icrat tutorial - uas challenges and opportunities in civil ......5/26/2010 5 • wide variety of uas...
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U d Ai ft S t (UAS)Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Challenges and Opportunities
in Civil Airspace
Andrew Lacher – UAS Integration Lead
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
May 2010
Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this paper are those of authors and The MITRE Corporation and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation. Case Number 10-2265
• What is an UAS?
• UAS Applications
Outline
• UAS Applications
• How are UAS different?Break
• Airspace Integration ChallengesBreak
• Research Opportunities
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• Research Opportunities
2
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Unmanned Aircraft SystemsUnmanned Aircraft Systems
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
NASA Photo
What is anUnmanned Aircraft System (UAS)?
Beyond Line of SightAircraft
Line of Sight
G d C t l
CommunicationsExploitation
andUsers
Launch & Recovery
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Ground Control System (GCS)
Also called: Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Drone, Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), Uninhabited Aircraft, Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle Images: US Military Services
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Why are these aircraft different?
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/media/Gallery/UAS.htm
5
RQ-4
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Photos: US Military
5/26/2010
4
US Department of DefenseUAS Groups
UAS Category
Maximum Weight (lbs)
Ops Alt (ft)
Speed (KIAS)
Current/Future Representative UAS
WASP III, FCS Class I, TACMAV RQ 14A/B BUSTER
•Hand LaunchedRaven
Group 1 0-20 <1200 AGL
<250
TACMAV, RQ-14A/B, BUSTER, BATCAM, RQ-11B/C, FPASS, RQ-16A, Pointer, Aqua/Terra Puma
Group 2 21-55 <3500 AGLAECV, VCUAS, ScanEagle, Silver Fox, Aerosonde
Group 3 <1320 RQ-7B, RQ-15, STUAS, XPV-1, XPV-2
•Short Duration (<1 hr)•Mostly Line-of-sight (LOS)•Auto flight stabilized
•Unique Launch & Recovery systems•Several Hours 1 day•Beyond LOS•Waypoint-to-waypoint•Auto Recovery
•Unique Launch systems•Runway Landing•Several Hours
Raven
ScanEagle
T-Hawk
Shadow
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< FL180
XPV 2
Group 4
>1320 n/a
MQ-5B, MQ-8B, MQ-1A/B/C, A-160, RQ-8B
Group 5 ≥ FL180 MQ-9A, RQ-4, RQ-4N, Global Observer, N-UCAS
•Sized like a manned aircraft•Includes turbo jets•Long Endurance•Larger Payloads
•Beyond LOS
•Sized like a manned aircraft•USAF: Remote Split Ops•Long Endurance - >12 hrs•Autonomy varies
Predator/Warrior Firescout
Global Hawk / BAMS Reaper/Pred ‘B’
Images: US Military Services
Predator Remote Split Operations
Ku Satellite
Nellis AFB In Theater
PPSL
GCS
LOSOnly
Fiber Optics
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Mission Control Element
Ops Ctr
y
Launch & Recovery Element
Predator VideoNetwork
Image courtesy the 57th Operations Group
PPSL – Predator Primary Satellite LinkLOS – Line of SiteGCS – Ground Control Station
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• Wide variety of UAS
– Size, Performance, Mission, Degree of Autonomy
Some Observations
• All UAS are not the same we can’t think about them as a single group no one size fits all solution
• “Unmanned” is a misnomer
– Human operators are directly involved – e.g., remote pilots
– In some cases in large numbers
• UAS are not necessarily cheaper to operate than manned
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• UAS are not necessarily cheaper to operate than manned
• Will continue to have challenges with human factors
UAS Applications
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
Image: US Navy
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Historical Retrospective
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FAA Video
• Organizations operating or planning to operate UAS in the CONUS– DoD: USN, USA, USAF, USMC, SOCOM– DHS: CBP Air & Marine, CBP Border Patrol, USCG
The Operational Need: Civil Airspace Access
Main
, ,– NASA/NOAA/USDA/Academic– UAS Manufacturers – Law Enforcement / Public Safety– Commercial (starting with small UAS)
• UAS Missions (public interest)– Military Training
• Pilot Training (take-offs, landings)• Coordination with Ground Forces
Military/Intelligence Operations
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– Military/Intelligence Operations– Border Patrol / Homeland Security Surveillance– Emergency / Disaster Response– Law Enforcement / First Responders/Security– Scientific Research– System Development
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D t i l d ll
UAS are Transforming Today’s Military
Dull, Dangerous, & Dirty Missions
Applications• Battlespace Awareness
– Bomb Damage Assessment– Reconnaissance
Signals Intelligence Does not include small hand-launched UAS
(e.g., Raven)
– Signals Intelligence– Chem/Bio Reconnaissance– Counter Deception– Digital Mapping– Covert Sensor Insertion
• Command and Control– Battle Management– Communications Relay
• Force Application– Precision Targeting– Weaponization/Strike
• Force Protection– Integrated Base Defense
collaboration
