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105PERCEPIONS, Autumn 2012, Volume XVII, Number 3, pp. 105-129.

taking place, which have important policy

implications for both urkey and Israel.

Key Words

urkish foreign policy, urkish-Israelirelations, image theory, frenemy, the flotillaincident, decision-making.

Introduction

For decades, urkey remained theonly Muslim country to have recognisedIsrael, following the countrys recognitionof the State of Israel in March 1949,less than a year after its proclamation.Diplomatic missions between the two

countries were opened in 1950 at thelegation level. Although urkish-Israelirelations did not have a meaningfulcontent until the 1990s, the relationsbetween the two countries became ratherstrained when the Israeli tactics used inthe 1982 Lebanese War created publicoutrage in urkey.1

Te improvements in urkish-Israelirelations that began following the end

Abstract

By way of utilising and also extending image

theory, one of the earliest and longest-lastingresearch areas in foreign policy analysis, thisarticle discusses the change in the perception ofthe Other that is currently taking place in bothurkey and Israel. It argues that whereas Israelsees urkey increasingly as a frenemy, urkeyconsiders Israel an inconvenient/untrustworthypartner. Israels image of urkey as a frenemyrepresents a perceived relationship in whichurkey has similar power traits, an inferiorculture, and that urkey presents a threat toIsraels power and security in the Middle East.urkeys image of Israel as an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner represents a perceivedrelationship in which Israel has similar powerand inferior cultural traits, and that Israelis a partner that cannot be trusted. Indeed,the strategic interactions between the twocountries, especially since the first significant

signs of problems emerged in the mid-2000s,illustrate the level and extent of these changes

Binnur ZKEEC-ANER*

FromAllies to Frenemiesand Inconvenient

Partners: Image Teory and urkish-IsraeliRelations

* Binnur zkeeci-aner is an Associate Professorof political science at Hamline University. Herteaching and research interests include foreignpolicy analysis, politics of the Middle East,regional and international security, coalitiongovernments and party politics, and urkishforeign policy. Her book, Role of Ideas inCoalition Government Foreign Policymaking:

Te Case of urkey between 1991 and 2002,waspublished in 2009 by Brill/RoL Publishers.


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flowed from November 2002, when theJustice and Development Partycame to

power in urkey, until December 2008,when Israel started a three-week offensivein the Gaza Strip. Relations between thetwo countries further deteriorated afterthe Davos incident in March 2009 andthe low-chair crisis in January 2010.However, it was the Mavi Marmara(or the Flotilla) incident of May2010 that brought the two parties to a

major crisis point. It is safe to suggestthat the urkish-Israeli relationship hasnot recovered since this incident. Infact, tensions between the two countrieshave once again been increasing sincemid-September 2011 following thepublication of the United Nations PalmerReport and the Israeli-Greek Cypriot

deal on oil and natural gas exploration inthe eastern Mediterranean.

But what explains the dramatic shiftin the relations between these twoimportant and powerful non-Arab statesin the Middle East? Is the changingnature of urkish-Israeli relations aconsequence of geopolitical factors?

Or should one also consider the roleof important perceptual and ideationalfactors? If neither urkey nor Israelconsiders the other side as a strategicpartner any more, especially so soon afterthe golden years of their relationship inthe 1990s, what is the new image theyhave of each other?

Based on preliminary research, thisarticle suggests that a change in the

of Cold War led urkey to upgrade itsrelations with Israel to full ambassadorial

states after the Madrid Peace Conferencein 1991.2 Te real intensification ofrelations started after the signing of theOslo Agreement between Israel and thePalestinian Liberation Organisation in1993, with urkish Foreign MinisterHikmet Cetin visiting Israel in Novemberof the same year, an unprecedented visitto Israel at that level.3More prominently,

the urkish military initiated and signedthe first military training agreementbetween urkey and Israel in 1996,which led to significant expansion anddeepening of strategic alliance, as wellas economic cooperation, that markedurkish-Israeli relations in the secondhalf of the 1990s.

Criticisms about close urkish-Israelirelations increased following the Israeliattack on the Jenin refugee camp in April2002, which caused massive civiliancasualties. In the midst of a major publicoutcry in urkey, then Prime MinisterBlent Ecevit described the Israeli attackson the Jenin refugee camp as genocideand accused the Israeli government of

committing acts against humanity.urkish-Israeli relations ebbed and

It was the Mavi Marmara (orthe Flotilla) incident of May2010 that brought the twoparties to a major crisis point.


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believe to be the current images the twocountries have of each other. Finally,

we summarise our findings and discusspolicy implications in the concludingsection.

Foreign Policy DecisionMaking and Image Teory

In order to answer the above-

mentioned questions about thedrastic change in urkish-Israelirelations, a foreign policy decision-making approach is necessary becauseindividuals (and in this case urkish andIsraeli foreign policy decision makers)interpretations of the world, their viewof the Self and the Other, and the ways

their preferences become aggregated inthe decision-making process can shapewhat governments and institutions do inthe foreign policy arena. As Snyder andhis colleagues observed in 1954, peoplematter in international affairs4 anddecision makers can affect the way thatforeign policy problems are framed, the

options that are selected, the choices thatare made, and what gets implemented.Tey can also play an important rolein changing the strategic culture ornational roles of their state by alteringpublic opinion or using public opinionto justify and rationalise their foreignpolicy actions.5

Since the 1970s, many foreign policyanalysts have especially focused on belief

image of the Other is currently underwayin both Israel and urkey vis--vis each

other. As the strategic interactionsbetween the two countries and thespeeches by leaders in both urkey andIsrael since the first significant signs ofproblems in 2008 have demonstrated,Israel increasingly sees urkey as a

frenemy, a partner who is simultaneouslya rival, and urkey considers Israel aninconvenient/untrustworthy partner.

