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MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper

Sea-Based Aviation andthe Next U.S. AircraftCarrier Design:The CVXby Reuven Leopold

Janaury 1998The MIT Security Studies ProgramCenter for International StudiesMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridge, Massachusetts

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nThe MIT Security Studies Program is a graduate level oresearch and educational activity based in the MIT Centerfor International Studies. It has an interdisciplinary faculty, a number of visitors and wide interests in security related ritopics that it conveys to graduate students and the generalpublic through a variety of mechanisms: courses, seminarseries, conferences, and publications including anoccasional paper series of which this paper is a part. s

The Program receives support from foundations, tcorporations, and government agencies and believes, like tthey do, that each author or group of authors in ourpublication series is responsible for all opinions expressed.For more information on the Program or to join that selectand much appreciated and admired group that helps tfinance its activities please try any of the following routesto Professor Harvey M. Sapolsky, its Director:

MIT Security Studies ProgramMIT E 38-674

Cambridge, Massachusetts o2139 USATEL 617 253-5265

FAX 67 258-7858

sapolsky @mit.edu emailhttp://cis-server.mit.edu/dacs/index.html

IntroductionFor the first time in over 30 years the U.S. Navy is about to define the characteristics of its

next aircraft carrier class, CVX. This effort will also influence the ongoing Joint Strike Fighter(JSF) program, (the next naval fighter/attack (F/A) aircraft), as well as the Navy's CommonSupport Aircraft (CSA) program (future airframe for all non-F/A naval aircraft). These threeNavy programs - the CVX, JSF and CSA - will likely cost the nation tens of billions of dol-lars. It is not surprising therefore, that fierce debate has begun to swirl around each of these piv-otal programs. The debate involves such issues as whether tactical aircraft or cruise missiles arethe preferred means of delivering conventional explosives to the target (see Appendix A), the bas-ing of the aircraft - aircraft carrier-based or ground-based - and the key features of the air-craft carrier such as its size, propulsion plant type and the type of aircraft which will fly offfuture carriers, i.e., Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL), Vertical Short Take-Off andLanding (VSTOL), Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL), Unmanned Air Vehicle(UAV) and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). The purpose of this paper is to lay thefoundation for considering these issues.

The first salvo in this debate has already been fired by the Air Force, a traditional critic of bignaval expenditures. In a recent article, General Ronald Fogelman, the now retired Chief of Staffof the Air Force,' emphasized the importance of stealth. He asserted that the Navy's cancellationof the A-12 program in 1991, the cancellation of upgrades to the A-6, and the subsequentretirement of this 30 year old Navy attack aircraft resulted in the Navy's loss of ability to operatein the current and future threat environments until the introduction of the JSF aircraft in 2015.He further argued that the F/A-18E/F which is to enter service on carriers by 2001 is notstealthy enough and is too expensive. He believes that the Navy would be better off not to buythe F/A-1 8E/F in spite of the fact that from a stealth standpoint the E/F is ten times better thanthe C/D aircraft. He suggested that the Navy should rather restart the F/A-18C/D aircraft pro-duction line - an aircraft with significantly inferior capability when compared to the E/EGeneral Fogelman's suggested course of action would significantly weaken the posture of sea-based aviation in the first part of the 21st century. Thus, it is only natural to question the moti-vation behind this suggestion. The Navy approach to the design of the F/A-18E/F is to assertthat its multi-mission requirements favor a more cost-effective approach to survivability thandependence on mainly all-aspect stealth. After all, even the Air Force's stealthy fighter/attack air-craft provide full survivability only during darkness. Additionally, all-aspect stealth is expensiveand difficult to maintain. A just published GAO report on the B-2 states "The Air Force decided

R.R. Fogelman, "First Force," AirForce Magazine, September 1996.

3

it was unrealistic to deploy the B-2 without shelters, as planned, because some low-observablematerials are not as durable as expected and require lengthy maintenance, some in an environ-mentally controlled shelter after each flight."2 Because of the harsh environment at sea it wouldbe prohibitively expensive to maintain a full stealth capability, such as the B-2/F-22, on boardship. Indeed, the Air Force's latest F/A aircraft - the F-22 comes at a cost of as much as$120M per copy, while the Navy's latest F/A-18E/F costs $55.7M (average unit recurring fly-away cost based on the 1997 QDR mandated fleet buy of 548 aircraft).

The Navy's balanced approach to the design of the F-18-E/F incorporates both passive andactive defenses such as: front-end [head-on] "affordable" stealth; more economical deceptiondevices such as towed decoys; destruction/suppression of enemy surface-to-air missiles usingHigh-Speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARMs); and standoff weapons such as the StandoffLand-Attack Missile Extended Range (SLAM-ER) and the Joint Stand-OffWeapon (JSOW).

The attack on sea-based aviation was also joined by Lt. General W E. Odom (U.S. Army,Ret.), who in an article in Foreign Affairs3 argued that sea-based aviation and carriers are obso-lete, "...using carrier- based aircraft is the most expensive way to deliver a bomb to a target." Hewas critical of the Marine Corps as well, asserting "...the case of the Marines as an expeditionaryforce is no better...," referring to his earlier negative comment on aircraft carriers. GeneralOdom would do the whole job with B-1 and B-2 bombers flying from U.S. continental bases(CONUS). He fails to mention that seven B-2 aircraft equate in acquisition cost to a completeaircraft carrier, including her embarked air wing.

He also fails to acknowledge that Presidents chose the Navy and/or the combination ofNavy/Marine Corps overwhelmingly over the Army and Air Force to respond to crises withinthe past half century. The Navy has participated in 205 out of 207 international crises since theend of World War II, while the Army in only 38 and the Air Force in only 53. This is not toargue against the important role of the Air Force and Army. That would be equally as one-sidedas General Odom's argument. The Army and Air Force are central to U.S. capability for fightingmajor wars and they will contribute to lesser crises and contingencies in certain circumstances.The point is that the Navy and the Marines play an essential role in a balanced U.S. militaryforce that can respond to a range of crises and contingencies across a spectrum of conflicts.They provide capabilities in circumstances where land-based forces are constrained by time,space, and political considerations. Events since 1990 from the Persian Gulf, to the Adriatic Sea,to National Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Africa, to the Straits of Taiwan, continue to showthat the Navy/Marine Corps team is the force of choice for crisis response missions.

General Odom also argues that any military mission that the U.S. might want to accomplishoverseas can be accomplished, if not entirely by long range bombers, then in combination withUSAF F/A aircraft flying from foreign air bases closer to the location of the conflict. U.S. expe-rience would question the wisdom of reliance on this option. When President Reagan orderedthe raid on Libya in 1986, France, Spain, and Portugal denied U.S. overflight rights. Out of the24 F-111 Air Force bombers that left their bases in the UK, only 18 arrived to deliver their pay-load on Libya, having had to be refueled, in air, a number of times along the way, because theywere denied over-flight rights. This then required the dispatching of many additional large

tanker aircraftcraft don't eve:severe than iMediterranean

Flying fronoff, not just d(CVN 65) in 1ing in the Adhours, ENTElCARL VINS(response to Ir;called on EN]by Turkey andmissions in sul

General O0tive to use thenear Taiwan,deployed somthat "land baswas how to shbase or appearwithout provothe Chinese a,forces - by t]airplanes coul,the Chinese w

At least on"Maritime forability to saildown approvacraft carriers."

2 "B-2 Bomber Cost and Operational Issues," GAO Report, NSIAD-97-181, August 1997.

3 W.E. Odom "Transforming the Military," ForeignAffairs, July/August 1997.

4

4 R.R. Fogelman, "Fir

low-observablein an environ-at sea it would-22, on boardof as much ast recurring fly-

,th passive andtical deceptionmissiles using3 the Standoffn (JSOW).

n (U.S. Army,riers are obso-3 a target." Heexpeditionary

'riers. Generalitinental basesto a complete

)mbination ofcrises within

:rises since theThis is not toy as one-sidedty for fighting:ircumstances.

U.S. militaryl of conflicts.ined by time,Adriatic Sea,

tinue to show

tanker aircraft to provide fuel. With the retirement of the F-1l ls, current tactical Air Force air-craft don't even have the range of the F-111s, therefore the tanker requirements are even moresevere than in the 1980s. Aircraft operating from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in theMediterranean had no such restrictions.

Flying from air bases located in a foreign country can result even in the denial of the take-off, not just denial of over-flight rights. A case in point was the use of the USS ENTERPRISE(CVN 65) in late 1996. On September 12th, 1996, USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) was operat-ing in the Adriatic Sea, supporting Implementation Force ground troops in Bosnia. At 1800hours, ENTERPRISE was tasked to proceed at best speed to support the units of the USSCARL VINSON (CVN 70) battle group participating in Operation Desert Strike II (USresponse to Iraqi troop movements) in the Arabian Gulf. The National Command Authoritycalled on ENTERPRISE because U.S. land-based aircraft were denied overflight authorizationby Turkey and Syria and land-based U.S. aircraft in Saudi Arabia were prohibited from flyingmissions in support of Desert Strike II.

General Odom goes on in his article to express his belief that it would have been more effec-tive to use the Fifth Air Force from Japan than carriers to deter the Chinese military maneuversnear Taiwan, which occurred in March 1996. The General argues that the U.S. should havedeployed some of this air power from Japan to Taiwanese air bases. Gen. Odom's suggestionthat "land based air power" would answer the threat by itself is highly questionable. The issuewas how to show U.S. political support for Taiwan without requiring support from a Taiwanesebase or appearing to militarily defend Taiwan. Naval forces allowed such a statement to be madewithout provoking the Chinese to escalate, or requiring us to abandon our friends in Taiwan. Ifthe Chinese actions were intended to intimidate Taiwan before its election in 1996, our navalforces - by their presence - were intended to reassure Taiwan of our support. No amount ofairplanes could provide that kind of presence unless they were based in Taiwan - somethingthe Chinese would have regarded as extremely provocative, which we were attempting to avoid.

At least on this issue General Fogelman seems to disagree with General Odom by stating:"Maritime forces are ideal for some expeditionary kinds of things. Aircraft carriers give you theability to sail into a littoral region and not have to worry about diplomatic clearance or beddown approval. The recent crisis during Taiwan's elections, for example, was an ideal use of air-craft carriers."4

to accomplishbination withct. U.S. expe-.agan orderedts. Out of thever their pay-because theyitional large

4 R.R. Fogelman, "First Force," Air Force Magazine, September 1996.

5

USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)

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The Value of Carrier-Based AviationThe initial challenge for planners when U.S. military operations are contemplated is to

determine the targets - where they are located, and the type of weapon required to destroythem. These seemingly simple tasks take elaborate surveillance and targeting systems, as capableas modern electronics can enable, connected through a sophisticated command and control sys-tem linked to the platform, which launches the weapon. During the design of this "system ofsystems" the decision has to be made as to where to locate the various elements - on satellites,carrier-based or land-based aircraft, UAVs, surface warships and/or submarines.

For most of these tasks there are multiple platform options. Theoretically, at least, the deci-sion as to which of the options should be chosen would be made on the basis of effectiveness,efficiency and cost considerations. Unfortunately, this is not as simple as it may appear:

1. There are few clear cut choices.

2. War is never totally predictable, so having alternatives on hand is desirable.

3. Reliance upon any single solution invites the adversary's focus on uniquecounter measures.

4. One never starts with a clean sheet of paper - there is a past.

5. Technology evolves constantly, changing the relative effectiveness, efficiency,survivability and cost of the options.

Given the uncertainty, a prudent commander would not eliminate options that have workedand that are still working before he can be sure that the seemingly superior but as yet unprovenconcept or platform indeed works and is reliable. Consequently, we have sensors on satellites,and sensors and weapons on manned aircraft, surface warships and submarines. The debate onwhich is the right solution goes on, almost continuously. Some factions would do away withexisting systems and "put all their eggs in one basket," often a concept which only exists as anidea or at most as an experimental object. For example, there are those who question the valueof manned aircraft in general and naval aircraft specifically as platforms for either sensors orweapons. They argue that we should stop future manned tactical aircraft programs, and useUnmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) despite the fact that: there- is no budget, no hard-ware and no current plans to spend any DoD resources to develop UCAVs 5. Some of these sameanalysts argue that manned aircraft are too vulnerable to enemy defenses and too costly to pro-cure and maintain. They also contend that if the aircraft have to be manned they should be

5 M.Walsh, "Northrop Grumman Plans Lethal UAV," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 20.

7

USS Nimintz (CVN-68)(1,100 ft x 250 ft)

Overlaid on a Typical Land-Based Airfield(8000 ftx 3000 ft)

land-based because the aircraft carrier itself is too vulnerable. The carrier, however is a relativelysmall floating object, surrounded by a vast ocean, an object which in 24 hours can move inunpredictable directions as far as 600 miles from where it was the day before. Therefore, it is

hard to understand how these analysts, worriedabout aircraft carrier vulnerability, could ignore thefact that fixed air bases are very large immovableobjects and as a result, when located not back inCONUS but near the area of conflict, can be target-ed by our adversaries months or years in advance ofa conflict, and thus in some respects are more vul-nerable than aircraft carrie's.

Laws of physics indicate that the least costly wayto carry heavy objects for long distances is by buoy-ancy, not by dynamic lift. The figure below shows,

quite dramatically, the transport momentum of large floating objects like tankers and aircraftcarriers when compared to aircraft and other high-speed vehicles.