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collaboration– Convoy Over watch
Dallas Brooks, OUSD/AT&L, Unmanned Warfare, FAA UAS Conference, San Diego, CA February 25, 2010
StatusCurrent UAS ActivitiesFuture UAS Activities
Grand Forks AFB
Ft DrumCamp Ripley
Ft Lewis
Arlington, OR
S / WR GH / P
SSEPortland
W / R
McChord (W,R)W / R
Limestone HillsW / R
Mt WashingtonW / R
UAS Operational ActivitiesCurrent and Projected
In 2009, the JUAS COE reported that by 2013
• Order-of-magnitude increase in locations
• Operations
In 2009, the JUAS COE reported that by 2013
• Order-of-magnitude increase in locations
• Operations Image Source: USAF
Beale AFB
El MirageMCAS Cherry Point
NAS Pax River
Creech AFB
Syracuse
Ft. Drum
NAS Pt Mugu
Ft Knox
Ft BraggVictorville
Camp Ripley
LagunaSimi
Blackstone
Lakehurst
Indiantown
Eustis
Pinon
Ord
Moffett
Irwin
Santa Fe
A.P,Hill
Ft CarsonFt Riley
Ft Campbell
Dugway
29 PalmsS
Reaper
SP
SW / R
SGH Spyder
GH / BRMAXSW / R S
Vigilante
S
SP / Reaper
RgMAV
P / Reaper
A160R
R/War/Pu
RMAX
RMAX
W
Camp Roberts
H
W,R
H / SCamp Williams
W / R
Lake OneidaRascal
Camp AtterburyT
Kenova
Patriot
LouisvilleW/R
W/R
War/R/Pu/S
USAFAV3 / SE
R
– 77% will be Small UAS (Group 1)
– 91% will need access to Class E & G airspace
– 77% will be Small UAS (Group 1)
– 91% will need access to Class E & G airspace
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PalmdaleHolloman AFB
Cannon AFB
Sigonella AB, Italy
Andersen AFB, Guam
NAS Pt. Mugu
Huachuca
Robert Gray
Wright
Benning
Ft Polk
Wainwright
Redstone
Wheeler AAF
Camp Shelby
Cochise
Ft Bliss
Hondo
Greely
Evens
Woodworth
Ft Worth
Longhorn
Okeechobee
Robbins AFB
Ft Hood
Germany
29 Palms
Kaneohe Bay
Ladd AAF
Allen AAF
War / R
Bryant AHP
R
H
R
S
PS
S
H
R
P / Reaper
RGH
S / RGH / B
GHS
R
S
S
S
S
Camp Pendleton
P / Reaper
War
H
W / R S
StennisW/R/Pu
Choctaw
Hurlburt Eglin
Camp Blanding
W/R
W/R/Pu/S
W/R
W/R
Homestead
Key WestW/R W/R
Camp BullisW/R
HS / R
ArmyNavyMarines
SOCOM
Air Force
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Military Not the Only Ones Using UAS
USCG Photohttp://www.uscg.mil/comdt/blog/2009/12/maritime-predator-acceptance-ceremony.asp
Scripps Institution of Oceanography, UC San Diego Photowww.nsf.gov
Lacher PhotoLacher Photo
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NASA Photowww.nasa.gov
Law Enforcement Application
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UAS Operational Deployment Vision
NORTHERN REGION
GRAND FORKS
GREAT LAKES
NORTHWEST
Main Ops Needs
San Diego
Riverside
Detroit
AMOC
AGILE SUPPORT FORNATIONAL EVENTS
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SSB-WCorpus Christi
Miami
SIERRAVISTA
MARITIMESOUTHWEST
SOUTHEAST REGIONSOUTHWEST REGION
Sustained ISR presenceon borders and coastlines
Agile UAS capabilityfor National response 17
• Scientific– Natural hazards research/monitoring– Environmental monitoring/ mapping– In-situ atmospheric monitoring
Potential Commercial / Scientific Applications
In situ atmospheric monitoring– Wildlife observation– Technology experimentation
• Commercial– Surveying/mapping/imaging– Aerial photography / Surveys– Agricultural application– Crop monitoring – Motion picture– High altitude imaging– Communications relay– Utility/Pipeline patrol
T ffi it i
http://www.draganfly.com
Created w/ Photoshop
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– Traffic monitoring– News/media– Aerial advertising – Fish spotting– Cargo– Infrastructure Protection
Business Case will Start with Small UAS
Yamaha RMAX• Available commercially• Designed for agriculture spraying• Flies autonomously • Automatic stabilization• 1000s operating in Japan
• ~$86k Agriculture Modelhttp://blogs.nasa.gov
http://ti.arc.nasa.gov
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Civil Application Example
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Video: Courtesy of Insitu and University of Alaska
Another Civil Application Example
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Video: Courtesy of Insitu and University of Alaska
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• There is no pilot on-board– Situation awareness
How are UAS Different Than Legacy Aircraft?
– Command and control latenciesIstockphoto.com
• Can be smaller
MITRE Photo
• Not necessarily designed and constructed to aviation
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USAF Photo
• Flight Performance and Mission Profiles
standardsNASA Photo
Break
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Airspace IntegrationFlight in Non-Segregated Airspace
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
“The development and use of unmanned aircraft systems is the next great step forward in the
evolution of aviation” – Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, July 13, 2006.
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
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“…unmanned aircraft systems are not ready for seamless or routine use yet in civilian airspace.” –Randy Babbitt, Federal Aviation Administrator, November 18, 2009.
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Golden Age of Aviation
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After WWI we had the Golden Age of
Aviation
Aviation Transformed Military in WWI
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/photos/
25
What Happens When They Come Home?
