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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002995

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(TF-90206, TF-90207)

ON A

GPOBA GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 5.18 MILLION

TO THE

PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA

FOR A

DECENTRALIZED ELECTRICITY FOR UNIVERSAL ACCESS PROJECT

December 24, 2013

Sustainable Development DepartmentBolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile Country Management UnitLatin America and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 5, 2013)Currency Unit = Bolivianos (Bs.)

1.00 Bs. = US$ 0.14US$ 1.00 = 6.96 Bs.

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1—December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSAPL Adaptable Program Loan MTR Mid term reviewCAS Country Assistance Strategy MSC Mid-term Service ContractCO2 Carbon dioxide MSE Micro and Small EnterprisesEA Environmental Assessment NPV Net Present ValueGOB Government of Bolivia OBA Output-Based AidGPOBA Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid O&M Operation and MaintenanceICT Information and Communications

TechnologyOTM Technical Office for Monitoring (Oficina

Técnica de Monitoreo)IDA International development Agency PAD Project Appraisal ReportIDTR Decentralized Infrastructure for Rural

Transformation ProjectPCU Project Coordinating Unit

IERR Internal Economic Rate of Return PDO Project Development ObjectivesIP Implementation Performance PPP Public-Private PartnershipIPDF Indigenous Peoples Development

FrameworkPV Photovoltaic

ISR Implementation Status and Results Report SHS Solar Home SystemKPI Key Performance Indicators TA Technical AssistancekWh Kilo-Watt-hour VMEEA Vice Ministry for Electricity and

Alternative EnergyM&E Monitoring and Evaluation Wp Watt-peak

WTP Willingness to Pay

Vice President: Hasan TuluyCountry Director: Susan GoldmarkSector Manager: Malcolm Cosgrove-DaviesProject Team Leader: Lucia SpinelliICR Team Leader Enrique Crousillat

BOLIVIADECENTRALIZED ELECTRICITY FOR UNIVERSAL ACCESS

CONTENTS

Data SheetA. Basic InformationB. Key DatesC. Ratings SummaryD. Sector and Theme CodesE. Bank StaffF. Results Framework AnalysisG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRsH. RestructuringI. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design................................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes...............................................43. Assessment of Outcomes.............................................................................................84. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.........................................................105. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance......................................................116. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................127. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...........12Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing...........................................................................13Annex 2. Outputs by Component..................................................................................14Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis..................................................................15Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.............17Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results............................................................................19Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results...................................................19Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR......................20Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders........................20Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents.......................................................................21

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1. The Decentralized Electricity for Universal Access Project, comprising two GPOBA Grants (TF090206 and TF090207) for a total of US$ 5.175 million was approved on July 2, 2007 and became effective on September 26, 2007. The original closing date —June 30, 2010— was extended three times throughout the implementation of the project. Final closing date was June 30, 2013.

1.1 Context at Appraisal

2. With an average nominal income of $960 (2004) and a poverty rate in rural areas (where about 40 percent of the population lived) of 82 percent, Bolivia was at the time of appraisal the most economically challenged country in South America. Only 30% of Bolivia’s rural population had access to electricity, the second lowest in Latin America, and the majority of schools and health centers in rural areas were not electrified. The provision of infrastructure services to rural Bolivia was, therefore, an urgent necessity but also comparatively costly. Responding to this challenge, in 2003 the World Bank approved a US$20 million credit as the first phase of a 10-year Adaptable Program Loan (APL) package for Decentralized Infrastructure for Rural Transformation (IDTR), a major component of which focused on rural electrification. This project developed a pioneering model for off-grid rural electrification through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) – “Medium-Term Service Contracts” (MSCs) for the provision of electricity with solar systems for dispersed rural population whereby the service provider would be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the installations during the initial years. The GPOBA Decentralized Electricity for universal Access Project assessed in this report built upon the experience of the IDTR project, while also aiming to enhance the output-based aid (OBA) approach, and the scheme’s sustainability.

3. Government policy. In 2006, the Vice Ministry for Electricity and Alternative Energy (VMEEA) launched a new national strategy for Universal Access (“Electricity to Live with Dignity”). The strategy recognized the magnitude of the universal access challenge and the need to mobilize both public and private sector financing and expertise. The Universal Access Fund has several funding windows for: (i) grid extension and densification, (ii) off-grid, and (iii) productive uses. At that moment, the VMEEA was interested in exploring Medium-Term Service Contracts as the leading mechanism for the off-grid window. The GPOBA project was proposed with view to help the Government mainstream the service contract approach into its new Universal Access Strategy. New service contracts would be implemented in 10 new areas throughout the country, with larger replication to be financed in the medium term by the Universal Access Fund, once operational. To this end, the Vice Ministry carried out a comprehensive analysis of the contracts and proposed modifications to: (i) adapt the model to new regions with different socio-economic conditions; (ii) increase implementation speed to contribute to faster scale-up; (iii) enhance focus on market development; (iv) improve accountability for outputs; and (iv) improve poverty targeting.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

4. The Project Development Objectives, as approved in 2007, were to increase affordable access to electricity in remote rural areas of Bolivia. To this end the project was expected to:

a. Extend sustainable electricity access to at least 7,000 households, micro-enterprises, schools and/or clinics in remote and dispersed rural areas using solar home systems at a subsidy of $650 per unit, and develop basic improved lighting solutions at a subsidy of $150 per unit for an additional estimated 2,000 very poor households (therefore directly benefiting an estimated 9,000 households, or 45,000 people).

b. Consolidate and mainstream a mechanism for electrification of dispersed households in Bolivia using output- based “Service Contracts” with private sector for the provision of electricity with decentralized, renewable energy technologies under the framework of the Government’s universal access policy.