1000

Speed vs. Transport Momentum

100

10

0.00 10.00 20.00 3C0.00 40.00 00.00 60.00 70.00 80.00

Transport Momentum=Weight x Speed/1,000

Because two thirds of the earth is covered by water and 80 percent of the earth's populationlives less than 200 miles from shore, most military targets of interest are not far from a body ofwater. Thus, nature appears to be cooperating by allowing the transport of heavy objects (high-explosive warheads) by water for the most substantial portion of the trip. High explosives'potency directly correlates to weight. In fact we measure the size of a warhead/bomb by weight(500 lb, 1000 lb or 2000 lb warhead/bomb). This relationship between high explosive powerand weight has been broken only once since high explosives were invented - by nuclearweapons. Nuclear weapons release much higher explosive energy per unit weight so it is costeffective to mount them onto very large and very costly missiles launched from submarines orland based silos, thousands of miles away from the target, thus making the whole journey from

8

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Itively storage site to target in one fell swoop.

Dve in On the other hand, the delivery of conventional high explosives with a one step transporta-

., it is tion system from storage to target, such as by long range Air Force bombers is clearly not nearly

>rried as efficient. When it comes to delivering conventional high explosives it is much more economi-

re the cal to switch to multi-modal transportation. This is the option offered by the Navy. The first

)vable part of the journey is made by truck or train from the weapon depot to a port to load the

ick in weapon onto a warship directly or onto a Combat Logistic Force (CLF) ship for transfer later at

:arget- sea onto a surface combatant or carrier. It is only in the last 50 to 500 miles from the target that

nce of these weapons are carried by missiles directly launched from a ship to the target or through an

·e vul- intermediate step, by manned aircraft. Therefore, of an 8,000-9,000 mile journey, more than

90% of the voyage would be assisted by buoyancy which is much less expensive when comparedy way to dynamic lift provided by aircraft.

buoy- As the Air Force and Navy argue their individual cases on Capitol Hill every year, it may

hows, appear as if each service is attempting to convince Congress that each alone can accomplish the

ircraft task expected from tactical aviation. However, once fighter/attack aircraft are in the air traveling

to their targets to deliver weapons or provide cover against enemy aircraft or missiles, whether

they come from land or carriers becomes immaterial. The value of land- or carrier-based aircraft

is in their availability on the scene when they are required and the array of weapons they carry

to their targets. (See Appendix A for details on weapons.)The figure below displays the variety of weapons as well as the different combinations of

weapons an F 18-E/F can be configured to carry.

- 9 78, F/A-18 E/F Air-to-GroundRepresentative WeaponsLoading Options6

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IALAU-So ) ...... .. 330 galTank my X F VQQ <--|t3OgU9lT

AGM-88 \-? A A/MK-831 MK-83 0 MK-58, LUU-2HARM - BSU-85 LDGP

a "- AGM-88 AGM-88 _ ALE-41lation D HARM HARM ARS NA 42R1 D [ ~. OCHAFF

Xdy of MK-36 Buddy Tank MK-20 MK-20, 0 ALO-167a)d~y of ~Mine Rockeye CBU-59,

GBU12 GBU-12 CBU-78 0 SUU-25

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veight 0 0 MK-83 LDGP, MK-106 0 0 LAU68MK-83, BSU-85 MK-48 0 0 LU-68

MK-52, MK-52, 0 3 MK76,ower MK- MK-55I-55, MK-36 BDU-33

MK-56 MK Mine a ' MK-106,iclear M M MK-52 a i n MK-48

s cost MK-63 MK-63 0U7 G MK-40~~~~s cost ~~~~~~~~~~~CBU-78 Gtor Mine

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Not only is the existing inventory of weapons impressive, but an exciting array of new, more Alcost-effective and more lethal weapons are in various stages of development. The chief enabler near lfor these changes in air delivered weapons stems from the reduction in size and cost of complex Air Felectronic sensors and processors. Naturally, these developments will greatly increase the effec- basedtiveness of the aircraft that carry them such as the F-18 E/F and JSE vides

As smaller smart weapons displace larger guided weapons, and as GPS/INS guided bombs take replace dumb bombs, tactical aviation will experience an order-of-magnitude improvement in Fcaircraft lethality and a great increase in the area over which an aircraft can perform an effective defenattack. New capabilities in weapons will also make aircraft more flexible, as the terminal phase groutof the attack is increasingly handled by the munition. (See Appendix Afor details.) stealti

The relative contribution of different aviation forces (Air Force and Navy) can vary consider- deranably. The force that plays the leading role in one case might play only a supporting role under Is asother circumstances. In cases with sufficient warning and ready access to secure bases, land- muchbased tactical aircraft should play the leading role. In the early days of a fast-breaking conflict, force,however land-based tactical aircraft may not be available in sufficient numbers, and the leading tacticrole must fall to sea-based aviation and the Air Force's bomber force. defen

The relative contributions of the different components - carrier-based air, land-based fight- Aier/attack aircraft and Air Force bombers - to the cumulative sorties generated show great varia- surveitions, depending on the situation they find themselves at the outset of a conflict, as illustrated able ibelow. fighte

not cl

Favorable for landFavorable for sea

Sorties Generated in the FirstSeven Days as a Function of

Different Conditions for Favorable for landLand and Sea Based TACAIR7 Unfavorable for sea

Unfavorable for landFavorable for sea

Unfavorable for landUnfavorable for sea

can p

gets aTI

well

other,value

The (TI

comb"The largest swings are in the relative contribution of land-based and sea-based tactical air- stratel

craft. The contribution of sea-based aviation during the first week varies from just over 20 per- devaslcent of the tactical aircraft sorties (when conditions are favorable for land-based air and unfavor- centuable for sea-based air) to a high of about 90 percent at the other extreme. As more land-based TIaircraft arrive in theater, the relative contribution of sea-based aviation declines. After three Theirweeks, the contribution of sea-based aviation to total sorties generated ranges from a low of 16 requitpercent to a high of 57 percent."8 The point is that a mix of aircraft is needed. sensoi

techn,

7 David A. Perin, et al, "Comparing Land-Based and Sea-Based Aircraft: Circumstances Make a Difference," Center for Naval Analyses, May 1995. it conIbid. other

10

,more Although, the value of carrier-based naval aviation lies in its unencumbered early presence.nabler near the conflict, and it's ability to deliver a wide variety of potent weapons, it also can support,mplex Air Force bombers in penetration of enemy defenses as well as provide fighter cover for land-effec- based surveillance and targeting aircraft. But most importantly, carrier-based naval aviation pro-

vides an alternative in the highly uncertain environment in which military operations inherently:ombs take place.:ent in For example, carrier-based aircraft can enable nonstealthy bombers to penetrate enemy air'fective defenses by suppressing long-range SAMs and providing fighter escort cover, in scenarios whenphase ground-based fighter aircraft are not based in the vicinity of the area of conflict. Although

stealthy B-2s may not require such support, B-is do. The B-1 force accounts for the prepon-isider- derance of bomber sorties and payload delivered because there are almost five times as many B-under Is as B-2s in the planned USAF bomber inventory. Even though the B-2 payload capacity island- much larger, the B-i force represents more than twice the payload delivery potential of the B-2

inflict, force, but will face survivability problems if it has to go it alone. In such a situation, the best:ading tactic is to devote some carrier-based sorties to enable the use of B-ls in the face of enemy air

defenses.fight- Another example is the case when the carrier-based aircraft can help support key land-basedvaria- surveillance aircraft (AWACS and JSTARS) when land-based tactical aircraft are not yet avail-

;trated able in sufficient numbers. In those cases carrier-based aircraft will play a key role in providingfighter cover to JSTARS and AWACS aircraft. While in return, since carrier-based aircraft donot currently have a theater-wide surveillance capability, JSTARS is an important system whichcan provide the Navy further information about locating and identifying concentrations of tar-gets and ensuring an efficient allocation of strike aircraft.

These examples demonstrate the fact that carrier-based and land-based tactical aircraft aswell as the CONUS-based Air Force bomber force are intertwined in their support of eachother, thereby emphasizing the need for the existence of all three and as a consequence - thevalue of naval aviation.

The CarrierThe large 100,000 ton carrier with its 80 aircraft complement accompanied by its surface

combatants and attack submarines is a very real and a readily apparent force. Unlike the U.S.'sal air- strategic weapons which for good reasons have not been fired in anger since World War II, the) per- devastating power of a carrier battle group has been unleashed many times during the past halffavor- century.based The potency of the carrier battle group is growing. Naval aircraft are becoming more stealthy.three Their weapons are more accurate and can be fired from greater distance. The intelligenceof 16 required to cue them and their ability to target their weapons has improved. The integration of

sensors and weapons is also significantly improving as a result of advancing information systemtechnologies. All this makes the carrier battle group a crucial element of our Armed Forces when

1995. it comes to conventional deterrence and when that fails, in crisis response. In collaboration withother forward deployed forces and the forces of allied nations it can help contain and halt an

Al_

Artist's Concept of a CVX9

Displacement 108,000 mtLength (overall) 333 m (1093 ft)Beam (max) 95 m (312 ft)Depth (03 level) 33.3 m (109 ft)Total Volume 328, 000 m3

Nuclear propulsion"Two level" flight deck"Two level" hangar

invasion by the prompt application of overwhelming force.

The Nimitz Class carrier is a very effective weapon system and will likely remain so for as far

into the future as we are able to look. If current plans are implemented, i.e., to build another

Nimitz class carrier, the CVN 77, in 2002 and to then design CVX as a new class of CVN, with

the retirement of the USS KENNEDY in 2018, the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet will be an all

nuclear propelled modern force.

Aircraft Carrier Fleet Compositionover the Next Half a Century

CVN Class 1998 2015 2035 2055

CVN-65 1 0 0 0

CV-64 2 0 0 0

CV-67 1 1 0 0

CVN-68-77 8 10 6 0

CVX 0 1 6 10

CVXX 0 0 0 0 2

The carrier's large size enables it to carry more than 80 CTOL aircraft, 56 of which are fight-er/attack aircraft, capable of reaching land based or air targets hundreds of miles away with the

most potent conventional weapons which exist today. Due to the flexibility and endurance of

nuclear power, these carriers can act alone, if necessary, and reach any corner of the world with-

in days, especially because they are stationed forward, in key locations around the globe.

The carrier has been our most modular ship concept. The adequate hangar deck height has

enabled all modern aircraft to be accommodated. If the next carrier design remains this flexiblethere is every reason to expect that the CVX will be able to handle the yet to be conceived,

manned and unmanned aircraft to be developed over the next 50 years.

Regardless of the CVX's size or propulsion plant choice, a "clean sheet of paper" design is

required. Specifically, even if the major features of CVX are to be an 80 aircraft wing of CTOL

9 Captain Manvel "The CVX Program" Viewgraph Presentation, RINA Symposium on the Future of Naval Aviation, London, June 1997

12

aircraft and nuclear propelled, i.e., an approximately 100,000 ton carrier, it shouldn't be a mod-ified repeat Nimitz class carrier.

The need for a brand new design stems primarily from the fact that since the initial designof the Nimitz (CVN 68), there have been many advances in relevant technologies. During thepast 30 years the Navy introduced many innovative systems "piecemeal" as a new carrier wasapproved for construction. CVN 76 is different than CVN 75 and CVN 77 is expected toincorporate yet further advances in technology.

But, certain new technologies which translate into new carrier systems are of a nature whichpermeate the whole ship therefore they can not be introduced "piecemeal" as modifications toan existing carrier design, as we have done from CVN 68 to CVN 77.

The prime example of such an item is the hull form. Whatever the final outcome of engi-APt/_ - _1 no __ _ _ en ct_ 1 - - - Ia a ar .1 Io I I I : Il

neerng/aCeslgn raueorrs as it relates to Tme null rorm, tne tv could De a racalca departurefrom the Nimitz class hull form. Whether it is a radical departure as shown on the artist con-cept here, or a more traditional looking one, it requires a "clean sheet of paper" ship design.

r as far The second item that demands a fundamentally new ship design stems from the fact that itnother is high time to adopt advances made in the nuclear propulsion plant of submarines into theI, with CVX. The impact of such a new propulsion plant design, including a brand new reactor,an all together with possibly a radically new electric plant and distribution system, also demands a

"clean sheet of paper" ship design.The third item that by its nature requires a new ship design is distributed computing. The

CVX design will abandon a "legacy" computing system approach, by decentralizing computing.Advances in information systems technology and the continually reduced cost of hardwareenable distributed computing on local area networks. A Navy program called ADCON-21 willallow simultaneous processing of many mission-critical software systems. If one computerbecomes incapacitated another will take its place without missing a beat. A by-product ofthis innovation is that the new carrier will be less vulnerable to damage and less expensive tomaintain.

