winds. It then continued northward and made a second landfall, on the same day, on the Louisiana/Mississippi border with winds of 125 mph.2

2 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAT_aug.shtml?



http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/rita/RITA0000.HTM

http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/wilma/WILMA0000.HTM

After hearing a great deal of anecdotal evidence about the performance of member communications systems, UTC looked for as many CII entities as

Most recently (October 24), Hurricane Wilma made landfall on the western coast of Florida, displaying category 3 wind intensity, near Cape Romano. It accelerated, crossing Florida in just five hours time.

Less than a month later, on September 24, Hurricane Rita made landfall just east of the Texas/Louisiana boarder, near Galveston, with category 3 intensity winds of 120 mph. Rita was reported by the NOAA as having caused devastating storm surges and wind damage in Southwestern Louisiana and the extreme southeastern portion of Texas.



possible in the most-impacted areas; after identifying 21 utility companies of various sizes in the areas hardest-hit by the storms, we contacted them in order to assess consistently the effects upon their communications systems. The list, while a fairly comprehensive cross-section of utility sizes and types, is not offered as a complete directory of affected entities.

Company Impacted by Katrina

Impacted by Rita

Impacted by Wilma

Baldwin EMC ● Centerpoint (includes Reliant) ● CLECO Power ●

Coast EP ● Dixie Electric Power Association ●

Entergy (Louisiana, New Orleans and Gulf States)

●

Florida Power and Light ● Huntsville Utilities ● Joe Wheeler Electric Cooperative ●

Lafayette Utilities Systems ● ● Lafourche Parish Water District No. 1 ●

Louisiana Generating LLC ● ● Magnolia EPA ●

Mississippi Power Co. (Southern Company) ● Pearl River EPA ● Sam Houston Electric Cooperative ●

Singing River EPA ● South Mississippi Electric Power Association ●

Southern Pine Electric Power Association ● Southwest Louisiana EMC ●

Washington St. Tammany EC ●



3.0 Survey Questions and Results The United Telecom Council posed five basic questions to utilities in hard-hit areas to determine how their various communications systems fared during and after the hurricanes, and analyzed the resulting data. Of the 21 electric and water utilities identified and contacted, 14 responded to the survey, a 66% response rate we deeply appreciate given the repair work to infrastructure still underway in some areas. In addition to answering the questions, many respondents offered anecdotal information; this is included as an Appendix at the end of this report to provide additional insights.

3.1 Communications Systems Performance Most utilities, regardless of service territory size or proximity to the centers of the storms, reported that their communications systems stood up well to the hurricanes. This stands in stark contrast to the public switched network (PSTN) in the region and wireless carriers, who suffered extensive loss of service and slow recovery time. The comparison points to the fact that communications systems, if built extremely well, can withstand the intense wind and/or flooding associated with these events; however, unlike public networks, CII systems� redundancies and robustness can be limited in size and scope, since they are designed and constructed to meet the specialized needs of a single entity or group of companies. Such construction would be cost-prohibitive for a commercial system designed to serve millions of the general public. Thus, in spite of the growth of various commercial communications networks, there will be a continued need for CII entities to maintain their own private communications networks for mission-critical functions, including backbone networks. Of the fourteen companies responding, twelve (86%) said that their communications systems stood up excellently or well, with only two companies (14%) having serious communications problems.3 Most companies that suffered damage to their equipment and networks fixed it very quickly, generally within 24-48 hours following the passing of the hurricane.4 Such repairs were carried

3 One of these was due to the company�s reliance on cell phones; the other company did not specify the reason for its poor performance (see Appendix). 4 Note that repairs to communications networks included ensuring that generators were operational and fully fueled, so that communications facilities operated where no grid-based power was available. In at least one case, electric utility telecom personnel were detailed to an uninhabitable headquarters building the day after Katrina to ensure that all local communications nodes were functioning via generator. In another instance, telecom networks were kept operating by sandbagging a flooded building, keeping water levels down to only six inches in the communications equipment room; the



out according to detailed emergency plans, since communications networks are vital to power restoration and infrastructure recovery efforts being undertaken area-wide. Across the board, private systems out-performed the commercial. Utilities reported that cell phones and landlines were down, leased lines did not fare well and that satellite communications were choppy at best. One small water district authority that depends entirely on cellular communications suffered serious communications difficulties. The utilities that had the greatest communications difficulties were the smaller cooperatives and municipal authorities. Such performance differences highlight the need to share resources in emergency situations and for interoperability among CII entities. Whereas cooperatives tend to help cooperatives and IOUs help IOUs, currently there tends not to be assistance provided between utility segments. Lack of interoperability among utilities and between utilities and public safety remains a serious problem that hampers restoration efforts; hurricane rescue and restoration efforts provide an example of the benefit that could be reaped from allocating a small amount of dedicated spectrum for CII, with systems to be built using an open architecture and made available to all emergency responders as needed for disaster recovery.

associated power generation plant at the same location had been knocked out by storm damage.



