1

*TITLE*

I.MODERNCONSITITUTIONALABORTIONLAW

A.Roev.Wade:

Thelandmarkcase,Roev.Wade,decidedbytheSupremeCourtin1973,was

thefirstSupremeCourtdecisionthatcontributestowhatweknowtodayasmodern

abortionlaw.

InRoe,asingle,pregnantwomanbroughtaclassactionlawsuitthat

challengedtheconstitutionalityofcriminalabortionlawsinTexas.TheTexaslaws

madeitacrimeforphysicianstoperformabortionsonwomenatanystageof

pregnancyunlesstheabortionwasinordertosavethelifeofthemother.Justice

BlackmunwastheauthoroftheCourt’sopinioninthecase.Hebegan,rightly,by

pointingouttheCourt’ssensitivitytotheissuethatwasbeforeit:

Weforthwithacknowledgeourawarenessofthesensitiveandemotional

natureoftheabortioncontroversy,ofthevigorousopposingviews,even

amongphysicians,andofthedeepandseeminglyabsoluteconvictionsthat

thesubjectinspires.One’sphilosophy,one’sexperiences,one’sexposureto

therawedgesofhumanexistence,one’sreligioustraining,one’sattitudes

towardlifeandfamilyandtheirvalues,andthemoralstandardsone

establishesandseekstoobserve,arealllikelytoinfluenceandtocolorone’s

thinkingandconclusionsaboutabortion.Inaddition,populationgrowth,

2

pollution,poverty,andracialovertonestendtocomplicateandnotto

simplifytheproblem.1

OfcoursetheCourt’sduty,asJusticeBlackmunnextstatedinsomanywords,isnot

toletpersonalconvictions,sentiments,orlifeexperiencesinformtheirviewsonthe

issue.2Instead,theirjobasajudicialbody,istostepbackandtakeanobjective

approach‐toexaminetheNation’scurrentsentimentsasawhole,thesentiments

andpracticesofourforefathersandmodernmedicalknowledge,inordertobalance

differingviews,protectingforwhomwhattheycanconsistentlywithour

Constitutionanditshistory.

**{{{{ TheCourtbeganbyaddressingtheDistrictCourt’srulingonstandingissues.

SeveralotherplaintiffshadattemptedtointerveneinRoe.TheTexasDistrictCourt

hadallowedalloftheplaintiffs(includingaphysicianandachildlessmarriedcouple

whowerenotpregnantatthetime)tocontinueinthelitigation.ButtheSupreme

Courtdecidedthateveryone,exceptforRoe,didnothavestandingtoproceed.Roe

wasdifferent.TheCourtaddressedTexas’sargumentthattherewasnoactualcase

orcontroversywithRoebecauseshewaspregnantatthetimethelitigationbegan,

butwasnotnowpregnant.TheCourtstatedthatRoe’ssituationfellunderthewell‐

recognizedexceptiontomootness:“capableofrepetition,yetevadingreview.”3The

Courtpointedoutthathumangestationistooshorttosurvivethetimeframeofthe

1Roev.Wade,410U.S.113,116(1973).

2Id.at116‐17.

3Id.at125.

3

usualappellateprocess.Iftheconclusionofapregnancywereallowedtorendera

casemoot,then“pregnancylitigationseldom[would]survivemuchbeyondthetrial

stage,andappellatereview[would]beeffectivelydenied.”4Pregnancythusmustbe

allowedtocomeunderthemootnessexception,andtheCourtproceededtothe

meritsofthecasebeforeit.

TheCourtbeganwithasurveyofthehistoryofabortionanditstreatmentin

ancientGreeceandRome,ourpredecessorsoflawinmanyways,aswellasin

EuropeandtheUnitedStates.TheCourtpointedoutthatabortionhadbeen

commonpracticeintheGreekandRomanempiresandthatGreekandRomanlaw

affordedlittleprotectiontotheunborn.5Howevertherewasoppositiontothese

practices,specificallythePythagoreansandHippocrates,theauthorofthefamous

HyppocraticOathinmedicine.

MovingontoearlycommonlawtheCourtnotedthattheconsensuswasthat

thetimeof“quickening”ofafetuswassignificant.6Beforequickening,abortionwas

apparentlynotconsideredhomicidebecausethefetuswasviewedas“partofthe

mother.”7ThiswasevensomewhatconsistentwithChristiantheologyatthetime,

whichpositedthatthepointof“animation”wassignificant,asomewhatsimilar

4Id.

5Id.at130.

6Id.at133

7Id.at134.

4

concept.8Althoughthepointofanimationoccurredearlierthan“quickening,”

accordingtoChristiantheology,fetusesdidnotbecomerecognizably“human”or

“infusedwithasoul”untilthepointofanimation.9(Interestingly,inChristian

theology,thepointofanimationwasatdifferenttimesformalesandforfemales–

malesapparentlywere“animate”at40days,whilefemalesdidnotbecomeanimate

until80days).10

Englishlawkeptthequickeningdistinctioninastatutepassedin1803which

madeitacapitalcrimetoabortaquickfetusbutprovidedlesserpenaltiesfor

abortionofafetusbeforethepointofquickening.Englishlawevolvedtoa1929law

makingitafelonytoperformanyabortionifitwasnotdoneforthepurposeof

savingthelifeofthemother.Butthemostrecentstatutepassedin1967isquitea

bitmoreliberalthanthe1929statute,allowingphysicianstoabortif(a)the

continuanceofthepregnancywouldinvolverisktothelife,physicalormental

healthofthewomanorotherchildreninherfamily,thatisgreaterthantheriskto

theirlivesorphysicalormentalhealthwerethepregnancyterminated,or(b)if

thereisalargeriskthatthechildwillsufferfromphysicalormentalabnormalitiesif

born.11}}}}}}*probablytakethiswholepartoutout

8Id.

