Chapter VI

IMPACT OF .WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE ON INTRA-MAGHREB RELATIONS

Chapter VI

IMPACT OF WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE ON INTRA-MAGHREB RELA 'i'IONS

The intra-Maghreb relations and the search for Maghrebi unity has seen many ups

and downs since the period when the Maghreb countries achieved their independence.

Among the major sources of dissention and diffidence among the Maghreb countries

during sixties and seventies had been the non-settlement of well-detined borders. There

is no doubt that this is a part of the colonial legacy and a divisive factor which had

hampered the formation of a regional organization. The Western Sahara issue has been

a divisive factor i~ the Maghreb since 1975. To understand its impact on the intra-

Maghreb relations, it is necessary to scan intra-Maghreb relations prior to the year 1975.

BAC~GROUND

Immediately after the independence of Algeria in 1962, tension between Algeria

and. Morocco over boundary settlement culminated into an armed confrontation between

the two countries in early October 1963. But the coQflict was successfully managed at

the urging of the OAU and by early 1964 the two countries had restored relationship and

engaged in discussions over economic cooperation in the Maghreb. But one of the

consequences of the 1963 conflict was that it resulted into the over-throw of Ben Bella

regime by the military regime of Houari Boumedienne in mid-July 1965. It was in the

year 1965 that the campaign for the decolonization of territory (Spanish Sahara) began

with the UN General Assembly resolution calling for negotiations. As the disposition of

the Spanish colony in the Western Sahara began to appear on the international agenda,

173

the annual resolutions of the UN General Assembly called for self-determination through

referendum. This set the neighbours of Spanish Sahara i.e. Algeria, Morocco and

Mauritania to join forces in pursuit of immediate aims after initial disagreements which

ret1ected their long-term goals.

Algeria and Morocco have been vying with each other for regional dominance

since their independence and the structural rivalry between them is such that Libya.

Tunisia and Mauritania, all with common borders with these powers, have had to t1nd

ways to protect their independence by making sure that neither became strong enough to

dominate the region. The principal means used by the small states to preserve their

political independence and territorial integrity has been to ally themselves alternatively

to Algeria or to Morocco, and at times to each other against the perceived threat from

one of two major powers. 1 Besides the security threat and desire for regional

dominance creating obstacles in the way of political unification in the Maghreb during

1960's and 1970;s, different political systems and the ideologies of the concerned states

also added fuel to the fire. While Morocco was and remains a constitutional monarchy,

Algeria was a radical state and a one-party Socialist Republic till 1988. Tunisia was also

a socialist one-party state but was a conservative republic. Mauritania was almost a

military dictatorship. Since 1969, Libya has remained a revolutionary republic. Besides

ideological differences, the personal antagonism between the leaders of the Maghreb

countries have also come in the way of Maghreb unity.

Mary Jane Deeb, "Inter-Maghrebi Relations since 1969 : A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers" in Middle East Journal, vol. 43, no. 1, Winter 1989, p. 22.

174

The Libyan coup of 1 September 1969 led by Colonel Muammar Gaddhat1

changed the political scenario ·in the Maghreb as close relations between Egypt, Sudan

and Libya were perceived as a threat by the other four countries of the Maghreb. This

resulted into closing of their ranks and efforts to forge a unity. While throughout the

1960's Morocco and Mauritania pursued their claims to the territory, Algeria led the

campaign for referendum; and Spain offered plans every year; each hoping for a weak

Saharan state that it could qominate. But once Morocco recognized Mauritania in 1969,

the three neighbours carne together, shifting their competition for territory to cooperation

against Spanish rule in Western Sahara. 2 It is pertinent to mention here that even after

Mauritania's independence in 1960, Morocco had not recognised the State of Mauritania

as it had claimed Mauritania as part of the 'Greater Morocco'. King Hassan had made

his first trip to Algiers to attend the OAU Summit in September 1968 and Boumedienne

visited lfrane in Morocco on 15 January 1969 to draw up a Treaty of Solidarity and

Cooperation with Morocco. On 27 May 1970, the two Heads of State met in Tlemeen

to coordinate their Saharan strategy and on 15 June 1972 at the OAU Summit in Rabat

they signed a ~reaty that finally established a common frontier. A similar treaty was

signed between Algeria and Tunisia on 6 January 1970 as well as an agreement and

protocol on the Tunisian-Algerian border dispute, which was a source of tension between

the two countries for a long time. Similarly the treaty of friendship, fraternity and good

neighbourliness, signed between Morocco and Mauritania on 8 June 1970, ended

Morocco's claim over Mauritania.

2 I.W. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford, 1985), p. 30.

175

The 1972 border agreement between Morocco and Algeria proved to be very

helpful and advantageous to King Hassan of Morocco. During late 1960's and early

1970's, King Hassan's position at domestic level was very vulnerable. Not only did he

have tp promulgate two Constitutions in 1970 and 1972, he also faced stiff opposition

from left parties and had to face two unsuccessful military coups in 1971 and 1972. By

signing the 1972 agreement favourable to Algeria King Hassan was able to mend fences

with Algeria for the time being. All these developments in the early 1970's laid the

ground for a possible Maghrebi unity. The intra-Maghreb differences over most of the

territory had been resolved and the problem of decolonisation of the Western Sahara did

not pose a serious threat to the regional stability. Rather a tripartite summit was held in

September 1970 between Houari Boummedienne of Algeria, King Hassan of Morocco

and President Ould Daddah of Mauritania in Nouadhibou at which a call for self-

determination in the Western Sahara was fncorporated into the final communique.3 In

July 1973 the three Heads of State met at Agadir to coordinate their policy regarding the

Maghreb cooperation and unity. In the Agadir meeting, 'presumably some kind of

understanding was also arrived at, by which Morocco was to receive Saqiet al-Hamra and

Mauritania was to receive Rio de Oro, with the acquiescence of Algeria' .4 Had

Morocco maintained this understanding of the division of the territory along the 26th

parallel, the history of Maghreb would have been different altogether.

3 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara Connecticut, 1983), p. 118.

4 Zartman. n. 2, p. 31.

The Roots of a Desert War (Westport,

176

Meanwhile the diplomatic relations between Morocco and Libya improved during

1973 and in December 1974 Morocco and Libya exchanged ambassadors. Since 1969.

