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Tkst in iony of SGT. E-5 I;I-i,chael A. Bex"nhardt, RA 1.1 8l6 1126, 1st J3rj.[{ccle, AIT, Headquarters Detachment, Committee C;rwu.p J. F o r t Dix, New J e r s e y , taken at t t h e 0ff j .ce of The I n s p e c t o r Getie?%il, Headquarters , I)ep~j?i;ment of t h e Army, a t 1.225 t o 1.1150 hour:; on 8 May 1969, by COL IrJilliam V . Wilson, I G .

For your informat ion , t i i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n conccrn:: t h e ' a l l e g ~ f i d e s t r u c t i o n o f a v l . l l age l:n South VJetncim n ick - named P i n l c v i l l c " wh1.ch was appi~ox-imately f i v e o r s i x mi l e s n o r t h of Qumg Ncai c i t y a t approximate coord ina te s 728795. The i n c i d e n t a l l e g e d l y occurred i n March 1968 d u r i n g t h e t:'Lnie Company C , 1/20 I n f a n t r y , Task Foj?ce Bark.er conciuct~ed sea rch and des t roy" operaticins on t h e Ba tanem Penlmnula. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n iis o f f i c j . a l and ,is be ing made a t t h e d . i rec t ion o f t h e c h r e f of S t a f f of t h e Army. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s privi.legecl i n the sense t h a t t h e r e p o r t wj.11 ,be made t o t h e Chief of S h f f . The subs tance t h e r e o f s h o u l d not be discussecl ~ ~ i t l i o t h c r s , It w i l l c a r r y a TOIWEDENTIAL c la :~ .s . i f ica t ion . The purpose of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s t o determ-ine t h e f a c t s r e l a t i v e t o t h e ma t t e r s i n qu.estlon.

appear ing a s a vi i tness , and I have a s e r i e s of q u e s t i o n s I want t o a s k you. Would you rj.se and r a i s e your r i g h t hand, p l e a s e .

(The wi tness was sworn. 1

Q. I 1

11

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You are n o t . s u s p e c t 1.n t h i s case . !Lou a r e .

Please s t a t e your f u i l name,: g rade and s e r i a l . number?

RA 11 816 1126. A. My name i s Michael A. Bernhardt , SGT E-5,

Q. Organiza t ion , s t a t i o n and p r e s e n t d u t y assignment? A. 1st Brigade, A I T , Headquarters Detachment,

Committee Group, F o r t Dix, New J e r s e y .

--Q. . What was your .du ty assignment i n Mal;ch ' 6 8 a t the.time Task Force Barker conducted sea rch and d e s t r o y o p e r a t i o n s ?

A. I was an automatic r i f leroan i'n a & f l e squad .

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'l'estimony of SGT' E-5 I,Hehuel A. Bernhardt" RA 11 816 1126, 1st Brjg;cc1e, 111'1', Heudquarters De'cacbrnent, Committee Gr>oup, Fort Dix, Ne\'l Jersey, taken at the Offlee of The Inspector Gellenll, lIeadqunrterr;, D(~paj"\;ment of the Army, at 12~25 to 1)150 hourf; on 8 I·lay 1969, by COL William V. Wilson, IG.

Q. For your' information, this investie:at:!,on concertw the 'alleged destruct:lon of a village In South Vietnam rd.ck­named "Plnkville" wh:l,ch was approx:tmately n.ve or six miles north of Quong Ngai city at approximate coordinates 728'195. The incident a11cge(l1y occurred in Harcb 1968 during the t:lme Compnny C, 1/20 Infantry, Task Force Barker conducteel "se<1rch and destroy" opernt:i.ons on the Batangan Peninsula. '1'11e investlgatj.on is official and .is being made at the a.irection of the Chief or Staff of the Army. 'J.'be investigation is privileged in the sense that the report wj.ll, be maele to the Chief of Staff. The substance there or should not be discussed with othcrs. It \·lilrctirry-a-CONIi':tl)EN'J.'IAJJ c1as.s_ification. The pUl'pose of the investigation is to determine the facts relative to the matters in question.

You arc not' suspect 1n this case. 1eJu are. appearing as a w1tness, and I have a series of questions I want to ask you. Would you ri.se and rais? YOU1' right hand, please.

number? A.

RA 11 816

Q. A.

Committee

(The witncss was sworn.r

Please state your fuil name~ grad~ and serial

My name is Michael A. Bernhardt, SGT E-5, 1126.

Organization, station and present duty assignment?' 1st Brigade, Arr, Headquarters Detachment, Group, Fort Dix, New Jersey.

--Q. l<Jhat was your ·duty assignment in March '68 at the'time Task Force Barker conducted search and destroy operations? ' ,

A. I was an automatic rifleman in a rifle squad.

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That v a s i n t h e ' - - I am n o t c e r t a i n . Q. l~Jhich p3Mtoon was tha. t? A. I f o r g o t .

I changed p l a t o o n s s e v e r a l tiities. I do b e l i e v e i t was number - - t h e number i s n o t i m p o r t a n t . The p l a t o o n wc:s - -

! I d o n ' t remember.

Q. Do you rcmernber your squcd l e a d e r ? A. Yes, I remember my squad l eadc r , , a l though 7: had

s e v e r a l squad I.ead.ers, t o o . You s e e , f t i's d ' i f f icu3. t -- a t the t3.nieJ you know, things, wel l , we had g o t t e n our company down t o ahout 68 3.n nu.mtcr i n t h e f i r s t two o r t h r e e months and :~t v!as d i f f i c u l t t o keep t+ack of thl.ngs. My squad l e n d e r a t t h e time, 3: b e l i e v e was -;--

Q. ( I n t e r p o s i n g ) Do you. remember yo& ' p l a toon l e a d e r ?

A. Yes, I remember hiin and I know his .name, but; f o r some r e a s o n o r a n o t h e r , r l g h t now I c a n ' t ch5.nk. of a t h i n g .

I

.. Q. Well, as we go on, maybe S L will come hack t o

i Y O U . :.,, name. I

:"A. A l l rlgh'c . Brooks was t h e p I a t o o n , l e a d e r ' s

Q. L i e u t e n a n t Brooks? ... A. Second L'ieutenant. At l e a s t 1 b e l i e v e a t t he

time i t was L ieu tenan t 13r3oIcs. S c h i e l was the squad leader's name, Skrgeant E-5, o r maybe Spec i ' a l i s t 4 , e i t h e r S p e c i a l i s t 4 o r Sergeant a t t h e t ime. He had g o t t e n advanced sooner o r l a t e r . I d o n ' t remember t h e time.

Please d e s c r i b e .in d e t a i l t h e e v e n t s which occurred i n I\larch 168 when C Company, 1/20th I n f a n t r y of Task Force Barker conducted s e a r c h and d e s t r o y opera- t i o n s i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e v i l l a g e nicknamed "Pinltvl.1le" n o r t h of Quang Ngai C i t y , and please i'ndt'cate any d a t e s

A. Mell, s i r , a s f a r as d a t e s and ' t imes go, I am going t o be a 1 i t t l . e b i t vague. I mean I am n o t sure about t h a . t . a t a l l . We were o u t maybc seven o r e i g h t days .

.was..conducted, t h i s Is what happened:, We l&nded j u s t o u t s i d e of a v i l l a g e c a l l e d Ily Lax ( '4 ) . , t o proceed t o My La i ( L I ) , ( 5 ) , ( 6 ) . t o Pinkvl:ll.e. We

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Q.

.~ and s p e c i f i c s , i f poss ib l e? '

. D a t e s d o n ' t mean a t h i n g . If t h a t was- when t h e o p e r a t i o n

We were supposed

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Q.. Which platoon \~as thc1.t? A. That Vlaf3 j.n the -- I am not certain. I fOl'[:;ot.

I changed platoons several t:ill1es. I do bel:ieve it \'las numbe1°' -- the number is not irnportEmt. 'l'he platoon \'WS -­

I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember your' squ3d leader? A. Yes, I remember my squad le[Jdc1' ,. although I had

several squad leaders. too. You see. it is difficult -­at the time. you lmOl'I. things. vlell, \,112 hOld gotten our COmpfll1y dowIl to Olbout 68 in number' in the first two or three months and it was difficult to keep t~ack of things. My squad lee>der at the time, I bel:levewas ·f·· .

i Q. (Interpos:i.ng) Do you remember your 'platoon

leadeJ.'? A. Yes, I remember him and I knoH Iii s na.me, but

for some reason or <mother. rj.ght now I c:an't think of a thing.

Q. -'WeTl,as we go on,

you··'··A. Allrlght. Brooks

maybe it will come back to

was the Platoonlle~der's name . j

Q. Lieutenant BJ:'ooks? L Second Lleutenant. At least I belleve at the

time it vJas Lieutenant Brooks. Schlel Vias the squad leader's name, Sergeant E-5, or maybe Speclallst Li, eitheJ:' Specialist Li or Sergeant at the time. lie had gotten advanced sooner OJ:' later. I don't remember the time,

Q. Please descJ:'l be j.n detai 1 the events which occurred in Illarch '68 when C Company. 1/20th Infantry of Tasle FOl°ce Barker conducted search and destroy opera­tions in the vicJ.nity of the village nicknamed IPinkvl1le" north of Quang Ngai City. and please fndlcate any dates

. and specifics, if posslble? L Well, sir, as far as dates an« times go. I am

going to be a little bit vague. I mean I am not sure about that.at all. We were out maybe seven or eight days. Dates don't mean a thing. If that was' when the operation .was.conducted, this is what happened: We l~nded just outside of a village called ~ly Lai (:4)' ,. we- were supposed to proceed to My Lai (Li), (5). (6)·to Pinkville, We

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landed : FYH . i t Ot.t($IHL ou t s - e of U 3 t My t a i Ul\bj , . . I - b e l i ~ v & t h e f i rs t lift encuuntered s m a l l arms and smaiJ. i n d i r e c t f i r e , t h a t is, .60 m i l l f m e t e r mortars. The f i rs t l e f t covered f o r t h e next l i f t coming i n . When we had g o t t e n everybody on the 1a.ndin.g zone, we s t a r t ed moylnE through t h e f i r s t v i l l a g e , which was ca l led .My L a i ( ) .

myself? 'Now, do you want t o knorr what happened t o me,

Q. No. A. Because my r e l a t i v e po8itj .on a s f a r a s t h e

company goes , this i s what I saw. a s we moved o u t , we moved out maybe a hundred y a r d s and the'company commander c a l l e d m e t o t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s a r e a because I wa.s c a r r y i n g a rope .

Q. Car ry ing what? A. A rope .

Q. Why? 4. I had t h e rope , s i r . We have t o c a r r y so much

.- .. o t h e r ~ v a r i o u s equl.pment t h a t we i s s u e ou t evenfx amongst

A t t h i s time,. J u s t

equipment and we i s s u e . i t out t o t h e men i n t h e squad, and I had rope e x p l o s i v e s . I c a r r i e d rope e x p l o s i v e s ,

the men Iiii€Be '-squa~d. I

Q.. Is t h e rope t h a t you r e f e r t o , d e t i n a t i n g cord? A. No, s i r , i t i s a rope . ..

'Q. J u s t 2 p l a i n rope? t . '

A. J u s t a p l a i n rope, r i g h t . . My cdmpany commander ca l led me t o t h e headquar t e r s group because I had the r o p e , and we found an a.mmo box. We wanted t o open t h e ammo box, move it and f i n d ou t what was i n i t , , and t o do t h i s we needed t h e rope becau,se sometimes t h e s e t h i n g s a r e boobytrapped. I g o t t h e r e and I p u t t h e rope on t h e box and I moved the box;. opened t h e box, found rncdi.ca.1 s u p p l i e s , a r a d i o , sma l l t r a n s i s t o r t ype , and s e v e r a l o,ther; items t h a t w,ould be c a r r i e d by VC.

A t t h i s t ime t h e rest of the company was moving forward. The headquar t e r s element was s t a y i n g more o r less behind t h e company. As we moved on we encountered a l o t of dead c i v i l i a n s , ap a FOR OFFICIAL ~fl%~L~viLtans --

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landed : Fq1~ ~Jttl~lAh ~~1a~'~~L Ibel1~ve the first lift encuuntered small arms and sma.!.J. indirect fire, that i8, .60 millimeter mortars. 'rhe first left covered for the next lift coming in. "lhen we had gotten everybody on the lancllng zone, we started moving thpough the first village, which \'laS called Ny Lai (4). ,

NOW, do you want to know what happened to me, myself?

Q, No. A. Because my relative position as far as the

company g@es,this is what I sal'l. At this time" just as we moved out, we moved out maybe a hundred yards and the'company commander called me to the headquarters area because I was carrying a rope. .

Q, Carrying what? A. A rope.

Q. Why? ./I.. I had the rope, sir. We have to carJ;'.y so much

equipment and vie issue, it out to the men in the squad, and I had rope explosives. I capried rope explosives,

._.oj;J1er various equipment that we issue out evenly amongst the men lh-t;hc·squad.

~ Is the rope that you refer to, detinatin~ cord? A. No, sir, it is a rope.

. Q. Just a plain rope? ! A. Just a plain rope, right. ' My company commander

called me to the headquarters gl'OUp because I had the rope, and we found an ammo box. We wanted to open the ammo box, move it and find out what was in it" and to do this we needed the rope because sometimes these things are booby trapped . I got ther'e and I put the rope on the box and I moved the box:. opened the box, .f.ound medi.ca,l supplies, a radiO, small transistor type, and' several other items that w,ould be carried by VC.

At this time the rest of the company was moving .. forward. The headquarters element was stay1'ng more or

less behind the company. As we moved on we encountered

a lot of defORDFficsl~LPQaSEnb~LVVilfans -- women,

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c h i l d r e n , o l d nicn, some 'of t h e c h i l d r e n apparent1.y no t o l d enou.gh t o walk y e t , $!ho were dend, i n ve ry I a r e e heaps i n area:;. I n o t i c e d , lool:i.ng on ahead, moving ahead; observing our American f o rces were gathei?ing Vietnamese v i l l a g e r s i n a l.are;e group and malting a c i r c l e around them and k i l l i n g a.1.3. t h e peop le . .

Q. OK, go ahead. A. . I would e s t i m a t e over a hundred people I saw.

Q. You saw what? A. Over a hundred dead people . Very few t h a t I --.

saw were m e n o f m i l i t e r y age . - 1 b e l i e v e t h a t t h e company encountered ve ry l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e . We t o o k one c a s u a l t y t h a t day. The m m t h a t was a c a s u a l t y accidentaI1.y s h o t h imse l f in a f o o t wi th a .'I5 when i n v e s t i g a t i n g a t u n n e l . The re fo re , 1 d o n ' t b e l i e v e we encount,ered t o o much re- s i s t a n c e .

When we .had f i n i s h e d the v i l l a g e My L a i ( L l ) , t h e company%rii!%mWer;-- e v i d e n t l y r e a l i z i n g .ivhat was happening, advanced an order t h a t no more c i v i l i a n s were t o be k i l l e d and. tha.t he was going t o , I guess , c n o r d i n a t c with h i s subord ina te leaders , fj.nd o u t what was going on

-. . ....

and why. I - i t We g o t t o t h e o b j e c t i v e a r e a . I b e l i e v e i t

was t h e o b j e c t l v e a r e a . d e f e n s i v e p e r i m e t e r . even look l i k e what t hey would c a l l P i n k v i l l e . . I d o n ' t

. a ~ p l a c e o r any th lng about i t . A l l I know fs t h a t f i r s t v i l l a g e t h a t t h e r e were over a hundred c i v i l i a n s lsi.lJed for a p p a r e n t l y no r eason t h a t I could see.

I n t h e sequence of combat a s s a u l t , , what was the . number of your p l a toon t h a t was a i r l i f t e d i n ?

From t h a t time on I l e f t my p l a t o o n and I stayed. w i th t h e headquar t e r s element because my p la toon moved'out

.-ahead of me when I was I n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e ammuniti'on box with t h e equipment i n i t .

You s a y a t t h e time t h a t you were"ca1Ied back t o t h e company headquar t e r s you had moved i 'nto t h e

We stopped and set' up a n i g h t I d i d n ' t see any th ing t h a t would

. know if we e v e r g o t t h e r e or n o t , o r if t h e r e . w a s such

Q.'

.............. A. My p l a t o o n was 1.if.ted i n , I be l i eve , , second.

' Q.

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children, old men, some of the children apparently not old enough to \',!alk yet, ,;,ho Here der.d, in very large heaps in apeas. I noticed, 1001c1.nr; on ahead, moving ahead,' observing our American forces ,~ere gathering Vietnamese villagers in a large group and making a circle around them and killing all the people.

• Q. OK, go ahead.

. A. I would estimate over a hundred people- I Slnl.

Q. You sm~ vlhat? A. Over a hundred dead people. Very feli that I

saw were men of military age. I believe that the company encountered very little resl.stance. Vie took one casualty that day. The man that lias a casualty accldehtally shot himself in a foot with a .115 when investigating a tunnel. Therefore, I don't believe we encountered too ll)uch re·· sistance.

___ ._.__ '~hen we. had finished the village My Lai (LI), the compmiy(!Orifm~flT(:l'er," evident ly realiz.ing. What was happening, advanced an order that no more civilians liere to be killed and that he was going to, I guess, coord:i.natc wi th his subordinate leade.t's, find out what was going on and \'Ihy. .. . /.

I ~ We got to the objective area. I believe it

was the objectj.ve area. We stopped and set' up a nl.ght defensive perim~ter. I didn't see anything that would even look like what they would call Pinkvi lle.. I don't knO\~ if ,~e ever got there or not, or if there. was such

.8 place or anyth:i.ng about it. All I know is that first village that there were over a hundred civilian.s ki.lled for apparently no reason that I could see. . .

Q. In the Elequence of combat assault, what was the number of your platoon that was airlifted in?

" .... .A. My platoon ,~as lif·ted in, I believe" second. From that time on I left my platoon and I stayed'wHh the headquarters element because my platoon moved out 'ahead of me when I was investigating the ammuni'tion box with the equipment in it.

Q. You say at the time that you were" caTTed back to the company headquarters you had moved into the

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v i l l a g e about R hundred -yards . A. We had moved o u t from t h e laicling zone a

hundred y a r d s . \Je wcre j u s t on t h e edge o f t h e v i l . l age . These v j . l l ages ai?e very vague i n t h c i r boundar ies . gueos you can unders tend . It was a r i c e f i e l d . I be- l i e v e t h e r i c e f i e l d was 8 p a r t of the v i l l a g e ; however, t h e d w e l l i n g s , t h e r a i s e d p a r t a s you usua'Lly f i n d 3 . t ove r miere, t h e b u i l d i n g s were s t i l l ahead of u s , no t very f a r . We r a n i n t o a f ence o r sometbi.ng.. We were a c t u a l l y I n t h e v l l l a g e b u t , a s I say, t h e boundaries a r e ' v a g u e a s fax, a s t h e v i l l a g e s a r e concerned.

Q. D1.d you see SGT S c h i e l a g a i n a f t e you l e f t

A. Yes, s i r , I d id ; a f t e r I lefl; the ' squad, yes .

I n t h a t c o r d c t ?

I.

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t h e squad? f :

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L a t e r on t h a t day we reached t h e a rea t h a t we'were going t o s e t up a s a n i g h t clefei1sive per imeter . . Then I jo ined my squad a g a i n . A t l e a s t by t h a t tfmq I had , i f n o t be fo re . I c a n ' t remember.

Q. You s t a t e d ' t h a t ou r f o r c e s were c l r c l i n g t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e - village-. Does.4h3.s -mau 'hey were forming a c i r c l e around. them?

A. Idel l , s i r , t h e y would g a t h e r t h e people up ,from many p o i n t s 3.n t h e v i l l a g e and j u s t ged them i n t o a l a r g e grou.p and make a c i r c l e around the group and then f i r e i n t o t h e group k . i l l i n g a l l . t he people .

' . Q. Now, horv many .men were' involved i n t h i s ?

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A. Well , sir, I would s a y a t l e a s t t h e ma jo r i ty of t h e 1st Platoon, which was t h e p l a toon I was observ ing , t he m a j o r i t y , t h a t i s , many, ma.ny. Afterward,. t lur ing

. . t h a t day, I ques t ioned some o f ' t h e men. I asked' them what had- happened and -why, - what ~ t h e i r p a r t i n It was ,, and, oh', ' I ' d s a y a t l e a s t t h r e e 2 q u a r t e r s of t h e pcopIe t h a t I asked had t aken p a r t I n It and t o l d me t h a t t h e y d i d .

