1IIIIIIIIIIIIII!IIIm~~UKAA.oo 1.0001

191t2

C.B. 3081 (5)

COpy No.2 5

This book Is Ulvl\lIably to be kepi looked up whennot Ul UN lUld II Dol 10 be l&ken outsIde the shtporeelab1lshme,,1 tor wluchll18 Wlued without the

_ llOrtIIIS!iou 01 th Oommllllding OlIIcer.

ACTIONS WITH

ENEMY DISGUISED RAIDERS

191t0-1941

BATTLE SUMMARY No. 13

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C.B. 3081 (5)

ACTIONS WITH

1940-1941

1942

ENEMY DISGUISED RAIDERS

STAFF DUTIES DIVISION

RICAL SECTION},

NAVAL STAFF.

ADMIRALTY.

f.-. _-~o~.':_ 0• \'::':' i ,"

Atkntion is called 't~ tIl;; penalties attaching to any injraction oj theOfficial .Sccrds Acts.

BATTLE SUMMARY No. 13

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CONTENTS

Jist of Battle Summaries, lSsued or in preparation. see page 3 of coveL]

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SECTION

L Int~odl1ction

2. The Alcanta.ra's Action. 28th juiy. lD4JI3. The Car1l(ly[!on Castle's Action, 5th December, 1~J·10

4, The LealldeY ,inks the R,A ,NI,Ji,l, 27th February, HJ415, The Voltaire, April, H)416. The Cornwall sinks Haider l\o. :13, 8th May, 19417. The Sydney's Action, 19th l\ovember, 1941 ..8. The Deuo1lshire's Action, 22n<1 November, 19419. The Doyselsh;,c', Action, 1st Dpcember, 1941

10. Raider Hunt, 4th-6th November, 194111. . Enemy Vessels Sighted but not Engaged, H142

APPENDICESA. Alcantara's WIT Messages, 2,';th July. 1940B. Record of· Cornwall's Courses, 7th-8th May, 1fJ41C. Details of German Raider }{onnol'an

D. Admiralty Message, 16th December, 1941

INDEX

PLANS

*1. Alcantara's Action, 28th July, 1940.·2. Caynarvon Castle's Action. 5th December, 1940.·3. Carnarvon Castle's Diagram.4. Cornwall's Action, 7th-8th :May, 1941.5. Sydney's Action, 19th November, 1941.6. Dorsetshire's Action. 1st December, 1941.7.< Dorsetshiye's Search for Raider. 4th-6th November, 1941......~Zf-.$II.Di'Ifig.£a4PJ'T~4';;'$f.A(;Jvem.,5ero /,942

*1 See ~otes on Plans; page 26.

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S has been compiled from the following :~(':lrll',This Battle ummary .

M.OI8572j40 . }For Alcantara's action.M.021171j40

M.02910j41 }For Camarvon Castle's action.T.S.D.6133j41 .

M.07842j41/ }For Leander's action.T.S.D.545941

T.S.D.6136j41 For Voltaire's action.

M.OI2944/41 } ll' . t'T.5.D.5465j41 For Comwa s de lOn.

M.05540/42 For Sydney's action.

M.019393j41 For Devonshire's action.

M.0799/42 For Dorsetshire's action.

¥XI.J~~t/~2}For.Dorsetshireand Ca'ltton, 4th-6th NOVCiI1iw! !<),

N.L.1l382/42 For Durban, 13th March, 1942.

N.L.9560J42 For Cheshire, 14th March, 1942.

N.L. 9557/42 For Pretoria Castle, 26th April, 1942.

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ACTIONS WITH ENEMY DISGUISED RAIDERS

1940-1941

INTRODUCTION1. This. Bat!le Summary deals with eight actions fought with enemy

merchant slup raIders up to the end of 1941. Dunng tillS period of 23 monthsAxis merchant ship raiders sank one British cruiser, one armed merchantcruiser, and 618,108 tons of merchant shipping* Their ovm losses were threeout of the seven identified during thaI period, alld two other ships, which wereprobably supply ships.

These figures may he compared with those of the last war. In 191418.51 months, ten armed merchant raiders sank 427,4;)~) tons Ollt of a total of12,741,781 tons, or :i<3 per cent. Of the ten r<liclers, four were sunk, three wereinterned, one was wrecked, and two got back to GClrJnany.

The action between the Sydney and /{or!ll()J'(111 off th8 west coast of Australiaon 19th November, 1941,t lIlay be comparee! with that between the Alcantaraand Gre'l! on 28th February, 1916, in the North Sea. The ,'!lean/ara, approach­ing within torpedo range, was torpedoed, but before she sank she opened aheavy fire on the Gre!! and sent her to the bottom.

The principal lesson to be drawn from the Alcantam's action was thenecessity of keeping well out of torpedo range. After the armed boardingsteamer Ramsey had been torpedoed by the disguised minelayer Metcor in theMoray Firth on 8th August, 1915, the Cornrnander-in-Chief, Admiral jellicoe,issued an order warning ships to approach suspected vessels on the quarter andto avoid bearings on which torpedoes could be flred: also that the Master of thesuspected ship should be requirecl to bring his papers on board in his own boat.t

.~ "ALCANTARA'S" ACTION, 28th JULY, 1940.' " , '. ,

2. On 15th july, 1940, H.M.S. Hawkins, flying the flag of Rear-AdmiralSir Henry Harwood, K.C.B.,O.RE., Rear-Admiral, South America Division,entered Montevideo for a 24-hour visit. Next day she sailed to patrol the Platearea. There had been recent inclications that an enemy raider was in theNorth Atlantic, and on 17th july a report reached the Admi~al that DiF bearings-had placed a German vessel to the westward of the Cape Verde Islands on the\15th. This information, coupled with earlier reports of unidentified vessels offthe eoast of Ireland, indicated that a possible raider was bound for the SO~lth:Atlantic. Admiral Harwood therefore ordered the armed merchant crUlser~leantara,§ Captain J. G. P. Ingham, R.N., which was patrolling the Rio de

, •.• ,~~ei.io-,Santos area, to patrol off Pernambuco, while the Hawkins moved up~.;tbe Rio-Santos area. ,To protect the important focal area of .the .P!ate

.,against a raid the Admiral intended to move both ships back to theIr ongmal,.i;, '~~t;'()lareas by the time that the anticipated raider would be well to. the

i~j» ..~~W'~d of Pernambuco on the assumption that she was proceeding directd~~~~Plateat economical speed..,;~i)·;ra-e;t day, 18th July, the Admiral received news of the sinking by a r~i~er

~ESt Indies area, on Or about 13th July, of two British ships, the DatnS1an

7·3 per cent. of the total shipping sunk.n 7. .

Order, 24th August, 1915.22,209 gross WJoIl;\'19 knots. Guns, eight 6-in., 14,000 yards range.

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No IS-DISGUISED RAIDERSBATTLE SUMMARY •

2 . . f the German tanker Rekll1n from Teneriffd Kilfg John,· and of the sailm~~bable tbat the oiler intc~ded to refuel t"~

an 7th July. It seemed very Pthe Hawkills patrolled off RIO. By 22nd JUI:ler. and from 19th .to 21st l;:;{ if the raider bad come south [rom the positio~Admiral Harwood estun.ated n the 15th she would be south of the latitUde "I'ven by the DfF beanng 0 er 4.30 p.m.t he orderd the Alcantara, which had

femambuco, and shortlyoa~ea on the 20th, to proceed south to exam;nr.reached the Pemambu~ island had occasionally been used by German raider.Trinidadet Island, as this ubse uently to patrol an ~ea south-west o[ Trinidadcin the last war. She was s il from the South Amencan coast.at a distance of over 250 m kes fuelled from the Arndale north-east of "-23 d the Haw HIS . . ' 'H)

On the r d h atrolled the British shlppmg routes off the outhSebastiao Island,§ an t Rie,:, Pde Janeiro and the Plate.Am' coast between 0 G'

encan Admiral Harwood learned that a erman submarine harlOn 25th J.uly nker near the Cape Verde Islands on the 18th. Clearly it

sunk a NorwegI~ ta d ot a raider that had been located by DfF on the 15thwas this submanfe, anthn West Ind{es however, and the fact that three hip~Further reportst ~om t ~ indicated the probability of there being one raider~ overdueradi reen~ ~other in the South Atlantic. During the 26th andm the hWesft n tesheaHawkins continued patrolling the British shipping rOUle,27th. t ere ore,between Rio and the Plate. .

D' the forenoon of 26th July the Alcantara Inspected the Island 01Trinid=gand at noon next day was in 23° 25' S., 31 ° 47' W. At 10 a.m. onthe 28th she was in 24° 39' 5., 33° 7' W.,II steering N. 75° E. at llt knots, whenthe tops of two masts were sighted from her crow's nest, due east, fine on thestarboard bow. She altered course to intercept, but :vhen the range had closedto 23 000 yards the unknown ship turned momentarily towards her and thenturned away. The Alcantara followed, and, as the range was opening, increasedto 15 knots and then to full speed. By noon she was doing 20 knots and by1 p.m. nearly 22. The day was fine and clear with a light breeze from thesouth-east. At 2 p.m., when the Alcantara was in 240 3' 5., 31 0 56' \Y., theunknown vessel altered course to starboard, and, hoisting the German ensign,opened fire with a two-gun salvo it 16,000 yards, 2,000 yards beyond theextreme range of the Alcalltara's eight 6-in. guns, followed a few seconds laterby two four-gun salvos.

One shell of the two-gun salvo fell 100 yards over, on the port quarter: oneof the second .salvo struck the Alcantara just abaft her dummy funnel, and!Bother. bursting over her quarter deck by P 4 gun, killed its trainer, severeda D~ber of fire control leads and put its range and deflection instrument outGf action. It was probably this salvo that brought down her main aerial, \~hich.lIclillahot.. away between 2.6 p.m. and 2.9 p.m. A shell of the third salvo hit the.. II abreast the stokers' mess deck, and another, bursting on her quarter~ the Officer of Quarte~. At 2.8 p.m. a hit on the water line abreast~...e room resulted m an mrush of water, which gradually reduced her=~Akanlara had. opened fire at extreme range at 2.1 p.m.,

;....~_ short to the nght. A hail of fragments flying around her

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fire control prevented the fall of her second salvo fu,m being olhcrved. Tht~

enemy, who was keeping np a very high rate of flfC, was stracidlinR constantl\"and a number of shcl,l~ bursting ~losc overhead ~ent steel shcr'ds whistliI~g

uncomfortably near. lh~sc explosIOns and the nOlSC of the /llcantara's gunsmade it difftcult for the sIght-setters to hear, and the sights were 500n out ofstep. Several tinles the A/cantlfnl had to check fire to correct tbem for ranf/Cand deflection. In spite of these delays she straddled the raider with a IHlmh~~rof salvos, and at 2.1~3 p.ll1. obscn'cd a bright Hash abreast her foremast.The enemy's forelllost starboard Run fired IlO lTIOrC, her salvos became ragged,and her rate of fire decreased. .

