iaea safety standards safety principles and technical ... safety standards... · authority of the...

safety seriesNo.99IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

Safety Principlesand Technical Criteriafor the Underground Disposalof High LevelRadioactive Wastes

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1989

This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/

CATEGORIES OF IAEA SAFETY SERIES

From 1978 onwards the various publications in the Safety Series are divided intofour categories, as follows:

(1) IAEA Safety Standards. Publications in this category comprise the Agency'ssafety standards as defined in "The Agency's Safety Standards and Measures"approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1976 and setforth in IAEA document INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1. They are issued under theauthority of the Board of Governors, and are mandatory for the Agency'sown operations and for Agency-assisted operations. Such standardscomprise the Agency's basic safety standards, the Agency's specializedregulations and the Agency's codes of practice. The covers are distinguishedby the wide red band on the lower half.

(2) IAEA Safety Guides. As stated in IAEA document INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1,referred to above, IAEA Safety Guides supplement IAEA Safety Standardsand recommend a procedure or procedures that might be followed inimplementing them. They are issued under the authority of the DirectorGeneral of the Agency. The covers are distinguished by the wide green bandon the lower half.

(3) Recommendations. Publications in this category, containing generalrecommendations on safety practices, are issued under the authority ofthe Director General of the Agency. The covers are distinguished by thewide brown band on the lower half.

(4) Procedures and Data. Publications in this category contain information onprocedures, techniques and criteria pertaining to safety matters. They areissued under the authority of the Director General of the Agency. Thecovers are distinguished by the wide blue band on the lower half.

Note: The covers of publications brought out within the framework of theNUSS (Nuclear Safety Standards) Programme are distinguished by the wideyellow band on the upper half.


SAFETY PRINCIPLESAND TECHNICAL CRITERIA

FOR THE UNDERGROUND DISPOSALOF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES


The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

AFGHANISTAN

ALBANIA

ALGERIA

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIAAUSTRIA

BANGLADESHBELGIUM

BOLIVIA

BRAZILBULGARIA

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

CAMEROONCANADA

CHILECHINA

COLOMBIA

COSTA RICACOTE D'lVOIRE

CUBACYPRUS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

DENMARK

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ECUADOR

EGYPT

EL SALVADOR

ETHIOPIA

FINLAND

FRANCE

GABONGERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICGERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OFGHANA

GREECE

GUATEMALA

HAITI

HOLY SEE

HUNGARY

ICELANDINDIA

INDONESIA

IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

IRAQ

IRELAND

ISRAELITALY

JAMAICA

JAPAN

JORDANKENYA

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF

KUWAIT

LEBANON

LIBERIA

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAfflRIYA

LIECHTENSTEIN

LUXEMBOURG

MADAGASCAR

MALAYSIAMALI

MAURITIUS

MEXICO

MONACOMONGOLIA

MOROCCO

MYANMAR

NAMIBIA

NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALAND

NICARAGUA

NIGER

NIGERIA

NORWAY

PAKISTAN

PANAMA

PARAGUAY

PERU

PHILIPPINES

POLANDPORTUGAL

QATAR

ROMANIA

SAUDI ARABIA

SENEGAL

SIERRA LEONE

SINGAPORE

SOUTH AFRICA

SPAINSRI LANKASUDANSWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

THAILAND

TUNISIA

TURKEY

UGANDA

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT

BRITAIN AND NORTHERN

IRELAND

UNITED REPUBLIC OFTANZANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

URUGUAY

VENEZUELA

VIET NAM

YUGOSLAVIA

ZAIRE

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

The Agency's Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the

IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Head-

quarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is "to accelerate and enlarge the

contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world".

© IAEA, 1989

Permission to reproduce or translate the information contained in this publication may be

obtained by writing to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,

A-1400 Vienna, Austria.

Printed by the IAEA in Austria

November 1989


SAFETY SERIES No. 99

SAFETY PRINCIPLESAND TECHNICAL CRITERIA

FOR THE UNDERGROUND DISPOSALOF HIGH LEVEL

RADIOACTIVE WASTES

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYVIENNA, 1989


THIS SAFETY SERIES IS ALSO PUBLISHEDIN FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

SAFETY PRINCIPLES AND TECHNICAL CRITERIAFOR THE UNDERGROUND DISPOSAL

OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTESIAEA, VIENNA, 1989

STI/PUB/854ISBN 92-0-123989-0

ISSN 0074-1892


FOREWORD

Safety Principles and Technical Criteria for the Underground Disposal of HighLevel Radioactive Wastes have been prepared with the aim of providing IAEA Mem-ber States with basic guidance on protection of humans and the environment fromthe hazards associated with deep geological disposal of high level radioactive wastes.

The present publication reflects the need, often expressed by Member States,for internationally harmonized criteria for the safe underground disposal of highlevel radioactive wastes. It sets out a basic safety philosophy for use in planning suchdisposals, the main objective of which is the isolation of the radioactive wastes fromthe human environment for considerable periods of time. The basic requirements forthe protection of humans arise directly from radiation protection principles extendedso as to deal with events and processes that can occur in a deep underground reposi-tory in the far future. Technical criteria regarding the waste, the repository and itsenvirons are also specified as a basis for assuring compliance with the safetyprinciples.

In the preparation of this publication account was taken of the recommenda-tions of other international bodies, in particular the International Commission onRadiological Protection (ICRP) and the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NBA), oncriteria for radioactive waste disposal. The safety principles contained in this bookare generally consistent with the recent recommendations of these two bodies.

A first draft of the present text was prepared at a Consultants Meeting in 1985.This was reviewed in two Advisory Group Meetings in 1985 and 1986 and by theTechnical Review Committee on Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes(TRCUD) in 1987. The draft was further revised following comments received fromMember States during 1988 by Z. Dlouhy and G.S. Linsley of the IAEA's Divisionof Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management.


CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. Background 11.2. Objectives 21.3. Scope 21.4. Structure 2

2. DEFINITIONS 3

3. SAFETY PRINCIPLES 7

3.1. Responsibility to future generations 73.1.1. Principle No. 1: Burden on future generations 73.1.2. Principle No. 2: Independence of safety from

institutional control 73.1.3. Principle No. 3: Effects in the future 83.1.4. Principle No. 4: Transboundary considerations 8

3.2. Radiological safety 83.2.1. Principle No. 5: Dose upper bound 93.2.2. Principle No. 6: Risk upper bound 103.2.3. Principle No. 7: Additional radiological safety 11

4. TECHNICAL CRITERIA 12

4.1. Criterion No. 1: Overall systems approach 124.2. The waste 13

4.2.1. Criterion No. 2: Radionuclide content 134.2.2. Criterion No. 3: The waste form 13

4.3. The repository 134.3.1. Criterion No. 4: Initial period of isolation 134.3.2. Criterion No. 5: Repository design and construction 144.3.3. Criterion No. 6: Nuclear criticality 14

4.4. The site 144.4.1. Criterion No. 7: Site geology 144.4.2. Criterion No. 8: Consideration of natural resources 15

5. ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFETYOBJECTIVES 15

5.1. Criterion No. 9: Safety assessment 155.2. Criterion No. 10: Quality assurance 16


6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 16

6.1. Long time-scale aspects 16

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 19

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 21


1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Radioactive wastes arise from nuclear fuel cycle operations for the generationof electricity and from other activities in which radioactive materials are used. Ioniz-ing radiation is recognized as a potential hazard to human health, and there is there-fore a common concern in all countries that radionuclides from the wastes must notenter the environment in concentrations or quantities that would cause unacceptablehealth hazards.

Spent nuclear fuel (if disposed of as a waste), the highly radioactive wastesfrom reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, and other wastes with similar characteristicsare referred to as high level radioactive wastes. They contain high concentrations ofcertain radionuclides that will remain radioactive for periods of time much longerthan human lifetimes. The long times required to develop disposal systems imply thatsafety principles and criteria are needed now to guide the initial stages of site selec-tion and disposal system design.

An important principle underlying the planning of high level waste repositoriesshould be that no unacceptable burden is to be inflicted upon future generations. Inthis regard, the responsibility for disposal should be borne by the society which hasderived the direct benefits from the nuclear fuel cycle operations which generatedthe waste. The design of the waste disposal system should be such as to avoideconomic, administrative or other problems after the time when control of the reposi-tory is relinquished.

The special attention that has been devoted to considering potential problemsfor future generations is an important feature of the developing policies for radioac-tive waste management. However, it should be recognized that in the disposal ofnon-radioactive wastes from many other industrial and agricultural activities theprotection of future generations and the environment must also be considered. Manychemical wastes may be rendered harmless by using chemical methods, but, unlikeradioactive wastes, whose potential hazards decay with time, some types of chemicalwastes remain toxic for all time.

It is recognized that radioactive waste disposal is only one, albeit the final, stepin the sequence of operations in the nuclear fuel cycle that give rise to radiationexposure. All these operations should comply with the Basic Safety Standards forRadiation Protection adopted by the IAEA (Safety Series No. 9, 1982 Edition) and,accordingly, each one must be optimized; this also applies to the nuclear fuel cyclesystem as a whole in order that radiation exposures are kept as low as reasonablyachievable.

1


1.2. Objectives

The main objective of this book is to set out an internationally agreed set ofprinciples and criteria for the design of deep underground repositories for thedisposal of high level radioactive wastes.

To the extent possible at this stage in the development of high level radioactivewaste repositories, and recognizing the technical differences of approach in MemberStates, the aim is towards achieving harmonization of the philosophical basis for theirdesign.

The safety principles and technical criteria are intended to form a commonbasis for the subsequent development of more detailed and quantitative performancestandards, some of which may need to be site specific in nature.

1.3. Scope

The safety principles and technical criteria have been developed with particularregard to the post-closure period of high level waste repositories located deep under-ground. This publication sets out the basic design objectives for underground highlevel radioactive waste repositories such that humans and the human environmentwill be protected after the closure of the repository and for the long time periods forwhich the wastes remain hazardous. It establishes principles for the protection offuture generations and quantifies the level to which they should be protected. Finally,it provides guidance on the technical aspects of repository design such that the princi-ples may be complied with.

The book is concerned with the post-closure period. Consideration of theoperational requirements which must be met when wastes are being handled, storedand emplaced are not therefore included.

This book does not address the need for, nor the form or content of, anyretrievability requirements that might be appropriate, either during the period ofwaste emplacement or during a subsequent testing or observation period prior to finalsealing of the repository.

Because the text was developed with particular regard to disposal of high levelwastes in deep underground repositories, these safety principles and technicalcriteria are not necessarily suitable for disposal of other types of wastes or fordisposal of high level wastes by other means such as sub-sea-bed emplacement.

1.4. Structure

The book begins with a set of definitions considered necessary to provide aproper understanding of the text (Section 2). Next, the safety principles and technicalcriteria are presented as two separate groups. In the first group are the basic safetyprinciples, including those that arise directly from radiological protection principles


(Section 3). The second group covers some basic technical criteria related to thewaste, the repository and the environment (Section 4). Two further criteria areconcerned with assurance of compliance of the disposal systems with the safetyobjectives (Section 5). The final sections contain a discussion of the long time-scaleaspects of high level waste disposal (Section 6) and a bibliography of importantreports in the subject area. The order of presentation of the principles and criteriawithin the text does not indicate their relative importance.

2. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are included to assure proper understanding andinterpretation of the key terms used in this book. Some of the terms have beendefined in a sense relating specifically to the context of disposal of high level wastesin deep underground repositories; others in the sense in which they are commonlyused in the radioactive waste management field.

Barrier (natural or engineered)

A feature which delays or prevents radionuclide migration from the wasteand/or repository into its surroundings. Natural barriers are, in the case of deepgeological repositories, represented by the host rock and the surrounding geologicalformation. An engineered barrier is a feature made by or altered by humans; it maybe a part of the waste package and/or part of the repository.

Burden

In this book the term burden means the (1) financial costs, (2) administrative,research and other resource commitments, and (3) radiological, social and otherimpacts which society must provide or endure in connection with disposal of radioac-tive wastes. Burden does not have the meaning formerly used in radiation protectionterminology and thus is not limited to the quantity of radioactive substances carriedwithin a human body or organ.

Conditioning of waste

Those operations that transform waste into a form suitable for transport and/orstorage and/or disposal. The operations may include converting the waste to anotherform, enclosing the waste in containers, and providing additional packaging.

Confinement (or isolation)

The segregation of radionuclides from the human environment and theprevention of their release into that environment in unacceptable quantities orconcentrations.


Containment

A term signifying either (1) the confinement of radioactive material in such away that it is prevented from being dispersed into the environment or is only releasedat a specified rate, or (2) the device used to effect such confinement.

Critical group

For a given radiation source, the members of the public whose exposure isreasonably homogeneous and is typical of individuals receiving the highest effectivedose equivalent or dose equivalent (whichever is relevant) from the source.