Tis article first examines the literatureon the origins and evolution of one ofthe earliest and longest-lasting researchareas in foreign policy decision-makinganalysis: image theory. Scholars havelong pointed out that cognitive conceptsand constructs such as images are helpful

in explaining foreign policy decisionmaking and state action in internationalrelations. In this section, we evaluate thecontributions of this particular researcharea by focusing on its strengths andweaknesses. I further argue that despitetheir success in foreign policy analysis,scholars of image theory have yet tosuccessfully explain how images of theSelf and the Other alter and how thesechanges influence relations between twocountries. Te following part re-focusesour attention on urkish-Israeli relationsin recent years, with an emphasis on anumber of crises, and analyses how theimages each side has had of the other hasbeen changing over time. In this section,

we draw hypotheses from the scholarshipon image theory and propose what we


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on the lenses through which leaders viewthe world. In this sense, it is misleading

to assume that leaders experiencing thesame political event have similar goalsand will choose similar responses unlesstheir definitions of the situation andbeliefs are somewhat equivalent. In fact,Michael Brecher has said that decisionmakers do not respond directly to anobjectively constituted environment, but

rather think and act upon their image ofthe Other and/or representation of thatenvironment.11

Individuals are beset with limitationswhen monitoring and analysing highlycomplex physical and especially socialenvironments.12 On the one hand,they are constantly bombarded with so

much information that it is difficult toabsorb and process. On the other hand,crucial information may be missing oruncertain. What is more important is thatindividuals hold on to their values andbeliefs. As a result, decision makers oftenhave to go beyond the information givenin order to interpret the world and make

necessary judgments. Beliefs, schemas,images, analogies, metaphors, lessonsfrom the past, and expertise providethem with short cuts for decipheringand classifying information to make itmanageable.13 In effect, the numerousinternational and domestic factors thatdecision makers must consider in the

decision-making process are channelledthrough these perceptual filters in

systems or schemas6and images.7Beliefsystems or schemas are the mental

constructs that represent differentclumps of knowledge about variousfacets of the environment for interpretinginformation.8 Tey simplify andstructure the external environment soas to make sense of the world and thesituation at hand. Te term imagerefersto the total cognitive, affective, and

evaluative structure of the behaviourunit, or its internal view of itself and itsuniverse.9

Robert Abelson has observed thatschemas and images of the worldinfluence how an individual is going to act

in the decision-making process.10 Suchschemas and images become, in Abelsonsterms, the possessions of individualsand define who they are politically andwhat they value. Tese possessions, inreturn, influence what a persons goalsare likely to be in a particular situationby defining what will be salient to them;

what people feel compelled to act upon;and how decisions can differ depending

Decision makers can affectthe way that foreign policyproblems are framed, the

options that are selected, thechoices that are made, and whatgets implemented.


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of images. Tis research employed acognitive approach to study general

images held by political elites, especiallyimages of the Self and Other. In the1950s and 1960s, within the broaderscope of the belief-system-perception-decision-making relationship there [was]a heightened concern for the problemof stereotyped national images as asignificant factor in the dynamics of theinternational system.16Since then, it hasbeen established that perceptions havetheir greatest policy impact when theyare not isolated beliefs but are part of anintegrated gestalt, or combined image, ofanother country.17

Te term image refers to the totalcognitive, affective, and evaluativestructure of the behaviour unit, or itsinternal view of itself and its universe.18Te earliest studies suggested that imagescan be partial or general and decisionmakers may or may not state theseimages consciously in their speeches.19Scholars have examined the originsand consequences of the images that

states hold of each other, particularly inthe context of international conflict.20

becoming part of the interpretation ofwhat is happening.

In Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA),belief systems and images becomeespecially important when and howdecision makers recognise that there isa problem that needs to be addressed,and how this problem is defined,represented, and/or framed. Framingis a selective representation of what

may be going on in a given situation.Tis cognitive agenda-setting tamesinformational complexity by identifyingthe key dynamics and processes drivinga (foreign policy) problem based oncognitive structures such as images andother types of heuristics.14For example,when problems are critical to decision

makers holding onto positions of powerand influence, such perceptual biasesmay lead them to see threats where thereare none and to become more dogmaticand rigid in their policy preferences. Inthis regard, the perception of the Otherand belief systems become importantin the interpretation and framing of a

foreign policy problem. In fact, thesefactors may serve as a filter, prison,blind spot, and rhetorical weapon.15

Additionally, decision makers tend to fitincoming information into their existingtheories and images, thereby influencingtheir interpretation of a problem.

One of the earliest research areas in

foreign policy decision-making studiesrevolved around the systematic analysis

Individuals are beset withlimitations when monitoringand analysing highly complexphysical and especially socialenvironments.


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important factors in ones creation of theimage of the Other: (1) the perceived

threat and/or opportunity representedby that actor, (2) the perceived relativecapability of the actor, and (3) theperceived culture of that actor. Te firsttwo components- the perceived threat/opportunity and relative capability of theOther- are directly related to Bouldingsand Holstis examination of both enemy/friend and strong/weak categories andare aligned with the established literatureon image theory. Te third componentis a new component that draws fromsociology and psychology. In additionto the enemy image, Herrmann andFischerkeller appended four images-degenerate, colony, imperialist, andally- to add greater analytical diversity

to cognitive perspectives.28 Anotherstudy by Herrmann and his colleaguesadded yet another image- barbarian-and further argued for a formal theoryof international images based on theperception of structural relationsbetween two states.29 Tey argued thatimages are a constellation of features

that cluster together in meaningful waysand are dictated by the interaction of theabove-mentioned three factors.