By 2.20 p.1n. the Alcantara'.::> speed had dropped to 1S knots, and at2.30 p.m. the raider turne~l a\.vay. dropping slnokc floats and. firing hvo sternguns. The Alca1ltara continued ~o rcpl~', but. tll(' range, which had previoush'closed t.o 9,800 y'arcls, ,was opcmng. At. 2.:~':; p.m. the illcantara turning t~)

starboard opened fire wIth her port hatter): obtaining a hit on the encmv's stern.The raider replied with three of her port g\lns. and d"[opped another smoke float.By this timc the Alcrmlara's speed harl dropped to 10 knots, and the enemv,steaming at something bctween IZ and IS knots. drew rapidly away till onlvher topmasts \vere visible. The Alcantara contintlCc1 to fire at extreme elevatio~,but the target was obscured by smoke. \Vhcn the enemv emerged from it theAlcalltara fired a few morc rounds from her port b"tfen' at extreme range, andthe raider replied with a few ragged three-gun salvos. At 3.15 p.m. theAlcal/lara was in 24' 10' S.,:Jl Sl' W. Firing had ccased except for a fcwdcsnltory rounds which fell short.

For some time the Alcaulam had been almost stopped: the raider, afteraltering course as though to dose her, turned round and steamed away at15 knots with a slight list to port. When last seen at :3.:30 p.m. she was steeringsouth, 29,000 yards away. Thus ended a sharp but iuconclusive action, duringwhich the Aicalliara had fired 152 rounds.

A close examination of the effects of the enemv's fire showed that she hadused only shrapnel or similar" anti-personnel" sheU throughout. Some hadburst in the air and eight others instantaneously on impact. Their fragmentationwas very great and as many as 500 perforations and ,lents were found near oneburst. The danger to personnel was obvious, and the Alcal/tara's reports'contain the following recommendations :-

(I) Gun shields to be fitted to all guns, not only as protection, but alsoto shield the sight-setters from blast.

(2) Fire control circuits to be run below decks and given greaterprotection.

(3) Steel helmets to be provided for all whose duty may require them tobe in an exposed place.

(4) Tdemotor leads to be further protected,

(5) Protection for ammunition bol1ard and operator.

(6) Further supply of protective mattresses for bridge, fore control andelsewhere.

(7) The 6-in., Mark VII guns with their 14,000 yards range, which hadbeen outranged by the enemy raider, to be replaced by 6-m.,Mark XII, or other suitable long range guns·t

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"ALc.\NTARA," Ju,\". IH40SECT. 2.

.:M;OlSS72j40. A full list of recommendations is in M.021171j40./"_ ,:t~~e. Alcantara was subsequently rearmed with two 6·in, guns, range'i;'~~"lQj:guns,range 17,700 yard,.

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ARY No. 13-DISGUISED RAIDERSBATTLE SUMM

. done by the Alca"lara to force the aCl___..king possIbl

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CASTLE'S" ACTION, 5th DECEMBER, 1940__ u~&D·DroN d ch t .~ ~., In.O the arme mer an crUIser Carllar

5 h December ".., t" th vall r IS On t d 'R N fought an a.c Ion WI an enemy ra'd 'It "

Captain H. Y(. M. H~~ t'o the Alca"tara's action of 28th JUly, 19~Oer In ISouth Atlantic .ve7t~e heavy handicap under wluch bo.th vessels labollr~d ,n, •.actions emphasISe ttes short range guns, and pnrnltlve fire control ( "\ilt~to their large silhou:s e 'uipped with long range guns and modern fire JPjJ<. 'Ito smaller ad~f:~e A~a11lara's 6-in. guns were outranged by 2,OOoc~:t:nl

:retems. Wh C tl 's <711nS were outranged by 3,000 yards, which ~ : c1,r~_'on as e .. - d fi . tit ~ale h,e .-.-. . tes of uninterrupte rmg a a arge arget before sh :,

opponent 20 mmu e ""'Id. bin range

get WIt .. swnrnary of the action is based largely on the CoThe folloWIng. h' f - h rllar' 'n, rve + At 6.42 a.m. on t e mornlllg 0 ;>t December I~

~~ c::r:w~+Cas~le was i:; 30° 52' 5:, 42° 53' "v,. , off the east Coa.,t U!South America,§ steenng 5.35 W. at I~ 3 knots, W1.t~ orders to arri" ,;Montevideo on 9th December, :nhen sfhe. S!bghl~ted a TsulSPICIOUS ve sel at a ran~,of 19,000 yards, the extreme lunlCt 0 l VI~I I I y: le sdtrangerll was steamingdirectly away, and the Carnarvon asl e, mcreasmg spee ,signa ed her to ,tnr'.She did not do so, and at 7.57 a.m. the Carnarvon Castle fired one round, whi, hfell short. She replied within 30 seconds at a. range of approximateh17,000 yards. with a four- or five-gun salvo., ~s thiS was 3,000 yards oUbldethe maximum range of the Carnarvon Castle s eight 6-m. guns, Captam Hard\tmned to port to dose the range and to bring all his starboard battery to hurThe enemy also altered course to port, but soon turned back to starboard.

These changes reduced the range, after 20 minutes, to 14,000 ya.rd" andthe Canuuvon Castle, opening fire, claims to have hit the enemy sel'eealtlme;,settiDg her on fire aft and apparently reducing her port battery temporanhto one effective gun, with which she continued the action for some time. The_, then turned to starboard behind a smoke screen, and on reappeann~reopeDed fire with his starboard battery in four-gun salvos.

. t 8.38 ~.m. ~he Carnarvon Castle sighted two torpedo tracks approachm~Cl8 sliptly divergmg courses, but, turning under full helm to starboard. wa·."tr~~~ between them, and they passed hannlessly 50 yards away on

JUs By 8.44 a.m. the range was down to 8,000 yards when the enemy, brin!'1n~'iM!rport_~~ once more to bear, hit the Carnarvon Castle repeatedly, setlJ~to Ul several places. At 9.11 a.m., therefore, Captain Hardy decld

lllT thtraage and get the fires under control behind a smoke crccn. (-= Cqstk's fire control communications were disabled and her

1=~d~ual:~CO:tntrol. The haze had increased and as the enemy W'd'

SJIloke on and off spotting thr~ugh the splashes of herY dilicu1t d hi~ . Th eMmlTt'f1"dIn ~ thng a matter of luck. e , d< the

__ IIltd a last bit at her extreme range of 14,000 ) ar "j theeaemy's bridge. The raider continued firing unll_

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range had opened to 18.000 yard. and although the CamarvOl' Castle alteredcourse in an a!tempt .to keep in touch. the enemy finally disappeared behind asmoke screen 10 the mcreasmg haze. steaming at t8 knots in a north-easterlydirection.

It w~ 11.' 15 a.m. before the Camarvoll Ca~tle was able to extinguish all herfires, and In vIew of her extensIve damage Captam Hardy steered lor ~Iontevideo.which he reached safely at 7 p.m. on 7th December. The ship was too damagedto be of any further sen'lce. though there was no immediate need to dock her_

. The enemy ship was a long, low vessel of about 10.000 tons displacement,pamted. a very dark grey or black, w~th two masts. one funnel, straight stemand cruISer stem. As 10 the Alcallta,a s action the enemy shell showed very highfragmentation. hut in this action no shrapnel was used. The Coma,vo" CasUehad received no less than 'l:7 direct hits: all her electrical and voicepipe com­munic:ations wC!e shot away. her engine-room telegraphs and telephones cut,her wireless aenal destroyed .. all her boats, except one. were riddled, her galleycompletely wrecked, the maIO exhaust pIpe from her engines extensively cut.and her fore peak was flooded. Commodore F. H. Pegram, the CommodoreCommanding the South America Division, who visited her the following day,considered that she had put up a gallant and spirited action against a superior­enemy.·

10141 aIId T.S.D.6133/41. .•~! ':no _. 32·S knots, guns. eight 6-in., eight '-w. H.A.

are z..--ot•.a::=.r ......·nportin M.07842/41 she hoisted the Italian men:antile~Iiat tD C-Ia<.. East adios. in T.S.D.5459/4I, pago 10. she hoisted the

THE .. LEANDER" SINKS THE .. R.A.M.B.1 ",27th FEBRUARY, 1941.

4. On 'l:7th February, 1941, H.M.S. Leallde,.t New Zealand Division,Captain R. H. Bevan, R.~., fought a successful action in the Indian Ocean withthe Italian raider R.A.M.B.l .

At 10.37 a.m.t on the morning of 27th February. the Leande,was patrollingnorthward off the Maldive Islands in about 10

1 ., 680 30' E., at 20 knots. whenshe sighted a vessel steering eastward on a steady course at a comparativelyhigh speed right ahead: she increased to 23 knots to close, and as she graduallyapproached, her suspicions were aroused by the stranger's resemblance to theR.A.M.B. class of Italian banana freighters and by a gun on her forecastle.She therefore went to action stations at 11.15 a.m. when the range was11,000 yards, keeping her turrets trained fore and aft. At 11.25 a.m.• when theRIIge was down to 10.000 yards, she ordered§ the stranger to hoist her colours.Pour minutes later the stranger hoisted the red ensign. The Leander thenordered her to hoist her signal letters, and after a delay of 5 minutes she hoistedG]YD. It was then 11.34 a.m. As these letters did not appear in the" SignalLetters of British Ships .. nor in the" Signal Letter Index," the Leande,. at11.41 a.m.• made the secret challenge, to which there was no reply.

Captain Bevan therefore decided to board, and at 11.45 a.m. ordered the~ by lamp and ftags to stop instantly. She did not reply. ~ut at 11.50a.~.,

as the Learulw was about to fire across her bows. she hOisted the Italianm •••tile ensignII and started training her guns.

'l'he Learulw at once trained her own turrets. She was just before the::.~~eer's beam with the stranger bearing Red 95. At 11.53 a.m., with?Ot

warning, the stranger suddenly opened fire, and the Leander replied

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S UARY No. 13-DISGUlSED RAJDhllS6 BATTLE UloI~

. ·d at 3000 yards. The enemy's fire was short an,1immediately WIth a roa~1 ~ad fired five rapid salvos Captain Bevan ceasederratic. ~'hen the t~~"e~~my"Do you surrender?" The enemy, who h'''1fire and stgnalled to three rounds a gun, was already 'on fire and ab.andonin~not fired more than . d t her gtlnS and he had struck her enSIgn. hp

. ews remame a ' . h bship. 0 cr bo d d the Leander, stoppmg on er star oard 'luart"rhad turned to s~ar bart'~h orders to save the burning ship if possible. T""lowered a bo:u;dinl! o~he ship stragglers were jumping overboard and c1imbin~lifeboats w~re ea~ngItar n officer in the water warned the boarding boat nf)'down her Sides. bunmin I~hip as it was loaded with amrrmnition. The boiltto approach tt;; d arched the fire spread slowly aft until a heavy explosiontherefore lay? anse:;' flames and smoke shooting high overhead. The raiderbefote. th~ b~dge . d and the fire continued to spread aft until at 12.43 p.m awas Iymg ea tlo 'Yl" ~\'idently of the after magazine, sent the stern hurtlin~very heaVY exp OSlon, 'd d' d' 1° 68·'. th . Five minutes later" the r3.1 er lSappeare m •., 30 E:0. e::t. a patch of oil burning on the surface of the sea.7 0

:hile the Leander had picked up her boarding boat and 103 Italian. eant . eluding the captain of the R.A.M.B.l, who stated emphaticalh

SllrVlvors, m S' fr th f t' .that h h d not scuttled his ship. teammg away om e scene 0 ac Ion tht-Lea";:' ~d through the floating wreckage.. The Commander-in-ChiefEast Indies, Vice-Admiral R. Leatham, C.B., .con,sldered that the R.A.M.B.Jmight well have become a serious menace to shlppmg ~d that the Leallder wa,to be commended for ridding the seas of a potential raider before It had hme tndo any hano.: At a range of only 3,000 yards, .howev~r, she was perhap,fortunate to escape the fate which befell the Australian CfUlser Sydney Ie thai,nine months later.§

'1'JIE ..VOLTAIRE." APRIL, 19415. Early in April, 1941, the British armed merchant cruiser Voltair£,

Captain J. A. P. Blackburn, D.S.C., R.~., left Trinidad for Freetown \\;thorders to pass through two areas west of the Cape Verde Islands on the way

On 5th April the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, "ice­AdmiralSir Charles Kennedy-Purvis, K.C.B., informed the Commander-in-ChiefSo1tth Atlantic, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Raikes, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., thataa:ordiDg to a German communique the Voltaire had been sunk by a German:«Uiser and that he had ordered the Canadian armed merchant cruiser Prillcl.1lpi4 to pr~ along her track ~t her best possible speed. On 11th April~ Raikes informed the Admiralty that nothing had been heard of the­-.,. though she had been due at Freetown on the 9th.