9Id.at133‐34.

10Id.at134.

11Id.at137.

5

TheCourtdescribedhowAmericanstatesdidnotpassabortionstatutes

rightaway.Somestateswhoadoptedearlylegislationkeptthequickening

distinction.AftertheCivilWarmanymorestatesadoptedlegislationandkeptthe

quickeningdistinction.However,bythe19thcenturymoststatelawshadgottenrid

ofquickeningandwereimposingmuchharsherpenaltiesonallabortionsunless

theyweredonetopreservethelifeofthemother.Ithasonlybeenrecentlythat

somestateshavebeguntoliberalizetheirabortionstatutesmoderately.TheCourt

inRoeconcludedthatincomparingmodernstatuteswithcommonlawatthetimeof

theformationofthecountryandtheadoptionoftheConstitution,itisclearthata

woman“enjoyedasubstantiallybroaderrighttoterminateapregnancy”two

hundredyearsagothanshedoestoday.12

TheCourtnextmovedtodescribingthesentimentsofsomedifferentmodern

groups.TheybeganbypointingoutthattheAmericanMedicalAssociationinthe

1800’shadfollowedthemajoritytrendandhadadoptedafairlysevere“anti‐

abortion”view.However,theyhaverecentlymovedtowardamoreliberal

approachandhavepromulgatedsomegeneralliberalprinciplesthatincludethings

like“bestinterestsofthepatient,”“soundclinicaljudgment,”“informedpatient

consent.”TheAmericanPublicHealthAssociationstatedinthe1970’sthat“rapid

andsimpleabortionreferralmustbemadereadilyavailablethroughstateandlocal

publichealthdepartments,medicalsocieties,orothernon‐profitorganizations.”13

12Id.at140.

13Id.at144‐45.

6

FinallytheAmericanBarAssociationapprovedtheUniformAbortionActin1972,

whichrecommendedthatstatesadoptlawsthatallowforabortionstobeperformed

bylicensedphysiciansinclinicorhospitalsettingswithinthefirsttwentyweeksof

thepregnancy,andthatallowforabortionsaftertwentyweeksif:thereisariskto

thephysicalormentalhealthofthemother,thechildcouldbebornwithdisabilities,

orthepregnancywastheresultofrapeorincest.14

Finally,theRoeCourtproceededtodiscussandapplymodernconstitutional

lawinanefforttofindalegalstandardthatcouldpossiblyreconcilethecurrent

sentimentsofdifferentgroupsofAmericanswhileatthesametimerespecting

Constitutionalhistoryandprotectingtheparties’respectiverights.Theybeganby

addressingtheargumentpresentedbyTexasandcertainamiciofthestate–“that

thefetusisa‘person’withinthelanguageandmeaningoftheFourteenth

Amendment.”15Insupportofthisassertion,TexaswentintowhattheCourt

describedas“thewell‐knownfactsoffetaldevelopment.”16TheCourt

acknowledgedthatwerethisargumenttobeaccepted–thatafetuswasaperson–

thenthefetuswouldenjoyarighttolifeundertheFourteenthAmendmentjustas

allotherAmericansdo.TheSupremeCourtthoroughlyrejectedthisargument.17

14Id.at146.

15Id.at156

16Id.

17Id.at157‐58.

7

Firstofall,theCourtpointedout,theConstitutiondoesnotdefinetheword

“person.”Therefore,onehastolooktothecontextinwhichthewordisusedinthe

Constitution,historicalcontextandpriorcaselaw.Theword“person”isusedin

severalplacesinourConstitution.However,theCourtpointsout,innoneofthese

placesdoesthecontextindicatethatthewordismeanttoapplyprenatally.18The

word“person”isusedtodefinecitizens,itisusedintheprovisionsforqualifications

ofRepresentativesandSenators,intheprovisiondescribingthequalificationsofthe

President,etc.19Noneoftheseusesindicatethatthetermismeanttoincludethose

notborn.Thenwhenonelooksathistoricaltreatmentofabortion–thefactthat

abortionhasnotconsistentlybeenpunishedasmurder,afelony,orsometimesnot

evenpunishedatall‐leadstotheconclusionthatatthatthetimetheFourteenth

Amendmentwasadopted,thewordpersonwasnotmeanttoincludetheunborn.

Further,theunbornhavenothistoricallybeenprovidedwithanyothertypesof

rightsinthiscountry.Forexample,traditionaltortlawdoesnotallowrecoveryfor

prenatalinjuries,evenwhenthechildisbornalive.Also,unbornchildrenhavebeen

treatedasacquiringsomeinterestinpropertyinheritance,butthe“perfectionof

interestsinvolved…hasgenerallybeencontingentuponlivebirth.”20Lastly,when

18Id.at157.