3.2 Land Mobile Radio, Backbone Survivor Without exception, survey respondents that maintain land mobile radio (LMR) systems were pleased with their performance during and after the storms. Unlike most commercial wireless systems, these networks are built specifically to weather such disasters and to continue to operate in extended power outages, in support of restoration crews carrying out extremely hazardous duties.5 Where possible, LMR networks also support radios brought in by visiting crews from utilities across the region or from other parts of the country. However, the superior performance of individual systems and the industry in general is offset by the lack of interoperability between systems and the lack of dedicated spectrum to share with other utilities and public safety. Where host utilities had no additional capacity, or assisting utilities used other frequency bands, valuable time was wasted in restoration efforts because of the need to work around communications difficulties or use host utility personnel to guide visiting crews without another means of contacting emergency control centers. LMR is at this time the most critical tool of critical infrastructure communications in emergency situations. It provides for necessary mobility and quality of service as crews travel throughout the damaged service territory. In many cases during events such as Katrina, it provides the only means of wireless communications during the first critical days after storm impact. The overall performance of private utility communications systems during the catastrophic storms, in comparison with consumer networks, reinforces the industry position that private systems must be maintained, and encouraged for emergency response. The emphasis upon reliability for utility operations dictates that critical infrastructure entities not depend upon commercial systems for core communications for the foreseeable future. However, one downside to the current LMR framework is that responding utilities operate on several different frequency bands: below 100 MHz, 150-512 MHz, 900 MHz and 800 MHz for voice systems alone. This hampers the ability of neighboring utilities to help each other and hamstrings utilities that travel to assist with restoration and recovery efforts. Unlike traditional public safety, energy companies such as electric utilities assume a nationwide response from other entities as part of their emergency response planning. A broad network of mutual assistance contracts is in place across the country, and in severe situations such as the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, other companies also 5 The job of electric lineman is consistently rated one of the ten most hazardous in the nation based on per capita deaths (Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), and visiting crews working long hours under unfamiliar conditions must be considered even more at risk. LMR units are carried and relied upon as safety equipment by field crews, who expect ubiquitous coverage across the entire service territory regardless of terrain or population density.



are contacted for equipment and crews. Assistance generally runs along ownership lines: investor-owned utilities generally come to the aid of other IOUs, while crews from other cooperatives are called to assist impacted cooperative utilities. It is not at all unusual to see crews from 30 or more utilities in convoys of trucks heading for the area ahead of time when a severe event is forecast, or immediately afterward when an unexpected disaster strikes. Outside crew convoys, especially from larger utilities, carry their own supplies and stage themselves near the area of disaster impact. In the case of disasters such as hurricanes, they enter the area and begin recovery work as soon as wind levels fall. Assisting companies should be able to bring their own radios to the area with the knowledge that they will function on the host utility�s system. Where this was possible in some areas post-Katrina (for example, one utility�s new 900 MHz trunked system accommodated assisting crews from two other, out-of-state companies), generally host utility personnel carrying local radios must serve as guides and communications links to assisting crews, a waste of personnel and time better spent in recovery efforts. Meanwhile, entities sending crews to assist must obtain emergency Special Temporary Authority from the FCC to use their own, portable equipment in areas where they are not licensed to operate. This is hardly an ideal situation. In order to take full advantage of the robustness of LMR networks, CII companies should have a small allocation of dedicated spectrum on which an open architecture, interoperable system can be built to CII standards. Such a system could ensure reliable wireless communication for emergency response, not only to a large number of responding CII personnel, but to public safety and Federal responders, as well. The storms of 2005, as well as the other disasters of the past and the certainty of more in the future, make a strong case for pursuing this option.



3.3 Utility Fiber Networks Benefited from Pre-planning The performance of private and commercial fiber networks during the hurricanes demonstrates that utilities build more reliability and redundancy into fiber networks than their commercial communications networks counterparts. The technology itself offers all system operators multiple opportunities to secure communications through the ability to deploy features such as intelligent, self-healing rings and by burying cables. The different performance levels of private and some commercial fiber networks throughout the Gulf Coast and Florida point to the fact that the entities have entirely different objectives in mind from the onset: utilities build for reliability because communications is critical to the functioning of the core business (electric, natural gas or water delivery), while commercial communications companies build for the general population to provide consumer services. While the difference in end-goals is entirely understandable, the redundancy and geographic diversity of utility fiber networks makes them potentially excellent candidates to meet Homeland Security goals of survivable networks. Responses to the third survey question bear out the conclusion that private fiber networks survived the storms due to pre-planning for worst case scenarios. Respondents owning fiber networks, as would be expected, are generally large in size. All reported that they stood up very well to the storms: where there were problems, they were overcome by inherent features of the technology. These features were pre-planned and built into the networks. By contrast, commercial companies suffered more difficulties with broken cables than private, internal networks and had more difficulty restoring service. Smaller utilities relying upon commercial fiber-based networks reported that it took weeks for service to be restored or that it still was not functioning properly at the time of interview. In only one case among respondents was significant difficulty by an IOU alluded to by a smaller company sharing the IOU�s fiber. It is interesting to note, as stated by a large electric IOU, that more damage to cable was done during the recovery effort by repair crews than by the storms themselves.



3.4 Microwave Systems Stood up to the Storms Like fiber networks, microwave systems stood up very well to the storms, a somewhat surprising outcome given the intense winds accompanying these events. Overall, some damage to microwave towers and attachments was reported, but this damage was not as extensive as it was to other types of communications towers such as generally taller broadcast towers. Additionally, utilities reported that they employed detailed backup plans, including employing mobile towers and safeguarding communications through redundant links. Any needed repairs, such as refocusing dishes to restore links, were accomplished in the days immediately following the storms. Some interesting anecdotal information relating to tower repairs included the physical difficulties for crews in reaching the tower sites due to downed trees; also, securing fuel supplies for generators was sometimes difficult. While many CII entities� response planning includes contracting for a reliable fuel supply, the 2005 hurricanes created unusual fuel shortages; in addition, Federal emergency responders often commandeered available supplies in the area, although no respondent to this survey specifically noted this as a cause for a lack of fuel in this case. Again, the Katrina response story among public safety, Federal, state and local officials, and CII entities, along with other industries, points to the need to include all emergency responders in disaster planning.



