implementation completion and results...

Document of

The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00005129

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

TF-A2340

ON A

STATE AND PEACE BUILDING FUND (SPF) GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 4.90 MILLION

TO THE

Government of Central African Republic

FOR

Local Connectivity Emergency Project (P157923)

March 30, 2020

Transport Global Practice

Africa Region

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Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret

Regional Director: Riccardo Puliti

Practice Manager: Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge

Task Team Leader(s): Marc Marie Francois Navelet Noualhier, Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto

ICR Main Contributor: Shruti Vijayakumar

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAR Central African Republic

CEMAC The Central African Economic and Monetary Community

CPF Country Partnership Framework

DPF Development Policy Financing

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

EU European Union

FCV Fragile, Conflict, and Violence

FER Fonds d’Entretien Routier, Road Fund

FPA Fiduciary Principles Accord

FY Fiscal Year

GBV Gender-Based Violence

GP Global Practice

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNI Gross National Income

GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism

ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report

IDA International Development Association – World Bank

LCEP Local Connectivity Emergency Project

LIPW Labor-Intensive Public Works

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MINTP Ministère des Travaux Publics, Ministry of Public Works

MINUSCA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OP Operational Policy

PAP Project-Affected Persons

PDO Project Development Objective

RAP Resettlement Action Plan

RCP Rural Connectivity Project

RCPCA Plan National de Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique, Plan for Recovery and Peace-Building

RN8 Route Nationale No. 8 – National Road No. 8

SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic

SPF State and Peace-Building Fund

TF Trust Fund

TTL Task Team Leader

UN United Nations

UNOPS United Nations Office of Project Services

USD United States Dollars

WB World Bank

WBG World Bank Group

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

1. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 4

2. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 9

3. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 15

4. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 17

5. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 19

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 22

ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 30

ANNEX 3. RECIPIENT, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ...... 31

ANNEX 4. PHOTOGRAPHS .................................................................................................... 32

ANNEX 5. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 36

ANNEX 6. MAP OF PROJECT INTERVENTION ......................................................................... 37

The World Bank Local Connectivity Emergency Project (P157923)

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P157923 Local connectivity emergency project

Country Financing Instrument

Central African Republic Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Government of Central African Republic United Nations Office for Project Services

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

The PDO is to reconnect the population of the Northeast CAR to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road. The project will contribute to the State and peace building efforts by ensuring basic transport connectivity between poorly connected areas in districts situated in the lagging regions (North-East). This should contribute to: (a) revitalize local economy by providing temporary employment at local level; (b) facilitate the movement of goods and domestic trade; and (c) State redeployment for development through the Ministry of Equipment and Transport, Civil Aviation, and Integration (Ministère de l’Equipement et des Transport, de l’Aviation Civile et du Désenclavement – METACD) decentralized civil servants along the targeted road.


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FINANCING

FINANCE_TBL

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

Donor Financing

TF-A2340 4,900,000 4,900,000 4,900,000

Total 4,900,000 4,900,000 4,900,000

Total Project Cost 4,900,000 4,900,000 4,900,000

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness Original Closing Actual Closing

03-Apr-2016 15-Apr-2016 30-Sep-2019 30-Sep-2019

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

15-Jan-2018 3.24 Change in Components and Cost

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 07-Feb-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.81

02 17-May-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.81

03 23-Oct-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.24

04 29-May-2018 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90

05 14-Dec-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90


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06 21-Oct-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Paul Noumba Um Jean-Christophe Carret

Director: Pierre A. Guislain Riccardo Puliti

Practice Manager: Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge

Task Team Leader(s): Marc Marie Francois Navelet Noualhier, Abel Paul Basile Bove

Marc Marie Francois Navelet Noualhier, Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto

ICR Contributing Author: Shruti Vijayakumar


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1. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world. As a landlocked

country bordered by unstable neighbors, it has a long history of violence and conflict. With a Gross National Income

(GNI) per capita of US$581 in 2014, it ranked 187th out of 188th in the 2014 UN Human Development Index. Since

early 2013, CAR has experienced a massive political-security crisis, creating unprecedented humanitarian needs. The

conflict has had a negative effect on the fundamental underpinnings of society in the country, including the collapse

of the economy, the erosion of the state’s capacity to reach and care for the population, and large-scale forced

displacement.