The fourth design issue that requires a new ship design relates to an attempt to reduce man-power through substitution of technology. Manpower represents the most expensive single ele-ment in the operation of a carrier. Analysts keep asking whether we could substitute moreautomation and artificial intelligence for people. Clearly, if the Navy is willing to accept new

fight- basic precepts for operations together with emerging technologies such as, fault-tolerant long-th the life systems, fiber optics, robotics and automation - drastic changes concerning the use of man-nce of power on carriers is feasible.with- The fifth design issue is the propeller (4 for the Nimitz Class) which serves as the thrust

deliverer of the propulsion power that the nuclear plant produces. The ship designer's task is toht has assure that these propellers deliver the thrust in a most efficient fashion. However, a by-product.exible of a propeller rotating in the water is noise. Although carrier propeller design has not changed a:eived, lot over the past 30 years, submarine propulsors have. The new CVX will take advantage of

lessons learned in submarine propellers to further maximize efficiency while reducing radiated;ign is noise.'TOL Along with the five reasons just mentioned, there are a number of other carrier systems

which demand a new carrier design. One example is the various carrier survivability enhancingfeatures. The bottom line is that it is time to depart from the existing 30+ year carrier design

13

because CVN 77 will have brought the Nimitz class design as far as it can go. are stAs the Navy is starting its R&D, design, acquisition planning and Analysis of Alternatives cise c

(AOA), formerly known as the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COFA) process, to 2060determine the size and other configuration characteristics of a brand new aircraft carrier design, Someit is vital to review the key issues in somewhat more detail. Specifically the matters of: air wing ety osize; type of aircraft - conventional versus assisted short take-off vertical landing (CTOL vs contrSTOVL); propulsion plant type-- nuclear vs. non-nuclear becat

Once these characteristics are chosen, 85-90 percent of the acquisition cost of the aircraft todaycarrier becomes defined.

Issue - Airwing SizeThe size of the carrier is affected by the type of aircraft (CTOL vs. STOVL) that constitutes

the airwing and the major features of the ship, including the size and type of propulsion system,the amount of combat sustainability, fuel, weapons, repair capability, etc., and the amount ofarmor plating and other survivability features. However, the single biggest factor is the size ofthe embarked airwing, i.e., the number of aircraft that can be accommodated.

The required airwing capacity depends on three types of factors:In

1. The technological basis of future aircraft and weapons: craft

· avionics, airframe, engines, and stealth characteristics of future aircraft some

* size, accuracy and lethality of future weapons Missicraft

2. The characteristics and capabilities of future adversaries:

* The number and types of targets that need to be destroyed

* The nature of air defenses that defend these targets

* The offensive capabilities - including aircraft (types and numbers), ballisticTImissiles, cruise missiles, and possibly chemical, biological, and even nuclear

afforcweapons, that could threaten U.S. bases, ports, ships, and lines of communi- afforccation in the vicinity of the area of the conflict.

in the3. The key circumstances of expected conflicts, including:

* Warning time: will warnings always be sufficiently lengthy and unambiguousto deploy U.S. forces prior to the conflict, or might U.S. forces be caught bysurprise?

* Forces on scene prior to the conflict: will the U.S. always have significantland-based forces in theater (as in Korea today), or might initial operationsdepend on forward-deployed sea-based forces and a few early-arriving forcesfrom the United States (as was the case when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August1990)?

* Access to bases: will U.S. forces always have rapid access to a basing infra-structure (as was the case in the Gulf War), or might base access be severelyrestricted (as it has been in the case of past Arab-Israeli conflicts)?

These key circumstantial factors are true variables, that will change from case to case. They '0"cvx r

14

are subject to U.S. influence, but are not under our control. We cannot hope to predict the pre-cise circumstances that will occur over the life of CVX - which stretches from 2015 to past2060. The only sure prediction is that circumstances will be different from those of today.Sometimes we will be caught by surprise, so U.S. forces must be capable of responding to a vari-ety of challenges under varying circumstances. For CVX, this implies a required capability tocontribute to fast-breaking crises and combat operations when on-scene U.S. forces are limitedbecause only sea-based aviation has managed to arrive on the scene. In these cases, CVX, liketoday's carriers, must have capabilities for three basic functions:

* Battlespace dominance: the ability to protect key facilities and forces and tohave access to sea and air space to conduct operations.

* Power projection: the ability to strike and destroy key enemy targets - includ-ing both fixed facilities and mobile battlefield targets.

* Command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-sance (C3ISR): The ability to collect, process and disseminate information onthe state of the battlefield and to act upon this information in a coordinatedoperation more quickly than potential adversaries.

In combat, these three functions must go on simultaneously because forward-deployed air-craft carriers represent a significant proportion, if not the entirety, of U.S. combat capability insome crises, especially in the early days of a fast-breaking, regional conflict. Therefore, theMission Need Statement (MNS) calls for CVX to maintain the core capability of existing air-craft carriers for these simultaneous combat tasks:

"It [CVX] must be able to operate sufficient numbers of tactical aircraft and carrysufficient ordnance and fuel to conduct simultaneous power projection, battle-space dominance, and surveillance operations for extended periods."1°

The MNS also calls for selected improvements in capability and significant improvement inaffordability. Cutting the size of the airwing is one way to reduce cost, but a small airwingwould not have sufficient aircraft to meet the fundamental operational requirements identifiedin the MNS, as illustrated by the table below.

80-Aircraft CVX 40-Aircraft CVX

Aircraft in the Airwing

- fighter/attack 56 24-28

- surveillance, ECM, tankers, logistics, helicopters 24 16-12

Allocation of Fighter/Attack Aircraft

- available on deck 34-45 20-25

- allocated to battlespace dominance 14-20 ?

- allocated to strike 17-22 ?

Allocation of Fighter/AttackAircraft to Combat Tasks

1' "CVX Mission Need Element Statement," DoD, May 1996.

latives

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15

The airwing on an aircraft carrier is a mix of fighter attack aircraft and various types of sup-port aircraft for air and sea surveillance, electronic countermeasures (ECM), aerial refueling sup-port, logistics, and helicopter missions. A full airwing for a large deck carrier would typicallycontain 24 support aircraft and 56 fighter/attack. Of the 56 fighter/attack aircraft, 34-45 (60 to80 percent) would be positioned on the flight deck and available for immediate operations.(The precise number depends on the detail of the flight deck and the nature of the operation.)Additional aircraft could be brought to the flight deck from the hangar deck to replace an air-craft that has maintenance problems, but 34-45 is the maximum number of fighter attack air-craft that would be available for operations at any given time.

The number required for battlespace dominance operations also will vary somewhat fromcase to case. In cases where there is virtually no threat - for example, once the adversary'soffensive air and sea forces have fully been suppressed - the battlegroup commander mightmaintain only a few fighter/attack aircraft on ready alert to respond to a small, unexpected basedthreat. But in the important cases where air and surface threats remain, the commander will U.maintain some aircraft airborne on combat air patrol (CAP) where they can react immediately expecto emerging threats. Another objective would be to extend the fleet's battlespace dominance obligeumbrella beyond the immediate vicinity of the carrier to establish control over areas vital to demaother U.S. forces. In the days of long-range threats from massed Soviet forces, such operations aircracould consume nearly the entire airwing when the carrier was in a high-threat region. With Atoday's lower threat and the improved battlespace dominance capabilities of the fleet, a more smallmodest posture is appropriate - for example, one to two CAP stations (two aircraft each) plus witha few alert aircraft, plus perhaps one or two aircraft to help counter the missile patrol boat and tthreat in coastal areas. Current operations show that 14 to 20 fighter/attack aircraft would be ashorneeded for such tasks, leaving 20 to 25 aircraft for strike operations in the case of the large air- Lwing (80 aircraft), which could generate up to 100 or more strike sorties per day in a surge nanc¢operation. other

A small capacity carrier cannot meet this basic requirement. To conduct surveillance and acces!other essential support functions requires at least 16 support aircraft leaving space for only 24 able fighter/attack aircraft. Even if some support functions could be assigned to other systems so that differthe proportion of fighter and support aircraft is maintained, the small airwing would have only and 28 fighter/attack aircraft. With 60 to 80 percent on deck, the airwing commander would have nizedonly 17 to 22 fighter/attack aircraft available for immediate operations. This might be enough worrto carry out most battlespace dominance tasks or to generate a credible number of strike sorties, Abut not both. In the case when one CAP station is required to carry out most battlespace domi- opernnance functions it leaves 2 to 4 aircraft for strike. But in the case when 2 CAP stations are shortrequired there would not be sufficient aircraft to even carry out the required battlespace domi- Mobnance functions, not to speak of aircraft for strike. platfi

Thus, in a significant crisis or combat operation, a small capacity carrier would have to wait mentuntil other carriers or land-based aircraft arrive on scene before it could conduct effective com- mighbat operations. And even when other carriers did arrive, a small airwing would reduce the sea- be atbased strike potential by half. This reduction may not be decisive in some cases, where the U.S. smallhas time to deploy large number of land-based forces to the theater. But in the most demandingand important cases, the combat capability of on-scene and early arriving carriers will be crucial ' View

to containing crises, minimizing early losses, and paving the way for a joint operation by forces 12 R.R.

16

At sup- 4u

ig sup- 35pically 30

(60 toations. ; 20-

ation.) 15-

an air- 10-

ck air- Z 5-0-

X

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Aircraft Available for Strikevs the Number of CAPs Required'

CVX air wing (80 a/c vs 40 a/c)

Larg e Iwings

m Small

t trom - U- z A -

.rsary's Battle Space Dominance posture

might

pected based in the United States.er will U.S. Forces are designed to project overwhelming force and the American public properlydiately expects a quick end to hostilities with a minimum of casualties. For this reason alone we areinance obliged to continue to make the required investments to provide the capability this expectation'ital to demands. This can only be achieved by a carrier capable of bringing to the theater at least an 80rations aircraft complement.

With A natural question is: could other forces or systems take over some CVX tasks, so that aL more small airwing, thus smaller carrier, might be adequate? And could they do this at lower cost and1) plus with the same effectiveness and reliability as a large airwing? For example, could surveillance,1 boat and battlespace tasks be assigned to some combination of UAVs, satellites, and aircraft based

uld be ashore or on a Mobile Offshore Base (MOB)?ge air- Land-based tactical aircraft could supplement a small airwing for strike or battlespace domi-

surge nance if they have access to bases near the action and have excess sorties available to devote to

other missions. This is the key issue. Some people, including General Odom, argue that base:e and access will always be available when it is truly needed. But history indicates that rapid and reli-nly 24 able access is not always available. In other cases, the ambiguity of motives and intentions, the;o that differing political objectives of host countries, and the possibility of enemy attacks will delay

e only and disrupt the deployment of land-based aircraft. As noted earlier, General Fogelman recog-

I have nized that "aircraft carriers give you the ability to sail into a littoral region and not have tonough worry about diplomatic clearance or bed down approval."12

orties, An idea for addressing the access problem is to build very large floating bases capable ofdomi- operating a wide variety of tactical and transport aircraft. One concept is to connect five off-ns are shore platforms, each more than twice the size of the largest oil drilling platform, to form a

domi- Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) that is several hundred feet wide and nearly a mile long. This

platform could serve as a forward logistics support base that would store prepositioned equip-o wait ment and supplies and serve as a transshipment point for cargo aircraft. Some tactical aircraftcom- might also operate from a MOB. If the MOB is located in the right place, these aircraft might

le sea- be able to take over most of the surveillance and battlespace dominance tasks of CVX, freeing ae U.S. small airwing to focuson strike operations.

.nding:rucial 1 Viewgraph Presentation to the CVX Oversight Group Meeting, May 1997.

forces 12 R.R. Fogelman, "First Force," Air Force Magazine, September 1996.

17

Available for strike operations

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But this is another idea that might be effective in some cases but won't work in the most TIimportant and demanding cases. One problem is positioning. Because the MOB moves much acconslower than a carrier (2-3 knots vs. 30+ knots), it must be already positioned in theater if it is to plishebe useful. Even then, the primary logistics role for a MOB dictates a forward positioning that is carrie:sheltered from the main combat activity, whereas CVX would be in the thick of the combat earlierzone. And, of course, a MOB would not be cheap. A recent estimate from one of the contrac- er cartors examining MOB concepts indicates the MOB would cost several times more than the cost sion adifference between a large-capacity and small-capacity CVX. Bt

Another question that arises out of the quest to find enablers for a small carrier is how does workithe arrival, a few days after the start of operations, of a second carrier (Nimitz Class) contribute even to the task of destroying a set of the targets identified for the mission? The figure below displays (Firstthe answer, but to understand this figure, the terms used require some explanation. er acc

that t;Case I Case II Case III equiv:

No 2nd Carrier 2nd Carrier 2nd Carrier I .

2000

Strike Sorties of aLarge vs Small Carrier' 3

C 1600(First and second phases of the attack -

14 days duration). 1200

._.

CD

o 400

2,)0

.*..