As able 1 below shows, the enemyimage is limited to a perception of athreatening Other that is similar incapability and not very different in termsof cultural sophistication. Te degenerate

image represents the image of the Otherthat is similar in terms of capability but

others in the international arena, whichlead them to see these others as allies or

enemies. As they suggest, these imagesmediate perception, interpretation, andbehaviour; they are used as analogs,allowing extrapolation from pastexperiences to current and anticipatedreality.26

Richard K. Herrmann and MichaelP. Fischerkeller provided well-placedcriticism of the efforts to study imagesin International Relationss (IR) andFPAs heavy focus on a single analyticalconstruct, the enemy image and theassociated spiral model of interaction.27Instead, Herrmann and Fischerkellerproposed a broader theory of ideal imagesthat included five different kinds of

strategic perception, which, according tothem, had more powerful analytical andexplanatory leverage in explaining stateaction. Teir theory, an interactionistperspective, was based on a combinationof cognitive-psychological approaches toFPA coupled with IR theory.

In their attempt to formulate the five

ideal types of national images, Herrmannand Fischerkeller focused on three

Te enemy image is limited toa perception of a threateningOther that is similar in capabilityand not very different in termsof cultural sophistication.


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presents an intense threat. Te ally imagecorresponds to a perceived relationship

in which the Other has similar culturaland power traits and that there can be amutually beneficial relationship betweenthe Self and the Other. Finally, in thebarbarianimage, the Other is perceivedto present a threat and that it has inferiorculture and superior capability.

is suffering from cultural decay. Tedegenerate can be exploited. Te colony

image represents a view of the Otherthat is weaker in terms of capability andculture and provides an opportunityfor exploitation. Te imperialist imageis the opposite of the colony imagein that it represents an image of theOther that is superior in capacity and


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there will be more complex strategiesassociated with foreign policy choices.

Still though, these ideal types andthe hypothesised strategic choices areimportant in determining what foreignpolicy choices are likelyto be consideredif the complex imagery resembles to oneof the ideal-types of images.

Tere are some hypothesisedrelationships between these ideal-typical

images and strategic choices as able2 below illustrates. Certainly, theseimages are the ideal types, and thus theyrepresent less complex images of theOther. In reality, when the prevailingimagery of the Other is more complex,

Table 2: Hypothesised Relationships between these Ideal-Typical Images and Strategic Choices

(Adapted from: Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995)

ImageForeign policy strategy that follows

from strategic judgmentsMain goals of the strategy

Enemy Containment

Deter; protect and shield; build majoralliance system, protect geopolitical assetsfrom target; protect credibility as a majorpower/attractive ally

Ally Institutional cooperation

Enhance combined capability and mutualconfidence in common action; enhance

third-party contribution to commoncause; reduce third-party threats that pre-occupy targets capability; reduce numberof power instruments and enhance positiveresource contribution

Degenerate RevisionismRollback and deter; build major alliancesystem; protect geopolitical assets andattract new alliances

Imperialist Independent fortress

Reduce target control; deter targetintervention or compel its exit; gain

support against target; reduce targets rolein region; reduce targets access to resources

Colony InterventionEnsure existence of cooperative clientregime in target

Some of these theoretical claims weretested in three different experiments.Tese experimental studies focused on

(1) the definition of the sub-componentsof each image, (2) spelling out the

relationship among the components,and (3) establishing the relationshipbetween these images, emotional and

affective feelings, and policy choice.30Teir findings strongly supported the


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the United States lend support toimage theory predictions regarding

the specific patterns of internationalrelations perceptions that lead to specificinternational images.33 Alexander andher colleagues found that Lebaneseparticipants in the experiment tended toperceive the United States as primarilyhaving relatively superior power, inferiorcultural status, and incompatible goals,and the strongest image they had of theUnited States was the barbarian image.Moreover, when these scholars held twoof the structural perceptions- high powerand goal incompatibility- constant

and examined therelationship betweenstatus perceptionsand endorsement

of the barbarianimage, they foundthat perceptions oflower cultural status

of the United States were associated withstronger endorsement of the barbarianimage.

Most recently, while attempting toassess the internal validity of imagetheory in explaining foreign policybehaviour, Rhezeda Bilali also extendedthe image theory by examining therole of emotions and the strength ofin-group identifications in informingan individuals understandingof international images.34 In her

examination of the interrelationshipsin the theory components within the

claims that (1) four of the six images-ally, enemy, colony and imperial- have

persistent sub-parts as shown in able 1;(2) there is a strong association betweenaffect and image; and (3) images ofother actors shape perceived interestsin at least two ways. First, an image ofan enemy can create instrumental needssuch as allies and colonies Second, andperhaps more important, core values donot directly lead to a policy choice but

must be put into a context [emphasisadded].31

More recent studies have consistentlyfound that imagesaffect strategicdecisions insystematic ways. Forexample, Herrmannand Keller show intheir 2004 studythat althoughattitudes towardtrade and global commerce have becomean important new ideational fault-line(or perceptual factor) in internationalrelations with implications on foreign

policy choices, American elitesperception that a country harbors hostileintentions and/or is nondemocratic(particularly if both elements arepresent) generally leads to an increasedwillingness to use force and to containthe target state, along with a decreasedpreference for engagement strategies.32

Similarly, the results from aninvestigation of Lebanese images of

Different types of in-groupidentifications such as nationalversus religious identificationcorresponded to differentimages of the Other.