Libya was more inclined towards Egypt and only after the 1973 war (Yom Kippour war)

when Egypt-Libya relations deteriorated that Libya turned towards the Maghreb. On 12

January 1974 Libya and Tunisia announced the merger of their two countries through the

Jerba Union. In January 1975 Qaddhafi visited Morocco secretly and offered King

Hassan II his assistance on the Western Sahara. Libya's friendly gesture towards

Morocco d!Jring 1975 was most welcome to King Hassan, as there was serious

disagreement between Morocco and Algeria over the Saharan issue. 5 The disagreement

started after Spain announced in 1974 its intention to hold a referendum in the Western

Sahara in early 1975. Over this, Morocco and Mauritania collaborated and embarked

on a series of diplomatic moves to prevent the holding of a referendum as it might lead

to the creation of an independent Saharawi state. They managed to delay the referendum

by having the matter referred through UN General Assembly to the International Court

of Justice (ICJ) for an opinion on the status of the territory during Spanish colonisation.

Moreover, Morocco feared the outcome of the referendum, which was an indicator of

the emergence of a genuine Saharawi nationalist movement led by Polisario and the

crystallisation of mass support around Polisario. 6

The ICJ delivered its advisory opinion on 16 October 1975, which King Hassan

of Morocco declared as vindication of the Moroccan claim. He also announced the

5 Deeb, n. 1, p. 26.

6 Arthur Kilgore, "The War in the Western Sahara : Unity and Dissension in the Maghreb" in Stephen Wright and Janice N. Brownfoot Eds. Africa in World Politics (London 1987), p. 161.

177

gathering of 350,000 civilian for a 'Green March' into the Western Sahara territory in

November 1975. As a result of the pressure tactics applied by Morocco, Spain

announced the transfer of administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania as

part of the Tripartite Agreement at Madrid on 14 November 1975. The transfer of

administration was to be effected by 28 February 1976.

Sensing a Rabat-Tripoli axis in October 1975, Algeria swung into action. In

November 1975, Houari Boumedienne asked Ould Daddah of Mauritania to choose

between him and King Hassan. He also threatened to annexe Mauritania whenever he

liked. 7 bn 12 December 1975 Boumedienne visited Libya and on 28 December 1975,

Algeria and Libya signed a mutual defense pact called the Hassi Masud Treaty. The

Algeria-Libya alliance was the most important alliance in the Maghreb during 1970's and

to some extent responsible for the perpetration of the war in the Western Sahara.

The signing of the tripartite agreement crystallized the conflict, as prior to

November 1975 the situation was quite fluid with the competing parties pursuing

different aims. In 1976, there was a occupying power claiming sovereignty in each part

of the territory which was later on joined by Mauritania and on the other side was a

Saharawi liberation movement led by Polisario which had declared its commitment to the

complete independence of the Western Sahara.

OCCUPATION OF WESTERN SAHARA AND INTRA-MAGHREB RELATIONS

The physical occupation of Western Sahara by forcible means crystallized the

Western Sahara conflict. The immediate parties to the conflict had been Morocco and

. 7 Zadtnan, n. 2, p. 34.

178

Mauritania on one side and Polisario on the other. But the tension over the conflict

spilled over to whole of the Maghreb region and accentuated the divisions among the

countries in the region. On 27 January 1976, Algerian and Moroccan forces clashed at

Amgalla, inside Western Sahara and about 100 Algerians were captured by the

Moroccans. This incident prompted the Moroccan government to accuse Algeria of

engaging Saharawi mercenaries to carry the proxy struggle to enhance Algeria's influence

in the region. 8 The Algerian survivors of the Amgalla incident blame Boumedienne,

as he refused air suppon for the surrounded garrison. 9 Since Amgalla incident, Algeria

has not involved itself directly into the armed conflict. Throughout 1970's (after 1975},

there had been a danger of escalation of direct war between Morocco and Algeria. This

was primarily because of the Algeria's backing of Polisario with considerable military

and diplomatic ~uppon, providing food and water to sustain tens of thousands of

Saharawi refugees and providing a crucial territorial sanctuary at Tindouf in South-West

Algeria.

After the proclamation of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Algeria

on 27 February 1976, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Algeria on 7 March

1976. In April 1976 Morocco and Mauritania reached agreement on the division of

Western Sahara. The greater part of territory, containing most of the known mineral

wealth was allotted to Morocco which subsequently divided it into three new provinces

8 Kilgore, n.6, p. 163.

9 Richard P. Parker North Africa : Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns (New York, 1984) p.114.

179

and absorbed it into the Kingdom. During this period Polis.ario was supported by Algeria

as well as Libya. Both the states supplied Polisario with modem Soviet-made weapons.

Algerians feared during 1970's that the absorption of the Western Sahara by its

neighbours would encourage Moroccan expansionist tendencies and whet Morocco's

appetite for pursuing its irredentist claim to territory in South Western Algeria. There

is no doubt that the Western Sahara conflict had been aggravated by the personal

antipathy between the political leadership of the Maghreb countries. Only Tunisia has

had the wisdom to steer clear of any direct involvement in the Western Sahara conflict.

The personal bitterness and antipathy between King Hassan and Boumedienne lasted unti I

the latter's death in December 1978. Though they came closer during late 1960's and

early 1970's but it never crystallized into concrete relationship. Similarly the ideological

and personal gap between King Hassan and Gaddafi had prevented the existence of good

rela~ions between Libya and Morocco. The war accentuated the divisions among the

countries in the region, and threate~ed to erase the modicum of Maghreb cooperation. 10

Again the generally good relation between Algeria and Mauritania prior to 1975 ceased

when Mauritanian President Mokhtar Ould Daddah shifted his alliance in favour of

Morocco which deeply disappointed the Algerian President Hovari Boumedienne.

Besides these differe!lces between the leaders it must also be no~ed that Libya and Algeria ·,

were pro-Soviet. Thus during 1975-1979 Morocco and Mauritania remained on one side

while Algeria and Libya remained steadfast in their support to Polisario/SADR.

The Western Sahara conflict had its most devastating impact on Mauritania during

the second half of 1970's. As Polisario focussed its attack on Mauritania, it had to divert

1° Kilgore, n.6, p. 162.

180

its meagre resources for defence purposes which was not sufficient to stop the Polisario

raids. As a result in May 1977 Mauritania looked to its ally Morocco for help.