Criticality

The conditions in which a system is capable of sustaining a nuclear chainreaction.

Deterministic analysis

A technique for studying a system's behaviour using the laws of science andengineering whereby all system parameters, events and features are deterministically(as opposed to probabilistically) defined.

Disposal system

A combination of a geological environment, a repository and waste packagesemplaced within the repository, without the intention of retrieval.

Dose

Throughout this book the term 'dose' is used to denote the sum of the effectivedose equivalent resulting from external exposure during one year and the committedeffective dose equivalent from that year's intake of radionuclides.

Dose limit

In this book dose limit means the primary dose limit for individual membersof the public. It is the limit for the total dose from all artificial sources (exposuresof medical patients excluded). The value recommended in the Basic Safety Standardsfor prolonged exposures is 1 mSv in a year.

Dose upper bound

A dose level established by a competent authority, to apply to the dose contri-bution to individuals from any specific single source or practice. It should be selected


so that the envisaged total of sources, present and future, will not cause doses abovethe primary limits.

High level waste

(1) The highly radioactive materials, containing mainly fission products, as wellas some actinides, which are separated during chemical reprocessing of irradi-ated fuel;

(2) Spent reactor fuel, if it is declared a waste;(3) Any other waste with a radioactivity level comparable to (1) or (2).

Host rock

A geological formation in which a repository could be located.

Institutional control

Control by an authority or institution designated under the laws of a countryor State. This control may be active (monitoring, surveillance, remedial work) orpassive (land use control).

Multibarrier system

A system using two or more independent barriers to isolate the waste from thehuman environment. These can include the waste form, the container (canister),other engineered barriers and the host rock medium and its environment.

Near field region

The excavated repository including the waste package, backfills or sealingmaterials, and those parts of the host rock whose characteristics have been or couldbe altered by the repository or its content.

Optimization

As used in radiation protection practice, the process of reducing the expectedhealth effect deriving from radiation exposure of a population, through the use ofprotective measures, to a level as low as reasonably achievable, economic and socialfactors being taken into account.

Post-sealing period

The period after a waste repository has been shut down and sealed.


Probabilistic analysis

A statistical analysis technique for studying the expected behaviour of a systemwith parameters whose values are uncertain, with events whose occurrences arerandom, and with features which may or may not be present.

Quality assurance

Planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence thatan item, facility or person will perform satisfactorily in service.

Radionuclide migration

The movement of radionuclides through various media due to fluid flow and/orby diffusion.

Repository

A facility or designated site for storage or disposal of radioactive wastes.

Risk

In this book risk denotes the probability of a health effect for an individual orhis or her descendants. It is equal to the product of the probability of exposure ata particular annual dose rate, and the probability of a health effect arising from thatannual dose.

Validation of a model

Validation is a process carried out by comparison of predictions with indepen-dent field observations and experimental measurements. A model cannot be consid-ered validated until sufficient testing has been performed to ensure an acceptablelevel of predictive accuracy.

Waste form

The physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g. liquid, incorporated inconcrete or glass) without its packaging.

Waste package

The waste form and any container(s) as prepared for handling, transportation,storage and/or disposal. A cask or overpack may be a permanent part of the wastepackage or it may be reusable for any waste management step.


3. SAFETY PRINCIPLES

The two overlying objectives of underground disposal of high level radioactivewastes are:

— to isolate high level wastes from the human environment over long time-scaleswithout relying on future generations to maintain the integrity of the disposalsystem, or imposing upon them significant constraints due to the existence ofthe repository (RESPONSIBILITY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS); and

— to ensure the long term radiological protection of humans and the environmentin accordance with current internationally agreed radiation protection princi-ples (RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY).

To meet these two objectives, the following safety principles are formulated.

3.1. Responsibility to future generations

3.1.1. Principle No. 1: Burden on future generations

The burden on future generations shall be minimized by safely disposing of highlevel radioactive wastes at an appropriate time, technical, social and economicfactors being taken into account.

The radionuclide content of all radioactive wastes decreases naturally withtime. Interim storage has a useful role for wastes with short lived radionuclides,although this may imply additional radiation exposures during the interim storageperiod and continuing financial and other commitments. Disposal of appropriatelyconditioned wastes reduces the burden on future generations and avoids furtheroccupational radiation exposures.

Since the present generations benefit directly from their exploitation of nuclearenergy, it is reasonable that they should bear the financial burden of waste disposal.

The timing of disposal of high level wastes, however, will be decided bynational authorities in the light of a number of technical and socioeconomic factors.These include the availability of reprocessing services, the availability and develop-ment of suitable repository sites, the technical advantages to be gained from coolingduring interim storage and, in the case of spent fuel, a desire not to discard prema-turely constituents that might be useful to future generations.

3.1.2. Principle No. 2: Independence of safety from institutional control

The safety of a high level waste repository in the post-sealing period shall notrely on active monitoring, surveillance or other institutional controls or remedialactions after the time when the control of the repository is relinquished.


Principle No. 1 concerning the minimization of burdens on future generationsalso implies that these generations should not have to take any action to protect them-selves from the effects of waste disposal. Records are expected to be kept andmonitoring may be carried out, for instance, as required by national authorities, butthe safety of the repository should not rely on these measures.

3.1.3. Principle No. 3: Effects in the future

The degree of isolation of high level radioactive wastes shall be such that thereare no predictable future risks to human health or effects on the environment thatwould not be acceptable today.

This safety principle is derived from concern for future generations. In accor-dance with the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection of the IAEA, the risksto future individuals should be limited on the same basis as are those to individualsliving now. Therefore, the level of protection to be afforded to future individualsshould not be less than that provided today.

Deep underground disposal in a variety of different geological formations canprovide a very long period of isolation for wastes; it can minimize the probabilityof inadvertent intrusion and it can prevent the release of radionuclides, or limit itsrate, even in the far future.

Although the principal objective of radiation protection is the achievement andmaintenance of appropriately safe conditions for activities involving humanexposure, the level of safety required for the protection of all human individuals isthought likely to be adequate to protect other species, although not necessarilyindividual members of those species. In the case of disposal of high level waste deepunderground, if humans are adequately protected as individuals then other livingspecies are also likely to be sufficiently protected.

3.1.4. Principle No. 4: Transboundary considerations

As a basic principle, policies and criteria for radiation protection of popula-tions beyond national borders from releases of radioactive substances should not beless stringent than those for the population within the country of release.