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political spectrum always supported thePalestinian cause, which meant that the

two countries did not really have anymeaningful relationship. Te minimalrelationship between urkey and Israelhit its lowest level in 1982 during theCold War when Israeli tactics used inthe 1982 Lebanese War and the Israelimassacres in two Palestinian refugeecamps on the Lebanese-Israeli bordercreated public outrage in urkey.35

It was only after the 1991 MadridPeace Conference that urkey upgradedrelations with Israel to full ambassadorialstatus. Te 1991 Gulf War and urkeysalliance with the US-led coalition againstIraq amplified urkeys view of Israel as anally and a strategic partner. Israel gained

new meaning in the eyes of the urkishsecurity establishment in a period whenmany European countries questionedthe value of urkeys military andstrategic alliance in the post-Cold Warenvironment. Te real intensification ofrelations started after the signing of theOslo Agreement between Israel and thePalestinian Liberation Organisation in1993. urkish Foreign Minister HikmetCetin visited Israel in November of thesame year, an unprecedented visit atthat level. urkey and Israel signed threeagreements over the next year, dealingwith security cooperation, combatingterrorism, and on agricultural projectsin Central Asia.36More importantly, the

urkish military initiated and signed thefirst military training agreement between

context of urkish-US relations, Bilalifound that while hostility is strongly

associated with both the imperialistand the barbarian image, trust is theonly emotion associated with the allyimage. Another important finding is thatdifferent types of in-group identificationssuch as national versus religiousidentification corresponded to differentimages of the Other. Bilali demonstratedthat for whom national identity is themain identity-marker, the United Statesrepresented an imperial power, whereasfor whom religious identity was moreimportant, the United States is viewed asa barbarian. Te results from the above-mentioned studies offer importantempirical support for the notion that aconstellation of interrelated perceptions,

or images, are central for generatingspecific foreign policy behaviour towardsthe Other.

urkish-Israeli Relations

As mentioned earlier, the tepidrelationship between urkey and Israelfollowing the establishment of the Stateof Israel in 1948 began to improve inthe 1990s, and intensified significantlybetween 1996 and 2002. urkey was thefirst Muslim country to recognise theState of Israel, less than a year after itsproclamation, and for decades remainedthe only Muslim state to have diplomatic

relations with it. However, the urkishpublic and political leaders across the


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after the Welfare Party came to office inJuly 1996.

Despite significant expansion and thedeepening of urkish-Israeli relations inthe 1990s, Israels attack on the Jeninrefugee camp in April 2002 created avisible crack in relations between the twocountries. Te bombings that inflictedmassive civilian casualties among thePalestinians created a public outcry in

urkey and led Prime Minister BlentEcevit to go as far to describe the Israeliattacks on the Jenin refugee camp asgenocide.

urkish-Israeli relations ebbed andflowed from November 2002, when the

Justice and Development Party cameto power in urkey, until December

2008, when Israel started a three-weekoffensive in the Gaza Strip. Te start ofthe Iraqi War in 2003 and increasinganti-American feelings in urkey werealso important in fuelling criticismagainst Israel as the Israeli leadershipvoiced their support for the Iraqi Waras one of the main regional allies of theUnited States. Nonetheless, governmentsin both countries maintained theircooperation. For example, while Israeldid react rather moderately when theurkish government launched a numberof foreign policy initiatives in the MiddleEast, including an invitation to Hamasleadership to pay an official visit tourkey following the latters victories in

the local elections of 2005 and in theparliamentary legislative elections in

urkey and Israel in February 1996.Te agreement called for joint training

of urkish and Israeli aircraft pilots,intelligence sharing to a certain degree,and permitted Israeli air force jets to flyin urkish air space.

Te urkish-Israeli strategicpartnership of the 1990s was consideredto be a relationship of status quo powerswho were concerned with maintaining

the existing geopolitical conditions inthe region and found similarities in eachothers political culture.37For the urksand the Israelis, both urkey and Israelrepresented the only two democraciesin a region filled with authoritarianand dictatorial political systems, bothhad Western orientation and did not

necessarily trust their Arab neighbours,and finally, both had extra specialrelationships with the United States. Teurkish leadership also wanted to send asignal to the Europeans that urkey wasnot obsessed with Europe, and thaturkey was ready and able to ally itselfwith other countries as a reliable politicaland military partner. Israel viewedits alliance with urkey as a powerfuldeterrent against Arab countries- Syria inparticular- in the region.38Te strategicpartnership being created primarily bythe urkish military was also seen as anapproach to keep the Islamist WelfareParty in check.39 In fact, the militaryhad chosen to make Israel a central

issue to showcase its differences with theIslamists and to challenge their authority


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injured. Israel considered its actionsto be legitimate self-defence. Israeli

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahusuggested that Had the blockade beenbreached, this flotilla would have beenfollowed by dozens, by hundreds ofships. Te amount of weapons that canbe transported aboard a ship is totallydifferent from what we saw get throughthe tunnels (beneath the Gaza-Egyptborder). Hundreds of missiles androckets, and an innumerable numberof weapons can be smuggled aboard aship.46

urkey, on the other hand, consideredthe Israeli actions to be unjustifiableand in contravention of internationallaw. Te urkish leadership called for

an emergency meeting of the UnitedNations Security Council, on which itheld a non-permanent seat at the time, onthe very same day of the incident. Duringthe Security Council session, urkishForeign Minister Ahmet Davutolucalled Israels actions banditry andpiracy... murder conducted by a state...and barbarism and charged that Israelhas once again clearly demonstratedthat it does not value human lives andpeaceful initiatives through targetinginnocent civilians.47 Prime MinisterErdoan described Israels actions as abloody massacre. In his speech to hispartys parliamentary group, which wasbroadcasted live by 25 foreign networks

while simultaneously translated intoArabic and English, Erdoan once again

countrys policy for security reasons. Tediscussion came to a breaking point,

however, when the moderator firstrefused to allow Prime Minister Erdoanto reply and then tried to repeatedlystop him after the Prime Ministerbegan his emotionally charged responseto President Shimon Peres, in whichErdoan did not hesitate to blame theIsraeli leadership for knowing well howto kill. After repeated interventions bythe moderator, Prime Minister Erdoanwalked off the stage complaining that hewas given much less time to speak thanthe Israeli president and accusing thepanel moderator of not allowing him tospeak.

If relations between urkey and Israel

reached a historic low point followingthe Davos incident, it was the MaviMarmara (or the Flotilla) incidenton 31 May 2010 that brought thetwo parties to a major crisis point.45 Asix-ship flotilla organised by the pro-Palestinian Free Gaza Movement and thepro-Hamas urkish Humanitarian ReliefFund to deliver humanitarian aid to theGaza Strip and to break Israels blockadeof the territory was intercepted by Israelispecial forces in international waters.

