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CAP4-£ ~ ;(C~jYf Gk7/-;:t'-r ~.'i,I.;;'::S i'in,r: e
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1./-':' ;j~::: :;)r;;; 1) -.-. -'-" "'_"_---.. 'I·h(;'~l:f.! it!"'::' .-'.pp:co:·:i_r.l~t·(!}y 3:l~~ !J.L. ,,;.!:r.it1ly.y i.!nc.1 c:.i.vi.J.5.;:H1!s
l:i.r~\:o:.~(1 a!; 1I,:::'s::.iIlCJ or captu<t;:(:u in loc.o~. 0: lld::: 'I.:C"/tal, Cli"'lPt·o:'i,j:l ... t~ly 2) 5 mr~n '.\";!':'.~ lo~-t: tl!iC~~r !.:\.'C:~i. (;.b:c~l'.I:,,;·l:~dH·'~[: lb •• :; the ('!IV.'li~y F):()b;'.bl~· lu-~G ir':':o':.T~·.':-ttil"n J:cCJi1:.:dil~0 thz:i}: L:;tc.
'l'he pr,p li~:t of i.C' p':'n'3:'lin~l C?pt':.:;;.:-d ir.. .L,~o:; (pr('Ji.ri..:1,~..:~ by DIW on J. l:"'clJr'..B,J:Y 19 7:·i) •
I .. j.£,\:: l:'i.lrp:-,:;:1:cC\ to b.~ ;:. r.t.at.!'!:m .. 'ii.l b~' th2" 1:'at!lC~:i; l.!~o of G2.I.-'t.u)'·cc. p£u:~c-nn~l ili LCi~S (~.l J".f;K:ric:«n!;, 1 Ci\n~di.:lJ)) (l~f.:(!l~);.~u::€! 1)
f!:;")·.iC .... C::;;:, t-.l~C·: li::t. c:0n!i~.s1:~d Cof: pcn;onn~l £~r~~:~~. :.:..::: thr-:"yOE!l: .. 2:'.et.'.!_~..:2?: hI j"';.~Q::: r~:::'hcr l:H::l tb::, l:.::.thc.!·:':' Lao,
J"!'":Il:r:" r::J: "Lhi! "t(:;) ln~n \.,~r.~ hel.::!. .in Pi'T cr.nlp!.i in Hc.l~l")5. Hith J.::H.!j:ic<::nr. c:c:p~:uJ:c:(! iil ~~\'H,
'flic PLJ:' lit~{'; di:::' n.:d: ~tV.t:c \".-h~:U:\.:'!·.=- tlwt.i.~ r.)Z;1"!. ·.·.'en:-: ci.Ci:~d. or .!J.lv . .:., C-~= -:";h-;~~:h(,:l:' ~d~(:y : .. r.:: t.r;o r::: rcl~, .. ~::(,J.
TI,,! PIX l:i.~ t is ;.l~~cl:·.:)lct.~, r::;"i:mpl('~ 0f. perRo .. !)':!l n·:,-{,; 0:\ I.:.:hi.s Ii::.\: a=-~ ('.11c.:~.(":~.:.:;;(l (Er,.;l:;~-.;t:.:t:(.?·.!-; ;:·,6).
On 3 Octc.·be!." 1967, t.hc Pc."It.h·:rt. L~o Rftiiio 11l1n~nflCecl thht ·b.:o·bw~r'lt, l'/ Hay and 15 S(~p·~:.:-,\be:: 1~·Fj7 th!'"!y '1.(.:C.ptUl:c:l ab..::ut n. c1'.1ze:l U. 3. pilots. II
C;'l 13 Ai':-il. 19'1], Princo f,oc'i.')l"!rm.o\.w.:mg G1:at.c~, iil an inb~;·v::.f~·"~ \:i th iJ. s'tI'C!iH.nh ·c("lrrc~po:icle!"t., th1.1t U, fj. P\~':; l:cc..::ivcd. hmni:~j~:: cnro. C!nd hOld been tc.i:~n to s:1.fe pJ..::-.C2:;,
In July 19'J)', ~ot.h ~·jjr;.trC'.!:l' r:tab.:<1 ~"rli.: ""!lcn th'2 Uni·t'~!5. St:.1..t..:'~: ~·tOL .• t: \:.:.'1e: bu:r:biJ!tj' ~.n l.~o;;., t.l".~ !'~.;,;!" .. ::'f:. r.~o \·~(.>uld pro ..... ic1e
.il li:·t. (.;£ U.s. l'h"s.
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In il 2 F~b:!:u.[\r.y 1972 i!Jtcr\'i::;·,·: ",i~}l ':n tJ;·,:.:!riev:1, SOUL PhcU7ar.y stilteD. tl~.:it "SOh1C tc,IH; (J): I'd :.;~n.::rs'l ~·!c\i.·e b~·d.l1£" he] c1 by the Pnt-het L?o (the f:'r·c:).::h [.·IH~.s("; u::icd \ni~ "q\.\'::::lq~l!~5 di;:1:!.5.1!C:!''').
F'J\OlO BHOl\DC.l~S'J·S . -_._--------In nddition, Rilc1.i,o Pclthet L~o bro~:<1Cii.5ts helve nlac.l~
r.epc .. ,ted el,d.ll"~; of dm-minc; U.S. tlil:l:!n:f:t (:I.,-1G3 cS 0); 7 In!lUil:'Y 1973) (Enclosure 7). 'T-hi!:. \','0\11d indicatc= fjomc:~ QC!cotll1"!.:5.n'J 0:: t.he: pr::r!:;ol"mel. invol\'~c1 could ))';! mnuc. .
Cf'J\SiI SI'l'BS
ThCl"C ar~ il.pp):o:d.mCl~cely 300 crash si ~..:'-'~ in Lao:>, th~ majol"ity of thrc:sc along t.he infil"\;l'i.!tion corridCll:s z.!ld adjl:cE:nt to. tho:! m:1Z arc(J. De<:U\lCe of Ule. prcGcncc cf nOJ,'th V.:i.ctnams!;;c forces, it can be rel!son~bJ..i'· HSr.U:llcd that the HortJ, Vi(~t.JHl.mCSC \-10\11(.1 have som(;!: kno\"lcdse on t.be fi!tc of wi .... :;·illc.;/cnp-:.:ured personnel in these areas ..
5'l'l\'i'T:-':;'j'1"{"!·1'.T. ~11".'or.17IRY 0f-' LISTS -----,,---The. Fr.£" ZlcknCl\·ll".dgc on1l' 9 ATr,eric.uns on their J. FebrlliJry
19~/3 lict".. This r(=!:pn~f;Cllt5 2.5t of the Pi·?/J·:illi p2l.:5011ncl in L~os. In c01"ltr(l~·t, tllc DUV list rcprcsC!!'.b: t15~ Dnc1 the:.: I"'HG list repr.cscmt! 20t; of the l'N/HIA pcrsonllC)l.
The PLF li~t cloer. not represent U.S. PN',s captured by the? l'ilthe·i:. Lao.
There is cvic1ence thnt the l'aV!1ct Lao h.:tvc information on ccli;t:ured/n\issing u. s .... personnel anc.l shot"!oJ.c1 be able to provide a llst of eli\'C:! U. S. l'~·l' s . Zlnd iniorr,\at.ioJl on the 'fute of many others.
'l'he North ViCt.'IN,!:.~se, bCCil:USC! of th~ir pl·e.~cnee in. part!; or Laos, should hev..:! more inform<Jtion th4l11 pn.1vic1ed to date on Cl.tptur.ec1/mizsing U. s. personnel. - InfClrr.mtion from the fiatlict Lno regaroiilCJ cc1ptlu:cd/r',it.;sing U.S. pel:scnilc:d r.~ay be forthcor:!ing \"iith II c.:f::~::;crirc N: c~!>~.atioi1 0': U.s. borilbing in Inos.
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1; BI::DIHGI:n I HENP.1 ,'. i:Dl~l\Cr:, El~N:l~~;'l' C.
. 13U'l'CHBil., JlICK f.! •
GOTNEH, llOHF.R'L' h.
L}:ONARD, Eiito:l'I..r.D ~': .
* LCNG, STEPHBN G.
l1n:fTI>: , Sf.!-l
OPPEL, r..r,OYD
RIESS, elf 1\!l!.)];S 1".
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SEnVICi"': IHCli/Et~'r n,!I!l'B ----_. ._ .. -.-----
USN 22 HOV 69
CIV 21 ~lllY G!;
USAF 24 Hl~H 71
USJ\F 3 PEB 71
USAT:' 31 HI\Y GO
USh" 28 FIlB 69
crv 27. oc'r 72
l:'ORE~G~ HA?ION1~r.l 27 CCT 72
US~.F 24 DEC 72
USII" ~3 ]\pn, 60
f:Kno';~'n to have h~C!1 Ci~ptUl-Cc.1 in Lao!:> bu~: \'leJ:C subf::cquent.ly confirmed "as having been moved to No::th Victl1ilm .
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FILE R::C01W SUMMARY
5 E RVI CE / RAN I( -=.U=..S N-,' I-.:L:..:T ___ _
DATe OF INCIDENT 13 l·lorch 1971
COUNmy Laos -.:::::..::.::..-----
PP. 0 V INC C --,S"al1rwi\~v~"""n!1~ ___ ~_
2. INFOR.\~\TION REGARDING THE ABOVE NAIlED INDIVIDUAL: Subject's aircraft tiaS struck by ground fire. Ejection and a good
chute were observed and voice contact \o!as subsequently established
with subject on the ground, who reported having a broken ar~ a:nc~u~ __
leg. Snbiect's oosition \·.'as approximo?tely 6 km 'south of Tavouac
village. At about 1230 local time subject broadcast, "Get me' out
no .... " they are here." No fUrther transmlr:sions \,'ere heC'lrd. 01 the follO\-1ing duy SAR fo~:ces noted thut the parachute had been moved.
3. INFORHATION PROVIDED BY THe· OlllER SIDE ON THE ABOVE NAt·IED WDIVIDUAL
NOT APPLICI\BLE
4. RI:O't.UtK5 on. ADtHT,IOi.j:\T, Co:.:\lC~"TS (:.5 Arpr.Ol)RIA"iE)
Subject's lli.rcr.aft \~·ar. nn 1I.-7F.. No other. pel:sonncl '·.'ere involved
in thi.~ incident.
._-_._---------.-_-..:._, ___ c ____ .. __ . ___ .. _--'-· __________ . __
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. r:ILt: RECO[m SUMIVIARY
1. NAME DEBRUIN, Eugene H.
SERVICE / r.ANK Civilian
DATE Of INCID~NTS September 196 3
COUNTI!yL ="' • .::0.::5 ________ _
PROVINCE Savannakhet
~ .".
2. INfOJ1)l~TION REGARDING TIlE ABOVE NAJ.IEJi INDIVIDUAL:
Subject was the pilot of a C-46 aircraft that was do\·mcd 7 km ,';est
of Tchepone. 1 Chinese and 3 Thid. personnel ''''ere also aboard the
---Ri.rcraft
3. INFOru,IATION PROVIDl:D BY .TIIE .OTIIER SIDE ON 'J1iE ABOVE NAJ.IED INDIVIDUAL
A photograph (see attachment) has been released with the following
caption" ... a C-46 of the nir 1\rncrica Company to/as shot dOl"'n nnd the
cre\\' of five ,'rere captured." The five cre","membcrs are sho''''n and
identified by ·npme.
4. Jlli.W:I:S Olt ADDITIONAL CO:,:-:I:~l'S (AS APPI:OI'ItIATE)
Since confincrr.bnt, subj(-~ct r.tny ha\'e groHn a dark red beard.
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FILE RECO!W SUMMARY
l.NAME HRDLICKA, D.1vid L.
SERVICE / RANI( USIIF leapt
DATE OF INCIDENT 18 flay 19G5
COUI~'fI!Y _...;L"'ae:o"'s'-_____ ~
PROVINCE Houa Phan
2. INI'ORHATlO~ REGhROING THE ABOVE NAJoIED INDIVIDUAL: Subject I ~ aircraft ""as shot dOh'n about 15 kin east-southeast of
fiam Neuq. Vi llaoers wer.e· seen rolling up the parachute and c:1')oearc:d
wa lki nq. ~~.~ay." ~-"i"t"h,--,s=-u"b"-,j-"ec>c"t,,.,--________ -,-____________ _
3. INFORJ.IATION PROVIDED BY TilE OTIlER SIDE O~ TIlE ABOVE NAl-;ED INDIVIDUAL
A photograph of subject was relensed by the Pathet Lao. In addition
a recording a.llegedly made by subject requesting pardon and release
from Prince SO\lphanouvong \'las broadcast on 22 l-1ay 1966.
' ..
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r .. m·t,'JI.i~S Oi~ AD~J1·IO~j.l.,t CO}r·I~"iS (/.$ Al'!'!:Cp:tIATr;) •
S\.lbjc.ct~s ~i!Crilft type w~s an F-lOS.
----F_QL!;'h.o..tQcrs:r·11-Lc:l:~u_u.:r.aC'l~~ . .l~
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___ . __ . ___________ . __ .... ___ ..... __ . ........ _ ..... ----_ .. --_. ____ .0.-_._ .. ---_.-------
. -----.-. ···----·------i------··· -.- --.--... --... -- -.--.... --.--- ----.------'-.----.. ------. , . _______ -·_0. __ - _. ___ .. _______ ... _ ......... :. _ . _______ .. _________________ ._
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llJNl\, Curter P. ., of
l.NAME
SEIIVICE/RANK USAF/r.t Col.
DATE OF INCIDENT 10 H~rch 1969
i
r COUNTRY _:::L:::":::0:::5'-______ _
PROVINCE Savannokhet
2. INFORJ.!ATION REGARDING TilE ABOVE NAl-:W INDIVIDUAL:
3.
4.
Subjec_t's aircraft \vas hit by gro\lnd fire, and the blo cre\.;rmcn
bailed out at 1218 local time. The aircraft r-oilet, \"he was sub-
sequcntly recovered, sa\\' subject reach the ground safely abou f.: 1.5
km south of Ban Kok Nak village and move into protective cover •. 0- __ 0'0__ •
Subject retained voice contact vlith SAR forces 'bv radio unt),l 1425
hours, at '1hich time the aircrClft pilot heard ,enemy troops close
to the 'position \-· .. here hOe believed subject \-las hiding.
, I
INFOrJ·IATIO~ PROYIDED BY TIlE OTlIER SIDE ON TIlE ABOVE NA.'tED INDIVIDUAL
NOT ApPLICABLE
I l~Ef'.ll\JtKS OR Al.lIHTIO:'AL Cm~!!;~:rs (AS Arl'r.OI'RIATE)
o ! • Subject's aircraft \o!;i!> il.n i-"'-·a)' The recovered pilnt was Cc:pt A. P .
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'" filE RECORD SUMMARY
l.NAt.lE SHELTON, Charles E.
SERVICE I RANI( USAF leapt
DATE OF IN(;IDENT 29 April 1965
COUNTRY _L=D=O=S=-____________ __
PROVINCE Houa Philn
( ;;;:;0·:.:~::;~::~:!:;~~;~. . / .... ,;
! .~:~ ~~i . !1 ',' .
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2. INFOPJ·L\TIOH REGARDI~G THE ABOVE NAI·IED INDIVIDUAL:
Subject' 5 aircraft was shot dO\1n by ground fire. He ejected
successfully and a good p'arachut~ was ohservf::d. Radio contact
was established \·Tith subject on the ground about 15 km erst-north~G.s L .of SaT,\ i'C!ua.
I 3. INFOIU-IATlOII PROVIDED BY TIlE OTHER SIDE ON THo ABOVE W,)oIED mDIVIDUAL
I A villager witnessed the crash and observed the capture and
arrest. of subject by pathct Lao forcqf..
4. \ P.L1·L\I:I:S OR ADDlTjO~:t,L CC:·NEM'S ('\S APPROP!:IATE) . .
Sl.1bjcct l s ai.rcrilft type \-laS tin RF-IOIC .
. ---~------.-----.---------------
,.