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UAS regularly operate in civil airspace
Ri k iti t d h th t ll
The Vision
• Risks are mitigated such that overall system safety is not degraded
• Traffic flows are undisrupted
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Airspace Classes
• Each class of airspace has different requirements and different operating procedures
• Class A, B, C, & D require contact w/ ATC• Aircraft in Class A, B, & C are transponding
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MITRE Image
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Balancing National Needs
National Security & H l d D f
Public Safety and Access AiHomeland Defense
Needs• Military Training &
Readiness– Train like you fight
• Emergency Response• Domestic-based Missions
to Airspace
• Mid-air Collision Risks• Vehicle Reliability Posing
Risks to Those on the Ground
• Airspace Deconfliction
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Image: US District Court – Eastern District of MS
• Border Patrol• Law Enforcement …
• Airspace DeconflictionReducing Airspace Access– TFRs not a scalable solution
• Air commerce and airspace efficiency
Integration Challenges
Lack of See-and-Avoid Capability
Pilot
Line of Sight
Beyond Line of Sight
Command & Control Integration• Coping mechanisms for vulnerabilities• Air Traffic Management
System Reliability
Mechanical Flight Control
Fly-by-Wire
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Air Traffic Control Pilot
System Reliability(Airworthiness)
Crew Qualifications & Training
Fly-by-Wireless
Images from US Military
MITRE Photo
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18,000
~ Class A (controlled)
Class E (uncontrolled)
FL600
Class E
Class G 1,200/700
18,000
~ Class A (controlled)
Class E (uncontrolled)
FL600
Class E (transponder required)
TFR (current)•COA required•3x/wk; 5 day notice
Class E (uncontrolled)
I: Transition
III: Class A or Oceanic Ops
IV: Transit
Airspace Access Scenarios
Class C
10NM
10,000Class E(no transponder required)
•3x/wk; 5 day notice•Talking/Squawking
4,100 AGL
Segregated Airspace
Class C
10NM
18,000
~ Class A (controlled)
( )
FL600
Class E (transponder required)
10,000Class E(no transponder required)
4,000 AGL
Class D
18,000
~ Class A (controlled)
Class E (uncontrolled)
FL600
Class E
II: Terminal Ops
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Segregated Airspace
10NM
10,000Class E
(no transponder required)
Class B/C/DClass G
800~1200
10NM
Class E (transponder required)
10,000Class E(no transponder required)
4,000 AGL
Segregated Airspace
Class C/D
V: sUAS Line-of-sight
• Airspace access controls– Segregated airspace– Positive Control Airspace – Class A (all aircraft are cooperative –
“Integration” Today [USA]
p ( ptalking & squawking)
– Temporary Flight Restrictions– Low Density Airspace
• Provide “see and avoid” equivalent – Chase plane – Ground Observers
• Treat like any other aircraft
• Public Aircraft• Experimentals
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y• Telephone connection between GCS and ATC supervisor• Limits on distance from base and/or segregated airspace• One UAS per center during emergencies• Unpopulated areas
No Commercial Operations
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Segregated Airspace [USA]
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MITRE Image
UAS Access to Civil Airspace
Challenges
OperationalNeeds
Organizations &Missions
UAS•Capabilities (aircraft, Control station)
Civil Airspace•Technologies•Policies
AirspaceAccessScenarios
AccessMethods
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)•Procedures
SystemsEngineering
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A Real World Example
• DHS Customs & Border Protection (CBP)
“Predator B” & Cessna 172
Protection (CBP)– Border Patrol
– RQ-9 (“Predator B”)
– Grand Forks AFB, ND
RQ‐9 (Predator B)Speed: 240 kts max
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Speed: 240 kts max.Altitude: Up to 50K ft.Range: 2,800 NMEndurance: 30+ hours max.LOS Link Distance: 150 NMMax Gross Weight: 10,500 lbs.AMOC: Riverside, CA BLOS: Ku‐band satellite
Photo: CBP
DHS CBP Air & Marine Northern Border Patrol Mission – Predator ‘B’
Operational Issue Mitigation
“See and Avoid” Mitigations for Transitioning thru uncontrolled airspace
•Temporary Flight Restriction•Daylight – VFR Only
Disruptions to Command & • Operational Procedures
Operational Issue Mitigation
“See and Avoid” Mitigations for Transitioning thru uncontrolled airspace
•Temporary Flight Restriction•Daylight – VFR Only
Disruptions to Command & • Operational Procedures
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Control Link and other Flight Contingencies
• Limit range • Operate in low density airspace
•Other Issues:System ReliabilityAll Wx Capability (icing, cross winds)Cold Durability
Control Link and other Flight Contingencies
• Limit range• Operate in low density airspace
•Other Issues:System ReliabilityAll Wx Capability (icing, cross winds)Cold Durability
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UAS Are Transforming Pilots
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How does this Impact the Pilot?
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Photo: US Department of Defense
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NTSB Investigation of CBP Predator Crash
25 April 2006 Nogales, AZ Photo: NTSB Report
ThrottleField of view
• GCS lock-up coupled with Pilot error causes CBP Predator to crash after engine was starved
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Condition lever Speed lever
Iris control
view
Focus
Functionality as Sensor Operator WSFunctionality as Pilot WS
gof fuel
• No injuries• NTSB Investigation
– 5 Recommendations for FAA– 17 Recommendations for CBP
Photo: NTSB Report
Image: NTSB
Crash Site
Departure Airport & Ground Control Station (GCS)
TFR Boundary
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Southern US Border TFR
Route of Flight
40
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What About Small UAS?
www.nasa.gov
www.noaa.gov
www.navair.navy.mil
Lacher Photo
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www.nasa.gov
www.navair.navy.mil
www.nasa.gov
Existing Guidance–AC91-57(circa 1981)
• Covers “model” aircraft– Intended only for recreation or competition– Effective in conjunction with Academy of Model
Aeronautics (AMA) Safety Code( ) y
• No enforcement - no regulatory basis • “Encourages voluntary compliance”
– ≤ 400 feet – Advise ATC if within 3 miles of airport– “Full scale” aircraft have right-of-way
• Does not limit weight and speed• Misapplied to small UAS
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FAA Clarified Policy (2/13/07)– UAS Ops two paths: COA or
experimental– AC 91-57 only for hobbyist– Commitment to explore small UAS
regulations
Photo: USAF
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Does This Make Anyone Nervous?