While the special forces took control offive of the ships without much resistanceor use of violence, a confrontation onboard the urkish vesselMavi Marmararesulted in the killing of eight urks

and one urkish-American citizen. Inaddition, more than 20 passengers were


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for the killing of nine civilians, as wellas for compensation for the relatives of

the victims. Prime Minister Erdoanadded that such an apology wouldbe a condition to continued urkishmediation efforts in any future peacetalks between Israel and Syria. In aninterview with Al Jazeera, the PrimeMinister responded to a question aboutthe flotilla incident by suggesting that

it was urkeys grandeur and patiencethat prevented it from going to war withIsrael.50

Although another major crisis wasavoided, urkish-Israeli relations wereperiodically tension-ridden until thepublication of the oft-postponed PalmerReport. Te report, which was first

leaked before being made public inSeptember 2011, called the commandosaction on the urkish ship excessive andunreasonable, condemned the loss oflife as unacceptable, and found Israelstreatment of passengers on the shipabusive. However, the report criticallyconcluded that Israels naval blockade

of the Gaza Strip was legitimate andthat it had to be enforced consistentlyto be effective. Te Israeli leadershipimmediately interpreted the documentto be legitimising the Israeli right ofself-defence. On the other hand, theurkish leadership declared it null andvoid, expelled the Israeli ambassador

and senior Israeli diplomats inresponse to Israels refusal to apologise

condemned the Israeli attacks, accusedIsrael of state terrorism and demanded

the lifting of the Gaza blockade, andrecalled the urkish ambassador from elAviv. He reiterated his earlier warning toIsrael: urkeys hostility is as strong asits friendship is valuable. Losing urkeysfriendship is in itself a big price to pay.48

On 13 June, mainly in response tointernational calls for an investigationof the incident, Israeli PrimeMinister Netanyahu announced theestablishment of a special, independentpublic commission to inquire intothe events of 31 May. However,urkish Foreign Minister Davutoluinstantaneously declared that any reportby this commission was unacceptable

because the crime was committedin international waters, not in Israelsterritorial waters.49 In a way to showurkeys distrust toward an Israeli-established commission, Davutoludemanded an international inquiryunder the supervision of the UnitedNations with the participation of urkey

and Israel. Te urkish leadership alsodemanded a formal apology from Israel

Davutolu demanded aninternational inquiry underthe supervision of the UnitedNations with the participationof urkey and Israel.


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the two countries, and partly as a measureto avoid Israels becoming a natural gas

exporter, urkey has vigorously objectedto Israels desire to drill in its exclusiveeconomic zone in the MediterraneanSea. Israel, on the other hand, signed acooperation agreement with the GreekCypriot leaders and started drilling foroil and gas despite urkeys opposition.


What do the above-mentioned eventsbetween urkey and Israel, especiallythose since December of 2008, signify?o what extent is the urkish-Israelilink that was once considered to be animportant strategic partnership in theMiddle East irremediably broken? Andfinally, what are the theoretical andpolicy implications of these changeson the image theory and the future ofurkish-Israeli relations, respectively?

Te two quick and straightforwardconclusion one can give from the reviewof the literature on image theory and theevents between urkey and Israel in thepast four years suggest are that, first, theideal image types provide less help thanthey did before in examining urkishand Israeli foreign policies vis--vis eachother, and second, urkish and Israeliforeign policy actions vis-a-vis each otherclearly illustrate that neither urkey nor

Israel sees the other side as an ally, or astrategic partner, anymore.

for the incident, suspended militaryagreements with Israel, and promised

to take measures to ensure freedom ofnavigation in the eastern Mediterranean,including providing urkish warships toescort new flotillas to Gaza. Te urkishleadership also announced (but has, tothis day, yet to execute) that it wouldchallenge Israels blockade of the GazaStrip at the International Court of Justice

at Te Hague.51

Expressing that urkeyalways represented an understanding ofpeace and not conflict, justice and notoppression, Davutolu stated therefore,we have displayed our reaction to theinhumane attacks in Gaza, just as weraised our voices against the massacres inBosnia and Kosovo.52

Since mid-September 2011 a newproblem, this time over gas exploration inthe eastern Mediterranean, has emergedbetween the two countries. Partly as away to block the Greek Cypriots fromhaving the precedent of an exclusiveeconomic zone in which they could drillfor gas to the detriment of the urkishCypriots, partly as a response to the

Israeli interception ofMavi Marmara in2010 and the ensuing tension between

Images, once formed, are hardto change, and when they dochange, the change does notalways happen in a predictableway.


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of a country. In return, the change bringswith it a realigning of national interests

and priorities, as well as foreign policygoals and objectives.

I contend that although the ally imageof the Other has yet to be replacedcompletely by another image in eitherurkey or Israel, something which needsto be studied more empirically in thefuture, a significant shift in the image of

the Other is currently underway in bothcountries. As discussed in detail above,

the scholarship onimage theory hasestablished thatthere are threeimportant factorsin ones image of

the Other: (1) theperceived threatand/or opportunity represented by thatactor, (2) the perceived relative capabilityof the actor, and (3) the perceived cultureof that actor. Based on these three factorsand urkish-Israeli interactions especiallysince 2008, I tentatively suggest thatwhereas the Israeli image of urkey isincreasingly that of afrenemy,54a partnerwho is simultaneously a rival and afriend in the region, urkey considersIsrael more and more as an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner.

Te scholarship on image theoryhas shown that images, once formed,

are hard to change, and when they dochange, the change does not alwayshappen in a predictable way. In one of themost important studies Charles Osgoodsuggested that the enemy image of theOther can change when the interactiverelationship between the partiespromotes gradual reciprocal reduction intension (GRI).53According to Osgood,the side that initiates a reduction intension remains uncertain as to the othersides intentions.Terefore, it protectsits basic security buttakes an initial de-escalatory move ina peripheral area.