Morocco responded by sending 9,000 troops to help bolster Ould Daddah's regime. The

growing vulnerability of Mauritania led to an intemationalisa~ion of the contlict as both

Morocco and Mauritania sought French aid - the former seeking weapons and advisers

while the latter sought direct military assistance from French combat forces. 11

During 1977-78 the parties to the conflict attempted some contacts for solving the

conflict. In September 1977, the Polisario approached Morocco and Mauritania to

inquire about a separate peace agreement against the other party. The attempt did not

succeed. Similarly in 1977, King Hassan approached Boumedienne about a political

solution and talks began in Fez in November and in Lausanne in December between

Presidential adviser Ahmed Taleb lbrahmi and Ambassador (Princess) Laila Aichy. She

was later replaced by Royal Adviser Ahmed Redha Guedira as the talks continued in

1978. It was to culminate in a meeting of the King and the President in Brussels on 6

June 1978, according m some sources, to complete the details of a Moroccan-Polisario

division of tht! territory but King Hassan did not participate. Another meeting in

Brussels scheduled for 24-25 September 1978 was cancelled due to Bo~medienne's

illness. 12

The military co~p in Mauritania on 10 July 1978 by junior army officers was the

culmination of Polisario's military strategy of 'war of attrition' which brought Colonel

Mustapha Ould Salek to power. Polisario announced cessation of hostilities against

11 Keith Someryille, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (London 1990), p. 116.

12 Zartman, n.2, p. 49.

181

Mauritania, hoping for a change in decision. The French support to Mauritania

continued even after the coup. The Salek regime attempted at first to get Morocco to

take part in an effort to end the tighting and reach a peaceful settlement. But Morocco's

intransigence prevented such a move. The presence of 9,000 Moroccan troops in

Mauritania still posed a threat to Mauritania. In August 1978, the Salek regime made

contact with Polisario but nothing substantial carne of the talks. Polisario wanted

unconditional withdrawal of the Mauritanians from the southern part of the Western

Sahara. The talks remained inconclusive till 1 October 1978, but by this time around

3,000 Moroccan military personnel _were withdrawn from Mauritania. 13 Morocco was

opposed to Mauritanian talks with Polisario. The coup of 1978 prompted France, Libya

and Male to provide their good offices for a negotiated settlement. A meeting between

Mauritanians and Polisario in Bamako was attended by King Hassan's close collaborators

Ahmad Reda Guedira and Colonel Ahmed Dlimi. The report of the meeting was

neglected by King Hassan as reports of Boumedienne's serious illness reached him. 14

Consequently the talks were abrogated. Further instability in Mauritania resulted into

to a 'palace coup' in April 1979 which led to the rise of Colonel Haydallah. On 30 July

1979 he announced the renunciation of all Mauritanian claims over the Sahara. The

Mauritanian withdrawal led to the end of the overt and direct French role in the

contlict. 15 On 5 August 1979, the Military Committee for National Welfare (CMSN)

13 Somerville, n. 7, p. 117

14 Zartman, n. 2, p. 50.

15 Hodges, n. 3, p. 273.

182

of Mauritania signed a peace treaty with Polisario at Algiers and in a secret protocol

agreed to hand over Tiris-el-Gharbia to the control of the Polisario.

The death of Boumedienne in December 1978 brought Chadli Ben-Jedid to power

who was not considered as a hard-liner as far as the Western Sahara was concerned.

But, 'as far as 4te Sahara was concerned, everything had been happening not only as

though the doves had been well and truly ousted, but as though Boumedienne had never

even dreamt of talking directly to Hassan. The only initiatives the Algerians have taken

is to offer to be friends with Mauritania on condition that real progress is made in the

talks with Polisario. The most likely explanation which King Hassan seem to have

accepted was that the new regime needed time to establish its ideological credentials'. 16

But the new Algerian government also contained hard-liners for whom continued support

for the Polisario was the last symbolic test of fidelity to Boumedienne' s legacy. The

Saharan policy was considered as of little cost in Algerian policy but of great loss to

Algerian prestige in its abandonment. 17

POST-1979 PERIOD

The 1979 Algiers Treaty brought Moroccan antipath to bear on Mauritania.

Morocco immediately brol_(e diplomatic relation with Mauritania while Algeria restored

relations with Mauritania shortly after the peace treaty. Meanwhile Morocco sent troops

to take control of Tiris-el-Gharbia and 'by 19 August 1979 King Hassan was declaring

16 John Gretton, "Turning point in the Sahara" -in Middle East International, 27 April 1979, p. 10.

17 Zartman. n. 2, pp. 50-51.

183

that all of Morocco's territorial claims had been satisfied' .18 Mauritanian withdrawal

from the conflict was considered as a betrayal by Morocco and it left Morocco

diplomatically isolated in the region. Although Polisario was receiving extensive support

from Algeria and enjoyed the backing of Libyans, it was nowhere near winning an

overall military victory and needed diplomatic support and greater military help. Even

though Libyan opposition to Morocco had taken the form of military and diplomatic

support for Polisario and SADR, it did not recognise it until April 1980. Prior to 1979

Algiers Treaty, Libya had always wanted Polisario to use the Libyan supplied weapons

to be used only agains~ Morocco and not against the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Probably that is the reason why Libyan support to Polisario was so limited before 1978.

Libya had always desired to see the SADR federated with Mauritania, with whom Libya

had developed close relations. Libyan recognition of SADR in 1980 resulted in increased

supplies to Polisario. But its ambivalence towards Polisario and its periodic tlirtations

with Mauritania and even Morocco destroyed its credibility as a radical state and a

supporter of liberation movements. During 1980 and early 1981 Libya along with

Algeria made strenuous attempts to Algerian support for Polisario and in 1981 arms

supplies from Tripoli increased to such an extent that Libya was giving Polisario around

90 per cent of its weapons. 19

Certain developments during 1980-81 changed the intra-Maghrebi relations which

is described by William Zartman as 'checkerboard pattern of competition of limited

18 Kilgore, n.6, p. 165.

19 Africa Contemporary Record 1981-82, p.Boll as quoted in Somerville, n.7. p. 118.

184

rivalries, preferred by Morocco but played by all the North African states in their bid for

leadership and rn their need for support on security issues'. 20 Two of these

developments deserve special mention. Firstly, during 1980, Morocco alleged and

identified Libya as the agent provocateur in the region and simultaneously branded

Polisario as a gang of 'Mauritanian dissidents'. MauritaJ1ian withdrawal from the

Saharan contlict not only left Morocco diplomatically isolated in the region but it was

considered as a sign of betrayal by Morocco. The unsuccessful coup attempt against

Mauritanian regime in 1981 was sought to be linked to th~ Moroccan government which

was considered to be nadir-point in the Moroccan-Mauritanian relations. During this

time, Polisario which had bases in Algeria had also set up bases in Mauritania.

Secondly, in order to get support of OAU Chairmanship, Libya turned the clock back in

June 1981 and tried to effect approachment with Morocco, promising to abandon support

for Polisario. But the military set back to Morocco at Guelta Zemmour in October 1981

forced King Hassan to accuse that Libya had supplied Polisario with SAM-6 missiles

which had been used to strike at the Moroccan aircrafts. Morocco also accused

Mauritania of allowing Polisario forces to establish bases on its soil, and of taking part

in the attack itself.