Where high level waste disposal could give rise to radiation exposures beyondthe frontiers of the country where the disposal takes place, this safety principle hasto be applied.

3.2. Radiological safety

Although the objective of the waste repository is to isolate radioactive wastesfrom humans, it is recognized that there are mechanisms which at some distant time

8


or at some low probability can result in the release of radionuclides. These have tobe considered in safety analyses of the repository and it is necessary, therefore, tohave radiological and risk criteria against which the results of such safety analysesmay be judged.

The mechanisms of radionuclide release from a disposal site are not the samefor all environments, but generally the primary cause is likely to be degradation ofconditioned waste and its container by water followed by transfer and dispersal ofthe radionuclides by movement of groundwater, modified by reconcentrationprocesses. These mechanisms are referred to here as 'gradual' release processessince they normally lead to a reasonably predictable radiation exposure pattern inspace and time.

Gradual release processes are considered to include all evolutionary processesaffecting the disposal, whether they be connected with repository construction,operation and sealing, or with predictable natural phenomena such as erosion, verti-cal movements, etc. Changes in groundwater movement can be one consequence ofthe initiating events.

Other possible processes are not gradual but occur as random events and mayhave a disruptive effect on the repository and its environment. Processes such as seis-mic and tectonic phenomena which modify water flows could be important consider-ations for disposal in some geological formations, and future human activities suchas drilling and mineral exploitation could have direct and indirect influences on somerepositories. Disruptive processes could, in some situations, dominate the overallsafety assessment of disposal. Usually they are examined using probabilistic tech-niques, although it is noted that in some countries seismic phenomena are treated ina deterministic manner.

The following Principles Nos 5 and 6 are intended to apply to gradual releaseprocesses and disruptive processes, respectively. However, it is important to recog-nize that the principles are linked and have the same overall basis when expressedin terms of risk to an individual.'

3.2.1. Principle No. 5: Dose upper bound

For releases from a repository due to 'gradual'processes, the predicted annualdose to individuals of the critical group shall be less than the dose upper bound

1 Observation by the delegation of the United States of America to the Agency'sBoard of Governors. "This document uses the ICRP Publication 26 mortality risk coefficientof 0.01 per sievert. A significant revision of this risk coefficient may be issued by the ICRPin 1990. If a revised coefficient is promulgated, it should be considered in the preparation ofnational standards and the document revised accordingly. The document does not addressalternative standard forms such as release quantity limits which might be used by MemberStates in conjunction with individual exposure limits."


apportioned by national authorities from the relevant individual dose limits whichcurrently correspond to an annual average dose value of 1 mSv for prolongedexposures.

This principle follows from the policy of the IAEA, as stated in its Basic SafetyStandards for Radiation Protection (Safety Series No. 9, 1982 Edition) in followingthe recommendations of the ICRP.

The application of individual dose limits to the doses that occur as a result ofgradual release processes is the same as for releases from other types of nuclear facil-ities. Two basic requirements are involved. First, the critical group, i.e. themembers of the public whose exposure is reasonably homogeneous and is typical ofindividuals receiving the highest dose, must be identified. Secondly, the overalldisposal system must provide assurance that the average dose in the critical groupwill not exceed the dose limit, taking into account possible exposures from othersources, including other repositories but excluding medical and natural sources. Thisallowance for other sources can be formalized by using a dose upper bound for thatsource rather than the dose limit which applies to the dose received by an individualfrom all sources. The dose upper bound is also intended to apply to the average dosein the critical group whether this occurs now or in the future (see IAEA SafetySeries No. 77, 1986, for a fuller discussion).

The identification of the most highly exposed groups in the future becomesincreasingly difficult with time. The dose upper bound may therefore need to beapplied to hypothetical individuals who could live where exposures are likely to begreatest. In defining the habits of these hypothetical individuals, it may be assumedthat their basic nutritional requirements and lifestyles are the same as those of peopletoday.

The dose upper bound that serves as the design constraint for the repositoryshould therefore be established taking account of doses from global, regional andother local sources, and reserving a prudent fraction of the dose limit for potentialfuture sources, e.g. future practices involving radiation exposure such as future usesof nuclear energy and other nuclear technologies.

3.2.2. Principle No. 6: Risk upper bound

The level of safety of a repository for high level radioactive wastes shall be suchthat the predicted risk of a health effect in a year from a repository to an individualof the critical group from disruptive events not covered by Principle No. 5 is less thana risk upper bound apportioned by national authorities from an individual limit ofrisk of health effects of one in a hundred thousand per year.

It has become clear during the development of safety assessments for high levelwaste disposal that unlikely events described as disruptive processes earlier in thissection, and their consequences, should be considered.

10


The judgement that is made as to the level of risk that should not be exceededis that the risk upper bound from events not covered by the use of a dose upper boundshould be no greater than the risk from doses at the dose upper bound.

The restriction of doses over a lifetime to 1 mSv per year on average impliesa constraint of the average annual risk to a level of about 10 ~5. The ICRP hassuggested that it seems reasonable to restrict the risk in a year to an individual ofthe critical group from events which are not covered by the use of a dose upperbound, so that it is also at a level of about 1(F5 (see ICRP Publication 46 (1985)for a more complete discussion of this subject).

The implication of this principle is that risks of health effects from events thatare highly improbable will be very small compared to any risk upper bound, andanalysis of such events need not be included in a risk assessment for a repository.2

3.2.3. Principle No. 7: Additional radiological safety

All radiation exposures that may result from the disposal of high level radioac-tive wastes shall be as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factorsbeing taken into account. The dose and risk upper bounds as defined in PrinciplesNos 5 and 6 shall be overriding constraints.

While the specification of upper bounds of dose and risk serves to ensure therequired level of safety for an individual, it is recommended that all exposures shouldbe as low as reasonably achievable below the upper bounds.

This recommendation is sometimes implemented in other radiation protectionactivities by a rigorous analysis of available alternatives to achieve an optimalbalancing of radiological impacts, economic costs, and other factors. The principlethat exposures should be kept as low as reasonably achievable remains valid forgeological disposal of high level wastes, but application of the principle requiresspecial considerations.

Many factors affect the siting and design of a high level waste repository,including other operations within the waste management system, costs, social andenvironmental effects and political considerations, as well as radiological effects.The alternatives available when disposing of high level waste in a geological reposi-tory are likely to be quite limited. Fundamental decisions, including whether toreprocess spent fuel, and many aspects of site selection, may be made on the basisof social or institutional concerns. The major problem is that the uncertainties in

2 In some Member States, the preferred approach is to use only a radiation dose basedcriterion together with a qualitative statement about the probability of various releasescenarios. In this case the scenarios considered in formal safety analyses are limited to thosejudged to be realistic or reasonable and comparisons are made with an annual dose upperbound.