3,l

attackrier c(

phaseto the

M Contributions of2nd carrier secon,

* Days to complete er, th(first phase of attack In

of thesmall

reasor

the arLarge Small Large Small Large Small

turnir

TIThe figure is constructed such that the question posed is how many strike sorties can be battle

launched in the second phase of the attack, i.e., within the first 14 days of operations (which time include the first and second phases of the attack), depending on whether the initial carrier arrivelaunching the attack is small (40 aircraft wing) or large (80 aircraft wing). poten

The first phase of the attack (not quantified on the figure) is defined as the phase in which nancehigh priority targets are serviced. This initial set will typically be the adversary's command and fromcontrol positions and coastal defense sites. The second phase of the attack (on which this figure sate fifocuses) deals with battlefield mobile targets such as tanks, armored vehicles, gun emplacements Depe:and troop concentrations. comp

There are three cases displayed on this figure. The first on the left side of the figure, Case I,shows the case when no second carrier arrives within the first 7 days of operations. In the sec- Issueond and third cases a second large, Nimitz Class (with an 80 aircraft wing) arrives to help in Socarrying out the task. In the second case, Case II, the second carrier arrives after 12 days, while siles,in the third case, Case III, it arrives earlier, after 7 days. gathe

Unm;13 Viewgraph Presentation to the CVX Oversight Group Meeting, May 1997. surfac

18

__�_

most The * marked numbers in the bottom of the chart designate how many days it takes tomuch accomplish the first phase of the attack. It specifically shows that the large carrier alone accom-it is to plishes the first phase task within 7 days, but it takes 48 days to do the same task with the smallthat is carrier. This length of time, 48 days, is only feasible if one CAP station suffices, as describedombat earlier. But as shown in the earlier figure if two CAP stations or more are needed the small carri-)ntrac- er can never accomplish the task, simply because it has no aircraft available for the strike mis-ie cost sion at all.

But if one CAP station suffices and a second carrier arrives on the 12th day, the small carrierv does working with the large carrier accomplishes the first phase of the attack within 16 days. Thus,:ribute even with a second carrier, the small carrier has zero sorties in the second phase of the attack.isplays (First and second phases combined are 14 days in length.) This shows how little the small carri-

er accomplishes by itself, since it still takes the second large carrier 4 days to complete the taskthat takes a large carrier, by itself, 7 days. That is, the small carrier in 16 days accomplishes theequivalent of 3 days work of the large carrier.

Still referring to Case II, the arrival of the second carrier doesn't affect the first phase of theattack of the large carrier because by the time it arrives the job is done. This way the second car-rier could work for the two days after its arrival (12 days to 14 days) to contribute to the secondphase of the attack. Thus in both Case I and II the small carrier does not make any contributionto the second phase of the attack in the first 14 days of the conflict. The large carrier without thesecond carrier launches 900 sorties and with the help of the second carrier to the first large carri-er, the two large carriers (the second carrier working only 2 days) launch 1200 sorties.

In Case III, since the second carrier has a chance to contribute 7 days out of the first 14 daysof the conflict, the two large carriers launch almost 2000 sorties in the second phase, while thesmall carrier with the assistance of the large carrier could only launch about 500 sorties. Thereason for the small number stems from the fact that for the first 11 days (meaning 4 days afterthe arrival of the second carrier) both carriers have to work on completing the first phase beforeturning to the second phase in which they have only 3 days left to work.

The conclusion of the above discussion must be that: (1) A small airwing cannot carry outan be battlespace dominance and strike simultaneously. Thus, it requires a much greater amount ofwhich time to complete the mission, and in most cases it would simply have to wait until other forces:arrier arrive, because alone it could not complete the task. (2) For the small airwing to have strike

potential similar to a multipurpose ground-based airwing or a large carrier, all battlespace domi-vhich nance, surveillance and other support functions would have to be carried out by forces coming

d and from other sources. The timely arrival of a reinforcing carrier and land-based air can compen-figure sate for the limited combat power of a small airwing, but arrival time is variable and uncertain.nents Depending on arrival time and depending on what forces arrive, it will take much longer to

complete the task than might be acceptable to the American public.:ase I,e sec- Issue - Type of Aircraft - CTOL vs STOVL vs Unmanned Aircraftlp in Some analysts would limit the offensive power of the U.S. Navy to land attack cruise mis-

while siles, using Unmanned.Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligencegathering functions. Others would augment cruise missiles for weapons delivery withUnmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) flying off relatively small conventionally poweredsurface warships. Some even argue that UCAVs should serve not as an augmentation but as a

19

replacement for manned aircraft.14,15 The National Defense Panel, appointed by Congress,issued its report on December 1, 1997. Among the many recommendations it addressed thefuture carrier issue by stating that: "Construct follow-on carriers to capitalize on short take-off,vertical landing; uninhabited aerial vehicle; and uninhabited combat aerial vehicle aircraft char-acteristics with attendant reduction in size and personnel."'6 These suggestions are made despitethe fact that the UAV/UCAV component is relatively undeveloped and is highly dependentupon the existence of ubiquitous reliable communications in enemy dominated battlespace.The development effort and deployment cost and schedule required to assure this quality ofcommunications as well as UAV maturity is not addressed. As the table below demonstrates,UAVs are currently in their infancy stage and UCAVs are still in the womb.

UAV StatusDoD's UAV Programs17 Aquila canceled

Pioneer in use by the Navy; no more purchases planned

Medium-Range canceled in 1993

Predator Air Force starting low-rate initial production

Hunter canceled in 1996

Outrider in development

Global Hawk in development

DarkStar in development

effectUAVtures

issue

STOIpariscSTO)smalls

that i:STOing gc

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The above discussion shouldn't be construed as that I am negative concerning UAVs andUCAVs. Quite the contrary. The dramatic advances now being made in areas such as miniatur-ization, stealth, and other technologies, combined with the potential for equally dramaticchanges in concepts of operation suggest that, in the future UAVs may prove effective in a widerange of roles, including precision strike, close air support and information warfare. As theNaval Studies Board recently said, "There will also be a mix of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) in fleet aviation. At one end of the mix will be high-altitude, long-endurance craft thatmay operate from carriers or be refueled from them in the air to provide the equivalent of a sur-veillance satellite in stationary orbit over naval forces at sea. At the other end of the mix, UAVsflown and recovered from carrier decks will be used for targeting opposing ground force ele-ments and for other combat-related applications."" But for the near term such concepts are justthat - concepts. Land attack missiles fired from warships and submarines are here today andhave demonstrated their value, but UAVs and UCAVs are still in the early stages of develop-ment by DARPA. Therefore, it would not be wise to give up any of our known, reliable and

'4 "Navy Eyes Stealthy Unmanned Aircraft," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 13, 1997.

15 Robert Holzer and Mark Walsh, "US Navy Eyes Lethal UCAV's," Defense News, October 13- 19, 1997.

16 Phil Odeen, etal, "Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st Century," Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p 48.

17 E.E. Heeter and S. M. Kosiak, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Current Plans and Prospects for the Future," Center for Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, July 11, 1997.

18 "Becoming a 21st-Century Force -Technology for the United States Navy and the Marine Corps 2000-2035," Volume 1, Overview, NavalStudies Board, National Academy of Science, August 1997.

20

ngress, effective systems such as manned aircraft for such, as yet, untested and unreliable vehicles as3ed the UAVs and UCAVs. 19,20 Thus, it would be unsound to design the CVX so its size and key fea-ike-off, tures are dictated by characteristics unique to UAVs and UCAVs. Therefore, the more realisticFt char- issue for CVX is between CTOL and STOVL aircraft.despite Why is this an issue? Because some participants in the debate suggest that: (1) The JSFendent STOVL aircraft will be less expensive. But at this early stage of the JSF program the cost com-espace. parison shows that the actual price may be the same ($31-38M for CTOL vs $30-35M forality of STOVL). (2) A STOVL aircraft carrier, for equal number of aircraft, should be significantlystrates, smaller. This turns out in reality to be another myth in the large aircraft carrier case. It is true

that in the case of an -20 aircraft thrudeck cruiser, which is of no interest to the U.S. Navy, theSTOVL-only resulting carrier will be smaller. (3) STOVL aircraft eliminate catapults and arrest-ing gear, which reduces carrier cost. This is true, but the saving is relatively small - 6 percent.

The next step then is to debate the issue of CTOL vs. STOVL aircraft for CVX. There aretwo questions: (1) Should the Navy switch from CTOL to STOVL for its next generation air-craft - both fighter/attack and the CSA, and (2) should CVX be designed as a STOVL carrier?i.e., have no catapults, thereby precluding CTOL aircraft from it. Recent studies have shownthat the savings in both acquisition and operations costs of a STOVL carrier design amount toonly 6 percent compared to a CTOL carrier with comparable air wing capacity and hull charac-teristics.2 ' In other words, eliminating catapults and arresting gear (and the people who operatethem) and reducing the size of the landing area saves about 6 percent in both procurement andoperating costs. This 6 percent savings remains about the same whether the airwing/carrier sizeis 80 aircraft/100,000 tons or 40 aircraft/55,000 tons.

This modest saving in ship costs is more than offset by disadvantages in aircraft perfor-Vs and mance. For example, the STOVL variant of JSF has less range and payload than the CTOLniatur- variant. Of even greater concern, is the performance of support aircraft, where the performanceamatic penalty for STOVL is greater because these aircraft have low thrust-to-weight engines and theya wide typically expend less of their payload in operation (mostly fuel), i.e., their return weight to theAs the carrier is higher than that of fighter/attack aircraft, making it more difficult to land vertically,ehicles without having to throw overboard expensive aircraft fuel prior to landing.ift that The current STOVL aircraft - the V22 - cannot meet the new CSA requirement. If we com-f a sur- pare a missionized V22 vs. a notional new CTOL CSA, the latter is characterized by higher val-UAVs ues in every key performance category, as shown in the table.

'ce ele- A comparison between the notional CTOL and the V22, when the mission is to maintainire just station at 100 nm radius for 24 hours, shows that: to achieve equal time on station requires 5ay and CTOL vs. 9 V22 sorties and to achieve equal search coverage, requires 5 vs. 12 sorties. Also, the:velop- size of the aircraft favors CTOL. For equal payload weight of 11,000 lbs, the size factor resultsle and in the STOVL empty aircraft weight of 52,600 vs. 41,800 lbs for the empty CTOL aircraft

weight. The Take-Off Gross Weight (TOGW) of the STOVL aircraft is 78,000 vs 59,400 lbsfor the CTOL version; if the CTOL version takes up 1.47 deck spot, the STOVL aircrafttakes 2.10.

7, p48.

ary '9 Mark Walsh "Northrop Grummann Plans Lethal UAV," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997.

/al 20 R.R. Fogelman, "First Force," Air Force Magazine, September 1996.21 "STOVL vs. CTOL Aircraft," Viewgraph Presentation to the AOA Oversight Group, May 1997.

21

MissionizedV-22 (STOVL)

STOVL vs CTOL for the CSAAircraft2 2

Comparison of Aircraft Size forEqual Payload 23

Notional CTOL CSA

Payload (Ibs 8,000 11,000

Mission Time (hrs) 3.5 6.0

Cruise Speed (knots) 250 275

Max Speed (knots) 265 380

Operational Altitude 20,000 30,000

Notional STOVLCTOL CSA

Payload (Ibs) 11,000 11,000

Empty Weight 41,800 52,600

TOGW 59,400 78,000

Deck Spot 1.47 2.10

To enhance the launch of the STOVL aircraft one would expect the addition of a ramp inthe bow portion of the flight deck. Of course, the catapults and arresting gear would be elimi-nated along with all supporting mechanisms such as the generation of large quantities of steamfor the catapults. Some aircraft handling personnel reduction is also expected. However, due tothe larger deck spots required it is not expected that the flight deck size would be reduced.

In fact, because of the very high exhaust temperature of the VSTOL and the downwardangle of the exhaust, when engines start it is expected that the parking arrangement will requireexhausting over the edge of the deck, putting some further constraint on flight deck usage.

One of the myths which drives some analysts to advocate STOVL stems from the belief thata STOVL aircraft carrier will be much smaller than one which is designed to carry CTOL air-craft. Indeed, in the case of a very small airwing (-20), the STOVL airwing does result in a sig-nificantly smaller carrier than that required for the CTOL airwing. But as the air wing grows,ship size requirement grows proportionally faster, whether the airwing is STOVL or CTOL,and so at 60-80 aircraft, the flight deck demands are matched by the need for a larger hull,thereby eliminating the difference in carrier size as a function of CTOL vs. STOVL aircraft.

One advantage of STOVL aircraft is operational flexibility gained by their ability to operateoff platforms other than the carrier, i.e., LHA, LHD, and expeditionary airfields ashore. Also,past analyses have shown that a predominantly STOVL airwing may be able to produce moresorties than the CTOL aircraft in cases where the carrier is close to the targets, i.e., 50-150miles. This difference can be as much as 20 to 25 percent. However, when it comes to payloadcarrying capacity CTOL is far superior. The Navy's JSF requirement is to be able to carry 2-2,000 lb bombs internally. The ability to carry 2,000 lb weapons is important especially in theinitial phase of a conflict when hardened targets are expected to be a high priority. Although1,000 lb warheads can generate and kill some hardened targets, it often takes several weapons.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

22

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However, against some hardened targets, a 1,000 lb bomb is simply not effective, thus thecapacity to carry 2,000 lb weapons is very important.

An additional drawback of STOVL is its more limited range. The range of next generationSTOVL aircraft is likely to be about 450 nm compared with the expected 600-nm range of theCTOL variant of JSE Allowing for external carriage of weapons the CTOL aircraft can carry8,000 lb or more whereas STOVL aircraft will likely be limited to 6,000 lb strike payload, evenwith the assistance of a ramp for take-off from the flight deck.

