ideal observer theories in aesthetics

Ideal Observer Theories in Aesthetics

Stephanie Ross*University of Missiouri – St Louis

Abstract

I examine the prospects for an ideal observer theory in aesthetics modelled on Roderick Firth’s1952 paper ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer’. The first generation of philosophers toconsider an Ideal Aesthetic Observer (IAO) found fault with Firth’s omniscience condition; morerecent writers have criticized the affective component of an IAO’s response. In the end, most dis-cussants reject the possibility of an IAO theory. Though the IAO theory gets the model wrongfor answering meta-aesthetic questions, revisiting the debate prompts useful reconsideration of therole of the critic and the nature of aesthetic appreciation.

1. Introduction

Reconsidering the fortunes of an ideal observer theory in aesthetics invites fruitful reflec-tion on the similarities and differences between moral and aesthetic judgment; it alsoprompts useful reconsideration of the role of the critic and the nature of aesthetic appre-ciation. In this paper, I will set out and assess some ideal observer accounts of aestheticjudgment. I will begin with the prototype for all present-day Ideal Observer (henceforth,IO) theories in ethics, Roderick Firth’s 1952 paper ‘Ethical Absolutism and the IdealObserver’.1 Subsequent discussion of this topic by those proposing aesthetic IOs dividesalong generational lines. Earlier contributors, writing in direct response to Firth (Hospers,Duncan, Garner, Taliaferro) focused on the scope of the IO’s knowledge, raising a num-ber of challenges to the omniscience condition. More recent writers (Bonzon, Kieran)instead investigate the affective component of aesthetic response which proves more diffi-cult to situate in an ideal being. Further issues that arise in the pursuit of this topicinclude questions of agreement – would IOs converge in their verdicts or might there bemultiple IOs who disagree? – as well as questions about how IOs relate to actual appreci-ators – are they usefully construed as idealized versions of ourselves2 and what forcemight their judgments have for actual imperfect appreciators?

2. Firth’s Ideal Observer

Roderick Firth offers his theory as a solution to a problem in metaethics. It is meant toilluminate what we mean when we call acts right or wrong, people good or bad. Thetheory doesn’t purport to answer normative questions, and it doesn’t claim to offer anaction guide. Thus it doesn’t help us decide which among the acts we’re contemplatingwe ought to choose. The IO that Firth introduces is omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent and, in other respects,normal (Part Two, sections 1–6). The meaning of ethical terms is tied to the responses ofthis being, or set of beings. The relevant responses are approval or disapproval rather thananything more cognitive – say, the belief that a given action is right – for reasons thatwill be discussed below. Thus for Firth, to say that an action is right is to say that an IO

Philosophy Compass 6/8 (2011): 513–522, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00416.x

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would approve of that action. Firth insists that the IO is a possible being; this allows histheory to remain objectivist, as it doesn’t fail if no actual IO can be found among us.

3. The Omniscience Condition

In setting out his theory, Firth anticipates and addresses some likely criticisms. One cen-tral worry concerns the threat of circularity. This applies most directly to the omnisciencecondition. Firth claims that the IO is omniscient with regard to non-ethical facts. He for-mulates the resulting worry as a dilemma:

… there appears to be a … vicious circle in an absolute dispositional analysis. For if moral emo-tions are experienced only as a consequence of moral beliefs or judgments, and if we refuse toattribute moral beliefs to an ideal observer in our analysis, then there is no reason to think thatan ideal observer would experience any moral emotions at all. But if, on the other hand, we doattribute moral beliefs to an ideal observer, we should have to employ the very ethical terms(e.g., ‘right’) which we are attempting to analyze. (p. 328)

The second horn of the dilemma is certainly to be avoided. It would be question-beggingto ascribe moral beliefs to the being whose responses are taken to define that notion. Firthtries to weaken the first horn of the dilemma by pointing out that we can have moral emo-tions directed towards acts whose moral rightness or wrongness we are unable to judge;equally, we can come to question the appropriateness or justification of some of our existingmoral judgments without having the accompanying emotions change or fade. Thus the linkbetween moral judgment and emotional response ⁄moral emotion is presented as one thatcan, on occasion, be broken. But does it follow that the two are always separate or separa-ble? Ethical naturalists who endorse a reductive analysis of evaluative terms could regardFirth’s dilemma with less alarm than non-naturalists of various stripes.