3.5 Utilities and Public Safety Need Better Coordination Given the outstanding performance of utility communications during the hurricanes and critical infrastructure personnel�s� role as emergency responders, as well as the dependence of all other infrastructures on reliable power (and all people on safe water), thorough Homeland Security planning demands CII participation. A number of Congressional hearings, including testimony by DHS officials on the subjects of interoperability, spectrum management and Incident Command Systems (ICS), took place in the weeks after Katrina and Rita. Much attention was paid to the role and needs of Public Safety (PS); however, in spite of statements noting the reliance of recovery on power restoration, CII entities were largely overlooked in the discussions. To do so deprives policymakers of a prime opportunity to use proven reliability for the good of Americans affected by disasters. Unfortunately, however, UTC�s research shows that, for whatever reason, local coordination between public safety and CII is inconsistent and patchy, a situation that must improve to enable efficient emergency response. The last question of this survey asked about coordination between public safety and CII entities during storm recovery. While utility communications systems fared well during the hurricanes, there was little or no coordination with state or local public safety organizations aside from some informal sharing of resources, such the assistance of a dispatch operator and/or a dedicated E911 line. In the examples given by respondents, the utilities played the role of assisting public safety, and not the other way around. At least one respondent noted that public safety agencies requested use of its communications network; such requests are not uncommon and reflect local understanding of the robustness of CII systems. What coordination existed clearly had been arrived at locally by personnel understanding the need for some form of communications, but with the exception of one statewide network, there was little in UTC�s survey responses to inspire confidence in this area.6 Beside the clear needs of dedicated spectrum for CII and accompanying advancements in communications interoperability, CII entities responding to disasters should be included in any State or Federally developed coordination process. Post-Hurricane Hearings During congressional hearings on September 29, 2005, witness David E. Liebersbach of the National Emergency Management Association noted that, �� local gas, electric and oil companies [need] to know exactly where [who] to go to in ICS (national Incident Command System) during emergency response.�7 6 Anecdotally, UTC members noted that public safety personnel unfamiliar with some utility truck logos sometimes refused entry to impacted areas by crews seeking to restore power. Such incidents underscore the need for prior planning at a higher level. 7 House Homeland Security Committee Hearing on Incident Command, Control and Communications during Catastrophic Events, October 19, 2005.



Even with excellent internal utility company emergency response plans, CII should be included in the next step of participating in an area-wide response effort. According to National Fraternal Order of Police President Chuck Canterbury, most communities use some form of the ICS system [this is not the case for utilities], but a national plan is required. During Katrina there was a situation of �self-dispatching� [for public safety], �and where there is a virtual destruction of the local command center � there needs to be a backup (national) command structure.8 As industries with thousands of personnel moving through the area in recovery efforts, CII entities need to be a part of this development. During the House hearings Chief William D. �Bill� Killen, President of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, stated that in order to be successful a national ICS needs the following: 1. DHS to require everyone to take an online course 2. NIS security requirements 3. DHS must offer resources to communities that submit a mutual aid plan 4. Congress must fully fund ICS9 CII entities are deeply involved with DHS, especially in the areas of critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity, because of large enterprise IT networks and critical control systems such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA. However, CII must be included in interoperability efforts, as well. Following an announcement by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Ken Moran, Director of Homeland Security for the FCC, stated in post-hurricane Senate hearings that a working group has been formed to study communications and specifically, ways to fund interoperability development. CII has a significant contribution to offer to such efforts, and must have a presence in these discussions.10 Equipment that is not dependent on frequency assignments is extremely important to both CII and public safety, while again, unlike traditional public safety, CII has no dedicated spectrum on which to operate a next-generation communications system. This definitely is a long-term effort and one that will require massive investment by all parties concerned in new infrastructure and new user equipment.

8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Senate Commerce hearing on Communications Interoperability, October 19, 2005.



4.0 Summary of Utility Communications Performance Issues from 2005 Hurricanes Utilities and other critical infrastructure companies along the Gulf Coast have a great deal to be proud of in their response to the catastrophic hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma. The massive responsibility of power restoration depended on a number of factors; chief among them was the necessity of functioning communications systems. Utilities are traditionally conservative in planning communications networks, placing heavy emphasis upon reliability. Thankfully, redundancy and contingency planning paid off for all but the hardest- hit in these industries. Survey questions posed reveal several important points:

• In sharp contrast to commercial wireless, landline telephone and other telecommunications networks, the private, internal networks (radio, microwave and fiber) of electric, gas and water utilities for the most part continued to function throughout and immediately after the storms;

• Interoperability among utilities and between utilities and public safety remains a serious problem that hampers restoration efforts.

• CII needs a small spectrum allocation to make possible a tough, resistant, interoperable network, whether to be used by CII alone or made available to other emergency responders in such situations.

• Given the good performance of utility communications and our role as emergency responders, as well as the dependence of all other infrastructures on reliable power (and all people on safe water), our members should be included in Homeland Security planning.