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5. Key outputs of the project were:

1. Installation of at least 7,000 solar home systems (SHS) for dispersed rural households, schools, clinics and micro and small enterprises (MSEs);

2. Distribution of an estimated 2,000 “Pico PV” systems for lighting and basic ICT (Information and Communications Technology) services for the poorest households (below 20Wp);

3. Provision of sustainable service by the SHS providers over four years (including maintenance visits, training, and market development activities);

4. Consolidation of output-based service contracts between government and private sector service providers as a key mechanism for the Government’s electrification program for dispersed households under the new Universal Access Policy.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

6. No changes were made to the PDO or any related performance indicators.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

7. The beneficiaries of the project identified at the design stage were an estimated 45,000 low-income people (mostly indigenous) living in the rural dispersed areas of Bolivia. The project was aimed to address the needs of new areas not covered by the former IDTR project. In addition, it was foreseen that the poorest households who would not be able to afford the subsidized solar home systems fees would always benefit from the electrification of rural schools and health posts as well as from the multiplier effects of electricity in making possible rural business.

8. It was also expected that the project would benefit the private sector in enabling the creation of sustainable business operations through medium-term service contracts and the expansion of the market for renewable energy equipment. Also, central and departmental governments were expected to benefit through the achievement of their rural electrification targets.

9. While on a relatively limited scale, the project was expected also to provide global benefits through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

10. The project’s components originally approved in 2007 were the following:

11. Component 1: New SHS service contracts (US$4.6m). The project was designed to fund output-based subsidies to private providers for market development activities, the sale, installation and after-sale service for solar home systems of different sizes for rural households, micro-enterprises, schools and clinics, for domestic, social and productive uses. At least 7,000 systems would be installed in the rural areas of five departments of Bolivia. The project was expected to bid out 10 new service contracts. Each area was to be awarded to the qualified bidder promising to service the largest number of users at given total subsidy per area. The contractors were expected to (i) market and install the systems, (ii) provide satisfactory service over four years, (iii) carry out at least one visit a year to each user, and (iv) provide specified market development services, and (v) perform basic monitoring and evaluation tasks. Although the subsidies would be channeled through the service providers, these were aimed to benefit the users through a reduction in the price of the panels and overall installation. As in IDTR, the actual user payments would be verified regularly via external audits and internal audits on random sample basis, with penalties for providers’ if overcharged.

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12. GPOBA subsidy would cover 61% of project costs of a typical 50Wp system for households, and 69% of a typical school system. Larger systems for household or productive uses are not subsidized but would be also offered by the service providers. It was considered at appraisal that the funding for a typical 50Wp SHS would come from costumers and GPOBA subsidy. GPOBA will cover US$650 and costumers would pay: (i) upfront fee of about US$50; (ii) repayment of remaining system costs either in cash or through micro- credit of about US$335; and (iii) replacement of battery of about US$65 if battery fails before the project end. In addition, the user would be responsible for replacement of batteries and spare parts for the rest of the system’s operation, estimated at 20 years. User contribution was estimated based on a comprehensive demand survey, assessing willingness to pay and the IDTR experience. However, it was expected that these subsidies could be further reduced through the competitive bidding process.

13. Component 2: Pico-PV (US$0.3m): This sub-component consisted of a pilot project to facilitate the market development of pico-PV systems by providing incentives for participating companies proven to meet well specified project quality criteria. This new generation of PV systems below 20Wp offer basic lighting and communication services such as cell phone and battery charging, and radios. Such systems could be distributed via a broad range of existing sales points, without installations. These pico-PV systems are considered the most promising modern lighting application for the very poor households worldwide and the project aimed to introduce this solution to Bolivia. A target of 2,000 systems was considered at appraisal. However, it was contemplated that the final number of Pico PV would depend on market response and absorption capacity. Pico-PV subsidy was estimated to average $150 per unit, covering market development costs as well as about half of an average pico-PV system price, but given the supply and demand uncertainties, the subsidy amount would be adjusted as needed during implementation.

14. The introduction of the pico-PV pilot aims at developing affordable lighting solutions for the lowest income strata, which cannot afford the subsidized SHS. The pilot built on successful experience of similar systems in Asia, but this was their introduction in Bolivia and Latin America. It was recognized, however, that pico-PV offers much more limited energy service compared to SHS and is therefore not a substitute for a SHS. This compound had a limited budget relative to the SHS because: (i) there was limited experience with supply of these systems worldwide and none in Bolivia; (ii) the response of the market to these new products was not known; (iii) it takes time to build markets for a totally new product; and (iv) the systems provide service at a level below the minimum required under the Government’s Universal Access Program of 20 Watts, therefore the role of such systems still needs to be defined.

15. Component 3: Transaction Support Technical Assistance (TA) (US$ 0.275 million)(3.1) External audits and Output Monitoring and Verification (M&E): Component to finance external technical and financial audits of the project (US$0.1mn over three years) and of the providers by an independent auditor, as well as the monitoring and verification of outputs over a three- year period (US$0.3mn). The monitoring and audits are relatively costly due to high logistics costs of remote areas with dispersed population.Pico PV

(3.2) Recipient-executed Technical Assistance for Transaction Support, Coordination and Supervision: While the majority of the technical assistance was covered by a specific Bank-executed TA component previously awarded by GPOBA in 2006, a further US$100,000 was earmarked for activities directly related to the coordination and supervision, which are executed by the recipient. These funds needed to finance the staff required for the project implementation in the event that the IDTR project (and its PCU) would close earlier than the proposed GPOBA activity.

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16. The provision of TA was consistent with emerging best practices for off-grid electrification, which indicate that successful projects require substantial accompanying TA resources for both project transactions and for supervision. Experience showed that the investment in TA and capacity building can be offset by a reduction in subsidy requirements. For example, successful bidding transactions in the IDTR project resulted in subsidy savings equivalent to US$2.5 million, compared to about US$600k in preparation and transaction TA.