11


projecting radiological impacts may be quite large. Therefore, it is difficult to applyfully the requirement to keep doses as low as reasonably achievable in decidingbetween available options for the waste disposal system. Also, a formal optimizationconsidering future radiological impacts but using present costs is not entirely justi-fied. Within the scope of this book, which is primarily concerned with the long termsafety of a high level waste repository, the application of this principle may be quitelimited.

Despite these difficulties, the principle of keeping doses as low as reasonablyachievable should be followed throughout the processes of site selection, wasteconditioning and repository design. Usually it will be necessary to do so in a qualita-tive manner, making significant use of engineering judgement rather than rigorousanalyses of repository impacts. In particular cases, a decision making methodology,such as multiattribute analysis, may be helpful for distinguishing betweenalternatives.

4. TECHNICAL CRITERIA

As a supplement to the basic safety principles for the underground disposal ofhigh level wastes the following technical criteria are specified. They establish a tech-nical basis for assuring compliance with the safety principles.

4.1. Criterion No. 1: Overall systems approach

The long term safety of high level radioactive waste disposal shall be based onthe multibarrier concept, and shall be assessed on the basis of the performance ofthe disposal system as a whole.

The entire disposal system consists of various components, such as the wasteform, the containers, the backfill material, the repository, the host rock, and thesurrounding geological formations. Because high level wastes present a potentialhazard for very long times and because the difficulty of long term predictions maylead to large uncertainties, it is necessary that the safety of waste disposal does notrest on one single component or barrier, but rather on the combined performanceof several barriers. If a barrier fails to perform as designed, then the overall systemshould still be sufficient to meet the safety objectives.

The overall systems approach incorporates the idea that in the final analysisit is only the performance and safety of the disposal system as a whole at any giventime in the future that has to be assured rather than the performance of all theindividual components. This approach offers great flexibility to the designer of adisposal system because a weakness in one barrier may be compensated for by thecontainment capability of other barriers. The overall systems approach thus makes

12


it possible to adapt the geological disposal concept to a variety of high level wasteforms and packages and to a variety of geological situations which are often differentfrom country to country.

It is nevertheless recognized that the geological barrier plays the major role inassuring long term safety. Its function may be inferred from natural evidences of thelong term containment provided by many types of geological formation.

This book does not specify minimum levels of performance to be achieved byindividual barriers. National authorities may find it prudent to specify such perfor-mance levels in order to permit the timely design and development of certainengineered barriers.

4.2. The waste

4.2.1. Criterion No. 2: Radionuclide content

Waste acceptance criteria shall be established for radionuclide content consis-tent with assumptions made in the repository design.

The radionuclide content is the source term for possible radionuclide release.It is therefore necessary that acceptance criteria for the radionuclide content be estab-lished in order to assure compliance with the assumed source term values on whichthe repository design relies.

4.2.2. Criterion No. 3: The waste form

High level radioactive wastes to be emplaced in a repository shall be in a solidform with chemical and physical properties favouring the retention of radionuclidesand appropriate to the disposal system.

During an initial period after emplacement the outer container or other barrierscan be relied upon to prevent water ingress. Thereafter the waste form and itssurroundings will govern the releases to the geological formation. Thus, it is essen-tial that the wastes are in a form which in combination with the repository and thehost rock retards the release of radionuclides.

4.3. The repository

4.3.1. Criterion No. 4: Initial period of isolation

A high level waste disposal system shall be designed in a way that aims atsubstantially complete isolation of radionuclides for an initial period of time.

13


Substantially complete isolation of high level radioactive wastes cannot bemaintained indefinitely. The initial period of time during which a high degree ofisolation is necessary will depend on the type of waste and its decay characteristicsas well as on the properties of the overall disposal system.

After the initial period of substantial isolation, barriers inherent in the hostrock and surrounding formations become of increasing importance.

4.3.2. Criterion No. 5: Repository design and construction

A high level radioactive waste repository shall be designed, constructed,operated and closed in such a way that the post-sealing safety junctions of the hostrock and its relevant surroundings are preserved.

In the early stage of site confirmation and later during the construction andclosure of a repository, special attention should be given to the techniques used andto the execution of fieldwork so that the isolation capabilities of the site will bediminished as little as possible. The consequences of disturbances caused duringthese operations should be assessed with regard to their safety implications.

The impact of the wastes and any engineered structure emplaced in the reposi-tory on the characteristics of the hydrogeological environment should not impairthose properties of the host rock which are relevant to safety.

4.3.3. Criterion No. 6: Nuclear criticality

The high level radioactive waste repository shall be designed and the wasteemplaced such that any fissile material remains in a subcritical configuration.

Some high level wastes may contain quantities of fissile materials sufficient toachieve nuclear criticality if improperly emplaced. It is therefore important that therepository is designed so as to avoid critical configurations.

Subcritical geometry is achieved by effective dilution of fissile materialsduring conditioning of the waste and/or by providing the necessary distance betweenwaste packages containing fissile material. Where leaching and subsequent accumu-lation of fissile materials could occur, adequate consideration should be given toprevent criticality.

4.4. The site

4.4.1. Criterion No. 7: Site geology

The repository shall be located at sufficient depth to protect adequately theemplaced waste from external events and processes, in a host rock having propertiesthat adequately restrict the deterioration of physical barriers and the transport ofradionuclides from the repository to the environment.

14


The location of the waste repository is of great importance to its long term safefunctioning. The size of the selected host medium shall be large enough to accommo-date the repository and that part of the surrounding medium which is necessary forsafety.

The most likely way radionuclides can migrate from the repository to thebiosphere is by groundwater transport. For that reason, special emphasis must beplaced on the hydrogeological and geochemical properties of the host medium torestrict nuclide transport by groundwater. The possibility of tectonic, seismic andother disturbances which can create new paths for the transport of radionuclides shallalso be carefully evaluated.

4.4.2. Criterion No. 8: Consideration of natural resources

The repository site shall be selected, to the extent practicable, to avoid prox-imity to valuable natural resources or materials which are not readily available fromother sources.

Two considerations argue against locating a repository near valuable, or poten-tially valuable, natural resources. First, future generations will exploit naturalresources for their own benefit. Location of a repository near such resources mightpreclude future use of those resources, or might require burdensome remedialactions to be taken to avoid disrupting the repository.