In June 1981, during the OAU summit conference, King Hassan agreed for the

first time to a referendum according to the OAU recommendations. But Morocco

refused to negotiate directly with the Polisario Front and insisted that the proposed

referendum be based on the 1974 Spanish census of the area. The Polisario Front

20 I. W. Zartman, "Foreign Relations of North Africa" in ANNALS, AAPSS 489, January 1987, p. 13.

185

insisted that prior to the possible poll, Morocco must withdraw its troops and

administration to a considerable distance inside its original borders, and allow refugees

living in Algeria to return and participate in the referendum. 21 But the conditions for

referendum was not acceptable to the parties concerned.

Another important development in the region during 1981 was the deterioration

in Algeria-Libya relations. The Algerian-Libyan 1975 Defense Treaty was consolidated

when Algeria backed Libya during the Egyptian attack on Libya in July 1977. Not only

was the Algeria-Libya alliance most formidable in region during the second half of

1970's, but it also perpetrated the war in Western Sahara. Libya's growing influence

over the Polisario in the Western Sahara not only undermined Algeria's role in that area

but also increased tension in the region over the possible confrontation between Algeria

and Morocco as the Polisario attacks against Morocco was relentless. Moreover, Libya's

merger with Chad in 1981 and its long-term intentions in the surrounding areas made

Algeria very uneasy. 22

The political developments in the region and the military stalemate over the

Western Sahara issue led to the realignment of forces in the Maghreb region. As King

Hassan resorted to regional possibilities to solve the dilemma over Western Sahara, a

number of secret contacts and exchanges took place between Algeria and Morocco during

1982. Even though it led to a summit between Hassan and Chadli Benjedid on 26

February 1983, no concrete results materialised as both the parties struck to their

21 Middle East and North Africa. 1995 (Europa Publications)

22 John Darnis Conflict in North-west Africa - The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford, 1983), p. 110-11.

186

respective positions. Defense of the principle of self-determination was a defense of its

national and international political options for Algeria.

On 16 June 1983, Libya announced its withdrawal of suppon to Polisario. Libya

took this step to end its isolation in the Maghreb region and as a gesture of good-will

towards Mor9cco for the possible reconciliation with it. In March 1983, the Treaty of

Brotherhood and concord was signed between Algeria and Tunisia. Mauritania was also

allowed to join the alliance in December 1983. but Libya was refused entry to the

alliance on the ground that border agreements between Libya and Algeria had to be

settled before it _could join. As a result prolonged approachment followed between

Morocco and Libya, which finally culminated into the signing of the Oujda treaty

between Morocco and Libya on 13 August 1984. The Arab-African Federation Treaty

at Oujda was established as a 'Union of States' between their countries as the tirst step

towards the creation of a Great Arab Maghreb. The Oujda Treaty provided for close

economic and political cooperation between Morocco and Libya and for mutual defence

in the event of attack. Morocco not only procured an ally in the region but was also able

to persuade Colonel Qaddafi to cut off Libyan aid to Polisario. Moreover, after Maurita­

nia's recognition of SADR in February 1983, it had become necessary for Morocco to

ally with someone in t.Pe region as it was surrounded by states openly hostile to Rabat

on the Sahara issue. The whole framework of the Oujda Treaty in 1984 was well

thought out and calculated to achieve the maximum benefits for both the parties. Both

the states were concerned about the rapproachment between Algeria and Tunisia and that

entailed for the balance of political forces in the region. 23

23 Somerville, n.11, p. 119.

187

Till 1984, the Western Sahara question was dealt with either by OAU or UN or

both. Just two weeks before the signing of Oujda Treaty, Qaddafi announced in Tripoli

that the question should be resolved in an 'Arab context'. On 1 September 1984, he

further suggested that Polisario guerillas should join the Moroccan forces to fight agains~

a common enemy, Israel. 24

Gaddafi's suggestions suited the Moroccan diplomacy as far as the Saharawi

question was concerned. But on the whole, Morocco did not get any respite either

politically or militarily over the Sahara. Not only the Sahara war had affected the

Moroccan economy badly but by the end of 1984 Morocco was forced to maintain an

estimated 100,000 troops at great cost. As far as Polisario was concerned, the shortfall

caused by Libya's withdrawal of assistance was made up by Algerian assistance.

Simultaneously, the President of SADR, Muhammed Abd-al-Aziz, undertook an

extensive African tour to gather support prior to the November 1984 summit of the OA U

in Addis Ababa. As a result, the SADR delegation was seated at the summit while

Morocco resigned from the OAU in protest. In October 1985, at the UN General

Assell1bly meeting, Morocco announced a unilateral cease-fire in Western Sahara on the

condition that there was no aggression against territories under its jurisdiction and that

it would be ready to hold a referendum in the territory in January 1986. When the UN

Decolonization Committee supported a settiement of the conflict through direct

24 Godfrey Morrison, "The King's Gambit", Africa Report, November-December 1984. p. 15.

188

negotiations between Morocco and Polisario Front, Morocco withdrew the offer in

November 1985. 25

In November 1984, President Habib Bourg\Aiba of Tunisia put forth the proposal

for hosting a Maghreb summit between leaders of Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and

Tunisia, with the idea of putting back the Maghreb unity on the rails. Both Algeria and

Morocco showed interest in the proposed summit and consequently diplomatic contacts

took place among Maghreb countries between 10 December 1984 and 2 February 1985.

which included six bilateral meetings between Algerian and Moroccan officials. 26 But

before the t1nal agenda could be finalised, President Chadli ben-Jedid revealed on 26

February 1985 that secret talks had been taking place between Algeria and Morocco and

that Algeria had tabled a proposal for a North African federation with the SADR to

participate on an autonomous, equal basis. 27 Later on, Tunisia announced that it had

abrogated the plans to hold summit as Morocco and Algeria had found their differences

over the Western Sahara to be insurmountable.

The attempts towards Maghreb cooperation and unity worried Polisario as it might

hamper its ultimate goal. In response to the attempts to convene a Maghreb summit

without SADR and Libya in early 1985, Polisario was quoted as saying that the

'Maghreb is composed of six countries'. 28 There are also reports that contacts had

taken place between a Polisario oft1cial and the Moroccan Minister for the Interior in

25 Middle East and North Africa 1995 (Europa Publications). p. 724.

26 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series). 15 March 1985, p. 7526.

27 ibid.' p. 7540.

28 ibid.' p. 7526.