Late oa the 15th the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies .•~,AcImiralty that the Prinu David hadsighted a patch of very hea\'Y

.-.~ area of 3 square miles, together with charred wood, clothes andm 14" 31' ., 40° 32' W., half-way between the West Indies andV~. Islands. at 2.30 p.m. on 7th April. This was the Vollai1£'

~~~i~OD: the 4th. and the Admiralty considered that it was

that the Prinu David had sighted. As there were noale available of the Voltaire's encounter but it eeOlSAkattW.. and Cancarvon Castle she was ~utranged and.

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UKAA.001.0011

" CORNWALL:' 8TH JLW, HHISECT. 6.

L.L ..... 1." ..... 4-:.. .\ T",ril 1 Q.J.lnow known that H.M.S, . Volume' was sunk by Raider E (Santa

raider engaged by the 'Carnarvon Castle' on 5th December, 1940.to repatriated prisoners of war, the enemy, which was small and very

fire at very long range. Her first salvo crippled the . Voltaire.' whichthree hours' continuous shelling. A number of survivors were pickedraider, St!c W.I.R., Raider Supplements. Nos, 2 and 3, and !'LI.D.

dix B.'blydetetted h~ by R.D,I" See Plan 4.

THE "CORNWALL" SINKS RAIDER No. 33. 8th MAY, 1941

6. On 8th ~Iay, 1941, H.:'l.S. Corllh"t/!l-l. fought an action with an enem,'raider in the Indian Ocean. .

-0 _<2? 7,tl~ ~I,:y :It 5.~5 am'~.,tl~e C..' was ncar the equatur in. 0' 2' S,::>6 ::>;, L"." :;teenng 160 at 1"", knuts \\ lth orders to refuel at the ~evcheHes

when a fa,ider, repo,r; _reached her from theS.S. FJrltlsh Emperor Alteringcourse to 340- at 6.2.') a.m. she llllTCclSed to 20 knots to the enemy'sposition without an unduly hean" consumpti,m of fuel. :\s this position \\'as500 miles away, in 8' :~O' ); .. 5(1 25' E. sl anticipated a prolomred search

A scheme for the search with the aid of aircraft was worked ont on theprinciple of dosing the enemy's" furthest on " line and then starting a Yignotsearch to covcr b~f?r.c dark the largest, pos:-iible \'ariatiun of the enemv in speedand course, At J .;,6 a.m, the Con/Will! mcreased to :24 knots, but at 8.15 a,m,.on receipt of a signal,! from the Commander-in-Chief. East Indies. \Vice-AdmiralR. Leatham, turned north at 25.\ knots to cO\'er thegan between rhe Se\"Chellesand the islands of the Chagos Al~chipelago to the east\\:,mL

As Admiral Leatham was unaware of her exact Dosition, the Cornwalldecided to regard his signal as an instruction and to 'proceed with her ownoriginal scheme of search as the most practical manner of complyin;.,; \vith it.

The scheme and the Cor1/(~'all'smovements can best be followed by referringto the attached plant! and to the record of the courses she 5teere(L** The searchhpfnT'p dark was designed to cover the raider's courses between 144: and 1900

and speeds between 13· 4 and 1G.tl knots,

Between 4 p.m. and 4.15 p,m, the Cornwall launched both her aircraft,re<:ovenn!! them shortly after 7 p.m. At 7 p.m. she altered course ::\. 15° E.

on the line of the main Yignot search. This was made out for a meanof 13 knots from one hour '~tfter the time of the raider report, on the

~;urnpticm that the raider \vould require an hour to deal with the BritishJ:1.1:np,erG'Y and would then steam at high speed until dark, \vhen she would ease

At 9.30 p.m. the Comwalf altered course t<2. t 13 and reduced to 161 knotsse~lrch on this line while the moon was up,

direction of search was correct, but the search was unsuccessful for,3.30 a.m. next morning. 8th May, the Cornwall was cl~se to theclaims to have sightedtt her as 51:e turned aga,inst the~seth~1g moon,

were to pass before she herself SIghted the nuder. }< rom 3.30 a.m.

in "iew of her slow speed, ?ut-n.l,u1Ccuvred also. Nothing IS definitely knO\vnabou~ her ~~~, r:or o~ the l:len:l:Y of the \'essel :vhich destroyed her', thoughAdnllral Rdlkes ~tates th,\f 1t \\,b probabh' the (H'nnan armed merchant shi )raider Santa Cruz.* . I

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1IIIIilllnlllllijllilimUKAA.OO1001'.;;.2_~

, 13-DISGl'ISED RAIDERSMMARY. No.

BATTLE. lJ

d 143· at 13 knots: .At da~n, I tween 6 ai).. th CIJ/'''Ulall st~re ft to cover a vanallon of ,l knots On 'itll,. ""'I

untiLdawn I :nched both aU'C~. and at 6.35 a.m. Increased to III kn"t rill,7 a.m.• sh~a·s estimated spee , ft si hted a merchant ship of til· 'Us .of the e;e7 Ym one of the atrc;~o s~me 65 miles we tward of the c; IH"r<!

At .~. ~bout 13 knots, 'n ~bout 8 a.m. At 8.25 a.m. tllc c';'"', oiltype st~o ~port before reJurm t~e suspect and increased speed, at ;'l~olibut ma ~urse to 255· to ose to 23 knots. It was about 9.:JO a.'ll rst 1<)

alteredts and then, at 8.34 a.m.~ h she hoped that it had not been 5' "h"":e~overed ,her airc~:J\hai~~ I~d been detected, probitbly by R.l).i:l;ltt~;I,I ter informatIon pro\ . s the aircraft approached and left the SlI51)I' na all ther occaSIon . tl' , ")11this as on o. from the cnuser, a ruse apparen v sUCCCS'f 1 ,>. . b direction away ., . .,,, Inship m t e . r's actual poSItIOn. '.hiding the cruise C wall catapulted her second aircraft With instru,

At 10.15 a.m. t~de torfi'e1d ship and discover, if possible, whether he ".'r'm,b till um en 1 223·t-e.to dose t e s Wb the aircraft returned at 1. p.m. I. reported that th

raider or n~ wa:~teaming at least 15 knots. and had hOi ted ignal lett('rUllknOWII v identified as those of the Norwegtan 5.:;. Tamerlalle, which shcThese were bled though the Tallleriane was not ill the Cornwall's list r[closely fese!II .' I

ezpec:t~~~n past noon and it was clear that the. Cornwall mu t incre;bes~tto get within striking distance of the suspect With plenty of daylight inh d She accordingly increased to 26 ~nots and at 1 p.m. to 28 knOB..\t1~ . m she catapulted an aircraft With orders to keep her Informed orthe~, course, and speed of the still unidentified vessel. She estimatedthe suspect to be within 32 miles. unless he had altered course. \\ hen thtaircraft retwned it was able to gl\~e an accurate .beanng of the unkno\\'1lship which was in sight from the all', and a few mmutes later, at 4.7 p.mwas sighted from the bridge of the Comwall, bearing 282°, Green 50.

At 4.12 p.m. the COrllwall altered course to close, but the stranger turneda""y, stem on, steering 300°. At 4.19 p.m., therefore, the Cornwall alteredcourse to bring her fine on the starboard bow in order to close as quickly a,

s;'ble to 12.000 yards without crossing her track. At 4.30 p.m. the strangermaking .. Raider reports," stating that she was the '\onreg:lan

S... T~lMIe. The plane in the air was therefore told to inform her that thlchaSlDg' her was a British cruiser and that she should stop engine. The

"'jJIlIlltd tamed at the same time to give her a good broadside view, and then'll tile <:base.

:.tn. v.:~en the range was down to 19,000 yards, the COrlli4:1111times Heave to or I fire," and backed this up with one warnlll'

:iVer and to the left,. but ~hough the stranger di obeyed the orderrefrlmed fr~m openmg direct fire, still thinking that she I11lght~t~p whose master was gallantly determined not to,·top.

gIVen for the second aircraft to take off and drop a 2~O·lb...."SUSpectosOl.ud, if that did not stop her, to drop the other.on her

me time, however, before this order reached the aircraft

~ttb:~apin signalled" Heave to er I fire," and foUo\\' .'Of 8-iD the range was then inside 12,000 y~d';

'Ibis apP&fently convinced the stranger t Infire- earnest. for when the 8-in. hell feU ne,tI'and then. making a large alteration to pori,

Wore 5.15 p.m.•

"·"'"1' TIll'~.c:}otI the ClJ/'llwall opened fire at 5.15 p.1\l

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UKAA.001 JJ013

" C()l{NWALL." HTlr T\L\Y, 1941

"FHA" and" B " turrets in quarters and" X" and" Y " in group cllntrol.f In 3° 27/ N., 560 38' E.tAt25knots at least. . ' .

,§ One engineer officer was fatally overcome hy the heat. The fallures III the engme-1!Q'e subject ofa board of enquiry .

. b, 15 Indian and 60 German surviVL)rs were rescued.

SECT. G.

. The enemy COlll<~ hardly have clj()s{~na. better IIlOlnent f!)r starting theact~o~1. .rust.as t.he Conl1f!al.l.tllrned ;ilkr tJrlng ]ll:!' ,,('C!)!lrl warning slIot. hertrall:1I1g nr::tl1t failed. H.eahsmg that she W;\S dang('r!)uslv dose to the rai(h~r,

she lnunedlately turned away to port to tlw limit of ":\" ;1[<"; to avoiddanger from torpedoes. and to .open the r:lt1f;(', \vhie'}] lIar! dey·;ed to If),SOl)

yards. r~ opened q111ckl~·. but for a tmlC. the Cnrm£!itl! \vas in gravedar~ger. ~hc \vas, frequenth' str;lddlci.l l;y r;qild ;l!ldfairly aC('tIrate gunfirewhIle her own 111:1111 armament was pomtl11,U: al1ywhen: l)1\t at the (ilH'mv, Inthese circumstances she turned further awa\', and an unicer W;IS St'nt f[i;m the'bridge with a message to "B" turret to train 011 the enemy and ifnecessary. to take over cuntrol of ":\" turret. The necessan' ()~(lers l~adhowever, already' been passed fnl!11 the fore cuntrol, and as the t~HTets trailled'the Cornwall turned back to star!Joanl to open" .\" arcs, As soon as the~'would bear, "A" and" 13" turrets tired two salvos, b1lt a 5·9-in. hit thenput her fore steering gear out of actio11. and she swun/.-; away, closin lf her"A" arcs once again for a short time, The breakdown '~vas fo'rtunate1\':' onlytemporary. The after steering gear was rapidly Im)ught into use and tile shij)was out of control for a matter of seronch; onh', \leanwhile, unfortunateh'communication bet\veen the bridge and the catapult had failed. with the resl{ltthat, before the order to launch the second airrraft was received, the aircra.ftwas put out of action by a shell splinter.