Q. You say t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e s e peopIe were from the 1st Pla toon?

A. The ones t h a t I observed, 1 could see t h e 1st Pla toon . I b e l l e v e i t was the 1st Pla toon . It was one of t hose t h i n g s . The men were a t a d i s t a n c e wearing unlforms and n a t u r a l l y -- b e s i d e s t h a t I f e e 1 t h a t most of t h e company, t h e people t h a t I ques t ionea , t h a t I asked about , you know, what had happened and eve ry th ing ,

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village about a hundred ~ardD. Is that coriect? A. We hDd moved out from the landing zone a

hundred yards. We were just on the edge of the village. 'l'hese vl1108CS aJ'e very vague in their boundaries. I guess you can understand. It was a rice field. I be­lieve the rice field was a part of thc villoge} however, the dwellings, the raised part as you usually find j.t over t'here, the bui Idings were sti 11 ahead of us, not very fop. We ran into a fence or somethi.ng. We were actually ih the village but, as I say, the bound~ries are'vagu~ as far as the villages are conccrned . ,

I . Q. Did you see SGT Schiel again after. you left

the squad? . ", A. Yes, sir, I did; after I left thQ squad, yes.

Later on that day we reached the area that we' were going to set up as a night defensive perimeter.. Then I joined my squad again. At least by that time. I had, if not before. I can't remembel'. .

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A. \1ell, sl1', the:>' i-Iould gather the people up .from many points j.n the village and just ge'fJ them into a large group and make a circle around the group and then fire into the gl'oup killing all the people.

Q. NOW, hO\<l many ·men were·l.11volved in this? A. \-lell, sir, I would say at least the majority

of the 1st Platoon, whlch was the platoon I ~Ias observl.ng, the majority, that is, many, many. Afterv-l8rd,. during that day, I questioned some of'the men. I asked· them what had -happened ahdwhy,' what. their part in it was, .and, oh, I'd say at least three'-quarters of the people that I asked had taken part in it and told me that they did.

Q. You say the majority-of these people were from the 1st Platoon?

A. The ones that I observed, I could see the 1st Platoon. I believe It was the 1st Platoon. It ~Ias one of those things. 'r'he men were at a distance wearing uniforms and naturally --' besides that I feel that most

. of !;he company, the people that I questioned, that I asked about, you know ,vlhat had happened and eV8ryth1-ng,

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these weren ' t necessnr j . ly men Prom t h e ' 1st Pla toon . This Is where 1 got t h e idea that; the r.!hol.e company had taken p a r t i n t h i s t h e sa.me a s the 1st had . I b e l i e v e t h e whole company was involved i r r t h i s .

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Q. How many groups d i d you see handled I n t h i s

A. I d o n ' t remember, sir. f a s h i o n ?

. Q. More than one? .A. 4lel.1, s i r , y e s , more t h a n one.. A t any r a t e ,

t h e r e were p l a c e s a l o n g t h e way a s v:e were traveling that ; you could s e e c i v i l i a n s more o r less p:i.led up, s o t h a t , you know, well what had happened Rnd how i t happened similar t o the way I had seen i t .

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Q. Did you recogn:lze any o f t h e people t h a t were

A. I d o n ' t know if I d i d o r not , . sf'r. You see, it happened over a y e a r , ago. Is i t over a y e a r ago? Yes.

-----.-An& &have gathered . the. impress ion from how I have t a l k e d -- 1 l i v e d with t h e s e men f o r a ySi??.'l- H-UI,JKI t a l k e d with t h e n , t h a t c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s were Tnvolved. I d o n ' t remembcr e x a c t l y who I savr except t h a t I can say d e f i n i t e l y they were from my company.

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Y Q. You say a man was s h o t i n the f o o t ? A. Yes, sir .

. Q. Who was t h a t ? A. It was a p r i v a t e first c l a s s no, S p e c i a l l s t

1st C l a s s C a r t e r .

Q. You s a i d he sh'ot h i m s e l f ? . . . . .

A. Well, s i r , I wasn ' t t h e r e . Now, I asked t h e people what had happened and t h e y s a i d -- I w a s n ' t ri@t t h e r e when he s h o t himself i n t h e f a o t ..- I was there when he was evacuated . I t a l k e d t o t h e medics and t h e y s a i d what happened. . .,

Q. How d i d he do t h i s ? . . . . .. .

. . . A. - He was i n v e s t i g a t i n g a t u n n e l . IIe had h i s .rr5 drawn and cocked and it went off a c c f d e n t a l l y .

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Q. It was a c c i d e n t a l ?

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FOR OFFIC1AL USE ONLY these weren't necessarily men from the 1st Platoon. This is vlhere I eot the idea thnt the 1'Ih010 company had taken part in this the same as the 1st had. I believe the t'lbole company was involved irr this.

Q. How many groups dld you see handled in this fashion?

L I don't remember, sir.

• Q. °f'lore than one? A. -Well, sir, yes, more than one., At any rate,

there were places along the way as 1'Ie were traveling that you could see c1vili1111S more or less pIled up, so that, you know, 1'iell vlhat had happel1ed and how it happened similar to the way I had seen it.

Q. Did you recogn:tze any of the people that were :(ir:l.ng?

A. I don't kn 0 1'/ if I did or not, sfr. You sec, it happened over a year ago. Is it over a year ago? Yes.

-·------l\l'ld--I-have gathered .. tll,e impression from ho\'l I have talked -- I lived with these men for a YEf!'tr"~- 11'01'1 I talked with them, that certain individuals were involved. I don't remember exactly who I saw except that I can say definitely they were from my company.

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, . I Q. You say a man was shot in the foot? A. Yes, sil'.

Q. A.

Class

\~ho was that? It was a private Carter.

first class

Q. You said he shot himself?

no, Speciallst

L Well, sir, I ~asn't there. Now, I asked the people what had happened and they said :- I wasn't right there when he shot himself in the foot., I was there when he was evacuated. I talked to the medics and they said what happened.

Q. A.

drawn and

How did he do this? He was inv'estigating a cocked and it went off

t.unnel. He had his .l15 aC:cldentally.

• Q. It was accidental?

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A. Oh, y e s , d e f i n i t e l y it was accfc ien ta l . The man knew enough. He wouldn't shoot himseIf wj.th a .45. That i s r i d i c u l o u s . There a r e much b e t t e r ways, i f he was going t o maI..lnger, much b e t t e r v:ay t o do i t than with a . .45 .

. 'Q. . How d o you know t h a t t h i s i s d e f i n f t e l y an . accident?

A. We1.1, because 1 knew t h e man. He was a f r iend . of mine. I j u s t d o n ' t t h i n k he was t h e type t o shoo t h imse l f d e l i b e r a t e l y f o r any reason . .

Q. Did he e v e r come back t o t h e u n i t ? A. No, s i r .

Q. Do you know where he i s now? A. No, sir, I d o n ' t . IIe l i v e s i n C a l i f o r n l a .

Q. A. Yes, I do .

Q. Who was hd? A. He was my company commander a t t h e -ime of t h i s

.. .

Did you know' CPT Ernes t 1,. Medi'na?

. . .

1. o p e r a t i o n and du r ing o t h e r times f o r approximately t h e f i r s t f o u r months, I b e l i e v e , maybe mare. !

Q. D i d he order t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e vi l l .age? A. The o r d e r , t h e o p e r a t i o n s o r d e r , o r whatever,

t h e n i g h t be fo re t h e o p e r a t i o n was such t h a t men could feel t h a t he was fo l lowing orders by doing what he d i d , t h a t is, t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h i s v i l l a g e . .

Q. A. He gave t h e impression t h a t t h e o r d e r had come

down t h a t t h e r e were no f r i e n d l i e s I n t h i s area and that -everyone was t o be cons idered a V i e t . Cong. Now, however a man could t a k e t h a t o t h e r t han t o say d e s t r o y t h e s e people, 1 d o n ' t know. I can s e e no o t h e r way t o --

Howsdid he g i v e t h i s impression? e

D i d he o r d e r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s ?

i . , . ,.,,-<,<.:

Q. ' ( I n t e r p o s i n g ) ' you say he gave t h i s impress ion . .

A. By g i v i n g t h e o rde r , or r a t h e r g i v i n g ou t t h e in fo rma t ion t h a t t h e r e were no f r f e n d ~ I i e s i n t h e a r e a , , t h a t everyone was t o be cons idered a Viet Cong. Now,

. V i e t Cong a r e t h e people we shoot , and t h a t ' s t h e way -

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A. 011, yes, definJ.tely H ~ras accidental. The man knew enough. He wouldn't shoot himself l'Iith a .45. That is ridiculous. There are much better ways, if he was going to malinger, much better way to do it than wi th a .• 4 5 •

• 'Q. Ho\'! do you Imow that this is d'efinitely an " accident?

A. Hell, becaWle I knew the man. He was a friend of mine. I just don't thJ.nk he ~iBS the type to shoot himself deliberately for any reason.

Q. Did he ever come back to the unit? A. No, sir.

Q. Do you Imow where he is now? ~ No, sir, I don't. He lives in California.

Q. Did you kno,:i' CPT Ernest r .. ~'edina? A. Yes, I do.

Q. \-lho we; he? i. A. He \,as my company commander at the time of this

operation and during other times for approximately the first four months, I believe, maybe more.

Q. Did he order the destruction of the village? A. The order, the operations order" or whatever,

the night before the operation was such that men could feel that he was following orders by doIng what he did, that is, the destruction of this village.

~ Did he order the destruction of the inhabitants? A. He gave the impression that the order had come

do~m that there were no friend lies in this area and that 'everyone was to be considered a Viet Congo Now, however a man could take that other than to say d~stroy these people,! don't Imow. I, can see no other way to--

'<CO'. Q. (Interposing)' You say be gave this impression .. How·did he give this impression? •

A. By giving the order, or rather giving out the information that there were no friendlies in the area, that everyone was to be considered a VIet Cong. Novl, Viet Cong are the people we shoot. and' that's the way

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I t h i n k he was t r y i n g t o g c t t h e word ac ros6 vi thout a c t u a l l y giv:tng the o r d e r .

.Q. Where was t h i s b r i e f i n g given? A. It was g iven on a l and ing zone c a l l e d LZ D o t t i e

n o r t h of Quang Ngai about 1 2 miles on Highway 1, r i g h t o f f Highaey 1.

6. . A. .I believe i t was gl.ven t d the e n t i r e cogpany,

yes , .I b e l i e v e . . . l n d i v l d u a l s a b s e n t , bu t i f you mean i t was d i r e c t e d t o - wards i t , y e s , i t was. t h e y had t a k e n a l o t of c a s u a l t i e s from us ?nd that; we

t h e ones, i n f e r r i n g t h e s e people were t h e oiies r e s p o n s i b l e : , for t h e . men k i l l c d i n t h e minef ie ld i n o p e r a t i o n s , v a r i o u s .

Was t h i s b r i e f i n g g iven t o t h e e n i i r e company?

I mean t h e r e may have been c e r t a i n

Be a l s o brought up t h e f a c t Lha'c

more o r l ess o w d them something, t h a t " thes , k ' people were

I . .I

'i Q. He made the s ta tement t .hat you had 10,st men

there be fo re? A. No, he made t h e s ta tement t h a t t h e s e people

t o us i n t h e paGt.,- T W n g t h o s e mon'chs vie l o s t a l o t of people and t h a t we owed them a c e r t a i n dc t , so t o speak.

p rev ious ope ra t ions?

some twenty some 'odd c a s u a l t i e s i'n a mine f i e ld i n c i d e n t .

.. y{e.~.e-$--vglvecl, r a t h e r r e s p o n s f b l e f o r what had happened

P Q. How many men had you a l l I o s t i n i h a t a r e a :in

.. . A. I c a n ' t remember, sir.. I know one day we had

Q. When was t h a t ? A. It was, 1 b e l i e v e --.now,, I am n o t sure about

'maybe ' s e v e r a l weeks- before . the o p e r a t i o n i n pu.e.st~i,on:.&re, - .$his , bu t I am p r e t t y s u r e t h a t i't was only a week o r

. . Q. How d i d t h i s occur? A. We were moving through xn a r e a , a sweep, o r

j u s t g e t t i n g from one p o i n t OP nna the r -- I am no t s u r e -- .but-vre were movLng from an a r e a xnd' a l l of a sudden ' a ' m a n s tepped on a mine, k i l l e d K i ' m s e l f , wounded t w o o t h e r people , and then somebody e k e t r i e d t o move, you

We were deep i n t o i t b e f o r e we rea l ized , I g h e s s ; ' a n d . t h e n a n o t h e r man t r i e d t o move and he s tepped on something, and-.we were t r g i n g t o

. .. &now,, go some p l a c e .

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I think he was trying to get the word across 'Iithout actually giv:lng the order.

.Q. v.Jhere \'las this brieflng g1 ven? A. It was given on a landing zone called L2 Dott:le

n01'th of Quang Ngai about 12 mi les on H:lghl'lay 1, right off Highl'12y 1. .

Q. . vias this briefing g:i.ven to the entire company? A. ·I believe it was glven to' the entire company,

yes, .r believe. I mean the1'e may have been certaln ind1v1duals absent, but if you mean it was directed to­"lards it, yes, it I~as. He also brought up the fact that they had taken a lot of casua Ities from us ~nd that l'le more or less oVled them something, that·thes13· people I'lere the ones, inferrlng these people were the oiles responsible for the men killed in the minefield 1n operat1,ons, various.

\ Q. He made the statement t.hat you had lo.st men there before?

A. No, he made the statement that these people .. WJ;r.?-.J,Qvolved, rather responsible for what had happened

to us iii-the pa'st',--nuring those mOl'lths we lost a lot of people and that Vie oVled them a eertaln de.rt, so to speak.

Q. HOI'I many men had you all lost in that area :tn previous operations?

A. I can I t remember, sir.. I know one day I~e had some twenty some ~dd casualties in a minefield inc1dent.

Q. When 1'1as that? A. It was, I believe --. now,. I am not sure about

,,this, but I am pretty sure that it was only a week or 'maybe' severa 1 I'leelwbefore the of?eratJ;on in ~u.c,st:l,OI'J~ her:.e~~~.

Q. Ho\~ did this occur? A. We were moving through an area, a sweep, or

just getting from one point or' another -- I am not sure ~-but. \'le \~ere moving from an area and' all of a sudden

. a' man stepped on a mine, killed' litmse-If, wounded two other people, and then somebody else tried to move, you .!m0wJ go some place. We were d'eep tnto it before we realized, I gu:ess~' and' then ano'ther man tried to move and he stepped on something, and'we ~Iere trxing to

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stcpp:i.n(i., on th l . ngs everywhere t h e y went .. We j u s t kit16 of prol-ied 0u.r m y out of I.t. Well, i f we prohcd an a r e a , f o r a h e l i c o p t e r t o come j.n and evacuate peop le , and then ve evacuated the peop1.e and probed OUT m y o u t o f 1.t.

Q. .Were t h e s e c a s u a l t i e s a l l . f rom one p l a t o o n ? A. No, t h e y vreran't. They r:iere from t h e e n t i r e

company. It was a l a r g e a r e a t h a t was m:lned'.

Q. Do I u.nderstand t h a t t h e un3.t p e n e t r a t e d th-is a r e a without rccej.vj.ng casu.al.t:i.es from t h e mlnes, and t h e n from t h e F i r s t c a s u a l t y on 1.n all. d i r e c t l o n s they encountered m%nss?

A. I was 1.n at. t h e the, I b e l i e v e 'it was t h e 2d P l a t o o n . It was e i t h e r the 2d o r t h e 1st. I b e l i e v e i t was the 2d Platoon. . The- 1st P1,al;oon o r the ' j d , one of t h e o t h e r platooii.s, was g e t t i n g it son8 o t h e r p1.ace

-dn~_thJ.s sane genera l v i c i n i t y , b u t t hey weren ' t n e a r u s . They were stepping on mines-and- th.inga. in. Some o t h e r a r e a . I d o n ' t know how they go t i t , hut t h a t I s how k;e go t i t . The f i r s t man who s t epped on it,, h i s name was Gus Ru tge r .

&. How do you s p e l l i t? I' A. I d o n ' t know'.what happened t o h i m . He s tepped

on something, o r ' maybe i t was a n o t h e r mail -- I d o n ' t know -- b u t anyway he was the one rvho got t h e b r u n t o f i t , He was k i l l e d . . .

Q. A. I d o n ' t know. You see, he vrasni't k l . l l ed . . . .

i n s t a n t l y . He had g o t t e n p a r t s of both legs blown : o f f , and a medic, a p l a toon s e r g e a n t , went t o a s s i s t

h l m and a n o t h e r man, maybe two men, I t h i n k , t h a t were wounded evacua t ing them. Meanwhile,; ano the r man , Robinson, s t a r t e d walking down the roed' t h a t was direct1.y i n f r o n t of u s ; g o t up on t h e road and made a l e f t t u r n and he s tepped on, I b e l i e v e - - well, , he made a h o l e

' 3 i k e ~ t h i s i n t h e ground, a very deep ho le . . I t a k e it t h e r e was a hand grenade down there sornewhere. H e s tepped on t h a t and t h a t was it a s f a r a s I,know. We evacuated a l l of t h e s e people .

How do you s p e l l t h a t man1's name?

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fOR OffiCiAL USE ONLY evacuate people and give med1cal aid, and people Vlere stepp:i.nrr, on thlngs evcryvlhere they went.. We just Idn(l of probed our way out of it. Well, if we probed an area, for a helicopter to come 1n and evacuate people, and then we evacuated the people and probed our way out of it .

. Q. A .

company.

. Were these casualties all from one platoon? No, they weron't. They tlere from the entire It I'/flS a large area that was mIned.

~ Do I understand that the unlt penetrated this area without r8ceiving casua1t:l.es from the m:tnes, and then from the first casualty on in all directions they encountered mines? .

A. I was :1.n at. the time, I believe ft vms the ·2d Platoon. It was either the 2d ox' the 1st. I beHeve it was the 2d Platoon. The· 1st PJatoon or the ·3d, one of the other platoons, was gettfng it some other place

.. --1n-.thi13 same .. general vicini t.y, but they \'Ieren' t nenr us. They were stepping on mine-s··and- things. in. aome other al°ea. I (1 on 't knovi how they got it, but that's hO\'1 Vie got it. 'l'he first man who stepped on it ,. his name was Gus Rutger.

I ..

Q. How do you spell it? A. I don't know ·\1hat happened to him. He stepped

on something, or maybe it was another man I don't kno\~ -- but anyway he vias the one who got the brunt of it. He was killed.

Q. Hovi do you spell that man '·s name? A. I don't know. You see, he wasn't kliled

instantly. He had gotten pal'ts of both legs blown off, and a medtc, a platoon sergeant, went to ass:tst him and another man, maybe two men, I think, that were wounded evacuating them. r~eanl'lhile, .. anothel' man, Robinson, started walking dO\'111 the road that was dtrectly in front of us; got up on the road and made a left turn and he stepped on, I believe -- well, he made a hole

.. like thls in the ground, a very deep hole. I take it there was a hand grenade dovm there sorn0vlhere. He stepped on that and that vias it as far as I~know. vIe evacuated all of these people.

Q. You say this occurred hol'l many days prior to

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vague o u t t h e r e , bu t I t h i n k it^ wasn ' t any more than s e v e r a l weeks be fo re .

A. 1' d o n ' t remember, s i r . Tlme i s kind of

.,

&. Have you e v e r seen t h e Quang Mgai' 1:50,000? A. Yes, s i r , I have.

Q. T h i s i a Map Sheet 6739 I1 S e r f e s L707.4, T i t l e : Quallg Nga l , Scale 3.:50,000. Irlould you i d e n t i f y t h e l o c a t i o n of t h i s mine f i e ld?

t h e n o r t h e r n r eg ion some p l a c e up liere.;, A. Sir, I d o n ' t know i f X coulid. It was u.p i n . .

Q. Y O U mentsoned MY L a i (4)? A. Right , My Lai ( 4 ) i s down h e r e . It wasn ' t thci*e.

It was no r th of wy L a i ( 4 ) . p l a c e .

It wzs up i n t h i s n rea soine

- -~ Q. I n o t h e r words, i t was a c r o s s t h e Song Diem? It was a c r o s s t h a t r i v e r ?