19Id.

20Id.at161‐62.

8

onelookstocaselaw,absolutely“nocasecouldbecitedthatholdsthatafetusisa

personwithinthemeaningoftheFourteenthAmendment.”21

FinallytheSupremeCourtmovedontodiscussingthecaselawthatdoes

exist,andwhatthatcaselawhasfoundimplicitintheConstitutionthatcouldgrant

certainrightstowomeninthearenaofabortionandreproductivechoice.Bythis

point,theCourtpointedout,alonglineofcaseshadfoundthatcertainrightsof

privacy,or“zonesofprivacy”existundertheConstitution.22TheCourt,overthelast

hundredormoreyears,hadfoundtheseprivacyrightstoberootedintheconcepts

andlanguageofvariousAmendments.Particularlyhere,theCourtchosetofocuson

theFourteenthAmendment’sconceptoflibertyanditsrestrictionsonstateaction,

asthesourceofarighttoprivacythat“isbroadenoughtoencompassawoman’s

decisionwhetherornottoterminateherpregnancy.”23However,theCourtrejected

Roe’sargumentthattherightofprivacyshouldextendtohertherighttoterminate

herpregnancyatwhatevertimeshechooses.TheCourtinsteadfoundthatthat

privacyrightexists,butitisnotabsolute.24

Instead,theCourtexplained,pastdecisionsshowedthatrightsofprivacy

werenotimpenetrablespheresintowhichstateregulationcouldnotreach.

AccordingtotheCourt,somestateregulationisappropriatewhenthestatehas

21Id.at158.

22Id.at152.

23Id.at153.

24Id.

9

properlyassertedstateinterests.Therighttoprivacy,however,hasbeenfoundto

befundamentalinnature.Thelimitationsimposedonfundamentalrightsmustnot

onlybejustifiedbyacompellingstateinterest,butthelimitationimposedmustbe

“narrowlydrawntoexpressonlythelegitimatestateinterestsatstake.”25TheCourt

statedthatitagreedwithTexasthatitsinterestinprotectinghealthandpotential

lifearelegitimateinterests,butonlywherethoseinterestsbecomesignificant

enoughtooutweighthepregnantwoman’sinterestinherprivacy,onlywherethey

becomecompelling,canthestateimposeanylimitationonherdecisionto

terminate.

TheCourtdecidedthatTexas’slegitimateinterestinthehealthofthemother

onlyoutweighsthewoman’srighttoprivacyaftertheendofthefirsttrimester.In

lightofmedicalknowledge,theriskofmortalityresultingfromanabortioniseven

lessthantheriskofmortalityfromnormalchildbirthbeforetheendofthefirst

trimester.Afterthefirsttrimester,theStatemayregulatetheabortionprocedurein

waysthatarenarrowlytailoredtoprotectthemother’shealth.Thestatemay

protectthemother’shealthbyrequiringcertainqualificationsofphysicians

conductingtheabortions,certainfacilityqualificationsandlicenses,etc.Howeverit

isclearthattheStateinterestinprotectingthemother’shealthcannotbeusedto

forbidanabortion,evenatthelaterstagesofpregnancy.Thestate’sinterestin

protectingthemother’shealthisneversocompelling:abortions,evenatlater

25Id.at155.

10

stagesofpregnancy,donotpresentsuchgreatrisksascanonlybealleviatedby

forbiddingabortions,onlyregulatingthem.

ThesecondlegitimateinterestthatTexasassertedthatwasrecognizedby

theCourtwasaninterestinpotentiallife.Thisinterest,theCourtstated,becomes

significantenough–becomescompelling–atthepointthatthefetusbecomes

viable.Viabilityisthepointatwhichthefetusispresumablycapableofliving

outsideofthemother.Wrappingthispointupquickly,theCourtsimplystatedthat

thereare“bothlogicalandbiologicaljustifications”forstateregulationprotecting

fetallifeafterviability,andthatafterthefetusisviable,thestatemaygosofarasto

forbidanabortion,exceptwherenecessarytopreservethelifeorhealthofthe

mother.

InconclusiontheSupremeCourtsaid,“[t]hisholding,wefeel,isconsistent

withtherelativeweightsoftherespectiveinterestsinvolved,withthelessonsand

examplesofmedicalandlegalhistory,withthelenityofthecommonlaw,andwith

thedemandsoftheprofoundproblemsofthepresentday.”26

ShortlyaftertheSupremeCourtdecidedRoe,theyissuedafairlyshort

opinioninthecaseofHarrisv.McRae.InHarristheCourtaddressedthequestionof

whetherMedicaid’srefusaltopubliclyfundcertainmedicallynecessaryabortions

violateswomen’sconstitutionalrightsastheywererecentlyestablished.27The

26Id.at165

27Harrisv.McRae,448U.S.297,300(1980).

11

Courtconcludedthatalthoughthegovernmentcannotplaceobstaclesinthepathof

thewomanattemptingtoexerciseherrighttochoosetohaveanabortionbefore

viability,choosingnottopubliclyfundtheseabortionswasnotanobstaclecreated

bythegovernment.Theobstacleherewasindigence.Indigencewasnot

governmentallycreatedorimposed,andthegovernment“neednotremovethose

[obstacles]notofitsowncreation.”28Thewomanisstillleftwiththesamechoices,

evenwhenthestatedecidestowithholdfundingforoneofthem.