1.6 Revised Components

17. While the nature of the project components remained unchanged, savings stemming from a successful bidding for SHS made possible an increase in the total number of SHS and Pico-PV systems delivered, as well as an increase in the allocation of funds for the TA component. In practice, this involved the incorporation of 1,650 Pico-PV systems into the bidding process (and budget) of Component 1, together with 126 solar systems for public buildings (schools) that were not contemplated initially. A final reallocation of loan proceeds was formally agreed in March 2013 as part of the third project re-structuring, as shown in the following table.

Funds allocation (in US$)

Original allocation Amendment of March 2013TF090207 TF090206 TF090207 TF090206

Component 1 1,380,000 3,220,000 1,380,000 3,220,000

Component 2 90,000 210,000 90,000 103,805

Component 3 82,500 192,500 82,500 298,695

Total 1,552,500 3,622,500 1,552,500 3,622,500

1.7 Other significant changes

18. The original closing date of the project was June 30, 2010. In October 2007, legal documents were amended to adapt them to the new organization of the Government of Bolivia (i.e. to move the PCU, including its staff, from the Ministry of Public Works, Services and Housing to the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy). Further amendments extended the project’s closing date in three occasions till June 30, 2011, March 31, 2013 and June 30, 2013 respectively. Also, the design of the project was amended twice in order to reduce the service contract period for SHS (starting immediately after installations) from four years to three years and, then, two years.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

19. The project was designed following the Output-Base Aid (OBA) approach of its predecessor IDTR, approved in 2003. It incorporated general lessons on service contract design as well as lessons specific to the IDTR transaction that was under implementation. These included the importance of market information in ensuring the sustainability of SHS systems, awareness of the high risks associated to long term exposure of providers, the need for transparent tender processes, the potential of SMEs in ensuring long-term sustainability and the importance of setting up an adequate incentives system for market development as well as establishing an accurate monitoring system.

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20. The project was designed to maximize the benefit of available resources by adopting an OBA through which: (i) payments to private or public operators were made against functioning services; (ii) the bidding process aimed selecting a responsive bidder that minimized the use of the subsidy per unit, thus maximizing the number of installations. By that time, this approach was being tested in the IDTR project and had been applied in other Bank projects elsewhere.

21. Although at the time of project preparation the Bank had accumulated considerable experience in the implementation of rural electrification involving private-sector participation, the project assessment recognized that a project in Bolivia in general, and an intervention in rural areas in particular, could confront a set of exogenous obstacles. Economic and/or social instability were rated as high risk at appraisal, as well as political interference that could affect project implementation and the withdrawal of support to PPPs in infrastructure. These risks (that could not be mitigated by the project itself) were correctly diagnosed at appraisal and, to greater or lesser degrees, affected project implementation. Given this situation, attracting private-sector participation as service providers was indentified as a main challenge. In hindsight, it can be argued that, given the perception of high risk associated to external factors, the original project design that required a four-year commitment of SHS service providers after installations was overly optimistic.

22. The project was designed to rely on the institutional structure already in place for the IDTR project, for which a PCU had been established 2003 and was operating satisfactorily in most areas (except perhaps financial management). It was decided also to follow the same procurement and financial management resources and procedures in order to reduce institutional transaction costs.

2.2 Implementation

23. The GPOBA grant was approved on July 2, 2007 and became effective in less than three months. This quick start contrasted with a prolonged slow-down that prevented any significant progress during almost three years and ultimately required three extensions to ensure the project’s compliance with its development objectives. The perception that the project constituted a ‘bridge financing’ or transition between IDTR and a follow-up operation (IDTR II), may have been the cause of the lack of attention given to the project by authorities. That is, as the IDTR project was also delayed –and, hence, both projects co-existed during a few years– most efforts were allocated to the completion of the IDTR, presumably because of a management capacity constraint as well as the perception that there was no need expedite the implementation of the GPOBA. This delay raised doubts on the Government’s political will to support the project during its initial years and led the Bank to consider the possibility of its cancellation.

24. Prior pre-qualification of bidders, Component 1: SHS service contracts, that comprised 89 percent of the project budget, was bid in 2008 following the original project design that required a four-year commitment from service providers after installations. This process did not attract enough competition and was subsequently closed. After adjusting bidding conditions (i.e. reducing the service contract period to two years –as it was done also for the IDTR– and, hence, reducing risks to the service provider) a new bidding process was launched in 2010. Three competitive bidders responded but, due to further delays associated mostly to the extension of the grant, one bidder withdrew. Eight contracts were finally signed in November 2011. These included, in addition to the SHS, 1,650 Pico-PV that were incorporated into the service providers’ obligations. The bidding process succeeded in achieving a lower subsidy level per unit, thus allowing a larger number of SHS installations. Furthermore, savings in the grant proceeds were used in bidding an additional number of Pico-PV systems in 2012. Overall, project implementation involved eleven contracts, including the said eight contracts for SHS, two for Pico-PV systems and one for public schools (Annex 2).

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25. The average subsidy for SHS system resulting from the bidding process was US$479 per unit (as opposed to US$ 650 considered at design). The subsidy for Pico-PV units was US$ 20. Upon acknowledging that users could not afford paying entirely the local contribution (estimated at US$ 390/unit at design), municipalities and departmental governments covered an important part of these costs. Actual payment of users was reduced to about US$ 100 per unit as an average. The mobilization of additional resources to cope with the limited affordability of users was instrumental in the success of the project. Overall, local contribution exceeded by 10 percent the original target (see Annex 1) and project outcomes also surpassed appraisal estimates. The Project closed with the installation of 7,700 SHS systems and 5,705 Pico-PV systems, exceeded planned outcomes by 10 percent and 158 percent, respectively (Annex 2).