The second, and more important, consideration involves the possibility that inthe future, when the institutional control ceases, the knowledge of the repositorylocation might not be available to an individual or society seeking to develop naturalresources. In this case, inadvertent intrusion into a repository could reduce itsintegrity, leading to release of radionuclides to the environment.

5. ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THESAFETY OBJECTIVES

5.1. Criterion No. 9: Safety assessment

Compliance of the overall disposal system with the radiological safety objec-tives shall be demonstrated by means of safety assessments based on models that arevalidated as far as possible.

It is recognized that the long term safety of a high level radioactive wastedisposal system cannot be demonstrated directly. However, it can be indirectlydemonstrated by evaluation using predictive analyses based on technical and scien-tific data. Demonstration of compliance with numerical safety criteria therefore

15


involves safety assessment and comparison of the results of the assessment with thecriteria.

Both deterministic and probabilistic analysis techniques may be used for safetyassessment purposes. These methodologies are not mutually exclusive, and in prac-tice a comparative analysis with both techniques is likely.

The health risks from disruptive events which might constitute a significantfraction of the total health risks from waste disposal should be assessed.

In safety assessments aimed at comparisons of several different designapproaches, realistic scenarios, models and input data should be applied. Models tobe used should be validated as far as possible against evidence from laboratory testsand field observations including natural analogues and site investigations wheneverpracticable.

Estimating the probability of occurrence of random events is difficult and onlyvery approximate values may be readily obtainable. In these cases, upper limits tosuch estimates should be used initially in assessments; refined estimates are onlyneeded if such events prove to be limiting.

More detailed information about safety and performance assessment method-ologies and model validation is included in two specialized IAEA publications(Safety Series Nos 56 and 68).

5.2. Criterion No. 10: Quality assurance

A quality assurance programme for components of the disposal system and forall activities from site confirmation through construction and operation to closure ofthe disposal facility shall be established to ensure compliance with relevant standardsand criteria.

The programme should contain provision to ensure identification of, andcompliance with, requirements of appropriate recognized engineering and miningcodes and regulations, standards, specifications and practices.

The programme should also define the organizational structure for implement-ing the quality assurance activities and should clearly delineate the responsibility andauthority of the various personnel and organizations involved in selecting the levelof quality assurance required and ensuring that the quality assurance programmes arefollowed.

6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

6.1. Long time-scale aspects

As expressed by Principle No. 3, the individual dose and risk upper boundsapplicable today should in principle be sustained indefinitely without a cut-off timeto respect our responsibility for protection of human descendants. However,

16


assurance of compliance with this principle over long time-scales introduces difficul-ties arising from uncertainties due to changes in environmental conditions and livinghabits of future populations.3

Describing the environmental conditions for the human species in the futurebecomes more and more speculative when the periods considered are tens of thou-sands of years from now. For example, glacial episodes have occurred in a cyclicalfashion, and the next ice age may appear within about 10 000 years from now.Significant changes in the biosphere will undoubtedly occur through these periods.The detailed environmental conditions and nutritional needs of individuals in thedistant future may be different from those of today.

Since neither the location nor the characteristics of human individuals in thefar future can be predicted, dose and risk assessments, in the absolute sense, maynot be meaningful for periods longer than a few thousand years. This does not implythat the assessments for such long time periods should not be made but it indicatesthat other independent means may be needed to reinforce the conclusions of the doseand risk assessments as they enter the period of increasing uncertainty.

One means may be to give assurance that the repository is not going to causesignificant change to the radiation environment of the future population. The doseupper bound and risk upper bound are less than annual doses from natural back-ground. Therefore, if the doses and risks from a high level waste repository toindividuals in the far future who are assumed to have our characteristics and ournutritional needs are less than the respective upper bounds, then there is the assur-ance that doses from the environment of any future individual are not going to beappreciably changed by a contribution from the repository.

An additional means of assurance may be to compare far future concentrationsor releases of radionuclides from the repository into the environment with concentra-tions or releases from natural sources such as the upper part of the earth's crust, thetoxicity of different radionuclides being taken into account in the comparison.

3 Some national authorities have considered it appropriate to introduce a cut-off intime for use in the implementation of Principles No. 5 (dose upper bound) and No. 6 (riskupper bound).

17


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Basic Safety Standards for RadiationProtection: 1982 Edition, jointly sponsored by IAEA, ILO, NEA(OECD), WHO, SafetySeries No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (1982).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Characteristics of Radioactive WasteForms Conditioned for Storage and Disposal: Guidance for the Development of Waste Accep-tance Criteria, IAEA-TECDOC 285, IAEA, Vienna (1983).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Concepts and Examples of Safety Ana-lyses for Radioactive Waste Repositories in Continental Geological Formations, Safety SeriesNo. 58, IAEA, Vienna (1983).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Development of Regulatory Proceduresfor the Disposal of Solid Radioactive Wastes in Deep, Continental Formations, Safety SeriesNo. 51, IAEA, Vienna (1980).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Effects of Controlled Releases of Radio-nuclides on Terrestrial and Freshwater Organisms and Ecosystems, Technical Reports Series(in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Effects of Heat from High-Level Wasteon Performance of Deep Geological Repository Components, IAEA-TECDOC-319, IAEA,Vienna (1984).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Performance Assessment for Under-ground Radioactive Waste Disposal Systems, Safety Series No. 68, IAEA, Vienna (1985).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Principles for Establishing Limits forthe Release of Radioactive Materials into the Environment, Safety Series No. 45, IAEA,Vienna (1978).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Principles for Limiting Releases ofRadioactive Effluents into the Environment, Safety Series No. 77, IAEA, Vienna (1986).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Qualitative Acceptance Criteria forDisposal of Radioactive Wastes in Deep Geological Formations, Technical Reports Series(in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Assessment for the UndergroundDisposal of Radioactive Wastes, Safety Series No. 56, IAEA, Vienna (1981).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Site Investigations for Repositories forSolid Radioactive Wastes in Deep Continental Geological Formations, Technical ReportsSeries No. 215, IAEA, Vienna (1982).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Underground Disposal of RadioactiveWastes, Basic Guidance, Safety Series No. 54, IAEA, Vienna (1981).

19


INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Cost-BenefitAnalysis in the Optimization of Radiation Protection, ICRP Publication No. 37, Annals of theICRP 10 2/3, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1983).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, RadiationProtection Principles for the Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste, ICRP Publication No. 46,Annals of the ICRP 15 4, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1986).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, RadionuclideRelease into the Environment: Assessment of Doses to Man, ICRP Publication No. 29, Annalsof the ICRP 2 1, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1978).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Recommenda-tions of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication No. 26,Annals of the ICRP 1 3, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1977).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Statement fromthe 1985 Paris Meeting of the ICRP, Annals of the ICRP IS 3 (1985).