. ' A. I b e l i e v e i t was. L e t ' s see,, where am I ?

Q. LZ D o t t i e may be off t h a t s h e e t . I A. No, i t should be h e r e , i'f t h i s i s the map.

U a i t a minute. Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . . T h i s i s the cape. T h i s i s t h e Eatangan Cape. i s Pin lcv i l le . It is n o t i n t h e cape. a l i t t l e l a t e r on.

T h i s f s My La1 (4) and t h i s We d i d the cape

8. I n o t h e r words. t h e mineffeId was tiot i n tho PinltvC1lc a rea?

A. It wasn't i n t h e PinkviIXe a r e a a s f a r a s I know. It was n o r t h of i t . We encountered s e v e r a l , s ay , mine i n c i d e n t s . I d o n ' t know i f t h e y were m i n e f i e l d s . That was where we tool: most of o u r C a s u a l t i e s , t h e mine. They were s c a t t e r e d j u s t about everyahere , both s i d c s of t h e highway. We u s u a l l y i n any of ou r o p e r a t i o n s -- I d o n ' t know r e a l l y . It was d e f i n i t e l y a mine f i e ld , t h e one we were i n where we l o s t twenty nome odd men t h a t day , t he c a s u a l t i e s we had, because t h e r e seemed t o be so many i n t h e same p l a c e . down. We d o n ' t knOW -- r i g h t ? We only knov~what we f i n d . We d i d n ' t f i n d them a l l . It-i 's a good t h i n g we d i d n ' t f i n d them a l l .

I mean we dl 'dn ' t p u t t h e mines

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the operation? A. I don't remember, sir. Time is I,ind of

vague out there, but I think it wasn't any more than several weeks before.

QI Have you ever seen the Quang Ngal 1: 50, OOO? ~ Yes, sir, I have.

Q. Thl.s is l~ap Sheet 6739 II Series L701J~, 'rit Ie: Quang Ngai, Scale 1:50,000. Would you identify the location of this minefield?

A. Sir, I don't know if' I COUld. It was up in the nOl,thern region SOITIC place up here.'

Q. You ment5.oned Ny Lai (4)? A. Right, ~ly Lai (4) is downnere.

It was north of flJy Lai (4). It was up In place. .

It \'laSn' t thel'e. thj.s area some

"

. _.__ Q. In other words, it was across the Song D:lem? It was across that river?

A. I believe it \'Ias. Let's see, where am I?

Q. J,Z Dottie may be off that sheet. I ~ No, it should be here, if this is the map.

vlai t a minute. Yes, that's right. 'rhis is the cape. '£his is the Batangan Cape. This is fijy Lai (LI) and this is Pinkville. It is not in the capo. We did the cape a little later on.

Q. In other words, the minefIeld was riot in the Finkville area?

. A. It wasn't in the Pinkville area a.s far as I know. It \1aS north of it. We encountel"ed' several, say, mine incidents. I don't knOl1 if they were minefields. That I'las where we took most of our casualties, the mine. They were scattered just about everyvlhere, both sides of the highway. \~e usually in any of our operations-- I don't know really. It was definitely a minefield, the one we were in where ole lost t.lenty same add men that day, the casualtles we had, because there seemed to be so many in the same place. I mean we dl'dh' t put the mines

,dovm. We don't kno\,1 -- right? We only knov!.. what we find. \<le didn't find them alL, It· 1'8 a good thing we didn't find them all.

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company comnanderls p a r t , GPT Medina, t o g i v e t h i s o r d e r ? A. N'o, n o t d u r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s o r d e r . However,

a t the t ime t h a t the o p e r a t i o n was t a k i n g p l a c e , he saw what was happening and e i t h e r he had af ter thou.gKts o r eSse he d i d n ' t r e a l i z e what he was p u t t i n g o u t the n i g h t be fo re , how i t was going t o t u r n o u t , and he fmmed'f.ately g o t on t h e r a d i o and t r i e d t o . s top t;hat was going on.

Q. &re you fami l . ia r with the Rules of . Engagement f o r . ' search and d e s t r o y and s e a r c h and c l e a r o p e r a t i o n s ?

A. ' 1 , m i g h t have been, sir; n o t as such . Nobody, I n o t h e r words, came up t o me and s a i d , "Thdse a re t h e r u l e s f o r s e a r c h and d e s t r u c t i o n and s e a r c h and c l e a r , no.

I f you were encountered wi th a s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e was a man t r y i n g t o evade you, what were your a c t i o n s toward a person t r y i n g t o evade you?

We w e r e ~ g i v e n .the o r d e r -- we g i v e t h e o r d e r t o h a l t , Dung L a i , : whatever, t h a t If . t h e person d'id no t

--.-. h a l t , -. t h a t we were supposed t o shoo t the person i f t h e person waS-running,-ermed o r othe_ryise. I d f d n l t ho ld wi th t h i s . I W:IS t o l d once when we -- one of. t h e f i r s t o p e r a t l o n s t h a t \id went on where t h e r e were # l o t of women running around up i n the h i l l s wi th f i s h .baske ts , t h a t this was t h e way t h a t it was. g i v e them "Dung La i " and t h e n s h o o t , . s o I j u s t missed.

-'........You know, t h e r e i s no sense going ou t and d isobeying o r d e r s r i g h t o u t r i g h t , s o I j u s t . m i s s e d and evaded t h e problem. O f c o u m e a Sot of o t h e r people d id i t . A l o t of people accepted t h e o r d e r , and t h a t was I t .

f i r e a warning s h o t ?

Did there appear t o be any r e l u c t a n & on t h e

I Q. .

. . ' A.

I was supposed t o

Q. . Were you e v e r t o l d t h a t you w%re supposed t o

A. I d o n ' t t h i n k ' so, sir.

Q. t h e VC and a c i v i l i a n ?

A. S i r , t h a t ' s one of the big problems. That i s what makes t h e world what It i s . You j u s t c a n ' t do i t , unless t h e VC i s armed and f i r i n g a t you t or i f he i s armed i n an a r e a , w e l l you should know i f t h e r e i s going 2'0 be PF ' s o r South Vietnamese Army, t h a t i s , t h e s e a re a l l South Vietnamese Forces, and I f ' you a r e no t t o l d t h a t t h e r e a r e South Vietnamese i n t h e areao-- when we

How could you de termine t h e d i f f e r e n c e betvreen

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Q. D:td there appear to be any reluctance on the company commander's pert, CPT Hedina, to give this order?

A. No, not during the operations order. HO~leveJ:', at the time that the operation I'-laS taking pIa ce, he saw what ~Ias happening and either he had afterthoughts or else he didn't realize "Ihat he I·las putting; out the n:l.ght before

l how it VielS going to turn out, and he immedIately

got on the radio and tried to stop I';hat vms going on. • i

Q. vlere you fami liar with the Rules of" Engagement for 'search and destroy and search and clear operations?

A. 'I'l11ight have been, sir; not as such. Nobody, in other Iwrds, came up to me and said, "These are the rules for search and destruction and search/and clear, no.

Q. If you were encountered wlth a situation where thel"e was a man trying to evade you, what were your actions toward a person trying to evade you?

, A. vie were given ,the order -- we give the order to halt, Dung Lai" whatevel", that if ,the person dId not

__ Q?].t, that we ~/ere supposed to shoot the person if the person ~Ia'$-rllnning i-armed or othel'wise. I didn't hold \'lith this. I was told once when we -- one off the first operations that I-Ie went on where there were * lot of \'Iomen running around up in the hills with fi,shbaskets, that this was the way that It \'las. I was supposed to give them "Dung Lalli and then shoot"so I just missed.

"._ You knovl, there ls no sense going out and disobeying orders right outright, so I just, missed and evsd'ed the problem. Of course a lot of other people did it. A lot of people accepted the order, and that was n.

Q. \1e1'e you ever told that you were supposed to fire a warni.ng shot?

L I don't think so, sir.

Q. How could you determine the d~fference between the VC and a civilian? ,

A. Sir,' that's one of the big problems. That is what makes the world what it is. You just can "t do it, unless the VC is armed and firing at you, or iT he is

. ,aE!lled in an area, well you should knol" if' there is going 'bo be PF's or South Vietnamese Army, that is, these are all, South Vietnamese Forces, and if you are not told' that there are South Vietnamese in t;he area~-- when we

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were e;oing o u t on a n o p e r a t i o n vie were g e n e r a l l y t o l d i f t h e r e were South Vietnamese Forces i n t h e a r e a . I f t h e r e was an armed person i n t h a t a r e a , vihether t h e y arc f i r i n g a t you o r n o t , t h i s 5: would cons ide r 51 V i e t Cong. If t h e r e was a person c a r r y i n g an i n d t r c c t f i r e vieapon, t h a t i s a l s o be ing armed. 1% could be carryl.ng a long tube o r something l i k e t h i s . NaturaIlq-,. males or females , t h e r e icere women b e a r i n g arms over t h e r e .

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Q. Were t h e r e any Reglonal Fo rces o r P o p u l m

A. Yes. During p a r t of the ope ra t io i l I. saw t h e

Forces wi th your u n i t a t the t ime of t h i s a t t a c k , . o r any N a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y P o l i c e ?

Nat iona l Polkce, r e p r e s e n t e t i v c s from the N a t i o n a l P o l i c e . o u t .~ there wi th us,. They i n t e r r o g a t e d some of OUT

.I

.% p r i s o n e r s . I saw i t . . .

Q. Horr many N a t i o n a l P o l i c e ? It: Maybe a.-.half‘. a dozen. -- .. . ’

!

Q.

A. They g e n e r a l l y used t h r e a t s and v i o l e n c e . That

Did you ‘ n o t i c e t h e procedures t h d t these N a t i o n a l Pol.ice used f o r i n t e r r o g a t i n g the p r i s o n e r s ?

was t h e i r method i n g e n e r a l .

,..Q. I n t h i s . c a s e ? I

A. I n t h i s c a s e . The people t h a t t h e y were i n t e r r o g a t i n g , most of them t h a t I saw were what^ I would c o n s i d e r V i e t Cong, t h e s e m i l i t , a r y age males t h a t were e i t h e r armed o r were bea r ing documents t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h i s was t h e i r j o b and mission i n t h e V l e t Cong,.

,What were t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e s e p o l i c e ?

,blows about t h e body, I don’ t t h i n k r e a l l y seri0.u.s a c t u a l l y , c o n s l d e r i n g , you know, it i s a war. They d f d n t t do t h e s e people any permanent damage. t h i n g s tough f o r them and asked a l o t of q u e s t f o n s . It i s t h e i r way, I believe. .

D i d you see any o t h e r South Vie tnamese~.Nat i .ona ls

. .

Q. A. The p o l i c e asked q u e s t i o n s , s t r u c k the p r i s o n e r s

They J u s t g e n e r a l l y made

.. ., Q.

A. No, I d i d n ’ t , I d o n ’ t t h i n k . . working wi th t h e company? 0

, Q. D i d you know t h e company South Vi’etnamese i n t e i p r e t

.““LA.

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were going out on an operation \'Ie were gene;roally told if there were South Vietnnmese Forces 5.n the area. If there \,Ias an armed person in that Rl'ea, ~Ihethel" they are fiJ;'ing at you or not, this I would consider a Viet Congo If there \'las a person carrying an indirect fire ~ieapon, that is also bej.ng armed. He could be aarry1ng a long tube or something like this. Naturall::r,. males o;ro females, there ~;e;roe women bearlng a;roms over there .

Q. Were there any Regional Forces or Popular Forces w1th your unit at the time of this attack~ or any National IVfilitary Police? ':

A. Yes. During part of the operation 1. saw the National Police, representatives from the National Police out there \'lith us,. They interrogated some of our

., prisoners. I saw it. "

Q. --"'-- fr.

How many National PoHce? Maybe 8 .. half·a dozen.

Q. Did you 'notice the procedures that these National Police used fOl~ interrogating the prisoners?

A. 'l'hey generally used threats and violElnce. That was the:l.r method in general. i

"Q. In this' case? A. In this case. The people that they were

interrogating, most of them that' I savl were what I ~Iould consider Vlet Cong, these milit,ary age inales that were either armed or were bearing documents to the effect that this was their job and mission in the Viet Congo

Q. \~hat ~Iere the actions of these poUce? A. 'The police' asked questions, struck the prisoners

blows about the body, I don't think really serious actually, consldering, you knoN, it ls a war, They didh't do these people any permanent damage. They just generally made things tough for them and asked a lot of questions. It is their way, I believe.

Q. working

A.

Q.

" .

Did you see any other South Vietna'meseNationals with the company? •

No, I didn't, I don't think •. . '

Did you knO\~ the company Soutb Vietnamese interpret

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A. Yes, I d i d .

Q. What was h i s name? 4. His name was Pus.

Q, .-How do you s p e l l t h a t ? A. F-U-S.

Q. Are you s u r e of t h a t s p e l l f n g ? A. Yes, I am p r e t t y s u r e o f i t .

Q. A. .Fus (pronouncing F-0-0), and he was' a s t a f f

-Q. Where was he ' a t t h e t ime Qf t h l ' s a p e r a t i o n ? A. I b e l i e v e h e was with t h e 'Headquar te rs , G.roup,

Q. Did you .see him? A* Yes, I t h i n k . You see, there were a l o t o f .

o p e r a t i o n s l i k e this, n o t e x a c t l y l i k e this -- oh, boy -- but I g e n e r a l l y saw him around du.ring the o p e h t i o n s . I n o t h e r WOIY~S, I had oppor tun i ty t o s e e him. I probably d i d , assuming he was t h e r e .

Q. But 'you d o n ' t remember any o f ' h i s a c t i v i t i e s on t h i s mission?

A. No, sir, I d o n ' t ; I ,don ' t remember. I seem t o remember l a t e r t h a t he wasn't ve ry happy,, at l e a s t the - t n t e r p r e t e r wasn ' t .. . .

And it was pronounced Fus (pronodncing F-0-O)?

s e r g e a n t ,

the one I was t r a v e l i n g with. ... .~ . .. . - -

Q. D i d you t ,a lk t o him a f t e r t h e ope ra t ion? A. I t a l k e d t o him, no t about t he o p e r a t i o n . I

g e n e r a l l y d i d . He was 'a f r i e h d of m i n e , n u t about t h e o p e r a t i o n , b u t I d o n ' t t h i n k he was t o o happy.about t he way i t was done.

- Q... .. ..How do you r e a c h this conclusfon? . . .

.. . A. I . s a i d I d o n ' t t h i n k . ' - 1 - d a n ' t h o w as f a r a s . . . tfiat. goes.

way It was done. I assume t h i s by.tli.e wag,:-just, YOU know, the way he func t ioned from t h e n on. He was a l i t t l e b i t less w i l l i n g t o t a l k about o p e r a t i o n s and t h e s i t u a - . t i o n , p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .

I d o n ' t t h i n k he was t o o happy about the

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A. Yes, I did.

Q. Hhat was his name? .fl.. His name was Fus.

Q. '-now do you spell that? A.· F-U-S.

Q. A.

Are you sure of that spelling? Yes, I am pretty sure of it.

.'

Q. And it was pronounced Fus (pronoundng F··O-O)? A.Fus (pronouncing F-O-O), and he was' a staff

sergeant.

-Q. \fuere was he 'at the time Qf this operatj,on? A.

the one I I be lieve he wa s Vii th the Headquarters, Group, was traveling with.

Q. Did you see him? A. . Yes, I thinl{. You see, there were a lot of.

operations like this, not exactly Uke tl1is -- 011, boy but I genel'S 11y saw him around dl.)J~lng the opehations. In other words, I had opportunity to see him. I probably did, assuming he. Vias there.

Q. But you don't remember any of his activities on this mission?

A. No, sir, I don't; I ·don't remember. I seem to remember later that he wasn't very happy, at least

''ttre' -interpreter wasn't. .

Q. Did you t.alk to him after the operation? A. I talked to him, not about the operation. I

. generally did. He was a friend of mine',. not about the operation, but I don't think he was too bappyabout the way it was done.

___ Q •.. ,.How do you reach this conclusion?: A. i· said I don 'tthink.· -I 'don't know as far as

that goes. I don't think he vias too happy about the· way it was done. I assume this by ·th.e wa,Y,,"jilst, you know, the way he functioned from then on. He was a little bit less willing to talk about operations and the situa-· tion, political situation.

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4. A.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Do you know a P W Char l e s D. Gruver?

What was h i s du ty assignment? .I b e l i e v e a t the time he was a machine gunner .

Yes, 7: do. I

1

- D i d vou. see him on t h i s ooe ra t ion? i. No, 'r d i d n o t , n o t t h e o p k a t i o n

t h e o p e r a t i o n s e v e r a l times, but , n o t du.rin:' t h e first

him. I d o n ' t b e l i e v e I saw him s p z c i f i c a l i y : I might have seen t h e group t h a t he m s wlth but 3: d i d n ' t s e e him.

t s e l f -- yes,

push, which i s the time i n quest j .on here , $ d i d n ' t s e e

.. Q. ' Was he i n YOLW pla toon? A. No, h e w a s n ' t .

&. t h e s e civi1;Lans i n groups?

A. I d o n ' t know. As I sa:L'd, t h e s e p o p l e , most of t h e men i n the company a t sone t ime o r o t h e r I aslced about what had happened a t My La i (ll), and I was given the impress ion , n o t t h e impression;. I was t o l d by t h e s e people t h e y took an a c t i v e ' p a r t , . most af t h e s e people , and t h e r e f o r e now, Looking back on i t , I can see t h e s e people involved i n t h i s t h i n g , b u t n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y . I can ' t s a y r e a l l y who I saw, but t h e y were i n my company. That rnuch I knovr.

' 'I .. . . \Ins h e an ind iv i6ua l '~who ' I c i l k d o r f i r e d on

Q. . Do you know Lieutenant; CaIIey? A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you know how t o spelS. t h a t name? A. Frankly , no, I d o n ' t , sir. I b e l i e v e i t i s

Q. Do you know h i s f i rs t name? A. No, sir.

Q. What was h i s du ty? - A. I Qn n o t s u r e , sir. R i s . d u t y assignment was

p l a t o o n l ead& of t h e 1st Platoon, I b e l i e v e .

Q. D i d you s e e him on t h i s a p e r a t i o n ?

C-A-L-L-E-Y ,

d u a l s I cannot s a y

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Do you Imow a P!!'C Charles D. Gruver? Yes, ! do.

~. What ~Ias hls duty assignment? A. .! believe at the ttme he was a machtne gunner.

~. -Did you see him on this operation? . A. No, I d:td not, not the operation/tself -- yes,

the operatl.on several times, but. not. durin:' the first push, which 1_s the time in question here, ; dj.dn' t see him. I don't beHeve I saw him specifically.' I might have seen the group that he I'ras with but I didn't see him.

Q. vIas he in your platoon? L No, he wasn't.

Q. \<las he anindlvidual who lell, led' oJ f1red on these civilians 1n groups? .

A. I don't know. I\s I saId. these p ople, most of the men in the company at some time or other I asked about what had happened at My Lai (11), and I I~as given the impression, not the impression; I was told by these

..... people they took an act~ve' part,. most of these people, and therefol'e now, looking back on it, I can see these people involved in this thing, but not specifically. I can't say really 1'1110 I saw, but they were in my company. That much I knovi.

Q. Do you 'Imow Lieutenant Calley?: A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you know how to spell that'name? A. Frankly, no, r don'.t, sir .. I believe it is

C-I\-L-L-E-Y.

Q. Do you kno".1 his first oame?: -A. No,. sir.

Q. What was his duty? • A.

platoon I ,IMU not sure J sir. His. d'uty assignment I'laS

leadet' of the 1st Platoon,. I beHeve.

Q. A.

Did you see him on this operation? I\s I said before, sir, ind1'viduals

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r e a l l i who I saw and who I d i d n o t . L s t e r on, whi le a s k i n g t h e men o f t h e company, t h a t i s , a l l t he .men , a l l . o f ' t h e people t h a t I aslced .we,re c e r t a i n o f one t h i n g , Informed me of one t h l n g , t h a t h e was d i r e c t i n g t h i s o p e r a t i o n , t h i s type of g a t h e r i n g t h e peopIe up i n t o a large group, encl . rc l . ing them and f i r l . n g i n t o t h e group.

Q.. A. 'That h r d i d or t h a t t h e y did? '

It is ext remely impor tan t t h a t you saw t h i s and you d i d n ' t h e a r i t . . .