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D~(Uf;J16 Hildie. Pd.hct 1.ao ((C.lc!:do:-stiuc:)) in L~o to Lao::; ¢'!i.\~ G!.;r' 1 Dc:c 1'2 D
(('l'Ci:t)) ACC:C1rdi:l(~ tor) 1'3.')L, o.s l·'·r-Or.tNl enrlic:r, 0:-1 the nitht of 11 Novenbe:r to the cornillG of l~ Jiov<:u'vcr tllz (o.rn,'~d fo::.'c:cs Nld people l(f LU:;'n& rrn'l.H\llr, lc.\.U1chccl f\ !:·ur·pdl:c c.rt.illc!.-y t:.t"l.n.::l: 0:1 t;:~ LU.a!I[; FJ'~brulG Airfic.'lci, tlc;;;;tro~!in~.: nine U.S, pirt'.tic nircraft. All c.c.ditiona.1 :rcport indicB.tc:s thr~t. the f,.l";::C·u. ~"l·cr.:r· l'Jld p~ople d~l:>!.rcy"d .( • .'"lother U.S. plene on the ,!;f'~C e.G.)'. All tc,ld, th~ Lr;,"-:G for'c-::!:; I~d pcc.plc c1cstl'Oj'c:d 10 U.S. pira1.;ie pl.e."1~s, thus raisinG t}}r,! )l\u;:ber of U.S, aircraft sho't d.(l,m or clcst-royeel frou\ 11 1';1:1:1 1964 to 19 H"O"'~lllbcr 1972 to 2,llj3. ~l¢"l) JIP/VIOLT:.:T:?f.:/?S V:1/{t642Z Dcc
Redio Pathct 1,(\0 {CluH'lCStill'::} in Lao tC1 Leos 0345 CH1' 3 J"nn 13 D
(Excer·pt)· -.J\ccordini; tCl KPr" em 1.9 lJeccll,b~l' 1972 the r,\ICl1~ Prc.bane:;: (\l"Iiied i'orc!'s CIld p!:oplc ntt;~j:t:c1. ~he LuanG Prabi.l.n& c.ir!'icld c.."'ld o.e:stl'oyed five T· 28 1 S Iil1c'1. c('.rc;v plc':)I~s', Cn' 19 Decelr,bel' thc Boriths .. n::>£lY l1.\'med fOl'CCD end people e.J.SCJ cestroycel one U.S. hclicortcr at Phc.. IoUJl "'hil" it \ros droppinG U.S.-fD!;tC'.rcU' f;f'ie~; c;lld eot:I:!I.!l.lldoa in the aretl-. Fourteen enemy troopn 'W"erC": e.1zo kf.L1e:d on the spot. In add:ttio:l to annihilatinc 211 ene:-r:v'" troops 11'1 theiJ: al,:\a'.c);,s o..:.t:'.inst the C1:.c:t:y pc:.ttions in Pa1~ Seng fro:n 14 to 20 D~cc .. '!.bc.r, th~ Dolo·{cJ;t. f'l'r.JNl ~orc.,s a..'1d people also shotdo\ffi thrc~ U.S. l'il'c.te pl£'J1CS on 1:5 !Jecl:.ocbcr. It \:£"S also reportcd that elO 1 r.:.nd 20 ncc~nibel' the S&vtumc-~bct ar.r.';d. ~(l:{'C('S Ll.ll<11',:!C1p1e ·c.h:o shot do~m fo\:r U.S. T-28 1 s in PhaJ.c.n-:: district.
J.(!co:r.d~.n6 to KPL, Be nportcd earlier on 22 December the al'r.ted forces and people in }:i)al.~.ou""f1e Prov"incc shot a£ U.:). pi.ratc hclicC1pt.cl'S ",hUe they ""ere c!ro~vi.ll3: cor.zlLndos 1.11 the Phr.· Hom cree. tn the provi.nee. In (!.d,Ution tl) Itut tine 38 (;llcrr.y tr("'':Jpn out of actioll, the lJ1CJl"";lllOUUne nrmcd forces olld peop1c wso dcs"l.royc<l one heli.covtcr.
'l"herefo::c I fz·o::: 17 )':I:Y 19611 t.o 22 D(':cC!lnbel' 1972 our artIe" forces on:::i. P~OIJlc shot clo~n 0:' destr(lJ!t!~ 01) th~ Sl'OunU 2,l.15·{ U.S. plane:;.
P.a.thct I.~o (1:1'5) (C;llmdcstillc) in La.o to R!!dio Pethct Lao 0100 ti,fl' '"( In.,., 73 J)
('r(,l;~) Accc:rclirlC to }Q~L, on 27 D~cCTolbcr 1972 the Sam Ucua c.rD:!U forces and p\~OPl.C, ur.:I.n,: int'nnll-Y riflf:5, shot dcn.'ll 0. U.S, helicolJtcr 1n the 1-:(.11:1 l,!\t~n (l.1'co. o.:lli).1i:: it 'W"uc droppinG enCioV'" spic:;. Thercforc. from l'{ r~r.y 196~ to 30 Dc:ccr;;.be.: 191~ our llrr..cd rc.l'CC~ Wlcl !'cCll,le throuGhout the eoc..ntl,)' have shot; dOl::! or dC3tro:,-cd on the Gl'cu..,d ~ ,11?3 u. S. p1NtoS.
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FO~ "1m lRAl. GA Ylt::~, 1NFO lrENI;;I<Alo WEYAND (PAss·:'ro ·f'Ui~~,- ... UO(lIiAIW ANO AMUA:iSADOR eUN~fR)FkO" AD~lHAI. "ook~~ CJCS 5~f/US D'l.IVf~ UPON R~CEIPT SU~JI u~ ~~IS (v, ReF: COHUSHACV 171~2~Z MAR 7J
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1, IN REGARD TO DRV ~~~~OSALS DtSCUSS~D ~lTk HE E£~LI~n TUOA, THE I.If>lITt::U STATI:.~ 1'0SITION 15 AS fULloOWSI "THE US tllli. CO/'lI"l;t:TE lliE ~lTHU~AWAI.. OF ITS MILITAWY FOWCES ~WOM SOUl" VlerNAM IH 'CCORDAH~E' ~lTH THE TERMS OF T/'IE AG~E~MENT A~D COINCIUE~T wIT~ THE NeLtASE OF &1..1.., ~f'E4T ALL A/'II:.~l~A~ PRISUNERS HELD THNUU~HOUT INDOCHINA." 2. UO NOT COM/'IENC~ ~ITHORA~AI.. OF TH~ ~UU~TH INCREMENT UNTIL THE FOLLVWlNG TkO CONUITIONS A~E HETI ll) uS HA~ ~~~N P~OVIUEU wlTH A CUMPl.ETE loIST Or Alolo I.IS PH'~ INCLUDING THUSE I1E1.0 IH THE" PATH!:.T L.AO; AS h:f.L.1.. AS 11'11:. ilME AI/D l"L.hCE OF I<EI.EASI:.. (2l THE FIRST GRUUP aF PM'S HAYE ~EEN PHYSICAL.l.Y TRANSF~RK~O TO 1.1$ CUSTODY. J, CTS' HHE~ THE CONOITIUNS UF P'~AGkAPH 2. ARE /'lET ANU ASSUMIN~ TH~ PIR5T GRDUI" OF PW'S WILL NOW Sf RELEASED ON MAWCk 2~, I:.X~CUTE ~IT~UHAWAL AS FUloLOWS 'NVMS~R5 API"RUXIMATE)
2:; MARCH 411111 ., 2ti /'IARCI'I CBB ." 27 IURC" U8I!I
28 ~A~CH Z~~9 " 4,. IF 01FFlcULTlEs AR%~~ DUHING TH~ P~OCfSS OF ~~loeASE, T~EH C~ASE·AI.l. wITHU~AWA~S UNT1L OTHtkHISt INSTRUCT~D, ~AKM REGAROS :~ ." . ST •• , 114eal
PA~E 1 " LIHIT CIST TO J COpy BY HAHE DELIVER IN SEALED ENVELOPE NUHBER COPIES MRC CAC NNNN
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON. D.C. lO)O\
C-3,293/DI-6
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
-SUBJECT: Briefing on Mistrea~ment/Torture of U.S. PWs (U)
1. With the return of the last increment of U.S. PWs,
information about mistreatment will inevitably come to light as the returnees, until now restrained by the presence of their fellows in North Vietnam, feel·more free to make statements. Some leakage has already occurred. In
a6dition increasing demands for information will come from
the press. In order to prepare for the ·forthcoming situ
ation it is essential that ASD(PA) be informed in these
matters.
2. ., Accor61ngly, Dr. Roger E. Shields, Assistant to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Affairs), has requested that DIA provide a briefing on a
close hold basis concerning the mistreatment and torture
of U.S. ?WS to the following:
a. Mr. Jerry W. Friedheim, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs).
b. Major General Daniel James, USAF, Acting Principal
Deputy ASSistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
3. (U) Unless directed otherWise, DIA will provide the briefing requested by Dr. Shields. .
cc: Director, Joint Staff
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.,....,. "-" " DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON. D.C. 2.0)0\
8 1 MAli 1973
S-3,284/DI-6
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Information Pertaining to PW/MIA Situation in Laos
1. Enclosure 1 is a copy of a paper prepared in response to a request by Dr. R. E. Shields, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs. . . ...•
2. Dr. Shields stated that this paper would be forwarded to Secretary Richardson for his information. Enclosure 1 is an update of an earlier version ~repared for Dr. Kissinger on 6 February 1973. A copy of the 6 February paper is provided as enclosure 2.
3. The above information has been provided to the Secretary of Defense.
2 Enclosures 1. Information Pertaining
to PW/MIA Situation in Laos • I 1 Oy
2. Talking Paper, 6 Feb 73 (U) 1 Cy
cc: Director, Joint Staff
....
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JOHtl R. DEANE. Jr. lieutenant aeneral USA I .•
Acting Dir.cto~,....-·
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INFORMATION PCRTAINING TO P~fHIA SI'l'UATION IN LAOS
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
-.. ,
. ~ :':l:;;~:F'::.j~· . . ..;,..':~.~'t.;; ::":":.~.
A "Patriotic Lao Front (l'L~') List" of 10 personnel
cllptured in La08 WM provided by the DltY on 1 .February .... J..
1973; .--- '
List purported .t'~. be' a Dtntement
Lao of captured personnel ~!i~~iI.~G
1 cannd;i~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The' "PLY List" is incotlplet'e,'
, the' Pathet to commetl't
• Furthe'r
" on~d if th~ list VQ~ compl~te,'
Lao spokesman, Soth Ph_trasy, declined
on the: number of PlIs being detained,
Th~·"l'Lr LiBt" of 10 ~ws repre~ents·2,5~ ~f th~
PH/MIt. personnel in LaOB, In contrast, the' DllV
11B~·repreBents 45% und t~e ~RG list represents
20~ of the 1'W/HIA persutlnel, 1~ their respective
area's.
PATHET 'LAO STATEMENTS ANn KNOHLEDCE OF US 1''1' S· .j .
In a 16 Fehr'uary 1.973 ·interview,...:itl: Vientiane, Soth ..
Phetrasy 8tate~ that the Pathe~ Lao leadership had
a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they
·were beltlg held. PW. captured in La08, h~ said,
would b~ returned in LaoG, He ~ould not ~rovide any
de tails "
'.
"
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-Previous mention of US PWs held in LnOD included a
statement by Prince Souphanouvon& on 13 April .1971
that US PWs recei~ed humane care and had been taken
to safe places. On 2 February 1971 50th Phatrasy
commented that "so~c tens of prisoners" were being
held by the rathet Lao (the French phrnse used was
"quelques dixaines. ")
The'· 'Pathet Lao have mad.e 'repeated claials of downing
many US aircraft. A 5 March 1973 broadcast reported
that, since 1964, ~ US aircraft had been shot down
or destroyed over Laos. This would indicate enemy·
ability to account for some 0,£ the l'ers~nnel i?vo~ved. , ...•.
Th~reare approxima~e~~ 300 crash ~ites in Laos.'
Since most of the' c'rash Bites':are within enetl!y-held
territory, Americnn teams may' not be permitted in
these areas to search for remainR and wreckage. Row
e~er, since many of these 'crash ~ites are along th~ .
infiltration corridors and sre adjacent to the DMZ,
it can be reasonably asaumed that, due to th~ presence
of North Vietnamese troops, Uanoi could provide in
formation on the fste of some of the MIA/PW personnel
lost in these aress.
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
SUMMARY
The cease-fire agreement, signed in Vienti'ane 'on
21 February 1973, provided for the exchange of
prisoners. Article 5 states that all captured person
nel, regardless of nationslity, will be released and
provide~ for an accounting of those personnel missing
in-action. The release of, all P~s is to take place
no later than 60 dllYs after the elltablishment of a '
Provisl~nal Nationsl Union Government. According to
th~ 'terma of th~ agreement, th~ Provisional Government
sho'uld be' implemented withi'n 30 days of th~ signing. ", .
,." . : ...
The'''PLF List," prov1.ded on 1 Feb'ruary 1973; does not
represent US PWs csptured by the Pathet Lao.
There il -evidence that the' Pathet' Lao liave information
on eaptured/miasirig US personnel and should be able'
to provide a list of alive US PWs, in addition to in
formation on the fate of 'many others.
2
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the' North' VietnQIi\~.se. because of thefr prcf;ence 'in parts of Laos. sholllrl hhV'·. more, information con captured/misBins as rer~onn~l than thae provi&ed to date.'
Since 'the cease-fire aGree~ent vas signed, th~re has been no out~llrd procrec~ t"ward acquiring either 11
list of captured and de&d US servicemen in Laos or obtJlinin& their relen'Ge,'
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Thora oro tlp,)ro:;i.~\:!\I;':o:ly :::S() u. s. 1:\111 t<:lry and 01 v11ians
li3tou IllJ r.,i ~;~in~1 (,r c;,,':.\.:~,r.w\ in :':iO:l. Cf thilJ total, D.i'proxi~1Itely
215 1~'3n \lerc loo!: uncl:)~ ,~u:::~ c:h'c;l1",~;l:enca3 that tJ1C onarry probably
hag in fOrT.I;).\:.ion r,~tJilr(:5, "'~' th·::!)· f'lte.
'''h~ I'1.1: Iig\:. of 1.0 'ptl):3M.nel cllpt\1rad .in L,!03 (provided by····./.'
D:\V 0:\ 1. l:'c~r~;ary 1~73).
X,:i.,lt p·.~-,,}o:: '.:.,(1 t·.f') ;"() ,"} I':t:ltc:urmt by the ?o'I.th<':t t,ao • ,
of capt:.lr'.!(! l'~,rool1;.~l .1.!: :,,:;,~).'; "J )\,"TIG1:ic::ms, 1 CanaJian) (l,llclon\:ro 1:.
lioH<J'1C::, ,-:,,:.:- l:i.f,t Gon:ii:;tccl of personnel £~"t\l£:..<l..Ex.
l:ho ::cE!l~~!:.I~~':;'~~~; ;.r. L:.O>l 1:;;tha:c thl'.n th3 Pathet !-110.
1''=>\1):: ~Jt ,:i1!l t,,:',n l,nn \'ere he ld in T'~i cat;}s in
1;;'Inoi ... ·itll ;::;:("',rs.c!,:n~ c:.:p\;·"l:~d in mm.
:"ho .';,c' 1:1.:':; :;j.el !lot st:tto ~lhctllQr thn:30 rn~n warl:! Oal'.t1
o.r alive, (.r whet:h:-;r th"y .. T.1l to be relcnsGd.
'rho l'r .. :~ 15.:;,: :I.:; in:::o~lplcte. E:(lll':lples of personnel
not on this list nl,"C< cncj.o3ccl (:::nclo!luros 2-6) • ... ~#
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On 3 rJr::tol:HH' lS~.7" th<! "<Ithet r.no Jl.nrlio lI.nnour,cad that
l,)ett'lcen 17 H1~~· anl~ iG ~'C:l·tm·,~b.'r l!)G 7 they "capt\lr,,<l a!'out a
dozen . ~. S. pi lot!:. • ,
- 0:1 13 "pril 1~71, ~·rinc.!l Souphano\\vonq statat1. in'illl
intcrvio'''' with 11 .C;;·~u,~l:':l C<"r1:o3pontient •. that U.S. 'PH's rocaivod
hum1.LllC care a;'\~l h<1.u bet.:"} \;Zlkca,. to anfe places.
States a list
rn July 197,1., ~!(lth Phct.ra~y :lta.tot' that \/hem tho' united
stops the bo:;.bi·ng in r.nos, the Pathot Lao would provide
of u.n. P'rI's.
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In ~dnition, ::·~':~l1.~.(.1 ·~\T~·.~··')~ ,;",10:: );.~··::7";(k·:.' .~·.~l hi'.'\.'~ ';'Ind,o!