189

Lisbon on 27 January 1985. 29 Perhaps, the framework for the Maghreb unit could not

be arrived at because the form and format of the Western Sahara question was viewed

differently by Morocco and Algeria. While Algeria remained steadfast in its support to

the Saharawi claims and Morocco wanted to legitimise its de facto control of the Western

Sahara, other Maghreb countries wavered in their respective positions over the Saharawi

issue. Even though Morocco endeavoured to understand the Mauritanian position and

in 1985 restored the diplomatic relations with Mauritania, the Magfhreb unity remained

hidden behind the problem of the Western Sahara.30

WESTERN SAHA.kA STALEMATE AND INTRA-MAGHREB RELATION

Towards the end of 1985, Morocco was diplomatically isolated as 64 countries

had officially recognised the SADR and the US-Morocco relations had deteriorated

following the signing of the Oujda Treaty with Libya in 1984. During April and May

1986, a series of proximity talks took place between Morocco and Polisario under the

auspices of UN and OA U, but no agreement could be arrived at. In April 1986, King

Hassan while acting as Chairman of the Arab League, suspended a summit meeting

following Libya's insis~nce that the US raids on Libya on 15 April should be the sole

topic on the agenda and that the summit should be held in Sebha in Southern Libya. In

June 1986, King Hassan proposed the foundation of a 'Maghreb Community Consultative

Committee' comprising Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, thus isolating Libya. Libya also

condemned Morocco for the meeting which took place in July 1986 between Israeli

29 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series}, 15 June 1985, p. 7654.

3° Kilgore, n. 6, p. 173.

190

Prime Minister Shimon Peres and King Hasan of Morocco at lfrane in Morocco.

Following criticism of the meeting King Hassan resigned as Chairman of the Arab

League. In August 1986, Libya attempted to improve relations with Morocco by

reaffirming support for the Oujda Treaty, but King Hassan abrogated the treaty at the end

of August 1986. Thus, the US hostility towards Libya and the Morocco's pro-western

attitude forced Libya to seek friendly relations with Algiers. The Algerian government

was also predisposed toward improving relations with Tripoli because of its desire to

avoid Arab and African accusations of support for American policies on terrorism and

Middle East. Moreover, the circumstances provided opportunities for Algeria to wean

away Libya from Morocco. Algeria held out the bait of economic cooperation to seal

the bargain. Though Libya did not renew its support for Polisario immediately,

nonetheless Mohamed Abdel-Aziz, President of SADR attended the 1 September 1986

celebration of the 1969 Libyan revolution which had brought Qaddafi to power. Perhaps

Qaddafi too no longer saw any point in concealing his basic sympathies for SADR once

Morocco unilaterally breached the terms of the Oujda Treaty. 31

There is no doubt that the US exerted enough political and economic

pressure to tum the alliance into a liability. By 1986, Morocco had virtually completed

the 'sixth wall' in the Western Sahara thereby controlling more than two-third of the

Western Sahara. Hassan no longer needed Libya to boost its standing in the region, as

it had signitlcantly improved its position vis-a-vis Polisario in the Western Sahara. The

falling oil prices and the economic embargo had limited Libyan and Algerian capacity

31 George Henderson, "Oujda on the Rocks" in Africa Report, November-December 1986, p. 13.

191

to proyide substantial military aid to the Polisario. The federation (Oujda Treaty) also

broke down when it was no longer useful to one of the parties. 32 Thus the regional

equation became more confusing than ever in September 1986.

In February 1987, the SAD R representative in Algiers claimed that an

attempted assassination ot· the SADR President Muhammed Abdel-Aziz had been foiled

and alleged that the Moroccan Minister of the Interior was implicated in the plot.33

When Morocco completed the· construction of its defensive wall parallel

to the Mauritanian border, Mauritania protested that its neutrality was threatened. since

Polisario troops might have to pass through Mauritanian territory to reach the Atlantic.

and Algeria expressed its concern and confirmed its support for Mauritania. In April

1987, King Hassan ordered a boycott by Morocco of all Palestinian events, after senior

Polisario members attended a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers.34

But all these irritants did not effect the flurry of diplomatic activity that

took place between the states of North Africa in 1987 which indicated the persistence of

spirit of Maghrebi unity. In ~ay 1987, a summit meeting was attended by King Hassan

and Algerian President Chadli Ben Jedid under the auspices of King Fahd of Saudi

Arabia. The ~wo leaders discussed the conflict in Western Sahara and issued a joint

communique after the meeting which stated that the two countries would remain in

32 Deeb, n.l, p. 31.

33 Middle East and North Africa 1995 (Europa Publications), p.727.

34 ibid .. p. 727.

192

consultation. Before the meeting, Polisario urged a direct dialogue between Morocco and

Polisario and attacked King Fahd's role as mediator. 35

In June 1987, Qaddafi called for unity between Libya and Algeria on ideological

terms as well as in terms of Libya's security. Algerian leadership was interested in the

idea but had to assure Tunisia about controlling Libya's wayward attitude. In 1987,

Qaddafi signed an undertaking not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tunisia, which

had been the main reasQn given for Tunisia breaking diplomatic relations with Libya in

1985. 36 Later on, on 28 June 1987, Chadli Ben Jedid declined to enter the proposed

bilateral union with Libya and instead favoured a multilateral alliance with Tunisia and

Mauritania.

The contlict in Western Sahara was regarded by the Maghreb countries as an

obstacle to regional unity and ill late 1987 and 1988 they attempted to isolate Morocco,

with the aim of forcing the kingdom to negotiate with the Polisario Front. Morocco

reiterated its commitment to Maghreb unity while meeting with President Chadli of

Algeria in November 1987. Prior to their meeting, the UN mission visited Morocco,

Algeria and Congo in July 1987 to examine the possibility of organising UN sponsored

referendum on the question of self-determination in Western Sahara. Some indirect talks

wert~ held between Morocco and Polisario at Geneva under the auspices of UN and

OAU. But after the talks, tighting broke out between Moroccan and Polisario forces

near the Mauritanian border. In November 1987, Polisario announced a three week truce

to enable a UN-OAU technical mission to visit Morocco, Western Sahara and Polisario

35 ibid.

36 Strategic Survey 1987-1988 (IISS, London), p. 185.

193

refugee camps in Algeria. But the intransigent attitude adopted by both the parties to

contlict resulted in Polisario renewing attacks on Moroccan position in Western Sahara

in January 1988.