In1989theCourtdecidedWebsterv.ReproductiveHealthServices.Thiscase

upheldseveralMissouristatutesthatplacedrestrictionsonabortionprocedures

suchasastatuterequiringviabilitytestingpriortoabortionandalsoonebanning

useofpublicfundsandfacilitiesforabortionservices.29Thecasewasnotvery

significantforitsultimateholding,however.Itwasmoresignificantforthedeep

splitthatitrevealedformingwithintheSupremeCourtregardingwhetherRoev.

Wadeshouldbeoverruled.30ItwasapparentinWebsterthatfourjusticesthought

thatRoeshouldnolongerbeallowedtostand.Thus,therewasanatmosphereof

anxietyandexpectationwhentheCourttookitsnextabortioncase:Planned

ParenthoodofSoutheasternPennsylvaniav.Casey.

B.PlannedParenthoodofSoutheasternPennsylvaniav.Casey:

28Id.at316.

29FeministJurisprudence:CasesandMaterials,4thEd.,Bowman,Rosenbury,

TuerkheimerandYuracko,439.

30Id.

12

TheCourtinCaseysurprisedmany.ItdidnotoverruleRoe.Ratheritupheld

Roe’s“essentialholding.”TheCaseycourtviewedRoe’sessentialholdingas

consistingofthreeparts.First,awomanhasarighttochoosetohaveanabortion

beforeviabilitywithoutundueinterferencefromthestate.Second,afterviability,

thestatehaspowertoprohibitabortionsorplacesubstantialobstaclesinthewayof

gettingthem.Andthird,theCourtfoundthatRoehadheldthatthestatehas

legitimateinterestsfromtheoutsetofthepregnancyinprotectingthehealthofthe

motherandthelifeofthefetus.TheCourtinCaseytookthislaststatementandbuilt

onitinordertomakeachangetotheRoeframework.

TheSupremeCourtstatedveryclearlyinCaseythatitwasrejectingthe

trimesterframeworkusedinRoebecauseitdid“notconsider[it]tobepartofthe

essentialholding…”Instead,theCourtdeterminedthattheStatecouldactonits

legitimateinterestsinprotectingthemother’shealthandthepotentiallifeofthe

fetusstartingfromtheoutsetofthepregnancy.Thestatemayactaslongasthe

regulationsitcreatesare“reasonablyrelated”31toitsinterestsandaslongasthey

donotimposeanundueburdenonthewoman’sabilitytochoosetohavean

abortion.Thatis,thestateneednotwaitonitslegitimateintereststoreachthe

“compelling”pointbeforeitcanpasslegislationaimedatpromotingthoseinterests,

aslongasitisnotcreatingundueobstaclesthatinterferewiththewoman’srightto

chooseanabortionbeforeviability.Atalaterpoint,atviability,thestate’sinterest

31PlannedParenthoodofSoutheasternPennsylvaniav.Casey,505U.S.833,878

(1992).

13

inthelifeoftheunborn“hassufficientforce”sothatitcompletelytrumpsthe

woman’srighttoabort,butagain,thestateneednotwaituntilthentopass

legislationpromotingthatinterest.Anditalsoneednotwaituntiltheendofthe

firsttrimester,whentheriskstowomen’shealthfromanabortionprocedure

becomesatallsignificant(asRoenoted),topasslegislationpromotingthatinterest.

Ultimately,Caseyupheldaninformedconsentrequirement,aparentalconsent

requirementwithanalternativeforjudicialbypass,andrecord‐keepingprovisions,

butstruckdownasan“undueburden”aspousalnotificationrequirementanda

reportingrequirement.32

Althoughwomen’srighttoabortioncameoutofCaseyintact,thedecision

openedthedoorforstatestopassmany,manymorestatutesconcerningabortion.

Thestatenolongerhadtowaituntilitsinterestbecame“compelling”toact.Casey

dictatedthatthestatehadlegitimateinterestsinbothmaternalhealthandpre‐natal

lifethatbeganvirtuallyatconception.Therefore,thestatecouldpassallkindsof

legislationbasedoneitheritsinterestinpre‐natallifeoritsinterestinmaternal

healththatappliedtobothearlyandlatestagesofpregnancy.Additionally,Casey

hadnotreinforcedRoe’srequirementthatthestateregulationbe“narrowlydrawn

toexpressonlythelegitimatestateinterestsatstake.”33Insteadthereislanguagein

32FeministJurisprudence:CasesandMaterials,4thEd.,Bowman,Rosenbury,

TuerkheimerandYuracko,440.

33Roe,410U.S.at155.