By 5.18 p.m, all the Corn'i.('(ll!', turrets were iJring* and her salvos straddlingthe enemy. The range was again outSIde 12,000 yards and she was reasonabl~'safe from torpedo attack, The enem~''s fire was falling off in accurac\' andvolume. At 5.19 p.m. it was near1\' 1,000 yards short, and the CornU/aliturned to bring the ships on to roughly parallel courses, By this timeshe had received two direct hits, but although a minute or two later theraider managed to straddle her she was not hit again. The action was virtuallyat an end. At 5.26 p.m. a salvo hit the enemy and she blew up.: disappearingin a cloud of white vapour which rose verticall~' some 2,000 ft. and hung overthe scene for manv minutes. i\,S she sank she fired an ineffecti\'e salvo whichstraddled the CorlLwall 20 seconds after she herself had finally disappeared.

Although the Cornwall had destroyed the enemy her own troubles were notyet at an end. 'With one of her two aircraft Ollt of action she was naturallyanxious to recover the other before dark. She therefore decided to hoist itin before searching for survivors among the debris, which covered a wiele area andwhich would have been dangerous to the aircraft. As she turned to recoverit, however, it was suddenly realised that although an order had been given fors~d to be reduced to 12 khots the Cornwall was still steaming very fast·t Shetherefore turned to pass to windward of the wreckage, ordering the aircraft toland as best it could. The Conmmll gradually stopped and pic~ed it up, but,as the plane was being hoisted in, electric power failed. TIns breakdow~brought all t~e fans to a standstill: the engine-room temperature rose to 200

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and for a time the engine-room had to be abandoned.§ &

About this time the Cornwall's starboard engines suddenly went half speedastern, presumably in accordance with an order given some time before. This:brought her into the middle of the wreckage, and before dar~n~ss fell.sh,e was~ble to pick up a number of British and German survin:rs clmgmg. to It m thewater.1I She remained without electric power from 6. b p.m, unhl 6.50 p.m.

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No 13--DISGUISED RAIDERSB"TTLE SUABI"RY .

10 d but she lay stopped in the wreckage .as restore , . h t h d untl!

At 6.50 p.lDit powe~: making telDporary reparrs, s e wen a ea and steerr'(]9.40 p.ID;, ~o~h: Seychelles.once agam an had found and sunk the enemy the Adl11ir· It

Although the Cornw t f the.operation left much to be desired. 'J~.Y

nSl'dered that the eondue °h as well designed, but when, at 7.7 a.111 ICYco h e of seare f hi h 't h'" lerregarded the se elD t ship of the type ?r w c .1 .was searc mg, it shou!'l~:rcraft .i.,hted a merehan instead of waJtmg until ItS return to the shi- -0 ed th fact at once . d' t t th P athave report e this failure to make an rrnme la e repor. e.CorllwlIll8 a.m. As a result of from the enemy for nearly an h,our! which mIght havecontinued to stearn awaY

h . craft was kept unnecessarily m the air.'tal while her ot er aU"

been VI, • d t that the Cornwall should have kept the CommandeIt was conslde~e , '~' rmed of events and of her intentions, With t;'

in-Chief,. East r~di~ :~ he could then have informed her that no friend!~informatIon ,at his P here near. She appears,. ho~ever, to.have been undulylDerchant ~Pthwthas an~ibility of her wireless bemg IIItercepted by the raider',concerned WI e podirection finder.

e Cornwall was engaged on a defin,ite raider hun~ ~nd e~ploying, quite~ both aircraft for the search. When t~e SUSpiCIOUS shIp was sighted

correc Yf them it could have shadowed her while the other was recalled and~fuclI~ in readiness to relieve the shadow~r, thus e~suring that the suspect

uld be almost constantly under observation. As It was the advantage of::ving two aircraft was lost· and the enemy wa~ left unwatched from 7.25 a.111until 11.25 a.m. and again from 11.50 a.m. until 2.10 p.m. If he had made abig alteration of course, or if the visibility had drastically decreased, the chanceof finding him again would have been slender.

The Admiralty considered that during this phase the rigid adherence tpwireless silence resulted in essential reports not being made from the aircraft tothe ComfIJall when the signal letters were hoisted by the suspect, and from theCor_all to the Commander-in-Chief when these had been identified as theTamerla1Ie's. In view of the nature of the operation and the obvious importanceof making contact with the suspicious ship as quickly as possible, the Admiraltl'~ed, to?, that the Cornwall should have brought all her boilers to~te ~otice at 8 a.m., the time of the aircraft's first report, instead ofwaiting until 12.50 p.m. when the report of the second sighting reached her.

,~~~Thro:ughout the period between the surface sightin~ of the raider and theCl; w1leD she opened fire the Cornwall held on to the idea that the suspect

,~jlti)l~~e t~ be a friendly neutral although in view of her sus~icious~ C -the evIdence ~as very much against it. The Admiralty constdered~t~' by a1lo~g ~erself to close to a range of under 12,000 ra:dI~~ Intentions, showed a lack of attention to the c?angm

..IS qUlte clear fr,;,m her reportt that this was fully apprecIated aterror of cl~ a very suspicious ship was intensified by hert~ fire. which lef~ no alternative but to turn awa.. and~moment, whIch might easily have resulted III the

- BlQre serious damage to herself than she actually

~1~~. . . 10",' '$0 action, dattcl 16th December, 1941, 's

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UKAA.OCJ1.0015

, 1941(, SYDNEY," 19THSECT,7.

~l'jt.ttey, Australian cruiser, 6,830 tons. a21 knots, guns, eight 6-in., four 4-in. H. A.

Ap'Rendix C.

·:>e<~tio,n al'itthe times following arc 2---7.knots accordip.gto Sub-Lieutenant Bunjes.

" You Should make your signal letters."

THE "SYDNEY'S" ACTION, 19th NOVEMBER, 19417. On 19th Novelnber,. UH1,. FUv1.A.S. Sydncy.* Captain Joseph Burnett.

R.A.N., sank the enemy raIder l\.ormoran off the west coast of Australia. Asthe S:ydney was herself destroved with all hands in the encounter this account isbased on the only available report of the action, that of the German survivors. t

On 11th November, 1941, the .')'ydney left Fremantle escorting theS.S. Zealandia, and handed her over to H.M.S. Durban in 7° 56' S., 1040 40 ' E.on the 17th. She signalled that she expected to arrive back at Fremantle or;20th November, but, eady on the 21st the District Naval Officer, WesternAustralia, reported that she had not arrived, and followed this on the 2an] witha signal that no further \\lord had been received from her. At 10.54 a.m. on the28rd the Australian Naval Board instructed her to report her expected time ofarrival at Fremantle, and an hour later all high power wireless stations wereordered to call her continuously' There was no reply, and an air search on24th November gave an equally negative result.

At 8.16 that morning, 24th November, however, a report came in bvwireless from the tanker Trows that she had picked up 25 Germans from a raftin 26° 6' S., 111° 40 ' E. Eventuall,Y 103 survivors from the Kormoran cameashore in two boats at Carnarvon, \Vestern Australia,t the S.5. Koolinda pickedup.a boat with 31 more, the Aquitania rescued 2H, and H.M.A.S. Yandra pickedup two Chinese who had been captured from the 5.5. Eurylochus when theKormoran sank her in 8 G 15' N., 25° 14' \V., on 29th January,§ and 70 Germans,a total of 315 Germans and two Chinese.

The story of the action between the Sydney and the Kormoran was toldby the Kormoran's captain, Fregatten-KapiHin A. G. T. Detmers and otherprisoners, and bears all the marks of a bonafide account. They could notexplain why the Syd·ncy carne so close before opening fire or attempting tolaunch her aircraft, but it will be recalled that on 27th Februarv, 1941, theLeander closed to within 3,000 yards of the R.A .M.B.l before' either shipopened fire.li

About 4 p.m.~ on 19th November the Kormoran was in 26 G S., III E.,steaming northwards at 10 knots** when she sighted what appeared to be a sailfine on the starboard bow. Commander Detmers soon identified it as a cruiserand immediately turned west into the sun and increased to full speed, which heestimated at 15 knots. The cruiser, which proved to be the Sydney, at oncetUlrn€~d and came up on the Kormoran's starboard quarter at high speed. For

an hour, as she approached, she repeatedly signalled NNJ, but Commander~.~·tmers had no idea what NNJ meant and did not reply.tt Meanwhile the

was busily making the "Disguised raider in sight)) signal,'V"V"V",-", 26 S, III £, STRAAT MALAKKA," and it may be noted that about-.~'•. "'+ G.M.T. on 19th November the tug Ueo picked up a QQ message, but

uua. .......... to read the position and ship's name.

the range had closed to 7 miles the Sydney ordered the Kormoran inlanlllualle to hoist her signal letters and the raider hoisted PKQJ, the

l~l~~¢lfS S.S Straat Malakka, on her triatic stay between the funnel and

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12 . could not se' them. it is reasonahl. t" "')Imast where .the cruiser 0 induce the Sydney to clo and InVf It ',1\