2. The challenges faced by CAR are long-standing, and conflict and political violence predate the 2013 crisis. The crisis

is believed to be a result of long-lasting, structural fragility fueled by inadequate public sector governance and

dysfunctional and weak institutions.1 In 2015, the World Bank Group (WBG) and other donors prepared a Fragility

Assessment of CAR, which concluded six drivers of conflict and fragility to explain how the crisis developed a cyclical

aspect: (i) a lack of social cohesion at every level of society; (ii) political power concentrated in a very small elite with

very little legitimacy; (iii) social and regional disparities between Bangui, the capital, and the periphery and between

the East and the rest of the country; (iv) elite capture of scarce natural resources; (v) imputing and lack of prosecution

of criminals; and (vi) a lasting state of insecurity.2 The 2013 crisis was unprecedented in scale and had a particularly

devastating impact, as half of the country’s GDP was lost.3 Over 20 percent of the country’s population was displaced

and 2.7 million, over half of the population, needed humanitarian support.4

3. The crisis prompted a large-scale international response. Peacekeeping interventions followed by the African Union

(AU), France, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) forces as well as emergency relief by UN agencies

and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As the crisis deepened, the country descended into localized violence

based on ethnic-religious lines. The need to reinforce peacekeeping led to the 2014 UN Security Council Resolution

2149, which authorized the deployment of a 12,000-men strong UN peacekeeping force, known as the UN

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which replaced the

former African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly MISCA) in September 2014.

4. National elections were held in February 2016, but challenges remain, and the conflict is not considered to be

over. The situation has continued to deteriorate with a rise in violence and fragmentation of armed groups in parts

of the country. At the time the project was prepared, there seemed to be clear consensus among local authorities

about the priorities for the country: peace, reconciliation, security, followed by good governance, the provision of

basic services, and economic development.5

1 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for the Central African Republic, Report No. 125268-CF, June 19, 2019 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Local Connectivity Emergency Project, Project Paper, Report No. PP1759, March 2016 5 SCD, June 2019


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5. The World Bank (WB) was one of the main development partners to reengage. The intervention was well-aligned

to the main objectives of the WB. The WB’s span of engagement included the CAR First State Consolidation

Development Program (DPF, P160123), the CAR Policy Notes (P157806), the CAR Recovery and Peacebuilding

Assessment (P160202), and the Turn Around Facility which led to the US$2 billion pledge in Brussels in November

2016. As elaborated in the Country Engagement Note for the CAR FY 2016-20176, the priorities were to (i) restore

core public sector institutions; (ii) provide basic support to livelihoods; and (iii) enhance basic social service delivery.

The operation was also aligned to recent WB analytical underpinning and strategies in Fragile, Conflict, and Violence

(FCV) countries, notably the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict Security and Development. The operational

implications included a focus on deepening partnerships and plans for enhanced implementation of the UN-World

Bank Partnership Agreements.

6. The State- and Peace-Building Fund (SPF) Trust Fund (TF) was able to quickly mobilize financing for this critical

operation for rapid infrastructure reconstruction in the CAR. The multi-donor TF was created in 2008 to finance

innovative approaches to state and peacebuilding in regions affected by FCV. It supports measures to improve

governance, institutional performance, and reconstruction and development in countries emerging from, in, or at

risk of sliding into crisis or arrears. In particular, the TF supports pilot innovative initiatives that address the challenges

of fragility and create a foothold for wider development involvement. The SPF remains an important part of the WB’s

broader efforts to address the drivers and impacts of FCV, and to contribute ultimately to peace, stability, and

prosperity. The project was processed under WB emergency procedures given the urgency of the needs.