14

Caseysuchas“reasonablyrelated,”and“designedtofoster.”34Additionallythe

Court’sdefinitionof“undueburden”wasambiguous,likemostconstitutional

standardsare,andwasonethatwouldobviouslyhavetobefleshedoutthrough

litigation,(an“undueburden”isaregulationthat“hasthepurposeoreffectof

placingasubstantialobstacleinthepathofawomanseekinganabortionof

nonviablefetus”).35“[T]heCaseyopinionvirtuallyinvitedthestatestotestwhether

oneafteranotherabortion‐restrictivelawconstitutedan‘undueburden.’”36

ItisimportanttonotethattheCaseyCourtmajoritydidnotevenfeelthe

needtoreaddresstheRoeCourt’sholdingthatafetusisnotapersonwithinthe

meaningoftheFourteenthAmendment.However,JusticeStevensinhispartial

concurrence,didaddresstheissue.Hestartedbypointingoutthatareaffirmation

ofRoe’sholdingonfetalpersonhoodwas“implicitintheCourt’sanalysis”here.37He

wentontopointoutthat,inRoe,“therewasnodissent”fromthemajority’s

conclusionthattheunbornarenotpersonsandthat“anabortionisnot‘the

terminationoflifeentitledtoFourteenthAmendmentprotection.’”38Additionally,

Stevensstatedthat,

34Casey,505U.S.at878.

35Id.at877.

36FeministJurisprudence:CasesandMaterials,4thEd.,Bowman,Rosenbury,

TuerkheimerandYuracko,447.

37Casey,505U.S.at912(Stevens’partialconcurrence).

38Id.at913(Stevens’partialconcurrence)(quotingRoe,410U.S.at159).

15

[I]ndeed,noMemberoftheCourthaseverquestionedthisfundamental

proposition.Thus,asamatteroffederalconstitutionallaw,adeveloping

organismthatisnotyeta“person”doesnothavewhatissometimes

describedasa“righttolife.”Thishasbeenand,bytheCourt’sholdingtoday,

remainsafundamentalpremiseofourconstitutionallawgoverning

reproductiveautonomy.39

II.FETALPERSONHOODBILLTHWARTEDWHENFOUNDUNCONSTITUTIONALUNDERROEANDCASEY

Veryrecently,agroupcalledPersonhoodOklahomafiledaballotinitiative

withtheSecretaryoftheStateseekingtoamendtheOklahomaConstitution.

PersonhoodOklahomaisastateaffiliateofalargernationalgroupcalled

PersonhoodUSA.40ThisgrouphasapparentlytargetedOklahomaasafavorable

foruminwhichtotrytopushitsagenda.Theballotinitiativesubmittedby

PersonhoodOklahomahasbeenreferredtoas“TheFetalPersonhoodBill.”Thebill

wasshortlychallengedinalawsuitfiledonMarch29thofthisyear,claimingthatthe

billwasfaciallyunconstitutional.TheOklahomaSupremeCourtreviewedthebill

pursuanttoacodeprovisionadoptedbytheOklahomaLegislaturein2009.The

codeprovisionrequiresa“pre‐submissiondetermination”oftheconstitutionalityof

39Id.at913‐14.

40Morice‐Brubaker,Sarah.OklahomaSupremeCourtUnanimouslyBlocks

PersonhoodBallotInitiative,1.

16

aproposedpetitionthatisfaciallyunconstitutional,sothatafutileandcostly

electionmaybeavoided.41

ThegroupsfilingthelawsuitsubmittedtheirProtestants’Brieftothe

SupremeCourtinconnectionwiththefiling.Thesegroupsincluded:theCenterFor

ReproductiveRightsandtheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionFoundation,both

locatedinNewYorkCity,theACLUofOklahomaFoundation,theHardwickLaw

OfficefromTulsa,andattorneysfromAndrewDavisAttorneysandCounselorsat

Law.TheirBriefexplainedthattheproposedbillsoughttoamendtheOklahoma

Constitutionintwoways.Thefirstthingitsoughttodowastodefine“person”to

includefertilizedeggs,andadditionallyitsoughttospecificallyconferdueprocess

rightsonevery“person”asithadjustdefinedtheterm.42Second,thebillsoughtto

expandthebasisofequalprotectiontoincludeage,placeofresidence,andmedical

condition–apparentlyinanefforttomakesurethatfertilizedeggsalsoreceived

equalprotectionofOklahoma’slawsbynotallowingdiscriminationagainstthemon

accountoftheirage(zero?),theirresidence(themother’swomb?)andtheirmedical

condition(developing?dependent?).InitspreliminarystatementtheBrief

highlightedthealarmingandfar‐reachingeffectsthatthisFetalPersonhoodBill

wouldhaveonwomen’sdecisionsconcerningprocreation.

TheFetalPersonhoodBill,asitwasproposed,wouldcompletelyban

abortion,itwouldcompletelybancommoncontraceptivemethodssuchas

41InreInitiativePetitionNo.395,StateQuestionNo.761,2012OK42(2012).

42Protestant’sBrief,InreInitiativePetitionNo.395,StateQuestionNo.761,2.

17

intrauterinedevicesandhormonalbirthcontrol,anditwouldrestrictdoctors’

abilitiestoprovidecareforwomenwithlife‐threateningconditionsandtoprovide

fertilitytreatmentstocouplestryingtohavechildren.Theproblemswiththis

legislationwereobvious.Inasuccinctandpowerfulargumentsection,the

ProtestantscitedtofortyyearsofSupremeCourtprecedentarticulatingand

protectingthelibertiesgrantedtocitizensbytheDueProcessClause,including,the

righttousecontraceptives,toengageinintimateconductwithconsentingadults,

andtohaveanabortion.43TheFetalPersonhoodBillinotherwords,would“bein

directandinescapableconflictwiththefederalConstitution.”RoeandCasey’s

holdingsmostclearlyprohibitthebill.ThoseopinionsestablishthattheDue

ProcessClauseprotectsarighttoprivacy,whichencompassesawoman’schoice

whethertoabortapregnancypre‐viability.Additionally,theRoeopinionexplicitly

considersandrejectstheconceptofafetusasaperson,andJusticeStevensinCasey

statedthatthemajorityinthatcasetoo,wasimplicitlyaffirmingthataspectofthe

Roeopinion.