A catapult launched CTOL aircraft will always be able to have more fuel and more payloadthan an equivalent technology STOVL aircraft. This is so because the STOVL aircraft carries,so to speak, the "catapult" in each aircraft, while the CTOL aircraft leaves it on the carrier deck-a much more efficient approach for the aircraft, because the ultimate objective is to put highexplosives on some target. Thus, every pound saved in aircraft weight results in an additionalpound of weapon weight. Obviously, what can be achieved is reduced if each aircraft has to sac-rifice some of its payload capacity to carry its own "catapult" on each mission. This net negativeeffect on STOVL aircraft remains despite the lighter weight airframe and landing gear madepossible due to the lower loads resulting from not having to absorb the harsh loads imposed onCTOL aircraft by the catapults and arresting gear. The basic question is whether it makes eco-

amp in nomic sense to get the one-time savings of 6 percent on the acquisition and another 6 percent

elimi- in the operations cost of the carrier by limiting the carrier and its aircraft's ability to achieve itsf steam mission. The STOVL option requires more aircraft, with less payload each and less range fordue to · each aircraft thus lengthening the time for mission completion, especially in the case of the

smaller carrier. Yet, the fundamental driving force, in the minds of those who support STOVL

vnward aircraft substituting for CTOL aircraft as the mainstay of the U.S. carrier aircraft, is that it willrequire yield a smaller and cheaper carrier and less expensive aircraft as well. Both are untrue.

The CVX AOA showed that for both the large and small carrier (80 and 40 aircraft) cases, it

ief that took the STOVL aircraft longer to complete the early combat phases because of their reducedDL air- payload. In later phases of the wargame when defenses were suppressed and the carriers movedn a sig- in closer, the STOVL aircraft could generate additional sorties, but this was not sufficient togrows, overcome the payload advantages of the CTOL aircraft.24

7-TOL, There are a number of other considerations which enter this discussion of CTOL vs.

,r hull, STOVL: Can we afford to entirely preclude CTOL aircraft from operating off the Navy'sft. newest carrier, especially when aircraft operations with STOVL from a carrier are somewhat

operate unknown? And more importantly, although USN STOVL, resulting from the JSF program,~. Also, might reduce F/A aircraft cost, (although as shown earlier, not by much, if at all), the STOVL

.e more configuration will surely increase the cost for the CSA aircraft, as discussed earlier. The next fig-50-150 ure displays the deck and hangar of a large carrier in the pre-launch mode and in the final recov-)ayload ery mode, both for a STOVL aircraft airwing. The drawings which display the flight deck and:arry 2- hangar in the size of a NIMITZ class carrier, show that operating a STOVL aircraft carrier doesin the not result in lesser demand on the size of the deck or hangar, as long as we compare the decks

though and hangar for an equal complement of aircraft - 80 vs. 80.apons. From all of the above discussion it is difficult to see how one could justify STOVL aircraftreplacing CTOL for carrier operations at this time. The Marines flying off 20,000 - 40,000 ton

24 Ibid.

23

� �

LHA/LHD, LSD and LPD's and having to operate from unprepared airfields in the combatzone have ample justification for choosing STOVL aircraft. But that is not the case for theNavy's primary future fighter/attack aircraft, or for its CSA airframe.

The argument against a STOVL-only design for CVX is even clearer. The cost savings wouldbe very modest (about 6 percent); there would be severe performance penalties on surveillance |and other support aircraft; and existing carrier aircraft could not operate from this ship.

i '

i

Is

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CVX Study 2C JSF 30 26 56 1V22 14 6 20

Prelaunch H60 4 0 4 TOT 48 32 80 1 a

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e

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CVX Study 2C JSF 30 26 56 (]V22 14 6 20 1

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F-7 F-7I I I

25 Warren Baker, "AOA Study," NAWC, Lakehurst, May 1997.

t)

ala]ai

la

Carrier Hangar and Deck Layoutin Prelaunch and

Final Recovery Phases25

(All STOVL Carrier Design)

24

______________._,_________________________._____________..___________ _______...._______________________________..___________________I______

:ombat Issue - Propulsion Plant Type - Nuclear Versus Non-NuclearFor the Decisions on the propulsion system for CVX should focus on the constants that have gov-

erned warfare for centuries: maneuverability, survivability and logistics. Nuclear propulsion pro-would vides distinct and measurable advantages over conventionally fueled propulsion systems in each'illance of these three fundamental areas: maneuverability, survivability, and logistics.

ManeuverabilityThe current carrier force structure (of 11+1 carriers) is unable to meet 100 percent of the

Commander in Chief (CINC) carrier presence requirements. Therefore, the ability of a nuclearpowered carrier to sprint to distant locations in response to erupting crises has taken on addedsignificance. Twelve carriers could not nearly meet today's operational requirements if they werenot a predominantly nuclear-powered force. The 1995 deployment of USS THEODOREROOSEVELT (CVN 71) illustrates this value. July through September 1995, while operatingin the Eastern Mediterranean, THEODORE ROOSEVELT repeatedly responded to urgent,national tasking that required transit speeds in excess of 30 knots to support operations in theAdriatic Sea including a high speed transit to Jordan to provide six days of flight operations insupport of operation "Infinite Moonlight" (in response to a possible Iraqi attack on Jordan) anda high speed transit back to the Adriatic.

Another example of the advantages afforded by nuclear power was the expeditious transit ofthe USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) in April 1996 from her operating area in the Arabian Gulf to thewaters off Taiwan. Rising tensions between mainland China and the island republic of Taiwanover the impending general elections, in March 1996, prompted the National CommandAuthority to show U.S. resolve to stabilize the situation by sending the Nimitz battle group tothe area. Nimitz was able to remain on station in the Gulf for an extra five days, sending all butone of the conventionally powered ships of the battle group ahead, and then steamed directly toher new station between the Phillippines and Taiwan. A conventionally powered carrier wouldhave required an accompanying oiler, or a complicated arrangement of pre-positioned assets toensure that sufficient fuel was available for propulsion.

As mentioned above, on September 12th, 1996, USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) was operat-ing in the Adriatic Sea, supporting Implementation Force ground troops. At 1800 hours,ENTERPRISE was tasked to proceed at best speed to support the units of the USS CARLVINSON (CVN 70) in the Arabian Gulf. ENTERPRISE transited between two of the world'smost critical regions in six and a half days covering 4300 miles at an average speed of 30 knots.(Not including of course its transit through the Suez Canal.) Within three hours of arrival,ENTERPRISE was launching aircraft over the Arabian Gulf. ENTERPRISE's conventionalescorts, including the new Combat Logistic Ship (CLF) (AOE 6) transited separately due toconcerns with speed of advance and a propulsion plant problem. They arrived in the Gulf thir-ty-six hours after ENTERPRISE.

A CVN's ability to sustain maximum speed expands the carrier's battle space. The carrier isable to reposition along a greater perimeter, providing a wider choice of aircraft launch positionsand forcing the opponent to dispense his forces along a greater defensive perimeter. In somecases it can avoid enemy defenses completely, decreasing risk to the strike aircraft from surveil-lance sites and missile batteries.

At best speed, a CVN can transit from the continental United States to the Arabian Gulf in

25

less than 20 days, ready to launch fully loaded aircraft. While transiting, the CVN can refuel Nimescorts, temporarily slowing down just long enough for the replenishment period, but without Tlimiting her own maximum range of travel. A CV on the other hand requires 5 additional days, logiswith an oiler in company for en route refueling. A high-speed transit from the Mediterranean INGSea to the Arabian Gulf would consume almost all of the on-board propulsion fuel for a con- Opelventional carrier, so the CV arrives on station without fuel for defensive maneuvering and CV1Xunable to launch aircraft. If for example, Iraqi forces had overrun Saudi Arabia after invading peaceKuwait, these five days of transit could have been critical. avera

flighi

Survivability of coNuclear propulsion allows a carrier to use its sustained speed advantage to reduce its vulnera- carri(

bility to submarine and missile attacks. Speed increases the difficulty of locating and attacking dowithe carrier. Speed also provides greater freedom to maneuver away from known threats whose fuel,fuel constraints prevent successful pursuit. Sustained speed directly impacts the battery power of as prdiesel submarines, forcing diesel submarine commanders to choose between speed and noisy upordiesel operations to recharge the batteries. The greater threat to a carrier from diesel submarines, Thowever, is more likely to occur in shallower waters close to an enemy coast. Even here the a tirrCVN's ability to immediately accelerate to maximum speed without the delay of lighting off pericmore boilers significantly enhances its survivability. Maneuvering to avoid storms or take advan- bat ctage of cloud cover are additional pay-offs of nuclear propulsion. On occasion, exercises have vitaldemonstrated how high speed transit can confound enemy efforts to locate, track and attack the "pipenuclear powered carrier.

For example, in May 1992, USS EISENHOWER (CVN 69) and USS BAINBRIDGE Techr(CGN 25) left the Arabian Gulf and transited to the Norwegian Sea steaming 7000 nautical F.miles at 30 knots average speed. As part of a joint exercise CVN 69 sprinted ahead of schedule pow(and launched simulated strikes into English air bases one day earlier than anticipated. The the sRoyal Air Force was taken by complete surprise thinking the battle group was 300-400 miles aircr.further south. 2002

aircr;Logistics have

Military history is replete with examples where the availability and vulnerability of propul- moresion fuel logistics dramatically impacted the outcome of conflicts. The failure of Rommel's and iAfrika Corps as well as the Japanese Pacific Campaign during World War II are just two exam- 12pies. carrii

During new construction, the Nimitz Class aircraft carrier's nuclear plant is loaded with over shaft20 years of propulsion fuel - the equivalent of over 11 million barrels of propulsion fuel oil. pow(The new nuclear propulsion plant of CVX is expected to increase time between refueling to 30 Theryears. This provides the Nimitz Class carrier with virtually unlimited endurance at high speed. the 'Conventionally powered carriers are restricted by hull stowage limitations to less than approxi- advamately 5000 nm at high speeds.

Due to the power and energy-dense nature of the nuclear propulsion plant, CVNs can carry Alterrone third more ordnance than conventional carriers and almost double the amount of aviation Tfuel - arriving on station with greater strike capability. Recent Navy studies indicate that to firedprovide a conventional carrier with the aviation fuel and ordnance capacities equivalent to the pow

26

refuel Nimitz Class carriers results in a CV which is 5000 tons heavier than a Nimitz Class carrier.ithout The value of this additional combat consumable capacity and freedom from propulsion fuel

days, logistic considerations was evidenced during a recent deployment of USS GEORGE WASH-

anean INGTON (CVN 73). In October 1994, GEORGE WASHINGTON participated int con- Operation Vigilant Warrior (US response to Iraqi troop movements). To support this operation,

g and CVN 73 was ordered to proceed rapidly from its station in the Adriatic Sea (supporting Bosnia

'ading peacekeeping operations) to the Arabian Gulf. This transit involved a 4400 nm transit at anaverage speed of 27 knots, including refueling two conventionally powered escort ships andflight operations en route. CVN 73 arrived in the Arabian Gulf within 7 days with many daysof combat endurance (aviation fuel and ordnance) remaining. A conventionally powered aircraft

Inera- carrier would have run out of propulsion fuel before reaching the Arabian Gulf unless it slowed

icking down (and therefore decreased its response time by several days) or burned precious aviation

whose fuel, JP-5, for ship propulsion. In the latter case, the CV could have arrived in the Arabian Gulf

wer of as promptly as CVN 73 but would have been almost out of both aviation and propulsion fuelnoisy upon arrival.

trines, These unique and essential operational advantages of nuclear propulsion could be decisive in

re the a time of war when there could be a high threat to a conventional carrier during a vulnerableng off period as in a replenishment; when the sustainability provided by the higher capacity for com-

Ldvan- bat consumables would become important; when the mobility and tactical flexibility would be

3 have vital; and when the high speed endurance and independence from the propulsion fuel oil

ck the "pipeline" would show exceptional value.

.DGE Technologyutical For the past 30 years U.S. aircraft carriers have been propelled by nuclear power plants. The

ledule power plant is capable of producing in excess of 250,000 SHP, plus enough steam to provide

. The the ship's service electric power requirement as well as to operate the catapults which launch the

miles aircraft. However, the power plant which will be used in CVN 76, to be delivered to the fleet in2002, will have the same power plant (with minor mods) as the one which started this class ofaircraft carriers back in the sixties, the CVN 68. During this period of more than 30 years wehave witnessed major changes in the power plant design of U.S. submarines - more efficient,

ropul- more HP/weight of the power plant, longer core life, less manpower, reduced cost of acquisitionamel's and improved spatial configuration.exam- U.S. nuclear submarines are propelled by a single propeller and one reactor. Large aircraft

carriers are propelled by four propellers and it has been found that two reactors (one per two

h over shafts) is an optimum arrangement. Even with two reactors the scaling required from submarineel oil. power plants to an aircraft carrier power plant is considerable (a factor of 5-10 in scale).

to 30 Therefore, if a fair comparison between nuclear and non-nuclear power plants is to be made,

speed. the Navy has to proceed with the task of developing a carrier sized nuclear power plant based onproxi- advances achieved for the NSSN.

E carry Alternative Propulsion Systems'iation The competing alternative power plants which can be considered are conventional steam (oilhat to fired boiler for source of steam) or gas turbines. Primarily due to their weight/volume per horse-to the power characteristics, diesel engines are not a realistic option for powering a 100,000 ton carrier

27

at a fairly high speed. The last conventional steam high pressure/high temperature power plantdesigned for a new U.S. naval ship the LHA, was in the late 1960s. It is a manpower intensivepower plant, when compared to other non-nuclear options. The U.S. Navy of the 21st Centurywill be devoid of conventional steam power plants (except of LHA/LHD classes whose retire-ment will be started as early as 2010). If for no other reason than the logistics tail, the choice ofconventional steam for a ship which will be in commission in 2050 strains credibility.Consequently, gas turbines provide the power source for the only realistic alternative powerplant. This is because gas turbines come in small packages with high power -70,000 HP per gasturbine, (the latest Rolls Royce engine converted from an aircraft engine to a stationary powerplant, initial operation of which commenced in early 1997). Additionally, because gas turbinepower plants, as the propulsion prime movers, have become so common on U.S. surface com-batants, the logistic support for such systems is well established in the Navy.