26. While the support of local government was instrumental for a successful bidding and implementation, it required also the signing of inter-institutional agreements to establish financial and legal responsibilities of each party. These agreements, plus the need to extend the project’s closing date and the difficulties faced by the PCU in obtaining permits from other government agencies, became important factors of delay.

27. Another factor of delay was the temporary but frequent understaffing of the PCU in several areas, but in particular in financial management, in spite of the continuous support (technical and financial) and pressure exerted by the Bank to fix this problem. This shortcoming was reflected in the project ratings for implementation project (IP). Throughout its implementation, IP ratings varied from satisfactory to moderately satisfactory, with the exception of some periods when it was downgraded to unsatisfactory levels (MU or U) either for the overall IP or for financial management, procurement and project management. At project close, overall IP was MU, in spite of the remarkable progress made during the last twelve months, thus reflecting the institutional weaknesses faced during implementation and the poor performance of initial years. It should be noted, however, that the project’s final rating for Development Objectives was Marginally Satisfactory.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

28. The monitoring and evaluation activities were fully merged with the IDTR M&E component, managed by the PCU established earlier. M&E was recognized since the implementation of the IDTR project as a key factor in following performance. Accordingly, under IDTR a technical monitoring office was organized (Oficina Técnica de Monitoreo—OTM) with the purpose of overseeing contracts, performance indicators and risks. M&E activities include: (i) general M&E for project outcomes and development impact, undertaken by the PCU; and (ii) M&E of providers’ outputs in the context of monitoring and verification of Service Contracts done by the OTM, which served as a basis for the release of subsidy payments and/or penalty calculations. However, the monitoring framework proposed at design, though extensive in terms of number of indicators, did not include baseline nor target values. Consequently, performance indicators were inferred from the few key outputs established at appraisal.

29. The OTM was organized with a unit director, a PV/SHS specialist, a grid densification specialist, and an information and geo-positioning specialist, staff that was supported by eight field supervisors. The OTM is aimed at channeling user complaints and controlling quality, both at the installation and customer service levels. It also or mainly oversees quality and contractor performance. The OTM is responsible for collecting project information, and controlling monitoring parameters. The OTM ensures that the Project is present and visible in the field, ensuring channels of communication with the users, and helping to strengthen communication with local officials.

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2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance.

Safeguards.

30. As most project activities, safeguard issues were fully merged also with the IDTR project and managed by the PCU. Environmental Safeguards. The project is unlikely to have any significant adverse impact on the environment. In fact, it is expected to have a positive global environmental impact due to the reduction of CO2 emissions. However, the Project triggered OP 4.01 and was categorized B for environmental impact in consistency with the then ongoing IDTR project.

31. The framework established under the IDTR project was used for the implementation of the project. Under the IDTR project, an environmental assessment (EA) was undertaken, identifying any possible negative environmental effects from the installation of the equipment. It concluded that the probability of negative environmental effects was very small. The EA included: (i) a summary of the potential for renewable energy projects in Bolivia; (ii) a proposal for screening criteria and procedures for all investment sub-components, in compliance with IDA safeguard policies; (iii) an outline of the main environmental and social issues, and (iv) main environmental aspects to be included in the bidding documents. The EA also included consultations with the targeted communities and identified measures to be taken to mitigate the environmental impact of the project. Given the major delays in the implementation of the project, these consultations had to be updated in 2011-12.

32. The main potential impact from the proposed project comes from the replacement of batteries, which typically last 5 years. Such an impact was mitigated through the contractual obligation of private providers to recycle the batteries, as included in the contracts signed under the project. In addition, capacity to monitor environmental impacts was supported by the Office of Technical Monitoring, in charge of monitoring the compliance of private providers with the contractual obligations, including environmental matters. Environmental safeguard compliance was rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory throughout the whole implementation of the project. 33. Social Safeguards. The Project triggered OP 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples since the main project beneficiaries are mostly indigenous rural low-income communities. The project adjusted the service contracts developed and implemented under the IDTR, therefore, project preparation and implementation was based on the existing Indigenous Peoples Development Framework (IPDF) developed for the IDTR project. The existing framework was based on a Social Assessment carried out during the preparation of the project, which included consultations with indigenous peoples, whereby indigenous peoples expressed their strong demand for rural electricity services. In order to ensure a continuous process of consultations with indigenous peoples, consultations in the new project areas were updated and incorporated into the existing IPDF. Compliance with OP 4.10 was rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory throughout the whole implementation of the project. Fiduciary

a) Financial Management. The operation of financial management arrangements was considerably affected by adjustments and internal reorganization processes within the implementing entities; as well as high staff rotation not only in the Project Coordinating Unit, but also in the Ministry's Administrative and Finance Unit. Lack of experienced and qualified staff for prolonged periods resulted in outdated and inaccurate accounting records thereby affecting the quality of financial information during the initial years. Consequently, Financial Management performance was rated unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory during a period of one year (2010). Although during the last

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years a more stable institutional environment was in place, the dynamics between the PCU and Ministry of Hydrocarbon and Energy were still difficult resulting in bureaucratic and cumbersome procedures. Project performance, as it relates to Financial Management, significantly improved towards the end, thus permitting an orderly project closing.

b) Procurement. The Project Coordination Unit was responsible for the procurement activities and the contracting process. Overall, responsibilities were handled in a satisfactory manner in spite of a very slow start caused by institutional weakness and a limited market response to the first bidding process. The technical Unit was in charge of defining technical specifications, preparing terms of reference and contract contents, evaluating offers and bid proposals and managing each signed contract. Problems faced during the initial bidding, which were associated to the difficulties in attracting quality bidders, were addressed satisfactorily through the amendment service contracts. However, this process was complicated by the linkages between the two projects (e.g. Bank’s no objection was conditioned to the extension of the projects closing dates) slow internal approvals and the need for inter-institutional agreements upon the participation of departmental governments and municipalities, less than optimal communications between public entities and shortcomings in staffing, thus resulting in an unusually long process.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

34. The sustainability of the project is addressed in two ways: (i) the project design, i.e. the new Medium-Term Service Contracts; and (ii) the project’s integration within the government’s new energy policy.