{ohret this was a ruse de g,,,,rre \oist the letters clear wa repeated <.<ml "1'", It a th Kormoratl toher signal to. e m llied with it.before the raider co J d tubes trained whcn shc cam up Will

The Sydtley had aU ~ssi~~al .. Where bound?" the KormOrt'" "'1:'"KorttWran. In reply to then apparently hOIsted the letters lK, wlU<I I ," Batavia." The Sydttey t d as in thc In tcrnational Code they mea,,' \

bl to unders an 1" Th . OJraider was una e hurricane or typ loon. ey were, In fal \should prepare for a cyclonfet'l e Straat Malakka's secret call sign II KI' I

d tl . d lettcrs 0 1 h t I tt .•second an 11r h Kormoran to shower secre e ers, an'J ("r'\Sydney then ordered t ew to reply decided reluctantly to fight. '1 he II

Detmers not knowm.g h~"esterlY direction at 15 knots on parallel couu", tships were steamlDg m a, tarboard beam Only a mIle· eparatcd them.Sydttey on thc Ko~:;orfn d:oppcd her ~ screens and, hoisting the Ge:;;the Korttloran s~ en.ih four of her SIX 6-in. guns. Her first salvo hi t

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ensign., oP':'1e~ ~h:S dttey immediately replied with a salvo which went I, -,

crwser s bndgd

' t the ra1der's fuel tanks on fire, In the meantime the Kon" ITa.but her secon se h'ch ntly put her [0 dhad hit thc Sydney with a torpedo W I appar~ ,rwar turrtt_

f t · d '''I'th a salvo which shot hcr aircraft to pIeces at a range"out 0 ac lon, an .. 'n! +close that the men round it could be pial y seen.+

About 4.40 J?m. the Sydney turned to port and passed so close astern ~Ithe Kormoral1 that some of the raider's crew thought that she would ram herAlthough an uncontrollable fire was raging in the Korm.o,:all all her guns lIerestill in action. The Sydney's after turrets, too, were finng, and at 4,50 pmshe fired four torpedoes which mi.ssed the raide~ ahead and astern, [heKormoran replied with a torpedo which also miSsed ItS mark. Both shIp w,'renow burning fiercely and the Sydtley was 6 feet gown by the bows,

Barely half an hour had p~ed since the KormOratl opened fire, but theaction was virtually over. The Kormoran, which had fired 450 rounds and thr~

torpedoes, was lying stopped with a fierce fire in her engine-room. The -y<in,ywith all her sUJ?Crstructure smashed and her boats destroyed, war stc,lInlll~

slowly§ away in a south-easterly direction under a dense cloud of moke. \t11 p.m. Commander Detmers decided to abarldon the Kormoran and shonhafter midnigh~ an explosion hastened her end. By this time all' trare "f theSydney had disapJ?Cared and she was never seen or heard again.1I

DIE "DEVONSHIRE'S" ACTION, 22nd NOVEMBER, 1941D S~· ~ 22nd kNovember, 1941, H.M.S. Devonshire, Captain R. D. Oh\'er..., . ., san an enemy vessel in the South Atlantic.

At 5~: a.m. t~at mo~ing Captain Oliver despatched his \\"alrus ,Iiraall

~j~di an anb-submanne patrol and long rarlge search allead o[ thc ,hll~.;turned at 7.l~ a.m. it reported sighting a merchant :ihl~'ln

. Fro~ the aircraft's description Captain Oli"cr susped l

to AI~ nught well be an enemy raider arld he ill1lllc.lIJ1d\......... her at 25 knots.

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SECT. 8. "J)E\'ONSlIIHE," 22Nll NO\,U,1JI1'H, 1941

tHHGMHeP¥B £BMIdBH smp it~?avoia: unnecessary bloodshed, especially as sheprobably had a number of BrItIsh prisoners on board.

The stranger at once stopped and, turning round, transmitted by wirelessat 8040 a.m. the warship raider report ;" Rl<R RHR R.l~R de P(i!vphemus4° 20' S., 18° 35' W. 0940 G.:\f.T." It was significant that the" R/s" werein groups of three and not of four and that n() signal letters were included.Captain Oliver could not ignore the possibility tliat the ship might be thegenuine Polyphemus, which was a yessel of similar appearance with a counterstem, and having been reported at Bilbao on 21st September \\las within reachof his position. To remove all doubts he made a signal to the Commander-in­Chief, South Atlantic, Vice-Admiral A. U. Willis, (,13" D.S,O., at 9.5 a.m.,asking if this were the real Polyphemus. The aircraft was also asked what typeof stern the stranger had and replied at 9.:H a.m. that she had a cruiser stemand a hull similar to the Atlantis. All doubts, howenr, were removed at9.34 a.m. when the Commander-in-Chief signalled "No, rew~ No."One minute later, at 9.35 a.m., the Devonshire: opened fire atr( I. yards.Her fourth salvo hit and started a fire which, she reports, eventually spread tothe enemy's magazine and blew her up. The enemy put up an efficient smokescreen, but made no attempt to return the Devomhire's fire.t By 9.39 a.m. the'l}evonshire had fired 30 salvos, and Captain Oliver checked fire and turned~tward to clear the enemy's smoke screen. He then tried indirect firing byR.D.F. range, but gun blast put the R.D.F. transmitter out of action. At

a.m. the enemy was visible once more, and according to the aircraft wasaining a steady 15 knots. The Devonshire therefore reopened fire until.m., wheri' the enemy was seen to be heavily on fire and down by the stern.

tain Oliver thought that she had consistently attempted to draw him to theh-eastward, and was determined to steam no further in that direction than

d help. At 10.2 a.m., however, there was a heavy explosion on board her.followed by another at 10.14 a,m., and two minutes later she sank.ptain Oliver's next anxiety was to recover his aircraft, which had aed propeller, and he successfully picked it up at 10040 a.m. It reported

ost certainly an enemy submarine was present. He was thereforeto stop and rescue survivors, as he could not have done so withouta grave risk ofbeing torpedoed.t

e 4.'ng to Devo1t'S1I,irs'$ report the enemy abandoned ship, but she was ~ubse.

d to be pro~dingat 15 knots. It is possible she may have been carryingpplies for $uBmatines.

S,etr e~7r 8

An hour later, at 8,9 a,lIl" the m<lsts of a sliil' (:lnH' intq c,lght lwannv160" in 4" 12' S., IS" 42' \\" '1'1)(,1'(' \\·.IS .I mOdC!.ltl' Im'('ZI'" frqllJ tilt' SOlltll,('aS;and a slight sea with a short slow swl'11. rhl' vi::.ihili!\' was 10 !l1Ih:s. llwDe-vol/shire ~lt once turncd cas,t to Ih· olT hl'!" aircraft. which Wa'; (,Ifapllltpd at~.20 a:m. w.lth ~)rders ~o. llkntlfy till' unknown \'('sscl if )lossihk. Bv this !iawCaptam OlIver S SUSIHClOllS wcre t hrol1g1Jlv aW,Ih('d h" tlJ(~ manO'U\TI", ;Iljl!

appearance of the shi,p, which clnsdv Iyscmhled 1{;lidcrN,) J(), wi t It the ;'Xll~PtIOn of moveable fittlllgS such as \'('nttlatnrs and.samson posts, He therdon~manreuvred the Dcvollsht'rc at 2() knuts, and kept her at a range qf between12,000 and 18,000 yards from the unknown ship' to frustrate possihle torped(Jattack.

Page 13. LlBe 12.Delett' .. the strangel' turned 32 P(Jlllts .... dlrr·(\l'iJl· and sails/tltI/1' ',' the

stranger turned a complete CIn:Iv t" st arb, >ani a Ild, 19l1nnng the ' Ikvo!lshiie's .signals, made ofl in a south-eastcrh' threet Ion.''"

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I. I III I III :11 '" lthulIHh ( .lftlulll ()IlVf'1 .UPIIIV ""1\' " nlltl ."h ,,,,,/,,

"'''''. h II It I «ttl III tflll1tlfvhlH Iht .Iul' lIy t It III IIlPII"" II' {'

Oh h, 1 t nl of \ 1"' Itty lutl II HI IH I H, pOI t. No 11:\, ,uld" f '

I It III 'llPP~C l~ Ilutlhn' ILit 'of 2tlld JUII' I If,..., ot n Hllld" , 1~1 t'l.n!f'0 "'jrt:"'I J lll.''''' th 1111"'" hlP 'C,ohllllf,1 '«lll'lllIlItlf'I,:,'1111 II

or tlallt "111\ l(lft f\l I ttl. fttlt h, I JIO, 'fIlH" with I VIII" U II' , I ",7 ..., (dOli \Y 1 t II SI I t V,u,. I,~ " he' II d link 21 .. , p , \ WI III 1lIH' II II 1111111 llllll

vartou ".I;)Aft'ntly Mlklltf til 1111111 UhllllllJlI' Whlll III 'l)fVlIIUllllJl 111'1 11&lid WI lhll ,11111/1"" fhr Juhllllulnt tel c "t 011 wei dlvf' Alii' It, I,...... n III I ( I I I I IIIJl: '"~ 1 d Ith UlvlVll1 wrl IIIfll JY II IIHUlln,'" lilt Ill"l hy til I~bO~ ~I\~;;<.'h tcluk" IIl1lUhN of thr'lI on hfMltl .. I 111'1,1

--.......~

or4. to IIr. glvu at 5.28 p.m.turned to lltarboard before topping,

aeutt I 1 fl Fr town on 2(ilh ov mh('1 10 ',m" fl" "11' IITh Dorsel h~'( hn~ 11'11'1'" 720 mil '. MOlllh find w('~l of "'t, 111'1"11., \t

~hip in the r 1l\~I.\'t 11t:r"~::~ 'n,'~ off h,'r Wall'\I~ alrn'l.fl in 2H .45' ..,., (; ~~. \\7 ".Ill.t on I~t DC'Ci') . Ih t"l t h\ll it rl'lmncd wllhonl '1!(htnll; :lllyll,,"ttl rt't'onnoitrt' to tIC ~/O\l '11' 'r(:d "mllse to III :lnd int1ea~I'r1 to IHI"'""\t It .\ n the Dorsets "r.. ,I l '. 'I t I '( I I

I ,.1 . W.I' '10111 again on a Sllnl nr pn 10 WI Ion t'l '("'.If IAt 3.15 p.llI. lhe d i~;\I'~I:\o\lr and then at righl. anl(lc~ t(~ th(' /)or~t'/\ll/rt',to theI,soutfhWtl"vl'\l\t'l.' for lInothl'l hO\l1 hcforc n'joinlnf.( lI\(' Sillp.m an me ° u, ' fl' I .

t 4.:4:4 p.IlI.§ lhe Dorse/shir.. S~KI~ltedf t1'\"II~r~SISII 0 '1"1\ .\~:!: ;~~lllIt: 1I:i~ Iabout 18 mile away althe ext I' '11\1' hml 0 V~Sll )11 y'f ,. I t I' "tl .. ('III" \\11,II s!' ht swell. Although the Walrus wr\s sUi oUl.O s'g 1 . 0 .11 ~olltlwa"l,C ~. A lecided to close lh unknown v('~sc1 ,II ()~lCe and ,f I\{'I ""<Iry tilre~~rl~le ~~~r~afl. Ill' lherdure l\lrn d 10 O:H· a~l(] 1I1('r ased to 25 knnl"The strang I' soon began milking snm,kc, .bul rcmamed h~11l dc)wn. "'1,,· ha<lappar nlly in 'rcased to filII spe d on .lghtl~lg lhe J)orsct~hlrc, and wa~ ~11'I'nl\~away from her. Cilptain Agar therefore IIlcrcased 10 .10 knnls and made arecall, which failed to reach thc Wnlru~, .