, • 1 l .. :~..... ~ '. ~~.. -.' .. - ...... ,', (2.,.""'} ;.::; ~/; 7 ~j~';.n'u\·'J::V
rc:.p'3etea c n _'!"I~ or. ,- .. I ••• ;·n.~: ... ~ \;, .. :, ..... : .. '~ ...... -. .,
1973) (l'nr.10s'.l=l~ 7). ·'·ld.:, ::,)'"1,,, :.:,:<:\1.cc·.:·:. !.".,,'.', r.\~'.::·;llt'.tin~ of th<:l
p:!::!':lonn~l in\'(~l\'(<<1 r;[J·,~J.cl i::'; ::,:~r.;;':
C~!\i.'.l SIT::~. ----ThorG are ,,:p;?!~(';::il::;:.d:J~),y ~··'j~1 (;~:t""'.:~ .:;) .:~.;:~ ~.n 1",.~:{')~, i.:..'"!~
-,. rl.·ty c'o t-·r. r '·' "ll"""J "'·1,," ;.\i::i····· .. ···: r ··· .~ ... , ........ ': ... ;.~ ...... ,: :.'.·,1d .·~,~.;,I.'.r.·~"'.nt ::.""JO 'J.: l •. ~ •• '·. c.;. •• ,~.~ l,...,',._ .1·, •. _. , .... \. .•... ~ _ .. r ... ~
to t.h~ l):·~Z n1."~". U·· . .!C.:\H~".:'. ~2 1;~~ .. ~ ~. I~:i;:" :'--; ::..: .::;:':\.~\ \f:L~i:.r...~.\;- .. :;~·:.~
f~rci:!!lt it Clln. b~; r~-.:~:()n:.:.;:'.'· .. ' .:::-:: ... ' .::': ; ... ~ .... ;:.:-·'.1 \.:".: ... :;';-! '::ltt·r~.rj':!~~~aa
\'10\11,1. hnv~ GOH·.~ kn(/ .. l) . .:;"":r1gc, C·:'I 'c.!'l~' :,~::.;:.':' : .. :: I;:i.t.;~·.:r .... c!/c:~p·~ur~d
pl?rso:'''1n~l in. thu!Je (l=-(~ll:J.
ST;\. .. .:"II!':~'IC]\.L ~U1·~'~,7\.~~'{ .:;~,l !;r::~~·:.·~ -------_._--_ .. _._._ .. _., ..
. -. ';.\ho PI.!'" ncl~n:::·,':'.:~(l~'!(;". 0:·,1y ~-; ; .. ~:I\·~.~;!.··· :n:'" ~':i'l ·;;~·!:·:!.:r: 1 'Pr:-br.~lc-.r}·
• .... J...
1973 li~·t. 'llhis l~.;~.~:ct;~r.n't:i·; ~.:}~:. :)~ t:.:: ·,'7:/·::r:,. :~~ll:::('r~1:l~1 :tn Jlr"'()~.
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:::n CO-~ltra~t, t;.\:n DJ~V lJ.i.:t. l.·,::~?::\-::::·~·· .. "~.'i ';r: : .. , tJ::)::~ 'U.· .. 1 pr:·~; li!'Jt r(,:;·}::>r~."3cnt~
nl\ of t.ne Pilj:1Il\ p~rcon11:~1 .•
-rho PLF list. (~O~S rl~t ,;c=!:I~:O:;(;\it: ~.f .. ';~ P~~'!'l c~p'c\.\r3tl by the!
Pathat Lao.
T~~rc in. evicl.~nc:t ·t.~'t!!t -:;~-:..,~ l'ct'~::~t. T..:H\ hr: ... ·(':. ).l",forrl,n:tlcn on
cllpt.ured/rnill:\itlg t1. S. pcrsom:Ql ;,wJ ol.~'~:J.d ~:'f~ :~blo '.;0 provide 3.
list of olive U.S. l'i"'S (,roc1 infc·r,··,".I'.:i.(·.'·: cm l.:l~:~ i:nCo of. In:my ollie::".
Tho !lort."1 Vi-:.cnnr.::l&':I, b~C:i).;.\:;·= (,{ Owl.': prclicncu in p.:'Irt:J 0:: .-.
L:l.09, should hav"" r.cre 1nfo~:rll.\t~.r.'i\ th~.!\ prc)'.1ic::t1 t(\ cata en
capturad/:nissing U.f,. per:J{>llnel.
InfornlL\tiorl from tl~c t'ntl:;:-.\; r,(:o r,-uCJnrtli1l9 <'::lptl.!rr.c.v~l!J!Jinl'J
U.S. perscmnel l::ay b:l' f:ort~\;:()!:lil·.g "'ith n c.;n:;~fir.e or cG!isntion cf
u. s. bOl'i\bing in laos.
..... - ....... -~. --' ,'. •• •• ......... 1· .. • ...... - ................ --... ••• • ......... " •• 4'" .., •. ,0, •• _ ........ __ ._._ ................ . ..
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\I M::-: ~ ;~!\V:( C~: I:~ CI !')t:::T -- ._-----
,. 11: m:;OINGr:H t lI1':~l ".¥ J. U!1H 22 NOV l
"';~!,!1\CEt r:~~lE~';" c. Cl'! 21 ni\Y
IIU'rCIli:n, JAC;-, H. lJS,'" 24 :t~\R
GOTL1i:TI, I~O:3r!'\:r' i\. U5r.F 3 r'~n
LCu?l,,\j(n t r:j)~·i7\ T·:I) '., " . ~1;;t;!:" 31 ! 1" '{
f: to:~G, ~fl';:T':~!::!T r.. \.T.'~:\P 2C n:n
~·!~'l·:r I ;.: , SN·l C!,V 27 OCT
I)PPr:r" , L!,OYD FO;';':IC:1 W\'!'I0:·1:\::' 27 ('C'r
R!::R!j , C!!.'\P.!..~:n ):' . ttS!'iP 24 DBC
·~Tlf;C!!Ea, \.~;'. It.' ;.~:l. !'!')P,;~!~ l.J~U\F 13 ;\t>a
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71
71
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!)~lt~-::lt) Hali,) ~:\~'.V~::!): :t1~IO {(Cl(;.';j:.·:::~. ~-.i:l.!») in J.!l.O to 1£09 ~!115 G:~ 1 :.";(': 'I'! .,
«Tl'!xt» Ac~ . .::r:',H;: ;:0 rr:" ,",', ",,. ':.J:::(,";. (::I~'l1"r, (';:'1 tho nir,~i; of 11 :!over,f~~r t" t~e r-~1':11:>~ ,,;' ~ .:' :'<;""."':, ,'::l' '~' •• : : :",:.~<1 t·"l·C~.~ 1l:1<l. people e>f L"r.:n:t Pra.bnn,; In\l:lche-d r'. n·":-1.~·\·:· .. ·.L·:~::!:;.·.::·J' !:'~-.: ,~ .. :;.-. on t~l:: L\.\~ .. '!'J'~ ~\r.l:.b:lr,~ hirticld, c.'1c:;tro:tir.:; :~l:t:: .:':'"'-' I.;.:.::;·.l~ !'d."~·;:-.!;;~ .• Ail c(1dltiO!lcl rC'f10rt intier .. tc!: trH.\t t.hc :!,:.:::~.,: :~(~. ';.:.~'; :t.',.~ ....... :~.:"!'~.-: ... ···:flt;'·"/·.·:, r":lo·tl1·:~r U.S. !llcnc Or: t~:~ no-me dr.~.. 1J.1 ~.:":;.:;;.:,, ~.~:'. '~:;'::.: ~ :::.~:,:.,;:.t.~ :'.'.'.l ;).:c;ll; ~:.:~t.roycd llJ U.~. 'Pi1."o.~1c r: 1:1!lC:1, tl~':.:1 ::"': . .: •.. .:: .. ; "":::C :.,,,.:<:~~ .. "'~.' :.:." ~J.:~. :.ircrn.f.l t:':'\r.,:t ,\o".:n or de:Jtr~·!:1l ft',':.l 3.7 !~tt: .. ~~,:'.:, ~, ).'1 ':·:,.·:,":;c; '.')·r'~ to 2,1133. ?'1!(,h15 ru'IVr.OIZ:;,';',:/i'3 \ll/~!C-~n D~;c
(:;xc:~r;lt.) ! .. \.'.r;:: ..•• ::".- .... ; t ... " .... ;'" .~: .•. :.,! lj~;:~:9;·::Cl' 1~7::? tb,~ J.,·J.:~11r; !':;::.'b~r.r~ o.r.:r:d
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fo:·~~:;. (:~,i .'.:.':-.:::.: .. ' . ·~:::~cL; ;;, .~.: .. ,,:, : :; ... ~.~:: ~ ... !.';~.~ ... ~,.,~~ uiri'it=111 tl.:1d r~c~t:-OJ"~:! fiy!} T-~a'n £\..'\Q. (;~.-.:... ;: -,.:; :.:~'l::.. ~';j .'l:~ ~.\~ .. "":;!:'::q,!, t.l,("~ !orl~:h:,\ll&".:r :\rr..~a l"ll!*C':l:1 t'l.'"";cl p(:f')r,lc nl!".C' ~:.':.:~i·.·~·; .... ·:·j t;~:: ij.C·. l~~~:t·lt!c.'r,t{··:, r.t rh!\ lJ:>UT.\ V~l:C.J"C" it "(\.~ d:oppinl7, U.:-~.-:ro:(tc::.·,:'.l !.:~·l' .. :. I.':~;;. ·;:·:.~.:::'~·.~l·:.; .... · ... ; ~\;~ the': Ul'C'!!'\.. r"urt":C!n c::e~ tl·('Cn~ vert.: -'-0 '-il)··· \ ... , ........ ".. "'1" 'it"~'l tel CI"~"l"~·'n~ .,1, Cllr...,.~ t~o~:'" in I'J",,£... 1\ ... '- '_ ..• '" ..•• _, • .;. . •.• r .... ! ,..... ..l'.' ....... Io.IL ,. f.. .! • ..., .... ",! .. ,
t!~nir Q.t~:)c::-::~ .. : .. ,,~.';, .. ~ .;-;::: :: :-.' ; •. 't ·:·j(';~:~.tio:,s in ?o.~: Sr/n:~ fl"C:.i 14 to 20 i.icccl'~ht!r, the !~oloYc:r .. :; .: ............ ,:~, :.< .. ~ ... : ..... :,:\,'t 1": ·;("·.-,Jc r\l:lu n11o't,,\O\;n t.h.!'cc i.1.:-i •. p1r:-.t., ':")lH~lC:\
o!'} 16 n,~c~:..;·,,·:r·.· ~ ... ~.':. :.I.!.:·rJ :!o';.,. ::·;"'",,:·u ·;;'h~\.t:. on 1 n~~tJ. ;~:, ~;;:'~l~~b~:" t:~~ E'~\"/~!l!::'~~:(;t. ~~.:.!~:1 fore,,"'j .:' ...... 'j r-~ '';'':l:'..':': :.).\:·:;0 ~;·~;t·~,,· :)o·.ru foul." U.t":. 'l'-2B·= ill ~·ha.ll1ll:J '~:lirict • .
• .. Ac::,:or~ing to ~.:~":"~ l· . .'~ )·.~~";C:·:.'1;:::.1 C':~~"l~.~;l" en ~2 !'tccc::-:~~:- t!l-:- ~!"',;:ed fo!"e~~ nni "~:>i'le :in ~:!":~,~:! .::: .. ~"":-.:':: ~·I=o·i'lr.::-: ~;')~)'.: I~t u. c. ji1rf.te ~:(:licC;1)to;·*::l v~:1:'..~ "they v.er~ dropp1 r.:~ l:~:: .. ·:d :·.1('5 i t~ t:,,· i~~;;·~ j!'J::\ tl!"cn in thf,,\ fJl"ovi nt·,;. In (~;j,(li t~(')n to l'u~~1ng 3!:i ~:'.:::.::.: ·i,.~(I-:*':1G (.i.\~; r.lt ;·.~·d en, t!l~ 1~lSl:,.r •• ':l'J.a.n3 Il.t';:'lcu. force:.: o.tnJ. !,l!opl.e o.1no dC3troy\!d, ~l~·::, :\61~.cf.:r::.~!·.
:.. .. hll!"ct."oro. fr<::1 17 : ',,~, 1'.)'·:)~ to r..~ iJ~ce:'~'(:r 1972 our f&r:::~:!. forceD an(\ !lco:ll~ :::~,ot dO ....... l1 c:- ~ '!::' ~l·i");:"J ~ o;~ t:l; Cl·,j\m·j, 2. J~ :; .. ( U.:;. pl.:"!lC3.
(':'rr:':t) Ac::c~:,i:',,'!~::: ':".1 ~:':"., (;i\ ~7 i)',:c.·.:l'b.::r 1912 t.!lC tu:~ i:~\.~F\ ar:;e:l forcos o.ntl ,eo";,lc, \:!J!.~~ S.!;~·::r-.;:.1"l' l"~,!":~,:!~, ::t-;'t ,1.0·.-n :!. u.s, hol~.eoDtp.r in tb'l ~:o.~ ::u'':o orell. 'While i~ .. ;:-:'$ ti~n·!';.~.l~;-; ~::.c;·y !;.~1f!&. ~tt.p.:"~to1.·e. fror."l 17 !!nv 19:Z4 t.o :!o n~cro=,,-'b~r 1!~7~! O;t;· ",~·::.:,l r~rcc:!J l!lld. !,~oplQ t.hrC:O'J,,':lout t:10 country htlv~ :;hct. d(l~1I or (1"::trt,:-,.,~ Cl~ th(' ~.m .. .,.l :? .~((3 tJ.s. l'lr.nes.
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';REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED OOCUMENT 862
("0§.tl" DATil. ,urCCIVt:O
: ";~~ ': " "' ... ..-71
. - RETURN TO 0""01:. CHAlftMAN • .Ica CL.A •.• 'P'ICATION
.. ' .. PtOOM &K .... THE peNTAGON .--
DACUa.tc~ HUM.It" COPY' HUM.SR D"To; or DOCUMeNT
:f';m~T;or CJC~ , ""u, ."' .,
.... aJECT . ,
.'
Information Pertaining to PW/M!A Situation in Laos
. THE A80VE"-DE8CRllllEg DOCUMENT HAlt BEEN R&C!IVIED IN THis OP'P"CII. OlftCUL...A.TIOH 0" '('Hie
ooeu~~t"L. Bo; LIMITE" TO IHOlvlDuALa IHDICA"'E" BELOW. THI: DOCUM"NT WILL al: .. ETU""ED TD THO;
ADMIt"S ATIVB: OP'P',C'C PO" RECORQ PRI~ITO DI ... ATCH TO ANOTH"" O ....... CK. oR OTHER DISPOSITION,
TtU S'" M WILL.. NOT BS REMOVEQ ""0""" B,rEC'T DOCUMENT.
TO !7 AM INITI", "a:~ARK.
[.7 CHAIRfI,4A .... .lea DO I if' .... ~ .J..
,
'k 2]. M~rch 19.73
') } ItXEcuTIV~ at
" ~ ~
THE AGSISTANT' To --;:J THe cHAtR"'AN
o. 1. OlA furnishes a copy of a paper pertaining
CKAJRMANIS trT'Ar'P GROUP 1-1' . to the PW/MIA situation in Laos.
~ / ... t .. "OReE toe... 0,.
" CHAUtMAWS flTAVF GROU~ T - There are approximately 350 US military
~ NAVY MBR 010 and civilian PW/MIA's in Laos. The 1 Feb . "PLF list" provided by the DRV consisted
, CHAIRMAN •• TA ...... GROUP of personnel captured by the ORV in Laos--MARIHE .... R •• 0 ., not those captured by the PLF.
) CHAIRMANS BTAF'" GROUP
0
... IItMv .. en .11: I - There several individuals
la IV are known
) LEClAL AOYI.oR AKD to have been captured but whose names did LEO'SL..A,TIYC A811T ....
- not appear on the list. A •• IIITANT 1"0"
~.L'C ArPA'''. a". -- Photographs of Captain ""I/"'~· ,) 'PEe.AL
and
I Mr. N"J,,!-~ have been shown.
» Aa.rrrAttT' O.H • -
0;) .t/- ADWIM'ST"A,TIYK ~f\ -- Voice contact with LeOL ,vA~.,t'~ and ........ TANT ....
1 ~
Lt. NI',., F has been made. ADMIN AIDE • 2. As you will recall, Dr. Kissinger haa
i \" , ... 1" P'OI'tOC AIDE 0, saated,even though the Agreement does not so
require,"American prisoners, held in Laos
MARl HE .'DK .. and North Vietnam will be returned to us ,,,."
, in Hanoi." I .OCIAL _.:0"1" ou. I 3. Pathet Lao officials have stated "Whatever
; US and North Vietnam agreed to regarding
~ prisoners captured in Laos is not my concern.
r-.... The question of prisoners taken in Laos is to ~e resolved by the Lao themselves
I / -;-\{ ) and cannot· be negotiated by outside parties
- over the heads of Lao." As late as 17 Karch, I
! 7 PIT' I~~' Sam Neua was reported to have stated, "The ; J PW's will be released by the PLF in Laos
'\ " (D and not by the North Vietnamese in Hanoi."
, i ~ V~~ respectfully;
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSs-. W"SHI_TOH,O.c:, ID301 '\"
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., , :·'t; ~J' '" ;: In reply refer,tol .' : . ' ..