UTC recognizes the immense efforts undertaken by utilities facing the challenges of restoration and recovery. On many levels, a fine spirit of cooperation, selflessness and courage emerged during our conversations with the men and women operating utility communications systems along the Gulf Coast and Florida. UTC encourages readers of this report to review the individual responses provided in the attached Appendix � you will hear in that text both their concern for the devastation they witnessed, and their pride in maintaining systems vital to restoration of their communities. The aim of this report is to bring to the attention of CII entities the need for active engagement in government discussions regarding the role of communications during emergency response. Through this small study, UTC also hopes to emphasize to policymakers the rich resource of robust infrastructure, emergency planning and commitment to community that CII entities can bring to emergency response planning and interoperability efforts. UTC and its members will continue to stress the key role of both the restoration of the services we



provide and the value of our robust internal communications networks during such emergencies, to make sure that our specialized needs, and ultimately the interests of the American public, are addressed.

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as r

ecov

ery

requ

ired

to s

ome

degr

ee fo

r al

l sys

tem

s bu

t th

e ne

twor

ks a

re d

esig

ned

with

a h

igh

leve

l of r

edun

danc

y so

rec

over

y w

as v

ery

prom

pt fo

llow

ing

●

Ka

trin

a N

o ef

fect

from

sto

rms

●

Ka

trin

a W

ilma

Did

not

lose

any

com

mun

icat

ions

at

all-

it w

as u

p co

mpl

etel

y an

d co

ntin

uous

ly t

hrou

ghou

t. I

n th

e m

iddl

e of

bo

th K

atrin

a an

d W

ilma

but

mos

t ef

fect

was

upo

n th

e el

ectr

ic li

nes,

abo

ut 3

day

s w

ork

rest

orin

g se

rvic

e.

UTC

RE

SEA

RC

H R

EPO

RT:

Hur

rica

nes o

f 200

5: P

erfo

rman

ce o

f Gul

f Coa

st C

ritic

al In

fras

truc

ture

Com

mun

icat

ions

Net

wor

ks

© 2

005

Uni

ted

Tele

com

Cou

ncil.

All

Righ

ts Re

serv

ed

19

● Ka

trin

a Ex

trem

ely

poor

- W

e us

e ce

llula

r ph

ones

w/d

irect

con

nect

feat

ures

for

com

mun

icat

ion.

●

Ka

trin

a W

ilma

Our

com

pany

ow

ned

com

mun

icat

ion

syst

em s

tood

ver

y w

ell d

urin

g an

d af

ter

hurr

ican

es K

atrin

a an

d Ri

ta.

Leas

ed s

ervi

ces

did

not

fare

wel

l and

wer

e ou

t up

to

a m

onth

aft

er t

he s

torm

s.

●

Ka

trin

a O

ur s

yste

m w

orke

d w

ell f

or t

he a

mou

nt o

f dam

age

we

had.

●

Ka

trin

a An

ythi

ng t

hat

was

lost

was

rep

aire

d w

ithin

24

hour

s. T

his

incl

udes

LM

R, M

W, r

adio

, sat

ellit

e�To

wer

s ar

e bu

ilt t

o w

ithst

and

hurr

ican

es. S

ome

land

lines

wen

t do

wn.

●

Katr

ina

VHF

radi

o sy

stem

sur

vive

d al

mos

t co

mpl

etel

y in

tact

. One

pro

blem

we

did

have

was

with

ren

ted

data

line

s (c

ontr

ol c

ircui

ts)

to o

ur r

epea

ter

site

s. W

e w

orke

d ar

ound

thi

s by

usi

ng m

obile

rad

ios

with

pow

er s

uppl

ies

to

wor

k as

bas

e st

atio

ns.

We

also

had

dam

age

to o

ur a

nten

nas

and

coax

line

s bu

t th

at d

id n

ot s

top

our

syst

em

from

wor

king

. W

e ha

ve im

plem

ente

d re

pairs

.

●

Ka

trin

a Co

mm

unic

atio

ns w

ere

neve

r lo

st d

urin

g th

e st

orm

, whi

ch in

volv

ed r

edun

danc

y du

e to

one

tow

er fa

ilure

.

● Ka

trin

a O

vera

ll, t

he u

tility

�s c

omm

unic

atio

ns s

yste

ms

did

not

stan

d up

the

sto

rm a

t al

l.

UTC

RE

SEA

RC

H R

EPO

RT:

Hur

rica

nes o

f 200

5: P

erfo

rman

ce o

f Gul

f Coa

st C

ritic

al In

fras

truc

ture

Com

mun

icat

ions

Net

wor

ks

© 2

005

Uni

ted

Tele

com

Cou

ncil.

All

Righ

ts Re

serv

ed

20

Q2:

Wha

t ef

fect

was

the

re o

n yo

ur L

and

Mob

ile R

adio

(LM

R)

syst

em (

on w

hat

freq

uenc

y ba

nd(s

)), a

nd h

ow w

ell d

id it

fun

ctio

n to

sup

port

res

tora

tion

?

LMR

w

orke

d w

ell

LMR

pr

oble

ms

Freq

. b

and

use

d

Impa

cted

P

rim

arily

b

y:

An

ecdo

tal I

nfo

rmat

ion

●

800

MH

z Ri

ta

No

prob

lem

s w

ith L

MR.