.. 0 ' Q. That i t was done.

of i t . I d i d n o t see, l i k e I s a y , an k 'ndividual . It was a l o h g t ime ago. I am p r e t t y s u r e ,of bhe people involved and I saw the i n c i d e n t , bu t a s f a r as which ones were and which ones were n o t , I c a n ' t r e a l l y say except t h a t t h e y were i n my company. .

gunned? . ~. A. I d o n ' t know, sir. I wasnl't t h e r e when and i f h e ~ J . Z , ' d ~ u t I~.was-- t o l d by-pract.ica1l.y . a l l . of t h e people t h a t I asked about it, t h a t he had.

A. That t h e company d i d . Yes, s i ' r , I saw a p a r t

~Q. ' Did Lieutenant . Ga l l ey order t h e s e groups rnachinc

Q. D i d you see him f i r e h i s weapon, or any weapon? A. I . d o n ' t know, sir.

A. Yes, f r a n k l y I do. I d o n ' t know e x a c t l y t h a t he d i d o r d e r ' i t , b u t from t h e in fo rma t ion t h a t I picked up from t h e company, from t h e o t h e r men, was t h a t t h e r e was a man who was a l i t t l e r e l u c t a n t -- n o t a 1 f t t l . e b i t -- he was a whole l o t r e l u c t a n t ab'out doi'ng t h i s , a man named Medloe -- I d o n ' t lcno~; how you s p e l l . t ha t -- t h a t , h e , d i d n ' t want any p a r t of i t , and t h a t L ieu tenan t C a l l e y p r e s s u r e d , h i m i n t o doing i t . But . t h i s I d i d n ' t see and I wasn ' t t h e r e e i the ' r , but I g a t h e r e d t h i s from t h e r e s t .of t he company, what happened..

. . ..

. .. Q. Do you know anyone t h a t he orde*ed t o do t h i s ?

- . . . Q. A. I d o n ' t know. I wasn't there,: sir, b u t . - - I

Did Medloe fire on these. people?

. d o n ' t know. . .

Q. Do you know why t h e s e people were rounded up

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really' ~iho I saw and ~Jho I dld not. Later on, I'Ih1.1e asking the men of the company, that is, all the men, all of the people tl1at I aslcedwe,re certaln of one thing, informed me of one thing, that he was dlrecting this operation, this type of gathering the people up into a large group, encjrc1ing them and firIng into the group.

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Q,. ,and you

A.

It is extremely important that didn't hear it.

'l:hat he--dld or that they did?

you saw this

.12 "Q, That it was done. 13 A. That the company did. Yes, srr, I saw a part 14 of it. I did not see, like I My, an fndivldual. It 15 was a loilg time ago. I am pretty sure .of the people 16 involved and I sal'l the incident, but as far 8S ~lhich ones 17 were and wh1.ch ones were not, I can't really say except 16 that they were in my company. ,

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Did Llel-\tenant, Calley ordel' these groups machine Q. gunned?

A. I don' t knoi~, sfr. I wasn "t there \~hen and if heara'~-l.'iut I-was- told by-p.racticallY.811 of the people that I aslced about, it, that he had. "

Q. A.

m,d you see him fire his weapon, or any weapon? I don 't lenON, sir.

f .. Q. Do you Ienow anyone that he ordered to do th1.s?

-A. Yes, frankly I do. I don't know exactly that he did order it, but from the informatlon that I picked up from the company, from the other men" was that there was a man who was a little reluctant -- not a little bit he was a ~lhole lot reluctant aeout dofng this, a man named Medloe -~ I don't Imovi hovl you spell that -- that,he didn't want any part of it, and that Lieutenant Calley pressured, him into doing it. But this I didn't see and I wasn't there ei the'r, but I gathered thls from the rest of the company, what happened.,

Q.Did Medloe fire on these people? A. I don't know. I wasnrt there,.' sir, but -- I

don 't know.

Q. Do you know why these people

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were rounded up

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I n t h i s f a s h l o n ? A. No, s i r , X d o n ' t . 'I cannot und'erstand the

It. ma.kes no 's.ense t o me. . whole t h i n g myself anyway.

Q. Who was PFC Michael Terrg? Did you Iwow him? A. Yes, X d i d .

'' Q. What was h i s duby aasl.gnment? A. . 1 b e l i e v e h e was e i t h e r a r i f l e m a n or an

au tomat ic r i f l e m a n i n e i t h e r t h e 3d o r 1st Pl.atoon, I don ' t know which. I believe i t was t h e 1st.

Q. . Did you see him on th i s ope ra t ion? A. 'No, '2 d i d n ' t s e e him -- oh,. I d i d . I saw him

I ' d i d n ' t see a f t e r we pushed through t h e f irst v i l l age . him .du r ing t h e push.

Q. A. Yes, 1 d i d .

Did YOU t a l k 60 him? ..

.~ -Q: "'-.-What -d%d--he say? . A. He was upse t about i t . Re d l d n t t . b e l i e ; e Tt

i s g rade was r i g h t . I d o n ' t know i f he had' any p a r t i n it o r n o t . He and myself and Olsen -- I don% know what

believe i t was t h e n l g h t we came back from t h e o p e r a t i o n , and we decided i b was n o t r i g h t . I thought a t t h e t 5 . n ~ I should have done something a b o u t . i t mysel?. n o t j u s t be ing p a s s i v e and n o t talllng an a c t i v e part;;. I should have done something a g a i n s t ft;, and t h a t was when we dec ided t h a t some time o r o t h e r we were going t o t r y and b r i n g out t h e f a c t s of what a c t u a I l y happened.

was -- and myself and OLsen Galkcd' about it 1 i : Sxr on. I

T h i s is

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. . Q. . Who decided t h i s ? .: A. Well, that nlt jht I d i d . ' I d o n ' t know whether

T h a t t h e y d i d o r n o t , T e r r y and 01sen. dec ided , t h a t t h a t would be t h e b e s t t h i n g t o d o ,

6t l e a s t one th ing we

would be t h e r i g h t t h i n g t o do., , .

Q. Who was Olsen? A.

Q. RTO? A. Radio o p e r a t o r i n Head'quaqt.ers Grbup. What.

Olsen was, I be l i eve , an RTO I n h e a d q u a r t e r s .

we c a l l e d t h e Headquarters Gro +-n~, ~ fF \C \ f i \ , , USE i%fv'-uded the company '

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A. No, sir, 1 don't.r cannot und'erstand the ,whole thing myself anyway. It makes no s,ense to me.

Q. Who was PFC t-Uchael 'l'erl'Y? Did you know him? A. Yes, X did. •

Q. --What \'Ias his duty assignment? A. ' ! be 11eve he wa s ei ther a rifleman or an

aut0mat1c rifleman in e1 thel; the 3d or lst Platoon. I donlt lmo~1 \~hich. I believe It Vi8S the 1st.

Q. Did you see him on this operation? A. ' -No, 1 didn't see him - - oh, I did. . I saw him

after we pushed through the first village. I didn't see him 'during the push.

Q. A.

Did you talk to him? Yes, I did.

.'

, . "--Q;--What ~1-tihe say? • A. He \1aS upset about ft. Be dldh'tbelieve it

was right. I don·t know if he had any part in it or not. Re and myself and Olsen -- r don "t knO\~ what his grade was -- and myself and Ol&en ,tal\ced about it later on. I believe it was the night we came back. from the operation, and we decided it was not right. I thought at the time I shbuld have done something about, it myself. This is not JU&t being passive and not taklng an active part; I should have done something against It, and that was when we decided that some time or other we were golng to try and bring out the facts of what· actually happened.

Q. . Who decided this? A. Well, that night t did.' I don't know whether

they did or not, Terry and Olsen. At least one thing we deCided, that that \'Iould be til\,! best thing to do. That would be the right thing to do.,

Q. Who was Olsen? ,A. Olsen was, I believe. an RTO in headquarters.~

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.~ .commander, h i s b a t t a l i o n r a d i o o p e r a t o r and ..+s ComfJany r a d i o o p e r a t o r , the head medic, and t h e a r t i 2 l . c r y P O , and t h e FO's r a d i o o p e r a t o r , and maybe somebody e l s e , oh,

1, t h e Vietnamese i n t e r p r e t e r , b u t peop1.e 1l.ke t h i n r;ere Inc luded i n what we c a l l e d Headquar te rs Group, end t h e y went j i t h t h e company. ' . .

, .

. . Q. Who was t h e othei; I:TO?

a ..A. : ... I ' m n o t s u r e . We had s e v e r a l changes of ' d u t y 8n a l t o g e S h e r d i f f e r e n t posi.tj.ons Peop3.e wer ' talcen'out of'

-~a lot of t h a t . X t h i n k it might have been i', W-I-D-M-E-R, PPC; I t h i n k it might have been.

,don ' , t vlear any k ind of i n s i g n i a . It i s d i f f i c u l t t o tell. ranks and suck. I d o n ' t remember e x a c t l y what h i s g rade was, or. what a l o t of t h e s e g r a d e s were. I was. a PPC

p o s i t i o n s and put i n t o there. Over t h e yea L s t h e r e vas

Over t h e r e w e . a l s o

' a t the t i m e . That Is the only ttifng J am su.re o f .

Q ..-- Di$-you...see_.any of t h e men you have mentioned

A. I d o n ' t t h i n k s o .

A. . No, I d i d n ' t see T e r r y a t a l l d u r i n g ' t h e pumh.

A.

. . . ~ f i r e on wounded c i v i l i a n s ?

Q. Did you s e e Te r ry f i r e on

. Q. What'do you mean by you clon ' t t h i n k so? By "I d o n ' t W i n k s o ' is I could have been

p r e s e n t a t t h e . t i m e t h a t something l i k e t h i s happened -- one of t h e people I mentioned here d2d 1- but t h e r e a r e a l o t of people I mentioned. here, . and t h e r e weFe a l o t of people i n the.company, and I t , w a s over a y e a r ago. I d o n ' t remember e x a c t l y who shob who o r d i d what, you know, as f a r as i n d i v i d u a l s go. As you can s e e , I am a l i t t l e vague on t h e p o s i t i o n s people h e l d , I wasn ' t sure what p l a t o o n I 'was In . Now. I believe it was the

' ' second, t he names o f my platoQn I e a d e r and squad l e a d e r ,

c i v i l i a n , i t is kind of hard t o a c t u a l l y name anyone. - - s o . - r e a l l y t o say t h a t I saw anybocly shoot a wounded

~-Q. . .-Did you see a woundea c f v i l i a n shot? ' A. Yes; y e s , I d i d . -

Q. Under what circumstances?. A. We were moving throuzli t h e v i l l a g e -- we were .

". on t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e v i l l a g e c a l l e d My La i ( 4 ) and

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... commander, his battalion radio operator and his company radio operator, the head medic J and ·the artillery 11'0, and the FO's r'adio operator, and maybe somebody else, oh, the Vietnamese Interpretel', but pe9Ple Uke thj.s \';e1'e Incluqed in ~Ihat Vie called Headquarters Group, and they Vlent \~i th the company. .

Q. 'Who was the othel; n'I'O? .. L .... I'm not sure. We had .several charges of:duty and

altogether different positions. PeopJe wer¢ taken out of positions and put into there. Over the yeats there \'las

-a lot of that. I think it might have been ,8 W-I-D·-r.1-E-R, P]!'C j I think it might have been. Over there we. also

. don 't ~lear any kind of insignIa. It is difficult to tell ranks and such. I don't remember exactly \,Iha'c his grade was, or what a lot of these grades were. I waf). a PFC

, at the time. That's the only thing I am sure of.

____ .Q. __ J2;Ld_Y9u.see any of the men you have mentioned fire on wounded civilIans? I

L I don't think so.

Q. Did you see Terry fire on wounded c1vilians? A.. No, I didn I t see Terry at all dl1X"i.ng· the push.

.-.. Q. What do you mean by :r,0u don't think so? A.. By "I don't think so' is I could have been

present at the.time that something like this happened one of the people I mentioned here did :.- but there are a lot of people I mentioned here ,. and there were a lot of people in the. company, and it .viaS over a year ago. I don't remember exact1y who shot? who or did what, you know, as far as individuals go. 1\s you can see, I am a little vague on the positions people held. I wasn't sure what platoon I'was in. Now I believe it was the second, the names of my plato"n leader and squad leader, so-really to say that I saw anybody shoot a wounded civilian, it is kind of hard. to actually name anyone.

. -Q ...... Did you see a wounded c.ivilian shot? . L Yes; yes, I did.

• Q. Under what circumstances'!. A. ~le were moving through the village -- we were

on the other side of the village c.alled My Lal (II) and

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY t h e r e vas a lironlan who was out p i c k i n g r i c e oy something. She was i n t h e r J c e f i e l d and she was s h o t v:hile I was there, from some p l a c e . Somebody s h o t her, . and t h e n a s we moved f o r w a r d , somebody went over and f i n i s h e d her o f f , $ired a few more rounds . It

..was.~soniebody. There were a l o t o f people s h o o t i n g a l o t of other people that . day. you would t i l n k , you know, a c t u a l l y s e e i n g somebody shoot soalebody, I ought ' t o r e -

. . member i t , b u t no, I d o n ' t remember. There was a l o t of t h a t t y p e of t h i n g t h a t day.

s h o t ?

I d o n l t remember who. .

-Q.

A. . Not s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t I can remember.

Q. Why was this woman s h o t ? A. I wouldn ' t know. I d o not unld.erstan6 t h a t ,

She had a r i c e baske t and she was p i c k i n g r i c e and she was j_ugt.-s&o_t and then she was l y i n g t h e r e . I gu-ess there were two t h i n g s . you cou la ''86;--caTT a"-medevac , which would be kind of a s t u p i d t h i n g t o do i n t h a t case because assume you sho t h e r , well i t i s kind of r i d i c u l o u s t o c a l l medical a i d . Whoever d i d i t , I guess, went and f i n l s h e d h e r o f f .

was calmly o u t t h e r e p ick ing r i c e ?

Weli, it was s o r t of a one-way f i r e f i g h t . . Vk.had gone through most eve ry th ing . I b e l i e v e t h a t where I was whi le moving through was on th'e r i gh t f l a n k of t h e second element , t h a t - i s , t h e second one f n a r d e r . I am not sure about t h i s b u t we seemed t o s e e no th ing but what was on o u r l e f t . It seemed t h a t e v e r y t h i n g was happening there , s o ' y e s , t h a t ' s what sha d i d . . She was out t h e r e calmly p i ck ing r i c e , o r maklng f t . appear she was. J u s t t o g i v e an example of uha t t h e s e people do -: you may n o t understand t h i s -- but t h e r e was an i n c i d e n t where t h e r e was an armed' V ie t Cong; h e ffred;; , he r a n . T h i s is a t a d i f f e r e n t t ime. Garry CrossIey s h o t him. He was armed V i e t 'Cong; f i r e d on Garry, and Garry- sho t him.. There were some o t h e r men a c r o s s an onen cl.eari.ng i n t h e wood l i n e shoo t ing a t u s t r y 3 n g ' t o keep us down, I guess , end l e t t h e r e s t of them make a getaway, and t h e r e was a f i r e f i g h t go ing on Between us two. and '

Any o t h e r c a s e s where you saGi wounded c i v i l i . a n s

A- - .- _ _

:- Q. Do you mean t h i s woman, d u r i n g the f i r e f i g h t ,

A. Yes, sir, and t h i s i s e x a c t l y what' t h e y d i d .

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FOR OfFICIAL USE ONLY there was a \'loman Nho VI8S out picldnG rice or something. She \'ltW in the rJce field and she was shot while I was there, from some place. Somebody shot her, ~md then as we moved forward, somebody vlent over and finishcd her off, fired a fev) more rounds. I don't remember who. It

,_was_somebody. There were a lot of people shoot1,ng a lot of other people that. day ;-You vlOuld think,. you know, actually seelng somebody shoot somebody, I ought to re­member it, but no, I don't remember. There was a lot of

- that type of thlng that day.

Q. shot?

A.

Any other cases where you sa~1 'wounded civl1:i.ans

Not specif:tcally that I can remember;'

Q. Why was this woman shot? " A. I wouldn It knol'l. I do not understand that.

She had a rice baske.t and she \'las plcltfng rice and she was .1..us1; __ l?hoJ;.L. and then she was lying there. I guess there were tvio- tb:tng-s,you-coli1.adb-;-call a-medev8c, which would be klnd of a stupid thing to do in that case because assume you shot her, well it is kind of ridiculous to call medical aid. vlhoever d·id it, I guess, went and flnished her off. t

Q. Do you mean th:l-s woman, during the fire fight J

was calmly out there picking rice? . A. Yes. sir, and this is exactly what. they did.

Well, it ~Ias sort of a one-way fire fight., We, had gone through most everything. I believe that where I vIas wh;l.le moving through was on th'e right flank of the second element, that -is J the second one in arder. I am not sure about this but we seemed to see nothing but what was on our left. It seemed that everything was happening there, so' yes, that I s ~Ihat she dId., She was out there calmly picking rice" or making it appear she , was. Just to give an example of what these people do -­you may not understand this -- but there was an incident where there was an armed Viet Cong.:: he fired';' he ran. This is at a different time. Garry Crossley shot him. He was armed Viet ·Cong; fired on Garry, and Garry-shot him. There were some othel' men across an open cl_earing in the ,~ood line shootlng at us try.ing' to keep us down, I guess, and let the rest of them make a geta\Vay, and there \~as a fire fight gOing on between us two, and

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r i g h t i n t h e middle of t h i s an o l d woman from somewhere %allced o u t - i n t h e middle of t h e kh.ing,. and t h e y t o l d h e r t o g e t o u t of the way, and she v!aliced rxght i n t h e middle of i t , and she g o t b i l l e d . So. t h i s is j u s t t o g i v e an example what t h e s e people do. I d o n ' t know

to"'€hem when you a r e out t h e r e shoo t ing . Maybe i t is because i t 4 s going on ' a l l the t ime. But t he day . in q u e s t i o n , t h a t i s e x a c t l y what she V J ~ S d-oing. She' wes ou ' c - the re calmly p i c k i n g r i c e .

. .~ why but f o r some reason i t doe,sn ' t seem t o mean a t h i n g

. ..

Q. ' Was t h i s someone from y o u r squad t h a t sho t her? A. No, I can say t h a t reasonably c e r t a i n because

my dqued was w i t h my p la toon , which was n o t r i g h t wi th m e a t t h e t ime. It was e l . ther somebocly from headquar t e r s o r somebody from t h e p la toon t h a t was a d j a c e n t t o head-

, q u a r t e r s . I d i d n ' t s e e my squad g r a c t f c a l l y t h e whole day u n t i l we f i n 8 l l y f i n i s h e d up t h e whole o p e r a t i o n and came t o t h e n igh t . de fens ive pe r ime te r . - . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . - . . ~. ~.

Q. Who was PPC William F. 'Doher ty? D i d you know him?

A. Yes, I d i d . Doherty, Oruver,, Te r ry , and -- i~e l l . , I t h i n k t h o s e a r e t h e t h r e e you mentioned i n bbis c l a s s -.-. we were a l l i n t h e 70th Long €lance Reconnaissance P a t r o l Detachment before we were s e n t t o Vietnam. T h i s u n i t was i n o p e r a t i o n f o r about maybe t-wo months' i n Schof i e ld Barracks , Hawaii . ' It was disbanded when t h e u n i t was t o move t o Vietnam, and we were s e p a r a t e d and p laced i n t o d i f f e r e n t a r e a s of the 11 th Brigade, most of u s . t o C h a r l i e Company, 1/20th.

Q. Did you see-Doherty on t h i s a p e r a t i o n ? A. N o t . e x a c t l y on the o p e r a t i o n . The o p e r a t i o n

l a s t ed -- wai t a minute -- t h e o p e r a t i o n l a s t e d f o r more t h a n j u s t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r fncident . , . I d i d s e e him on t h e o p e r a t i o n but no t du r ing t h e push.

. .