1-35174/73 I,; ''': .,J;: ',~, ~ : ':'. ',',' :
, ~ ~ <" '.',:::' HEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: U.S. POW/HIA Personnel In laos - ACT! ON KE!'IORANDUK ~ , . d:!,':): :'~:':' ,
•• 'j
. REF: Your 13 Har 73 query on leas POWs (atteched) ',- . :' '..I
:i:i:;i:.-,! l~'
On I February 1973. Harth Vietnam (NVN) released the names of ten ". POWs who were captured In Laos. NVN clalOled that these ten people.were '<.',:.: prJ soners of the Pilthet Lao, but D IA analysts I·ndl cate these I ndlvl dual.;·:j. : . were actually captured by the North Vletnarnose In laos. The ten POWs ... ;;.:. . .I.dentlfled consist of nIne Americans (sIx USAF, one US", two' civilians) ",,~,:: ; ....... end one Canadian, The evidence Indicate. that most, I f not. all. of the :·.,:V· ten,are currently being held In Hanoi. .
I,f
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.' DIA lIsts approximately 350 U.S. military and civilians as missing····'·, . or captured I n Leos. Therefore, tha leo Patrl ot I c Front (LPF) I,lst of ;'
., ten POWs constItutes only a 2.5'lt; accounting. In contrast, the NVN list I,"
represents 45% end the PRG list represents 20% of the POW/KIA personnel '., carried on our lIsts In these respective ereas. There 15 an obvious lack of reportIng on the part of the LPF. Because of the foregoIng statIstics end analysis of the conditions under which our peQple have' been lost, OIA concludes that the LPF may hold a number of unidentIfied U.S. POWs although we clnnot Iccurately Judge how many. The American Embassy, Vlentllllne, agrees with thIs Judgment.
Severel dIplomatic moves have been mlde recently In an attempt to get an Iccountlng and r.le.se of Amerlcln prIsoners being held In Laos.
,
\ On 10 March 1973, the lPF Delegltlon chairman In VIentIane Informed us . that recent U.S. demarche, r.gardlng prisoners In Laos had been conveyed to Souphannouvong, the Lao communIst chief, personally. No other Information WIS made avalleble.
On 15 Harch the Secretary of Stete instructed Ambassador Godley to " ••• slngle out Soviet Ambassador for the full treatment ••• tt regarding the leek of progress In VIentIane on politIcal and POW matters •. Godley was also I.nstructed to Inform the SovIet Ambassador that we " ... contlnue . , . to hold North VIetnam to Its commlt~ents on releasIng all U.S. POWs In . Laos by 28 Harch and will not tolerlte any deleys." No conmunlit resparlse to thIs line of action has been noted es yet.
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On 22 Harch 1973, the United States informed NVN and tho PRG that
the U.S. would " •.• complete wlthdr~wal of its military forces from South
Vietnam In accordance with the terms of the agreement and coincIdent
wIth the release of all repeat all American prisoners held throughout
IndochIna." This statement was aimed directly at securing release of
all U.S. prisoners held by the Pathet Lao.
, On 22 March Ambassador Godley addressed the Laos POW/MIA questIon
2
at length In VientIane 2139 (attached). Godley separates the I February
list of ten prIsoners from the Issue of accounting for the remaining POW/
HIAs In Laos. The Ambassador states that the LPF " ... just has not focused
on the PW repatriatIon and accoyntlng problem until very recently ... "
Godley concludes by recorrrnendlng that we concentra,te on helping the RLG
get an acc~ptable military protocol to the Laos, cease-flreagre~ent'
approved by the LPF. In th 15 way the Amb~ssedor Is hopeful thet we, can
eventually gain LPF cooperation In the POW/KIA matter. However, Godley
also states -that he is having great difficulties In Influencing the RLG
negatl ators; and he states we must expect many nonconcurrences from the
LPF.
On 23 MarCh, the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Party Joint Hllitary
CommIssion (FPJMC) was instructed by Washington to reaffirm our negotiating
stance. General Woodward was Instructed to seek a private meeting with the
NVN representatIve and Inform'hlm that the U.S. must have assurances that
the prIsoners on the I February list will be released by 28 Harch. GIven
these assurances, private or otherwise, wo will completo our troop wIth
drawals. This 23 Harch guIdance to the field also Indicates that " ... we
I "tend to pursue the quest I on of other U.S. personnel miss Ing or Cllptured
In Laos following the reblue of the men on the I Fllbruary IIs,t."
, To revIew the bIdding to date, the U.S. Is prepared to accept release
of the ten men on the I February lIst along wltn' the other U.S, personnel
being held In NVN 115 the final ~ondltlon for complete U.S. troop withdrawal.
However, there has been no accounting of U.S. personnel MIA In Laos other
than the I February list of ten who were probably all captured In Laos by
the NVA rather than the Pathet lao. Hence, assuming all the prisoners cur
rently beIng held In HVN are released by 28 Harch, we st111 have the Laos
MIA question remaining unresolved. Additionally, Ambassador ,Godley proposes
that we rely upon the yet-to-be developed'and'approved Lao Hilitary Protocol
as a means of gaining 5atlsfa~tlon on thl, I.sue. And finally, Ambass.d~r
I Godley does not discuss HanoI's Influ.n~e or control of the LPF -on this '
Issue.
From the foregoing, there eppears to be need for a well-orchestrat~d
plan for solving the problem of our Laos POWs and HIAs. Therefore, I am
rocommendlng below a serlcs of diplomatIc moves aImed at gaining a proper
ac~ountln9 of our men lost In Laos. You may wIsh to pass along to the
President part or all of the follOWing diplomatic track:
./
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/
3
A. After the recovery of the last prisoners fron. INN, Hanoi should be advised unequivocally that we stili hold them responsible for the return of all POWs being held In Indochina. And in this regard, any further mine sweeping activity as well as ell future U.S. reconstruction assistance should be described as wholly dependent upon the accounting for and or release of U.S. prisoners being held In Leos. Once again, NVN should be clearly Informed that an accounting for ten men out of a total of more than 350 is considered unacceptable.
B. In the meantime (just aftor 28 March), a strong demarche should be made to the ranking LPF representative In Vientiane by the U.S. Ambassador personally. This initiative should plainly and forcefully assert that the u.s. wi J.J-n0" longer play games wi th the POW Issue In Laos. The LPF should' be told that we have reason to believe they hold additional U.S. p"risoners, and we demand their immediate release as well as an accounting and Information on all those who may have died. Finally, the LPF should be advised
. that fai lure to provide a satisfactory answer could result. In appropriate:' United States actions.
e. Simultaneous with our representations to the LPF, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos should also ask tho USSR, PRe, NVN, French, British and ICC senior representatives to Vientiane to use their good offices with the LPF In order to avoid a serious situation.
D. Shortly after 28 March, assuming the LPF have not responded favorably, Intensive and obvious tactical air reconnaissance of North and South Laos should commence. Additionally, the movement of a new carrIer task force Into the waters off Vietnam should be publIcly announced.
E. Concomitant with the forogolng, the LPF. and NVN should be prl~etely. advised that the Thei Volunteer Forces now In Laos wJII not be removed until there Is a satisfactory resol~tion of the POW Issue:
Other moves that may be worthy of consideration .re listed below. They should only be contemplated If we are reesonably strongly convinced thet the Pathat Lao hold POWs.
A. Ambassador Godley could be instructed to "leen herd" on Souvanna Phouma and tell him to let the LPF know that pol i tical concess.ions In the new Provisional Government of National Union (especially as regards'LPF' appointments to cabinet posts) will be next to Impossible wi thout resoll(ln9' the POW question.
B. As a last step, U.S. air strikes and Lao and Thai Irregular offensive operations could be resumed in laos In order to force the releaso of our prisoners In Laos.
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rep: 1st:
The forego I ng recommended dip lomat I elm; 11 ~ary moves wou I d represent a considerable toughening of the·U.S. stance regarding our POWs being.' held In Laos. Such a line 15 even harder to take wIthout a clear picture as to how many U.S. personnel ofe actually being held In laos. The Intelligence data available Is voluminous but Imprecise. However, the evidence Indicates that the NVN/Pathet Lao forces have captured·U.S. personnel since 1964, and the LPF have provided no prIsoner or' casualty data at all other than the ten names listed on 1 February. Therefore, the hard negotiatIng track outlined In steps A through E above, and possIbly even the optional steps A and 8,' seems clearly justified. Finally, It Is recognized that this Is II very delicate situation, and the application of anyone or ell of the above actIons cannot assure success--there Is, of course, lIttle physICal rIsk assocIated with options A through E.
- '':-- - . -, ' . • ,' I f you approve of the above 11 sted courses of act lon, I 'recolll1l8nd you sign tho attached memorandum for Dr. KIssinger.
Attachments: () SeeDef query dtd 13 Hal' AmEmb8ssy VientIane msg 2139 Proposed memo to Dr. Killinger " ',-','
No coordInation requIred.
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LtG.secord/ls/AD123Ma(73/5)164 ..
or:tg #1 add.. \ bl 112. RC yelo II) AD Iwh 114 I sA/S
: Prepared by RADH Bil/ley, )(54175 : " LTC, Secord " X53164 I
"
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WI\::;'IIiNCTON D C .7n~O\ ~
/ / A /J 2 8 M~R 1973 a.3'/.d, £....1:J. p--Pl-V #t-~ .. .:.,/",J!.~-,.::I--./3.-,.
" 7YJ!~ .!.l..c,~ .-.4 0JtT:".-r;» ~~"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT VOR -~"ATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: uS POW/MIA Personnel in Laos
I am concerned over the sl tuatlori in laos regarding our men who are
stili being held prisoner or missillg. To dilte, there has been no account
Ing of US personnel missing In Laos other than the I February 1973 list
of ten who were probably all captured In Laos by the Horth Vietnamese
rather than the Pathet Lao.
As you know, there are over 350 US personnel listed by DIA as missing
or captured In Laos. 'The I february list of'ten amounts to only a .2.5%
accounting; whereas the Horth Vietnamese have accounted for ~5% and the
PRG has accounted for 20% of the people we have carried as miss'lng or
captured in their respective areas.
I recorrrnend the Pres I dent' cons I der the fo 110>-11 ng diplomat I c track
in order to gain some accounting of our men held/missing in Laos:
A. After the recovery of the last prisoners from NVN, Hanoi should be
advised unequivocally that we stl II hold them responsible for the return of
all POWs being held in Indochina. And In this regard, any further mine
sweeping activity as well as all future US reconstruction asslsta"ce should
be described as wholly dependent upon the accounting for and/or release of
US prIsoners being held In laos. Once again, HVN should be clearly Informed
that an accounting for ten mcn out of a total of more than 350 is considered
unacceptable.
B. In the meantime (about 28 March), a strong demarche should be
made to the ranking LPF representative in Vientiane by the US Ambassador
personally. This Initiative should plainly ond forcefully assert that
the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW Issue in Laos. The LPF
should be told that we know they hold US prisoners, and we "demand their
immediate release as well as an accounting and Information on all those
who may have died. Finally, the LPF should be advised that failure to
provide a satisfactory answer could result in direct United States actions.
t. Simultaneous with our representations to the LPF, the US Ambassador
to laos should also ask the USSR, PRC, NVN, French, British a~d ICC senior
representatives to Vientiane to use their good offices with the lPF In
order to avoid a serious sltu~tlon.
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D. Shortly after 28 March, assuming the LPF have not responded favorably, Intensive and obvious tactlc~1 air reconnaIssance of North and South Laos should commence. AddItIonally, the movement of ~ new carrIer task force Into the waters off Vietnam should be publicly announced.
E. ConcomItant with the foregoIng, the LPF and NVN should be prIvately advIsed that the ThaI Volunteer Forces now In Laos will not be removed untl I there Is a satIsfactory resolution of the POW Issue.
F. As an accompanying measure, Ambassador Godley should be Instructed to "lean hard" on Souvann .. Phouma Olnd tell hIm to let the LPF know that polItical concessIons In the new ProvIsional Government of NatIonal Union (especially as regards LPF appointments to cabinet posts) will be next to Impossible without resolving the POW question .
"
MARCH 22, 1973, FROH 9: 11 TO 10: 35 A. M • 53
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEI1AN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
Yep. But what
We'll have --
We'll have'em there, you know, we'll have, we'll have to have at least (unintelligible) and, uh, and also (unintelligible). The biggest danger on all this really is that (unint~lligible).
I think that we could, but I don't think we're out -- well, what's the danger of having a speech?
Well, you know, (unintelligible)
Not on television
(Unintelligible) .
(Unintelligible)
(Unintelligible)
Do you have what you need for a -- are you, are you going to do a press conference next week, or a speech?· Are you still hanging fire on that?
No, I'm set.
Do you want any material for the weekend •
No.
. . • either way?
I've decided that, uh, if I do a press conference (unintelligible)
The question, uh, with the Congress, if you go on, I mean, Tuesday may be too soo~ -- from, from the Vietnam viewpoint. If they pull the prisoners, the prisoners, wher~, and, and the troops out (unintelligible)
(Unintelligible) •
Better wait and see (unintelligible)
The prisoners, oh, the prisoners (unintelligible)
MARCH 22, 1973, FROM 9:11 TO 10:35 A.M. 54
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
Oh -- Okay then, you don't need any, any other raw data for the, for the Congressional speech, and if you do th~'press conference, it would be Thursday so you wouldn't need the briefing book til
Monday or Tuesday.
Yeah.
Okay. (Unintelligible) As far as the raw data is concerned (unintelligible) and so forth and so on. I mean I, I'm,.I'm just, I'm gonna have to sit and think it through
Yeah.
• • • Come up with a plan (unintelligible) come up (unintelligible) • • •
. . .
I think that (unintelligible) (Noises)
(Unintelligible) I think it's the best thing to do ••
I do too.
• • I think it's better than trying to go before a press conference • • .
I do too.
• • • and the other possibility is to not do anything (unintelligible).
That's what this, God-damn watergate stuff -Pat Gray's stuff a~d all this crap -- it's not the people's obsession. So you will be talking about a subject that, that they want to talk about instead of (unintelligible) Congr~ss.
You get -- Congress you're all right. The point if I want a press conference that's what'd be.
'.
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MITCHELL:
HALDEMAN:
MITCHELL:
HALDEI'.AN :
PRESIDENT:
DEAN:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT :
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
II
See, that's the only point, the only point
Yeah.
where the President -_
That's where you look like you're covering up right
now. That's the only thing, the only active step you've
taken to cover.up the Watergate all along.
That's right.
What is?
Was that.
Ev--, even though we've offered to cooperate.
To the extent -- and on legal grounds, and, and
precedent,
That's right.
and tradition, and constitutional grounds and all that
stuff you, you're just fine, but to the guy sitting
at home who watches John Chancellor say that the Presi
dent is covering this up by re--, this historic re
view blankets the widest exercise of executive privilege
-46-
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\"'UIJI.~U (11. I'.'''''''''. ,. -...,"
MITCHELL:
HALDEMAN:
MITCHELL:
HALDEMAN:
PRESIDENT:
HALDEMAN:
EHRL!CHMAN :
HALDEMAN:
EHRLICHMAN :
in American history, and all that. He says, IIWhat
the hell's he covering up? If he's got no problem
why doesn't he let them go and talk?"
And it relates to the Watergate, it doesn't relate
to Henry Kissinger
That's right.
or foreign affairs.
That's right. Precedent and all that business -- they
don't know what you're talking about.
Well, maybe then we shouldn't have made the statement.
I think we should have because it puts you in a much
better position to -- They were over here. That's
what Ervin wanted. He wanted all of us up there -
unlimited, total, wide open. He -- The statement
in a sense puts us over here. Now you move back to
about here and probably you can get away with it.
Well, you can get away with it in the Watergate con
text. You see, you said
That's right.
executive privilege would work and, and then, then you've
-47-
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/--- o6fi EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:.
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:
EHRLI CH}!AN :
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:
EHRL-I CH/1AN :
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, H. R. HALDEMAN, JOHN EHRLICHMUL~,
.AND RONALD ZIEGLER ON MARCH 27, 1973 FROM . 11:10 A.M. TO 1:30 P.M.
This story and, uh, this one, uh, this, this water.$Jate thing is potentially very debilitating around, but we:·have to devote a large part of our time to keeping people busy in, uh • • •
I know. , ~ ,
••• affirmative kinds of (unintelligible)
(Unintelligible) because it involves people \~e know.
Yeah.
It involves, frankly, people who don't (unintelligible) guilty. This and that.
Yeah.
And, and, also for, you, you ~on't want anybody guilty, or, it isn't the question. We know that everybody in this thing did it whatever they did with the best of intention. That's the sad thing about it.
--- ----, . Sure.
I told them all this morning, I don't want people on the staff to divide up and say, "Nell, it's this guy that did it, or this guy -that did it," or thth-th:-th--
Yeah.
The _point is what's done is done. Do the very best we can, and cut our losses and so forth, best you could evar do. -.
Did he talk to you about this, uh, this thing, uh, uh ••• Commission ••• commission thing?
<b\
I '
MARCH 2.7, 1973 FROM 11: 10 A.M. TO 1: 30 P.M. 2
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:
EHRLICHMAN:
PRESIDENT:
NO, uh, I, uh, I (unintelligible) I, I don't know what you can do. I don't, think, though, I don't think that I, even though it's moving along, that story and so forth. I don't believe, that I should go out on national television like tonight or tomorrow and go out on the Watergate Commission and then come on the next day on . n2!.tional television on Vietnam. I don't like:· :.y.'~, , the feeling of that. I, uh, I, I don't' think you . get it ready by that time? My view would be to,' get the V~nam out of the way, and maybe get this right. if you could. I think that gives you time:.