We

use

800M

Hz

for

pers

onal

com

mun

icat

ions

.

●

900

MH

z

Katr

ina

Rita

N

ew 9

00M

Hz

trun

ked

radi

o sy

stem

and

�cr

itica

l tow

er s

ite (

are)

con

figur

ed w

ith fo

ur c

hann

els

for

voic

e co

mm

unic

atio

ns -

a fo

ur-f

old

incr

ease

in u

ser

com

mun

icat

ions

occ

urre

d, w

ithou

t ta

lkin

g ov

er e

ach

othe

r.

Sepa

ratio

n of

voi

ce a

nd d

ata

allo

ws

the

serv

ice

crew

s to

con

tinue

com

mun

icat

ing,

uni

nter

rupt

ed b

y da

ta ..

. Po

rtab

le "

wal

kie-

talk

ies"

wer

e cr

itica

l.

●

Ka

trin

a Th

ere

wer

e no

ill e

ffect

s on

the

LM

R sy

stem

itse

lf, ju

st th

e co

nges

tion

prob

lem

.

●

800

MH

z

Katr

ina

Rita

Pe

rfor

med

) ve

ry w

ell,

part

icul

arly

follo

win

g Ri

ta.

Afte

r Ka

trin

a, w

e ha

d ab

out

90%

of o

ur r

adio

s si

tes

back

on

line

by

Tues

day.

Onl

y 1

radi

o si

te �

was

off

line

for

an e

xten

ded

perio

d of

tim

e du

e to

hig

h w

ater

in t

he

area

. (U

se)

800

MH

z M

otor

ola

Smar

tzon

e. A

dditi

onal

por

tabl

es w

ere

acqu

ired

and

used

by

the

inco

min

g (n

on-c

ompa

ny)

crew

s. W

e al

so a

dded

rep

eate

rs t

o si

tes

whe

re t

raffi

c w

as h

igh

to r

educ

e tr

affic

con

gest

ion.

●

900

MH

z 45

0 M

Hz

Wilm

a (W

e us

e) a

900

MH

z M

/A-C

OM

Tru

nked

Rad

io S

yste

m fo

r vo

ice

disp

atch

ing

and

a 45

0 M

Hz

Dat

aTAC

Sys

tem

fo

r fie

ld d

ata

com

mun

icat

ions

. �

Alth

ough

the

net

wor

k co

nnec

ting

the

tow

er s

ites

is d

epen

dent

on

the

loca

l te

lco

prov

ider

s (w

e) c

reat

ed h

ighl

y re

dund

ant

netw

ork

with

con

tinge

ncie

s to

add

ress

loss

es in

bot

h te

lco

and

elec

tric

al s

ervi

ce.

●

450

MH

z Ka

trin

a W

ithou

t th

is s

yste

m it

cou

ld h

ave

take

n se

vera

l wee

ks to

res

tore

pow

er�

(in

stea

d of

3-4

day

s).

●

Ka

trin

a W

ilma

No

effe

cts

●

150

MH

z

Katr

ina

We

oper

ate

a hi

gh b

and

repe

ater

sys

tem

from

tow

ers.

We

had

to in

stal

l gen

erat

ors

at t

he t

ower

site

s as

no

pow

er w

as a

t loc

atio

n fo

r da

ys.

We

had

com

mun

icat

ion

to a

ll tr

ucks

thr

ough

out

the

stor

m.

●

800

MH

z 45

0 M

Hz

Katr

ina

LMR

stoo

d up

ver

y w

ell.

We

use

800

MH

z So

uthe

rn L

INC

radi

os (

Mot

orol

a) a

nd s

ome

450

MH

z in

add

hoc

pl

aces

. Rad

ios

wer

e us

ed a

t ca

paci

ty o

f cou

rse,

sin

ce t

hey

wer

e be

ing

shar

ed w

ith p

eopl

e co

min

g in

to

help

●

800

MH

z Ka

trin

a Th

e sy

stem

func

tione

d ex

celle

ntly

� W

e su

stai

ned

dam

age

due

to w

ater

in o

nly

one

loca

tion.

•

Ka

trin

a Th

ere

was

virt

ually

no

voic

e co

mm

unic

atio

n an

d ce

ll ph

ones

� b

eing

use

d�w

ere

not

fully

func

tiona

l at

all

times

.

UTC

RE

SEA

RC

H R

EPO

RT:

Hur

rica

nes o

f 200

5: P

erfo

rman

ce o

f Gul

f Coa

st C

ritic

al In

fras

truc

ture

Com

mun

icat

ions

Net

wor

ks

© 2

005

Uni

ted

Tele

com

Cou

ncil.

All

Righ

ts Re

serv

ed

21

Q3:

Wha

t w

as t

he e

ffec

t on

fib

er n

etw

orks

?

Fib

er

Net

wor

k w

orke

d w

ell

Dam

age

or p

oor

perf

orm

ance

Impa

cted

P

rim

arily

b

y:

An

ecdo

tal I

nfo

rmat

ion

●

Rita

Fi

ber

is 9

7% b

urie

d so

ther

e w

ere

no c

able

bre

aks,

no

prob

lem

s.

●

Katr

ina

Rita

Li

mite

d im

pact

to

com

pany

dep

enda

nt c

omm

unic

atio

ns. A

lthou

gh w

e ha

d m

ultip

le fi

ber

optic

bre

aks,

due

to

faul

t to

lera

nt r

edun

danc

y, m

ost

syst

ems

rem

aine

d fu

nctio

nal.