Firth’s attempts to defend the omniscience condition are all ways of accommodating thefact ⁄ value distinction. One might wonder whether his theory, as he sets it up, remains inviolation of Hume’s famous dictum that one can’t derive an ought from an is. If we carefullyascribe to the IO all possible non-ethical knowledge, we leave it open that he lacks ethicalknowledge altogether or has incomplete ethical knowledge. If we honour Hume’s principle,then the IO cannot engage in successful moral reasoning; he cannot start from his store ofknowledge and emerge with valid moral conclusions regarding the acts or situations heenvisions. This may not be a deal-breaker for Firth’s theory, as he requires only that emo-tions of approval or disapproval result, not actual claims about situations. However, therecent flurry of work by philosophers since the time Firth’s paper was written has donemuch to rehabilitate the emotions – arguing that they have cognitive dimensions, that theyare appraisive in various ways, that they can be judged appropriate or inappropriate. Thus amore sophisticated account of approval and disapproval may find that circularity worriesreturn even when we track just these responses, and not any beliefs they might ground.

While I have been focusing on concerns about the omniscience condition, at least twoother traits of the IO are equally puzzling – omnipercipience and dispassionateness. Sincethe first is another infinite attribute, it is similarly susceptible to the paradoxes that befallperfections. Firth glosses omnipercipience as the power of vivid imagining. Somethinglike this ability may well be a precursor to sympathy and empathy. But Firth adds a cog-nitive dimension to this trait when he suggests that it allows the IO to vividly imagine‘the consequences of all possible acts in any given situation’ (p. 335). However, thetemptation to understand omnipercipience as a partner or handmaiden to emotionalresponse is undercut by addition of the second trait mentioned above, dispassionateness.

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Before turning to follow-ups to Firth’s theory that propose specific aesthetic applica-tions, let me offer a few summary reflections on differences between moral and aestheticcases. It may well be that background information works differently in these two realms.It seems highly likely that basic moral principles respond to universal human interests,desires and needs. Yet the nature and proper understanding of works of art seemsgrounded in the specifics of their originating situations. One might counter by notingrecent evolutionary accounts of art. These posit universal drives to explain the vast rangeof what counts as art across times and cultures.3 But there is another sense in whichmoral principles are secured by taking away knowledge; I have in mind John Rawls’snotion of the Original Position (A Theory of Justice, 1971). Rawls invites us to considerwhat results when people come together to choose principles of justice under a veil ofignorance. He argues that individuals kept unaware of their place in society and theirallotment of natural assets and abilities will select principles that protect the least well offin society. In this case, ignorance helps achieve a moral solution. By contrast, one stan-dard account of aesthetic appreciation – Hume’s portrait of an ideal judge or critic in hisessay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (I will return to Hume’s theory shortly.) – includes twocriteria, practice and comparison, that in effect maximize the critic’s store of art-historicalknowledge and experience. Note too that the notions of expertise and connoisseurshipthat are at home in the artworld do not seem applicable in the moral sphere.

A second difference between these two realms has to do with the stability of the rele-vant properties that judges track. It seems plausible to maintain that slavery was wrong in1840, even if a majority of Americans deemed the practice morally acceptable. By con-trast, the aesthetic qualities possessed by a work do not seem forever fixed. A musicalcomposition that was transgressive in the late nineteenth century can seem quite staidnow. Kendall Walton’s important paper ‘Categories of Art’ demonstrates persuasively thatthe aesthetic qualities a work appears to possess can vary depending on how that work iscategorized. And there is some choice regarding categorization.4 Moral attributions donot seem similarly susceptible to category effects because the assumptions we need tomake in order to unseat a judgment (though slavery is wrong when seen as x, slavery isacceptable when seen as y) are generally false.