35. Project design followed the approach of its predecessor (IDTR project) in bundling SHS installation with training and market development services, and requiring operators to remain active in the project area for two years (initially four years) after the installation to provide operation and maintenance services and assist in the development of the local market. That is, the equipment installed under the SHS component, and its satisfactory operation, has a guarantee of two years backed by warranty policies that include maintenance and the replacement of defective equipment. Contracts for service providers stipulate that the full service is paid during the implementation phase, subject to confirmation of a satisfactory service, and no payments are made after installation. This ensures appropriate technical, financial and institutional support during a period of two years. Furthermore, a contractors’ guarantee is being held by the Bolivian authorities to assure contract compliance with maintenance requirements. Project design contemplated that, after that period, it was expected that both demand and supply are sufficiently developed to ensure long term sustainability.

36. The project’s focus on private sector providers was complemented by the establishment of an adequate regulatory framework through the creation of the Office of Technical Monitoring (OTM) as a supervisor and regulator of the service contracts, responsible of monitoring the quality of service and overall contracts compliance during implementation and initial years of operations. These activities are supported by a legal framework established with support of the IDTR project that approved the rules and regulations for Rural Electrification, together with Bolivian norms for PV installations.

37. While there may be some degree of uncertainty regarding which would be the operation and maintenance (O&M) conditions after the expiration of the two year guarantee period, it is expected that the Government’s continued support to rural electrification and, in particular, to the development of SHS nationwide, would offer the resources and delivery models to guarantee a

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sustained operation of the existing installations. A follow up operation under preparation (IDTR II) contemplates the engagement of distribution companies or local electricity service providers in providing these services to the new, and possibly, prior installations as those of GPOBA. It is also expected that in a near future distribution companies will be engaged in providing this service by law.

38. It is planned to conduct a beneficiary assessment for the project, and its predecessor IDTR project, 12-18 months from project closing in order to assess the effectiveness of the project and to monitor closely the sustainability of these projects.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

39. The project’s objectives and outcomes –which translate into improved living conditions for the targeted rural population– continue to be relevant, particularly given current country priorities, i.e. Government’s programs strongly emphasize improved living conditions and empowerment of rural and particularly indigenous people, including the objective of reaching universal electricity access by 2025. There continues to be a large population in Bolivia that lacks electricity.

40. The project’s design was clearly oriented towards improving rural living conditions and followed the experience, and relied on the institutional set up, of the ongoing IDTR project. In particular, it incorporated the lessons in implementing an OBA approach through medium-term service contracts that: (i) mobilized private service providers; (ii) ensured an effective operation and maintenance during the initial years of operation; and (iii) provided adequate training to customer in the use and basic maintenance of the installed equipment. Implementation of the project followed the original design with a few amendments to adapt it to market conditions. However, the OBA contracts designed for a 4-year post-installation maintenance guarantee proved to be overoptimistic and the M&E framework was insufficient.

41. The project was fully integrated with the Bank’s assistance strategy. In particular, the emphasis on rural and indigenous populations provided by the project reflects the Interim Strategy Note (2009) which led to a fast adaptation to the Government’s priorities, as well as objectives such as: (i) identifying shared goals and priorities, (ii) working with the fragile capacity of Government teams; (iii) continue the focus on shared priorities; (iv) to consider additional support for government teams in the preparation and implementation of projects; (v) avoid the fragmentation of projects and focus on a limited number of simple projects with clear objectives, well defined, measurable and realistic time frames for implementation; and (vi) continue to work to strengthen the long-term commitment of the World Bank in the country.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives


42. The project development objective was to increase affordable access to electricity in remote rural areas of Bolivia. In spite of an unusually slow start associated to political changes and institutional weaknesses, the project had a very strong finish that is reflected in the full achievement of all renewable energy installations and posterior service through medium-term service contracts. The project also helped consolidating a mechanism for electrification of dispersed and poor households in Bolivia as the two service providers operating under contracts are well established in rural areas and in a position to continue providing their service. The outputs by components are shown in Annex 2, together with the achievement of indicators. The

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project was restructured to adapt it to new organizational conditions, allow more time for its completion and reduce the service period. However, the latter amendment implied a tradeoff between an effective project implementation and sustainability.

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Satisfactory

43. In spite of a very slow start, the Project was conducted efficiently overall, particularly during the last year of implementation. The design of the component on Solar Home Systems favored efficiency, as the selection of services providers was based on an optimal use of the proposed subsidy (i.e. maximizing the number of connections for a given subsidy). On this basis, the average subsidy per SHS dropped to US$479 (from US$ 650) thus allowing a larger number of SHS installed and, prior re-allocation of funds among components, the distribution of a much larger number of Pico PV. Overall, it is estimated that the Project directly benefits around 55,000 to 60,000 people, i.e. an increase of about 30 percent compared to what was originally planned.