The, the, the picture of the Congress having an inquiry going on •••
·Yeah.
••• and the Grand Jury having an inquiry going on in the Judicial branch... ", ,
Right.
••• it seems to me gives you, ah, ah, opening, thinking about it after a while •••
Step in.
••• and say well, step in and say there doesn't seem to be anybody except me in the position to resolve this. I have talked with the, ah, ah, Chief Justice of the United States and I have talked with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker. and, uh, I, uh, uh, after that consultation, uh, have proposed this, uh, three branch, uh, •• ,
Nell.
EHRLICHMAN: ••• board of inquiry.
PRESIDENT: To start with the proposition of Ervin and Baker, where you don't ~ome across right there at the beginning on whether you can get the three men. I'm not sure you can get the three branch, John.
."~', 1 ~- '.
.::':';:.-"'~
!~ "'.:< '.' " . • ~I :_ ._
,~~r: .. ~~~.~~ ,:-•. :t't:
.'.
, .
(\'
:':.~ P.C:l 27, 1973 )"2'),: 11: lOr. .:~. TO I: 30 P. !.!. 3
EJiRLIC,;;,: . .;:i:
PRESIDENT:
PRESID!::::'I' :
ZIEGL::R:
PRESID:::!T:
ZIEGLER:
PRESIDE::':.' :
ZIEGLER:
ZIEGLER:
Well, I'm not sure you could set it either. It, it, ah-- ;.c·;.< .. r, .', . "<.'.".
But, but, Just suppos~ you couldn't. Then I still think that it' is:gooq. possibly a good idea , I r::e.::m, ah. but \'Ie' ve r,ot to have. so~ebody other th~n me that could broker it. The .~roblem you've:sot.t~:~eco~nize, you see, is that. Haldeman.can' ti,hy-ou can 't. Dean can't. ·:.:'!ainly because, you . possibly could;. but it's', it's also that·:! don't ":ant to" out' out,~ . ···'.the.l'1hqle,,!·lhite House. You're the only onei·:ho· co'uld do it.
The, ah..':"
... '.- ... _-'';-'
,- -r' h~ve 'to"do,- this -is why I"told you ~ (un1ntellirible), but I might have to Rorers on the job to be the broker.
use
Fine.
U~, he'd be good, uh(unintellir.ib1e). I don't kno:1 ullether you could get a-.-
(KnockinG on dobr)
Co;:;e In. Oh, hi. HOI'1 are you?
Thought we'd just check in.
Sure, sure. Right.
The reas'on ... In position,. rieht--
... 1';0' have, ull. the, uh. patient rehabilitation veto today and t!":e uh, uh, l'le hope ,-it's a :. return shipoent to Thieu ~., in South 'J.1etna:n, preparations. uh, that, uh--
RiGht.
DescI'1binG •
':11 27, 1973 FROM 11: 10 A.M. TO 1: 30 P.M. 4
RESIDENT: '
IEGLER:
RESIDENT:
lEGLER:
RESIDENT:
IEGLER:
RESIDENT:
lEGLER:
RESIDENT:
IEGLER:
RESIDENT:
lEGLER:
RESIDENT:
IEGLER:
RESIDENT:
IEGLER:,
RESIDENT:
lEGLER:
Right.
(Unintelligible)
Right.
Then tomorrow we should, uh, send statistics and so forth. Uh,I talked to, Uh, Dean and to Moore this morning in terms of whether or not we say anything (unintelligible)·
Right, right.
The Grand Jury's stuff, and, uh, Dean's feeling is that we should not tOday.
That is my feeling.
And, uh, Hoore'sfeeling is that we shouid not today, and I concur in that (unintel1ig~i>l,e):,'
Yeah. My view is today, unless you've got something more to say •••
That's right.
.•• I would simply say I have nothing to add to what they said yesterday.
That's right.
I, I think that would be better (unintelligible).
The, uh--
Just get out there and act like your,usual cocky, confident self.
Then the, uh" if, if I am asked a question about whether or not, uh, Dean would appear before the Grand Jury, if I'm asked that question •••
",
Yeah. It's, uh--
••• how should I handle that? (Unintelligible). I could -- two options: One would be to say that, uh (unintelligible); the other would be, (unintelligble),
, ,
communique Signed at Paris on Implementation
of Viet-Nam Agreement
Following is the transcript of a ne!Vs conference held at PaTis on June 13 by H em-y A. Kissinge,', Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, togethe,. !"ith the texts of joint communiques signed at Paris that day by the fouT parties to the January 27 Viet-Nam agreement and by the United States and the DemoCl"atic Rep"blic of Viet-Nam.'
DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
White House press release dated June 13
Dr. Kissinge,.: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank those of you who have been following me around in these many sessions in November, December, January, February, and now, for your patience, sometimes for risking your necks. I regret I haven't been able to be more communicative at the end of each session, but these negotiations are somewhat complex and involve many parties.
I understand that there has already been a previous briefing which went to the details, but let me say very briefly what we consider to be the significance of this communique, what is in the communique, and then I will take your questions.
As you know, during the course of March and April the United States became quite concerned about the manner in which the cease-fire agreement was being implemented.
1 For texts of the Agreement on Ending the \Var a.nd Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and protocols Signed at Paris on Jan. 27, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.
JUly 9, 1973
We were specifically concerned about the following points:
-One, the inadequate implementation of the cease-fire.
-Secondly, the continued infiltration into South Viet-N am and the continued utilization of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for that infiltration.
-Three, we were concerned about the inadequate accounting for the missing in action.
-Fourth, we were concerned about the violations of the demilitarized zone.
-Fifth, we were concerned about the inadequate cooperation with the International Control Commission and the slow staffing of the Two-Party Military Commission.
-Sixth, we were concerned about the violations of article 20 requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia.
Needless to say, the other side had its list of complaints, and in these circumstances we proposed that Mr. Le Duc Tho and I meet again to review the implementation of the agreements that had been so painfully negotiated last fall.
There was a preliminary meeting between Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and Vice Minister [for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co] Thach, and then on May 17 Le Duc Tho and I met again and reached some preliminary conclusions. We were in daily contact with the Government of South Viet-N am through its delegation here and through our Embassy in Saigon. We then sent Ambassador Sullivan to
45
" 1 ~
, <
Saigon for further consultations. I returned here. The negotiations continued. There was a slight interruption last Saturday, and we reached a final conclusion today.
As far as the content of the joint communique is concerned, we believe that we have achieved a satisfactory concl usion of the points that were of principal concern to the United States.
There is, as you know, to be issued a new order on the cease-fire, which is to go into effect roughly 36 hours from now, which we hope and expect will be implemented fully.
Second, there is a clear repetition of the prohibitions against the infiltration of personnel and materiel into South Viet-N am, except as replacemen ts under article 7 of the original agreement and according to procedures agreed to by the two parties with reference to respect for the demilitarized zone and to the prohibition of transiting the demilitarized zone except in accordance with the replacement provisions of the agreement.
Under the provisions for missing in action, all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indo-· china, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States.
The Two-Party Military Commission is to be fully staffed, and special assurances have been given in paragraph 12 about cooperation with the International Control Commission by all the parties to grant them reasonable freedom of movement.
With respect to Laos and Cambodia, the communique says that the provisions of article 20 are to be scrupulously observed, and there have been long discussions about the whole complex of issues raised by Laos and Cambodia. However, since the final results depend on the sovereign decision of other parties, we will not discuss this subiect here, and we will leave it to the results and to events to testify to progress.
The other subject which has been discussed and which·I have left separately is that of political evolution in South Viet-
46
Nam. As you know, the United States always taken the view that the political lution of South Viet-Nam is to be de(~jd(!d1 by the South Vietnamese.
Therefore the United States has believed-and that is refiected iii the munique-that the political future of uVU'U ,:
Viet-N am should be determined by a nr,oep.,··~ of free and democratic general elections. other provisions regarding political tion reaffirm what is said in chapter IV the cease-fire agreement.
Now, we have today signed the cOlnrrlUD1-l que, ladies and gentlemen; and the history Indochina is replete with agreements joint declarations. I am not naive enough pretend to you that the mere fact of naVlTlV
again agreed to certain words in itself gu.ar-:;; antees peace; but I will also say that _". __ ., all parties have worked so seriously for the last three weeks, we have every hope that they will match this effort with performance· and therefore there is fresh hope, and we hope a new spirit, in the implementation of the agreement, which in itself is maintained.
What was signed today is an amplification and a consolidation of the original agreement. It is not a new agreement. Now, the people of Indochina, and especially the peo" pIes of Viet-Nam, have suffered conflicts for a generation, and our greatest ambition has been to end their suffering and to restore peace, and it is our hope that by what has. been done toaay a significant step has been taken in the consolidation of peace in VietNam and in Indochina.
Now I will be glad to answer your questions. For my own education, will you identify yourselves.
Q. What were the changes in the communi- . que in the last few days that made it acceptable to the South Viet=mese Government?
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it is useful to go through all the details of the negotiation and to provide a scorecard. In any negotiation there are sometimes impasses reached that afterward are rather complex to explain.
Department of State Builletin
I" e.xistt ment: was' conce muni
Th that betw, reeor parti it she with ese p that
W' "hic be a datio whic: four· prorr. part~
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ion of ained. :ation
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v, the ~ pea-· ts for' n has ,store' t has been Viet-
quesiden-
nuni'ceptzent?
'ul to ation 'otiached llain.
IIelin
I will be glad to explain one difficulty that xisted which was perhaps not of monu~ental substantive significance but which was extremely time consuming and which concerned the formal signing of the communique.
The United States began by proposing that it should be a two-party communique between Hanoi and the United States as a recommendation to the South Vietnamese parties. The North Vietnamese proposed that it should be a two-party communique signed with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties. The South Vietnamese proposed that it should be a four-party communique.
We accepted a four-party communique, at which point Saigon proposed that it should be a two-party communique with reCommendations to the two South Vietnamese parties, which in turn induced Hanoi to accept the four-party communique. We then, as a compromise, accepted Hanoi's proposal of a twoparty communique ,,'ith the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties,
So there was one fleeting moment where Saigon had our position, we had Hanoi's position, and Hanoi had Saigon's position. So you must not believe that every time that a great deal of time is spent, it always concerns final issues of war and peace. This was one of the issues that took some time, but I will not discuss every issue that arose,
Q. Lou Cioffi, ABC News, Besides the fact t!wt the othe)' parties did negotiate se>"iously, w!wt else makes you think that they al'e now willing to work together sel-ioll.sly fOl' a political solution in Indochina and not a military one?
Dr. Kissinge>": I think, Mr. Cioffi, that the whole evolution of the Indochina tragedy and of the Vietnamese war has been a slow realization by all the parties that they could not impose a military solution on each other.
This has been a very painful process for all concerned, because I think it is safe to say that the art of compromise is not the most highly developed quality in Viet-Nam.
JUly 9. 1973
I believe that the realities of the situation, both before the cease-fire agreement and, I think it is fair to say, since the cease-fire agreement, may have brought home to the parties concerned the necessity of, first. peaceful coexistence and eventually some political solution.
I repeat. I did not say that this was guaranteed. It is undoubtedly a process which will have its ups and downs. But we are entering this new phase with the intention of contributing what we can to easing the situation and promoting the peace.
Q. The communique today deals witit the two sides' military leade)'s getting together to crg)'ee on lOhat areas are controlled. If since the January agreement of the 27th they have not been able to agree even on an agenda in the 'political discussions, why is the)'e "eason to believe they will be able to agree on 'I:hat area.s the milita,'y cont)'ol?
D,', Kissinger: Well, of course, events will show very quickly whether they will be able to agree. One of the reasons why the TwoParty Military Commission has not worked as efficiently as was originally hoped was because of the difficulty of agreeing on location and immunity; and that problem has been substantially resolved by this agreement, or should have been substantially resolved by this agreement.
With respect to areas controlled and modalities of stationing, it is our view that this is determined by the military presence, and on that basis both sides, after a clear ceasefire is achieved, should be able empirically to determine where the forces are located and on that basis delimit the zones of military control.
One reason it has not worked previously is because the cease-fire was not fully observed. To the extent that this new ceasefire order-which will go into effect at 4 o'clock Greenwich mean time on the 15th-to the extent that that is observed. the delimitation of areas of control should be substantially eased.
47
I I:
.I
i ., :I
, >
, .~ .,
Q. Do you feel now that with the signing of the document you have more or less ended your w01'k in the Indochina area or that you will still have a lot of difficulties, especially concerning Cambodia?
D,·. Kissinger: The remaining issues in Indochina will still require significant diplomatic efforts, and we expect to continue them. Of course, we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement, and we will maintain our interest in it. I hope to be able to reduce my ovm participation in this process in order to preserve my emotional stability. [Laughter.]
Q. If the question that Iras just asked had to do lvith American aerial milita,'Y operations in Cambodia, that is what I lcaS going to ask also. If it was not, lChat I 1l'0«ld like to ask is, is there anything in this agreement, this communique, which substantially commits the United States to cease such operations?
D,·. Kissinge,': There is nothing in this communique that commits the United States to cease such operations. It is our hope, and we will make major efforts in that direction, to continue the diplomacy that will produce a cease-fire in Cambodia.
Q. Jim Browning, Westinghouse Broadcasting. Can I ask you what there is in the communique that Ivas released today, besides the good luill and seriOllsness of the people who negotiated it, that Icil! make it work better than the agreement that n'as negotiated on Jamwxy 27?
Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in any communique that makes a communique work. A communique works because the parties concerned intend to implement it, and therefore all a communique can do, or an agreement can do, is to prescribe what the obligations of the various parties are.
To the extent that this communique prescribes the specific obligations and reaffirms
48
them, it can contribute to the COllSolidati(lb' of peace. But it is never words alone produce peace; it is the combination of ",,'"'." the intention, and the consequences of formance.
Q. I am with Economic Revielu, Dr. singer. I find in the communique one point, and that is that yow' government agreed to conclude the first phase of the talks on the Joint Economic Commission with' the North Vietnamese within 15 days afte, the signing of the accord. If I understand the' America.n negotiation process correctly, '1 IVas under the impression that in fact thi' negotiations on the joint economic aid wert to some extent meant to be a guarantee tlwi North Viet-Nam does apply the accords.
Have you managed to obtain some standing or some glw.mntees from the Vietnamese, apart from what Ice have in the communique, that they will apply accords-beca1l.se I am rather sUl-prised this concession, if we can call it that?
D,·. Kissinger: The Joint Economic mission had substantially completed its at the point when we suspended negotiatiOns':: So that the schedule which is indicated in communique is inherent in the resumption negotiations.
The United States has always made that the final implementation of the eccmolnic:, clauses of the agreement has to be part and parcel of the total imple'mEmtati1ln: of the agreement.
Of course, many of you know after the Joint Economic Commission pletes its work, its results will first have be submitted to the Congress and, se,carldl)r,: will have to be approved by the Comrres;s,~ which is not an automatic process.
So, there will be sufficient time in to assess the implementation of the ment. This administration has left no au'""'.:. that its support for the program in the ous forums is related to the overall im,pIE~1 mentation of the agreement.
Department of Stale
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Q say 10M talk,
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Q. May I ask you a question off the subject of the immediate subject of the Viet-Nam
. ? communtque. Dr. Kissinge)': Preferably not.
Q. Preferably not, but I may?
Dr. Kissinger: Well, you can ask it, and then I will determine whether I will answer
it. Q. I wondel'ed if you would be prepared to
say why you 1vent to see M,.. Chi P'eng-fei today, and at whose initiative, and what you talked about.
Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister of China is an old friend whom I have seen repeatedly in Peking, and since we found ourselves in the same town, a courtesy visit was arranged. It lasted 50 minutes, but you have to allow time for translation. [Laughter.]
Q. I am 1vith the Los Angeles Times. I "'ould like fo ask, Dr. Kissinger, 1chat kind of an estimate you hat'e over the last few months in connection 1vith the cease-fire violations, the extent to which they are intmtional or accidental; that is to say, controlled or "ncontrolled, on the other side, naturally.
. Dr. Kissinger: In a situation, as in VietN am, where many of the forces are mingled together in very close contact, an implementation of the cease-fire is of course extremely difficult. The first thing to remember is that the level of violence since January 27 has dropped very markedly and is at the lowest level that it has been in a decade.
I would say that there are daily reports of major and minor violations. I think it is safe to say that, of the minor violations, a significant percentage is produced by the proximity of the forces and not necessarily by a deliberate design.
In the case of the major violations, which have averaged around 15 a day, I think it is safe to say that a significant majority are produced by the deliberate decision, often of l?cal commanders, but" in any case by dehberate decisions.