TheOklahomaSupremeCourtdidnottakelongtoissueanorderinthe

matter.AboutthirtydaysafterthelawsuitwasfiledtheCourtstateditsfindings.

Thefindingsmainlyincludedthatthe“UnitedStatesSupremeCourthasspokenon

theissue”andthatthemeasureis“clearlyunconstitutional”pursuanttoCasey.44

Onehastowonderwhatthisgroupwasthinkinginattemptingtopassaballot

initiativeliketheFetalPersonhoodBill.SurelyOklahomansknowthatcurrent

43Id.at4.44InreInitiativePetitionNo.395,StateQuestionNo.761,2012OK42(2012).

18

SupremeCourtcaselawwouldabsolutelyprohibitsuchanamendment.Indeedit

seemsthatPersonhoodOklahomawasaware.Theballotinitiativeissuspectedto

bepartofthegroup’sbiggerplan–to“fasttrack”theissuetotheSupremeCourtof

theUnitedStates.Thegroup,accordingtoaPersonhoodUSApressrelease,intends

toappealthedecisiontotheU.S.SupremeCourt,andoncethere,hopestoobtaina

rulingoverturningthenowalmostforty‐year‐oldRoev.Wadedecision.45

Thisseemsfancifultosaytheleast.Manypro‐lifeattorneysandsupporters

areevenupsetaboutit,warningthattheplanmaybackfireand“theSupremeCourt

mayadoptanevenmorepro‐choiceposture.”46

ItisnotsolelyRoe’sandCasey’sarticulationoffundamentalprivacyrights

(andtheirexplicitholdingsthatafetusisnotaperson)thatclearlystandintheway

offetalpersonhoodbeingadoptedbytheSupremeCourt.Evenolderandmore

establishedcasesdescribingandaffirmingprivacyrightscannotbereconciledwith

fetalpersonhood,suchasGriswoldv.Connecticut.InGriswoldtheSupremeCourt

foundarightofprivacyimplicitinthe“penumbras”oftheBillofRights(or

alternatively,intheopinionoftheconcurrence,intheNinthAmendmentortheDue

ProcessClause)thatallowedmarriedcouplestochoosetousecontraceptives.47

Thisrightisinconsistentwithafetalpersonhoodframeworkbecauseuseofany

45Morice‐Brubaker,Sarah.OklahomaSupremeCourtUnanimouslyBlocks

PersonhoodBallotInitiative,3.

46Id.

47Cushman,Claire.SupremeCourtDecisionsandWomen’sRights,2ndEd.,192.

19

contraceptivethatpreventsafertilizedeggfromimplantingintheuteruswould

constitutedestructionofa“person,”andpresumablycouldbeprosecutedas

murder.Anargumentmightevenbemadethattherightsdescribedina1942case

thatoriginatedinOklahoma,Skinnerv.Oklahoma,inwhichtheSupremeCourt

decidedthat“oneofthebasiccivilrightsofman,”istherighttohavechildren,are

inconsistentwithideaoffetalpersonhood.48Thatcasedeclaredtheforced

vasectomyofacriminalunconstitutionalonthegroundsthathehadabasicand

fundamentalrighttohavechildren.Arguablyimplicitinthatholdingistheholding

thataman‐aperson‐hasarighttochoosewhetherornotheorshewantstohave

children.Justlikeforcedsterilizationtakesachoiceabouthavingchildrenaway,

beingraped,butnotbeingallowedtoabortthepregnancy,(aswouldbethecaseif

theCourtweretoadoptafetalpersonhoodregime),wouldalsotakethechoiceto

havechildrenaway.

TheCourt’sdecisionsestablishingfundamentalprivacyrightsforwomen

(andmen)tomakechoicesaboutreproductionstandasastrongshieldagainstany

adoptionofafetalpersonhoodframework.Toadoptsuchaframeworkwould

completelyunderminetheserights.Itwouldnotonlycompletelytakeawaythe

righttochooseanabortionandtherighttousemostcontraception,butitwould

alsounderminethegeneralrighttochoosewhetherornottohavechildrenthathas

beenarticulatedbytheSupremeCourtinseveralcases.

48Id.at189.

20

III.OTHERPROTECTIONWEMAYHAVEAGAINSTFETALPERSONHOOD,OR,ALTERNATIVEY,TOTHERIGHTTOCHOOSEANABORTION

ItseemshighlyunlikelythattheSupremeCourtwouldthrowawaysucha

stronglineofprecedentestablishingandreaffirmingoverandoveragaincertain

fundamentallibertyandprivacyrightsimplicitintheConstitution.However,inthe

eventthataSupremeCourtdecisioneverissuesthatoverturnsRoe,Casey,andother

fundamentalprivacyrightcases,andholdsthatawoman’srighttochoosean

abortionpre‐viability(orevenherrighttofreelyusecontraception)isnotapartof

anyprivacyrightimplicitintheConstitution(oreventhattherearenoprivacy

rightsimplicitintheConstitution),wouldwehaveotherlegalargumentstomake

thatcouldpossiblypreventtheadoptionofafetalpersonhoodframework,orinthe

alternative,atleastprotecttherighttochooseanabortion?