Q. Did you s e e Doherty f i r e on wounded c i v i l i a n s ? A. No, as I say , . I d i d n ' t s e e nfm dur ing the, push

'.Ill t h i s p a r t i c u l a r . i n c i d e n t I didnlit see anybody -- a c t u a l l y , I cannot s ay a person s h o t a wounded ' c i v i l r a n ' or a c i v i l i a n i n any o t h e r s i t u a t i o n . . I dic?nlt s e e . a n

, i n d i v i d u a l do t h i s . I know I saw g r o u p , which i s i n

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right in the middle of thiS an old "loman rrom some1'lhere \~alked out in the middle of the ,thing" and' they told her to get out of the way t and she v!alked 1'1'ght in the middle of it, and she got killed. So this is just to give an example 1'Ihat these people do. I don't ImoVi \~hy but for some reason it doesn't seem to mean a th:tng

"to'Them when you are out there shooting. Maybe 1t is because it 'is going on all the time. But the day .1n ques,tion, that is exactly what she Vias d'o1'ng. She ,~as out"there calmly picking rice.

Q. Was this someone from your squad that shot her? L No, I can say that reasonably certain because

my squad was with my platoon, which vias not right with me at the time. It was either somebody trom headquarters or somebody from the platoon that was adjacent to head-

.quarters. I didn't see my squad practically the "hole day until we finally finished up the whole operation and came to the night defensive perimeter.

, Q. Who was PFC William F. 'Dbherty? Did you kno1'1 him?

A. Yes, I did. Dohel'ty, Gruver, Terry. and -- vlell, I think those are the three you mentioned' in itbis class .,., we were all in the 'roth Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment before we were sent to Vietnam. This unit was 1n operation for about maybe t\~O months' in Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.' It was disbanded when the unit "las to move to Vietnam, and we vlere separated' and placed into diffel'ent areas of the 11th Brigade, most of us, to Charlie Company, 1/20th. . ,

, . ,

Q. Did you see Doherty on this operatj,on? A. Not. exactly on the operation. The operation

lasted -- wait a minute -- the operation lasted for more than just this particular incident .. , I did see him on the operation but not during the push.

Q. Did you see Doherty fire on wounded civilians? A. No, as I say,. I didn't see him during the push.

'In this particular' incident I didn ',t see anybody -­a,ct(.ually, I cannot say a person shot a woundedC1 vl1fari' or a civilian in any other situation,.. I didn't see ,an individual do this. I knOV! I saw groups, which is in

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f a c t what t h e s e people a re . A t t h e t ime the4 a r e p a r t of .a group, a - u n i t . -I could say I saw elements of t h c company shoo t ing wounded c i v i l j . a n s , shoo t ing c i v i l i a n s gathered up i n t o a group , a p p a r e n t l y c i v f l i a n s ,

, Q. . D i d you know PPC' E s e q u i e l Torres? , .

A. Yes.

A. Yes, he was i n my p l a t o o n . I ' m n a t sure 1

Q. Was' he i n your p la toon? I '

vihether he' was i n my squad OP n o t , or whether he was t h e . r a d i o o p e r a t o r f o r t h e p l a toon , o r what. He was .-later .on -- l i k e I say, we changed o u r j o b s ' s e v e r a l times. I ended up a s a machine gunner i n t e 3d Pla toon b y ' t h e end. of my t o u r . I knew h i m , y e s . I f d i d n ' t see him d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n , du r ing t h i s par tL;cular t ime . He was I n my p l a t o o n and my p l a t o o n wasn ' t 'anywheres n e a r me d u r i n g t h e time i n q u e s t i o n . They were way ahead and I was with headquar t e r s group. I t r a v e l e d with them f o r the rest of t h a t day. ..

Q. Did you see Torres d u r i n g t h e push?

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. Q.. Did anyone tel~l you no t td? A. Frankly , . y e s ..

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Q.

A. No, 3: d i d n o t . I ,made no such t h r e a f . However;,

D i d you e v e r t h r e a t e n t o x r f t e a Cbngressman'

for some reason o r o t h e r it was be l ieved t h a t I would. Somebody a p p a r e n t l y t o l d the p l a t o o n lead:er, the.company

-commander, or something l i k e t h i s , t h a t I was going t o write t o my Congressman, Senator o r P r e s i d e n t . I d i d no t t h r e a t e n t o do i t . However, I 1ntended . t .o do i t , n o t t h r e a t e n e d t o do i t .

or anyone concerning t h i s i n c i d e n t ? I

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Q. Who was It? A. My company commander, CPT Medina.

Q. When? A. The day a f t e r -- t h e even ine vie r e t u r n e d , o r

t h e day a f t e r . f romXhe OpCIQtiQn t o LZ D o t t i e . H e d i d n o t g ive me a n o r d e r t o n o t w r i t e . He only encouraged me more o r l e s s

It was wi th in a day a f t e r we r e t u r n e d

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tact .h,t th",~O!o~::~~~~L~S:h~~i:~ tJJ are p.r' ofa group, aunJt. -I could say I sm~ elements of the company shootJng vlOundcd qi vi Hans, shooting civilians gathered up into a group, apparently civilians.

Q, A.

Did you know PFG Esequiel Torres? Yes. i

I ~, Was he in your platoon? I ' A. -Yes, he was in my platoon. I'm not sure

whether he' VIaS in my squad or not, or whether he was the. radio operator for the platoon, or what. He was lateron-- lij{e 1 say, we changed our jobS' several times. 1 ended up as a machine gunner in t~e 3d Platoon by 'the end of my tour. I knew him, yes. II dj,dn't see him during the operation, during this partiicular time. He was ,in my platoon and my platoon wasn I t any-wheres near me during the time in question. They were ~18y ahead and I \~as with headquarters group. I traveled with them for the rest of that day.

Q. Did you see Torres during the push?

-----:-----:~ :o:,i::~:. threaten to write a cLgressman -or anyone concerning this incident? /

A. No, I did not. I_made no such threa.\;. However, for some reason or other it was believed that I would. Somebody apparently told the platoon leadel' ,_ the _ company

-commander, or something like this, that I was going to write to my Congressman, Senator or President. 1 did not threaten to do it. Hovlever, I intend-ed - to do it J not threatened to do it.

, Q. - Did anyone te1l you not to? A. Frankly, - ye s .'

Q. \~ho was it? A. My company commander:, CPT medina.

Q, When? A. The day after -- the evening vie returned, or

the day after. It was within a day after we returned tr6nf~t:heopeJ:lationto -LZDottie. He did not give me an order to not ~Iri te. He only encouraged- me more or less

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n o t t o Tirite, . a m a t t e r of s ay ing , "I. wXsh you wouldn ' t do t .hat , more o r l e s s , o r words t o t h a t e f f e c t .

Q. Who i s LTC Beers? Did you. know I X m ? 6. Yes, I d i d . I knew who he was ., I d i d n ' t know

him '.pcTr~soijally.

- Q. Did you see him on t h i s operatl 'on? .A. .No, I d i d n o t ,

.Q. How about MAS B e l l ? Did you .Know him? A. No, I d i d n ' t know M A J Bell..

Q. M A J C l i f f o r d ? A. No, I d l d n ' t ltnow MAS Clifford ' . . There was --

I b e t t e r n o t say t h a t I d o n ' t remember. N O ~ ' I d o n ' t know e i the r MAJ"Ue l1 o r MAJ C l i f f o r d . .

t h i s -oper a t 5. on ?

first v i l l a g e , t h a t t ype of t h i n g was s topped . r i g h t t h e r e . We went through t h e r e s t of t h e v i l l a g e s c o l l e c t i n g l i k e l y . s u s p e c t s , VC as they a re c a l l e d , . a& ga the red them a t t h e p o i n t where we had ou r n i g h t devensXv8 p e r i m e t e r .

Q.

A. A s I ullderstand i t , a s I b e l i e v e , a f t e r t h e

Were-any o the r viL.liLges. simi.lar1.y t r e a t e d on ,

Q. Was My L a i ' 0.1 burned? ' A. Yes, My La i ( 2 ), t h e peop1.e were k i l l e d , most

of them, p r a c t i c a l l y a l l of. them, I b e l t e v e a l l of them. X d i d n ' t see anybody a l i v e . The houses were burned, t rampled . The - l i v e s t o c k was a l l k i l l e d ... . . . . . , . . , . , . .

Q. ,Were t h e o r d e r s g iven p r i o r t o t h e combat

A. ..a supply p o i n t and a h i d e o u t , more o r l e s s , f o r t h e

a s s a u l t t o d e s t r o y t h e v i l l a g e ?

V i e t Cong, t ha t t h i s was where t h e Viet Cong g o t t h e i r food, t h a t t h i s was where t h e y stayed a t n ight . , and so

we should des t roye) i t .

Q. A. Myself?

Yes, t h e o r d e r was g i v e n t l i a t . ' t he v i l l a g e was

. . .on , and t h a t vie shou lddes t roy the dweIlings and t h e l i v e - s t o c k , and a s much p o t e n t i a ' l food as.. t h e r e was, . .

c

Did you burn any o f the ;i'Iluges?

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not to write, a matter of saying, "I wIsh you ~/Ouldn't do that", more or less, or words to that effect.

Q. \~ho is LTC Beers? Did you know n:Lm? 1\.. Yes, I did. I knelV who he was.. I didn't knoVi

himpe-rfforlally.

Q. Did you see him on this operatIon? LBo, I did not.

. Q. How about I.jAJ· Bell'! Did you know him? A. No, I didn't know MAJ Bell.

Q. MAJ Clifford? A. No, I didn't know rvlAJ Clifford·.

. I better not say that -.- I don't remember. knovi either MJlJ Bell or MAJ Clifford.

'rhere was -­No;' I don't

Q. Wer.e-cmy ot!)er village.s. s.imi.larly treated on this ·operatj.on?

A. As I understand it, as I believe, after the first village, that type of thing "las stopped right there. We vlent through the rest of the villages colle.cting . likely suspects, VC as they are called, altd gathered them at the point where we had our night devenslve perimeter.

Q. Was My Lai . (II) burned? . A. Yes, My Lai (4), the people wel'e killed, most

of them, practically all of them. I believe all of them. I didn't see anybody alive. The houses \·lere burned, trampled. The livestock vias all killed ...

Q. . Were the orders given prior to the combat assault to destroy the village? .

A. Yes, the order was given that the village was _.8 supply point and a hideout, more or less, fOl" the

Viet Cong, that this was where the Viet Cong got their food, that this was l1here they stayed· at night·, and so

. -on, and that we should destroy the dweIIings and the li ve­stock, and as much potential f'ood as. there was here, we should destroy tit. . ..

Q. . A.

Did you burn any of the villages? Myself?

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Q. Yes. A. No, I d i d n ' t .

Q. Were you. ordered t o ? A. S p e c i f i c a l l y , no, I w3s n o t . I cons idered that; ,

wel l ; I was more o r l e s s an excep t ion . I was t aken ou t and.'iisea f o r t h i s rope t h i n g , a.s I mentioned b e f o r e . I s t a y e d with headquar t e r s and we were belifnd most .. of the burn ings . I d i d n ' t s e t f i r e t o , a n y houses on t h i s pa'r- tici?'lar i n s t a n c e . I d i d , however , .on I a t e r o p e r a t i o n s s e t ' f i r e t o houses . There were some doubts about this, too , b u t I d o n ' t f ee l t h a t t h i s was r e a l I y t a o bad, tha t i s , burning houses down,

Q. I n t h e o p e r a t i o n s conducted' by 'C C.ompany, a s i d e from this p a r t i c u l a r one, vJas T t normal t o s u b j e c t t h e v i l l a g e r s t o t h i s t r ea tmen t?

.A. were mistr ,eated b a s i c a l l y . They were h a r r i e d and h a r a s s e d , s62o--$pealr. It wasnJt--basi.cal-3;y-an~3r Aind o f k i l l i n g Intel? on. There was 'some i n s t a n c e s where there was ki l l l .nf , , and t h e r e was a q u e s t i o n about , you know,, why, bu t i t . was no t t aken t o o s e r i o u s l y . It was taken ve ry l i igh t ly due t o the f a c t t h a t we had done sonetii ing before . tha t made that look .I.ilce it was p r a c t i c a l l y no th ing a t ' a l l ; t h a t l s a l l . The people were j u s t g e n e r a l l y m i s t r e a t e d i n most c a s e s .

.. Not this pa r t i cv . l a r t rea tment , . But t h e v i l l a g e r s

Q. I n what way were they mls t r e s t ed? ' A. The men were bea ten i n s e v e r a l c a s e s , sorne o1.d

men. They were bea ten . There was a l o t o f ' c u t t i n g o f f of beards a n d . s u c h . ~ . . .~ . . . . .

Q. Who d i d t h i s ? A. Various people i n t h e company.. I n t h i s par-

t i c u l a r one I would prefer n o t t o name names. I know a few but X d o n ' t f e e l i t would be ju~s t i ' ce , . you know, t o s a y any th ing about them. I n l i g h t o f w h a t happened p r e v i o u s l y , t h i s wasn't anything..

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' ' ' . Q. DO you refer t o ~ P i n k v i l l e 7 , , ~ .

6. When I s a i d "previously",. I r e f e r t o what happened i n t h e P i n k v i l l e 'Opera t ion .. t h i s wasn ' t r e a l l y t o o much. The& peopl'e escaped w i t h t h e i r l i v e s and they were b a s i c a l l y no t oermanently damaked.

What. Kappened t h e r e ,

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Q. Yes. L No, I didn't.

Q. "Iere you ordered to? A. Specifically, no, I was not. I considered that,

well; I Vias more or less an exception. I was taken out .. 'anilusea for this rope th:l.ng, as I mentioned before. I

stayed with headquarters and we NC1"e behind most. of the burnings. I didn't set fire to'any bouses on this par­ticltlar :l.nstance. I did , however ,on later operations set' f:l.re to houses. There vlere some doubts about th:l.s,

.too, but I don't feel that this was really too bad, that is, burning houses down.

Q. In the operations conducted by ·C C,ompany, aside from this particular one, was it normal to subject the villagers to this treatment? .

·A. Not this partj.cular treatment, but the villagers \'lere mistr,eated basically. They were harried and harassed,

"sot;(f-speak. It wasnJ t·bssica1-1Y-lilny-kind of killing later on. '1'he1'e was' some instances where there was k1 111nf" and there was a question about, you kno1'l,. 1'lhy, but it· \'18S

not taken too seriously. It \'Ias talten very lightly due to the fact that we had done somethlng beford .that made that look like it was practically nothing at all; that's all. The people were just generally mistreated in most . , cases. f

Q. In what way were they mistreated? A. The men were beaten in several cases', some old

men. They \~ere beaten. There was a lot of' cutting off of beards and such .

Q. vlho did this? A. Various people in the company. In this par-

ticular one I would prefer not to name names. I know a few but I don 't feel it would be Justice,. you knO~I, to say anything about them. In light of what happened previously, thi s wasn't anything.,

Q. Do you refer toPinkvflle? 1).. vlhen I said "previously"" I refer to what

happened in the Pinkville' Operation., What. l1appened there) this wasn't really too much. Thest! p'eople escaped with their lives and they \1ere basically nat permanently dama.L;ed.

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"Q. Did. t he NCOB t r y t o e x e r c i s e coatro ' l over t h i s

A. It would be d i f f i c u l t f o r anyone t o under the s o r t of t h i n g ?

s i t u a t i o n a s i t was i n many c a s e s , but t he re :v l e re some times where t h e p l a toon s e r g e a n t , SGT Buchanan, t r i e d , some-tXrnGs tried - t o t control what lrms g o i n g on'. I cou1.d tell he dit l n o t want anyth ing t o d o w i t h m i s t r e a t i n g c i v $ l i a n s . He d i d n ' t e x a c t l y what you c a l l sympathize with them, was supposed t o be doing , and he trol t h e peop1.e. There were

but he' r e a l i z e d i t wasn ' t

t h i n k he d i d r iFht i n t h i s way. men would m y , tvould say , No, knock it o f f . Keep going',. H e i s unarmed. -- tr .ying t o make these men f e e l bnsical.lsr down, t h e way

There were' t imes when I I

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go * Sometimes we had 'PBCs and' SPbs running- dhese j o b s . It i s u s u a l l y t h e , ca se over thelie.

Q. Were s e d r c h and d e s t r o y o p e r a t i o n s t h e normal. t ype?

A. As f a r a s an o p e r a t i o n goes , going from one o p e r a t i o n t o a n o t h e r , t h e r e wasn ' t r e a l l y much o f a d i s t i n c t i o n . They j u s t s a i d go o u t , and o u t . w a s outs j .de of t h e f i r e base, o u t s i d e of the p e r i m e t e r . We. would go o u t and t h i s , I take it,,would be an apera t i 'on . Sometimes we d i d n ' t s e e damn mnch of an ob jBc t ive . We j u s t ' wandered. - However, t h e r e were some t1m.e.s we we,re t o l d t h a t we were supposed t o go through, and' if t h e r e was any th ing found i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r v i l l a g e t h a t might have been used by t h e V i e t Cong, l e f t t h e r e by t h e V i e t Cong, if t h e r e had e v e r been any i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e V l e t Cong had e v e r been there , ' t h a t we sliould' burn t h e house, or whatever, and t h e r e were o t h e r occas ions t h a t we were t o l d we were j u s t supposed t o move t.a t h e v i l l a g e and s e a r c h i t , and t h a t was a l l .

I

>Q. What was t h e enemy s t r e n g t h i n t h e a rea? A. I d o n ' t know what the enemy s t r e n g t h was. I

g o t t h e impression t h a t t h e r e were l a r g e numbers, but. a s f a r a s what t h e s t r e n g t h was, I don% kmw.. They seemed. t o be a l i t t l e l i g h t , bu t i t always seemed' l i k e t h a t .

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'Q. Did the NCOs try to exercise control over thts sort of thing?

A. It would be difficult for anyone to under the situation as it was in many cases, but there'were some times 'where the platoon sergeant, SG'r Buchanan, tried, soniEft~rjjeg triE)dto'control I'lhat Vias .going on', I could tell he ditl not ~lant anything to do vlith mistreating .civ;\,lians. He didn't exactly what you call sympathize with them, but he realized it wasn't exactly what he was supposed to be dOing, and he tried someihmes to con·· trol the people. TherE) were several incidents that I think he did I'i\iht in this 11ay. There 1'lere! times when men would say, 'Let's place them," and such~. and he would say, "No, knock it off. Keep going', He is unarmed." -- trying to malce these men feel basicallj' dOVln, the way they were treating ci vi lians. He ~i8S my platoon sergeant. That's how I knol'l. As far as the rest of the platoon sergeants, I don't knOlL It is kindo! hard to tell.

-'--'NC0s;-'-w,~-werea little bit shorthanded as,.:C?r as NCOs go. Sometimes VIC hadPPCs and sp4s running tihese jobs. It is usually the' case over there. /

Q, vlere search and destroy operations the normal type?

", A. As far as an operation goes, going from one operation to anotl1er, there wasn "t really much of a distinction. They just said go out, and out Vias outside of the fire base, outside of the perImeter. We ~Iould go out and this, I take it, ,would be an operati'on. Sometimes we didn't see damn much of an obJective. We just' wan.dered .. However, there were some time,s, we were told that Vie were supposed to go through, and' if there ~Ias anything found in this particular village that might have been used by the Viet Cong, left there by the Viet Cong, if there had ever been any indications that the Viet Cong had ever been there; that we should' burn the house, or ~Ihatever, and there were other occasions that we were told we were Just supposed to move to the village and search it, and that was all.

J Q. What was the enemy strength in the area? A. I don't know what the enemy strength was. I

, got the impression that there were large numbers, but as "far as what the strength was, I don tt kn.ow.. They seemed' to be a little light, but it always seeme~ like that.

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'.Q. Were a l l of t h e a r e a s t h a t C Gompany opcraLed i n hot.VC a r e a s ?

A. It i s kind of h s r d f o r me t o s.ay.. They a l l seemed t o be about t h e same except f o r t h e Duc Pho

. r e g i o n t h a t we were a s s i g n e d , t o 3.n September, l a t e r September and e a r l . y O c t o b e r . That was $he only p l a c e t h a t there r e a l l y wasn ' t much doing .. p.lae~e. The r e s t of t h e p l a c e s seemed t o be about t h e same except~"€Ia Tahn -- €1-A T-A-H-N. I. b e l i e v e t h a t I . s t h e way i t I . s s p e l l e d . Ha Tahn was the l a s t p l a c e we went t o . Ha Tahn t h e r e seemed t o be a ' l o t more than i n p r e v i o u s a r e a s , Ha Tahn was N V A i n f e s t e d , .ancl t h e r e were l a r g e numbers, s e v e r a l companies,, I suppose.

That was ai lother

Q.

A.

Was t h i s i n your normal A 0 f o r t h e co.mpany or t h e t a s k . force?