Finally, there can be a sense of urgency to the moral case that has no parallels whenwe interact with works of art. Of course there are countless occasions when we graduallybuild up our moral appraisal of a person, act or practice. But faced with a classic moraldilemma that demands action, we don’t always have the luxury of contemplation. Com-pare the familiar saw from the aesthetic realm that claims masterpieces invite repeatedreturns, allowing us to find new rewards with each re-encounter. The works becomericher and more deeply understood. A number of aestheticians have analogized works ofart and friends for this reason.

4. Aesthetic Ideal Observer Theories: The First Generation

Starting in the 1960s, a number of philosophers responded to Firth’s theory with papersexploring the viability of an ideal aesthetic observer (henceforth IAO). I will examine fourinitial contributions to this discussion, those of John Hospers (1962), Richard Garner(1967), Elmer Duncan (1970) and Charles Taliaferro (1990). All but Taliaferro end uprejecting the notion of an IAO. This group, which I have loosely labelled the firstgeneration of IAO theorists, is distinguished from the generation that followed by theirfocus on knowledge rather than affect.

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In his 1962 paper ‘The Ideal Aesthetic Observer’, Hospers asks whether we shouldembrace the idea of an IAO. He takes up in turn and finds problematic each of the crite-ria Firth proposed for his moral IO. Hospers adds an additional dimension to the discus-sion of omniscience by relating it to the isolationist ⁄ contextualist debate (p. 105).Isolationists extend the line of argument developed by Beardsley and Wimsatt in ‘TheIntentional Fallacy’, claiming that we do not need to bring any external information tobear on our encounters with works of art. Contextualists instead welcome backgroundinformation about the artist and the artworld (previous works by the artist, similar worksby other artists, influences that helped shape the work, future influences exerted by thatwork and so on) as effective aids to interpretation and appreciation. Hospers raises thepossibility that an excess of information can impede appreciation: ‘May not the art histo-rian who knows all about the artist, the period, and the work of art sometimes appreciatethe work less, and be a less reliable judge of it, than an aesthetically sensitive person whoknows fewer facts?’ (p. 105). While he is correct that ‘excess’ information is not necessaryfor interpretation, this does not establish that it is impermissible.

After quarrelling with or qualifying each of Firth’s conditions, Hospers suggests thatperhaps Firth’s theory is not the best model to follow in building an aesthetic IO theory.He considers an alternative approach set out in an unpublished paper by Paul Taylor.Here are the components of Taylor’s formulation:

1. The IAO should have as high a degree as possible of discriminative sensitivity in hisresponses to works of art…

2. He should have some practice of artistic techniques through creative endeavor in one ormore art media.

3. He should have a considerable knowledge of art history …4. He should have as wide and deep aesthetic experience as possible of works of art …5. He should be as competent as possible in intellectual analysis of works of art …6. He should exhibit a willingness to reason … (pp. 108–9)

Taylor’s proposal seems to create a hybrid of sorts, something between a Firthian IAO and aHumean ideal critic. In his 1757 Essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume presented a portraitof the ideal critic, then proposed that the verdicts of such appreciators would converge andthereby constitute the sought-after standard.5 Though rational reconstructions of Hume’sview by contemporary aestheticians can pull in different directions, there is good reason toview Hume as a progenitor of the IAO tradition. Humean critics possess delicacy of taste,freedom from prejudice and good sense along with extensive experience of the arts. I haveargued elsewhere that this constellation of traits could only be possessed by actual, asopposed to ideal, beings (BJA, 2008). Like Hume’s, Taylor’s proposal can be plausiblyviewed as describing an actual person with considerable experience of the arts.

Tracking the parallels to Firth’s IO is, however, beside the point, as Hospers declaresall Taylor’s criteria ‘expendable’ (p. 110). He claims that they are neither necessary norsufficient for the successful appreciation of art. I believe a similar attack could be mountedagainst a Firthian IAO. While each of the factors Firth considers – wide knowledge, vividimagination, etc. – could contribute to effective judgment, we can imagine cases where anappreciator lacks the trait yet judges correctly; we can also imagine, for each trait, ineptjudges whose preferences are askew despite possession of the property in question.