Certain developments took place in 1988 which had different implications

for the regional unity in Maghreb and the future of Western Sahara. After the 'Jasmine

revolution', a new government under President Ben Ali took charge of power in Tunisia

which officially restored relations with Libya in February 1988. In early May 1988,

King Hassan received the Algerian deputy leader with an invitation from President Chadli

for Morocco to attend the Arab League summit in June. Hassan promptly despatched

two of his senior advisers to hold further discussions with Chadli, and on 16 May 1988

both countries announced the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations. The official

communique issued simultaneously by both parties on 16 May 1988 announced that one

reason for the resumption of diplomatic relations was the mutual desire to find a 'just and

lasting solution to the Western Sahara conflict by way of a free referendum on self-

determination'. 37 On 10 June 1988, the heads of state of five Maghreb countries

(excluding SADR) met together to discuss the future regional cooperation. They

established a Maghreb commission, which met in mid-July in Algiers and among other

issues discussed the conflict in the Western Sahara and agreed that the conflict should be

resolved through a referendum held under UN auspices. In July 1988, King Hassan said

in an interview with Le Monde that while he supports the referendum on self-

37 David Seddon, "Polisario and the Struggle for the Western Sahara: ·Recent Developments, 1987-1989" in Review of African Political Economy, no. 4S/46. 1989, p. 134.

194

determination for the Western Sahara, it did not necessarily imply independence. He

envisioned an 'autonomous Western Sahara with in the Moroccan state' .38

The rapproachment between Algiers and Rabat was possible due to the efforts of

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. He also helped to arrange secret discussions in Taif during

July 1988 between Polisario Front and Morocco. Although the talks did not produce any

concrete results, they created ~ atmosphere for continued dialogue and in August 1988,

the UN Peace Plan which proposed a cease-fire and a referendum on self-determination,

was accepted with reservations by both Morocco and Polisario Front. 39

The Polisario attack against Moroccan Royal Armed Forces in Oum Dreiga in

September 1988 saw the hardening of attitudes of Algeria and SADR at the NAM Annual

meeting in Nicosia (Cyprus) and at the UN in October 1988. President Ben Jedid

announced in September 1988 that Alger~a 'will not renounce her fundamental principles

regarding the defence of just causes and right of people to self-determination'40 The

attacks on Moroccan positions by Polisario was undertaken to put enough pressure on

Morocco to agree for negotiations. As the UN General Assembly voted in November

1988 in favour of a resolution calling on Morocco and the Polisario Front to undertake

direct negotiations, King Hassan announced in December 1988, his willingness to meet

Saharawi repres~ntatives. But he empJ'lasised that such a meeting would involve

discussions and not negotiations. In the same month Polisario announced/declared a

38 ibid, pp.134-35.

39 Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Western Sahara Cont1ict : Regional and International dimensions" in The Journal of Modem African Studies 28, 2 (1990), p.228.

40 El Moudjahid, 21 September 1988 as quoted in Zoubir, n.36, p. 229.

195

truce in order to facilitate talks. In the first week of January 1989, a delegation from the

Polisario Front and the SADR met King Hassan and the Moroccan ofticials in

Marrakesh. On 19 January 1989, SADR President Mohammed Abdel Aziz stated that

the meeting Marrakesh was an important gain for the Polisario Front and that the issue

of the Western Sahara would be on the agenda of the Maghreb summit in Marrakesh and

declared a unilateral truce effective from 1 February 1989 for one month. 41 But the

Polisario Front still insisted on direct negotiations, a UN administered referendum, the

withdrawal of Moroccan forces and administration from the region and the return of its

own forces and supporters to the territory while the referendum was in progress.

Yahia H. Zoubir cites four reasons for Hassan's conciliatory tone towards

Polisario -- firstly, Hassan was convinced that the scheduled Maghreb summit in

February 1989 would be jeopardised unless Algeria's demand for direct talks between

Morocco and Polisario was accepted. Secondly, that to make it feasible for Morocco to

return to OAU, the OAU/UN resolutions should principally be accepted. Thirdly

pressure was put up by France on Morocco during the Franco-African summit to speed

up the peace process. Fourthly, the US had also shown increasing interest in seeking a

settlement that would promote stability in the region.42

As a result of these diplomatic moves, Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was

proclaimed on 17 February 1989, linking Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and

Tunisia in the form of association to improve intra-Maghreb economic relations and to

work in cooperation in other fields. The Polisario Front was particularly disappointed

41 Seddon, n.37, pp.l36-7.

42 Seddon, n.34, pp. 136-7.

196

not to be directly involved in discussions on the Western Sahara at the Maghreb summit.

Thus, on 2 March 1989, President Mohammed AbdelAziz of SADR announced that in

view of lack of progress in the peace process and Morocco's failure to pursue direct

negotiations, the Polisario had resumed military operations following a month-long

truce. 43

A M U AND THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE

The formation of AMU had iiitle or no impact on the Western Sahara cont1ict.

Any hope that unity among the Maghreb states would lead to greater Moroccan

willingness to negotiate over the Sahara was dashed due to Hassan's unwillingness to

renew talks with Polisario Front. An analysis of the text of the Arab Maghreb Treaty

signed on 17 February 1989 shows that there is no scope for the solution of the Western

Sahara issue or support for the Polisario Front in AMU. Article 3, among other

objectives, makes it a common policy to safeguard the independence of every meber

state. Article 14 states that 'any aggression to which a member state is subjected will

be considered as an aggression against the other member states'. Article 15 of the Treaty

specifically enjoins "the member states not to permit any activity or organisation in their

territory that could harm the security, territorial integrity or political system of any other

member state. It further restrains member states to join any alliance or military or

political bloc directed against the political independence or territorial integrity of the

other member states". 44 As the borders between a number of Maghreb countries are

43 Seddon, n.34, p. 137

44 Africa Research Bulletin Political Series, 31 March 1989, p. 9458.

197

yet to be settled, it is not clear as to what extent the 'territorial integrity' extend to and

to what extent the Moroccan boundary in the southern part extend and whether the

occupied Western Sahara is included in the Moroccan territory or not. Whether the

support provided by Algeria and Libya to Polisario would amount to violation of Article

15 of the Treaty. Similarly the support, establishment and maintenance of Saharawi

refugee camps in Tindouf in Algeria would amount to permitting any activity or

organisation in the territory of a Maghreb country that could harm the security and

territorial integrity of other member state Morocco. The Algerian position is best

explained by an article published in semi-official Revolution Africaine whi-ch states that . "the Western Sahara is neither a 'parasite' nor an 'intruder' in the Maghreb but a

question of decolonisation and of self-determination of a people who have been waging

an armed struggle for more than a decade. To reduce it to a 'grain of sand' (as

described by King) is to insult the thousands of victims of this cont1ict, the 71 states

which have recognised it, and the international organisations such as OAU and UN which

have adopted very clear resolutions on this question". 45

The creation of AMU does not necessarily meet the expectations of the Polisario

Front and its drearri of neighbourhood. But surely it had a tremendous effect on the

contlict as several Polisario leaders including Omar Hadrarni defected to Morocco and

expressed their wish to see the conflict solved once and for all. At this juncture

Mohammed Chtatou predicted two major possibilities for the settlement of Western

Sahara contlict -- tlrstly that increasing defections within the ranks of the Polisario Front

. 45 Revolution Africaine (Algiers), 3 March 1989, pp.47-48, as quoted in Zoubir.

n.39, p. 239.