Expecting the otherside to be suspicious,the first side may make several movesof this type in hopes of inducingreciprocation. When mistrust is high andneither party is willing to make multiplepositive initiatives, GRI is likely tofail. However, when successful or when

repeated actions of a party is inconsistentwith the expectations that a pre-existingimage generates, policy makers start tore-think the existing image. A changein the image of the Other may also becaused by changes in the domestic setting

A change in the image of theOther may also be caused bychanges in the domestic settingof a country.


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Table 3: Israel and Turkey: From Allies to Frenemiesand Inconvenient Partners

(Adapted from: Herrmann et al., 1997)

Foreign policy challenge

THREAT

CULURE

Superior Similar Inferior

Superior (1) (2) Imperialist (3) Barbarian

CAPABILIY Similar (4) (5) Enemy (6) Frenemy

Inferior (7) (8) (9)

MUTUAL GAIN A

CULURE

Superior (10) (11) (12)

CAPABILIY Similar (13) (14) Ally B(15) Inconvenient/untrustworthy partner

Inferior (16) (17) (18)

OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT

CULURE

Superior (19) (20) (21)

CAPABILIY Similar (22) (23) Degenerate (24)

Inferior (25) (26) (27) Colony

As illustrated in table 3, I argue thatIsraels image of urkey as a

frenemyrep-

resents a perceived relationship in whichurkey has similar power traits and in-ferior culture. Moreover, the Israeli per-ception is that urkey presents a threat toIsraels security in the Middle East. Forexample, in a speech dedicated mostly tothe Iranian threat and the current civilunrest in Arab states, Major General

Amir Eshel, head of the Israeli DefenceForces Plans and Policy Directorate, also

mentioned urkey as a point of concern:We do not see [urkey] as radicalbut where it is heading is a big ques-tion.55 During a presentation at Her-zliya, Director-General of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs Rafi Barak also notedurkeys ambitions towards becoming aregional superpower and suggested thatwe [in the Israeli government] are look-ing at this closely. Moreover, for the first

time in its history, urkeys position inthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict became


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has similar power and inferior culturaltraits. Israel, irrespective of its small size,

has a very powerful military. Moreover,despite the policy of opaqueness pur-sued by the Israeli state, Israel is knownto have nuclear weapons capability. Terise of right-wing parties in Israel and anincreasing hawkishness on the Israeli-Palestinian issue also seem to be a keyfactor in urkeys changing perception ofIsrael.57 In his September 2011 visit to

Egypt as part of his North Africa tour,Erdoan stated in reference to Israel thatstates, just like individuals, have to paythe price for murders and for acts of ter-rorism they have committed so that wecan live in a more just world,58and re-iterated urkeys rejection of the legalityof the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip.

It is also telling that a urkish televisiondrama, Te Valley of the Wolves, was clear-ly able to depict Israeli intelligence agentsand diplomats as murderous and cruel inone of its most-watched episodes. Unlikebefore, Israel seems no longer part of thesecularist-Islamist competition in urk-ish politics today.59

Nevertheless, the principles of zero-

problem foreign policy and pro-activeand pre-emptive peace diplomacy es-

one-sided, demanding that Israel takesteps to ease the blockade of Gaza or risk

unspecified consequences.Despite questions about urkeys

warmer relations with the Arab MiddleEast and its increasing foreign policyassertiveness Israel still favours at leastfriendly relations with urkey, especial-ly in a volatile time in the region. Teinternational communitys pressure on

Iran has not yielded any positive resultsregarding the issue of Iranian nucleari-sation, and violent revolutionary unresthas created an environment with thefuture unclear and Islamist groups suchas Egypts Muslim Brotherhood gainingfrom instability. Some Israeli officialshave warned against further deteriora-tion in Israeli-urkish relations such as,for example, when urkey excluded Is-rael from a joint military exercise due toIsraels offensive against Hamas in Gazain December 2009.56 Furthermore, theIsraeli leadership welcomes urkeys me-diation in resolving its problems withcertain Arab countries and organisations.For example, most recently in October

2011 urkey was directly and indirectlyinvolved in brokering a deal between Is-rael and Hamas in which the Israeli sol-dier Gilat Shalit, who had been held cap-tive by Hamas for five years, was freedin exchange for more than a thousandPalestinians held in Israeli prisons.

urkeys image of Israel as an incon-

venient/untrustworthy partner representsa perceived relationship in which Israel

It is very likely that bothcountries will try to containeach other by using differentforeign policy instruments.


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Iraq in an attempt to build an allianceand to prevent future urkish influence

in the area. Similarly, urkey could pre-fer to have closer relations with Egyptunder a possible leadership of the Mus-lim Brotherhood. In other words, bothcountries are likely to pursue policies thatwould help them protect geopolitical as-sets and attract new alliances, withoutprovoking each other into an actual war.

Tis topic would benefit from futureresearch providing an extensive contentanalysis of the leaders speeches, partypositions, and government programmesin both urkey and Israel, as well asin-depth understanding of the foreignpolicy actions each country has takentowards each other and other political

actors in international relations to ex-amine (1) whether or not the suggestedchange in the image of the Other in bothurkey and Israel vis--vis each other isin fact taking place, (2) whether or notthe images of frenemy and inconvenient/untrustworthy partnerare indeed relevantin analysing the future of urkish-Israeli

relations, and finally, (3) if yes, what thisall means for urkish-Israeli relations inparticular, and for Middle East politicsin general.

poused and promoted by the urkishleadership favours urkey and Israelcontinuing to have a mutually beneficialrelationship. In other words, despite thebitter rhetoric used against Israel as il-lustrated above, the Israeli image that isbecoming predominant in urkey is fil-tered through lenses that are influencedheavily by a desire to create a peacefuland stable regional order, with urkeyhaving regional power status, based

on principles of cooperative security,economic interdependence and good-neighbourly relations, the main pillars ofthe strategic depth doctrine in urkishforeign policy.