July 9, 1973
Q. Scott Sullivan, Newsweek. Both the Saigon government and I believe the A mencan Government have said they were very wger to tie down a date for free and democratic elections in South Viet-Nam. On thesurface of the communique, there doesn't seem to be any such tying down or linking. Are you satisfied that significant progress has been made in that particular direction?
Dr. Kissinge1': We have two separate problems. One is the desirability of the dates for general elections and the suitability of a fourparty document to tie such a date down. Last fall, when we negotiated this agreement, the Saigon government very properly took the view that it would be inappropriate for the United States or for an international document to prescribe the specific date for elections, and we spent many days on that issue because it was at that time that the North Vietnamese wanted to tie down the date and it was we who, following the recommendations of the Saigon government, did not do so.
In these circumstances, it is impossible for the United States to insist now on what it refused in December. Nevertheless, we have always taken the view that the political future of South Viet-N am should be left to the South Vietnamese and that free and democratic general elections should be a central element in determining that future.
Individually, we support the South Vietnamese proposal that a time should be fixed for that election. We think it is a reasonable proposal. But in the light of the negotiating history, it was not appropriate to introduce into a communique which is supposed to bring about the implementation of the agreement a clause which was not part of the original agreement and which was not part of the original agreement at the request of the South Vietnamese Government.
But nevertheless, as far as the internal negotiations are concerned, we think the South Vietnamese demand is reasonable, and we hope it will be accepted.
49
I.
. i"
, '-::"
Q. John Harris, Hearst Papers. If this agreement doesn't work out, do you envisage
negotiating a third agreement?
Dr. Kissinger: It is a prospect I cannot
face today. [Laughter.] When we sign an
agreement, we hope that it will be imple
mented, and whatever difficulties.. arise should
be principally discussed between the Viet
namese parties, and I don't want to address
now the question of what happens if there
should be violations before we have even
concluded the two-party signature. We have negotiated this in good faith,
after a long war and a great deal of suffer
ing, with the hope that at last the parties
concerned will draw the conclusion from the
overwhelming reality in Viet-N am that no
body can have his way by force. Thank you very much, ladies and gentle
men.
TEXTS OF JOINT COMMUNIQUES
Four~Porty Joint Communique
JOI:\T CO~lMU:SIQUE
The Parties signatory to the Paris Agreement
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet
Nam, signed on January 27, 1973,
Considering that strict respect and scrupulous
implementation of all provisions of the Agreement
and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them
are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and
contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and
Southeast Asia, Have agreed on the following points (in the
sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement) :
1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement,
the United States shall cease immediately, com
pletely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet
Nam. 2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement
and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:
(a) The United States shall resume mine clear
ance operations within five days from the date of
signature of this Joint Communique and shall suc
cessfully complete those operations within thirty
days thereafter. (b) The United States shall supply to the Demo
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed
to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in
rivers. (c) The United States shall announce when the
50
mine clearance in each main channel is
a,nd issue a final announcement when all the opera_,~
bons are completed. --/,,:'j,'
3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agre~ ment, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the ~ High Commands of the two South Vietnamese'""
parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and.
irregular armed forces and the armed police under
their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire'
throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400-
hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously
implement the Agreement and its Protocols. L
4. The two South Vietnamese parties shall strictly"
implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the
Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam which read as
follows: '
(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force 1" and until regulations are issued by the Joint· '-~:~
Military Commissions, all ground, riYer, sea and 1, air combat forces of the parties in South Viet~ ~ Nam shall remain in place; that is. in order to ~,
ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no t.: major redeployments or movements that would ,1-extend each party's area of control or would ,,p result in contact between opposing armed forces ~~ and clashes which might take place. .~-
(b) All regular and irregular armed forces '.'
and the armed police of the parties in South ;"'
Viet-Nam shall observe the prohibition of the ::
following acts:
(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by
opposing armed forces and flights by bomber
and fighter aircraft of all types, except for
unarmed flights for proficiency training and
maintenance; (2) Armed attacks against any person, either
military or civilian, by any means whatsoever,
including the use of small arms, mortars,
artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes
and any other type of weapon or explosive
deVice; (3) All combat operations on the ground, on
rivers, on the sea and in the air j (4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals;
and (5) All acts endangering lives or public or
private property.
Article 3
(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shaH
not hamper or restrict:
(l) Civilian supply, freedom of movement,
freedom to work, and freedom of the people to
engage in trade, and civilian communication and
transportation between and among all are3.S
in South Viet-Namj (2) The use by each party in areas under its
control of military support elements, such as
engineer and transportation units, in repair
Department of
,
strucHon of public facilities and the
and con tation and supplying of the population; lfSlUPor fi ' t"
) Normal military pro Clency ramIng con-
~ by the parties in the areas under their
::'pective control with due regard for public
.. rety, (b) The Joint Military Commissions shall
. ediately agree on corridors, routes, and
"\hilI!! regula tions governing the movement of o .er . f 'I' lDilit&ry transport alrcra t, ml Itary transport
Tthic1es, and military. transport vessels of all
tyPes of one party gomg through areas under
the control of other parties."
5 The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall
~~ediateIY carry out its task pursuant to Article
l(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas COD-
lied by each of the two South Vietnamese parties
:d the modalities of stationing. This task shall be
eotnpleted as soon as possible. The Commission shall
also immediately discuss the movements necessary
to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the
two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they
occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into force
on January 28, 1973. 6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred
to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders
o( the opposing armed forces at those places of
dire-ct contact shaH meet to carry out the provisions
of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in
Muth Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agree
ment on temporary measures to avert conflict and to
ensure supply and medical care for these armed
forces. i. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:
(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not
accept the introduction of troops, military advisers,
and military personnel, including technical military
pErsonnel, into South Viet-Nam.
(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not
accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and
""ar material into South Viet-Nam. However, the
h'o South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make
periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and
"'ar material, as authorized by Article 7 of the
Ag-reement, through designated points of entry and
subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint ?-.lili
t.ary Commission and the International Commission
o( Control and Supervision. In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agree
ment regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone,
military equipment may transit the Demilitarized
Zone only if introduced into South Viet-Nam as re
placements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement
and through a designated point of entry.
(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force
of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two
Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the
modalities for the supervision of the replacements
of. armaments, munitions, and war material per
mitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three
July 9,1973
points of entry already agreed upon for each party.
Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the
cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South
Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement
three additional points of entry for each party in the
area controlled by that party .
8. In conformity wit~ Article 8 of the Agreement:
(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article
8 (a) of the Agreement who have not yet been re
turned shall be returned without delay, and in any
event within no more than thirty days from the date
of signature of this Joint Communique.
(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the
Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall
be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese clvilian
personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement
and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Cap
tured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possi
ble. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their
utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days
from the date of signature of this Joint Communique.
(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol
on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured
and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shaH
be treated humanely at all times. The two South
Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement
Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days
from the date of signature of this Joint Communi
que, allow National Red Cross Societies they have
agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel
are held. (d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall co
operate in obtaining information about missing per
sons and in determining the location of and in taking
care of the graves of the dead. (e) In conformity with Article S(b) of the Agree
ment, the parties shall help each other to get infor
mation about those military personnel and foreign
civilians of the parties missing in action, to deter
mine the location and take care of the graves of the
dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatria
tion of the remains, and to take any such other meas
ures as may be required to get information about
those still considered missing in action, For this pur
pose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be
made between Saigon and Hanoi.
9. The two South Vietnamese parties shaH imple
ment Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as
follows:
"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two
South Vietnamese parties will:
-achieve national reconciliation and concord,
end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of re
prisal and discrimination against individuals or
organizations that have collaborated with one
side or the other; -ensure the democratic liberties of the peo
ple: personal freedom, freedom of speech, free
dom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom
51
of organi~ation, freedom of political activities,
freedom of belief, freedom of movement, free.
dam of residence, freedom of work, right to
property ownership and right to free enterprise."
10. Consistent with the principles for the exer.
cise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self·
determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agree·
ment:
(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide
themselves the political future of South Viet·Nam
through genuinely free and democratic general elec·
tions under international supervision.
(b) The National Council of National Reconcilia
tion and Concord consisting of three equal segments
shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity
with Article 12· of the Agreement.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an
agreement on the internal matters of South Viet·
Nam as soon as possible, and shall do their utmost to
accomplish this within forty-five days from the date
of signature of this Joint Communique.
(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree
through consultations on the institutions for which
the free and democratic general elections provided
for in Article 9 (b) of the Agreement will be held.
(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall im
plement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads
as follows:
HThe question of Vietnamese armed forces in
South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two
South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national
reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual
respect, without foreign interference, in accord
ance with the postwar situation. Among the
questions to be discussed by the two South
Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their
military effectives and to demobilize the troops
being reduced. The two South Vietnamese par
ties will accomplish this as soon as possible."
11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agree
ment:
(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of
the Protocol on the Cease·Fire in South Viet·Nam
shall immediately be implemented with respect to
the Two·Party Joint Military Commission. That
Commission shall also immediately be accorded the
eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed
upon by the Four·Party Joint Military Commission.
Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made
between Saigon and the headquarters of the Regional
Two-Party· Joint Military Commissions and other
places in South Viet-Nam as required for the op
erations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commis·
sion. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also
be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh.
(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party
Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon
S2
proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South"
Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by
fth d " on,
o em a JOIns an area controlled by the other.
locations of the headquarters of the Regional Tw
Party Joint Military Commissions and of the tea: of the Tw.o-Party Joint Military Commission sha~
be deternnned by that Commission within fiftee
days after the entry into force of the cease-fire r n
ferred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be
changed at any time as detetmined by the Corn~
mission. The locations, except for teams at the points
of entry, shall be selected from among those ~-n
specified in Article 11 (b) and (c) of the Protoco;
on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-~am and those
places where an area controlled by one South Viet.
namese party adjoins an area controlled by the
other, or at any other place agreed upon by the
Commission.
(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned
in paragraph l1(a) are accorded by both South
Vietnamese part:es, the Two--Party Joint Military
Commission sh.ll be fully staffed and its regional
commissions and t.;..ams fully deployed within fifteen
days after their locations have been determined.
(d) The Two-Party Joint MilitaT1 Commission
and the Int~tn.2.:hnal Commission of Control and
Supervision shaH closely cooperate with and assist
each other !n caT!"ji.!:g out their resp-=ctive functions ...
12. In cor.ivr:::.:,,:s with Article 18 of the Agree.
ment and Art:c:'l: 10 of the Protocol on the Interna.
tional Core:!:l:.:.::rJ~ of Control and Supemsion, the
International C~!::::.r.i5sion. inc1ud:ng its te:ams, is al.
lowed such r:::.o:.'::=e!!t for observation as is reason.
ably require:<J f0r tr.e proper exerdH:: of its functiOn!
as stipu!a~ !!l. :!'.~ Agreement. In C2.:rrj'!ng out these
functior.s, tee l=.':..e;rnational Comrn:ssion, including
its teams, sf-aU e~jljy all necessary a.:sistance and
cooperation frt.::l tr.e parties concerned. The t';lr'O
South YietI:;c:.=~~ parties shall issue the necessary
instructior.s -:n t:'e!r personnel and take all other
necessary l!:~-::~ to ensure the safety of such
mOVEment.
13. Aric!e 20 <:of t1:.e Agreeme:r. t, regarding Cam~
bodia and Ut;tS, 3na.~1 be scrupulvus17 implemented.
14. In COn.!0~:y with Artic1e 21 c.f tr.e Agre~
ment, th 'C::.::.:d .s:ates-Democrat~c Republic of
Viet·Xa::l Jdr.: EcC/nomic CommiHlljD s1:a11 resume
its meet'.J:g:5 !o:.":.~ eays from the date of signature of
this Jo:.n: CJ'J==-:.r .. ique and shall complete the first
phase of its jli''j:="i:: within fifteen dar! thereafter.
Affirrrj!:.l :.!:t.: ±e parties concf:!":.ed !Shall strictly
respect cd SC'":pll]oosly imple:ne:::.t all the pro.'·
visions of tie Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and
this Joir.::: Cv!::..:=::!:::l.!q"Je, the unders:ped ~~:::::~:; ti\'es of t;,e ;:c-::~ :rigr:atf)ry to the Paris ~
have c~:c~ J) ~~e this Joint Cv!!:.!nunique to re
cord 2.!:d p~l:!:: t::e points on wClch they have
agre<ci-
Sig:.~ ::. ?a.~..!. J>;.ne 13, 19i3.
Department
sary ther such
~am· lted. ~ree·
; of ume
<e of first ~r.
:ctly proand ntanent . relave
(Separate Numbered Page)
For the Government of the United States of
·America:
:HENRY A. KISSINGER
Assistant to the Presi. dent of the United States
of America
For the Government of the Republic of VietNam:
NGUYEN Luu VI EN
Representative of the Government of the
Republic of Viet·Nam
[Separate Numbered Page]
For the Government of the Democratic Republic
of Viet·Nam:
LE Due THO Representative of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam
For the Provisional Re\'
olutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam:
NGUYEN VAN HIEU
Minister of State of the Prov£sional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Viet-Nam
Two-Party Joint Communique
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
From May 17 to :\-!ay 23, from June 6 to June 9,
and on June 12 and June 13, 1973, Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, on behalf of the Government of the United
States of America, and Mr. Le Duc Tho, on behalf
of the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet·~am, reviewed the implementation of the Paris
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace
in Viet-Nam and its Protocols and discussed urgent
measures to ensure the correct and strict imple·
mentation of the Agreement and its Protocols.
The Government of the United States of America,
with the concurrence of the Government of the Re
public of Viet-Nam,
July 9, 1973
The Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam. with the concurrence of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Viet-Nam, Considering that st.ric.t respect al1d scrupulous im
plementation of all provisions of the Paris Agree:·
ment and its Protocols by all the parties signatory
to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet
Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indo
china and Southeast Asia, Have agreed on the following points (in the
sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement) :
[Texts of paragraphs 1-104 as above1
Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly
respect and scrupulously implement all the provi
sions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, this
Joint Communique, and a Joint Communique in the
same terms signed by representatives of the Govern
ment of the United States of America, the Govern
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Govern
ment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Viet-Nam, the representative of
the United States of America, Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, and the representative of the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Le Duc Tho, have de
cided to issue this Joint Communique to record and
publish the points on which they have agreed.
Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.
For the· Government of" For the Government of
the United States of the Democratic Republic
America: of Viet-N am:
HE!':"RY A. KISSI:-;"GER
Assistant to the President of the United States
of America
LE Due THO Representative of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam
53
THE NEW YORK TIMES. THURSDAY. JUNE,/f, H7J
Transcript of Kissinger's News Conference on the Results fthe 1 P"P.IS. }"M /J-Fol!D .. 'mr
~, e :ra~""",pe 01 c ,,~ .. , r"",' .......... t lode, I>~ Ht"O') ~ }.,e".'." ..... P'UIl!."t ."'JrO,,·l "~""P' G~ ""',OMI ....... "ty IItfcon. 0.' ....,o~ by TJw. .'.~ .... y",. 11 ......