At 5.!! p.m. the Dorsdshirr sighled several small pal'hes 01.011 01\ lhl' wall'[,and Captain Agar, suspecting lhe ]lrt'scnc o[ an enemy submanne, tlltlled aW;l1to starboard. About this time he sightcd an objecl I' s mbling a slIbmarllw'sconning tower 6 miles away on the port bow, but at 5.20 p.m. id ntifl") it ,IS;I

power-boat with four or nvc othcr boats in tow. Although he coliid notentirely reject the possibility that lhc v s el he wa chasing was. Briti~h ~hipwhich had mistaken the Dorsctshire for an enemy cruiser he aSSUl1\N\ thal ,h('was an enemy raider or supply ship. To reduce lhe risk of attack by a submarine he kept the Dorse/shire moving at high speed oulside a ran~l' of16,000 yar~. In these circumstances he could neilher prevenl the enemyfrom scuttlmg herself nor could he capture her. At 5.31 p.m. he fi[('d (WI)~ shots at 24,000 yards,~1 one right and one left of the target. By thl'~e th~ enemy had stopped and was lowering boats.** lIe therefore wilhheld.his~ In~ she, had any captured British merchant seamen on board, anllcon ed zJg-zaggmg outsIde her range, but in ide his own.

y 544 p.m. the Dorsetshire had crossed the enemy's bows,tt ancl altho(l~hn:nwas l~,OOO yards, Captain Agar was able to sec the boats movIng1 . .her Side. At 5.51 p.m. he observed that the en m , who had a

,'=~=t:to port, was on fire. The fire spread rapidly until 6.5 p.m., when:1

~ .OJ! forward ~tt1ed her fate. It was evidenl that lhe enem)'IIlCtioln was certam nd Captain Agar at once turned away 10 dear the

of Secl

don 9. An dmlralty menalle re D,vot! ".,t~' "diull. dllil'd 16thn ppendlx D .

,lU1S toOl 82i !mota, guns, oight 8-in. Rnd cl~ht 4 ·111. II ,\

" deck lor

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HEI~, IRAIllER lIt NT,SECT. 10.

ate position,fromtracl{ chart in 1\'1.0799/42.,--, "

area.asquicklya:'l?ossih1e. AtH.21 p,m t san\{ in2? SIJ' '.., :3 05,:;' \1\ 'If.

leavmg only a trail of smoke and it l111mh!'r survivIJrs In lJilrl Is . f\ t 7 10the Dorsdsh.zrt' recovered her \\alnh ;dr' rdft ,tnd ('IJlt'lill \ .... .1 ' ..'t.l .. 1 .. t 7 .) - t .' I " . ., , ... If;' r ( (''''j J;! I I"f IIagam a .,')~ p.m. 0 rCCOflllOltre t \(' dr('d nf tile !>IJ;lls.

In the failing l.ight observatioIl was difli(llit Il111' '\" tl ' '.' '.. ft '\'d 1

· I f 4 ) f . . . (.., Ie 0111" I'd 1.1[( ('f)

roun at a lelg 1t 0 . O( t. It ~V~IS a1>](' t,) establish that there were ffJurtePIl !;11;lt,and two large rafts 111 .the POSItlOIl wh~~r(' t he ship had WJlW down. Jt (:"limatl'('that each boat contamed at least :2:1 SI!r\'I\'ors 'Ind tint t if ttl I f'. 500 1'1 \~r 1 1" . . " .,. I' 0 a rnlln )er IIsurvivors was . le\ a rus t wn exanllned the boats WlllCl1 tll('!J . t I .1.- d . ht d - 8 TI' '. .'. one 5 11Yt11a Slg e. at b. p,m.. ley we're stIll -t or ;) miles from the survivors' [)0;1t,

and were fully loaded \"':Ith packages and crates. It appears possible that the'.we~e actually transfer.rIng these stores to a suhmarine when the J)r)Yselshl1'(arnved, but It so the aJrcratt saw nothing of it.

' ...... , ~

Page 15. Lines14to24. " '-~. -.:,1.- """+;"L:",,_

Delete .. The' Devonshire's' and' Dnrsetshnl:'''' '1. ·t· , , ,hI "( d d f t) I .. L to lOllS . , !TlO"'t dlftic! itpro em an secon ootno e anc Sllbstit1i!( '. The "'hip' J- 1 . 'l·" '... ,.J.

was the submarine supply ship,' F\·thon,' a Ir(o\'Jr "';""('1 :'Ufll.,'-(,:..,\ 1. Ie, Ilor",etshlr,c 't · (U 126' 23 d N ~ . '." (i ·~,)u't tOll" whIch aft'Tmee lng on [ luvemh"r, had takC'1l on b1nrrJ" ,. f' 1 ' , ~n_'d C. 1 th ., d ." .,fJnl(. (J t le C,,(·\\, IJf

LUl<l er ane en procecc.lc south·eastward tIJ [due! 'm n tl1c ,]. . . .tat d b

. I .. ' . . , "T "U HllaTlnl: 1+ hasn s e y a SurVIvor t lat two submannps were in tlll' .,' '. ') • -

tsh" d h ..' . - \ I\, ll1 n v w lell theorne Ire engage er and that une ot tlH'fll tircd " tf,rI)('(!( \ '1" '1- ".' 1'T'h . k' f th' 'G Id " ." } \ 11c , rn''':Ot,(

-;Ii e SID mg 0 e 0 enfels and !'\·t!Wll' hv tIll' . I) '\' .. '.1 .. ' 'd't I;) tsh' 'h d . " . . ,\,. ems lire an

orse Ire a an Important result. perhaps nut fully realized at the tllneIt brought to a sudden. sto.p a submarmc cam!)ai u !1 '\')110'11 \\'~" ,'1"" '1' '. 1 'SO th '. . .'" . v d., .v>t UIJllIt; In tll'

. U AtlantIc and postponed any renewal ot It 111 that area for nCclrly a year.• Sunk by the' Devonshire,' See Scctil)!] 8," .

...... . £ Uk J!t ,.is ,.' . .d

10. In addition to the eight actions against enemv raiders and suspectedraiders, fought during 1940 and 1941. there ha\'e been a number of cases in

2 when enemy vessels were encountered but not identified as sllch. Therealso at least one instance in 1941 of a raider report leading to a pro­

-f,racted search when no enemy armed raider was present.

On 4th November. 1941, the R.F,A. oiler Otwell reported a surface raiderck at 5.30 a.m. G.M.T. in 3° 4' N., 22~ 42' \r.t The Dorsetshire was at sea,the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, "ice-Admiral A. U. \Yillis, after

0rdering her to investigate, instructed the cruiser Dunedin to leave Freetown'With the special service vessels Queen E'mmCl and Princess Beatrix and join inthe search.'.' When the Dorsetshire, Captain A. \;Y. S. Agar, intercepted the Olwen'staiderdistress signal at 6 a.m. she turned east immediately to close the po~ition.\\\1'tienwas 600 miles away, and at 6.45 a.m. increased to 20 knots. the maXImumspeed of the armed merchant cruiser Canton which was with her. Captain Agar

that the U.S. cruiser Omaha and U.S. destroyer Somers, being well to the...west of the enemy's reported position, would be able. to support then. and ordered her at 7.45 a.m. to make for a position in 5° N., 27° 3.0' \\T.,ter.eept the raider should she steer a north-westerly course, whIle the

're steamed soutn-east at 24 knots to intercept her to d.le. sou~hward,unaware that the U.S. cruiser lklemphis was near the pOSItion given byn.. ira! Willis, not knowing that the Dorsetshire and Canton had parted

Qrdered them at 9.31 a.m. to search a sector to the southward of the

..RAIDER HUNT, 4th-6th NOVEMBER, 1941

..

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B SUM'IARY No 13-DISGUISED RAIDERS16 ATn.E··

't!' • and the DUlledill, Quem Emma and Princess Healr'5 reported POSI on f 't I'enemy t'o the south-eastward 0 I .

to search a sec or ~ il' . f d h B"th ovember Admiral W lis In orme t e nbsh ships th"t

At 3 p.m.:M~m !lis and the U.S. destroyers DaVIS andjollell had searchedthe U.~.~ th ttack without result until 7 p.rn.on the 4th. He added thatthe position o. eO ha and the U.S. destroyer Somers were searching Ifthe .U.S. erwser r~~~eding to a position in S° 5., 34° W. That evening, ~~SurviVOrs ~fo~~d that if nothing further were heard 01 the raider by dUsk on6 p.m., he s~ the DOl'setshil'e and Callion wete to sean::h on a northerly course6t':w.::e~0~' w. and 30° W. to 2° N. The Dorsetshtre woul<!- then return tobe b t th Canton would continue on patrol. The Dlmedm, QlIeell EmiliaFreetown, u e ch rth I c rse t -0 N

P . B t·:· were to sear on a no er y ou 0;) i. beforeand "ncess ea ,.~

returning to Freetown.Next moming, 6th ovember, a new li!1ht was shed upon the situation. At

- 10 30 m. the Olwell reported that the raider Signal had been made When an. a·enemy probably a submarine on the surface, had fired on her in the

:=~gbt. At 11.33 a.m. Admiral ":'illis informed the Dorsetshi~e,Cantoll andDtlnedin that as the attack bad certamly not been made by a raider they were

• to act forthwith on his signal of 6 p.m. on 5th November. No fewer thanten British and American warships had searched for two. days for a raider withno actual existence. The search, however, was not frUItless, for at 8,45 a.m.on 6th November the Omaha and Somers captured the German supply ship0'J;9J-'d in 0° 35' N., 27° 45' W., and took her into an American porq

EIElIIIY VFlmrs SIGHTED BUT NOT ENGAGED, 1942

II. On 13th March, 1942, at 7.25 p.m.,; H.M.S. Durban, steaming 257 ,on passage from Durban to Sirnonstown, at 13 knots with one engine brokendown, sighted a ship in 33° 53' 5., 20° E., steering east at 10 knots, 11 milesahead. As the stranger would pass fairly close the cruiser maintained her owncourse and speed, and at a distance of 6 miles signalled N J§, using a red Aldislamp in the failing light. The absence of any reply being not unusual theDwban then asked" What ship? .. using a white Aldis lamp. The strangerreplied that she was the Levernbank, bound from ew YOl'k to Durban, andwished the cruiser good-night. Her silhouette corresponded to that of a BankLine sbip. .

!he '!eather was too rough for boarding, and the Durban, facing thefamiliar difficulty of identifying a ship in poor light without closing to adaD«aously short range, allowed the stranger to proceed. There can be littlecloqbt. hoWever. that the unknown ship was the ex-British ship speybal/k.~tw~ by ~e Germans in January, 1941, and probably acting as an enemymKaelaymg nuder.

11.30 a.m. next day, 14th March, 1942, a bare sixteen hours after the"illaathad ~owed the.spurious LeveYnbank to proceed unmolested, the armed"" c:rwser C/usMre was in 38° 11' S., 20° 10' E., 258 miles away to

1941, and

11111':1111[:11:11111111:111111111111111,11111

UKAA.001.0021

•

must have covered the distance at an average of 16 knots.s see N.L.9560/42.

-----------------------

SECT. 11.ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED BUT NerI' J'NC'A"'I" 1942