Lea

sed

circ

uits

wer

e m

ore

diffi

cult

to r

esto

re a

nd t

ook

mor

e tim

e. L

ease

d ci

rcui

t pr

ovid

ers

wer

e un

able

to

prov

ide

repa

ir da

tes.

In

Texa

s, d

urin

g Ri

ta, F

iber

bre

aks

near

La

ke C

harle

s ca

used

2 s

ites

to b

e of

f the

air

for

a fe

w d

ays

but

over

lapp

ing

cove

rage

lim

ited

impa

ct a

nd fa

ult

tole

ranc

e fib

er r

ings

lim

ited

impa

ct t

o ot

her

com

pany

sys

tem

s. W

e ha

ve a

n ex

tens

ive

fiber

sys

tem

ove

r a

four

sta

te

area

mos

t of w

hich

is c

arrie

d in

the

sta

tic s

hiel

d w

ire o

n tr

ansm

issi

on li

nes.

Dur

ing

the

stor

ms,

man

y tr

ansm

issi

on

lines

wer

e da

mag

ed.

Som

etim

es t

he fi

ber

rem

aine

d in

ser

vice

on

a do

wne

d lin

e bu

t ev

en w

hen

it w

as b

roke

n, t

he

redu

ndan

t rin

gs li

mite

d im

pact

to c

ompa

ny d

epen

dant

com

mun

icat

ions

incl

udin

g ra

dio,

voi

ce, a

nd d

ata

●

Wilm

a (W

e ut

ilize

) a

ringe

d ar

chite

ctur

e fo

r (t

he)

Fibe

r N

etw

ork.

Alth

ough

the

re w

ere

brea

ks in

the

Fib

er s

yste

m t

he

alte

rnat

ive

rout

ing

prov

ided

by

the

ringe

d ar

chite

ctur

e pr

ovid

ed c

ontin

uity

of s

ervi

ce.

In t

he 2

004

Hur

rican

e se

ason

th

ere

wer

e br

eaks

in t

he F

iber

Net

wor

k th

at r

esul

ted

in lo

ss o

f the

prim

ary

and

seco

ndar

y pa

ths.

(W

e w

ere)

pr

epar

ed t

o m

ake

imm

edia

te t

empo

rary

res

tora

tions

and

mos

t cr

itica

l ser

vice

s w

ere

rest

ored

with

in 2

4 to

36

hour

s.

●

Katr

ina

Wilm

a N

o ef

fect

s

●

Katr

ina

We

have

non

e bu

t th

e te

leph

one

syst

em in

the

are

a ha

d bi

g pr

oble

ms

and

is s

till n

ot w

orki

ng li

ke p

re-K

atrin

a.

●

Katr

ina

Wilm

a W

e do

not

ow

n a

fiber

net

wor

k ho

wev

er, w

e do

sha

re in

the

use

of t

he (

larg

er I

OU

) fib

er s

yste

m.

This

fibe

r sy

stem

w

as b

roke

n in

sev

eral

pla

ces

follo

win

g H

urric

ane

Katr

ina.

It

took

sev

eral

wee

ks to

res

tore

.

●

Katr

ina

Ring

s ar

e in

telli

gent

, sel

f-he

alin

g rin

gs s

o ev

en t

houg

h th

ere

wer

e fib

er b

reak

s, t

here

was

no

sign

ifica

nt lo

ss o

f tr

affic

. We

actu

ally

had

mor

e br

eaks

aft

er t

he s

torm

whe

n th

e re

pair

crew

s w

ere

wor

king

tha

n du

ring�

●

Katr

ina

The

effe

ct o

n (c

omm

erci

al)

fiber

net

wor

ks w

as s

uch

that

tel

epho

nes

wer

e co

nsid

ered

to b

e nu

ll an

d vo

id. S

ome

area

s ar

e ju

st b

egin

ning

to

rece

ive

tele

phon

e se

rvic

e, w

hile

oth

er a

reas

stil

l don

�t ha

ve it

. But

it is

slo

wly

com

ing

back

.

UTC

RE

SEA

RC

H R

EPO

RT:

Hur

rica

nes o

f 200

5: P

erfo

rman

ce o

f Gul

f Coa

st C

ritic

al In

fras

truc

ture

Com

mun

icat

ions

Net

wor

ks

© 2

005

Uni

ted

Tele

com

Cou

ncil.

All

Righ

ts Re

serv

ed

22

Q

4:

H

ow w

ell d

id y

our

mic

row

ave

links

/com

mun

icat

ions

tow

ers

wit

hsta

nd t

he

hurr

ican

e?

M

W

perf

orm

ed

wel

l

N/A

Im

pact

ed

Pri

mar

ily

by:

An

ecdo

tal I

nfo

rmat

ion

●

Rita

Lo

st n

o to

wer

s. J

ust l

ost

2 or

3 d

ishe

s th

at a

ffect

ed 2

maj

or S

CAD

A sy

stem

s. E

very

thin

g w

as r

epai

red

in 4

8 ho

urs.

●

Katr

ina

Rita

Au

g. 2

9th

Tele

com

m c

rew

s er

ecte

d a

new

100

� mob

ile to

wer

. . .

in t

he S

ervi

ce C

ente

r. T

he m

obile

tow

er w

as th

e on

ly c

omm

unic

atio

ns s

yste

m o

pera

tiona

l in

the

paris

h fo

r th

e fir

st 1

2 ho

urs.