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How About This?
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Or Maybe This?
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Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) Analysis
72–73 MHz902–928 MHz2400–2483.5 MHz5725–5850 MHz
• Objective – Predict RFI & Quantify Outages– Focus on Small UAS
• FY07 – Preliminary AnalysisIdentified substantial risk of lost C2 uplinks above populated areas from unlicensed emitters
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– Identified substantial risk of lost C2 uplinks above populated areas from unlicensed emitters
– Developed UASAT Tool to predict RFI caused by licensed emitters
• FY08: Extend Analysis– Extended to additional bands
– Used UASAT to predict licensed-emitter effects– Estimated potential extent and duration of link outages in urban & suburban areas
• FY09: Continued to Extend Analysis– Included 5725–5850 MHz band and examined licensed-emitter effects in all 4 bands– Focused on Select US cities
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Small UAS ARC – Layered Approach for Ensuring Safety
People & Property on the Surface
Aircraft & Other Airborne Objects
Reduce Encounters
Keep Separated
• Altitude limits• Airspace class limits• Fly-away protection / C2 link
robustness• Away from airports• Crew training
• VMC/Day/VLOS• ATC Notifications• Visual Observer• Comm monitoring
• VMC/Day/VLOS• Telemetry• Proximity to people/property• Crew training
• Take-off/Landing areas• Population density considerations• Access controls• Buffer zones• Crew training
• System design/testing
• Crew training• Telemetry
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Avoid Collisions
Minimize Impact
• Visual Observer• Performance requirements• Visibility (Paint, strobe,
transponder)• Crew training
• Physical size• Frangibility• Airspeed limits
• Visual Observer• Crew training• System Design/testing
• Physical size• Frangibility• Airspeed limits
Break
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Airspace IntegrationResearch Challenges
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
Research Questions1. Air Traffic Management Implications – What is the impact on air traffic management of routine UAS
operations in sectors of varying complexity?
2. Implications for NextGen Concepts – How should the NAS evolve in the future towards NextGen to best accommodate UAS capabilities and unique airspace integration requirements?
3. Mitigations for the Lack of See and Avoid – What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?
4. Standardized Lost Link and other Contingency Procedures – What are the appropriate standardized procedures for lost link and other flight contingencies and how can their safety effectiveness be demonstrated?
5. Implications of Autonomy – What are acceptable levels of autonomy for operations in the NAS?
6. Training and Pilot Qualifications – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS pilots and other required crew members?
7. Equipment Certification – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS equipment including aircraft, avionics, ground control stations, launch/recovery, and communications equipment?
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8. Command and Control Link – What are the communications system performance requirements (e.g., range, integrity, availability, latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link?
9. Airspace Security – What are the airspace security implications of UAS?
10. Safety Risk Assessment – How should safety risk assessment methodologies and criteria be customized for UAS operations?
11. Flight in Non-Traditional Regimes – Can the FAA establish new safety and operational requirements for flight in non-traditional regimes (e.g., under bridges, urban canyons, in close proximity to buildings, below tree line)?
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Relative Priority - Notional
Pilot Qual.
& TrainingSystem
SecurityConcepts for
Flight New Regimesst)
ATM
Integration
NextGen
ConceptsLost Link
Procedures
Autonomy
Certification
Standards
C2 Link
Spectrum & Stds
Safety Assessment
Methods
Flight New Regimes
egree of D
ifficulty (m
ost to leas
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Sense & Avoid
y
De
Urgency (most to least)
Urgency: The pressing necessity of when and or what pace this research is conducted. Research from which results are needed immediately would thus be the most urgent.Degree of Difficulty: The relative complexity and risk associated with the research (not implementation or policy adoption). This should capture the technical risks associated with development efforts, the breadth of the unknowns, and the interaction of technical, operational, and policy issues. The greater the degree of difficulty the more the research would be dependent upon fundamental breakthrough for success. [based upon Mankins, John, Research & Development Degree of Difficulty (R&D3) - A White Paper, NASA Office of Space Flight - Advanced Projects Office, March 10, 1998]
What is the impact on air traffic management of routine UAS operations in sectors of varying complexity?• What is the impact on controller workload? – Should the sector
it b dj t d?
1. Air Traffic Management Implications
capacity be adjusted? • Should ATM Procedures be revised to account for different aircraft
performance characteristics, potential for control latency, non-point-to-point flight plans, potential for lost link, and wake vortex vulnerabilities?
• What is the impact of command and control latency? – What command and control latency can be expected for various UAS?
• What is the impact of lost link on air traffic controller workload? • What are the implications for NAS systems including ERAM, conflict
probe, conflict alert, air-to-ground data communications, NOTAM S t d th N tG i it h f h f t
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System, and the NextGen voice switch from such factors as contingency flight plans, lost C2 link vs. lost voice communications, non-point-to-point flight paths, and varying flight performance?
• What are the impacts on legacy traffic flows?• Are there implications for airspace design including the potential for
new airspace categories, vertical off-sets for UAS, and new route structures?
• Are there additional controller training requirements due to UAS?
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One Perspective
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
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Senior Airman Frank Gilman, 332nd Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, air traffic controller - U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth
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How should the NAS evolve in the future towards NextGen to best accommodate UAS
2. Implications forNextGen Concepts
capabilities and unique airspace integration requirements?• How could the NextGen concepts [including
Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO), Enhanced Visual Operations, Separation Management, and Performance based Navigation (PBN)] enable
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Performance-based Navigation (PBN)] enable routine integration of UAS into the NAS?