Conclusion

Tere are several implications of thesechanging images of the foreign policiesof both urkey and Israel. First and fore-most, urkish-Israeli relations are headedfor a tumultuous and less-than-friendlypath in the foreseeable future, though Is-rael and urkey have acknowledged theirmutual need to cooperate.60 Second, it isvery likely that both countries will try to

contain each other by using differentforeign policy instruments. For example,Israel may further increase its relationswith the Kurdish autonomous region in


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Endnotes

1 Amkam Nachman, Te Remarkable urksh- Israel e, Mddle East QuarterlyVol. 5,No. 2 (March 1998), pp. 19-28; Melha Altunk, Te urksh-Israel Rapprochement nthe Post-Cold War Era,Mddle Eastern Studes, Vol. 36, No.2 (Aprl 2000), pp. 172-189.

2 A detaled examnaton of urksh-Israel relatons n the 1990s and 2000s can be found nAl Balc, urkyenn D Poltkas ve Isral: 1990lar ve 2000lere Ilkn Br Karlatrma,Ortadou Ettler, Vol. 2 (2011), pp. 117-136.

3 Ayegl Sever, urkey and the Syrian-Israeli Peace alks in the 1990s,Middle East Reviewof International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001).

4 Joe D. Hagan, Does Decson Makng Matter? Systemc Assumptons vs. Hstorcal Realtyn Internatonal Relatons, Internatonal Studes Revew, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp.5-46.

5 Herbert Smon brllantly showed that human bengs can have only bounded ratonalty, andthe satsfcng man (for example, the foregn polcy decson maker) who has ths boundedratonalty s very much a socal-psychologcal creature operatng under condtons of tmeconstrants, ll-defned goals, and uncertan condtons, see, Herbert Smon, RatonalChoce and the Structure of the Envronment, Psychologcal Revew, Vol. 63, No. 2 (March1956), pp. 129-138.

6 See for example Susan . Fiske and Shelly E. aylor, SocialCognition, 2nd ed., New York,McGraw- Hill, 1991.

7 Ole R. Holst, Te Belef System and Natonal Images: A Case Study, Te Journal of ConflctResoluton, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1962), pp. 244-252. (Reprnted n James N. Rosenau,Internatonal Poltcs and Foregn Polcy, 2nd ed., New York, Te Free Press, 1969, pp. 543-550).

8 Jerel Rosat, A Cogntve Approach to the Study of Foregn Polcy, n Laura Neack, PatrckJ. Haney, and Jeanne A.K. Hey (eds.), Foregn Polcy Analyss: Contnuty and Change n ts

Second Generaton, Englewood Clffs, NJ: Prentce-Hall, 1995, p. 53.9 Kenneth Bouldng, Te Image: Knowledge n Lfe and Socety, Ann Arbor, Unversty of

Mchgan Press, 1956, p. 423.

10 Robert P. Abelson, Belefs Are Lke Possessons,Journal for the Teory of Socal Behavour,Vol. 16, No. 3 (October 1986), pp. 223-250.

11 Mchael Brecher, Te Foregn Polcy System of Israel, New Haven, Yale Unversty Press, 1974.

12 For example, n Patrca G Devne, Davd L. Hamlton, and Tomas Ostrom, SocalCognton: Impact on Socal Psychology, San Dego, Academc Press, 1994, pp. 3-4; DonaldSylvan and James Voss, Problem Representaton n Foregn Polcy Decson Makng, Cambrdge,Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1998.


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13 Tomas Preston and Margaret G. Hermann, Presdental Leadershp Style and the ForegnPolcy Advsory Process, n Eugene R. Wttkopf and James McCormck (eds.), Te DomestcSources of Amercan Foregn Polcy, New York, Rowman & Lttlefeld, 1999.

14 Erc Stern, Crss Decsonmakng: A Cogntve-Insttutonal Approach, Stockholm Studes nPoltcs 66, Stockholm, Stockholm Unversty, 1999. See also Alex Mntz, Behavoral IRas a Subfeld of Internatonal Relatons, Internatonal Studes Revew, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Sprng2007), pp. 157-172.

15 Erc Stern, Contextualzng and Crtqung the Polheurstc Teory, Journal of ConflctResoluton, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 2004), p. 113.

16 Holsti, Te Belief System and National Images, p. 244.

17 Richard K. Herrmann and Jonathan W. Keller, Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S.Leaders Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of Globalization,Journal ofPolitics, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2004), p. 561.

18 Boulding, Te Image: Knowledge in Life and Society, p. 423.

19 In particular, Boulding, Te Image: Knowledge in Life and Society; Holsti, Te Belief Systemand National Images.

20 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations,New Haven, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976; Jerel Rosati, A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy, inLaura Neack, Patrick J. Haney, and Jeanne A.K. Hey (eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity

and Change in its Second Generation, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp. 49-70.

21 Bouldng (1959), quoted n Rchard K. Herrmann., James F. Voss, onya Y.E. Schooler andJoseph Carroch, Images n Internatonal Relatons: An expermental est of CogntveSchemata, Internatonal Studes Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 1997), p. 407.

22 Holsti Te Belief System and National Images, p. 249.

23 Rosati, A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy, p. 55.

24 Wrights (1957), quoted in Holsti, Te Belief System and National Images, p. 244.

25 Francs A. Beer, Alce F. Healy and Lyle E. Bourne Jr., Dynamc Decsons: ExpermentalReactons to War, Peace, and errorsm, n Margaret G. Hermann (ed.),Advances n PoltcalPsychology I, London, Elsever, 2004.

26 Beer, Healy, and Bourne, Dynamic Decisions, p.141.

27 Rchard K. Herrmann and Mchael P. Fscherkeller, Beyond the Enemy Image and SpralModel: Cogntve- Strategc Research after the Cold War, Internatonal Organzaton, Vol.49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), p. 415.