Hospers closes his paper by trying to diagnose where IAO theories go astray. He main-tains that Firth started at the wrong end of the problem. Instead of offering a detailedcharacterization of the IO, Hospers says Firth should have started with the subject-matter



that the IO judges. He compares similar definitional endeavours in engineering and phys-ics, noting that we judge bridge-builders by assessing the success of the bridges theybuild, and we judge theoretical physicists by their theories, rather than first puttingtogether the portrait of an ideal builder of bridges or an ideal thinker about physics.I believe this closing criticism misses the mark, because judging bridges and judging worksof art are not analogous tasks. We have independent criteria for the failure or success ofbridges; those that collapse were not well built! We do not have equivalent criteria forsorting artworks into the good, the bad and the mediocre, as this is precisely the problemwe’re trying to solve. Some theorists make use of the test of time to identify certain worksof enduring value. This is used in turn to single out a reliable set of critics whose verdictsabout contemporary works can then be heeded. But whether their verdicts will indeedcarry over to the present-day artworld, that is, whether the resulting theory is reliabilist inthe epistemologist’s technical sense, is precisely what is in question here. Hosper’s bridgeexample alerts us to the problem but does not provide a workable solution.

Richard Garner’s paper discussing the prospects of an IO appeared 5 years afterHospers’s piece. Though he begins with some claims by renowned aesthetician MonroeBeardsley, Garner addresses Firth’s originating ethical version of the IOT. He does, how-ever elaborate the discussion in useful ways, and his conclusions carry over to an IAOT.In what follows, I will apply Garner’s points to the aesthetic case.

Garner begins by using Moore’s Open Question test to challenge any IO theory. Whatis to prevent us from noting that an IAO approves of a given work, then going on to ask‘But is it good?’ Unless one had a reductive naturalistic formula that captured our notionof merit in art, this question would always be open. Certainly no plausible formula of thissort can be proposed. For a start, merit or success would be described very differently inthe different arts. No handy formula is likely to characterize a successful novel and a suc-cessful piece of architecture.

Garner finds a way to quiet the Moorean challenge. He suggests that any IO theory,whether involving moral theory or aesthetics, is meant to tell us not the definition of aright act or a good work of art, but merely how these notions are commonly wielded.This latter formulation is not one that can be unsettled by an Open Question challenge,as it is answering a sociological or statistical question rather than a definitional one. ButGarner does not rest happy with the IO theory he has now saved. He in fact rejects thisapproach because of some problems we have already broached regarding relevance. Theproblem emerges at the metalevel. Presumably, the IAO knows the relevant facts, as sheis omniscient. But does she know of them that they’re relevant? Or, to put this anotherway, does she know which facts are relevant? (p. 622) Garner believes that there is nosatisfactory answer to this question. Consider some examples. The detritus around apainting by Anselm Kiefer, the siting of a sculpture by Richard Serra, the slow-paced keychanges in a musical composition by Steve Reich are all crucial and aesthetically relevantfeatures of these works. But other works could have equivalent properties that were ofno aesthetic interest. So too could objects that are not art at all. If we propose an IAOwho has mastered these distinctions, then he or she must already be in possession of con-cepts whose definition is meant to be given by the IAO’s responses.

Elmer Duncan is the third nay-sayer whose account I’ll examine. In the paper ‘The IdealAesthetic Observer: A Second Look’, he, too, rejects the possibility of an IAO theory. ButDuncan advances the discussion by offering an argument that takes note of the way thataesthetic judgment actually proceeds. He does so by importing Frank Sibley’s importantobservations about aesthetic concepts. In his renowned paper ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Sibleyargues that aesthetic concepts are not condition-governed. According to Sibley, no set of



non-aesthetic qualities can ensure that a particular aesthetic quality is in place, as base quali-ties always underdetermine the aesthetic character of a work. A given quality mightcontribute to delicacy in one context, but detract from it in another. And it remains possi-ble for a work to lack any aesthetic character whatsoever. Sibley concludes that aestheticqualities can only be recognized through the exercise of taste or perceptiveness.