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY OF THE OECD, Long-Term Radiological ProtectionObjectives for Radioactive Waste Disposal, OECD, Paris (1984).

Nuclear Power Experience (Proc. Conf. Vienna, 1982), IAEA, Vienna (1983).

Radioactive Waste Management (Proc. Conf. Seattle, USA, 1983), IAEA, Vienna (1984).

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Nuclear Power: Management of High-level Radioac-tive Wastes, WHO Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen (1982).

20


Johnston, P.O.

Thomas, K.T.(Scientific Secretary)

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CONSULTANTS MEETING28 October to 1 November 1985

Department of the Environment,Romney House, Room A5.16,43 Marsham Street, London SW1P 3PY,United Kingdom

Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle,International Atomic Energy Agency,P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Ahmed, J.

Benassai, S.

Bloser, M.

Costello, J.M.

Dlouhy, Z.

Fehringer, D.J.

ADVISORY GROUP MEETING4-8 November 1985

Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

ENEA - Directorate for NuclearSafety and Radiation Protection,

Via Vitaliano Brancati 48,1-00144 Rome-EUR, Italy

Bundesministerium des Innern,Graurheindorfer Strasse 198,D-5300 Bonn 1, Federal Republic of Germany

Lucas Heights Research Laboratories,Australian Atomic Energy Commission,Private Mailbag, Sutherland, NSW 2232, Australia

Nuclear Research Institute,CS-250 68 Rez near Prague, Czechoslovakia

623-SS Room 788,United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Washington, DC 20555, United States of America

21


Gen til, J. Institut de protection et de surete* nucleaire,Commissariat ii l'6nergie atornique,B.P. 6, F-92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex,France

Hamstra, J. AVORA B.V.,Geological Waste Disposal Consultants,Postbox 138, 1860 AC Bergen (N.H.),Netherlands

Harrington, E.

Hemming, C.

Heremans, R.

Kimura, E.T.

Kumra, M. S.

Larsson, A.

Murano, T.

Niederer, U.

Health and Safety Executive,Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,St. Peter's House, Balliol Road,Bootle, Merseyside L20 3LZ, United Kingdom

Radioactive Waste (Professional) Division,Room A5.28,

Department of the Environment,43 Marsham Street, London SW1P SPY,United Kingdom

ONDRAF,Boulevard du Regent 54,Boite 5, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

University of Tokyo,Tokyo, Japan

High-Level Waste Management Section,Bhabha Atomic Research Centre,Trombay, Bombay 400 085, India

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate,Box 27106, S-102 52 Stockholm, Sweden

Power Reactor and Nuclear FuelDevelopment Corporation (PNC),

Sankaido Building, 1-9-13 Akasaka,Minato-ku, Tokyo 107, Japan

Federal Office of Energy,Nuclear Safety Inspectorate,CH-5303 Wurenlingen, Switzerland

22


Osborne, R.V.

Paakkola, O.

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd,Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories,Chalk River, Ontario KOJ 1JO, Canada

Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety,P.O. Box 268, SF-00101 Helsinki, Finland

Palacios, E

Piermattei, S.

Richter, O.K.(Chairman)

Ruokola, E.

Senoo, M.

Simon, R.


Wagstaff, K.P.

National Commission of Atomic Energy,Avenida del Libertador 8250,1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina

ENEA — Directorate for NuclearSafety and Radiation Protection,


Staatliches Amt fur Atomsicherheit und Strahlen-schutz der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,

Waldowallee 117, DDR-1157 Berlin,German Democratic Republic

Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety,P.O. Box 268, SF-00101 Helsinki, Finland

Tokai Research Establishment,JAERI,Tokai-mura, Naka-gun,Ibaraki-ken 319-11, Japan

Commission of the European Communities,Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium


Waste Management Division,Atomic Energy Control Board,P.O. Box 1046, Ottawa,Ontario KIP 5S9, Canada

23


CONSULTANTS MEETING11-15 November 1985

Dloulry, Z.




ADVISORY GROUP MEETING6-10 October 1986

Ahmed, J. Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Araki, K.

Benassai, S.

Bloser, M.

Costello, J.M.

Dlouhy, Z.

Fehringer, D.J.(Chairman)

Tokai Research Establishment,JAERI,Tokai-mura, Naka-gun,Ibaraki-ken 319-11, Japan

ENEA — Directorate for NuclearSafety and Radiation Protection,


Bundesministerium des Innern,Graurheindorfer Strasse 198,D-5300 Bonn 1, Federal Republic of Germany

Lucas Heights Research Laboratories,Australian Atomic Energy Commission,Private Mailbag, Sutherland, NSW 2232, Australia


623-SS Room 788,United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Washington DC 20555, United States of America

24


Gentil, J. Institut de protection et de suretd nuc!6aire,Commissariat & 6nergie atomique,B.P. 6, F-92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex,France

Hemming, C.

Heremans, R.

Kumra, M.S.

Larsson, A.

Murano, T.

Niederer, U.

Osborne, R.V.

Palacios, E.

Piermattei, S.

Radioactive Waste (Professional) Division,Room A5.28,Department of the Environment,43 Marsham Street, London SW1P SPY,United Kingdom

ONDRAF,Boulevard du Re'gent 54,Boite 5, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

High-Level Waste Management Section,Bhabha Atomic Research Centre,Trombay, Bombay 400 085, India

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate,Box 27106, S-102 52 Stockholm, Sweden

Waste Management and Raw Materials Divison,Waste Isolation Office,Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel

Development Corporation (PNC),Sankaido Building, 1-9-13 Akasaka,Minato-ku, Tokyo 107, Japan

Federal Office of Energy,Nuclear Safety Inspectorate,CH-5303 Wiirenlingen, Switzerland

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd,Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories,Chalk River, Ontario KOJ 1JO, Canada

National Commission of Atomic Energy,Avenida del Libertador 8250,1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina

ENEA - Directorate for NuclearSafety and Radiation Protection,


25


Richter, O.K. Staatliches Amt fur Atomsicherheit und Strahlen-schutz der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,


Ruokola, E. Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety,P.O. Box 268, SF-00101 Helsinki, Finland