T h i s was no t ' i n t h e t a s k f o r c e . . - . ~ ~ a s ~ : l a . t e y _ . o i i a f t e r . the t a s k f o r c e was disbanded , I be-

l i e v e . Ha Tahn was not-liormal-Py -- .aP c o u r s e , I don ' t We were what t h e y c a l l e d

a f l o a t 3 n g uni t , . s o t o speak . We d i d t r ave l . around a l o t . We were i n t h e t a s k f o r c e AO,, which i s , t h i s area here ( i n d l c a t i n g ) , goes up n o r t h , I b e l i e v ? , arid then we went back t o Duc Pho. We had t h e Dou.gPas.Brigade a r e a . We had an a r e a l i k e LZ Black and 1iil.I. 992, which was west of Highway 1 and south of Quang Ngai, I t h i n k . We had t h a t a r e a f o r awhi l e . Then we bad Duc Pho aga in and then Ha Tahn.

T h i s Ha Tahn

. r e a l . l y know what our 'A0 was.

Q. .How many c i v i l i a n s ,do ou est'i'mate were k i l l e d

A: I e s t i m a t e over a hundred.. aver a hundred , i s d u r i n g the push through My L a i ($I?. a l l I c a n . e s t i m a t e .

Q. What p r o p o r t i o n of t h e s e do ~ l a u t h i n k were VC? A. I t h i n k t h e s e p a r t ' i c u l a r Ones were very s m a l l '

p r o p o r t i o n s . s ay VC, an a c t i v e VC?

I t h i n k maybe -- WeII,. a c t u a x l y when you

Q. No, a c t i v e or suppor t ing . ,

.Q. Yes. A. It is d i f f i c u l t f o r me t o say.. T.hey may be

a l l suppor t ing except the ones t o o small' t o . walk, b u t

. I A. Active. o r suppor t ing? c

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'. Q. Were all of the areas that C Company operated in hotVC apeas?

A. It is kind of hapd for me to say. The.)' all seemed to be about the same except fop the Due Pho region that we wepe ass:tgned. to In September, latep September and earty- October. That Vias the only place that there really wasn't much dolng.. That I'las [mothe):'

' .... pla.de. 'rlle rest of the places seemed to be about the same excepi-Ha Tahn -- H-A T-A-H-N. I believe that ls the way H :I.S spelled. Ha Tahn was the last place we went to. Ha Tahn thepe seemed to be a lot more than in p1'evlou8 apeas. Ha Tahn was NVA lnfested,.and there \-Iere large numbers, several companies ,. I suppose.

15 Q. "las this in you:r normal fiO for the cOJl1pany 16 or the task force? 17 A. This ~Ias not' In the task force. Thls Hn Tahn

.-. __ 11) .- .... ____ .-\"/asla.j;.§!' on after the task force Vias dTsbanded ,I be-19 l1eve. Ha- Tahnwas-hot-t'iOrma1:-1y -~ofcourse, I don 't

.,

20 _ really Imol'l l'lhat our' AO was. We Vlepe what they called 21 a float1 ng unit i so to speak. \I/e did travel around a 2 lot. We Vlere in the task force flO, which is this area 2.~ here (indIcating), goes up north, I belieVe' and then' 21\ we went back to Duc Pho. ~le had the DougJ;as. Brigade 25 area. We had an area like LZ Black and- Hi 11 992, whi ch 26 was \-Iest of Higl:)I'i8y 1 and south of Quang Ngai, I think. ~~. We had that area for a\"lhlle. Then we had' Due Pho agaln

and then Ha Tahn. 29 30 31

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Q.How many civilians ·do you estimate were kllled during the push through My Lai (41? . . .

A. . I estimate over a hundred-. aver a hundred is all I can· estimate.

Q. What proportion of these d-o you think were VC? A. I think these part'icular ones were very small'

proportlons. I think maybe -- well,. actually when you say VC, an active VC?

Q. . A.

No, active or sUpportlng .. Acti ve. or supporting?

. Q. Yes.

.. A. It is difflcult for me to g·ay.. T.hey may be

all supporting except the ones too small to walk, but

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t h e y could a l l be . Even a r!o?::ar., o l d man o r small c h i l d cou3.d s e t a mine. I couldnft s a y which, b u t a s far a s say inz vihat would be a r m bea r ing V i e t Cone; were. men, usual.13; men of rnil3:targ. age had l e f t a v i l l a g e . Th3.s 3,s usua1.I.y what we f i n d when we go t o a v i l l a g e , that; t h e r e a r e n ' t any younp; men t h e r e .

. .

small c h i l d r e n ?

a ~ t .

Q. IIon many o f t h e one hundmd would you say were

A. I d o n ' t know. I c a n % rcaIiy say. There were

Q. What i.s a l o t ? A. Well, l i k e I s a y , 3.t i s d i f T i c u l t . I c a n ' t

r e a l l y t e l l you i n numbers. I d i d n ' t c o u n t . .When you see sonie small c h i l d r e n k i l l e d like t h a t , you d o n ' t real.1.y get t h e r i g h t inipression of it,: I d 'on ' t t h i n k .

Q. Was it two, four, s i x 01- -- A. ( I n t c r p o s i n g ) Q u i t e a few, more than t ~ o , f o u r ,

.- s i x .

Q. What percentarre would vou. s a v ? - A. I wouid s a y -- well , small c i i i l d ren . What i s

I . small. c h i l d r e n ?

Q. You mentioned small. c h i l d r e n t h a t c o u l d n ' t wa lk . A. Oh, cou. ldn*t wa1.k. There weren't , t o o many.

&. Babies? A. Maybe less t h a n a dozen or so;

Q. And how many would you s a y , were under a y e t o d o

A.

. ~

.. . . any s o r t ~ . o f s u p ~ p m ~ c t ? ..

Well, l i k e I s a i d before, . a s long as you can walk, you h o w , weLl you can do some suppor t a c t i v i t y , and t h e y do u t i l i z e people on a Iarge sca1.e a s f a r a s t a k i n g them f r o a d i f f e r e n t age groups. you can walk, you can suppor t t h e cause, I b e l i e v e , even i f i t i s a c h i l d c a r r y i n g something.

sympathizing, of t h i s group of one hundred?

I mean a s long a s

--Q. .. -How many would' you tbiink af t h i s p o r t i o n were

A. 1 would say a good 9C$ cou ld have,

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they could all be. Even a vI0~]an, old man or small child could set a mine. I c0\11dn't say Wh'lCh, but as fElt' as saying vihat would be arms bearlng Viet Cone; \1e1'e. men, usually men of milItary age Iiad left a village. This is usually what we :find \'lhen vIC e;o to a village, that there aren't any young men there.

Q. How many of the one hundred would you say Vlere small chiidren? '

A. I don't know. I can't really say. There l'Iere a lot.

'Q. What l.s a lot? A. Well, like I say, H is difficult. I can't

really tell you in numbers. I dldn' t count. ,When you see some small children killed like that, you don't really get the rie;ht j.mpression of it ,. I don't think.

Q. Was l.t two, four, stx 01' --A. (Interposing) Qu:t te a few, more than t\'iO, four,

. --v. six .

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Q. What percentage would you say? A. I would say -- well, small children. What is

small children? I. Q. You mentioned small children that couldn't walk. A. Oh, couldn't walk. 'l'here weren't/too many.

Q. Babies? A. Maybe less than a dozen 0.1' so'.

~.7C ;!_ '_. . Q. And how many would you say were under age to do . -'~. any' sort 'of suppWv--act1vity'i'

'. '

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35 L Well, like I said before~ as long as you can ;; walk, you Imol1, well you can do some support activity, 30 and they do utilize people on a large scale as far as 39 taking them from different age groups. I mean as long as ~o you can walk, you can support the cause, I believe, even ~I if it is a child carrying something .

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-Q. ·How many would' you think of this portion were sympathizing, of this group of one hundred?

. . A. I would say a good 90% could have.~

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Q. No, I meant how many of t h e g roup ' bf one

A. Oh, below t h e age o f t w e l r e y e a r s ? Oh, 'well.,

hundred w0ul.d you s a y were, well., 1.ct"s say below t h e age of twelve y e a r s ?

t h a t I s somethlnl;; e l s e - - approsinlate!.y 20. 6 ;

8 ' A. Dozen o r Less. ,' .Q. We have g o t about a dozen b a b i e s ? ,

' Q. Arid twenty - - j

- A. ( I n t e r p o s i n g ) Perhaps more t h e n ,20. IAke 1:

i l

say, t h e numbers a r e going t o be - - .Q. ( I n t e r p o s i n g ) The men 'thaL were , i ' n t h e s e

groups of dead t h a t you say{, what age would t h e y be? A . . The men were f o r t h e most p a r t o l d men, or

men, o r o l d men.

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Q.. A. There were a few young men. T w i l l s a y not;

Were t h e r e any young men 'In. the. v i l l a ' ge?

young men but men t h a t appeared t o me t o be -- t h e r e klere.-sEveral -J - noti-ced . --.-I -went. . through one house. There were a l o t of dead p e o p l e ' i n t h e house!. There

dead, b u t t h e y were about 30 y e a r s o l d , 1 w u l d say , 30 , 35, I wou1.d s a y . They were a l i t t l e b i t g e t t i n g on a s f a r as the Vietnamese a r e concerned, g e t t i n g on i n .age,

"-.. . ,. but: t h e y were s t i l l young. They could be f i g h t e r s . I b e l i e v e t h e y were. There were sjme weapons captured t h a t day, and I t h i n k t h a t was t h e a r e a . t hey were c a p t u r e d . 1 d o n ' t remember. I wasn ' t t h e r e . Lfke -I say , .I thi.nl:.

.

were two men tha't were m i ~ t a r y age males t lj a t I J C ~ C ~ ".

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Q. ( I n t e r p o s i n g ) Then where were t h e s e young .' b a b i e s coming frorn? b

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A.

D i d t h e r e appear t o be a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f

NO. . ~~

b a b i e s i n th:Ls a r e a ? .. . .-:-:.-:- ~ ~ ... ~~~~ ~. .

l i v i n g a r e a . There were a l o t of.women, a l o t of o l d men, but there w a s ' d e f i n i t e l y a s c a r c i t y b f m-i l i ta ry a&e males. t h e age of 15 onwards t o age 40 f n Vietnam. .Most men l i v i n g i n t h e s e out-of-the-way v i I l a g e s ,, when t h e y r each the age of 40, you have j u s t . about kind SX. . They have worked hard and --

It seemed t o be it was just a r e g u l a r

By say ing 11 m i l i t a r y age maIe", a- male say from

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hundred would you say were, \vell J let's say below the age of tlielve years?

A. Oh, belol"/ the age of twelvE: YE:8X's? Oh, ·well, that's somethinr; else -- approXim8tely 20.

• Q. A.

Q. A.

say, the

.Q. groups of

A.

We have got about a dozen bobies? Dozen or less. i

I And twenty --(Interposing) Perhaps more than 20. Like 1

numbers are going to be I'

(Interposing) The men that Iiere ,i'n these de8d that you sa" what age wou14 t~ey be? The men were for the most part old men, or

men, or old men.

. Q. \'Iere there any young men in. the. vD.lage? A. There were a few young men. I.d 11 say not

young men but men that appeared to me to be -- there .. ·.---IVere·.sBveralI·noti-ced. ··I·went .. through. one house.

There were a lot of dead people in the house!. There were two men tha·t ~Jere military age males tHat I·Jere dead, but they were about 30 yem's old, I I"lduld say, 30, 35, I would say. They were a little bit gett;:i.ng on as far as the Vietnamese are concerned, getting on inagc,

2.3 24 25 26 27 2.8 2.9 30 31 32 33 ~

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..... but they were sti 11 young. They could be fighters. 1 .. believe they were. There were some weapons captured that

day, and I think that was the area they were captured. I don't remember. I wasn I t there. Like·I say, .1 think.

Q. Did there appear to be a large proportion of babies il1 th:ts area? ... ........ .

~ No. It seemed to be it was jUst a ~egular living area. Ther~ were a lot of women, a lot of old men, but there was definitely a scarcHy of mtllt8ry age males. By saying "military age male", a male say fl'om the age of 15 om~ards to a.ge 40 in Vietnam. Most men living in these out-of-the-way villages, "Ihen they reach the age of 40, you have just about had ft. They have worked hard and --

Q. (Interposing) Then where were these young babies coming fromi

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A. Right . Well, t h e r e . was d e f i n i t e l y a male

f o r c e i n t h e v i l l a g e . this was t h e way t h e v i l l a g e was' l a i d out,, t h e r e was a l o t of women and a l o t of c h i l d r e n and very f ' e ~ young men, t h a t t h e r e must have been some you.ng men', s ay , o f rnil.itary age , e i t h e r V i e t Cong o r j u s t young men who

U s u a l l y i n an o p e r a t l o n 1l.ke t h i s , you move through a v i ' l l age and any male who i s of m i l i t a r y age, whether he h a s an I D card o r n o t , i f ' he i s no t an ?iRVN,or a PF, o r a RP, you usua1.3.y t a k e him i n a s a V i e t Cong s u s p e c t . some p l a c e and e i t h e r sent back t o h i s , v i l l a g e o r d r a f t e d , so t o speak, and u s v a l l y you just go through t,he v i l l a g e ona .you l c i m ~ , you f o r g e t about t h e people who . a r e t h e r e , and p i c k up t h e m i l i t a r y males and move on, which i s

%what t h e y might have thought we were gofng t o do, s o t h e military age males might; have t a k e n o f f and' 1.eCt t h e s e people behind. They ,might no t have been V f e t ,Con&. Tliey. mlght have beell V i e t Cong.

r e s i s t a n c e .

H e l l , you can assume from s e e i n g that;

- d. idn ' t want t o he t aken as^ s u s p e c t s .

He i s questionecl

S t i l l there i s no excuse ----- Tor -shoot-:ing women and chtld-rsn who a r e n ''t g i v i n g any

~. . . .~ , . ~ .

. .

Q. D i d you s a y whether any c i v i l . i a n s were l e f t

A. From t h e f i rs t v i l l a g e on, vie s t a r t e d

a l i v e o r n o t ?

c i v i l i a n s , no. c o l l e c t i n g p r i s o n e r s , l eav ing people t h c r e .

I n t h e first, v i l l a g e I d i d n ' t sele any l i ve

. Q. Did you see any medical a t t e n t i o n be ing g iven t o t h e c i v i l i a n s ?

A. No, I d i d n o t .

Q. k As I s a y , my p la toon , I wasn ' t wi th my.platoon . a t the t i m e . . W e d i a h a v e ' a p l a t o o n medic i n my p l a t o o n .

A t t h e . t ime 1 c a n ' t remember who i t 'was'.. J-A-R-$-A - - i t might have been J a r s a . know. I am t r y i n g t o t h i n k who i t would have been i f it. wasn ' t him.

i n c i d e n t , such a s w r i t t e n o r d e r s ? .

Did you have a ' p l a t o o n medfc?

It might have b&n h i m ; ~ I d o n ' t I t h i n k it was him. He was' the p l a t o o n medic.

- ,. ". . . . , , . ~ .~

Q.

A. No, I d o n ' t .

Do you have any documentary evidence on t h i s . . ' .

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A. Right. lyell, there was definitely a male force in the village. vlell, you can assume from seeing that this was the way the village was· laid out ,. there was a lot of women and a lot of children and very few young men, tpat there must have been some young men, say, of military age, either Viet Cong or just young men ~Iho

. d.idh't \1ant to be taken as suspects. Usually in an operation like this, you move through a village and any male who is of military age, whether 1112 has an 1D card or not, if he i.s not an lIRVN,or a PF, or a RF, you usually take him in as a Viet Cong suspect. He is questioned some place and either sent back to his .village or drafted, so to speak, and usually you just go through the village E1nd,.you know, YOll forget about the people who·are there, and pick up the military males and move on, whicl1 is

,what they might have thought we were going to do, so the inilitary age males might have taken off and left these people beh:l.nd. 'fhey might not have been Viet. Cong. ~~he)y might have been Viet Congo Still there is no excuse

·------for -s-hoot-lng :women and chiJclJ:'~n who aren't gi vj.ng any resistance. --.,

Q. Did you say whether any civilians weloe left alive or not? .

A. In the firs t. vi llage I didn't sele any 11 ve civilians, no. From the first village oni 1'le started collecting priSOl1el'S, leaving people there.

. Q. Did you see any medical attention being given to the civilians?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you have a platoon medic? A. As I say, my platoon, I wasn't with my_platoon

at the tiine . . Vle dia have·a platoon medic in my platoon. At the time I can't remember who ltwas .. J-A-R-S-A -- it might have been Jarsa. It might have been himj·I don't know. I think it was him. He ~ras the platoon medic. I am trying to think who it would have been if it· wasn't him.

Q. incident,

A.

Do you have any documentary evidence on this such as written orders? • No, I don't.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q. Photographs? A, No, 3: d o n ' t .

Q. Did you s e e a photographer on t h i s o p e r a t i o n ? A.' Yea, I d i d . The photographer was ,coiiscientJ.ousl.y

avo id ing takl.ng p i c t u r e s of s cenes , you k.now, t h a t would make It appear we were s h o o t i n g women and c h i l d r e n . He d i d take a p i c t u r e of.meIi moving through t h e v i l l a g e . He took p i c t u r e s of captured weapons,: p r i s o n e r s , and t h e woqded men, and t h a t was a l l . I don% h o w who t h e photographer was.

Q. Was he i n m i l i t a r y uniform? , A. Yes, he was.

Q. Did he have "US Army" on h i s j a c k e t ? A. I d o n ' t remember.

.. Q. D1.d he wear any insignl :a of' rank? A. I d o n ' t remember that; . I b e l i e v e he was Army

I n s t _ b e r words,. h e was no t a c i 'v l l ian newsman. We d i d n ' t e v e r have c i v i i i a n c o r r e s p 3 n a e n l ; people w i t h US on any o p e r a t i o n $ .

Q. A. No, h e was t h e r e t h a t day and t h a t vhs a l l .

Q. You d o n ' t remember h i s name? A. I d o n ' t remember h i s nzme.

Had t h i s man been with you be fo re? , I

Q. A. No, I d i a n ' t .

b i d you t a l k t o him?

Q. Do you know SGT LaCroix? A. LaCroix? Yes, I do. He was ano the r member o f

t h e 70th Long Range, P a t r o l , went a long with Gruver, T e r r y , Doherty and myself .

Q. Was he i n your p la toon? A. I b e l i e v e he was. I am n o t s u r e .

-Q. A.

D i d you s e e him i n iy Lai (q)? I d o n ' t remember any th ing about him i n My I ,a i (11 ) . - -

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q. Photographs? A. No, I don't.

Q. Did you see a photographer on this operation? A: Yes, I did. The photographer was conscientiously

avoiding taking pictures of scenes, you know, that \~ould make J. t appear we ~Iere shooting women and chi 1drcn. He did take a picture ormen moving through the villaGe. He took pictures of captured \'Ieapons" prisoners, and the wOU\lded men, and that was all. I don "t Jr..now who the photographer was.

Q. Was he in military uniform? A. Yes, he was.

Q. Did he have "US Army" on, his jacket? A. I don't remember.

Q. Did he wear any insignIa of'rank? A. I don't remember that. I believe he

In-.Q..t..ber wordSJ he was not a civi lian newsman. didn't everhave-'civilIim 'corre-sponaimt people on any operation:;>.

Had this man been with you before? I

vias Army. We

w:Lth us

Q. A. I •

No, he was there that day and that was all.

Q. You don't remember his name? A. I don't remember his name.

Q. Did you talk to him? L No, I didn't.

Q. Do you know SOT LaCroix? A. LaCroix? Yes, Ido.- He was another member of

the 70th Long Rang~ Patrol, went along with Gruver, Terry, Doherty and myself.

Q. Was he in your platoon? L I believe he was. I am not sure.

""Q. , A.

I don 't

Did you see hIm in My Lai (~)? I don't remember anythIng about

remember.

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FOR OFFICIAL US€ ONLY. Q.

A.

What e x a c t l y were t h e o r d e r s wlien t h e uni.t; ~12s

I'm n o t c e r t a i n e x a c t l y what t h e d r d e r s were. t o l d t o s t o p fCiring on c i v i l i a n s ?

I

Q. How d i d t h e y come down? !

, A. The r a d i o .