Nevertheless, gas turbines have several major drawbacks. They consume voluminousamounts of air that subsequently is turned into exhaust gas, which has to be expelled. As a con-sequence, enormous amounts of the ship's internal volume have to be dedicated to intake andexhaust ducts and stacks. Commercial aircraft, which are also propelled by gas turbines, don'tsuffer from this problem. They need no ducting because the engines hang on the wings.Imagine how little space, if any, would be left for passengers in a Boeing 777 if the inlet andexhaust gases had to be routed through the fuselage.

Another major difference between aircraft and ships is that in the case of gas turbines pro-pelling aircraft, the component which delivers the thrust is an integral part of the engine. Thethrust is obtained mainly from the fan in front of the compressor blades and to a small extentby the exhaust jet, except in the case of high performance fighter aircraft, for which the so-calledafter burner delivers significant additional thrust. However, in the case of ships the power gener-ation portion of the power plant is decoupled from the thrust delivery device. The fan isremoved, there is no after burner and the shaft is coupled to the propeller shaft. The thrust isdelivered by a large propeller below the waterline, near the bottom of the after end of the ship.Because gas turbines turn at speeds of several thousand RPM the turning speed of the gas tur-bine has to be reduced significantly - from several thousand RPM to as low as 150-200 RPM.

To achieve this there is a need for a reduction gear with mechanical transmission or a genera-tor/motor combination. A large aircraft carrier requires several propellers and because each islocated quite deep in the water, in the case of the mechanical reduction gear option for trans-mission of the power, the gas turbine, the reduction gear and the propeller have to be all linedup more or less in the same horizontal plane. Therefore, naturally both the power producingand transmitting elements have to be located near the bottom of the ship. This results in a largediameter inlet and exhaust ducting running from the bottom of the ship to above, or just below,the flight deck. This feature, in turn, means that a considerable amount of space on every deckis taken up by ducting instead of being available for utilization by vital functions of the carrier,such as space to house people, ammunition storage, command and control compartments and,of course the centerpiece of the carrier, the hangar to store and maintain aircraft. The onlyprospect for reducing this major negative impact rests with advanced motors and generatorswhich, if they are light enough, might make it possible to decouple the location of the powersource (the gas turbine) from the thrust delivery device (the propeller) by moving the gas tur-bine and generator sets higher in the ship closer to the flight deck and transmitting the power

28

via flex

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r plant via flexible electric cables, rather than through a rigid shaft. In so doing the costly and lengthytensive ducting is avoided.:entury Although the advanced, light weight electric motors and generators required to achieve thisretire- decoupling of the power generation device (the gas turbine) from the thrust delivery device (the

oice of propeller), have received considerable R&D funding in recent years (especially electric drive foribility. warships), so far the results don't indicate that the Navy could responsibly commit a new designpower of an aircraft carrier to this propulsion prime mover option. The reason is that advanced light

per gas weight/small volume electric drive just does not appear to be available in the time frame of thepower CVX design. Additionally, an entirely new electic power distribution technology will beurbine required to handle these massive power requirements. There are some serious fundamental tech-> com- nological issues which have not been resolved despite decades of significant R&D investment.

Solving this problem will take more time and large amounts of R&D money, neither of whichinous have been budgeted as yet.a con- Another major drawback of gas turbine propulsion in the aircraft carrier case is that the cur-ke and rent catapults needed to launch CTOL aircraft require a very large steam generator. Non-steam;, don't catapult technology has not yielded sufficiently good results despite 25 years of efforts in thewings. attempt to perfect it. Therefore, there is no firm basis at this time to indicate that the Navylet and could responsibly commit a new large carrier design to a launch method whose viability hinges

on an as yet unproven non-steam catapult.as pro- As a result of these considerations it should be dear that the gas turbine application for largeLe. The aircraft carrier propulsion without electric drive and without a reliable and efficient non-steamextent catapult could impose an unacceptable set of penalties and risks on the carrier design.-calledgener- Benefit of the Nuclear Propulsion Option to Other Navy Programsfan is The Navy is committed, as it should be, to the idea that true submarines, which are expect-

irust is ed to operate long distances away from the continental U.S., have to be nuclear propelled. If wee ship. stop building nuclear power plants for carriers, and because for all practical purposes the com-;as tur- mercial nuclear propulsion industry is nonexistent, the whole burden of carrying the navalPM. nuclear industry will fall on SSNs. While current NSSN cost estimates are based on no concur-,enera- rent nuclear powered carrier work, NSSN would most certainly benefit from a nuclear powereach is decision for CVX. Savings to the NSSN program due to the continuing building of nuclearI trans- powered carriers, could well provide the differential dollars between the cost of a conventional[I lined gas turbine propelled carrier and a nuclear one. It follows that because we appear to be buildingducing submarines at a rate of about one unit per year, while we build one carrier every five years, thea large savings from the cost of five submarine nuclear power plants could add up in such a way thatbelow, the savings from the Navy's shipbuilding program of submarine construction will pay for they deck differential cost between a gas turbine and nuclear power plant for the carrier. As a result for thecarrier, Navy as a whole, the choice of power plant becomes cost neutral.ts and, Another consideration in favor of nuclear propulsion is that it reduces the quantity of fuelte only required to be transferred from the CLF ship, because none is required for carrier propulsion,erators launch and recovery of aircraft operations, and electric power generation. This in turn providespower the opportunity for the CLF ships to carry a larger quantity of ammunition and aviation fuel

;as tur- than would otherwise be the case.power Also, as a consequence of maintaining an all-nuclear propelled carrier fleet the requirement

29

1/_1____1_______1_____L�I__ �1___�__

for the number of CLF ships could get reduced, adding further savings which would properlyaccrue to the nuclear propulsion option and offset the higher acquisition cost of the nuclearpower plant for the carrier.

Issue - CostA large carrier is built to last 50 years, witness USS MIDWAY (1943-1994) and USS JOHN

E KENNEDY (1968-2018). Consequently, it is only to be expected that the percentage ofacquisition cost of the carrier itself will represent a relatively moderate portion -30 percent ofthe total life cycle cost of the carrier (excluding the cost of its complement of aircraft).Therefore, it is important not to attribute disproportionate importance to acquisition cost sav-ings of the carrier design. Also, because of the long life of a carrier, it is prudent to recognizethat flexibility of utilization is of paramount importance. In the long run, with an ever changingset of aircraft and aircraft delivered weapons technology, a larger, more flexible carrier will makepotential major savings available later, not because it is cheaper to buy and/or operate, butbecause through a larger, more expensive but adaptable carrier we may avoid the need to scrapthis large investment, earlier than would otherwise be necessary, and undertake a new design.

The other large component of life cycle cost is people. The people who operate the carrier,not the embarked air wing of 3,200 people, represent about another 30 percent of the carrier'slife cycle cost, not including the shore costs, like training. The remaining 40 percent of cost isdivided among mid life complex overhaul, normal operations and maintenance, excluding peo-ple cost, and cost of ship disposal after decommissioning (a small 2-3 percent of the cost).

The total life cycle cost of the nuclear carrier (without its air wing cost) is -$16B in 1995dollars (CNA Study26).

Key Carrier Life Cycle 16 ..... -------- Cost for ship disposal after decommissioningCost Elements2

14 ...1 -------- Cost for mid-life refueling and overhaul, which~12 *-'b -:-'~ i &includes fuel for the remainder of the ship's life

~ Maint ~5 ~'"'~-- --- _._Cost for normal operations and maintenance10 ---- .-- . over 45 years

.. ---- 1' sI;. -Total direct cost for the ship's crew, includingPeople ------ pay, allowances, medical, retirement. Doesn't

6 .....H~l~~i.-~~ .... ''· include CVW personnel.

4 ----- I----- Includes the equivalent of 11 million barrels ofDFM, enough to power the ship for half its

2 -...·1 SCN projected 50-yr service life

I I III

'I ' I I, i . . . . . :

Notes:

1. These are CNA's estimates based on historical data [3], [4].2. Personnel costs do not include the shore tail for people at sea (such as the training pipeline). Including these costs

would add at least 30 percent to total personnel costs.3. Costs for maintenance and mid-life refueling overhaul are based on the historical experience of CVN-68 and other CVNs.4. The initial construction costs of CVNs, measured In constant dollars, have been relatively constant for the Nimitz class.5. The ultimate disposal cost In uncertain. This figure is based on a recent estimate by the General Accounting Office.

26 Dr. Dave Perin, "CVX Cost Considerations," CNA, 1995.27 Ibid.

30

- I-

I

I

i

i

Technology, as it relates to people functions, and especially if it results in a reevaluation oftraditional uses of people, can reduce costs significantly. However, manpower reductions mustnot reduce the quality of ship and aircraft operations. Operations and maintenance (less thepeople cost) is another area where advancement of technology and changes in concepts of oper-ation can result in significant savings.

The table below displays life cycle cost reductions as a function of the size of carrier.

CVX Aircraft Capacity Tons of Displacement $ Life Cycle

Large - 80 aircraft 109,000 16B Life Cycle Cost vs. Carrier Size28

Medium - 60 aircraft 70,000 14.25B

Small - 40 aircraft 55,000 12.5B

The smaller the carrier, the cheaper it is to buy, but the performance penalties as discussedearlier, are out of proportion to the savings in cost. Are we ready to give up the capability toconduct simultaneous battlespace dominance and strike missions for 11 to 22 percent savings oflife cycle costs? Are we willing to diminish the carrier's key role in containing crises during thecrucial early stages for this cost savings? It is difficult to imagine the effective projection of U.S.power into highly volatile trouble spots around the globe without a carrier force capable ofdominantly engaging an enemy, independently at a moment's notice.

Nuclear propulsion increases the total ownership cost of the carrier. Given the tremendousoperational advantages provided by this means of propulsion, we should not expect to get theseadvantages for free.

As far as the choice of aircraft for the next carrier is concerned, to change from CTOL toSTOVL would result in: smaller payload; shorter range; less sorties; longer combat period; andmore costly CSA aircraft. Is it worth it?

Some claim that the cost of the aircraft carrier cannot be measured in terms of constructionor life cycle cost alone; it must also include the price of escort vessels required to provide AAWand ASW protection, as well as logistic support. It is true that the U.S. Navy operates aircraftcarriers in conjunction with other ships, which together comprise the carrier battle groupthe foundation of current U.S. naval operations. However, those other ships are not developedand purchased to just provide the escort function for the carrier. They do provide that func-tion, but also have their own unique missions. Aegis cruisers and destroyers for instance can beused to provide theater ballistic missile defense for U.S. and allied coastal areas. They can beused on their own in smaller scale contingencies such as embargo enforcement, counternar-cotics and reconnaissance missions. Logistics vessels are effective in delivering relief supplies torefugees. Therefore it wouldn't be fair to attribute their entire cost to the carrier's cost.

We are given to spending an inordinate amount of effort looking for relatively small sav-ings by trading-off essential capability, but tending to forget that these decisions will last forthe 50 years of the carrier's life. For example, we might combine the food preparation of theenlisted men and officers and skimp on the number of ward rooms/mess halls by combiningservice with the attendant reduction of comfort and convenience to the pilots and the opera-

31

28 Jim Rabber, "Alternative CVX Conceptual Designs and Cost Comparisons," Viewgraph Presentation to the AOA Oversight Group, May 1997.

_ __

the operations/maintenance crew, only to save a few dollars, while forgetting that many otherfactors, which don't lead to loss of capability, can have a much more major impact.

A recent Newport News proposal recommends changes to the CVN 77 construction sched-ule which could result in overall savings as high as $600 million. This administrative move islarger than the combined potential dollars saved-stemming from all technical tradeoffs, expectedto be tackled in the next six years of the CVX program.

This is not to say that significant engineering/design trade-offs should not be undertaken inorder to optimize the design of the next carrier; but, rather, that it doesn't pay to reduce theoperational effectiveness of the carrier over the 50 years of its life for a one time small savings inacquisition cost. This issue becomes even more pronounced when we look at the overall costsinvolved, not just in the acquisition of the carrier itself but its complement of aircraft, ammuni-tion, fuel and the cost of the 3,200 people who are associated with the airwing.

Remembering that the useful life of the aircraft is about 20 years, a carrier over its 50 yearlife will have 2-1/2 generations of aircraft operating from it. The life cycle cost of this element,i.e., the cost of acquisition and operation of the airwing is more than twice, approaching threetimes, the life cycle cost associated with the carrier itself (the -$16B, mentioned earlier). Thus,when we combine the life cycle cost of both carrier and airwing, the total life cycle cost isbetween $50B and $60B over a 50 year period. Therefore, we need to put theengineering/design tradeoffs of the CVX in this perspective. When we do so, the differential ofthe acquisition cost in, say, nuclear propulsion and conventional propulsion seems small, not tospeak of the many other advantages nuclear power offers such as the one-time refueling of thecarrier in its entire 50 year life.