44. An ex-post economic evaluation of the project, using actual data on costs, early benefits and most recent market studies, yielded the following results (details in Annex 3): an internal economic rate of return (IERR) of 17.3 % and a net present value (NPV, at 12% discount rate) of US$1.87 million. These results are based on a conservative forecast for future energy consumption (8.5 kWh per month per household). In the case that such consumption would reach 12 kWh/month, the IERR would be 23.4 percent and the NPV US$ 4.24 million, indicating the high sensitivity of the project’s economics to the future consumption of solar energy. The results obtained are similar to the estimates made at appraisal, which gave an IERR of 19.2% and NPV of US$1.72 million.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating


45. Taking into account the confirmed relevance of the project’s objectives, and the progress made in surpassing most of these objectives both in the physical side and the benefits to customers (confirmed by the economic analysis) the overall outcome rating is considered Moderately Satisfactory. The project had a strong finish after a slow start. The original model was amended in order to reduce risks to services providers and subsequent costs. However, these amendments, that included shortening the period for service contracts, implied a tradeoff between expediency and sustainability that may have an impact on the project’s operational sustainability.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

46. Through its design and execution, the project is helping to improve the living conditions of around 55,000 to 60,000 people, mostly indigenous, in rural areas. The social impact associated with providing lighting to schools is also worth noting. Also, the project is having positive gender consequences particularly through improved lighting that allowed more productive hours and better safety conditions. Further, the project interacted strongly with local communities and communal organizations, thereby developing a sense of ownership among beneficiaries.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

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47. The effort in implementing the project under difficult conditions, including an OBA approach, has contributed considerably towards strengthening the capacity of the implementing agencies in dealing with the contracting and monitoring of electricity services in rural areas.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)None were detected.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder WorkshopsNot Applicable.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome and Global Environment OutcomeRating - Overall: Significant.

48. As noted above (section 2.5), the sustainability of the project’s outcome –i.e. the benefits of increasing affordable access to electricity in remote rural areas of Bolivia– will rely mostly on an adequate operation and maintenance of the solar energy (SHS) installations. This is ensured for the first two years of operation through the existing service contracts. Accordingly, providers are expected to take care of the O&M of the systems and assist in the development of the local market during the said period. At project design it was foreseen that, after that period, both demand and supply would be sufficiently developed to ensure long-term sustainability. While the OTM set up with the support of the IDTR project has established the practice of monitoring performance and channeling user complaints, it is not clear what will happen at the conclusion of the service period when service providers will no longer have any obligations and the adequate operation will rely on beneficiaries. A follow-up operation under preparation (IDTR II) contemplates the engagement of distribution companies or local electricity service providers in providing these services to the new, and possibly prior, installations.

49. Overall risks were assessed as significant (from high to moderate) at the moment of project appraisal. While some of the risks that were assessed as high at that moment –such as economic and social instability, political interference, low demand for Pico-PV and lack of counterpart funds– had an impact during the initial years only, or simply did not materialize, the risk that the development outcome will not be maintained is still significant due to the uncertainties surrounding the post service contracts period. It should be noted, however, that PV technology is well established in Bolivia. Also, in an effort to address the challenges of highly dispersed customers, two service providers have developed a network of specialists trained to address O&M and continue operating in all project areas.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 50. The project was carefully prepared by taking into account the particular needs of the rural population in Bolivia and the lessons of the then ongoing IDTR project. The risk ratings were consistent in balance with what actually transpired during project execution and the bidding method incorporated strong efficiency incentives. However, the monitoring framework was too extensive to be used in a practical manner and lacked quantitative values. Also, the proposed OBA contracts included an apparently optimistic 4-year post-installation maintenance guarantee that was not achievable. This required the amendment of the SHS contracts to attract an adequate number of service providers and ensure the main component’s implementation.

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(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory51. During project execution the Bank maintained a constant presence in supervising the project, with two or more supervisions a year, and provided help to overcome the different difficulties encountered, particularly the project’s very slow start and failure of initial bidding initiatives. The project team responded in a timely and flexible manner in re-allocating the grant proceeds saved during the first bidding process. Also, it made a remarkable effort –together with the local counterpart– during the last year of implementation and ultimately succeeded in surpassing the expected outcomes and almost fully utilizing the grant proceeds (99 percent) within a very tight timetable.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory.

This rating combines the ratings for project preparation and supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


52. The changes in GoB impacted project performance and generated an unstable institutional environment during the initial years; however, the Government always provided the required support to the project (e.g. counterpart funds) and its development objectives. The Government’s support to rural electrification was prioritized in 2008, when the Electricity Program for Living with Dignity (Programa de Electricidad para Vivir con Dignidad) was issued as the National strategy to reach Universal Access by 2025. The GPOBA project, together with the previous IDTR project, were important components of the said program.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


53. Although the PCU experienced rotations mainly at the director level and fiduciary staff (financial management and procurement), it managed to maintain a core of qualified staff and to advance the project, and it ultimately achieved the project’s goals as measured by performance indicators. The PCU acknowledged the importance of supervision in the field and allocated important part of its resources (through the OTM) in doing so. Its efforts were intensified during the last year of implementation and, in close coordination with the Bank’s team, succeeded to meet its targets within a very tight timetable.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


54. Combines the ratings for Government and Implementing Agency.

6. Lessons Learned55. The following lessons address areas that require special attention in the design and implementation of future OBA and rural electrification projects.

56. An OBA approach complemented by medium-term service contracts incorporates efficiency incentives and helps guaranteeing an adequate electricity service during a specific period, however, achieving sustainability may require other long term approaches. The

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project succeeded in installing a large number of SHS in remote areas and in guaranteeing a satisfactory operation during a period of two years after installation, however, there are concerns about the sustainability of these systems after the said period, i.e. at the termination of the medium-term service contracts. In particular, the situation would be aggravated after four to five years, when most batteries will need replacement. Long-term sustainability of SHS is a challenge yet to be resolved that requires an objective assessment during the preparation phase and a project design oriented towards a greater involvement of local communities and/or the long-term involvement of a utility or electricity service provider (as is being envisaged for the IDTR II project under preparation).