7. At the time the project was prepared, the infrastructure deficit in CAR was enormous, particularly its road

network. Although the road network formed the backbone of the transport system in CAR, it remained

underdeveloped and in poor condition. Road density was low at only 1.5km per 100km2 compared to an average of

15km per 100km2 for Sub-Saharan Africa.7 Transit times remain high and many roads are only accessible for some

months of the year. Many communities were left isolated, exacerbated by the rainy season due to damaged and

flooded roads and bridges.

1.2 Theory of Change (Causal Chain)

8. The underlying logic of the proposed emergency intervention was clear. The project was intended to ensure basic

transport connectivity between poorly connected areas in districts situated in the lagging region of the Northeast of

the country, which would contribute to peacebuilding and development efforts. The project aims to reopen the

section of the National Road No. 8 (Route Nationale No. 8, RN8) between the city of Kaga-Bandoro to the Northeast

city of Ndélé, a gravel/earth road section of about 333km long. RN8 was prioritized and selected as the main

intervention of the project, and is the lifeline that runs through the Northeast of the country, from Sibut via Kaga-

Bandoro, Ndélé and Birao to the Sudanese border. It has a high symbolic value as it reconnects the capital Bangui to

the marginalized Northeast, a hotspot following the 2013 rebellion.

6 Country Engagement Note for the CAR FY 2016-2017, Report No. 96209-CF, July 13, 2015 7 Project Paper, March 2016


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9. The rehabilitation of RN8 enables the isolated rural populations of Northeast CAR to be physically connected to the

country’s other urban centers, particularly the capital Bangui. This would help to (i) revitalize the local economy by

providing temporary employment and related cash transfers; (ii) facilitate the movement of goods and internal trade;

(iii) make local governance more inclusive by engaging stakeholders and local communities in maintenance; (iv)

redeployment of state authority through civil servants.

10. The intervention focuses on tangible outputs (i.e. improvement of roads, bridges, drainage etc.) using Labor-

Intensive Public Works (LIPW)8 where feasible. This approach goes beyond infrastructure-building, to promote social

cohesion and economic inclusion of the vulnerable populations, while fostering community ownership and reviving

territorial connectivity along a humanitarian corridor.

8 Labor-Intensive Public Works (LIPW) tasks include clearing brush, manually opening diches, curing channels, and dealing with certain critical points as they arise.


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1.3 Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

11. The Project Development Objective (PDO), as stated in the Grant Agreement, is to reconnect the rural population of

the Northeast part of the Central African Republic to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-

Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road.

1.4 Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

12. The PDO indicators were as follows:

• Number of direct beneficiaries (including share of women) provided with an all-season access to the

Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road within a 2 km range under the project;

• Average daily traffic (all types of vehicle included); and

• Number of man-days created through Labor Intensive Public Works activities (including share of man-

days created for women).

13. Main beneficiaries. The main intended beneficiaries were the villages along the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui

– Ndélé road. Reopening the road was expected to benefit 74 villages, accounting for more than 37,000 people and

the recovery of traffic along the road. The population would also benefit from the temporary employment generated

through the LIPW and light maintenance, helping to revitalize the local economy. The population would benefit

directly from increased state presence and supervision through the redeployment of the Ministry of Public Works

(Ministère des Travaux Publics, MINTP) civil servants in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé. Furthermore, the reopening of this

road, RN8, a commercial road linking Bangui to the border with Sudan, was of strategic importance for MINUSCA

and was expected to also contribute to improving security along the road and fostering domestic and foreign trade

along the corridor.

1.5 Components

14. The US$4.9 million Local Connectivity Emergency Project (LCEP) consisted of four components:

a. Component 1: Drainage Improvement (US$ 2.8 million). This component finances the improvement of

drainage, road signaling, and rain barriers along the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road (333

km), including (a) the rehabilitation and construction of bridges, and box and pipe culverts; (b) the

construction of ditches; (c) the provision and installation of rain barriers; (d) the provision and installation of

road signaling through LIPW. This project’s main activity and accounting for 51 percent of project costs, this

component finances the construction of a new metal bridge over the Bamingui River to allow the crossing of

the river during all seasons.

b. Component 2: Road Protection and Maintenance (US$0.5 million). This component includes the

management of rain barriers, and the setting of light maintenance systems involving communities

(“cantonnage”) to ensure the protection and maintenance of the full length of road (333 km) during project

implementation.