ConclusionsLarge nuclear-powered carriers provide U.S. Forces forward presence without the entangle-

ments of bases on foreign soil. Carrier-based aircraft together with long range missiles fired fromsurface combatants or submarines provide the U.S. the ability to project power deep inlandshould it become necessary to protect U.S. interests or those of our allies.

Tactical manned aircraft, whether land or carrier based, remain one of the very effectiveoptions for delivering conventional warhead weapons. Further, tactical manned aircraft basedon large aircraft carriers are a very efficient and effective option when compared to completereliance on Air Force F/A aircraft based in friendly countries' land bases and/or CONUS basedbombers.

Although tactical cruise and ballistic missiles are very important vehicles that can deliverconventional high explosive weapons on fixed targets with great accuracy, they can't, by them-selves, do the entire job and they are not always the most cost effective approach to neutralize afoe.

As smaller smart weapons displace larger guided weapons, and as GPS/INS guided bombsreplace dumb bombs, tactical aviation will experience an order-of-magnitude improvement inaircraft lethality and a great increase in the area over which an aircraft can perform an effectiveattack. New capabilities in weapons will also make aircraft more flexible as the terminal phase of

32

the atideliver

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other the attack is increasingly handled by the munition. The chief enabler for these changes in airdelivered weapons stems from the reduction in size and cost of complex electronic sensors and

:hed- processors.we is Any future airframe/propulsion technology advances should be equally applicable toected STOVL and CTOL aircraft. CTOL aircraft possess inherently superior performance character-

istics when compared to VSTOL or STOVL aircraft. Therefore, the gap in the performanceen in efficiency between CTOL vs STOVL, in favor of CTOL is expected to continue, simplye the because CTOL aircraft leaves the catapult on the carrier while the STOVL aircraft will effective-igs in ly continue to carry the "catapult" in each aircraft, substituting its weight for useful payloadcosts and/or fuel. This advantage is projected to prevail in the future because studies have shown that-uni- the lighter airframe and landing gears of STOVL/VSTOL aircraft resulting from reduced loads

on the aircraft do not offset the added weight imposed on STOVL/VSTOL aircraft due to fea-year tures that effectively carry the "catapult" in each aircraft. The small saving in the cost of the car-

nent, rier resulting from elimination of catapults and arresting gear (-6 percent) does not to justifythree the pefalty each aircraft, and, as a result, the complete carrier air wing has to pay in lost effec-thus, tiveness. As long as the air wing size is larger than 50 aircraft, there appears to be no impact on:st is the carrier size whether the air wing is composed of STOVL or CTOL aircraft (aside from the

the already mentioned impact resulting from the elimination of the catapults and arresting gears).ial of In the future there will be a role for UAVs and even UCAVs, but today we don't haveot to enough reliable and well tested experience with them. In the case of UCAVs, today they are no,f the more than a concept. Therefore, an aircraft carrier that is to be operational within the next 10-

15 years can not be limited in its design to operate strictly UAVs and UCAVs. In fact, it wouldbe irresponsible to design the next aircraft carrier by limiting its capability to even just STOVLaircraft.

A large new design carrier which is designed to accommodate existing and future mannednaval aircraft will automatically allow the operation of STOVL, UAV and UCAV aircraft,should they prove themselves as worthwhile augmentation or even complete replacements of

ngle- manned CTOL aircraft. The reverse is not true.from The new carrier, therefore, should be designed to accommodate CTOL aircraft launchediland with catapults and landed with arresting gears. For most types of hostilities, the number of tar-

gets to be destroyed dictate a large air wing, i.e., 80 aircraft not 40 or 50 aircraft. The superior:ctive operational effectiveness and cost efficiency of one large carrier carrying 80 aircraft versus two~ased small ones carrying 40 aircraft each, is clearly demonstrable. Whichever criteria one applies, sus-tplete tained speed or logistical independence, nuclear power has significant advantages over conven->ased tional steam or gas turbine propulsion and it is well worth the small difference in acquisition

cost, especially when viewed in terms of the life cycle cost of the complete system of the carrier-liver and its airwing.hem- The Navy has to respond to challenges from the Air Force, the Army or other forces at work,lize a by making sure that the facts that are the basis for the value of its carrier fleet are well under-

stood. The Navy shouldn't allow itself to be pushed into the purchase of less capable STOVLambs aircraft for its mainstay fighter/attack aircraft or for that matter its CSA airframe. Neithernt in should the Navy allow itself to give up manned in favor of unmanned aircraft before it is very.ctive clear from operational experience that UAVs and UCAV can indeed be substitutes for mannedise of aircraft.

33

_CI��__

The Navy's case for wanting the most capable aircraft and carrier is strong, thus the Navy replamust ensure that the basic means of meeting the Nation's strategic military goal is a product of gies'the best that U.S. industry is capable of developing. The CVX has to be a "clean sheet of paper" long,new ship design because there are a number of new systems which by their nature permeate the mornwhole carrier, thus are not amenable to incorporation into an existing design. Examples are: gies.new hull form, new propulsion system, new electrical generation and distribution system, dis-tributed computing, reducing manning and new survivability features. Incorporation of newtechnologies into the next carrier design, while keeping its cost to as low a level as sensibly pos-sible is crucial; but changes from well proven practices or questionable trade-offs for strictlyminor economies that result in unwarranted reduction in capabilities should be avoided at allcost.

Had the British had one of our carriers, with its complement of CTOL aircraft, the 1982Falklands War might have been over in days with little casualties to Royal Navy ships. But withonly a small number of VSTOL aircraft with short endurance, small payloads, flying off shipswhich could carry very few aircraft, and due to the small size of the aircraft carrying ships beinghindered by bad weather, the war lasted longer and the casualties were many, both in equipmentand personnel. Obviously, the Falklands War would have been entirely different if the RoyalNavy had not just a U.S. carrier but an Aegis destroyer or cruiser and the many other sophisti-cated surveillance and targeting features of the U.S. Navy.

Therefore, if the Navy capitulates in this upcoming debate to the pressures to build a smallnon-nuclear carrier equipped with a small VSTOL/STOVL aircraft wing, we are likely to wit-ness, in say 2040, the U.S. Navy becoming the Royal Navy of the Falklands War, at least from anaval aviation standpoint. The way to avoid this is by the Navy making sure that DoD and ItCongressional staff understand the value of the maintenance of the existing fleet of carriers, as carriwell as the building of a "dean sheet of paper" newly designed large nuclear powered carrier Ameequipped with more and more capable CTOL aircraft (which might be augmented by future affor.STOVL aircraft, UAVs and UCAVs). shou

The Navy should also aggressively pursue the funding required to translate the major typeadvances made in nuclear propulsion for submarines over the last decade to carrier propulsion,in order that propulsion tradeoffs which will be made in the next few years during the Analysisof Alternatives (AOA) phase of CVX will not be forced into comparing gas turbine technologyof the 21st Century with 1960's nuclear power technology of the Nimitz Class carriers.Therefore, the Navy has to decide to pursue the development effort for an advanced nuclearpower plant in the size that a large aircraft carrier demands, despite the risk that this course ofaction will be construed by some as prejudicing the decision in favor of nuclear propulsion.

Navy leadership should also work hard in convincing the Office of the Secretary of Defenseto shorten significantly the AOA process. This action is required in order to solidify, earlier thancurrently planned, the CVX baseline along the lines suggested by this paper, i.e., large, nuclear,CTOL capable carrier. The results of such action will allow the Navy to develop a rationalR&D plan consistent with the goal of basing the CVX design on radically new systems, basedon revolutionary (vice incremental) technology. Given adequate funding, an array of new sys-tems is feasible, which in turn has a good chance to increase significantly the performance whilereducing the cost of the CVX.

Since there is a hard date of 2013 when ENTERPRISE has to be retired, CVX, which will 29 Penis

34

~~I~~~ _ _ _--..

replace it, has to be awarded to the ship builder by 2006. This then defines what new technolo-gies will be incorporated in CVX. The more time that is taken to decide its key features and thelonger Congress delays its appropriation of the necessary funds for the CVX R&D program, themore development time is wasted and the less CVX will be able to incorporate new technolo-gies.

The Life of a Carrier 29

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In short, the Navy should steadfastly stand by its conviction that the large, nuclear poweredcarrier, flying advanced CTOL aircraft is a most important national asset and a uniquelyAmerican weapon system, which other countries would be only too glad to have, if they couldafford them. Our national security strategy demands it, the Nation can afford it, therefore thereshould be no compromise on their essential basic features of size, type of propulsion plant andtype of aircraft which will fly off them. Making these decisions should not be delayed.

35

29 Peniston, Bradley, "Scrambling for ways to Squeeze More out of Shrunken Carrier Fleet," Navy Times, October 27, 1997.

-1 ------ I-----,-

L i.

II

I

I

I I

I

Appendix A: Land Attack Weapons Delivered by Aircraft and Surface Combatants/Submarines againstThe purpose of naval forces is to deliver high explosive weapons on target. The Navy possesses a variety of weapons fired ber of s

from various platforms. The choice of weapons in specific cases is influenced by some primary characteristics such as: range, Sp(size of warhead and cost per round, and a number of secondary characteristics such as: type of warhead and type of seekers.

Although long range missiles fired from submarines and surface combatants provide a valuable capability, they are not asubstitute for aircraft delivered weapons. The fact is that the airplane not only carries a heavier payload than one Tomahawkmissile, but it can run multiple missions and deliver much cheaper weapons. These facts don't diminish the value of surfacecombatant/submarine launched land attack missiles in certain situations. These missiles and aircraft-delivered land attackweapons should be viewed as complementary weapons. As our surface combatant force achieves the capability to hit targetsfrom longer and longer distances, it better enables air defense suppression from a safe distance, thus enhancing the effective-ness of naval aviation by reducing the probability of the loss of aircraft to enemy fire.

Cost effectiveness is a primary driving force in the choice of weapon delivery. The cost advantages of using aircraft areobvious. Tomahawk costs well over $1 million per copy, while naval aircraft costs about $56 million. Naval aircraft also havea 20 year or more life span, and can repeatedly deliver much less expensive weapons (JDAM = $16K; JSOW = $150K;SLAM-ER $450K).

The perceived cost effectiveness of large land attack missiles fired from surface combatants/ submarines is based in parton two assumptions: promised future substantial reductions in the cost of missiles, and large aircraft losses, caused by enemyair defenses.

But after an initial assault on fixed land targets by large land attack missiles fired from surface combatants/submarinesthere are several important considerations that favor carrier-based aircraft as the means of delivering ground attack weapons:

* If a planner who launched a mission made a mistake, the pilot has the option of returning to base. Obviously,the missile has no such option, although the most recent feature of Tomahawk allows for instructions for themissile to be retargeted while enroute.

* Even if missiles launched from surface combatants replace the need for strike aircraft in attacks against fixedtargets, attacking mobile targets is much more complex and the pilot may be able to make crucial judgements.

* For the near term, at least, significant development is still necessary in surveillance and targeting. Therefore,carrier based aircraft will be used against dispersed, mobile targets if only because of the time delay betweentargeting and getting a cruise missile to the target.

* The aircraft themselves have demonstrated major deterrence value in scenarios as we have seen in NATO airoperations over Bosnia and post Gulf War operations over no-fly zones in Iraq.

* Aircraft provide instant Battle Damage Assessment.

* Aircraft provide the possibility of repeat attacks.

Naval aircraft and aircraft carriers were largely justified during the Cold War era by the need to be able to take the attackto the Soviet Union on the Kola Peninsula and in the Pacific maritime provinces. Strangely enough the basic task for the Navyhasn't changed with the new emphasis on littoral warfare, or by the disappearance of the Soviet Union. To be sure, the Navyhas fewer concerns about getting from CONUS to the area of conflict because the transiting fleet no longer has to cope withthe Soviet Navy's sophisticated threat, but once the carrier battle group arrives in the littoral, it still has to have large fixed wingaircraft capable of long range (-500+ miles) travel with the capability to carry a heavy weapons load.

The value of carrier-based aviation resides not only in the capability of the aircraft, but naturally, also in the effectivenessand versatility of the array of weapons it can deliver. 30 Sweatm

The following are the weapon programs which if successful will significantly increase the reach of airborne weapons 31 Admiral32 Walsh, i

36

against many targets, while others will increase the number of weapons that today's aircraft can carry, thus reducing the num-

ns fired + ber of sorties required to hit a given set of targets.range, Specifically these new air-to-ground weapons are:30

ekers. JDAM, Joint Direct Attack Munition results from merging two programs: Inertial Guidance Technologye not a Demonstration (IGTD), and the USN's Advanced Bomb Family (ABF). JDAM evolved because the short-rangeiahawk air defense threat had forced aircraft to operate above 15,000 ft, making unguided weapons almost useless.surface To rectify the problem, the Department of Defense developed JDAM to be a more accurate weapon whichattack would cost so little that it could replace almost all unguided bombs. The large number of JDAMs on order is

targets one indication that unitary bombs are the most versatile means of destroying fixed ground targets. "Baseline

fective- I JDAM tail kits will fit on current Mk 83 1,000-pound, Mk 84 2,000-pound, and BLU-109 submunitions

weapons. The kit consists of moveable fins for maneuvering and a Global Positioning System/Inertialraft are Navigation System (GPS/INS) that will give the bomb a 13-meter Circular Error Probability (CEP) accuracy."3'3o have

JSOW, Joint Stand-Off-Weapon, resulted from the AIWS, Advanced Interdiction Weapon System. The AGM-t;150K;

154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW), which is due to enter service in December 1998, typifies the way inwhich new technology is changing the world of air-launched weapons. In the USN, JSOW replaces several

in partein part kpvery different weapons: the Maverick missile, the Rockeye cluster weapon, and the Walleye as well as theenemy

Skipper glide bombs.

narines '* HARM, High-Speed Anti Radiation Missile. The brand leader among anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) remains

pons: the AGM-88 High-speed ARM (HARM). One of the principal advantages of the new version is particularlyimportant in the confusing world of peacekeeping: the GPS permits the missile to be programmed with specif-ic inclusion and exclusion zones, so that even it if is fired in bearing-only mode against an emitter whichturns out to be outside hostile territory, it will not attack that-radar.