• What modifications of these concepts are needed to account for some of the differences in UAS vs. manned aircraft?
What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?
3. Mitigations for the Lack of See and Avoid
mitigate the lack of see and avoid?
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See and Avoid vs.Sense and Avoid
Cooperative Traffic
Big Sky
Cooperative Traffic[Talking & Squawking]
Non-Cooperative Traffic
Airspace Structure Airspace StructureProcedural Separation Assurance
Air Traffic Control Self-Separation
Tactical Separation Assurance
d A
void
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Risk of Collision
TCASSee & Avoid
See & AvoidCollision Avoidance
Sen
se a
n• Self-Separation Reduce probability of a collision by remaining “well clear”
Sense and Avoid system function where the UAS maneuvers within a sufficient timeframe to prevent activation of a collision avoidance maneuver while conforming to accepted air traffic separation standards. Any UAS maneuvers will be in accordance with regulations and procedures.
FAA/DoDSense and Avoid Workshop
• Collision Avoidance Last ditch effort to prevent collision
Sense and avoid system function where the UAS takes appropriate action to prevent an intruder from penetrating the collision volume. Action is expected to be initiated within a relatively short time horizon before closest point of approach.The collision avoidance function engages when all other modes of separation fail.
Self Separation
ATC Separation Services Sense and Avoid
Combination of Self-Separation and Collision Avoidance
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Collision Avoidance Threshold
Collision Volume
pThreshold
Threat
Intruder
200
ft
“Wel
l Cle
ar”
1,000 ft
3 – 5 nm
Means of compliance with 14 CFR Part §91.111 and §91.11350
0 ft
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• Must function in:– Visual- and Instrument- Metrological Conditions – Night/Day/Twilight
Challenges for See and Avoid Mitigations
Night/Day/Twilight– With targets
• Masked in ground clutter• Of varying sizes, dimensions, relative speeds• In the air and on the ground• In the airport pattern• Non-transponding and transponding
– Range sufficient to avoid collisions• Avoid airborne & ground targets as well as terrain
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• Fuse data from multiple sensors (e.g., TCAS/Mode A/C/S, ADS-B, Radar, Electro-optic, etc.)
• Sensors/processing equipment are likely to create SWAP2and cost issues
• Maneuver and return to course as expected• Making the safety case
• MITRE believes technology readiness precludes operational
What about an Aircraft-based Sense and Avoid Solution?
p puse in the next 5 years
• Based upon – Experience with TCAS
– Technology R&D
– Involvement with RTCA SC-203
• Working with community to align
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Working with community to align towards a nearer term alternative
Ground-based Sense & Avoid
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Ground-Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) –Alternative Means of Compliance
Class E/G Airspace
ManeuverCommand
Non-cooperative Aircraft•Not talking w/ ATC•No transponder
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“The task of the observer is to provide the pilot of the UAS with instructions to steer the UA clear of any potential collision with other traffic.”
– FAA AIR-160 – Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01
Pilot GCS
Traffic Situation Awareness
Observer
Today:Visual
Observer
Future:GBSAA
• Surveillance: How well does radar system detect non-cooperative targets?
The Safety Questions for GBSAA
p g
• Traffic: What is the operational environment?
• Operational Concept: What operational procedures and decision support capabilities mitigate the risks?
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• Hazards/Risks: What are the hazards and their likelihood and effect What are the risks?
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See and Avoid – Integration Alternatives
When Approach Costs Development Risks StakeholderImpact
Small UAS Line-of-sight Regulations
+2 yrs Establish regulations & certification standards for aircraft and crew that would enable small UAS (<25 kgs)
Low Low Regulations & standards Safety case
LowGlass G users may encounter small UASRegulations
to operate for commercial purposes
Ground-based Sense & Avoid(GBSAA)Dedicated Sensor
1-2 yrs Deploy dedicated 3D air surveillance radars to enable UAS flight crews to monitor traffic
Medium Medium Installation of radar Operational concept Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Highly dependent on C2 link
LowUAS operators need to remain well-within surveillance range
GBSAARepurposedSensors
2-3 yrs Operate within coverage of existing ground sensors (e.g., ASR-9/11) which will enable UAS flight crews to monitor traffic
Medium Medium Radar post processing accuracy Operational concept Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Highly dependent on C2 link
LowBroader surveillance area
Airborne-based Sense & Avoid(ABSAA)Cooperative
10+ yrs Airborne equipment receives signals from cooperative aircraft (ADS-B). Traffic situation info sent to UAS pilot or used by automation on board the UAS to autonomously
High High Avoidance algorithm development and
validation Policy requiring equipage in specific
i
High Reduces access
for legacy airspace users unless
i t l
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Coope at e on-board the UAS to autonomously sense and avoid
airspace Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Dependent upon C2 link or
autonomous software
appropriately equipped
Technology could be extended to manned aviation
ABSAANon-cooperative
12+ yrs Airborne equipment uses non-cooperative sensor technologies to locate other aircraft and hazards. Situation info sent to UAS pilot or used by automation on-board the UAS to autonomously sense and avoid
Very High High Requires the development of new non-
cooperative sensor technology which is able to be certified for the purpose of Sense and avoidance
Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Dependent upon C2 link or
autonomous software
LowTechnology could be extended to manned aviation
Trade-offs: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Sense and Avoidance
Non-Cooperative( t di )
Cooperative( t di ADS B)
Independent of equipageAccuracy and integrity knownSimplifies algorithms Reduces development and certification risks
(e.g., non-transponding)(e.g., transponding, ADS-B)
Requires a policy d i i
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Clipart ETC is copyright © 2003 by the University of South Florida
decision
Would it be more effective to equip all aircraft with ADS-B “Out” than to develop certifiable non-cooperative collision avoidance?