57. Local commitment from the early stages of a rural electrification effort is paramount in improving project design, contributing towards financing and ensuring sustainability. The active involvement of departmental governments and municipalities proved to be instrumental in the successful implementation of the project through the provision of better information on the communities’ requirements, poverty challenges, and the need and provision of additional financing. Also, since local interests are consistent with the long-term sustainability objectives of the rural electrification effort the involvement of local entities during this period is essential.

58. Adequate training of customers in the effective use of SHS is essential to fully achieve the benefits of electrification. Early experience of the GPOBA project, as well as in the IDTR project, confirms the importance of familiarizing customers in the correct use and primary maintenance of photovoltaic equipment in taking full advantage of the electrification effort. This training should be incorporated into the obligations of the service provider and the entities to be responsible for monitoring longer-term operation and maintenance.

59. Rural electrification projects are, by nature, poverty reduction operations. The limited affordability of rural households in dispersed rural areas constitutes a major constraint that often requires the support of local governments. The local contribution to the financing of off-grid electrification projects should be carefully assessed taking into account households affordability and local government’s willingness and capacity to support such effort. A flexible design –in terms local contributions and levels of subsidy– adaptable to the conditions found in each community should help in maximizing the benefits of the electrification effort.

60. An adequately designed bidding process has the potential of reducing subsidy requirements and, hence, maximizing the outcomes of a rural electrification project. The project experience confirmed that a competitive process that incorporates incentives to maximize the leverage of grant proceeds (e.g. the selection of bids based on the lowest subsidy requirement per unit) is an effective way of taking advantage of what the market can offer, and actually reduce subsidy requirements, while enhancing the scope of an electrification project.

61. A well designed, comprehensive and independent monitoring system is essential to the implementation and operation of an OBA approach to rural electrification. M&E is essential to off-grid electrification projects in order to track the performance of service providers, confirm payments and ensure that benefits reach the target population. The OTM established during the IDTR project, and maintained for the GPOBA, was particularly successful in keeping track on the project’s progress through frequent and periodical field visits and thus helping to attain the projects’ development objectives.

62. Pico-PV has the potential to address the electricity needs of the poorest rural households but should not be seen as an alternative to SHS. Project experience showed that Pico-PV systems are a viable solution to primary energy needs of rural households in spite of its provision of a very limited Wp capacity.

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7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

63. The PCU submitted comments to the draft ICR that have been incorporated into the text. In addition, the following comments and/or clarifications were made:

Savings stemming from an efficient (below budget) bidding process were used for social purposes, thus allowing a larger number of beneficiaries.

The Project underwent four amendments that constituted the main cause of delays (particularly the third amendment) and lack of compliance with the original timetable.

The subscription of agreements with Departmental governments and municipalities provided contractors a firm market in their assigned areas. This helped reducing implementation periods; nevertheless they had to face right-of-way issues that were solved through bilateral negotiations.

As for its predecessor (IDTR Project), the Project contemplates a maintenance service (Medium-term service contracts) until 2015. After that date, customers will assume responsibility for the maintenance and the reposition of parts, i.e. of the sustainability of the PV systems.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

SourcesGPOBA Users & local

governmentsTotal

Component 1: New SHS service contracts 1

PAD 4,600 2,695 7,295Actual 4,254 2,9502 7,204

Component 2: Pico-Photo Voltaic Pilot

PAD 300 100 400Actual 384 --- 384

Component 3: Transaction Support TA

PAD 275 --- 275Actual 514 --- 482

Total PAD 5,175 2,795 7,970Actual 5,152 2,950 8,102

1/ In addition to what was planned at appraisal, Component 1 included 136 solar systems for public buildings. Also, 1,650 Pico-PV systems were incorporated into this component. 2/ While it was expected at appraisal that users would cover fully the local contribution, due to their limited capacity users contribution was complemented by departmental governments and municipalities, who covered as an average more than half of the local contribution.

Sources: Project PAD and Grant Agreement, ISRs and reports of the PCU.

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Performance indicators were not explicitly quantified at appraisal. Upon this shortcoming, supervision reports (ISRs) established a performance monitoring system on the basis of the main outcomes proposed by the project. Hence the weakness reflected by a limited number, and relative significance, of intermediate outcome indicators. The table below presents the project’s outputs by the closing date.1

PDO Indicator Baseline Target Actual % Achieved

Installation of at least 7,000 equivalent SHS for rural households, schools, clinics and MSEs

0 7,000 7,700 2 110.0

Distribution of an estimated 2,000 Pico PV systems for lighting and basic ICT services for the poorest households

0 2,000 5,705 285.3

Number of SHS service providers operating under contracts signed in GPOBA areas.

0 3 2 66.7

Intermediate Outcome Indicator

Launching bidding process No process

underway

Bidding process

launched

Bidding launched in 2012

Overall, project implementation involved eleven contracts with two service providers, including eight contracts for SHS, two for Pico-PV systems and one for public buildings (schools), as presented below.

Component 1: Solar Home SystemsDepartment Service

ProviderNumber of Contracts

SHS units Pico-PV units

Potosi Energetica 2 1.793 410Cochabamba Energetica 3 2,300 640Chuquisaca Enersol 2 3,098 600La Paz Energetica 1 373 0Total 8 7,564 1,650

Component 1: Social Systems (public buildings)Zone Service


Solar PV units

Chaco Enersol 1 57Chiquitania Enersol 79Total 1 136

1 Source: ISRs complemented by completion reports of the PCU.2 Includes 136 solar systems for public buildings (schools) that were not contemplated initially.