Q. From bat ta l . ion? ./

(Y

A. No, from t h e company commande,r. n o t s u r e whether t h e y came from ba t t a l . i on . They mig t have come from b a t t a l l o n f i r s t , but I only know t h e c'onipany commandkr gave t h e o r d e r .

Q. D i d he g i v e i t himself o r d i d he give. i t t o h i s r a d i o o p e r a t o r ?

A. fie never gave' h i s r a d i o o p e r a t o r any kind of ---tm-.order t o - g l . v e . l t a h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s . He a l m y s gave

t h e o r d e r t o t h e subordJ.na~e-s-~-hiins~e1-f. Me always hendled t h e phone. His r a d i o ' o p e r a t o r never gave an o r d e i x , and e spec ia l . l y on . t h i s oc.casl on.

o r was i t a f t e r t h a t ?

I 'believe we h a d , g o t t e n ' t o -- I don't . mean u s , b u t I b e l i e v e t h e l e a d element had g o t t e n through t h e v i l l a g e ' , b u t t h e c a p t a i n a c t u a l l y gave t h e order-,: bu t i t was when we were j u s t g e t t i n g i n t o it..

r a d i o d i s c u s s i n g a t h r e a t t o r e p o r t t h e o p e r a t i o n ?

Q. Was t h i s d u r i n g t h e push through My j i i ( 4 ) ,

A. A f t e r t h e push through.Ny L a i (4) o r d u r i n g ?

. . . . .... . . ,

Q.

A. I heard of i t , y e s .

Q. D i d . you h e a r , the communfcatfon? A. No, I d i d n ' t h e a r t h e communication.

D i d you e v e r . h e a r o f ' a h e l i c o p t e r p1.l.ot on the

a

Q. . . I . - , . , , r . A.

From wh0.m d i d you .hear th .e in fo rma t ion? The . night, t h a t Olsen, T e r r g and' myself were

. d i s c u s s i n g t h e operation' :" That was t h e n i g h t a f t e r we came back o r some t ime very soon a f t e r we came back.

'Q. Do you know PPC Pedrick?: A. Yes, I do. He was a l so mother member of the

70th Long, Range P a t r o l Detachment when I was a member of - it.

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Q. "lhat exactly were the orders when the unit Nas told to stop firing on civilians? ,

A. I'm not certain exactly what the orders were. I •

Q. A.

How d:i.d they corne down? 'I'he radio.

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Q. From battalion? l' A. No J from the company commander. ' 'm not sure

11hether they COme from battalion. They mig t have come from battalion first, but I only ktlO,,' the c'ompany commander gave the order.

Q. Did he give it himself or did he give, it to , his radj,o operator?

A. He never gave' his radio operator any !cind of -.........an"order to_g:l.ve~t,().his subordtnates. He alvwys gave

the order to the subordj,na te'i'j" 'him;se:tf . He always hondled the phone. His radio operator never'gave ant orders, and especially on .th:ls oc.c.asi.on. '

Q. Was this durIng the push through f1y Lai (4), or was it after that? '

, A. After the push through, Hy 1ai (4) or during? I believe VIC had gotten 'to -- I don't mean us, but I believe the lead element had gotten through the village, but the c.aptain actually gave the ord'er'" but it was when we were just getting into it.

Q, Did you ever:herir of'a helicopter pilot on radio discussing a threat to report the operation?

A. I heard of it J yes. ' •

Q. Did you hear the communic.ation? , A. ,No J I didn't hear the communication.

Q. From whom did you hear the fnf'ormation?

the

• A. Th~. n:igh~. that Olsen, Terry arid myself were disc.ussing the operation:' That was the night after we came back or some time very soon ~f'ter we c.ame bac.k.

'Q. A.

70th Long it.

Do you knOVI PFe Pedrfc.k?,· Yes J I dd. He was also arwther member of the Range Patrol Detac.hment when I I'/as a member of

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Q. Did you see him j.n Ny LaS ( h ) , ? I No, I d i d n ' t . . . A.

Q. How many weapons were captured i n t h a t vil.l.a.p;e? A. I d o n ' t knot!. I saw three . 1 savi a weapon

t h a t I di:d n o t recogn.ize. i t . I am-not s u r e . I know f o r sure I can recognj.ze two, of them. There was one MI carb:!ne and one M1 Garaild. I - b e l i e v e t h e r e was more t h a n two. I d o n ' t know whether the o t h e r weapon was a ca rb ine o r Garand. There was more. I can only be c e r t e i n of numbers t h r e e ,and type , two.

Q. What was t h e body count f o r t h i s ope ra t ion? A.

count was. I got a l l k inds of numbers fro!n d . i f fe ren t people when we were ta l l t ing about t h e o p e r a t i o n , s o I ' c a n ' t r e a l l y say what t h e body count m s . from 500 t o two hundred and seven ty ' someth iqg , .two hundred..seventy .some odd, qp-t .o.~five hu.ndrcd, b u t I d o n ' t know what t h e body cou.nt was o f f i c i a l l y .

I b e l i e v e I' d i d n ' t ' r e c , o g n i z e

I never g o t an o f f i c i a l word' of what t h e body

I g o t anywhere

Q. Do you know t h e o t h e r p l s t o o n leaders bes ides Galley and -.- you mentioned --

A. ( I n t e r p o s i n g ) Cal ley and. Lieut+ant ' Eroolcs ,'

Q. ' D o you know t h e o t h e r p l a t o o n l e a d e r s ? A. Actua l ly , no. There was a n o t h e r p l a t o o n l e a d e r .

I d o n ' t know whether he rrtas on t h e o p e r a t i o n o r n o t . I d o n ' t even lcnow if h e was a pIa toon l e a d e r a t t h e t i m e . No, I clonlt remember which one i t was. There a r e s e v e r a l names I can g i v e o f what p l a t o o n , l e a d e r s were i n t h a t company around t h e approximate time ,. but I ' c a n ' t ' sj3y which one was t h e p l a t o o n l e a d e r o f t h e o t h e r p l a t o o n a t the t ime. '

Q. Was any a t t empt made ta warn t h e v i l l a g e ? A. I : b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y drappcd l e a f l e t s . I found

a . l o t of l e a f l e t s around written i n Vietnamese. were from t h e p l ane . t ha t f l i e s aro.und'.

. s t i l l g iv ing . a warning, I. b e l i e v e i t was a warn9.ng. st was i n Vietnamese. N o w , I d b n r t ' u n d e r s t a n d ' the ' language t h a t niuch..and I c a n ' t rend i t a t a.71 -- t h a t t h e p l ane was s t i l l making a n announcement.. -The a i r p l a n e with the loudspea'ker on i t was stfll making - a n announcement. , I unders tand from someone somewhere t h a t I t had made t h e

~ ... ..,..

They The p l a n e was

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Q. Did you see him jn Ny Lai (~)? A. No, I didn It.

Q. How many weapons l;e1'e captured in that vilJ.age? A. I don It kno\'I. I saH three. 1 saw a I'/Capon

that I djd not recognize. Ibel1eve I- didnltrecognizc it. I am.not sure. 1 know f01' Sllre I can recogn,lze two, of them. The):e \'las one JIll carb:lne and one MI Garand. 1 -believe there \'las more than tl'IO. I don I t kllO\~ whethc): the other weapon \'las a carbine or Garand. There vias more. I can only be certain of numbers three ,.and type, two,

Q. What \~as the body count for this operat:ton? A. I never got an official word of what the body

count was. I got all kinds of numbers from different peoplevlhen we wepe talJdng about the operation, so I can It really say what the body count ~las. I got anYVihere from 500 to two hundred and seventy' som(,thing, tl'W hundred ,seventy some odd~ up_tofive hundred, but I don ',t know what the body count was o1'1'1c;ia11y.

Q. Do you'lmo\'1 the other pIstoon leaders besides Calley and _.- you mentioned --' , .

A. (Interposing) Calley and- Lieut~nant' Brooks,

Q.Do you knol1 the other platoon leaders? A. Actually, no, There was another platoon leader,

I don't know whether he was on the operation or not. I donlt even know if he was a platoon leader at the time, No, I don I t remember which one i't I'·las. There are severa I n-ames I can give of What .platoon·le/lders were in that company around the approximate t.trne, but I' cai))'!;' say which one was the platoon leader of the othel' platoon at the time,'

Q. \vas any attempt made t.o I~arn the village? -A. I believe that they droppe.d leaflets. I found

a lot of leaflets around written. in Vietnamese. They were from the plane ,that flies around'. The plane was

,sttll giving aW5lrn:l,ng. I believe it was a. warnIng. It was in Vietnamese. NOI", j' ifori'l; "uriders'tandthe' language

.. that: much and I can.'t read it at all -- that the plane was still making an announcement. ;The airplane "J:lth the loudspeaker on it \'las still ma:I<Tng' an announcement .• I understand from someone somewhere that it had made the

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announcement f o r days be fo re they had t h e o p e r a t l o n , b u t I c a n ' t s e e why o r how, b u t t h a t i s what I ' w a s t o l d .

Q. Thl.s was a loud-speaker a . g r c r a f t ? A. One of t h e loud-speaker a i r c r a f t was making ail

.-annbuncement a t t h e t ime.

Q. D i d you h e a r i t ? A. I am p r e t t y suile I d i d . \\re had t h a t v i t h us '

most of t h e t ime , t h a t Loud-speaker a i r c r a f t . . Now, I c a n ' t . r e a l l y be certa5.n. There a r e a l o t of d e t a i l s about t h a t day , t h a t s i n c e i t was a n o t h e r day i n so.ma.ny,

sure i t was t h e r e . . t h a t I c a n ' t remember e x a c t l y , bu t I can say I,,zm p r e t t y

'Ilhese..~l~e.afl~ets~that you r e f e r t o , d i d you eve r . .

..a a s k t h e i n t e r p r e t e r .or any3ody wNit-'.they s a i d ?

them, What t h e y s a i d , you know, was sort of vague. I ' c o u l d n l t unders tand . Like t h e i n t e r p r e t e r c6n speak t o me in Engl i sh ' b u t when i t come t o ' t r a n s l a t i n $ .something e x a c t l y from Vietnamese t o Engli'gh,. i t i s a l i t t l e b i t d i f f i c u l t f o r him. I r e a l l y couldnl ' t make ,ou t what i t was about , someth:lng about -- well,, ane of t h e element's was t h a t you should h a l t when we gi've t h e o r d e r t o h a l t -- .Dung L a i -- t h a t you should h a l t ; T h a t ' s a1.1 t h a t L could r ead myself , I could make ou t myself , but t h e r e s t of it I c o u l d n ' t .

Were t h e s e . l e a f l e t s . ' d i f f e r e n t from t h e Chu I,@ l e a f le ts?

A. Yes, n o t ' t h e s e s p e c i f i c ones, but 1 e a . f l e t s l i k e

2

'Q.

A. I ' m n o t ' s u r e . I J u s t know t h e r e ' w e r e l e a f l e t s .

-Q.

A. . I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e l e a f l e t s had Engl i sh on

The Chu La i l e a f l e t had' Eng l i sh on i t , Eng l i sh

I am nbt.

on one s i d e , Vietnamese on t h e o t h e r s ide .

. them. 3 d o n ' t t h i n k they h,ad EngIi'sh on them. 'sure.

i Q. But t h e ones you saw' cTk'dn.% have Eng l i sh on them?

.A. I am p r e t t y s u r e they d'fdh"t have Eng l i sh on them. 1 am n o t c e r t a i n , though.. 1. c a n ' t r e a l l y s a y t h j t I am c e r t a i n .

Q. . .

But you d i d d i scuss ' these ' l e a f l e t s w i t h t h e

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announcement for days before they had' the operatj,on, but I can't see why or hOVl, but that is vlhat I'was told.

Q. Thls was a loud-speaker aircraft? A. One of the loud- speaker ai'r'crart was mak:tng an

,--BnnOUl1cemG:nt at the t:i,mc.

Q. Did you hear it? A. I am pretty sure I did. We had that I'lith us

most of the time, that loud- speaker aircraft., NOVI, I can' t'really be certain. Thet'e are a lot of detai Is about that day, that slnce it was another day in so many,

'that I can't remember exactly, but I can say I.,am pretty sure it was there.

'---'...Q. __ 'TbE!.:3.e.'leaflets that you refer to, did you ever' ask the :i.ntel'pl'etei;or'a'nyoody vl!'lat'they said?

L Yes, not'these specific ones, but leaflets like them, \'Ihat they said, yOll know, was sort of vague. I couldn't understand. Lilce the interpreter cain speak to me in English but when it come to translating 'something exactly from Vietnamese to EngH,sh, it is a little bit difficult for him. I really couldn"t make .out I'lhat it was about, sometb:Lng about -- well" one of the element's was that you should halt when we gIve the order to halt --Dung Lai -- that you should halt; That's all that I could read myself, I could make out myself, but the rest of it I couldn't.

Q. Were these leaflets'different from the Ghu Lai leaflets?

'A. I'm not' sure. I just know there were leaflets.

'Q. The Ghu Lai leaflet had' English' on it, English on on~ Side, Vietnamese on the other side.

A. I don't think the leaflets had English on ,them. 'I don't thin!( they had EngHsh on them. I am not' 'sure. ..

Q. But the ones you saw cUdh"t have EngHsh on them? ,A. I am pretty sure they d'fdh't have English on

them. I am not certain, though., I can't really say tha't I am certain.

Q. But you did discuss' these leaflets with the interpreter?

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A; O r a t some o t h e r t ime .

A.

I a. But k a f l e t s ? ~

. L e a f l e t s i n general . , I a.sked him some things about then]. There were a l l d i f f e r e n t lcincls'.

t h i s ope ra t ion?

and my p l a t o o n , a s I s a i d be fo re , was ahead' of me. WeI.l., I d o n ' t b e l i e v e I: saw him. way ahead of me where I saw all . t h e s e people , b u t I d o n ' t knoi~ . I d o n ' t b e l i e v e s o .

' A. Yes; yes', .I d i d .

Q. D i d .you see SGT ScEilel f i r e h i s weapon d u r i n g

A. No, I dS.dn't. . SGT S c h i e l was my p l a t o o n

He might have deen up t h e r e

. . Q. D id you ever 'know a SP4. P a u l ?

Q. Who was he?. A.

/ . . ~~

- . . - ~ ~

He was. a member o f the headquar teJs group. I d o n ' t know whether -- I b e l i e v e he c a r r i e d the r a d i o , b u t I am no t s u r e . t o u r he d%d cai;ry a r a d i o . I b e l i e v e t h a t was' one of his j o b s , and I bel j .eve t h a t was t h e Job he had duri.nE; t h e t ime i n q u e s t i o n .

A t l e a s t some t ime o r atiothdr d u r i n g t h e

' ' .

Q. D i d you s e e him i n My Lai' ( g ) ? A. I must have. I b e l i e v e I d i d . Yes, I: r e a l l y

Q. bJhere? A. He was with t h e headquar t e r s group. I f he was

t h i n k so . . .

t h e r e , he was with , t h e headquar t e r s group t h a t I was t r a v e l i n g with, w i t h t h e company commander, t h e o t h e r r a d i o o p e r a t o r s , and s o on; t.he PO,. and s o on. There was a n o t h e r man t h e r e . I don' t know who he was. I t h i n k he w a s a . f i e l d grade o f f i c e r , bu t I had. never seen him b e f o r e , and I have neve r seen him s ince . ,

Q.

t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n was resumed- as f o l l o w s : )

Let's recess f o r about f i v e minutes .

( A b r i e f r e c e s s was taken,. a f t e r whi.ch *

Q. I w i l l remind you t h a t you a r e s t l l l under o a t h .

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A; Or at some other time.

R. But leaflets? ' A. ·Leaflets in general, I asked him kome

about them. 'l'here vlere all different kinds. th:ings

: Q. Did you see SGT Schiel fire his weapon during this operation? I . .

A, No, I dj.dn 't •. SGT Schiel was wH;h my platoon and my platoon, as I said before, was ahead of me. Well, I don't believe I saw him. He might have been up there way ahead of Ole where I sawall these people, but I don't knOI'I. I don't beLieve so.

Q. Did you ever· know a Spil Paul? L Yes; yes, .1 did.

Q. ···-Who was he? . . I . A. He I~as. a member of the headquarters group. I

don't know whether -- I believe he carried the radiO, but I am not sure. At least some time or anothclr during the tour he did carry a radio. I believe that wa~ one of his jobs, and I believe that was the job he had during the

.. -. time in question.

Q. A.

think so.

md you see him in My Lai (4)? I must have. I believe I did. Yes, 1 really

Q. Where? A. He was with the headquarters group. If he Wa"1

there, he was with .the headquarters group that I was traveling with, with the company commander, the other radio operators, and so on; the FO, and so on. rEhere ''1as another man there. I don't know who he was. I think he was a. field grade officer J but I had· never seen him before, and I have never seen him stnce ..

Q. Let's recess for about five minutes. ~

(A brief recess was takeFl,. after whi.ch the interrogation was resumed· as follows:)

Q. I will remind you that you are

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still under oath.

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Did you a s a n I n d i v i d u a l , rec.eTve any enemy f i r e i n LaS ( ~ ! j ?

A. I d o n ' t t h i n k s o , I beli.eve - - well., t h e r e -were a l o t of rounds f l y i n g chis w a y an& t h a t . I d o n ' t t h l n l : t h a t any of them wer'e c l o s e t.o me; espec ia l1 .y I dpn I t t h i n k , anyway.

Q. Was an a r t i l l e r y p r c p a r a t i o n f i r e d p r i o r t o e n t r y ?

I n the o p e r a t i o n s o r d e r we were A. t o l d t h a t t h e a r e a had been prepped" wi th a r t i l l e r y . I d o n ' t know whether i t was o r no t ..

I d o n ' t know. I t

Q. ~ You don.'t knoa where this p r e p a r a t i o n was f i r e d ? A. Evident1.y it was supposed t o come from L'L D o t t i e .

. They have .l55 m i l l i m e t e r . They have ..105s on D o t t i e . -.---I-undersfood a l s o .t;.he., Nwy was f l y i n g a i r guns.

~~

Q. '

wa.s? A. No, they j u s t sa5.d t h e y were going t o prep:

the ape8 we were go ing i n t o , or r a t h e r t h g LZ,' t h e I,%, t h a t i s , t h e a r e a we a r e going t o land in. 'I d o n ' t know about t h e v i l l a g e ; I b e l i e v e t h e v i l I a g e a l s o , bu t t h e whole a r e a .

Q. Do you know where SPb Pau l l i v e s ? A. No; I donlt; lcnow where he f s .

Q. D i d you heax, a t any t i m e p r T o r ' t o t h i s opera-

Do you know what t h e t a r g e t for ' the. prepnrakioi i * /

'I

t i o n , any of t h e t r o o p ' s ' i n C Company complain about r e s t r a i n t s being p laced on t h e i r combat a c t i o n , o r what we might r e f e r t o as Rules o f Engagement?

A: There were g e n e r a l mumb.lings about t h i s t ype of t h i n g . People thought t h a t they shouId be ab le t o do p r e t t y much wYiat they wanted t o do- a s long a s t h e y

.. had a gun i n hand, s o t o speak. Qf course , t h e s e people d i d n ' t u s u a l l y t e l l me,aboQt i t if $.hey d i d f e e l th is way because most of t h e company, t h a t i s , knew how I f e l t about i t , t h a t I would j u s t a s soon use a l i t t l e d i s c r e t i o n when f i r i n g t h e r i f l e i f t h e r e a r e 1.ives a t s t a k e . If you a r e going t o t a k e somebody's l i f e , St should be the person who i s a t h r e a t e i ' ther t o you o r somebody, e i t he r a t h r e a t t o your coun t ry o r t h e o b j e c t i v e ,

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Did you ( as an indivIdual, rec,eive any enemy fire in My TJai (l:)?

A. I don't think so. I bell.eve -- well, there "were e lot of rounds flying thiR way and that. I

don't thlnl[ that any of them \,!er'€ close t,o me~ especially I dpn't think, anyway. '

~ Was an artillery preparation fired prior to entry?

A. I don't know. In the operations order VIC l'lere told that the area had been "prepped" with artIllery. I don't know whether it \'las or not.

Q. . You don" t kno\,) where this I?rel?aratJ,on was fired? A. Evidently it ~las supposed to come from LZ Dottie.

, They have .155 millimeter. They have .105s on Dottie. - ----I_underst.ood ,slect-he, NaVY, \~as f!-ying ail' guns.