Image: Department of Health and Human Services
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Collision Avoidance – ApproachTrade-offs
• Pros ■Pros
Non-Cooperative(e.g., non-transponding)
Cooperative(e.g., transponding ADS-B)
– Independent of target aircraft equipage–More analogous to human “seeing”
• Cons–Accuracy/Integrity still in question–Physical limitations to detecting
targets/obstacles–Some technologies cannot detect
targets in all conditions (e.g., night, bad weather)
–Suite of sensors likely to be needed–No available solutions or standards
–Standardized aviation solution–Available, proven technology that is
relatively simple–Accuracy and integrity known–Simplifies collision detection and traffic
avoidance algorithms (FAR 91.113)–Reduces development and certification
risks
■Cons–Depends upon critical mass of aircraft
equipping with ADS-B OUTN t d t d til 2020
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–False/missed detection rate is critical to effectiveness
–Weight, power and cost of aggregate solution unknown
–Significantly more complex than TCAS
■ Not mandated until 2020
–SWAP & cost issues w/ existing ADS-B IN systems
–ADS-B is not certified for collision avoidance
Would it be more effective to equip all aircraft with ADS-B OUT than to develop certifiable non-cooperative collision avoidance?
UAT Beacon Radio – ADS-B for VFR Ops
• Designed for small UAS• Size: 2”x 5”
• Wgt: 9.6oz (6oz board only)
• Pwr: 3W
• Internal GPS (or use ship’s)• Internal pressure sensor• Performance: >20 nmi @ 7W• Architectures
• Tx-only for surveillance by others only
• Tx/Rx to assess situation and maneuver
A i t f ll UAS ti i
UBR-TVR (Patent Pending)
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• Appropriate for small UAS operating in low-altitude airspace with GA
• First UAS flight with ADS-B, Aug 2007• Other NAS Applications
– Non-powered, VFR aircraft
– Recoverable launch vehicles
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Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Proven Technology
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MITRE’s UAT Team was recipient of FAA’s 2008 Excellence in Aviation Research Award and the AIAA Dr. John Ruth Digital Avionics Award
UAT Beacon Radio (UBR-TVR)Technical Specifications
Physical Specifications:Width: 2.9”Length: 5.38”Height: 1.2”Weight: 9.6ozTemperature: -20C to 40C
GPS Antenna
UATAntenna
External ConnectivityCompact Data Connector- RS-232- RS-422- USB- 1 pulse/sec- Transmit Suppression
GPS ReceiverFrequency: 1575.42 MHzUpdate rate: 1 Hz
AntennasUAT Dipole AntennaSupports external Antenna
UBR-TVR Situational Awareness Display
BatteryRecharger
Port
Compact Data Connector
PowerSwitch
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SpectrumFrequency: 978 MHzBandwidth: 1.04167 Msymbols/secModulation: CPFSKPower: 38.5 dBm
Update rate: 1 HzPPS: +/- 1 usTTFF (Cold) : 40s typ.
Power Specifications:Li Ion Battery (rechargeable): 6.8 WhApprox. 5 hours of TX/RX (20 deg C)External Power: 9-40V inputCurrent: 300mA
Supports external AntennaVSWR 1.1:2GPS Patch Active AntennaPort outputs 3.3V
Awareness Display
Approved for public release 09-4131
Patent Pending
5/26/2010
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Flight Demonstration of Cooperative Autonomous SAA on sUAS
Demonstrate Cooperative (ADS-B based) Autonomous (lost link/no link) Separation Assurance for small, lightweight (under 55 lb)
Use existing MITRE expertise and capabilities in lightweight, compact ADS-B systems (UBR) , avoidance
l ith (TCAS C fli t P b, g g ( )
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Natural ‘bird-like’ maneuvers
algorithms (TCAS; Conflict Probe; A3S), and UAS integration/operations
to support lab and flight demos
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CollisionAvoidance
Self-Separation
Leverage required ADS-B equipage mandated for Class B (plus Mode C Veil) and Class C
Airspace
Maneuver early in manned aircraft/UAS encounter to avoid
imminent collision risk situations from developing
What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?• What is the effectiveness of visual observers?
3. Mitigations for the Lack ofSee and Avoid
• What is the effectiveness of visual observers?• What are the performance requirements for sense and avoid
including self-separation and collision avoidance?• What are the trade-offs among cost and policy of various
alternatives?• What is an appropriate extensible concept of operation for
Ground-Based Sense and Avoid? – How can a safety case be made?
• What are the appropriate Airborne-based Sense and Avoid
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pp p(ABSAA) technologies, operational concepts? – How can a safety case be made?
• What are the trade-offs among cost, effectiveness, implementation time, and policy implications between cooperative (e.g., ADS-B) vs non-cooperative ABSAA alternatives?
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What are the appropriate standardized procedures for lost link and other flight
4. Standardized Lost Link and other Contingency Procedures
p gcontingencies and how can their safety effectiveness be demonstrated?• How should procedures for UAS lost link differ from a loss
of ATC communications?
• What are the implications for ATM procedures?
• Are their new technologies to enhance the situation
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gawareness of controllers and other pilots to the intent of the UAS?