Tokuyama, A. Natural Science Department,Hyogo University of Teacher Education,Shimokume 942-1, Yashiro-chu, Katoh-gun,Hyogo-ken 673-14, Japan

Wiley, J.R. Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle,(Scientific Secretary) International Atomic Energy Agency,

P.O.Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

EIGHTH MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ONUNDERGROUND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES (TRCUD)

26-28 January 1987

Araki, K. Department of Environmental Safety Research(Observer) JAERI,

Tokai-mura, Naka-gun,Ibaraki-ken 319-11, Japan

Baas, J.L. Ministry of Housing, PhysicalPlanning and Environment,

P.O.Box 450, NL-2260 MB Leidschendam,The Hague, Netherlands

Boge, R. National Institute of Radiation Protection,(Observer) P.O. Box 60204, S-104 01 Stockholm, Sweden

Burtic, T. State Committee for Nuclear Energy,(Observer) Bucharest, Romania

Cahuzac, Ms. Institut de protection et de suretd nuc!6aire,(Observer) Commissariat ii 1'dnergie atomique,

Departement de protection technique,B.P. 6, F-92260 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex,France

26


Cooley, C.

Cornelissen, A.(Observer)

Fukuyoshi, T.(Observer)

Heremans, R.

Jourde, P.

United States Department of Energy (RW-40),Washington, DC 205856, United States of America

Ministry of Housing,Physical Planning and Environment,P.O.Box 450, NL-2260 MB Leidschendam,The Hague, Netherlands

Radioactive Waste Management Centre,Land Disposal Section,No. 15 Mori Building, 2-8-10 Toranomon,Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan

ONDRAF,Boulevard du R6gent 54,Boite 5, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

Commissariat a I'e'nergie atomique,B.P. 6, F-92260 Fontenay-aux-Roses, Cedex,France

Kuehn, K.

Larsson, A.(Chairman)

Malasek, E.

Olivier, P.J.

Okuno, T.Observer)

Gesellschaft fur Strahlen undUmweltforschung mbH,

Theodor-Heuss-Strasse 4, D-3300 Braunschweig,Federal Republic of Germany

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate,P.O. Box 27106, S-102 52 Stockholm, Sweden

Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission,Slezskd 9, CS-120 29 Prague 2, Czechoslovakia

Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development,

38, boulevard Suchet, F-75016 Paris, France

Waste Management and Raw Materials Division,Waste Isolation Office,Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel

Development Corporation (PNC),Sankaido Building, 1-19-13 Akasaka,Minato-ku, Tokyo 107, Japan

27


Owen, R.G.

Palacios, E.

Rometsch, R.

RydeH, N.(Observer)

United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority,AFPD Building 10, Atomic Energy Research

Establishment,Harwell, Didcot, Oxfordshire OX11 ORA,United Kingdom

National Commission of Atomic Energy,8250 Avenida del Libertador,1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina

CEDRA,Parkstrasse 23, CH-5401 Baden, Switzerland

National Board for Spent Nuclear Fuel,Sehlstedsgatan 509,S-115 28 Stockholm, Sweden

Saltzman, J.(Observer)

Venet, P.

Vovk, I.F.(Scientific Secretary)

Yamamoto, K.

Zappe, D.

United States Department of Energy (RW-40),Washington, DC 205856, United States of America

Commission of the European Communities,Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium


Office of Emergency Planning andEnvironmental Radioactivity,

Science and Technology Agency,2-2-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo 100, Japan

Staatliches Amt fur Atomsicherheit und Strahlen-schutz der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,


28


HOW TO ORDER IAEA PUBLICATIONS

An exclusive sales agent for IAEA publications, to whom all ordersand inquiries should be addressed, has been appointedin the following country:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-4391

In the following countries IAEA publications may be purchased from thesales agents or booksellers listed or throughmajor local booksellers. Payment can be made in localcurrency or with UNESCO coupons.

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIABELGIUM

CHILE

CHINA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FRANCE

HUNGARY

INDIA

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAPANPAKISTAN

POLAND

ROMANIASOUTH AFRICA

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UNITED KINGDOM

USSRYUGOSLAVIA

Comision Nacional de Energfa Atomica, Avenida del Libertador 8250,RA-1429 Buenos AiresHunter Publications, 58 AGipps Street, Collingwood, Victoria 3066Service Courrier UNESCO, 202, Avenue du Roi, B-1060 BrusselsComisidn Chilena de Energfa Nuclear, Venta de Publicaciones,Amunategui 95, Casilla 188-D, SantiagoIAEA Publications in Chinese:China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, Translation Section,P.O.Box 2103, BeijingIAEA Publications other than in Chinese:China National Publications Import & Export Corporation,Deutsche Abteilung, P.O. Box 88, BeijingS.N.T.L., Mikulandska 4, CS-11686 Prague 1Alfa, Publishers, Hurbanovo namestie 3, CS-81589 BratislavaOff ice International de Documentation et Librairie,48, rue Gay-Lussac,F-75240 Paris Cedex 05Kuitura, Hungarian Foreign Trading Company,P.O. Box 149, H-1389 Budapest 62Oxford Book and Stationery Co., 17, Park Street, Calcutta-700 016Oxford Book and Stationery Co.,Scindia House, New Delhi-110001Heiliger & Co. Ltd.23 Keren Hayesod Street, Jerusalem 94188Libreria Scientifica, Dott. Lucio de Bmsio 'aeiou",Via Meravigli 16, 1-20123 MilanMaruzen Company, Ltd, P.O. Box 5050,100-31 Tokyo InternationalMirza Book Agency, 65, Shahrah Quaid-e-Azam, P.O. Box 729, Lahore 3Ars Polona-Ruch, Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego,Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7, PL-00-068 Warsawllexim, PO. Box 136-137, BucharestVan Schaik Bookstore (Pty) Ltd, P.O. Box 724, Pretoria 0001Diaz de Santos, Lagasca 95, E-28006 MadridDiaz de Santos, Balmes 417, E-08022 BarcelonaAB Fritzes Kungl. Hovbokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, P.O. Box 16356,S-10327 StockholmHMSO, Publications Centre, Agency Section,51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5DRMezhdunarodnaya Kniga.Smolenskaya-Sennaya 32-34, Moscow G-200Jugoslovenska Knjiga.Terazije 27,P.O. Box 36, YU-11001 Belgrade

Orders from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed andrequests for information should be addressed directly to:

Division of PublicationsInternational Atomic Energy AgencyWagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria


INTERNATIONALATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYVIENNA, 1989


iaea safety standards safety principles and technical ... safety standards... · authority of the...

Documents