SFW and WCMD, Sensor Fused Weapon, the BLU 108B and WCMD, Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser.The SFW is designed to allow a fighter to kill several tanks in one pass, at an affordable cost (assuming thatthe tanks are stationary, or moving slowly, and tightly grouped). It is also a weapon used against armored andsoft-skinned vehicles and distributed, mobile targets such as surface-to-air missile (SAM) complexes.

In the design of dispenser weapons two significant trends have been emerging: the maturing of smart anti-armor dispenser weapons and the increasing use of guided dispensers. Because SFW, as it exists today, hasto be released from low altitude to achieve acceptable accuracy, the USAF decided to blend inertial guidancewith the SFW and in the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) program. It reduces the CEP from90m to 25m from a rmedium-altitude release, which is adequate for dispenser payloads.

* JASSM and SLAM-ER, Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-Off Missile and Stand-Off Land Attack Missile - Expanded

attack Response. "JASSM is a cruise missile being developed for Navy and Air Force long-range precision bombingagainst high-value targets such as command and control bunkers. JASSM replaces the Tri-Service Standoffle Navy

ie Navy Attack Missile canceled in 1995 because of cost hikes and development delays. A decision on JASSM pro-duction is expected to be reached in 2000."32

pe with

]d wing SLAM-ER (AGM-84H) is smaller and lighter than JASSM and of course has a smaller warhead. It is a sub-

:iveness30 Sweatman, Bill, "Air to Surface Weapons," Janes International Defense Review," Volume 30, July 1997.

31 Admiral Jay Johnson, CNO, "Force 2001-Vision, Presence, Power," A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, February 1997.eaalsh, Mark, JASpM Funding ring Added Costsns

32 Walsh, Mark, "JASSM Funding Cut May Bring Added Costs," Defense News, August 25-31, 1997, p. 4.

37

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stantially modernized version of SLAM, with planar wings derived from the Tomahawk cruise missile, a new weapons.warhead and an upgraded guidance system. It has a maximum range of 180 miles. These features, and the frigate is datalink, make it particularly suited to missions where collateral damage must be avoided at all costs. The oping theUSN, which was to acquire JASSM for the F/A-18E/F, has recently proposed to terminate its share of the pro- deliver migram in favor of a further improved version of the AGM-84H SLAM-ER. missile is

But Air Force officials argue SLAM-ER fails to meet the service's requirements for range, stealth and lethality. with a 3(Navy officials, on the other hand, say they want out of the JASSM program because SLAM-ER meets current achievednaval needs and already is in production.33 turning its

Howe* LOCAAS, Low-Cost Autonomous Attack, System. The LOCAAS is an Air Force developed weapori with a 500 and

1,000 lb warhead and 100+ mile-range vehicle capable of detecting and destroying vehicle targets within a more expepre-programmed area. The key technological advances are the seeker and the warhead. Each

The lidar seeker can discriminate between different types of tanks, as well as discriminate trucks from tanks able to thEor SAM launchers. This allows the weapon to choose its mode of attack. If it detects a tank that is assumed to who can (carry a self-defense system, it will fire the warhead as an 'aerostable slug:' the warhead's metal liner is i fighter/attaformed by sintering to eliminate strong crystal structures, and the charge is designed so that it forms rudimen-tary fins on the slug. This gives greatest accuracy at long range. If the target does not appear to be defended,the LOCAAS will close in and fire its warhead as a rod for greatest penetration. If the target is a SAM or atruck, the LOCAAS warhead will fire as fragments. Range

* MMTD, Miniaturized Munition Technology Demonstration. The MMTD sprang up as a result of the recognitionthat 80 percent of protected targets are covered by 2-4 feet of concrete or its equivalent (these include most Type of Fireaircraft shelters) and that these could be successfully attacked by a much smaller penetrating weapon thanthe 2,000 lb BU-109.

The MMTD program started in September 1995. The objective was to demonstrate a 250 lb weapon with a50 lb explosive charge, and a differential GPS/INS guidance system delivering a 3 m CEP against pre-sur-veyed targets.

* Big BLU - Currently a candidate for an ACTD program, Big BLU is a GPS/lnertial guidance bomb weighing no Type of Targless than 10 tons, and designed to destroy very deeply buried targets that would otherwise be immune tonon-nuclear weapons. The case will have a dense-metal penetrating tip, protecting a smart fuse.

* Yet unnamed as a specific weapon, a fundamentally new technology in air-to-surface weapons is an emerging

group of very high-speed missiles powered by ramjets. This development is driven in part by improved airdefenses, and in part by the search for a standoff weapon that is effective against highly mobile targets such In anyas ballistic missile launchers. The argument is that a very fast missile can reach the target area before the tar- ing becauseget has moved very far, so that the area which its seeker must scan is much smaller. Also, a weapon with a aircraft-deli\very high impact speed can be effective with a smaller warhead; against some targets, it may not need anexplosive charge at all because kinetic penetrators will be adequate.

This detailed discussion of aircraft delivered ground attack weapons does not mean to ignore the aggressive Naval SurfaceFire Support (NSFS) program which supports the development of an array of surface combatant based weapon programs.

Indeed, the Navy is working on increasing the range and lethality of its surface ship and submarine delivered land attack

33 Ibid. 34 Rear Admire

38

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weapons. The range of the 5"/54 naval gun which populates every surface combatant with the exception of the FFG-7 class

frigate is going to increase from 13 to 63 miles by lengthening the gun barrel by 40 inches and enhancing the bullets by devel-

oping the Extended Range Gun Munition (ERGM). Further out in time a new gun concept has been conceived, the VGAS, to

deliver munitions to ranges in excess of 120 miles, but this is not a funded program at this time. Also, a less expensive cruise

missile is being developed, the Fast Hawk, projected to cost only $400K. The adaptation of the Army's ATACM ballistic missile

with a 300 mile range is also pursued vigorously by the Navy. Last year a demonstration of the firing of the missile was

achieved by strapping an Army launcher to a deck of an amphibious assault ship. The Navy is even exploring the possibility of

turning its surface to air missile, the SM-2, into a land attack missile, called Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM).

However, the fact remains that with the exception of Tomahawk and its variants whose ranges keep increasing to between

500 and 1,000 miles, the range of the NSFS weapons is fairly limited if it is to be fired from a gun barrel. And missiles are

more expensive than aircraft delivered weapons.

Each form of weapon delivery has its value and application as part of the total spectrum of weapon delivery systems avail-

able to the Navy. The strength of the joint U.S. Armed Forces resides in the options available to the Commander of U.S. Forces

who can call upon the Navy surface ships/submarines or naval aircraft or the Air Force's CONUS based bombers and tactical

fighter/attack aircraft depending on a variety of factors such as time, space and political considerations.

StrikeLong Range

201 to 1200 miles

Reaction Time Minutes Minutes Hours - Days

Type of Fire Support ·Close Support · Fast Attack · Deep Strike- ERGM - Navy TACMS -Tomahawk BLK IV

(Competent Munitions) - VGAS - Fasthawk-VGAS - STD Strike

·Close Air Support ·Air Interdiction * Air Strikes-F/A-18 -F/A-18 -F/A-18-AV-8B -F-14 -F-14-Attack Helo's -AV-8B

Type of Targets ·Emergent Battlefield ·SEAD, Choke Pt. ·Deep High Value TargetsTargets 'ASCM, C2 Nodes -Strategic Targets

·Call fire 'Troop/Log SitesDanger Close Scenarios 'SSM TELs

'No Danger Close

In any case it is clear that a wide variety of current and near term future aircraft delivered land attack weapons are emerg-

ing because the job either can not be accomplished by large long-range cruise missiles alone, or it is more cost effective to use

aircraft-delivered weapons. Hence, again the value of sea-based aviation is demonstrated.

/al Surface

rams.

and attack

39

Range

NSFSShort Range

1 to 63 miles

InterdictionMedium Range

64 to 200 miles Land Attack Continuum34

34 Rear Admiral Murphy, USN, N86, "Presentation to the CEP Quadrennial Review Task Force," November 1996.

,,, ,,, ,

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��--- -- ------------- ----

Dr. Leopold is eminently qualified in the subject of daispaper. He spent all of his 35-year engineering career inthe naval field and contributed to both the design ofnaval ships and naval aircraft.

For a dozen years he led the design of all U.S. sur-face ship and submarine design, first, as Director ofEngineering, Litton Industries Shipbuilding Divisionand next as Technical Director, Ship Design Division ofthe Naval Sea Systems Command, resulting in thedesign of over half of the U.S. fleet afloat today. Later,for seven years he was in the business of military aircraftengines occupying two positions in industry: Manager,Business Development for all military aircraft enginesfor GE and Vice President, Advanced Systems for allmilitary aircraft engines, Pratt and Whitney. The engineshe dealt with included all the engines which propeltoday's naval fighter/attack aircraft - F-14 (Pratt &Whitney's TF-30 and GE's F110), F-18 (GE's F404 andF414).

Dr. Leopold earned four degrees in Engineeringfrom MIT, from Bachelors to Ph.D., as well as an MBAfrom George Washington University. He is the recipientof almost all the prestigious awards the naval professionbestows. In 1992, he was presented with the U.S. NavyLeague's highest technical award for lifetime contribu-tion in science and engineering, named after the firstAmerican to receive the Nobel Prize in Science, theAlbert A. Michelson Award. In 1987, he received thehighest award of the American Society of NavalEngineers-the Harold E. Saunders Award, for life timecontribution to naval technology. He is also the recipi-ent of the U.S. Navy's Superior Civilian Service Award,for his distinguished service during the decade of the 70sto the U.S. Navy. He is also the recipient of the Jimmy

First and foremost I want to thank Dr. David Perin forimparting to me some of his many years of experienceon the subject of this paper. Also, I am thankful for hissubstantial contribution in editing several significantpieces of this paper.

I want to express my appreciation to the followingpeople who have taken their time to review the docu-ment and provide substantive suggestions for changeand improvement:

James O. Ellis, Jr., Vice Admiral, USNWilliam Gravell, Captain, USNR. Robinson Harris, Captain, USNKarl Haslinger, Captain, USNJerry M. Hultin, Undersecretary of the NavyRobert S. Johnson, SyntekRonald K. Kiss, SyntekWalter E. Morrow, Jr., Director, Lincoln Lab,James O'Brasky, NSWC, Dahlgren

Hamilton Award for the best paper published in 1972by the American Society of Naval Engineers. He wasalso inducted into the Royal Academy of Engineering byPrince Philip in London, in 1993, the only American sohonored that year.

He serves as a member of the CNO Executive Panel(member for the past 17 years) and a number of activeTask Forces of it. He is also a member of the currentDefense Science Board Task Force studying future sub-marines, as it relates to roles and missions, new technol-ogy and future design characteristics (was member-at-large of the DSB in the 1980s). He is also a member ofthe National Academy of Science's Naval Studies BoardTask Force on the impact of technology on the 21stCentury Navy (was member-at-large of the NSB in the1980s). He is a member of the "Brainstorm Group" ofthe Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics(N4) . He is on the Red Team for Cost and OperationalEffectiveness Analysis (COEA) of the SC-21 Program.He is also a member of the Advisory Board to theAssistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations forAviation(N88) for the CVX Program.

The CNO just appointed Dr. Leopold to chair anew task force titled "Revolution in Business Affairs"which will review the Navy's current practices and rec-ommend changes so as to improve the effectiveness andefficiency of the Navy's day to day operations in defini-tion of requirements, R&D, design, acquisition, mainte-nance and logistics.

Dr. Leopold is the author of over 40 professionalarticles and books in the U.S. and abroad. Currently heis the President of SYNTEK, an international as well asdomestic defense consulting firm.

Robert C. Percival, SyntekBrian Persons, Deputy Program Manager, CVXLouis Rydill, Professor Emeritus, London UniversityHarvey Sapolsky, Director, Security Studies Progam,

MITDr. Allan R. Somoroff, NAVAIRJames R. Stark, RearAdmiral, USN,

President, U.S. Navy War CollegeCraig E. Steidle, Rear Admiral, USN,

Vice Commander, NAVAIRJohn J. Turner, SyntekMichael Yermakov, SyntekLast, but certainly not least, I want to thank

Admiral "Skip" Bowman for his and his staff's (in par-ticular Bill Schmitt's) review and contribution to theChapter on "Propulsion Alternatives."

40

About the Author

Acknowledgments

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