• Mitigate the impact of PIC unable to control aircraft Autonomous
Challenges for C2 Integration –What does it mean to fly-by-wireless?
operations– Procedures
– Technologies
• Integration with ATM and existing traffic flows– UAS-specific aircraft separation criteria
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– Standardized lost link and contingency procedures
– Mechanism to communicate intent
– Controller work load and implications for traffic flows ATM procedures
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C2 Challenges –Integration Alternatives
When Approach Costs Development Risks Impact on Stakeholders
Standardized Lost Link & Contingency
2 yrs Procedures for all UAS platforms to follow during lost link and other flight contingencies including in flight
Medium Low Validation of procedures
SW D l t
MediumLegacy users may be
t d t l th fProcedures contingencies including in-flight emergencies (e.g., engine failure, fire)
SW Development Certification
vectored to clear a path for a UAS following a contingency
UAS-specific ATM procedures & separation criteria
2 yrs Specific ATM procedures tailored to unique UAS operational characteristics.
Medium Medium Validation of procedures Changes in NAS systems
MediumChanges to controller functions
Link Robustness 2-4 yrs Work with International Telecommunications Union to protect specific frequencies for UAS C2 links
Low Low Low risk – process in place;
needs time and money
HighThere is a demand for spectrum for aviation and other industry applications.
Autonomous Operations
5-15+ yrs
In addition to robust software architectures for autonomous UAS operations (i.e., with limited pilot interaction) some promising
High High Certification Integrity monitoring without
h i t ti
LowThere is a big public perception and acceptance h dl t
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interaction) some promising technologies include: Mechanism to communicate intent
(voice or data) Machine-to-machine negotiation Auto-take-off and landing Auto emergency management Auto flight path management
human intervention hurdle to overcome
NextGen Operational Concepts
15+ yrs Integration into future ATM framework . Most promising concepts are associated with Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) and Equivalent Visual Operations (EVO)
Medium –High
High Exactly how UAS will fit into
emerging NextGen concepts is unclear
Unknown
What are acceptable levels of autonomy for operations in the NAS?
5. Implications of Autonomy
p• What criteria and standards should the FAA
establish for civil certification of autonomous software where a human is no longer able to monitor and is unable to intervene?
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So Far, Most Robots are Teleoperated
ISR
Sensing
Operator
Teleoperation
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Mobility
Courtesy of Dr. Richard Weatherly, MITRE Director Army Robotics Research
The Future is Autonomy
ISR
Sensing
PerceptionMobility
Situational
Awareness
Autonomy
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ReasoningCommandandControl
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Degrees of Autonomy –Architecture Trade-offs
(1) Human does the whole job, turning over to the computer to implement
Ro
le o
f H
um
an
Ro
le o
f A
uto
ma
tio
n
(2) Computer helps by determining the options
(3) Computer helps to determine options & suggests one, human need not follow
(4) Computer selects action and human may or may not do it
(5) Computer selects action and implements it if human approves
(6) Computer selects action, informs human in plenty of time to stop it
(7) Computer does whole job and necessarily tells human what it did
(8) Computer does whole job and tells human what it did only if human explicitly asks
(9) Computer does whole job and decides what the human should be told
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(9) Computer does whole job and decides what the human should be told
(10) Computer does the whole job if it decides it should be done, and if so, tells human, if it decides that the human should be told
Thomas Sheridan and William Verplank¸ Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Prepared for the Office of Naval Research, July 1978.
Perception Exercise
How many “f”s are in the sentence below?
FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-
SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-
IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE
EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS
FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-
SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-
IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE
EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS
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OF STUDY.
7OF STUDY.
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• What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS pilots and
6. Training and Pilot Qualifications
other required crew members?
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• What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS equipment
7. Equipment Certification
including aircraft, avionics, ground control stations, launch/recovery, and communications equipment?
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What are the communications system performance requirements (e.g., range, integrity, availability, latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link?
8. Command and Control Link
latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link? • What are the bandwidth requirements?• What range of protected spectrum is needed? • What are appropriate frequency bands? • What redundancy is required? • What are the up-link and down-link security/encryption
requirements? • What interference rejection capability is needed?
What are the acceptable latenc req irements for ario s
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• What are the acceptable latency requirements for various phases of flight?
• What are the acceptable C2 link integrity and reliability?• What are the natural atmospheric impacts on link latency,
integrity and reliability?