Our

cor

e m

icro

wav

e sy

stem

sus

tain

ed

no d

amag

e an

d w

as u

naffe

cted

by

the

stor

m. W

e ha

d ab

out

3 sp

read

spe

ctru

m li

nks

(2.4

GH

z) t

hat

had

dish

es

mov

ed o

ff-pa

th, b

ut t

hose

wer

e co

rrec

ted

rath

er q

uick

ly.

We'

ve a

lso

adde

d st

iff a

rms

to th

ose

site

s, s

o th

is s

houl

d no

t be

a p

robl

em in

the

futu

re. T

he b

igge

st p

robl

em w

as c

lear

ing

the

tree

s of

f of t

he r

oad

to g

et to

the

tow

er s

ite.

We

used

our

100

' cra

nk-u

p to

wer

for

the

first

12

hour

s un

til w

e co

uld

get

to t

he m

ain

tow

er s

ite to

tur

n it

back

on.

●

Katr

ina

All 4

tow

ers

fare

d w

ell.

●

Katr

ina

Rita

N

O t

ower

s re

ceiv

ed s

igni

fican

t da

mag

e be

yond

tur

ned

dish

es &

loos

e fe

edlin

es. K

atrin

a, m

inim

al d

amag

e ex

cept

fo

r (o

ne)

site

... R

ita, n

umer

ous

dish

es in

TX

wer

e tu

rned

by

the

win

d bu

t m

ost

path

s re

mai

ned

in s

ervi

ce w

ith

redu

ced

qual

ity.

All w

ere

retu

rned

to

norm

al o

r se

rvic

e re

rout

ed w

ithin

5 d

ays.

One

of t

he m

ost

diffi

cult

issu

es

was

kee

ping

our

com

mun

icat

ions

gen

erat

ors

runn

ing

and

fuel

ed.

●

Wilm

a (W

e) d

id n

ot e

xper

ienc

e th

e lo

ss o

f any

com

mun

icat

ion

tow

ers/

stru

ctur

es in

the

200

5 H

urric

ane

Seas

on.

In 2

004

� lo

st 1

ligh

t du

ty to

wer

tha

t w

as o

ver

30 y

ears

old

.

●

Katr

ina

The

stor

ms

did

not

effe

ct o

ur m

icro

wav

e lin

ks

●

Katr

ina

Wilm

a N

o ef

fect

s

●

Katr

ina

Wilm

a M

W li

nks

and

tow

ers

with

stoo

d th

e tw

o hu

rric

anes

ver

y w

ell.

Two

emer

genc

y ge

nera

tors

exp

erie

nced

pro

blem

s;

how

ever

, the

y w

ere

deal

t w

ith e

ffect

ivel

y.

●

Katr

ina

Tow

ers

with

stoo

d da

mag

e at

our

loca

tion.

●

Katr

ina

We

did

not l

ose

any

MW

tow

ers

at a

ll, o

nly

faci

litie

s at

the

base

. Som

e tr

ansm

issi

on e

quip

men

t w

as lo

st.

●

Katr

ina

We

have

no

mic

row

ave

but

our

com

mun

icat

ions

tow

ers

with

stoo

d th

e st

orm

ver

y w

ell.

Inte

rope

rabi

lity

with

co

oper

ativ

e cr

ews

and

cont

ract

cre

ws

wou

ld h

ave

been

of u

se.

●

Katr

ina

One

of t

he fo

ur m

icro

wav

e lin

ks fa

iled.

The

ope

ratio

n su

ffere

d lit

tle d

ue t

o re

dund

ancy

.

●

Katr

ina

The

tow

ers

are

good

; th

ey w

ithst

ood

the

stor

ms

fairl

y w

ell.

How

ever

, ove

r 80

% o

f the

grid

� e

lect

rical

pow

er �

had

to

be

repl

aced

. Nei

ghbo

ring

(util

ity)

had

prob

lem

s w

ith t

hat

(too

).

UTC

RE

SEA

RC

H R

EPO

RT:

Hur

rica

nes o

f 200

5: P

erfo

rman

ce o

f Gul

f Coa

st C

ritic

al In

fras

truc

ture

Com

mun

icat

ions

Net

wor

ks

© 2

005

Uni

ted

Tele

com

Cou

ncil.

All

Righ

ts Re

serv

ed

23

Q5:

Wha

t co

ordi

nati

on d

id y

ou h

ave

wit

h lo

cal o

r st

ate

publ

ic s

afet

y, a

nd h

ow

shou

ld t

his

be im

prov

ed?

A

ny

Coo

rdin

atio

n w

ith

pu

blic

sa

fety

?

Sh

ould

co

ordi

nat

ion

be

impr

oved

?

Impa

cted

P

rim

arily

b

y:

An

ecdo

tal I

nfo

rmat

ion

● ●

Katr

ina

The

Dep

artm

ent

of T

rans

port

atio

n an

d O

ccup

atio

n, S

afet

y &

Hea

lth [

OSH

A] t

ouch

ed b

ase,

but

the

re w

asn�

t an

y ot

her

coor

dina

tion.

With

the

mag

nitu

de o

f wha

t ha

ppen

ed a

nd t

he d

amag

e, n

ot s

ure

how

any

sys

tem

co

uld

impr

ove

the

coor

dina

tion.