1 .cloh 1"Il ~'ltmtrl. r,m ~ III I ""IM (0 thank
~~"~ 01 ,'ou ... -1'10 hlH ~" 'ollo".-,n~ me .HNnd for I~~'" ~.In,. ';'·Ulonl. In No'~m':>t". ~'~mbtr .nd Jan· """" .-.d ~.""'. for rOUt :",:,~r.{O .',m~',m ... II t~
"',~ 01 ,',~r r.!'tk J ,...,rpt '~I: I ·~,~~·t !)no" Ib:p II) t->o m'''' ",,..."'~rlql"t at Trr 'n~ " ~ .. ~ 1-f"~.,l)n Th~.~ ~~r"I_G',,,c_, H" ",,,,.p,,·hll 0.,.-"1,, H~ '."'>1\., ml~y
I ~"'<!"" ••. ~ l'~1 Ihn., hH a ,~.c. • .. ·c I ~'l" ,r.u, hnd· ,.~ ' .. ~"~ \, .. ~~t :hroul!h In. ~'"a,h I., ""f ... " ""ry "r.f1, -. ',t ... ., cOl'ISld.". to t->o Ih. '.I' .. f'(lnce of Ih,s r"-.,....u·_'o •• _ thtn I WIll .n· <"W~r .''''-t ql,"~UOfl"-
". "", kD'-. dunlll lIIost ~I ... ",h •. ~d "r>nl th~ t:n't· t'd S:~'H !>Ku:-~ Clu,t. ron· u,",,<'d hy Iht mln~tr in · ... ~i, 1'1 '--~. , ... ,.,·I'r-t -I""" ''','''''' "'a. ~'n( " .. plf"fTl.nltd. \lot ...... s~vr,~'t1 ... enn· . --m~d hy tho 1011oWln, r.-"M\
__ ~::;,,::: ~~'~~U:~~:r.::' ~<0"~1,. (or.t:nurd I"IiI.
Ir~t'o~ ,~:" ~:h V,.tnam .r>ol ",~"'""<l ... "I'l1l,,," of I.,.~ a~~ (,,.,!><>oj,. IS COfn· d"', (fI' :r.1 Irfdtral10n T~'H_ ". "'-.. ~ ronctrnP4
.f>o,,! I~~ :~ad .... uatt IC' '''untl''( :01 !h. m",,~, '" .n.'W\
: • ,;. t'
.-,,:
F"~M~'-,. ..... .-f'ff con· ,~m~d .MUI It>e ,·,<)\,t,on rol Ih., dtrr.,lilaJ'lztd lont
l .. _, ... n~.,,_
ao,."b-t, c1ropped b)' l'.$. pbnti fall On CommWlln pent Dear,C&nI.bodl.lI JOldien
f,!:h_ .... ~r., (On~~rnl'd
• lv>ul I~. :n~d""'l"'tp {O">pe" ~·'on of I"" 1 .. ! ...... 11'0fU1 'nntrol (""..rr.,~".,.., ,rid 1M """'~r ,:a~I,"~ 01 Ih. T .. oPIMV '1I1i(11'\ (t>mm, ... 0011
<;" .... ~ ';'-.rr conuml'd ""-""I !~r ,,0Ia!icn5 of "". "('~ 20 acr"nJonl "" tht ~ ,'~:ir""'-OII 01 fO'.I'~ !Too!>, r, .• .., C1rl~,a ."d UO'l
I"umpl.i"n oa Othtr Sidt "~--c'~" ,., ", Iht ot~r
<j~ ~.'" 11' hI of (orr.pl.lIIl. 10 1;,~'~ ',rr~"'''.nCU ... r'''-lpOl~~ Ih~1 ~lr tt ouc ""'0 ."d I II'M-t .lta,n 10 ,... . '~"'- I'~ ,-.pl.m~nUl1.Jon of 'ht ~,r .... m~"t 1hll h.d ~n <0 p_".funy n~lo".ttd Int 1111. Tl'lH~ ....... prdiminary ml'f'l,"~ bftwl'f'f! Ambu ... dor '>u11,".n .nd Pnmt' ""nistft' Th.dl. and tl>tn on ""')' 17 Lt Duc Tho .nd 1.IM1. .pin .nd rf'uhtd iDmr pre1imiIw'J conclUSIon.
W ..... tr., in dlity contact w,th Ihe eovrmll'tetlt 0( Soulh V,etnam thl"OUlh iu d.,I .. "allon h~re. throulh 0\11"
(t"",·I,,. ",-hleh " 10 JO 1,,10 t/ftCt P"'>bab-lv 36 """rs from n"'" .r.d ... ~Kh .. ., hopt and upt':t "'111 ~ Impl.,mrr::td
~""dl)·. ,: :" • clur rf'~. 111'0:>11 ,;,( :~.. p.o/I,b,:>Qn "c.a-,n<t tho ,~I'lIt11l>on 01 p"'r1-'mr.~1 ~'.d m.altn,1 ,~Io
Sov'!'o \" .:~a", "C~PI I< 'l'
.. ".,~n" "f ":'tid. ';' of :~.r .,r:ll~~1 ~~rf't"..tnl .~d .(](",~,".( 10 pf<)(t(!·.r.~ .,r-t'f"d 10 ~i :~. ''''0 par':,U T'lt ... " ." .",II(:t ",f •• tnc., 10 t~" dl~I' felr :h., ~tmJ!,. I~ ZOrf .n~ to Ih. pro· h,bLtJOn 01 1~'~"llnl t.'>t do IJI;h:..al'lztd ltrnf uc.,pt '" J.e(ord;a:>c., ",:Jot t. .. ., nphc.·
~!neII! p:'O'\ , •• c.ns of the Ir-tily. t:ndft' tho PI"(WU1Dn1 lor
m.iSlnl III .cuon. 111 lid" hI.,·t plf(led li'I.a! tilt)' would rMke IT.&JOI' rlloru to t>eJp ncb otM1 to UCOWIt lor Ihe millinl ill .CUQII t.hMup.o."t 1adoel'n~, and thil iI I mit·
::. ;:~~:,rs=t ""T' Uos and C_bodl.
f"fTl!).a"" 'n <;Ii,on .nd ~"I A Two-Pan)' ""hll')" Com. "m~"ado. Sulh",n to S.I. mls-,on IS I" be 1"l1y .. , up. 2"" for f~rth~r (onSU11l1on and .~:al LUW"I.."lct-J ~"H I f~I<;.nN h ...... n'loo.i~ll"ru bttn ,'-.en ,n P'ntlntph 12 cnnl,nu"~_ T~'rf ",II. sli,hl .bollt coop.:'lIon .. "h 1!It m,tl'T\l""on 1 .. 1 SIIIlrd,,'. ID:.n:a\l',"~l ("II:ml ("n,· and .... ru<.:h~d • fin.l·e:on· "".\Ion b) ,11 Ih., p.rt,t, 10 elu.,on loo1~)1 ,nnt I~ .. m ,u~ct.a~le I~·
8y Ih~ conl.nl 01 th., )Oinl dlom In ff':>f<-' 10 L.a01 .nd
~t~~~~I~" .. ,:~:;;r:~;r<:: ~.)~~~ I~':' ~:.~~;q~ • ",11.1,,'0,), conc1us."" of An,d. 20 .ff 10 bf -<",pU· Ihe po,nn 11'1.1 Wfr-t 01 lo .. hl)· """r"-td pnnClpal ""nrUII to the: 'Th.r-t hi" bfton lon, dIS' Unll~d St:01n. Th~ n, IS. cw.soons on th.,.. .. hol., com· ~'O\I kilO,", • new---{h~ it to ' pI ... of isWf'S niH'd 11)' 1..101 be I~,~.,d _ new Q/'drr on. and C.mbocbL H ",,·ct. the
f,nal deltrminltYll'ls dQtnod 011 the !n1emn o..clYOl".i of ot~tr plnlO!_ Wf .. ·111 not d,~cu's IhlS nlh)tcl htrr:. and "" •• ..,:1 Ie"'" ,t 10 thf tU:.l!:S ~nd news .,~·ft"1ts to test,fy II)
prolren Tl'le ol!'!tr .ubll'Cl: t~.lt
~H bern d.s..u)H'd L"'Ld .... ~" ~ _I h~\e Itfl ~p.I1"'ltl>' I, \h~\ ni ;>altl".1 fvol~!,OI". .~ SO'~t"l \'Ielnlm .... Y<'" "nO"· Ih., l nlltd SI.IH ~.as ~I"i" lahn Ihe "tW 1~.1t Ih~ ·?"hll(~1 ",ol .. t,,,n of SOlll!'! Vi.,tn~m IS to hoe de· Cldod by the. Soutb V,eU".I· mfSt "nd thtr-t'Oortl Ihe t:~.it· I'd StittS hIS 11 ..... 1' b(. h",,·f1i. Ind Ihlt"s "'{;~It'd In the comm<.1niq\if. WI ... .,., po/l(lCI.! IUIUr-t 01 Soulh Vil!'t· n.m sllould be dettMnlned by • procesa ol lree and dtmOCral,c ,mer.l tla::uo .. , The ot.ht-r P'fO"i$ion1 reprcl· in, tM pohlical e ... olutlon l"!!' Ilhmot'd ,,·h.t .... as .,d 'n O.PIn 4 of thlt (elH,r~ c:otnm<.1niquf. \
Now....., haV., today .;ped • eommuniqllf.
And th., history ot. 1r>60-ch",. IS ~n.t ... ·Ith' a.uer· m.,nu .nd jo.nt dKlu:auons 1"1'1'. nat nli ... e ~ to pr.l.nd to you Ihll the mt~ I~(\ 01 '~~In hl'ln&: I""'.,tod '0 (pnlln .... -on!. '1'1, :t.~ll ,uaranltU puc •. But: 1 "'ilI Il~ U)' thll ,i>r., .11 ~lnlH h.n ""OI'ktd ~ s.er,ou,ly lor Ih., put Ihree ... ·.,..b. ...., hH .,,,.,ry hope th_ 'h~y
.... ·'LI match Lhis flloll with ptrlonn&n«.
And Lhtrelor., Iht... IS KT.,11 hope IUIcI ..... hope, •
,...w spint in III., ,m"lern.,nl.· uon of tho .r""'ment ...... ich VI itself iI ~"'Ii,"l'd, whal ... as "gnrC IOOi}" 1I1n .mph· hCII,on .nd I co~.olidition 01 thr DflJ;in.1 ',rttmtfll-it is not .. nrw ~,reem'~1
SOw th., po'opl., 01 Indo· ch,n.. and e'~lil1," III., :><"Ople 01 V,etnam. hi"." ,ufo Itrtd coMltel r"r I £tntn .• lLon, Our .£'rrathl ~frort. hl~
bern w .-nd th~" SUfffr,nl!: ind 10 ",'I"re ;><;,~,e. Ind It IS our hopt Ih~t bv ... 'h~t has bttn dnM (001)' a' .. ,n"iclnl step h.s betn uktn in Ih., (onsolidillon 01 pi"lce In V,rtna.m .nd IndOCh.n.
..."d now 1"11 be ,1.11 to an*w.r your quutiolu.
Ito 'Scencard' Provllkod . lor m)"~ own tducation.
WOlIld you identify YOutierf? O. lNhal were the eh'~'H
In Ihe (onvnW\iq~ WtllYlde it I~ptlblt 100 tht South Vietnamne Vovemmtnt1 ..... J don't think it is ust{uI
\10 CO thMJUlh .11 th., dtt.ails of tl* ne,otialJons &nd to pro. ",iik I Korecl.rd, IfI.ny fI.,cou .. 1Ion ther-t ar-t Impasse. ruched t.itlt alttrward Ire nih.". complex to upl.in. I
;wouid be ,I'd to uplail\ on., cll.frocullY Ihl u,ntd ..... h,ch ""u perhaps n,,1 of ",onu· lIIen:.1 subSlinct. or "~ntfl·
·Qnc., bUI .... ·hlCh "'n ","rh,pJ uI~rofly tllTlt· consuminz. .nd whIch concemtd th. (onn 0( II,flln, of th., com· muniquf.
Th., Ulljttd StllU bt,'n by proposin, that It s.bould lit • two-pany communiquli
""'Iwetn Hlnol Ind the Unll· ..... ronlmJS ud mod.aliti., td SIIIU .nd • recommend.· of Jlltion, it is of COUI'$r OIl tion to tht South Vietnamen ... iew that this il determl p.niel. The Nonh Vietnamese by the military pr-tsence In proPOit'd thlt it Ihould be;. on th.t buis both sidH at
~~P&J!Y ~:~=~f ~ir~ ~~ ~tI.~:.,~~~.~ SouLh Vietnamese pan.ies. Th. dtterm;n., whtre the fOr'l:e South Vi.,tnamese proposo-d. are loeated •. nd on thlt ba~; that it should be a four·p.ny delin:nt the zonn of tho. mili communique. We accepto-d.. t'6n~on::,sOn It has no
~J:'~nt ;~n~~o~ worked ,fitVlously il beca that it s.bould be • two·p.tty the cent·fire ... u not rull~ eommuniquf with rKom· obserw:d. Th., extent lb.1 m.ndltions to tht two South this new ctaJe·fire order ,oe~ V,.i.t,',',.m
H,," •• "',. ",.i-:S,',',,',;','-"',. intOo tff«t. .t .. o'eloe~
und.,r the imprn ... the- f.rt Ih., nflt0' the jo,nt ~o!\Om" 10 some tlllent m • 'Ilantntoe that r 111m don .pply tl Hnc YPll m.n~,e< some undersllndLr, ruarantees from Virtnamese .pan W~ h .... ., found i~
. muniqut. Ihlt Ihe) the accords beCI filh.,r 5urpriH1l b ension. if we cln
y th, Gn-enwich mUn timt on thl 10ur,p.1ny communique. We 15th, to the txltnt that Ih. Ihen as I corrlprom,se .cc.,pt· is otlstrvtd, tho dellmitllii ed Hanoi's pl'OpC>$I' of. IWO' 01 .re.i of control shOUld pin)' commWl\qut WIth thr SUbst.nlially used.
~~;~~::::.~t pa~~ies~e Soulh Major Inu.,1 R.,m.in
m~e'!n:: :~I~~~~t r::rr IhS' !':h t~; Si~\~;"Of ~~~ pCIstLion, we ".0 nino, 5 {XI- docwnent you h.,·e mo", or Iltion .nd HInDI nad ~il' less rndtd. your work or that ,on's polltion. SO one must you will have. lot or d,rtr not bt!ieni; thai e ... ery Ulhe cullin? . that • ,rut u •• 1 01 ume 1$ A. The main issuts in In' 5ptnt it a1 .... ~ cDncerns . dochinl will SlilI require • vII.1 inues of w.r ,nd pelCt. significant diplom.tic effori. Thb Will one '01 t.lIe ISSU." Ind we expect to conlinue that took some time.. but I them. Of course w., nmli~ W1l1 ne"'fl (u" . Vtf'y IS committed 10 the strict illl' sue that I'::." • plement.tion of the Ilr~.
Polil1cal Sollltio,,*, ment .nd we will mainulI/I Q. Dr. Klsslnler, lIesides our int.,nsls in it. T hope tp
the f.et thaI LIlt ulher P"' -=n~~I:at:~n ~u~~iSm:r::1! lIes dlO ne,Oltat!: ~rJouslY, in Oorder 10 be .ble to pre· whit tIle maKes yoll U'lmlt Itrvr my emolionll $I.bilili'. that lh.,y- 1111 now ... ·uhng 10 Q. T belie.·t lhat Iht qu.,.· work ,o,et.ner senousl), lor lion lhat W.iS jusl ISkl'll hlis • polillt.il solution In IndO:- 10 do with Amtric.a .. lerU.1 chtna .nd not. rrumary \Jne! ..... ork .• nd \J'Ie oper31~;' .,
A. I Utinlt that tile ... ·nole Cambodi •. If it "'IS not. "'hlt t"olution 01 trte Indoenm. I would like t.o ask is. IS Ih. 'i' Ingeo)" that·trte V,elnimese .nythin, .t:retd in thiS co . war, has been a slow rUllll' lnuniqUL! wh,ch SUbsl."I'a! y
~~:ldb~~I1!.;:,:s .~ti~~~ ~~:~i:!c~~~,:!tti~n~~atn 0
solution on each other. ThIS A. There is nothing in this hilS bten .... el')' painful proc· , communiquf Ihlt COmmi!, es.s for all t:oncemed be·., tht United Statu to tU e eaU5e, I think il ,is safe to such opentions. It is 0 r s.ay that the an of eompro- hope, and .... shall make m • mue IJ not the mOSI highly' jor effons in Ihll dirKtlon. de ... eloped qll.lilY in Vietnl_m. .nd we .re miking m~jor ;"'r.
I beJitve that the telliues (onl i~h.t d· l' t of the ,itullion both befOore linue ~lh·~KitIO!il? ~o '.' the . ctlse·fite •• ,rumtllt, duee I a:-ase·fi~., III C.l' and I Ihink it is pfe 10 ... )' 'bodi •. sInce the cust .. f.re alne· Q. Can I a~k \·ou .... h t m.nl. ma)" b .... ~ proved to Ihfre ill in Lht .coinmunlq e Ihr parties' con~rned tile ",le.H'II toda), besldts I ~
n"Ctl5lt)", o( nnl' pe.ce be· ,oodwill .nd seriou.nt" t' lUr., eouinel)C., .nd nen· the people ... ·1'00 ntgotialtd I. tllilly some polit(l:il ~oluu{'.n. 11'111 will make it work belt r B~t I rtpeat. I did no< s~)' Ih~n Ih., ag","ement th:01 w S
lhal Ihis WII luarante<:d. It neeotillo-d. 00 J.n. 2'" IS _ undoubledly I proctn A. Th.,~ is nOlhinr: .in I y whIch will have its ups ... 0 eommuniquf th~t m.ktl I down. but w. u. cnterina ' eommWliquf: work. The co . this, new phase wllh the 1./1. rnuniquf ... orks b«.use £' ' ~~t~n o~;C:,'C:u!:' s7;~:~ :~l~. t~~~rn;:e~f~e~ :: lion .nd lIrt1motinc the pe.ce. a communiquf or an., •
Q, PoIDt S of the communi· ment c.n do is to preseri qut to4Iy de.ls with the wh.t the obli,lIionJ of tWO-Jide JIIi1111ry Iuclers ,tt· various partin ~. To t tin, lopther to 'Itee on u.ttmt that this communi_ Ii what areas, are eonlrolled. JAYS out the sp4:CI{ic obh .Since the J.nu.')' acreement tions and ~.ffirm. them It of the 77th., they have IIOt can oontn"bute to the c ", been .ble U) 111ft on.n SDlidltion or pe.ce. Bllt it
:fotn"..da~ f:1~~~ ~~ :rod:~~;.oer:.slt~Ot~~c~ '~. to believe that they will be binalion of words, intenl; S Iblt to .,fft' on What arras .nd the c:onsequenefS of they milillrily eDntn:l1? . formilnCL
A. £,·tntl will ~ , . .,ry Schr4ule Is Dennr4 quickl), .. htther Ihey will lit Q. I find in Iht coml .blt to .jlrte. One 01 tht tea'· niquf OIW ,..... point. JOnl why ttlt two·party mil. Ihlt is thlt vQur Go ...... • il.ry ,has not ... orked ,uffi· ment hl.s I,rftd 10 o;ontl de cI.,ntly II had bttn hoptd Ihe firsl ~:toe of the tllkl wu bec;.'"t of the difficull" the Joint Economic Com i,.. of .,n-ein, on loation loci siOll with the Nonh Vi.,1 . immunit)'. And that problrm me-se withi. IS d.ys afler he has tlftn or should h.ve- been si,nin, ,.of tht accord. I I substanti.lly JOIved by this Wlderstand tht -Amen In .,n-e",enL With respect to pr1)UH of ne,otiation, I .