OnealternativeargumenthasbeenpresentedbyJudithJarvisThomson,

EllenWillis,SylviaLaw,andothers.49Theyusethetheoryofself‐defensetojustify

abortion.Itisaninterestingargument,howevertherearelimitstothelogicthatare

quicktocometothesurface.Theselimitspreventtheself‐defensetheoryfrom

providingtheextentofprotectionthatRoeandCasey’sprivacyrightshaveprovided.

Additionally,theself‐defensetheorymayprotectawoman’srighttohavean

abortioninsomeimportantinstances,butitisnotinconsistentwithafetal

personhoodframework–itactuallyreinforcestheideaofafetusasaperson.

Thereforeitwouldlikelynotactasabarriertotheadoptionofsuchaframework.

49FeministJurisprudence:CasesandMaterials,4thEd.,Bowman,Rosenbury,

TuerkheimerandYuracko,476,479.

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Mostclearly,theself‐defensetheorywouldallowawomanwhoselifewas

beingthreatenedbyherfetustohaveanabortion.Shecoulddothisbyrelyingon

simpleprinciplesofself‐defense,whichwouldallowhertousedeadlyforcewhen

shewasfacedwithadeadlythreat.50Thistheorywouldatleastprovideadefense

toanabortionthatwasnecessaryinordertosavethewoman’slife.Butwouldit

allowanabortionforanythingless?Itcanbearguedthatno,itdoesnot.Itisa

logicalargumentthatunlessthewomanisobjectivelyfearfulthatshefacesdeathor

greatbodilyharm,thatthetraditionallawofself‐defensecannothelpher.

EileenL.McDonaghhowever,elaboratesonthetheoryofself‐defenseina

waythatmayexpanditsprotection.Shearguesthatthefetus’implantationcouldbe

analogizedtorapeinthatitisaforcedbodilyintrusion.51Again,thefetus“is

analogizedtoanassailant”andtherighttoabortioncanbedefended“underthe

liberaltheorytodefendoneselfagainstnonconsensualinvasion.52Thiswouldseem

torequiredistancingtheconsent(assumingtherewasany)toasexualactfromthe

consenttotheactualimplantationoftheembryo.Somewouldnodoubtarguethat

consenttosexisconsenttopregnancy–thatonefollowstheother.Howeverthatis

notalwaystrue.Sexdoesnotalwaysresultinpregnancy.Thusawomanwho

consentstosexdoesnotexpecttoorconsenttobecomepregnanteverytime.

Further,ifweareviewingthefetusasaperson,theimplantationbecomesan

50Id.at477.

51Id.at480.

52Id.

22

entirelyseparateactfromsex,byanentirelyseparateperson.Surelyconsentgiven

tooneintrusionbyonepersoncannotcarryoverandgiveconsenttoanintrusion

byanentirelydifferentperson.

Theself‐defensetheory,despiteitsinterestinganalogies,doesnotseemtobe

averystrongargumenttoprotectawoman’sdecisioninallbutthemostdire

circumstances–whenthewoman’slifeisthreatened.Inothercircumstancesitis

vulnerabletoargumentsconsistentwiththetraditionalrulesofself‐defenseand

consent.Additionally,itclearlyreinforcestheideaofafetusasaperson.Byusing

anareaoflawthattraditionallyinvolvestwointeractingpeople–anattackeranda

victim–thefetusisputintoaroletraditionallyfilledbyalivingperson.Becausethe

theoryplacesthefetusinthisrole,itreinforcestheideaoffetalpersonhood.This

theorythereforedoesnotseemlikeanespeciallydesirablealternativeargumentfor

pro‐choiceadvocatesopposedtofetalpersonhood.Itactuallymountsnoreal

barriertotheadoptionofafetalpersonhoodregime,itmerelygivesajustification

forabortionincertainlimitedcircumstancesinspiteofthatregime.

Asecondtheorythathasbeensuggestedasanalternativelegalargumentfor

women’srighttochooseanabortionhasbeenbasedonequalprotection.Kathleen

M.SullivanandSusanR.Estrichputforthaconvincingargumentthatrestrictive

abortionlawsareclassificationsbasedonsexandthattheycannotstandabsenta

compellingjustification.53Theypositthata“classificationbasedonpregnancyis,by

53Id.at481‐82.

23

biologicaldefinition,aclassificationbasedongender.”54Additionallytheypointed

outthatabortionrestrictionsarearesultandareinforcementofgender

stereotypingandoldnotionsaboutwomen’srolesinsociety.Thesestereotypes,

theyargue,arepreciselythosewhichhave“overandoveragainbeenthefocusof

[the]Court’smodernequalprotectioncases.”55

Becausetheyarguethatrestrictiveabortionlawsareclassificationsbasedon

sex,thenthoselawsmustwithstandthemostexactingscrutiny–theycanonlybe

upheldiftheyaresupportedbyan“exceedinglypersuasivejustification.”56

However,couldtherebeprofferedjustificationsbypro‐lifegroupsthatmeetthis

requirement?ItwouldseemthatinlightoftheCourt’srecognitionand

reaffirmanceofstates’legitimateinterestsinpotentiallifeandmaternalhealththat

thosejustificationsmaybeviewedasmeetingthestandardof“exceedingly

persuasive.”But,itisimportantthatintheCourt’sopinionsithasexplainedthat

theseinterestsmaynotbecomecompellinguntilcertainpointsinapregnancy.