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Component 2: Pico-PVZone Service


Pico-PV units

Chiquitania, Chaco and Amazonia

Enersol 1 4,055

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Annex 3. Economic Analysis

Following the Appraisal’s approach, the economic analysis focuses on the residential photovoltaic component, i.e. the Solar Home Systems (SHS) that were installed by the GPOBA project in thirteen departments and accounted for 95.5 percent of the project’s total investment (excluding Component 3: Transaction Support TA).

The economic internal rate of return for the residential solar component is 17.3 percent and its net present value (NPV) is estimated to be US$1.87 million, based on a 12 percent discount rate that, as at appraisal, is considered to be the economic opportunity cost of capital in Argentina. These results are based on a conservative forecast for future energy consumption (8.58 kWh per month per household). In the case that such consumption would reach 12kWh/month, the rate of return would reach 23.4 percent and the NPV US$4.24 million, thus indicating the high sensitivity of the project’s economics to the future consumption of solar energy. These results to compare to a rate of return of 19.2 percent estimated at appraisal and a NPV 0f US$1.725 million.

Costs: The analysis includes the actual investment cost of US$ 7.2 million for 7,564 Solar Home Systems installed by the project. It includes also a cost of US$ 65 per unit for the replacement of batteries every four years, annual operation and maintenance costs and an economic life of fifteen years.

Benefits: SHS have two types of benefits: on one hand, they substitute the expense associated with traditional energy sources, i.e. lighting and communications devices, such as kerosene lamps, candles, gas and batteries, by solar panels whose running costs are practically negligible (replacement of parts and batteries are considered as maintenance costs and are taken into account in the analysis). In addition to the savings over traditional lighting and communications devices, SHS make available more energy —and of better quality—and, therefore, they provide additional welfare benefits to the beneficiaries. Benefits are explained in the following figure that represents schematically the rural household demand for energy:

When using traditional energy, users consume QK at price PK and the value of saved traditional energy resources is given by areas B+D. Once the consumer adopts a PV system, demand increases to QPV at price PPV, and the additional benefits associated with the extra energy are given by areas C+E. A straight line approximation to the demand curve is used given the lack of quantifiable information regarding consumers’ preferences. The analysis considers the case of a single PV customer using a 50Wp panel (by large the most used panel in the project) with the following characteristics based on the findings of surveys undertaken in different provinces:

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QK: 52.6 kWh per yearEconomic value of savings in traditional energy (B+D), at border prices: US$ 132.8 per year; which yields a unit cost of US$2.52/kWhQPV: 103 kWh per year (with a sensitivity for 144 kWh per year)PPV: US$0.0 per kWh (i.e. running costs are only fixed maintenance costs)

The table below presents the flow of costs and benefits for the project’s SHS component in thirteen provinces.

Residential SHS Component – Cost and Benefits (thousand US$)

Year# SHS units

Capital Cost

BatteriesReplac. O&M

Total Cost

AvoidedCost WTP 1/

TotalBenefits

NetBenefits

0 7,564 7,204,0 0 0 7,204,0 0 0 0 -7,204,01 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,82 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,83 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,84 0 0 419,6 40,1 459,8 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,025,15 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,86 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,87 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,88 0 0 419,6 40,1 459,8 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,025,19 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,8

10 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,811 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,812 0 0 419,6 40,1 459,8 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,025,113 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,814 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,815 0 0 0 40,1 40,1 1,004,6 480,3 1,484,9 1,444,8

NPV: $1,868,2IERR: 17.3%

1/ Additional benefits associated to more and a better quality of energy source

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

LendingSusan Bogach Senior Energy Specialist LCSEG Former TTLKaren Bazex Senior Energy Specialist LCSEG Team memberDana Ryzankova Senior Energy Specialist AFTEG Former TTL

Supervision/ICR Lucia Spinelli Senior Energy Specialist LCSEG TTL Luis Vaca-Soto Consultant LCSWS Jose Vicente Zevallos Sr. Social Development Specialist LCSSO

Lourdes C. Linares Sr. Financial Management Specialist LCSFM

Juan Carlos Enriquez U. E T Consultant LCSENDavid Reinstein Senior Oil and Gas Specialist SEGOMJanina A. Franco Energy Specialist LCSEGJose Yukio Rasmussen K. Procurement Specialist LCSPTJoaquin Aguilar Consultant LCSEGWendy Guerra Consultant LCSEGAdam Behrendt Social Development Specialist LCSSOGabriela Arcos Environmental Specialist LCSENPilar Larreamendy Sr. Social Development Specialist EASVSMegan V. Hansen J.P.A. LCSEGMaria Lucy Giraldo Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPTKaren Bazex Energy Specialist LCSEGLuz A. Zeron Financial Management Specialist LCSFMSusan Bogach Senior Energy Specialist LCSEG former TTLLuis Tineo Senior Operations OfficerYogita Mumssen Special Assist. To R.V.PAlejandro M. Tapia Energy SpecialistKilian Reiche ConsultantEnrique Crousillat Consultant ICR

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Supervision/ICRFY11 35227.68FY12FY13 71.00

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Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

FY14 71.46Total: 35370.14

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey ResultsNot Applicable

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and ResultsNot applicable

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR

The Borrower issued in June 30, 2013 a draft report at the completion of the project. This reports included the following:

Brief description of project components Detailed account of sub-projects for each component Identification of all municipalities that benefit from the project Budget execution as of end June 2013

The report did not include any specific conclusions or lessons learned.

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Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not applicable

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Aide Memoire for the Project’s Supervision Missions. Global Partnership on Output-based Aid (GPOBA). Commitment Paper: Bolivia Decentralized

Electricity for Universal Access. January, 2007. (project appraisal document)Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy, Project Coordination Unit. Data/reports on project

execution and disbursements. World Bank. Implementation Completion and Results Report for the Bolivia Decentralized

Infrastructure for Rural Transformation (IDTR) Project. 2011World Bank. Project Implementation Status Reports (ISRs).

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