28 Herrmann and Fischerkeller, Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model, p. 426.

29 Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Carroch, Images n Internatonal Relatons, pp. 403-433.30 Ibid., p. 423.


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31 Ibid.

32 Herrmann and Keller, Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice, p. 577.

33 Michele G. Alexander, Shana Levin, and P. J. Henry, Image Teory, Social Identity, and SocialDominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying InternationalImages, Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 1 (February 2005), pp. 27-45.

34 Rezarta Blal, Assessng the Internal Valdty of Internatonal Image Teory n the Contextof urkeyU.S. Relatons, Poltcal Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 2(Aprl 2010), pp. 275-303.

35 Nachman, Te Remarkable urksh-Israel e; Altunk, Te urksh-IsraelRapprochement n the Post-Cold War Era.

36 Sever, urkey and the Syrian-Israeli Peace alks in the 1990s.

37 evk Br and Martn Sherman, Formula for Stablty: urkey Plus Israel, Mddle EastQuarterly,Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 23-32.

38 Bnnur zkeec-aner, Role of Insttutonalzed Ideas n Coalton Government ForegnPolcymakng: urkey as a Case Study, 1991-2002, Leden, Brll & RoL Publshers, 2009;Bnnur zkeec-aner, Te Impact of Insttutonalzed Ideas n Coalton GovernmentForegn Polcymakng: urkey as an Example, 1991-2002, Foregn Polcy Analyss,Vol. 1,No. 3 (November 2005).

39 Altunk, Te urkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era.

40 Oded Eran, Israel: Quo Vadis, urkey?,Insight urkey

, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp. 31-38.

41 urkeys new actvsm n the Mddle East has been examned by many n the past years. wo ofthe more detaled studes n Englsh language are: Blent Aras and Ayln Grener, NatonalRole Conceptons and Foregn Polcy Orentaton: Te Ideatonal Bases of the of the Justceand Development Partys Foregn Polcy Actvsm n the Mddle East,Journal of Balkan andNear Eastern Studes, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 73-92; ark Ouzlu, Te ChangngDynamcs of urkey-Israel Relatons:A Structural Realst Account,Medterranean Poltcs,Vol. 15, No. 2 (July 2010), pp. 273-288.

42 Erdoan Angered by Israels Gaza Campaign, odays Zaman, 29 December 2008.

43 Ibid.

44 Echoes of Davos Walkout Still Resonating Worldwide,Hrriyet, 30 January 2009.

45 Te low-chair incident of January 2010 did not reach a crisis point as Israel apologisedto urkey following the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dani Ayalons insult to urkeysambassador to Israel by having him sit in a lower chair than his and pointing this to the pressduring the photo session.

46 Statement by Prme Mnster Bnyamn Netanyahu at the Prme Mnsters Offce n Jerusalem,Channel 10 elevson, 2 June 2010, Open Source Center Document GMP20100602738007.Quoted n Carol Mgdalovtz, Israels Blockade of Gaza, theMav Marmara Incdent, andIts Aftermath,CRS Report for Congress #7-5700, 2010.


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47 urksh Mnstry of Foregn Affars, Press Release Regardng the Use of Force by the IsraelDefense Forces Aganst the Humantaran Ad Fleet to Gaza, Open Source Center DocumentGMP20100531017013, 31 May 2010. Quoted n Mgdalovtz, Israels Blockade of Gaza,

theMav MarmaraIncdent, and Its Aftermath.

48 Speech delivered by Prime Minister Erdoan at the AK Party Parliamentary Party GroupMeeting, 1 June 2010, at http://www.akparti.org.tr/tbmm/grupkon.asp [last visited 12 June2012].

49 urkey FM Says Ankara Entitled to Review ies with Israel,Anatolia, 14 June 2010; BBCMonitoring Newsfile, Quoted in Migdalovitz, Israels Blockade of Gaza, theMavi MarmaraIncident, and Its Aftermath.

50 zvi Ben Gedelyahu, urkey: Patience Prevented War with Israel over Flotilla, Israel

National News, at http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/147798 [last visited27 February 2012].

51 Foregn Mnster Ahmet Davutolus remarks at the Press Conference n New York, 27September 2011 at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayn-bakanmzn-new-york_ta-duzenledg-basn-toplants_-27-eylul-2011.tr.mfa [last vsted 25 July 2012].

52 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu, Press Conference, Hurriyet, 2 September 2011 athttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/18633531.asp [last visited 28 May 2012].

53 Charles Osgood, An Alternative o War or Surrender, Urbana, University of Illinois Press,

1962.

54 Te term frenemy was used to describe the changing US-urkish relations by Steven Cookin his opinion piece, How Do You Say Frenemy in urkish?, Foreign Policy, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/01/how_do_you_say_frenemy_in_urkish [last visited18 June 2012].

55 Quoted n Chrs Delso, In Israel, Concerns over urkeys Present Orentaton and FutureCoures, at http://www.balkanalyss.com/turkey/2011/02/19/n-srael-concerns-over-turkey%E2%80%99s-present-orentaton-and-future-course/ [last vsted 22 June 2012].

56 Barak Warns Against Further Harming Israel-urkey Relations, Haaretz, 12 October 2009.57 Gkhan Back, urksh-Israel Relatons after Davos: A Vew from urkey,Insghturkey,

Vol. 11, No. 2 (Aprl- June 2009), pp. 31-41.

58 Erdoan Attacks Israel, Trows Weight Behind Palestinian Statehood, odays Zaman, 13September 2011.

59 Hasan Ksebalaban, Te urkish-Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?,Middle East Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 2010), pp. 3650.

60 In a recent publcaton, aban Karda also contends that the relatons between urkey andIsrael are headed n a rocky path. See, aban Karda, rk-Isral Krz: Moral Poltkadanatmaya, Gr, Vol.70 (October 2011), pp. 12-17.

image theory allies to frenemies

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