Links Between Control Station and Unmanned Aircraft
UNMANNEDAIRCRAFT (UA)
CONTROL
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CONTROLSTATION
(CS) Color key:
Safety-related
Mission-related
Images: US Military
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Pilot/UA CNPC Information Flows
Control Downlink (Non-Payload Telemetry)
Control Uplink (Telecommands)
Pilot (CS)
UA
Navaid Setting Changes
Navaid Display Data
ATC Voice Relay
ATS Data Relay
Non-Payload Target Data
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Airborne Weather Radar Data
Video Downlink (for Safety)
Color Key: Command & Control; ATC Relay; Sense & Avoid Data
Estimated Throughput of a Single UA
Opera-tionalPhase
Relative Phase
Duration (Percent-
age of Total)
Mode
Non-Payload Communications Throughput (Bits per Second)
Command & Control ATC Relay Sense & Avoid Data
Control NavaidsATC
Voice Relay
ATS Data Relay
Target Data
Airborne Wx Radar
Data
Non-Payload Video
UL DL UL DL UL+DL UL DL DL DL DL
Pre-Flight 4 M 183 5 0 0 4800 113 173 9120 0 0
Terminal (Departure)
8M 2386 5715 669 836 4800 49 59 9120 27771 270000
A 775 912 141 186 4800 49 59 9120 27771 270000
En Route 76M 1201 2356 669 836 4800 23 28 9120 3968 270000
A 289 532 141 186 4800 23 28 9120 3968 270000
Terminal (Arrival)
11M 4606 7615 669 1140 4800 16 32 9120 27771 270000
A 1246 1277 141 234 4800 16 32 9120 27771 270000
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A 1246 1277 141 234 4800 16 32 9120 27771 270000
Post-Flight 1 M 1 2 0 0 4800 15 22 0 0 0
Weighted Average of Flight Phases
M 1695 3248 669 871 4800 24 31 9120 8729 270000
A 441 650 141 192 4800 24 31 9120 8729 270000
Overall Average : 0.8A+0.2M 692 1170 247 328 4800 24 31 9120 8729 270000
UL = Uplink, DL = Downlink, M = Manual Operation, A = Automatic Operation
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Aggregate CC Bandwidth Analysis
• Began with detailed analysis of CC throughput for single UA-- Each large UA assumed fully equipped for all CC traffic-- Less equipage assumed for medium and small UA
UA TypeWeight
(Pounds)
Altitude (Feet AGL)
Maximum Number Simultaneously Aloft in CONUS
Large > 4,400 30,000 341
Medium 55 4 400 18 000 1 515
• Then analyzed number of RF channels needed to serve all UA in 2030 deployment scenario developed by SC-203 CC Product Team:
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Medium 55 – 4,400 18,000 1,515
Small < 55 1,000 6,257
• Resulting estimates of nationwide bandwidth requirements:
34 MHz for terrestrial LOS comm links56 MHz for SATCOM links
Leading Candidate Bands for Protected Spectrum
Band ProjectedUAS Use
Incumbents Remarks
960–1164 Terrestrial DME TACAN • Crowded but gaps exist960 1164 MHz
Terrestrial DME, TACAN,TCAS, SSR, JTIDS, UAT
Crowded, but gaps exist• Airborne cosite issues• Good propagation
1545–1656.5 MHz
SATCOM Globalstar, Inmarsat, Iridium
• Existing safety allocation• Incumbents could serve UAS
5030–5091 MHz
Terrestrial,SATCOM
MLS • Currently little used• Europeans might revive MLS• Large free-space path losses
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10-31 GHz (selected subsets)
Geosyn-chronous SATCOM
Other geosyn-chronous SAT-COM systems
• Much bandwidth available• Substantial latencies• Very large path losses
86
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What are the airspace security implications of UAS?
9. Airspace Security
• What standards should be required for physical security (e.g., GCS access protection)?
• How can we assess the potential threat of civil UAS operations?
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How should safety risk assessment methodologies and criteria be customized
10. Safety Risk Assessment
gfor UAS operations?• Should the risk classification for unmanned
aircraft be reassessed?
• Can a standard that uses lethality based upon kinetic energy (especially as it relates to small UAS) be established?
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UAS) be established?
• Can the FAA establish an approach that uses comparative risk assessment to examine risk trade-offs between unmanned flight risk vs. risks associated with similar flight carrying a human?
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A Routine Puma Landing
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Rob Strain, MITRE
Can the FAA establish new safety and operational requirements for flight in non-traditional regimes
11. Flight in Non-Traditional Regimes
(e.g., under bridges, urban canyons, in close proximity to buildings, below tree line)?
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Small UAS – New Missions – New Airspace
Small UAS can fly in places where no one flies– Between buildings (urban canyons)
U d b id (i ti )– Under bridges (inspection)
– Inside buildings
– Below tree line
– Underneath / near power cables
Istockphoto.com
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When is this no longer “navigable airspace”?Would a risk-based approach shift the regulatory paradigm?
Photo: USGSPhoto: NPSPhoto: US DOE Photo: NPS
Research Questions1. Air Traffic Management Implications – What is the impact on air traffic management of routine UAS
operations in sectors of varying complexity?
2. Implications for NextGen Concepts – How should the NAS evolve in the future towards NextGen to best accommodate UAS capabilities and unique airspace integration requirements?
3. Mitigations for the Lack of See and Avoid – What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?
4. Standardized Lost Link and other Contingency Procedures – What are the appropriate standardized procedures for lost link and other flight contingencies and how can their safety effectiveness be demonstrated?
5. Implications of Autonomy – What are acceptable levels of autonomy for operations in the NAS?
6. Training and Pilot Qualifications – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS pilots and other required crew members?
7. Equipment Certification – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS equipment including aircraft, avionics, ground control stations, launch/recovery, and communications equipment?
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8. Command and Control Link – What are the communications system performance requirements (e.g., range, integrity, availability, latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link?
9. Airspace Security – What are the airspace security implications of UAS?
10. Safety Risk Assessment – How should safety risk assessment methodologies and criteria be customized for UAS operations?
11. Flight in Non-Traditional Regimes – Can the FAA establish new safety and operational requirements for flight in non-traditional regimes (e.g., under bridges, urban canyons, in close proximity to buildings, below tree line)?
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• A number of integration challenges exists – The most daunting– Lack of an On-board Capability to See and Avoid– Coping Mechanism for Link Vulnerability and ATM Integration
Summary and Conclusion
• Implications for – Technology – Operating procedures– Policy/regulations
• Research Opportunities Exist• Alternatives need to be considered
– Can’t treat all UAS the sameGBSAA viable near term alternative
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– GBSAA viable near-term alternative– Explore cooperative Sense & Avoidance alternatives
• Community should develop a UAS Airspace Integration Roadmap – Align efforts – Coordinate research and implementation efforts– Examine trade-offs among alternatives – Justify additional resources to match complexity of the issue
Conclusion I
Thank YouThank You
Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited94www.arcent.Army.mil (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Michael Larson)
94