' "~lX, \.X~D, , 17the southward, when she sighted an unknovrrI \'essel I II 1h d · ., ... ' HI Cown At II 50s e turne to mtercept. and the stranger aftt'r mom' ,.' " .' a.m

towards her turned away. This, bein p" ('ontr'II'" tC) l'e .cnt(~Itlly <lltcrmg course• • , ,.., " (v COg-HI Ion I)rorpdu ' 'a SUSpICiOUS manreuvre. Half an hour later Il(~),"e'\"', tl 't " . re, WdS

Cit h · . ~ , .." Cl, Ie s ranger passed thee,S 1re on an 0,ppOSlt,c cour,se o,nlv .{ miles '\W'I\' ']:, tl ('J 1" ' ."\ITI t h' ~"h ]. I . ( '. ,0 Ie / Zcc;,ttre S sIg!}'!.1} 1a S Ip. S e rep lec that she was the Invcrl;aJl 1o I 1 f . 1Ll . . • (t 1\1 lb d'] .h, )011l1C rom lV ontcvIdcua ~. e ourne, an conv1I1cec, from her '11)I)e'Il"ll1ce th' t 'I .B k L · , ] h Cl' « ( , a s Ie was a genuInean me \ esse ,t e rlcshzre allowed her to l)foc'eecl ",'tl t f tl '

I lOll or IeI' question.The rea] I}ozverban~, however, was OIl passafSe from Montevideo to Freetown

Though there IS no plOof that thc "cssel whIch hlsel\' 'I ,. l} 'd .'d, ' , '" ( "ssumec ler I entItvwas an enemy rai er, It seems pOSSIble that she \\"IS tIle f'll'c I b k h' 'I'h d d ' d h D ( - '. ", <, ( S .~evenz an w leIa eceive t e urban 2;:,8 mIles awav on the ])re\Jl'ouS '* 1'1C 'd' ('}', f SA' . J .' even1l1g. 1('amman er-I~- ,ue , ,outh tlclIltI~~, VI~e-AdIl1lra1 E. C, Tait, C.E" M.V.O.thought that .It. may. have beer: provlden~Ial that the Cheshire did not make th~secret recogmtIOn SIgnal. \VIth a pOSSIble enemy raidcr within 7 000 d

d 'th h h' , ' .. , yar s.an . WI er own s II? s com~any qUltc unpreparcd and not even at actions~atIons, the re~ult mIght eaSIly havc ~een ~he ~Iysterious and regrettabledls~ppearanceWIth all hands of one of HIS Majesty s valuable armed merchantcrUlserst·

Si.:c weeks later, at 8.43 a.m., on 26th April, 1942, a Seafox aircraft,patrollIng from the armed merchant cruiser Pretoria Castle, sighted an unknown'\7'essel in 1

0

17' N., 24° 34' VV., steering about 2870 at 8 knots.

Th~ Seafox ~ad left the Pretoria Castle at 6.45 a.m. to carry out a routinereconnaIssance WIth orders to return at 9.15 a.m. The observer was told thatso far as was known no ships were in the area, but that he was to returnimmediately and report any suspicious vessel sighted.

When therefore the unknown steamer came into sight at 8.43 a.m. heordered the pilot to approach within half a mile and, circling round beforecoming down for a closer view, called her up on his Aldis lamp. She replied

'th identificatkm flags GSLD, but he had no means of decoding them nor ofcO'\7'ering her identity. The Seafox made a thorough inspection at close rangesaw nothing suspicious. The vessel was of about 5,000 tons, with one funnel,

o slightly raked masts, samson posts on fore side of mainmast, one derrick1:toisted aft, but no structure on the well decks. She had normal defensive

. ament, but apparently no A.A. guns, The only unusual features werendels painted on the hatch covers. At 9,10 a.m. the Seafox turned to

oin the Pretoria Castle, 40 miles away.

When the Pretoria Castle failed to sight the aircraft by 9.5 a.m. she calle.dand learned that it expected to be back at 9.40 a.m.; but at that hour It. out of sight. Ten minutes later, howe\:er, ju?t as ~t sigh~ed the ship,raft, running out of petrol, was forced to alIght, signallmg a~ It came down

.5. 270°. 5 miles." The Pretoria Castle closed, but the dIstance proved"12 and not 5 miles. The sea was choppy with a heavy swell. All

s to pick the aircraft up failed, and it was not until 12.10 !?m. ~hat ~hecould report the unknown ship which had hoisted IdentificationLD. These belonged to the S.S. Anglo-Cana~ian, but this name wase Pretoria Castle's shipping plot, and she deCIded to make a further. The suspect's estimated mean line of advance was roug~ly parallel

course, and to get well ahead she ~~ld on at 16 knots until 1.15 p.m,ing to intercept. Though she antICIpated that the suspect would be

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l' BAmB SUMMARY O. J3-DlSGUlSIW RAIJW.I(<'

io~ by p.m., it had no~ been sighted half an hour later Ito 1#1". to cr_ the stranger s probable track. At 5.45) W 1(;/1 ,,10, IA~ ... In tJ><'- only to be told that t1,;~'':;'' 'he "'b·" :,",Boi"-LY OD tetb April. Further air rcconnaissan c wa'l ~lP h,tel "fll .•~ ,

Prt/IfI#C"I1i1.-d a;,cralt was """,,,,,..b1o, "" alth"~~I'~'"'" • :1,_to till weD after dark she saw nothing of th suspic' ~ I ,,10,; "H," ',IOU VL") ,.,. .1',

APPENDIX A*

H.M.S. u ALOANTARA "-WiT MESSAGESt SENT IN AOTIONON 28th JULY, 1940

II: 1";11:: I:: Ii1/:":II ~ I/111:""1111;I" 1:1

UKAA001.0023II

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I.MPOHTANT :-Commander-in-Chief, S ..\ .. IL\.S.A.D., from .., LCA .\'1'.·1 RA.

HAVE SIGHTED SUSl'ICIOl'S :\IEl<CII,\NT SHIP 10: POSlTIO" 024 2T S.,032

031' \V" STEERING 040". I A:\I CHASING A'r :\!.\XIMCM SPEED BUT NO'}

GAIN ING. 1328z/28.

(This message was broadcast at 1410 ill 0:aval Cypher llsing l'cscrvl'd Block Call Sign.)

IMMEDIATE :-Commander-in-Chief, 5,1\" IL\.S.A.D" from A LCA lVTA RA.

MY 1328z. AM ENC-;'AGING ENE:\IY AI0lED MEECHANTSHIP. MY POSlTIO:SIS NOW 024° 03' S, 031° 58' 'V. 1500z/28.

these signals was received by the Hawkins which was a thousand miles.e: '

(Broadcast at 1506z when main aerial was shot away during repetition. Message)vas then broadcast on auxiliary WIT at 15512 and at 1608z. Fleet Code.)

IMMEDIATE :-Commander-in-Chicf, S,A., R.A.S.A.D., from ALCAXTA RA.

MY 1500z. COUHSE AND SPEED OF ENE?lIY 180°, 15 KNOTS. MY SPEEDREDUCED TO 10 KNOTS, HOLED IN ENGINE HOOM. MY POSITION NOW0240 10' S., 031° 50' \V. 1555z/28.

(Broadcast on auxiliary \V/T 500 kcs., at 1G42z and a~ain at IG57z on main W!T usingsmall broadcast aerial. Fleet Code.)

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1,IIIIIIIIIHllllllillllllUKAA.OOI.OO24

,APPENDIX B*

"" ..- fJ'l'E":RED BY B.M..S. .. CORNWA' •JIBlX'BD OF U_ .......

• Sp"dr.""', A u~red course I .

7111 MDY. 1941 340' 20 kOfJt()625

075624 kno

0815000' 25 knob

1600040' 23 kDO

1900015· 23 kn<>"

2130113' 16l kOfJl

IV" '\{DY. 194 I0330

143· 13 knl) ...

0600 090'

063518 knob

0820258'

0825255· 20 knn

083423 knots.

0838 252'

1230 240·

1245 26 knot;.

1302 28 kno

1609 250'

1612 262'

1619 295°

1635 29 knot-

1637 240'

1642 290·

1651 285·1701 320'

1713 290'1716 240·1717 260·1719 240·1722 220'1725 250"1717 Altered COUI'ge towards wrecka'e

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APPENDIX C*

I BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE "KORMORAN" AND HER CRUISEt~

According to her survivo~s the C;erman rai(lcr !\'UiI}ZOiWl was th<.~ German S.S. Slcier­mark, a vessel of 9.400 tons, with a maXImum speed of 18 kn()ts. reduced, at the tinw of heraction with the Sydney, t<;> 15 or 16 knots b)' a foul bnU()lll. At this time she was disguisedas .the Straat Malakl.a with a blac.k hull, hlack fu.und, and buff superstructure. and wasftymg the Dutch flag. She hacl smkd as RaIder No. '+1 and receIved the name J(ormoranat sea.

194,1.

13th January.

18th January.

28th January.

29th January.

23rd "March.

9th April.

12th April.

t M. 05540/42.

3° S., 30° W.

26° 36' X, 30° IS' W.

8° N., 15') \V.

8° 15' N., 25° 14' W.

4° N., 23° W.

3° S., 21° W.

20° S., 22° W.

TOllS.

3,729

6,987

11,900

5,723

3,552

8,022

5,486

Antonis (Gr.) ..

British Union (Er.)

A "ric Star (Br.)

Eurylochus (Br.)

Agnita (Br.) ..

Craftsman (Br.)

Nicolaos, D. L. (Gr.)

On 27th March she captured the tanker Canadolite, 11,?09 tons, in 15° N., 33° \V.,sent her into Bordeaux. She enterecl the Indian Ocean In May and proceeded to theof Bengal where she sank two vessels on 2Gth June, 1941, the Yugo-Slav shi.p yelebit.

3 tons, and the British ship Mareeba, 3,472 tons, in 8" N., 88° E. Her last .VlctlIll wasGreek S.S. Stamatios G. El'nbirikos, 3,941 tons. which she sank near the ]\lalcllve Islands.uding the Cataadolite she accounted for 68,274 tons of shipping.

Her armam<"nt was not positively established but it appears to have been six 15-em.(6-in.) guns, six torpedo tubes, four nn deck and two submerged, and tWI) ;{·7-cm. A.A..gJ.lRS. She also carried a number 'of mines, prohablv "hout 200, and one aircraft which,Being difficult to hoist out, was not ofkn used. She carried a numher of disguises such asa second funnel and additional masts but as she was huilt on Dutch lines and ftew a Dutchflag which for general purposes provided sufficient disguise these, too, were not used.

She left Germany on 4th December, 1940, and steered along the Norwegian coastBefore passing Between Iceland .and Greenland and down the Atlantic where she sank thefollowing, ships :-

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Ifl18A/l6 DecemberDate: 16th Dccemb"r, I ~Il

MESSAGE

APPENDIX D'"

(B) C~, JwDUd.... :

Crcbant ship recognition procedure laid down in Recognitiou ~lallual and.c., I. 371 does not appear to have been used. This is now onll'

applicable t? red ens!gn and SOme DIltch ships, but arrangement. aroiii hand for .ts extenSIon to U.S. and .n Allied shippin~.

TlIIOIies :

'natn is a possi~i1ity that commandiJ)~ olicers under-estimate the olionsl\epo- of nuders. T~ey should be warned that enemy raiders :uT often~Uy armed WIth guns and torpedoes and if fitted 'nth modern

.F. -y be able to open fire even at long range with great actur3 ,

~:

~,~~'II!~IDli!~ aIice>s sbou1d be warned lba .n enemy gel- throu~h ut I "

-::;~puUedd b U- and that the mereh. nt ,..,., I·t .. the Brttillb ship towafd' the e·& t

Comment-(4) Enemy rnidt·rs will always disguise themselves and use the appropnatc

name in any siA'Oal whether by an RRF-R message on 500 k cs or threplr to a challen e.

(5) In no case so far has the disguise adopted been such as should haye decei\commanding officers had the}' tru ted the negative inteDigence th •infonnation of the ship's movements had not been reported tn them

(6) Positive information of British, Allied llnd .5. merchantmen fr mAdmiralty or Shipping Intelligence Officers is sufficiently accurate. an!positive mformation of neutral vessels by local \Var Trade Reponm,Officers should be ufficientlv accurate to enable commanding officers tbe k pt infonned of the position of all non·enemy hips they may mCommanders·in·Chief should ensure that their information ami plo l!~_OJ'R3nisation. can achiew this.

From Admiralty. .'th enemy merchant nuders by H.M.S. eM,," 111

nalysis of enCO\1ntc~s '~ccan' II ~I A S Syd1ley ofT the \Ve.st Austrahan r-,8th lIIay, 1941, in th': rnd~a~ ~I.S. Devo;.shir~ in the South AtlantIC on 22nd . '" 119th ovembcr, 1941 '. an . .. .1941, brings out follo",ng pomts .-

(A) RuolJ1lilion :(I) Cornw<./I's raider reported herself as 5.5. Tamerlane, who was no ,n h

station.

(2) Sydfl4v's raider replied tBo :' challenge tbat she was .5. Stroot -'1.laU.who had that dar left e.ra.

(3) /)IvonsAlYe'" raider reported herself as 5... PolypM/Ilus then in );e\\, York

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INDEX

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(The Ref_ ill to the Number of Section)

Re CO'Nwall', actio~, 8th May, 1941,8; m-.ere encounters WIth enemy mercqDt rai4en18th December, 1941, Appendix D. •

SuC~ by Ko,mo,an, 28th January, 1941, AppeDdIx

Commanding Do,selshi,e, sinks enemy supply ship,1st lJecember, 1941,9; hunts for raider, ~thNovember, 1941, 10.

Sunk by Ko,mo,an, 23rd March, 1941. Appendix C.Incorrect use of, by Co,nwall, 7-8th May, 1941.8 ;

search for Syd""y. 24th November, 1941 7'Syd1Uy" aircraft shot to pieces, 19th Nove~bcr:1941. 7; Devonshire's aircraft reports enemyvessel, 22nd November, 1941, 8; Dor.It.M,e,aircraft reconnoitres scene of Dor,ltshire', action,1st December, 1941,9.

Action with enemy raider, 28th July, 1940, 2, 3 ;signals in action, 28th July. 1940, Appendix A.

Action with Grtij,.28th February, 1916, I.By Akanla,a, 28th July, 1940, 2; by Korrnoran,

19th November, 1941. 7,Sunk by Kormoran, 13th January, 1941, Appendix

C.Picks up Kormoran survivors, November, 1941.7.Orders Sydney to report, 23rd November, 1941: 7.Commanding Leander, sinks R.A.M.B.l, 27th

Februaty. 1941, 4.Commanding Vollai,e, lost With her. about 4th

April, 1941, 5.Into Cornrua/I's engine-room failures on 8th May,

1941. 6 footnote.Slink by Raider No. 33, 7th May, 1941,6.Sunk by Kor_an. 18th J~uary, 1941. Appea4Ix

C.Commanding Sydney. lost with 1Ier. 19th No...•

ber. 1941. 7.Sent into Bordeaux by Korrnor_ 26th IIua1a,

1941, Appendix C.Hunts for raider, ~th Novem.be1'. llll 10

ction with enemy raider, 5th o-ber. 1840, S.SightsUDidentified enemy vessel. 14

;eand west Indies. -'~Ollti?dies. ace J,.eatham; '"WJIlIs. aDd.Tait.

""",or•i:~' '33.1Ira::.

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Bocorta ZI<lltMlill4, _ber, 1941. 7 I 1unidentified _y..-I, 13th March, i942~:~

Sunk by Kumwra.., 29th January. 1941 7Appendix C. ' .

Action with A.leIJrJIa,a. 28th l'ebruary. 1916, I

Commanding C_...."" Ctutk, engaraider. 5th December. 1940, 3.

Rear-Admiral, South America Diyu,'on JUI1940,2. • }.

Flag of R.A. South America Division. July. 1940 .,

Commanding A.tca_A. eugages enemy raIder28th July, 1940,2. '

Searches reported raider position. 4th • 'oyemb<,r1941, 10. '

Commander-iu-ehief. America and Wcst Ind,cApril, 1941,5. >,

Sunk by raider, 13th July. 1940.2.

Picks up ]{o",,,wan survivors. ~ovember, 1941,7.

Lost in action with Sydney, 19th _·ovember. 1941I. 7; description and cruise 01, Appendix C. .

Sinks R.A.M.B.l. 27th-February, 1941.4.

Commander-in-Chiel, East Indies, February, 1941,4, lIIay 1941,6. •

Sunk by Ko,moran, 26th June, 1941, Appendix C.Searches reported raider position, 4th. ovember,

1941, 10.Sunk by ](o,,,,,,,an, April 12th, 1941. Appendix C.

t::aptured by Omaha, 6th Noyember, 1941. 10.

Commanding D~o....Ili,., sinks enemy supply ship,22nd November, 1941, 8.

Reports raider attack, 4th November, 1941, 10.

Captures Ode..wald, 6th November. 1941, 10.

Commodore, South America Division, December,1940,3. •

Enemy submarine snpply ship, reports herself as.22nd November, 1941, 8. Appendix D.

Aircraft from sights suspicious ship, 26th April,1942. 11.

Discovers wreckage, probably of Voltai", 7thApril, 1941, S.

Hunts for raidel:, 4-6th ovember. 1941, 10.

Hunts for raida: 4-6th ovember. 1941, 10-

Sunk by C........",1Ith May, 1941.6.

S,.K~an.

Tonnage sun ~, 1914-18, and 19S9-'t.l. ,problem of diatfnguishing from supply ships, 9.

Commander-in-ehi8f. Sou.th Atlantic, ApriI,I94I. 5.

Sunk by Leande" 27th February. 1941,4.Leaves Teneri1le, 17th July. 1940, 2.

May have sunk VollAi", April, 1941, 5.captures Odenltlald. 6th November, 1941. 10.

,. SilK_AEn _._.A'Ill/flla raids. March. leu. 11.•• emy .........

•• Sunk by K • 1841. pptD Co

.."..'" (Dr. u)

Gnf/(German armed raider, 1916)HIM,., capt. H. W: M., R. . ..

Harwood, Rear·AdmiraI Sir Henry,K.C.B., a.B.E.

s ...... (cruiser)Iapam. capt. S. G. P., R.N.

JtIIM# (U.S. t.b.d.)

KellDedy-Purvis, Vice-Admiral SirCharles, KC.B.

X..Jail" (Sr. 5.5.)

KotJIirr44 (Br. 5.5.)

X~A", Ex German 5.5. Steie,ma,k(Germanarmedraider 0.41)

LMIIuIu (cruiser, ew Zealand Divi·son)

Leatham, Vice-Admiral R., C.B.

Pri_ DtJ1f1i4 (Canadian a.m.e.)

MtJrUbA (Dr. s.s.)MIfllPIlis (U.S. cruiser)

NUtol4os DL. (Gr. s.s.)

OdMtllllJW (German supply ship)..Oliver, Capt. R. D., D.S.C., R.N.

a ~.A. oiler) .•

9MdII (U.S. crniser) ..

~ Capt;. F. H. (Commodore 2nd

p~ (Dr. s.s.) •• • . • .

PntoJ» eM. (a.m.e.)

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Escorted by Sydney and Durban. November, 1941,7.

Signal letters of, used by [{ormnran, 19th Novem.o?r. 1~41, 7; [{orll/oran disguised as, Appen­dices C an,l L>.

Lost. in action with J(ormoran, 19th November,1941. 1,7.

Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, March, 1942,11.

Signal letters of, used by Raider No. 33, 8th :May,1941, (,.

Picks lip /{orl1loYaJl survivors, November, 1941, 7.

Picks lip Q <'2 message. 19th November, 1941,7.

Su uk by /{oymol'lIn, 1941, Appendix C.

Sunk by raider, about 4th April, 1941, 5.

Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, November,1941,8. 10. ..

Picks up f{o1'llwran survivors, November, 1941, 7.Yandra (Australian auxiliary AjSvessel).

eiilandia (Br. s.s.)

Trocas (Br. tanker)

Uco (Australian tug)

Velebit (Yugo-Slav s.s.)

Voltaire (a.m.e.)

Willis, Vice-Admiral A. U., C.R, D.S.O.

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PLANS' 2 AND 8

THE •• CARNARVON CASTLE'S" ACTIONlith DECEMBER, 1940

I,mlllili/mill WilliUKAA.001.0030

DISGUISIW RAJDEII!!

PLAN 1

-THE .. ALCANTARA'S" ACTION

28th roLY, 1940

BATTLE SUMMAIIY No, 1

NOTES ON PLANS•

A/ I 's report (1'>1 01 8572{40) shows the A/cal/lara' Irar'.AI.__ In the call ara '.., ••TIle ......_. aid 1'1 e report Kives only the io.tial beanng o( the cnemy (ff"n lh,

ba DOt tllat of the r er. b I ossible to produce a reliable track o( his cour,,' 'II"A~. aDd It has oot een p , I.. track In Plan I, while conforming with all the availab e data, must thcrcr"," I..~. dl f the enemy's probable movements.ftIIUIltcI m.-.Jy as a agram 0

11J11II10/"I, .. H.M.S. Carnarvoll Castlt, Heport of Actioo with German Rarder onIIIQ;.,.b8r. 19<&0," contains a diagram of the tracks of the Camaroon Castle and lhe

TlI cIIqram II not to 'lCDle and the enemy's track differs in many re peel> (rom_,._•• 01 the report, The raider's track has therefore been redrawn in Plan 2

.. poaible with the available data, bllt, as in Plan I, it must be regarded01 the-y' probable movemen • The Carllarooll Castle's dlDgram

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PLAN

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',-< •: ~1!N5 \: \ \, , ,, ' ,'_ #' I,,,

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EEN H.M.S. ALCANTARA ANJULY 28,1940.

dt is bas~d solely onort (M.OI657~'O)'te. on Plans-).

·I'w1E -+-2.

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PLAN 2.M S. CARNARVON CASTLE'S ACTION

'WITH A GERMAN RA1DEf'l,

DEc~5TH IQ40.

. his p'lon is based on a diaqrorn.(,Plan 3),In M 02910{41. (See' Notes off Plans.

Zone lime +2.

Wind N.E force 3.

-

-

k.li! sc.reen.

PLAN 3

Track of H..S. CARNARVON CASTLE

Track of Rider - - - --

H.M.S. CARNAR ON CASTLE'S DIAGRAMfrom

M. 2.910/41.

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7 0836 '2I\ ..... ....l 0rened Fire

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IRIlIDU

SYONIY

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H.M.A.S. S VON (V'S A CllOft­NOVEMBER 19'"1941.

~

'-<1620

1620

AREA OF ACTION

1630

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PLAN 6

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I~ 20Mi/~s

IRE'S ACTION.ER 194/.

-

PLAN 7

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