198

would bring it to the point of collapse and individuals rather than an organisation will

attempt to negotiate their return to Morocco in exchange for guarantees, and secondly,

that under pressure from Algeria, the Polisario Front would give up armed struggle and

settle for autonomy in a federal type of system similar to that in Germany, as King

Hassan II had always suggested. 46

The SADR's international position received a boost in March 1989 when the

European Parliament ended the EC's official position of supporting Morocco and passed

a resolution stating that the Saharan problem was one of decolonisation. In May 1989,

the 1972 Treaty of lfrane with Algeria on the demarcation of the joint border was tinally

ratified by Morocco which recognised the 'Algerianity' of the Tindouf area. As the

Algerian-Moroccan relations improved, there was apprehension that Algeria's

committnent for the Saharawi cause would be reduced. But during the 7th Congress of

the Polisario Front held in April 1989, the Secretary General of the Algerian FLN, Abdel

Hamid Mehri, reaftirmed his government's support for Polisario in all domains like

military, economic, political and diplomatic. As Morocco adopted dilly-dallying tactics

to avoid or at least to delay the second round of talks between Morocco and Polisario

Front, Polisario launched a number of offensives against Moroccan armed forces in

Western Sahara during October-November 1989. The renewal of Polisario campaign

provoked criticism of the government within Morocco. Even the Algerian government

became frustrated by Morocco's tactics and decided to go public and reiterate its position

46 Mohammed Chtatou. "The Present and future of the Maghreb Arab Union" in George Joffe Ed. North Africa : Nation, State and Region (London, 1993). pp. 279-80.

199

on the Western Sahara. 47 During the offensive, Polisario Front demanded direct talks

with the government which King Hassan rejected saying that he 'cannot negotiate with

his own subjects' and threatened to continue the conflict indefinitely and announced his

readiness to order his troops across international borders in pursuit of Polisario forces.

In March 1990, $e UN Secretary General expressed caution over any practical outcome

of his efforts to persuade the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government to agree to

a programme for a referendum on the future of the Western Sahara.

In June 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 658 which was a draft

Peace Plan. Consequently in July and August 1990, a special UN Technical Commission

visited Western Sahara and the neighbouring states to investigate the practical difficulties

in conducting a referendum on the territory's future. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact

countries in Eastern Europe and then the Kuwaiti crisis in August 1990 put restraints

upon the United Nations in 1989 and 1990 from proceeding more quickly on the Western

Saharan issue. The Western Sahara issue was brought before the UN Security Council

only in 1991 after the Gulf war. 48 In April 1991, the UN Security Council approved

Resolution 690 which authorised the establishment of a UN Mission for the Referendum

in Western· Saharwa (MINURSO) which was to implement the Plan for a referendum on

self-determination. In May 1991, the UN Security Council approved plans for a

referendum in the disputed territory. The proposed referendum plan to which Morocco

agreed was a 'bone in the throat of King Hassan which he could neither chew nor take

47 Zoubir, n. 36, p. 241.

48 Robert J. Bookmiller, "The Western Sahara : Future Prospects" in American­Arab Affairs, no. 37 (Summer 1991), p. 72.

200

it out. In May 1991, King Hassan visited Western Sahara (probably to reassure

Moroccan army) and created a new province Assa-Zag on the Algerian border. In early

August 1991, a significant increase in hostilities developed as Moroccan armed forces

launched a major assault beyond their extensive system of 'walls' which encloses areas·

of the SADR. The air strikes led by 16 mirage F1 planes involved the bombing of

Tifariti, about 100 kms. south of the Moroccan 'wall'. Moroccan government stated that

it was engaged in clearing 'no mans' land. The SPLA took immediate but limited

defensive action against the Moroccan aggression. Each side was trying to intimidate the

rival elements into leaving the area before the cease-fire, which was to come into effect

from 6 September 1991. The Moroccan army claimed that it had taken control of the

Bir Lehlou, Tifarity and Mijek by driving the SPLA out of these areas near the Algerian

and Mauritanian borders and claimed that it had as much right as did Morocco to deploy

its forces in what it regarded as a 'liberated area' and accused King Hassan of fabricating

a pretext for further offensive action. 49

The UN sponsored cease-fire in the Western Sahara came into effect on 6

September 1991, while both Morocco and Polisario accused each other of violating the

cease-fire. As the Moroccans reduced their military presence, Algerian support for the

Polisario was aiso r¢uced. Algeria was on record supporting the outcome of the

Referendum. As Algeria had pressed support for the final solution of the problem, the

reduction of support by Algeria to Polisario was expected. Moreover. the political

instability and the financial crisis in Algeria also forced it to reduce the support to

. 49 David Seddon, "Western Sa,hara Tug-of-War" in Review of African Political

Economy, November 1991. no. 52. pp. 111-12.

201

Polisario. Consequently the Western Sahara issue did not attract much attention at the

AMU summit and it was even less discussed among the Maghreb countries except

Morocco.

The Sahara iss~e was one of the few topics about which King Hassan has allowed

pubiic discourse to tlourish in an otherwise controlled system. In any case regarding

referendum the King could be expected to utilize the Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara

and the Polisario defectors to his advantage. But the Polisario Front received some kind

of consolance as the European Parliament and President Bush of US made some

statements regarding Western Sahara. In early September 1991, the European Parliament

passed a resolution at a meeting in Strasburg calling for a freeze of some agreements

with Morocco until the referendum takes place. The proposal of the European

Parliament to send observers to monitor the cease-fire and referendum in Western Sahara

was officially denounced in Rabat as 'shameful blackmail'. Similarly at a speech to the

UN General Assembly on 23 September 1991 President George Bush of USA listed

Western Sahara as one of the five 'diverse and troubled lands' where the US and the UN

were working together to pursue peace. 50

Even though Morocco had consolidated its military advantage, it has not helped

its image abroad. Though Morocco has little international backing on the Sahara issue,

it has overall support from the majority of the permanent members of the UN Security

Council and most of the Arab and European states. With polisario turning to Algeria and

its non-aligned supporters for help, Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdelatif Filali

50 Bookmiller, n.48, pp. 72-73.

202

was seeking the support of all five Security Council permanent members at the end of

1991. 51

Relations between Algeria and Morocco were very good during the tirst half of

1992 when Muhammad Boudiaf was the Algerian Head of State (Boudiaf had lived in

Morocco for more than 20 years during his exile period). The two states collaborated

on the security matters, and the Algerian government urged the Polisario Front to make

peace. But, after the assassination of Boudiaf, relations between Algeria and Morocco

deteriorated and Algerian supplies to Polisario were resumed. In January 1993.

reconciliation between Algeria and Morocco took place resulting into exchange of

ambassadors and reopening of borders. 52 In mid-January 1993, the OAU Secretary

General visited the Western Sahara and held talks with SADR President Mohamed

Abdelaziz. Both of them agreed that UN Resolution 690 was the best and only solution.