Duncan accepts a Sibleyesque account of aesthetic judgment and argues that thisundermines the omniscience condition. If aesthetic concepts are not related in any law-like way to non-aesthetic concepts, then according an IAO the value-neutral equivalentto an IO’s omniscience with regard to non-ethical facts – namely, omniscience withregard to non-aesthetic facts – would leave his aesthetic judgment underdetermined.Duncan outlines three possible ways in which an IAO might grasp aesthetic concepts –(i) they’re just facts that any being could discern; (ii) they are only discerned by thosepossessed of taste; (iii) they are not only descriptive but also appraisive, i.e. fact-valuehybrids – and claims that all three possibilities make the IAO ‘pointless’ (pp. 50–1). Dun-can bases his rejection on the belief that there is a clear disanalogy between moral andaesthetic judgment. While moral judgments depend on complete knowledge of the non-moral facts, he states that ‘aesthetic judgments are (by common consent) not made in thisway’ (p. 51). The point of disanalogy, for Duncan, is that we don’t treat aesthetic judg-ments as truth claims. We instead view them as in some sense subjective.

While I do not accept the pat distinction between moral and aesthetic judgments thatDuncan defends, I believe he greatly advances the debate by guiding our attention to therole aesthetic qualities play in aesthetic appreciation. I have argued elsewhere6 that aes-thetic qualities are ‘where the action is’ in this regard. While most appreciators could,with sufficient time and exertion, become apprised of the non-aesthetic qualities a givenwork possesses, it isn’t a given that they would also be able to discern the aesthetic quali-ties that supervene upon that base. (Recall that Sibley claimed taste or perceptiveness isrequired for this task.) Thus disagreement about aesthetic qualities is often the first pointof contention when we argue about art, and it remains possible that even specialists,whether IAOs, Humean ideal critics or simply well-positioned but ordinary humans,might disagree among themselves.

In offering this account of aesthetic dispute, I am touching on a separate but relateddebate regarding the role of the critic. Noel Carroll has built his recent book On Criti-cism around the proposal that ‘criticism is essentially evaluation grounded in reason’(p. 8). In the arts, criticism is meant to guide us to rewarding aesthetic experiences,7 andpart of what is needed to secure these is help in understanding just what properties aworthy work presents. Sibley’s analysis suggests that these matters are not always transpar-ent. Thus many appreciators need the help of a guide. I suggest that the qualms Duncanvoices in the course of dismissing the IAO theory reminds us of the central role that aes-thetic qualities play in aesthetic response.

I should note that one philosopher, Charles Taliaferro, champions both IO (PPR,1990) and IAO (BJA, 1990) theories and argues that their overlap grounds an equivalencebetween the good and the beautiful. I believe the existence of worthy works of art thatlack beauty vitiates his metaphysical proposal, while the criticisms levelled by the authorscanvassed above undercut his version of the IAO thesis.

5. Aesthetic Ideal Observer Theories: The Second Generation

I would like to turn to two more recent assessments of the IAO Theory, both by philos-ophers who attend to the emotional dimension of aesthetic response. In his 1999 paper



‘Aesthetic Objectivity and the Ideal Observer Theory’, Roman Bonzon goes beyondDuncan’s contribution to the ongoing debate by not only taking into account the relationbetween aesthetic and non-aesthetic qualities, but also penetrating farther to consider therelation between the evaluative and the descriptive components of aesthetic qualities.Bonzon concerns himself with thick rather than thin aesthetic properties and argues thatin the end their structure makes an absolutist IAO Theory impossible. The thick vs. thindistinction, owed to anthropologist Clifford Geertz, contrasts evaluative properties thatconvey descriptive content – ‘bold’, ‘funny’, ‘delicate’ and ‘transgressive’ – with proper-ties that carry a valence, express approval or disapproval, but don’t convey any furtherinformation about the nature of their objects – ‘beautiful’, ‘excellent’ and ‘meretricious’.