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i. Sub-Component 2.1: Management of Rain Barriers (US$0.15 million). This sub-component finances

the management of 14 newly-installed rain barriers (one every 20-25km), provided and installed

under Component 1, for the protection of the road. The activities will contribute to restoring the

national operating system of rain barriers, by (a) recruiting and training local agents; (b) restoring

supervision from the MINTP at the local and national level; (c) setting a payment system

ii. Sub-Component 2.2: Light Maintenance Systems (US$0.35 million). This sub-component finances

the implementation of a light maintenance system on the full length of the road (333 km). This

system will allow the day-to-day local maintenance of the road for the duration of the project and

progressively following road rehabilitation. The system would be composed of segments of 20-25

km, each managed by a team composed of a chief cantonnier whom would manage 10 cantonniers.

It would include setting up a payment system and recruiting, training, and compensating local

workers. Local maintenance committees will be set up and trained in order to encourage the

sustainment of the light maintenance system, which will be handed over to the MINTP for

supervision and payment once the project ends.

c. Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (US$0.4 million). This component focuses

on carrying out a program of activities aimed at redeploying the Chefs de Services Préfectoraux to ensure

proper supervision and monitoring of the project, including the rehabilitation and reconstruction of offices

and supervision-related training for the Chefs de Service, and carrying out studies and workshops to identify

lessons learned from project-related activities and assess the project impact.

i. Sub-Component 3.1: Redeployment of the Chefs de Service Préfectoral of the MINTP in the sous-

prefectures (US$0.3 million). This sub-component finances (a) the rehabilitation and re-equipment

of MINTP offices in the sous-préfectures of Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé; (b) job-related expenses

(excluding salaries and compensations) for the Chefs de Service who will be in charge of the

monitoring of the project; (c) the training of the Chefs de Service in order to be able to conduct

proper supervision of the project.

ii. Sub-Component 3.2 Lessons Learned (US$0.1 million). This sub-component will finance a study and

a workshop for stakeholders, building on lessons learned from the project and other similar

initiatives. A baseline and impact study, taking into account the indicators of the project and the

impact on economic activity once the project is completed will also be financed.

d. Component 4: Project Management and Contingency Fund (US$1.2 million). This component will finance

the direct and indirect costs necessary for the implementation of the project. The Fiduciary Principles Accord

(FPA) provides 7 percent for indirect cost. Direct costs related to project implementation by United Nations

Office for Project Services (UNOPS) will be financed under this component. Project management will also (a)

include the hiring of a social specialist and a community facilitator to ensure the project implementation is

well coordinated with local authorities; (b) a rapid development assessment at the community level to gather

necessary data for successful project implementation; (c) inclusive engagement with local stakeholders and

setting up a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM); (d) the provision of contingency funds to cope with

unpredictable challenges during project implementation (US$0.5 million).


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15. Initial project costs and project costs at completion are included in Annex 2.

1.6 Other Significant Changes

16. Restructuring. A Level 2 restructuring was approved on January 16, 2018. The restructuring was intended to

reallocate costs to cover the additional costs involved in the construction of the Bamingui Bridge, the main activity

under the project (see Annex 2). It did not affect the theory of change for the project nor the originally expected

outcomes.

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

2.1 Relevance of PDOs

Rating: High

17. At the time when the operation closed, the development objectives remained consistent with the Bank’s strategy.

The Country Partnership Framework (CPF), currently under preparation, is based on the major findings of the

Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) published in June 2019. The CAR SCD concludes that improved mobility is a

critical aspect of an enabling environment for service delivery and income generation, whilst also helping to reduce

the rural-urban divide that might otherwise emerge when state presence is limited to mostly urban areas due to

security concerns. To address the low levels of security, emergency investments in road corridors (for example,

through labor-intensive programs) is specifically mentioned. Moreover, while upsurges of violence and instability can

be expected, creating an accountable state presence across the territory continues to be critical to addressing spatially

inequitable service delivery. In this regard, the operation continues to be highly relevant as it sought to address all

three binding constraints defined in the SCD: (i) low levels of security; (ii) grievances and spatially inequitable service

delivery; and (iii) inadequate growth and job creation. To put CAR in a trajectory towards poverty reduction and

growth, the need to address the country’s structural challenges including regional imbalances, weak institutions, and

lack of state presence outside the capital remains highly relevant.