But the UN Plan could not be carried out due to the difference between the Polisario

Front and Morocco on the criteria of identitication of Saharawis who will be able to vote.

On 13 April 1993, Algerian Foreign Minister, Mr. Redha Malik, held a meeting

in Rome with the UN Secretary General Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali and among other

major issues _at the international level discussed the Libyan and Western Sahara issues.

Earlier in the saine month in their meeting with the Polisario Front leader Mr.

Mohammed Abdel Aziz, the Italian officials had expressed concern over delay in the

implementation of the UN resolutions on the Western Sahara. 53 On 9 June 1993, Mr.

51 Africa Research Bulletin Political Series, 1-30 September 1991. p. 10279.

52 Middle East and North Africa 1995, (Europa Publications), p. 731.

53 Africa Research Bulletin Political Series. 1-30 April 1993, p. 10987.

203

Mohammed Abdel Aziz of SADR asked for the support of US in the peace process in

the Western Sahara at Washington and urged that since the situation was very delicate.

the US should not support Morocco's position, but rather the UN efforts to carry out a

free, impartial, honest and democratic referendum in the Western Sahara. He welcomed

the 'positive role' of Spain in the peace process but strongly criticised France which

continued to support Morocco. 54

In the month of July 1993, negotiations between the Polisario Front and Morocco

on organising a referendum failed to make progress as the two sides broached questions

of protocol. But, nonetheless first direct talks took place between the two parties.

Relations between Morocco and Algeria deteriorated during August 1994, after Morocco

imposed entry restrictions on Algerian citizen as a security measure against the threat of

terrorism. But, it did not effect the ongoing UN efforts as the UN announced on 4

November 1993 that it had started preparations for a census of the electorate in the

Western Sahara with the prospect of a referendum on self-determination. After

mammoth negotiating sessions in Rabouni and Rabat, the identification process finally

got under way on 28 August 1994 in the Western Saharan capital of Al-Ayoun and in the

Polisario refugee ~amps of Tindouf in south-west Algeria.

The political settlement to the Western Sahara issue still seems difficult as

Moroccans are steadfast in their belief over the 'Moroccanity' of the Western Sahara.

The Algerian government is besieged by its own political and social unrest and is

increasingly concentrating on its own domestic problems rather than increasing its

support to Polisario. The stakes are indeed high, as Adekeye Adebajo states "King

54 Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 June 1993, p. 11051.

204

Hassan II appears to have staked the honour of his crown on the issue, while the

Polisario Front has lived in the Algerian wilderness for two decades, refusing to submit

to rule from Rabat'. 55

On 31 January 1996, the UN Security Council extended the mandate for the

MINURSO until 31 May 1996 and called on Morocco to 'relaunch the process' and

'overcome all obstacles' otherwise MINURSO would be withdrawn. On 12 March 1996,

two Moroccan war plans flew over the region of Bir Lahlou which is under the control

of the Polisario Front and location of a UN observation centre. Polisario Front

considered this as an act of provocation in a sensitive area, together with the continued

and accelerated strengthening of Moroccan military positions in the Western Sahara as

threatening the cease-fire and incitement to resumption of hostilities. Meanwhile,

President Nelson Mandela of South Africa wanted to formally recognize the SADR, but

had delayed the process at the request of Boutros Boutros Ghali who felt that it could tip

the balance in delicate negotiations with Morocco. 56 The Polisario Front has threatened

to return to desert war after a five-year cease-fire if a planned referendum on the future

of the mineral rich territory is not held. It has repeatedly accused the UN of favouring

·. Morotcan interests, failing to investigate accusations of bias in the voter-registration

process ~da.IIo~~-Morocco to intimidate and imprison those calling for a fair vote. 57

55 Abekeye Adebajo, "The UN's unknown Effort" in Africa Report, March-April 1995, p. 63.

56 Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 March 1996, p. 12201.

57 Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 April1996, p.l2239.

205

Finally, UN Security Council reduced the number of international troops and suspended

the voters identification process on 29 May 1996.

CONCLUSION

The Maghreb region is an area where conflict and cooperation are the two major

themes. The Maghreb countries are not a world apart but live within circles of relations.

The intra-Maghreb relations is also closely linked with the Arab world and the

Mediterranean countries. The rivalry among the states in the region since their

independence is dominated by Algeria and Morocco. Prior to 1975, it was the boundary

disputes and ideological differences which kept them apart. But, since 1975 the Western

Sahara issue has played a major role in keeping the Maghreb region divided. From 1976

to 1983, Libya an~ Algeria had been the major supporter of the Polisario Front providing

financial, military and diplomatic support. This was the period when Polisario Front

threatened the Moroccan armed forces at will. The withdrawal from the conflict by

Mauritania further isolated Morocco in the region. But with the military and financial

support from its western allies and the Arab monarchies Morocco was able to consolidate

its position in the Western Sahara militarily. Since 1983, Morocco involved itself in all

sorts of diplomatic tactics to usurp the Western Sahara. First, it weaned away Libya

through Oujda Treaty in 1984 and then in 1986-87 it tried to forge closer cooperation

with Algeria in the wake of serious political and financial problem it was facing. During

the second half of 1980's all the Maghreb countries were facing severe economic

problems. This forced them to come closer and to form the Arab Maghreb Union in

1989. By 1988 Morocco had virtually incorporated two-third of the Western Sahara

territory. Polisario is not a big military threat since 1988 to Morocco. Even though the

206

UN Peace Plan was approved in ·1988, the cease-fire could be effected only in 1991.

From 1988 onwards Algeria had been facing severe domestic problems and continues to

face them till date. This forced Algerian government to reduce its support to Polisario.

Algeria increased its support only when its relations with Morocco deteriorated. Thus

during the post-Ar~b Maghreb Union period the Western Sahara question has ceased to

be an issue which can threaten the intra-Maghreb relations. Rather, it is the non­

Maghreb countries that have pressurised Morocco for the implementation of the

referendum plan in Western Sahara.

207