Bonzon nicely characterizes the impulse towards IAO theories when he says towardsthe start of his paper that objectivism can be resuscitated by considering ‘responses of asubject ideally possessed of faculties which it is thought would endow those responseswith special authority’ (p. 231). In setting up his discussion, Bonzon develops an instanceof the Euthyphro dilemma, applying it to the alternatives (i) having aesthetic value, and(ii) being approved by an ideal observer (p. 233). The dilemma is named after thePlatonic dialogue in which Socrates asks whether pious things are loved by the godsbecause they are pious, or are instead pious because loved by the gods. Thus, thedilemma directs us to ponder the ultimate source of value. Bonzon’s account of thick aes-thetic qualities foregrounds their ‘primitive (e.g., non-analysable) unity of fact and value’(p. 239).8 With this analysis in place, Bonzon argues that IAOs who are required, by theomniscience condition, to be ignorant of aesthetic value facts can only account for usesof aesthetic terms governed by ‘strictly reductive aesthetic principles’ (p. 238). An exam-ple would be a principle grouping together as elegant all works possessing some complexset of non-aesthetic qualities (p. 237). It seems a given that we should reject such patequivalences. Bonzon draws the following conclusion from his analysis of aesthetic con-cepts: ‘the possibility of contradictory responses from equally ideal AO’s is inherent in thedefining presuppositions of ideal observer theories’ (p. 239).

To block Bonzon’s negative assessment of IAO theories, one must challenge hisaccount of the structure of aesthetic concepts. I believe there is a tension between hisposit of a primitive descriptive ⁄ evaluative unity, on the one hand, and his acknowledge-ment that ‘genuine divergence in aesthetic taste’ requires a ‘fully isolable descriptive core’(p. 235). Moreover, Bonzon may have created a straw man in his formulation of thenon-cognitivist position. This worry arises because there seems to be room for a robustmiddle ground between reductionism, on the one hand, and non-cognitivism, on theother, namely a view that takes aesthetic properties to supervene on non-aesthetic baseproperties. But even if we eschew this label in assessing the IAO debate, Bonzon hasgiven us strong reason to attend to the evaluative structure of thick aesthetic concepts.Much turns on this notion. In fact, the ongoing debate between Alan Goldman andJerrold Levinson regarding aesthetic realism turns on a seemingly trivial point – the sepa-rability of descriptive and evaluative components of aesthetic concepts.9

Entering the debate about aesthetic realism would take us far beyond the present topicof Ideal Aesthetic Observers, so let me turn to one last participant in the IAO discussion.Matthew Kieran has developed a virtue theory of aesthetic appreciation, one that identi-fies a mode of non-virtuous appreciation that is influenced by such irrelevant features assnobbery and social status. While Bonzon rejected IAO theories based on claims aboutthe evaluative component of aesthetic concepts, Kieran (BJA 2008) examines the psycho-logical and emotional states that ground our appreciative aesthetic responses and arguesthat the manner in which we acquire such states and dispositions rules out the possibility



that an IAO might participate. Kieran claims that he is investigating the intrapersonal ver-sion of an IAO. He is interested in the aesthetic judgments that each of us might see aris-ing from idealized versions of ourselves. In this regard, his account recalls Peter Railton’sinvestigation of the desires we’d likely retain given full information (Railton 1986).

In section V of his paper, Kieran gives a full and nuanced account of emotion forma-tion, one that recruits insights from the most recent work in this area. This is relevantgiven his assumption that the value of an artwork depends upon the ‘greatness and depthof pleasure afforded’ (p. 279). In discussing the development of our discriminatoryresponses, Kieran is at pains to show that developing some such responses can interferewith the cultivation of others (p. 284). That is, the response set that allows us to appreci-ate some works of art may position us to be immune to the appeals of other works. Theexamples he cites here include Jane Austen vs. Oshima and Hubert Selby Jr. Readerswho derive pleasure from Austen’s refined and observant comedies of manners from theearly nineteenth century are unlikely to be similarly appreciative of the raw and brutaltopics and explicit treatment that give Oshima’s films and Selby’s novels their signaturestyle. This portion of Kieran’s paper provides a much more finely calibrated and convinc-ing account of the possibility that Hospers flagged with the claim that more knowledgecould destroy rather than facilitate aesthetic appreciation (quoted above, p. 4).

A second important point that Kieran develops is the way that our appreciation tracksand owes much to the peculiarities of our emotional and personal history. He says, ‘Muchof the nature, tone, and tenor of our emotional lives is a function of our history’ (p. 289).His section on the emotions is in service of this point. The upshot is that ideal beings can-not follow any of these developmental tracks that result in fixed enthusiasms, preferencesand prejudices. Yet these are what ground our emotional and, ultimately, our aestheticresponses. Thus Kieran concludes that ‘the notion of an ideal appreciation divested of per-sonal idiosyncracies fixing the relative ordering merits of artworks is useless’ (p. 287).