Q.' Do you kno\'/ what the target for the pl'eparation was?

A. No, th~y just said they were going to "prep',' the area we were going into, or rather thp L~; the LZ, that is J the area we are going to land in'. I don't know about the villagej I believe the village also, but the whole area.

Q. Do you know where sp4 Paul lives? A. No, I don't know where he is.

Q. Did you hear, at any time prior to this opera­tion, any of the troops in C Company complain about re-straints being placed on their combat action, 01' vlhat we might refer to as Rules of Engagement'?

A. There were general mumblings about this type of thing. People thought that they should be able to do pretty much what they wanted to do' as long as they had a gun in hand, ~o to speak. or course, these people didn't usually tell me,abo(Jt it if they, dId feel this way because most of the company, that is, knevl ho\~ I felt about it, that I would just as soon US(l a little discretion when firing the rifle ir there are lives at stake. If you are going to take somebody-'s life, it should be the person who is a threat ei'ther to you or , somebody, either a threat to your country or the objective, the mission. '

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY @. 1):1d you r e f u s e t o t a k e p a r t i n th5.s o p e r a t i o n :i.n

A.. No. ' As I s a i d be fo re , 1 see no rea::oii t o . r e f ' u s e . any way?

A t t h e tl.me I wasn't i n a ' p o s i t i o n where I could hnve 'done too much demage, t h a t i s , where I cou1.d have I t iLled any peop lc . Tnere were s i t u a t % o n s before where I was, and as I mentioned b e f o r e , I j u s t rn:l.ssed'. Tnere i s , you k.nor!, no sense i n refusirig t h e o r d e r , because i't j u s t d o e s n ' t make any sense a t a l l . Then you can wlss J u s t a s e a s i l y , X mean purpobely, I mean. I d i d this. because I 'bel.leve t h n t when I teak my oa th I a@reed t o obey a l l l awfu l o r d e r s of my s u p e r i o r s , and i n a s i t u a t i o n XIkc t h a t 0u.t there :I have t o dec ide r e a l l y what i s a l awfu l o r d e r . R e a l l y , who else can? I g i v e them a whole l o t of e l a s t i c i t y , so t 'o speak, b u t when i t comes t o something l i k e t h a t , t h a t was completely ou t of l i n e and J wouldn ' t have anytli5.ng t o do with i t .

Q. D i d you f i r e 'your weapon dur fng t h i s o p e r a t i o n

A. Yes, I ' d i d . ' I found D woundcd an%mal, a COY!, I b e l i e v e , and t h e a.nimal was wouncTe6 and' I f l r e d a t i t and . sh -o t - i t . - i t r .&he -head..and . .k ; i l l . ed~i t ,? b u t . a s f a r an people , no, I d i . d n ' t , and o t h e r t h a n t h a t I didn't. f i r e t h e weapon a t 211.1. I b e l i e v e I f i r e d two r o u n d s t h e e n t i r e opera. t ion.

d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e toward t h f s o p e r a t i o n than they d i d toward any o t h e r , ope ra t ion?

f o r , I b e l i e v e , was t h a t , yes , t h e y t h ~ u g l i t t h i s was going t o be a whole l o t b e t t e r ; t h i s i s t h e way i t should be done. That was t h e i r a t t i t u d e , f o r most of the people i n - t h e company.

Had you been on any p rev ious operatJ.ons with L ieu tenan t C a l l e y ? . D i d you e v e r w i tnes s him i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y k i l l i n g c i v i l i a n s ?

. i n My L a i ( 4 ) ? ..

. I . .

Q."

A. 'My impress ion , which is what you a r e a sk ing me

D i d t h e members of C Company seem t o ' h a v e any

. . Q.

. ~ . A . No, I d i d n o t . 3 .never witnessed i t . '

Q. Did you e v e r wi tness any men'i'n t h a t u n i t ,

A. No: no:-I- d i d n o t . As I sa id . b e f o r e . from t h e -p rev ious o r a f t e r t h i s , . i n d i s c r i m f n a t e I y k i l l i n g c i v i l i a n s ?

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q. D:\d you refuse to take part in this operat:Lon :i.n

any way? L No. As I said before, I see no reason to refuse.

At the time I wasn't in a position where I could have done too much damage, that is, 1<There I could have killed any people. There I'lere situa'Gj,ons before ~lhere I was, and as I mentloned before, I just m:Lssed, There is, you knol'l, no sense in refusirlg the order, because it just doesn't make any sense at all. Then you can miss just as easily, I iiiean PU1'posely, I mean. I dJd thts, because IbeUeve t\1at when I took my oath I aereod to obey all lawful orders of my superiors, and in a situation lIke that out there I have to decide really what is a Im~ful order. Really, who else can? I give them a whole lot of elas'Gic:l,ty, so to speak, but when it comes to somethine; like that, t!'ls,t was completely out of line and I wouldn't have anythlng to do with it. .

Q. Did you fire your vleBpon during this operation ,in My Lai (4)?

A. Yes, I'did. 'X found a wounded anj,mal, a COVl, I belj,eve, and the animal ~las wounded and I fired at it arrd-zhot-it'it't theheadand,.Y..1.ll.edH,_ but,as far ae people, no, I didn't, and other than that I didn't fire the \'1eapon at all. I beHeve r fired' two rounds the entire operation. ' r.

Q .. Did the members cif C Company seem to have any different attitude toward this operation than they dld toward any other operation? /

A. My impression, which is what you are asklng me for, I believe, \'/BS that, yes, they thought this was golne; to be a whole lot better; this is the way it should be done. That was thelr attitude~ for most of the people in'the company.,

Q. Had you been on any previous operations with Lieutenant Calley? Did you ever witnes~ him indiscriminately killing civilians?

A. No, r did not. ,rnever witnessed it.

Q. Did you ever witness any men·i'n that unit, ,previous or after this, ,indiscriminately killing clvilians? , A. No; no ,,X did not. As I sa id before, from t!'le very beginni~OR bWrcrAetfSr O~ yen we:e aware of my

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views on t h e s i t u a t i o n , and i f t h e y were going t o do anythi.ng o f t h a t t ype , would n o t do i t i n my m s c n c e , I don' . t t h i n k , of course except f o r My L a i (11 5 , which 1.s an e n t i r e l y s i p g u l a r s i t u a t i o n .

i ' 8. , D i d you wi tness t h e f i r e suppor t of any hclj .cop-

- t e r gun s h i p s whi1.e t h e o p e r a t i o n was being 'conducted?

t h e . f i r i n g , bu t I d i d n ' t s e e where t h e f i r e was lanciing i n most c a s e s .

Q. , Would you say t h a t My L a i (4). was, more heavl . ly boobytrapped and mined than o t h e r hamle ts ahd v i l l a g e s ?

A., Mo, it was n o t . I d o n ' t b e l i e v e ' i t , p{as mined o r boobytrapped a t a l l . These people were l i v l n g t h e r e , and i t ' s kind of dangerous even f o r V i e t Cong t o booby- t r a p t h e i r own p l a c e , o r a p l a c e where people a.re 15.vj.ng. Usua l ly when we r a n int.0 boobytraps o r mi'nes, t h e y were on the o u t s k i r t s ; t hey weren ' t i n v x l l a g e s . I d i d n ' t see

people i n my company encountered a n y . mines o boobyt raps .

w i t h t;he rope , wds n o t boobytrapped .Zn any yay. j u s t ].eft t h e r e .

A. P o , I d i d n ' t . I saw t h e h e l i c o p t e r s and I mi':

'.I '

-%ny n l n e s or~ . .boobyt raps myself.;,. ..I .. .&on I t b e l i e v e any

The box 1: picked up, ' a s I mentioned i n t h e v t r y bee;inn?.ni;, It was

Q. Was t h i s box t h a t you r e f e r t o , p r o p e r t y of the VC?

A. I dicin ' t s e e who l e f t i t . It was d-isc:o.vered l a y i n g t h e r e i n t h e r i c e f i e l d . When we g o t t h e box and opened i t , I found i n s i d e medical suppl i .es I a sy r fnge , s e v e r a l needl.es, c e r t a i n medicines , gauze ~ p a d s ; and' thihgs.~ of . t h i s , na tu re , , . a 1 s o . a r a d i o , a t r a n s i s t o r radio,. Suny, and t h a t ' s a l l I can remember. There w e r e ' s e v e r a l - o t h e r items but I c a n ' t remember what t h e y were'. The things t h a t we found i n t h e box p e r t a l n i n g ' t o medical equfpment'were s i m i l a r t o o t h e r t h i n g s we found previously,: and. l a t e r on we found t h e y were e i t h e r i n t h e posses s ion o f ar l e f t behind by the V i e t Cong; s o I can be c e r t a i n t h e y were Vie t Cong.mater1.els

It was. l e f t behind a s they. evacuated, a p p a r e n t l y .

Q. WePe, t h e y foreLgn medical equipment, medicines? A. I n f a c t , some of the glass c o n t a i n e r s t h a t the

. . . . .

'' medTcine was i n had c h a r a c t e r w r i t f n g on them, .so evident1.y it was f o r e i g n .

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views on the situation, and if they anything of that type, would not do I don't think, of course except for an entirely singular situation.

were going to do it in my {Jl:'esence, My Lai (II), wh:Lch is

i 'q. Did you ~litness the fire support ,?f any heHcop'­

·ter gun ships while the operation was being conducted? , L' No, I didn't. I saw the helicopters and I sav:

the.firing, but I didn't see where the fire was landJnr; , in most cases., 'I

Q. , \'lould you say that My Lai (ll) was. more heavUy boobytl7apped and mined than other hamlets ahd v:Lllages?

A.. No, it was not. I don't bel:Leve:Lt'was mined or booby trapped at all. These people were livjng there, and it's k:Lnd of dangerous even for Viet Cong to booby­trap their o~m place, or a place where people are Hving. Usually \'lhen we ran int.o booby traps or mfnes, they were on the outskirts; they 11eren't in V:J;llages. I dj.dn't sec

-any mines or booby traps myself •. .l§on't believe any people in my company ,encountered any,mInes 0t boobytr8ps. The box I p1.cked up, as I mentioned in the v ry beginning, w1 th the rope, was not booby trapped 111. any wiay. It Vias just left there.

Q. '. '" the VC?

Was this box that you rerer to, property of'

A. It was ,left behind as they evacuated, app8rently. I d1dn't see 11ho left it. It was d"isco:vered laying there in the rice field. When we got the box and opened it, I found ins1de medical supplies, a syr1"nge, sever-al neeelles, certain medicines, gauze pads ; and things of, thisnatul'e, alsaa radio, a transistor radiO" Sony, and that's all :t" can remember. There were several 'other 1.tems but I can't remember what they were. The thlngs that we found 1n the box pertaining 'to medical equipment·were sim11ar to other th1ngs I<le found prev10u,sly" and' later on we found they were either in the possession of or left behind by the Viet Cong; so I can be certain they were Viet Cong .materj.pls.

Q. Weve· they foreign medical eqUipment, medic1nes? , A. In fact, some of the glass containers that the

.. medfcine was in had character writing on them,so evidently it was roreign.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q. HOW long was Sergeant Phu with company C ?

. . .A. . Sergeant Yhu? I

Q. Yes. A. I c a n ' t remember how long he was with t h e

conipaRy. H e was with t h e company f o r a t l e a s t s l x months I am p r e t t y sure of t h a t . Like. I say,. time. was a l i t t l e b i t f o u i e d up. i n f h e company.

I c a n ' t remember when,: how l ong he was

Q. A. Yes, it was, 'berb." He was evacuated t o Japan,

Was S P ~ I C a r t e r ' s name "Iierbert L."?

s o I understood anyway,~.-and he l i v e s i n C a l i f o r n i a , somewhere f a i r l y c lose t o P o r t Ord..

Q. Was SGT Buchanan's narne "Jay A . " ? A. SGT Buchanan?

Q. Yes. ~ . - ---A. - -. I-~.d.on-!t -.knox,. -He u a s a...ser.geant. B-7 , Sergeant

F i r s t C las s . I d o n ' t know what h i s f i r s t name VJaS or middle i n i t i a l . . . . .

. : Q. D i d you know a PFC Gonzalez? A. Yes, 1 do.

-Q. T h i s wo.uldn't be the "Jarsa" t h a t you r e fe r r ec i I

t o ?

know Gonzalez well, b u t I knew of him. . A. No. There was a Goiizalez a's-well. I d i d n ' t

.. . . ... .. . . . &; Do , you :have.. a n y - - fu r th . e r in . for ma t i on c-om e m i ng t h e matters we have d i scussed?

about -- I r e a l l y d o n ' t know how t o pu t . t h i s . There were some - r e p r e s e n t a t & v e s ,.- f i e l d g r a d e 3 f f i c . e r s from a higher o r g a n i z a t i o n -- 1 d o n ' t know e x a c t l y which h i g h e r , e i t h e r b r igade o r d i v i s i o n , o r something ' l i k e this who came down t o t h e LZ D o t t i e and ques t ioned c e r t a i n of t h e i n - d i v i d u a l s of t h e company about t h e operafirion. a p p a r e n t l y knew what-had.happ.ened on. t h e . o p e r a t i o n a.nd wanted t o know how some o f t h e men f e l t about i t . One of the people t h a t they' ,queseioned was SGT Ruchanan who., from what I understand, had no cornm&nt t.o make on t h e matter. The q u e s t i o n asked was PI e ' e . r . h c thought t h i s *

A. No, except t h a t -- well, t h i s is some in fo rma t ion

They . .

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FOROFFIGIAL USE ONLY How long ~Ias Sergeant Phu vlith Company C? SeJ:'geant Phu? I

Q. Yes. A. I can't J:'emember hOl1 long he was with the

compal'ly. He "las w1 t\l the company for at least six months. I am pretty SUl'e of that. Llke I saj',. time. ~I3S a l:ittle bit fouied up. I can't remember when,. how long he was in :the company.

Q. Was Splj Carter's name "UerbeJ:'t L. "? A. Yes, it was, 'Herb." He was evacuated to Japan,

so I understood anyway,and he lives in California, somewhere fa1rly close to Fort Ord.,. ' .

Q. Was SGT Buchanan's name "Jay A."? A. SGT Buchanan?

Q. Yes. ---A ... - .1·.QonJ t.knO'\1.~JIe ~laa a ... Sergeant E-7, Sergeant

First Class. I don't know what his first name vIaS or m1ddle ini tj.al.

to?

Q. A.

Did you knOl1 a PFC Gonzalez? Yes, 1 do; I

Q. This wouldn't be the "Jarsa" that you referred

A. No. There was a Gonzalez a's ·well. I d1dn't kno,~ Gonzalez well, but I knew of him.

"' ......... Q. Do· you have .. -any--·further fn.formation concerning the matters we have discussed?

A. No, except that -- well, this is some information about -- I really d0n 1 t know how to put. this. There were some 'representat:!:ves,-field grade officers from a higher organization -- I don't knOI'! exactly which higher, either brigade or divislon, or something like this -- who came dOVin to the LZ Dottie and questIoned' certain of the in­dividuals of the company about the operation. 'l'hey apparently knew what-hac;l,-happened on the. operatlon and wanted to knON how some of the men felt about it. One

, of the people that theY"quest'ioned was SGT Buchanan who} from what I understand, had no comment to make on the

matter. ~hFoltOFFI1~iAeUSr d'Nt~er he thought this'

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was p a r t of h i s job, t h a t i t was necessa ry , and he repl:'ted t h a t h e had no comrlieiit.

Q. Did t h e y wear any i n s i g n i a on t h e i r j a c k e t s which would i d e n t i f y them, whether t h e y we%e fimn t h e d i v i s i o n ?

~ A. T h a t ' s what f d o n ' t knoir.. I d 'on ' t know whether they-xare from div3.s ' i .a1--0~ &r..€e;ad.e. o r . t a s k f o r c e , o r what. .I d o n ' t know. They might have been 'from someth5~ng h i g h e r y e t , bu t I don ' l t knoiu where t h e y were from. j u s t came by a n d . t h e y asked SGT Euchnnaq,, and re d e f i n i t e l y know, s i n c e he was d i r e c t l y ques t ioned .

They r.

8 . . Whcn VJas t h i s ? A. T h i s rias w3.thj.n two days a f t e r v:e r e t u r n e d fi-on]

t h e . o p e r a f i o n on L Z D o t t i e , ve ry soan a P t e r t h e operat,i.on was^ over wi th .

Q. A. No, I don ' t . , except t h a t t hey were f i e l d grade

Do you remember t h e names o f .any of t h e s e people?

officers; t h a t I s a l l .

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D i d -you :see' them ~.questioD$ng anybod.y? . '

No, ' I d i d n ' t .

. . ..

I didn 1t see the people ' a t a l l , I b e l i e v e I was some p lace e l se e n t i r e l y .

Q. Who e l s e d i d they quest , ion? A. I d o n ' t know.

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Q. Did you see them qucs t ion ing SGT Buchanan? A. No, I d i d n ' t .

- . . .

Q. He t o W y o u t h i s ? A. Yes, he d i d .

Q. Do you have any f u r t h e r st.aternents t o make re-

Can I say something o f f t h e r e c o r d ?

Q. No. A. No, OK.

.... . .< , , ;.

38 Q. Do' you Laow where you g o t t.Ms in fo rma t ion? 39 A. Yes, SGT Buchanan.

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was part of his job, that it was necessary, and he repl:Led that he had no comment.

Q.. 1fuen was thi s? A. This ViaS w:!.thln two days after He returned from

the·operation on 1,Z Dottie, very soon after the operation vias over \'ii th .

Q. A.

officers;

Do you remember the names of.any of these people? No, I don't~ except that they were field grade that's all.

Q. Did they "lCar any insign:ta on their jackets which would identify them, ~lhether they were f'l"Om the divis:ton?

A. That's what i don't know.. I don't know vlhetl1er -·--they-werefrom-olvls:ton··oJ? -brigade. or. task force, or

what. I don't know. They might have been from something higher yet, but I don' tknow where they "lere from. 'rhey just came by and· they aslced SGT BuchanClr), and )./e def:Ln:Ltely know, since he was directly questioned. . .

Q. Who else did they question? A. I don't know.

Q. Did you see them questioning ·SGT Buchanan? A. No, I didn't.

Q. A.

I believe

Did .yousee· them .queSt;i:opi'ng anybody? NO,I didn't. I didn't see the people at all. I was some place else entirely.

Can I say something off the record?

Q. No. A. No, OK.

Q. A.

Do you Icnol1 where you got this information? Yes, SGT Buchanan.

Q. He told you this? ~ Yes, he did.

Q. Do you have any further statements to make re­garding the subject under investigation?

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A. I d q n ' t b e l i e v e I do . I would 1 l k e t o reserve - - in o t h e r words, I may l a t e r have sone th ing t o s a y , bu t d o n ' t th i i ik I do.

is p r i v i l e g e d i n the sense t h a t my r e p o r t will be n1ad.e t.0 t h e Chief of S t a f f of t h e Army f o r such use a s he deems a p p r o p r l a t e . You a r e o rde red n o t t o d i scuss t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r t h e q u e s t i o n s and answers covered d u r i n g t h i s i n t e r v i e w except a s you o the rwise may have a r ; ip ; l i t ' t o do s o i n accordance with law.

Q. Se rgean t , t h i s i s an o f f i c i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . It

i'; (The wi tnes s was excused'.) , '

I 1 .

(The foregoing tes t imony of SOT E - 5 Michael A . Bernhardt was t a k e n s t e n o g r a p h i c a l l y and- t r a n s c r i b e d by Robert I . Hend.erson , Shorthand. Repor te r ,, O f f i c e of The I n e p e c t o r General , Headquarters , Department of t h e I\rrny. )

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A. I don't believe I do. I would Eke to reserve in other words', I may later have something to say, but 1 don't think I do.

Q. Sergeant, this is an official investigation. It is pl'ivileged in the sense that my report will be made t.o the Chief of Staff of the Army for such use as he deems approprlate. You are ordered not to dIscuss thls investigation or the questions and ans1'lers covered dUPing this interview except as you otherwise may have a right' to do so in accordance with law. ,I,:

(~lhe witness was excused.)

(The foregoing testimony of SOT E- 5 t~ichael A. Bernhardt ~las taken stenoc;raphically and' transcribed by Robert I. Henderson, Shol'thand Reporter,. Office of 'I'he Inspector General, Headquarters, Department of the Army.)

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