InRoetheCourtclearlystatedthatthestate’sinterestinpotentiallifedidnot

becomecompellingenoughtojustifyaprohibitiononthewoman’srighttochoose

anabortionuntilthepointofviability.Caseydidnotexplicitlyreiteratethisholding,

butitkeptthepointatwhichthestatecouldprohibitanabortionatviability,which

54Id.at482.

55Id.at483.

56Id.at482(quotingMississippiUniversityforWomenv.Hogan,458U.S.718,724

(1982)).

24

seemstoimplythattheCourtstillagreedthatastate’sinterestwasnotcompelling

enough,upuntilthattime,tojustifysuchanintrusion.ToputitinCasey’slanguage,

theCourtbelievedthataprohibitiononabortionupuntilthetimeofviabilitywas

anundueburden.Theconclusionthatitwas“undue”beforeviability,but“due”

after,impliesthatthestate’sinterestbecamemoreimportantatthatpoint,

importantenoughthatitseemingly“outweighed”thewoman’srighttochoose.

Itseemsthattheequalprotectiontheorymaybeagoodalternativetothe

fundamentalprivacyrighttheoryintheabsenceofafetalpersonhoodbill.It

appearsthattheargumentthatpregnancystatutesclassifyonthebasisofsexis

logicalandstrong,justifyingtheapplicationofstrictscrutiny.Andalthoughthere

maysometimesbecompellingjustificationsandstatutesthatarenarrowlytailored

enoughtothosejustificationsforthestatutestobeupheld,itseemsthatthiswould

onlybethecaseincircumstanceswherefundamentalprivacytheoryhasalso

allowedrestrictivelegislation.Infact,“feministlegalscholarshavebeenurgingthe

adoptionofasexequalityapproachtoreproductiverightsforsometime.”57

Howeverthistheorydoesnotnecessarilyprotectagainsttheadoptionof

fetalpersonhood.Yes,womenwouldhaveargumentsthattheycannotbe

discriminatedagainst,(forcedtocarrybabiestoterm),butitmaybedifficultto

arguethattheirentitlementtoequalprotectionunderthelawsactuallyprevents

fetusesfrombeingdeemed“persons.”And,iffetalpersonhoodwereadopted,it

wouldthrowawrenchinequalprotectiontheoryandreducethescopeofits

57Id.at485.

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protectionforthedecisiontohaveanabortion.Iffetalpersonhoodisadoptedand

fetusesstarttobeconsidered“persons”undertheConstitution,theCourtmaybe

forcedtofindthatsavingthelifeofafetus(preorpostviability)isalwaysa

compellingjustification.Thusaslongaslegislationwasnarrowlytailoredto

protectingprenatallife,theCourtwouldbeforcedtoupholdthosestatutes.

Itseemsthatafterareviewofthesealternativetheories,thatthe

fundamentalrighttoprivacy–theCourt’sarticulationthatawoman(andaman)

havecertainwell‐establishedrightstoreproductivechoices–isthestrongest

defensetoanattempttopassafetalpersonhoodbill.Passingsuchabillwould,very

clearly,infringeontheserights.Othertheoriesmaybeavailablethatcouldprovide

abarriertotheadoptionofafetalpersonhoodbill,orinthealternative,could

provideprotectionofwomen’srightstochooseanabortioneveninthefaceofa

fetalpersonhoodbill.Moreexplorationandcreativeapplicationsofexistinglawto

thearenaofreproductionwouldsurelygiverisetoseveralotherconvincing

arguments.

IV.FETALPERSONHOOD’STHREATTOFEMINISTGOALSFROMADOMINANCETHEORYPERSPECTIVE

‐ McKinnonarguesthatmostoftoday’sinequalityresultsfromtreatingdifferencesdifferently58

‐ Wedevaluewomen’straitsthataredifferentfrommen’s‐ Thisleadstoasocietywheremenaredominantandcontrolling–anutterly

patriarchalsociety‐ Menexerttheirdominanceoverwomeninamultitudeofways,butoneis

sexually‐ Reproductivechoiceshavegivenwomenmoreofanopportunityto

counteractthisexertionofdominance;theycanfreethemselvesofsomeof

58Id.at130.

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theresultsofsexualdominance(pregnancyandchildbearing)whichhaveonlytendedtoexacerbatemaledominationandcontrolbycreatingdependence

‐ Fetalpersonhoodwouldseverelylimitreproductivechoiceandundoubtedlyitwouldresultinmorewomenbeingforcedtocontinueinunwantedpregnancies

‐ Moreunwantedpregnancyleadstomoredependencebywomenonmen‐ Thiscounteractsthegoalsofdominancefeminism:topromotechangesin

societythatgivewomenpowerandlessentheirdependenceonanddominancebymen