Though Kieran joins the chorus of those who reject the usefulness of an IAO, he isunique in zeroing in on the emotional component of aesthetic response, rather than lin-gering with the circularity worries that accompany the omniscience condition. One coulduse Kieran’s data to undermine the dispassionate clause Firth added to his definition.Kieran’s identification of the intrapersonal case also relates his paper to Jerrold Levinson’sincisive 2002 paper ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste: The Real Problem’. Levinson raises acrucial question: why should ordinary appreciators, happy with the works they currentlyenjoy, try to ‘train up’? What incentive is there to shift their attention to allegedly wor-thier works that would at the outset be more difficult and less pleasing?

Kieran offers a tentative answer to this question when he judges that an IAO cannottell us what works we should like or why. By contrast, Levinson builds an argument toshow that masterpieces recommended by ideal critics represent our ‘aesthetic best bets’ –they’re likely to provide ‘satisfactions ultimately more worth having’ (pp. 233, 234). In afollow-up paper, ‘Artistic Worth and Personal Taste’ (JAAC, 2010), Levinson addressesthe worry that appreciators who follow the advice of ideal critics court inauthenticity.Levinson counters that since we follow different paths towards mature taste, and sincethere are equivalence classes of meritorious works, we needn’t become carbon copies ofone another nor of the critics who guide us.

6. Closing Considerations

Were we to stick with a simple vote, it seems clear that the IAO theory would not pre-vail. The majority of philosophers who have considered this approach do not endorse it



in the end. Yet the persistence of this strand of aesthetic theory illuminates a number ofimportant issues. First, all IO theories investigate a perennial human desire: to know howwe would behave, were we fully informed. This desire has a long tradition in moral phi-losophy.10 The impulse continues in the aesthetic realm, whether in the shape of identi-fying an ideal advisor or configuring improved versions of ourselves. The promisedpayoff is self-knowledge, information about what works we should choose, what workswe should like.

Firth offered up the IO to address a metaethical question; consideration of an IAO directsattention to some parallel questions in aesthetics. In particular, it invites us to ponder thenature of aesthetic response and the prospects for aesthetic realism. I have argued above foran account of aesthetic appreciation that foregrounds the discerning of aesthetic qualitiesrather than the mere delivery of a summary response – a simple thumbs up or thumbs down.To engage in such appreciation, I believe an IAO must have the range of traits and experi-ence specified by Hume.11 Two pressing questions remain, one theoretical – can realism besustained in aesthetics? – the other practical – how can we best use the advice of ideal critics,however they’re construed? The first question turns on whether there might be multipleIAOs and whether their responses could differ. In completing his portrait of ideal critics,Hume allowed for two sorts of ‘blameless differences’ that could cause critics to disagree:differences in temperament, and differences in customs and opinions.12 Alan Goldmanembraces aesthetic non-realism on these grounds, and counsels appreciators to seek criticswhose taste they share. Fleshing out this notion and determining how critics actually clusterin their interpretations and assessments is work that needs doing. But it must be informed byan accurate understanding of the nature of aesthetic qualities and aesthetic response. Thusimportant projects in the future should be to determine just what it is to share taste, andhow we calibrate the differences that inevitably arise among critics and between criticsand those who look to them for advice. Thinking about IAOs does prompt us to revisit andmore fully understand this basic issue.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Sherri Irvin and two anonymous referees for very helpful com-ments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Short Biography

Stephanie Ross is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-St Louis. Shehas written on topics ranging from allusion to landscape aesthetics to artistic style. Hercurrent project investigates how critics aid appreciation.

Notes

* Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, One University Blvd., St Louis, MO63121, USA. Email: [email protected].

1 A similar impulse in aesthetics can be traced to Hume’s much earlier essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, thoughinterpreters differ on whether Hume intended to characterize an ideal being. Bonzon also cites Adam Smith’simpartial spectator as a precursor.2 Kieran labels this the intrapersonal issue.3 This notion is of course complicated by the question of whether various cultures possess the concept of art as weknow it.