A. The Joint Commission hid II COmpl.,ltd il5 ,,', po,nt .... ·hen .... e nerotlltlons. So sch.,dult ~h~t is I
lilt commun,qutl in Iht .esumpllon \lOn5.
Tlie Unil,.., Sl~ "'1)"$ mldt cit" fln.! iml1lrmental KOIIomic cliuses L m.,nl h.ve 10 be , of 11'1.,_ 10111 impl of 11'0., ",rtemc-r rourst many of that .,·tn ~ftfr ECDnomic Comm etlmpl.,ltd il5 .... ·1 lults first hJ". , millrC 10' Iht .nd s~ondly .... '11 Ip~ro"rd oy 11'0., ... ·hich is nOI In procns, So Ihtr .. hcienl lime In .... ~eu the im;>lem, 'he ilJ:rrem<fll, T iSlfillOn hu 1<'11 lIS ~ro'fim in I forms I. ,-ehtC'd • ~l\ implrmenllti' agrcemen\.
Q. M~)' I uk ~ linn nf{ Iht <\lb· V,elllim ~grr<'mel
A_ Preferably J')
Q, Preferably ml)"?
.... : Wtn. you, IIIen. I will len )' I I,,",·ft'·i!.
Q. I ... ·ond,·r ,r tot prtptrtd 10 ~. w.,nl 10 see Chi d~y. on who~t In; "'hI you lalked
A. Tilt For~ll:n Ch,nil is ~n old I. 1 h~,"., ~l!'L!n n'i p~k,n:. and ~,nrt In I~'~ .,.m(, In" n '''1\ "';" ~ .. ~nl:~ 50 minul~~_ R~I ,', ~no ... , lime fnr ir
EJffCt 01 Clo~f Q. I .... ·ould likr
Kissinrer, .... h~1 meuur.,ment }'(HI
th., lilt few mon nKlion wilh tht~'iolltiDns? To in. which they .re or Iccidtntal. cc 'out of control, 01 side. natUfiUy?
A. In • situaliDl 111m ..-btre rna fort .. &R mingl' in very- dose (om pltmtnUlion of c of" COlIne UU'e-1\\( Thr fi~t thin, II is that the It".,1 $ince Jan. Z; b '?ry .... idaly. ItId 10ll'Ht I.,"d th" , .. iI decldt.
cli~I;-tJ:!~~l ~~. minw '"ioll1ions.
'!.;tIe 10 -.ar 1h.'11 ,. ~ioll1ions I ~I,n ""nll,e- ,~. produ proJrimilY or t~ nor ntcts ... rily b: dHiln. In t.ht cas. jar "'iolltionJ, ~ • ... ented .round
Fra!~Fresh:Hope' f~r Vietnam Truce T~:~;~ ~~~~'~'~f.IEx~erpts Fro_m~N~e_w_s_'_C-+ ___ ~ Continut4 From ...... I, C-Dl.. 2: ,pt.norn hDh, .nd Ihtftby eDd!ptni... • vlri~ly 0( _ tool, \(I .5AJ(i()N, SOulh VietnlJll, ...... 1 w;,., .... ,._""_ South, . VteU\amtse pan. es. baRd on Ihe P.I
___ I .ole fIetd lot AlDtT>CIII bomb- ruch I peac.,ful sollluOn.. June 13 (Reuttrs) _ Five P RIS J IJ-F If' . Accordlnl to the doeu nt The' joinl commll .. iw. as Pnsidmt~)'eII VQ'~I- '. , , RfCIIlU li.ilDll fh,bu! •• ill' ptcoplt died .nd 20 ;were a .. A u~, -:c lrom ~ o:!! before)'bU. if'Iabou~~6. h finns \hit the po Th~ 0( Soulh vil-tnam hasl . But all SIpS lrom Captol be nmW out between SLilon l"lured ... h.,h an uplosil)n con/erlt,",: ,ive" he- • lode eessation of hostlhtlH in lion fot South Vii 1'1'. d., rlt ... in tJlt 411 S the HIli sup .... ! that Con&resl ... ill!and Lodt ~'nt.-a :m,"on rocktd .'1'1 outdoor ~ovie 10, N.' ..... n X- Ph:n, dt'JI South ~m will ha... tD. be- a llobal' iSQJUI
• ret . y, '10 .M.4 .ncI C\l1 01'1 flln¢l; I.,-,thatl Loc Nmh, Mil t e.m· tl'w.te'l ,n lhe M~konr Delta -.". . ' ."" be defimtlvt. ' .11 .• spretl ." lin S.I,on Go\'frTImtnt II no more bDmbilll in C,mboLi!u. by theltKodiln bord.". is n ,.\1 un. pro"illct 0( An Xuyen. the III)' .ch,e/ :',.,Ih~. SOilth V'tl' I would .110 like- to d., inr rtmain. on.et .p: INSlln, or condllatory .boul e!wl d this monlh. mak'n, illof'K"! Vll'lCOhl c:ap!t,L Soulh Vi.,ll>.m.,se corrm.nd ~ .... eM':Z'ciro,on 10 v~· m)' Go ... ernment's poIltio on, question I.cin, \.:nmmu""m Ih .. III tIIIt paIL.i.,probabl., Ih.t Lht InsaorJfflt n.e Nonh V,rtnlrnest' "',lIt sa,d lodlY. A spokesmln s.aid nom q tef:'.J: 0; I I' ttlt joint. cornmuniqu6 we Vitln.rnt:oe poort.te
Wh.t .. un-ltnown. 0( course. fOtff$ thrre, wnsinlt I\Kh .,be permJ\ted by the ,!:'Cord 101 thatt ti ... ~ of lhe'II\Iur-td, w.,~ 10led I 011'1 It: F 0t3r h fIlS. si,ned Ihis aft.,moon. tlDn of '~M'ral coil' ,s ... -htth .... ..11'w ISI.,S! dOCUlM'nt~~etot)l ~n til., IIr, m'cht mabiHnd.mUillry f'qUlpmt/'lI, lJO II poltccrn.en. _ : New ';orlt Ti~e~en y h, fint,,- ~his dt,XUmenl is pl'WtU dtfmrd II U only, t fOn"mltnt doal( fOf the pohlocal dtal toucht byjDne.for-ont replaC.,mtlll bu,s. OfficIIIS IIlr1buttd the 1- melnt to ptnnLt. Itr .. m.,nl .pin strf'a> man Sll!n,hc.nt secret under.,1l1r. ~lISin'n". I,cross the d.,m,litari2jtd lone bI.st 10 "C~unlSt tl!rror· To bfJi, with, I will read !mplc-mfllta~on .. I comp e~ mil')' tmpD~nct Sllll<r.np ff .. ,h"" by Mr. Kis.r: \.:n4oubttdly. in CDCI\inI 4llY5.\lIttween thr 1"'0 VldCLInI'. W) ISH."' i)'Oll our ftlta.tion', commu.· ·.mplemcntahon, of the ru e-lcc:lIons, rt(julnn s,,,,.,r .nd MT. Tlto III wit 7S
I'the Admlnl5tr.uon ,.,iII lIfIe !one u( thry dn'ln .• ., SOI!M: In tilt non.hem pro .... ince n'qut ODDctmil!l tht ligninl ac:conl aDd p~lcocoll. N far 01. N.a1,0 ... ' Coo.
hours of ne,Dliation. . Con,"::n not to tit huty and "Ie on the ~Lh. V,etn _ of Qoutn, N.m, IWO children of our joint cornmuni~ut: u ..... are coneemt;d. tional Coneord lUI W,th?ll suCh III'C:ret .s;.ree- ~ pemnt the bomtMn, 10 eon· 1I<lt as ~ If,.! polnl d.,ntry_ dOf'd .nd SI. "'rre in,lIred The joint rnmm""inl'" ~I~e dDCWnl1lt remalnl sn the in"
THE NEW YORK TIMES. THURSDA Y. JUNE /4. J9jJ
n._'''''_M_ 'I!in post Mat t.ambodlaB ~Idift"t
~- ........ • ~ 0<-<1....),.,., 01
We- 'IoMl not .';t(! "'""' .• :-0<1 . 10:''>0- r.-."Iu
'.'-l 1.0 ,.,a,ry U!
'"~:K1i t~t ! .... ~,....c UId ;.r~ Y."p..I,·udy 1',.1 ~'''h ... t><A"1
_ IpI"t In t~ ''''pi""enuo· 1>On 01 t~ a'n-tm~nt ",,"ICII "VI I1SoeIl" IS m&,nt:llnt'd, ..-!\it wu s'an~ ,od.), >, an arn;>h II<"Uion and a coniooll<::,IIOn 0/ thor O"II:,oal a,rf'tmo.nl-<t 'I not .. n~'" all:""~mt"~l
So,., Ih.. pooopl .. of Indo· ~~,na. ,nd ~'p"("jall' ~~ .. [It""Oplf of V'~ln~m. ~~\~ ,,,f· ft~ f"nllon I,,, I fta.u·
"'.~m .... VU\l non Our ~'nt~'1 ~ffo:-t hl\ ,~.-..! ~'.!h 'has bf'tn U! ~d ,h .. " ~"f1tr'n! 1~" "~ ... thaI and 10 rt',IOrt' r>!"~'e .• Id <I
",,1,,1>«1 01 15 our hope Ihal by ... hal has ..,., L5 '<I bt df' bet-n dnnf loday a sL,n,hcant · SO\I1lI '-'fln" ~Irp Nos boten uohn ,n the -.don Ihe en'" (OnJoOlidallon of puce ,n " al""1 5 b(. V~'III Ind Indoch,na '.'~ oJ rtlfiKted /.rid nOW I'll be illd 10 ~~'j~u~'v~ ''*'''er your qurntOl\$ be 4~rmuled r: 'Scon!card' Provl~ ~ of /~ and' or IJIY'~ own t"d~uon. ~ ~IU. wOuld you hlenufy ~"O\I.I"$tlr.»
:;':~ ~Yh.~~u~~~ .t ......... MI in it· aa::.eptable to the South r !he ~~r~ YkUwnese GoYenllMnt?
! " . ",.A. I don't think it is usduf .Vt" tod.aylsip'lltd ~o CO tbrou,h ,II the 4e1.alls of ~. I • tie nqoti,tiona &nd to pro-in or)' a( 1000- .~.~&rd.ln.nyneco_ WIth! &&Tft- . dWon I.Mre IfI." ,mp..un ·,nt 4~l.U":allon, '~a(he::l that altt-rw.td afl." ve ~ 10 .'. RothfT tomplu \.0 npflin. I '" Wt the If"CfI." i ..-oufd be ,fid 10 Upflll~ one ~' .• n'~:I,"~ d'/,"culty thn u,n~. "'h,eh
• OrCl ,n 1~."' Irll Pfrh.ps not of 1II0nU. ,acf. Bu I will . ~~nta.l lubs"nce. o-r ~'~n'f,.
~"'~~y":: '::~~e.,..~~ ":~~~ ~c'~n~~,~~ ...... "·,",,~ ... e Ind ..-hlCh concemd. the :"oopot' ual they lonn of lilllln, of lilt" com· .h" rffO(l wtth ·muniqut.
t, ~ Un;ud Stne, ~gI"n !1Ot"f .~ is by proposin, thit it should .lid.. " ~"I be" two-party cornmuniqut
..
I TrLce Th'"'' Blast Killl,- 5 \ Excerpts From News C' nference by Saigon Official , In th~ Mtkont D~ltQ . ,.. I __
,r , toOls 10' ~ SOo,Ilh Vie~am. ...... , .. ~ _ "J_ T_ SOuth' Vtetn,lJIrsl" ~~ es. bIoH"d On lhe Plris accords. "'\ allempt ~hould br I!I.3de ~ , ~:.l:. June 13 .(Reuters) _: Five PAli:IS JIUU! 'J-Folfo'n ACCOrdinl to the docuL~ nt The· joint communiquf ",.f·· I"'~ this t:l5k In)' ot~ ;~ .; s' .will ~ d,,~d .nd 20 :wef1." 0, .. u~ til lrotn a:..! before.~ In .boul.~. h !tI f!nns thit the polltiCiI s,olu· meaning..:1 is n~ ·1I.LlJlissibk
becw 5airon Injured wheta In upiosilln conlerfnc': liven Mrf todo)' cessauon or ~Ulltles lfI liOn for South V'f.UI'~U5t 10. ~ltle ~ p?hl!UI pro. b.ltn" '"'"--- lion roc.ked .• n outdoor fnov>e b N II en XIIOII Phon. eft SOuth ~U\ll1Jl will Nov to. be a ,IQbal soI~nton. wllt're \ ,.,>(1.',.. the .J:Ulse 6f \5ot1lIlnJ:) L. neat ,eam· !he.a~r In the Mekonl pelta IIi !h'~' ot tht SOIlJ Vi!': be definl!",e_ . III.upt"Cu are II1~ked. 1'h<"n-.• thiS qu~l .. m. The Pans ~r:. · II -'''0 lin_ pro,"lace .of An. xuye"., lhe ~ d,ItPlio 10 Ihe 1 would 11$0 like UI de In. e _I.ns once '11,n Ihe "-~oe coni and Ih. "llrn.\IIro\5l\eflne nc. C.pitst.., ~Ih VieUl.meiot comm.nd "'ris rte,Olioliou" art V .... ,. my ~mment'l PCJ:i'lio on. q':'"t'tln "Cin'.~he South quile cle~r1~' I hn"" ""e mull V.rtn.unn.t will lII.d today. A lpokesm.n I.Ild /loG GI l"KOI"CIed IlIId "Ort~ I~e JOIn~. commun,qu~ we Vietnamese partJe , the qUl.-SI proc~1 m "'.,..r 10 5tttle
!1y the &ttMd to thIot fiv~ or the·lnjurrd. were 10,':1"0'" Ih." Fffnch h)' 7h; I'ltn.~ thl' ~llernoon. . lion of ~nt".nl rl. lions.·.Thf Soulh '·~Inar.t·~ pnlihc;al. <1l"IPIhf1It. on.' policemen. I Nt Yo," 7iltlf ' F,nt.. Ih., d?Cumenl .s pnKtH dffinftl In the d",.,,; I problt"m. Z"n.:~ of I."on;rol pll~t balli, Officials att';bul~. the W s; rnant to Pfmlll • br ler • menl IJ:aon Sirnscs Ihe pri.; and lhe 'luc.:.an of ~oner; of ·md'lIn..s. Z9f1t blast t.o ~. unLsI a,nw, To brai. with, 1 will rnd ~plem~nllltion. II c~gel;t mal"): ilJl[>O. T\.1t:'<"e \of J:cnml \ milllll")" Ctl'I.lnll :nust be.dO!"-wo V>rUt.&mI, 10 iIU.M L you our deJ.eca1>on's eommu. ImPlemfntahon., of the .. : ns elecloons.1""HI"'"nll fnrmauon fonl."d by the f"l'J~IUon of Uri~ dn,~ _ In the nonhem pn,vince n.qut conc:emipl the .i,niq 1C1:0rd.nd prolocol,. As'at 0.' a NatlOnll Couhcil of N., \ in ~Ulh V .. 'lnillJI.... _
1:''''.' VM-tname'! ~of Qun, N,m, two childfl."n of OW" joint ctlll\lllWli!:IU~: as .we are concemt:d, the toOnll Concord.an~ln. ':rH-. I .\ Inrillrilion Ciled '. pocnt. tnU"y. died and 5ill wrre '"jUft"d The joinl Cllrl'lmuniqu~. ba~c document ""lJIi~ the II'Itnt on. the IIISI tuhons 10' . .
• of T_ .. +..on ,,,,"v " .. ,nnatfOd a hand, ".Mrll ... ~ ...... ~ i,,~' .... ; .. "M. ~ins acron! and proc ... IL ~ ,· ..... ed mlo nc .. n~. Thus The /",.nh ""inc: If ... -e
J