�N

othi

ng c

ould

�ve

help

ed.�

Fur

ther

wes

t w

asn�

t as

bad

, but

her

e in

thi

s lo

catio

n th

e tr

ees

wer

e do

wn

and

the

pow

er li

nes

wer

e ou

t.

●

Rita

W

e w

ere

talk

ing

to c

ity o

ffici

als

3 or

4 ti

mes

dai

ly. W

e ha

d pr

oble

ms

with

blo

cked

roa

ds a

nd I

thi

nk t

he

deci

sion

to

evac

uate

nee

ds to

be

mad

e m

ore

judi

ciou

sly.

Not

eve

rybo

dy h

ad to

leav

e to

wn.

●

Katr

ina

Rita

Ev

en s

tate

pol

ice

was

dow

n du

ring

the

initi

al a

sses

smen

t ph

ase

(I d

on't

have

an

exac

t tim

e on

how

long

th

ey w

ere

dow

n).

● ●

Katr

ina

Ther

e w

as s

ome

coor

dina

tion

but

prob

ably

not

to

the

exte

nt t

hat

you

wou

ld li

ke t

o se

e. I

'm n

ot s

ure

wha

t th

e be

st w

ay t

o im

prov

e th

at c

oord

inat

ion

wou

ld b

e, b

ut h

avin

g at

leas

t on

e co

mm

on m

etho

d of

co

mm

unic

atio

ns b

esid

es la

nd li

nes

and

cellu

lar

phon

es b

etw

een

ours

elve

s an

d pu

blic

saf

ety

wou

ld b

e (d

esira

ble)

.

Katr

ina

Rita

At

my

leve

l, m

inim

al.

I di

d vo

lunt

eer

our

com

mun

icat

ions

tow

ers

and

AC p

ower

whe

n re

ques

ted.

● ●

Katr

ina

We

give

the

loca

l 911

offi

ces

an u

nlis

ted

phon

e nu

mbe

r so

the

y ca

n ge

t th

roug

h to

our

dis

patc

her.

Thi

s w

orks

OK,

we

som

etim

es t

hink

we

need

an

extr

a pe

rson

to

take

the

se c

alls

so

the

disp

atch

er c

an fo

cus

on

gett

ing

crew

s to

out

ages

●

Katr

ina

Wilm

a W

e ar

e lin

ked

into

E91

1 sy

stem

s at

the

sta

te le

vel.

We

have

our

ow

n Em

erge

ncy

Man

agem

ent

syst

em t

hat

coor

dina

tes

with

the

sta

te. E

very

thin

g w

orke

d w

ell.

●

Katr

ina

Ther

e w

as n

one.

The

y ha

d th

eir

own

prob

lem

s.

Katr

ina

Wilm

a W

e di

d no

t ha

ve m

uch,

if a

ny, c

oord

inat

ion

with

sta

te o

r lo

cal a

utho

ritie

s. (

We)

not

ow

n tr

ansm

issi

on li

nes

and

do n

ot h

ave

the

wor

k cr

ews

that

oth

er u

tiliti

es h

ave.

Our

wor

k fo

rce

is s

mal

l, si

nce

we

mai

ntai

n su

bsta

tions

and

not

line

s.

●

Katr

ina

We

had

dire

ct li

nes

to o

nes

that

had

pho

ne li

nes

plus

we

mon

itore

d th

eir

freq

. and

rad

io tr

affic

. W

e m

aint

aine

dph

one

seic

ein

oa

eaas

ea

eno

thof

the

coas

tb

150

mile

s

UTC

RE

SEA

RC

H R

EPO

RT:

Hur

rica

nes o

f 200

5: P

erfo

rman

ce o

f Gul

f Coa

st C

ritic

al In

fras

truc

ture

Com

mun

icat

ions

Net

wor

ks

© 2

005

Uni

ted

Tele

com

Cou

ncil.

All

Righ

ts Re

serv

ed

24

mai

ntai

ned

phon

e se

rvic

e in

our

are

a as

we

are

nort

h of

the

coa

st b

y 15

0 m

iles

●

Katr

ina

Publ

ic S

afet

y fo

lks

calle

d to

ask

how

to g

et o

n ou

r sy

stem

s an

d ho

w t

hey

coul

d w

ork

with

us.

The

re w

as n

o fo

rmal

pro

cess

� in

mos

t ca

ses

PS k

new

peo

ple

with

in th

e IT

dep

artm

ent.

● ●

Katr

ina

Dur

ing

the

first

tw

o w

eeks

aft

er t

he s

torm

the

re w

as a

lot

of c

onfu

sion

from

all

part

ies.

We

did

wor

k th

ings

ou

t w

ith e

mer

genc

y of

ficia

ls b

ut h

ad n

o di

rect

com

mun

icat

ions

via

rad

io w

ith a

ny o

ne o

ther

tha

n ou

r lo

cal

G&

T [g

ener

atio

n an

d tr

ansm

issi

on p

rovi

der]

.

●

Katr

ina

Coor

dina

tion

with

sta

te p

ublic

saf

ety

etc.

was

don

e on

ded

icat

ed p

hone

line

s an

d no

t th

ru a

ny r

adio

link

. Th

e co

mm

unic

atio

n to

my

know

ledg

e di

d no

t su

ffer

any

maj

or p

robl

em.

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