4 Actual intentionalists may argue that there is less leeway here than I am suggesting, but even members of thiscamp must acknowledge the possibility of failed intentions; thus there is no strict entailment from artist’s intentionsto possessed properties of the work.5 ‘Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all pre-judice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to befound, is the true standard of taste’ (David Hume 1987: 241). Towards the end of his Essay, Hume introduces twofactors that can cause even ideal critics to diverge in their opinions (see Section 6 below).6 ‘Would Ideal Critics Disagree? Prospects for Realism in Aesthetics’, unpublished manuscript.7 I owe this formulation to Jenefer Robinson.8 He draws on both Wittgenstein and Bernard Williams to establish this point, see pp. 236–7.9 Levinson maintains a realist view by insisting that there is a descriptive core to which disputants advert in com-mon; Goldman instead claims that appreciators who disagree are ascribing different and incompatible aesthetic quali-ties to the work of art in question (see Jerrold Levinson 2001). Levinson refined his position in the paper ‘WhatAre Aesthetic Properties?’ reprinted in Contemplating Art (Oxford, 2006). For Goldman’s view, see Aesthetic Value(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Levinson and Goldman butted heads directly in a JAAC symposium on realism(Vol. 52, No. 3 (1994), pp. 349–56).10 Compare Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator and Firth’s IO to more recent constructions such as Peter Railton’sobjective subjective desire and Michael Smith’s advice model.11 And I believe these should be supplemented by emotional responsiveness and imaginative fluency (see Ross 2008).12 ‘…there still remain two sources of variation, which are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries ofbeauty and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation and blame.The one is the different humours of particular men; the other, the particular manners and opinions of our age andcountry’ (p. 243).

Work Cited

Bonzon, Roman. ‘Aesthetic Objectivity and the Ideal Observer Theory.’ British Journal of Aesthetics 39.3 (1999):230–40.

Carroll, Noel. On Criticism. New York: Routledge, 2009.Duncan, Elmer H. ‘The Ideal Aesthetic Observer: A Second Look.’ Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 29.1

(1970): 47–52.Firth, Roderick. ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12.3 (1952):

317–45.Garner, Richard. ‘Beardsley, Firth, and the Ideal Observer Theory.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27.4

(1967): 618–23.Goldman, Alan. Aesthetic Value. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.——. ‘There are no Aesthetic Principles.’ Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew

Kieran. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. 299–312.Hospers, John. ‘The Ideal Aesthetic Observer.’ British Journal of Aesthetics 2.2 (1962): 99–111.Hume, David. ‘Of the Standard of Taste.’ Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Ed. Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis:

Liberty Classics, 1987. 226–49.Kieran, Matthew. ‘The Vice of Snobbery: Aesthetic Knowledge, Justification, and Virtue in Art Appreciation.’

Philosophical Quarterly 60.239 (2010): 243–63.——. ‘Why Ideal Critics are Not Ideal: Aesthetic Character, Motivation, and Value.’ British Journal of Aesthetics 48.3

(2008), 278–94.Levinson, Jerrold. ‘Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, and Differences of Sensibility.’ Aesthetic Concepts: Essays

after Sibley. Eds. Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 61–80.——. ‘Artistic Worth and Personal Taste.’ Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68.3 (2010): 225–33.——. ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste: The Real Problem.’ Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60.3 (2002): 227–38.——. ‘What are Aesthetic Properties?’ Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2006. 336–54.Railton, Peter. ‘Moral Realism.’ Philosophical Review 95.2 (1986): 163–207.Ross, Stephanie. ‘Humean Critics: Real or Ideal?’ British Journal of Aesthetics 48.1 (2008): 20–8.Sibley, Frank. ‘Aesthetic Concepts.’ The Philosophical Review 68.4 (1949): 421–50.Talliaferro, Charles. ‘The Ideal Aesthetic Observer Revisited.’ British Journal of Aesthetics 30.1 (1990): 123–38.Taliaferro, Charles. ‘Relativizing the Ideal Observer Theory.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49.1 (1990):

123–38.Walton, Kendall. ‘Categories of Art.’ Philosophical Review 79.3 (1970): 334–67.



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