18. The project remains fully aligned with the Government’s Plan for Recovery and Peace-Building (Plan National de

Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique, RCPCA), which was enacted in late 2016, during project

implementation. The RCPCA identified the widening gap between the elite and the rest of the population, and the

total neglect of large parts of the rural population, as root causes of the crisis. It emphasized the need to improve

road infrastructures across the country especially in rural areas. The project remains relevant as it helped to open

remote areas and foster access to market and trade. CAR’s post-crisis transportation policy also outlines the

importance of strengthening the capacity of sectoral institutions, especially outside the capital, and enhancing the

rural transportation network and services to open-up remote areas and promote national cohesion.9

9 Rural Connectivity Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. PAD2199, June 2017

2. OUTCOME


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19. Recognizing the ongoing need to close the infrastructure gap, the operation paved the way for preparation of the

$45 million IDA-financed Rural Connectivity Project (RCP). This is testament to the relevance of the project’s

objectives, design, and implementation arrangements. Given the emergency nature of the intervention, RCP is

consolidating works in the same geographic area, while incorporating the lessons learned. Reconnecting the isolated

Northeast region of the country by reopening a key section of the RN8 remains a key objective of the follow-on

operation, including the use of LIPW to create employment opportunities for vulnerable populations, which is

contributing to reconciliation and stabilization efforts. An additional financing for RCP is currently under preparation.

2.2 Achievement of PDO (Efficacy)

Rating: Substantial

20. The PDO of the project is to reconnect the rural population of the Northeast part of the Central African Republic to

urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road. This

essentially entailed the physical improvements on the gravel/earth road to ensure connectivity, including improving

the drainage system, the installation and maintenance of road signage and rain barriers, and the installation of a light

maintenance system throughout the road section. On the institutional and capacity building side, the project

rehabilitated and equipped the MINTP’s prefectural service chief offices in both Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé to ensure

proper supervision.

21. By project closure, the objective of reopening the road had been met. Two of the three PDO indicator target values

had been achieved:

a. Direct project beneficiaries. The number of targeted beneficiaries was met. The reopening of the Kaga-

Bandoro – Ndélé road directly benefited 74 villages along the road, accounting for more than 37,000 people.

The works have improved the traffic conditions. Some parts of the road still do not have all-weather access

as mechanized works were not completed on the entire stretch. The main bottleneck on the road, Bamingui

Bridge, was successfully constructed.

b. Average daily traffic (vehicles per day). The number of vehicles per day recorded at project closure was 20

vehicles, well below the target of 120. Although it did not meet the intended target, there is a significant

improvement from the baseline of 3 vehicles. Security conditions in the region is a major factor for the limited

number of vehicles travelling on the corridor. Generally, vehicle ownership in CAR remains very low and

consists primarily of intermediate means of transport (bicycles, animal carts, motorcycles), especially in

remote and isolated areas. The number of registered vehicles and transport permits and overall traffic levels

have declined dramatically because of looting and insecurity. This has discouraged transport firms from

operating in CAR. In addition, overloading of vehicles has increased. The benefits of the passable road may

take some time to materialize in view of the limited number of transport vehicles and high levels of insecurity

in the project area. This indicator also highlights the difficulty in setting realistic baselines and forecasts in

such FCV environments with crucial lack of data and connectivity, and high insecurity.

c. Number of man-days created through the Labor-Intensive Public Works (including share of man-days

created for women). At project closure, 100,830 man-days had been recorded, well exceeding the target of

75,000. However, the sub-indicator on the share of man-days created for women was only 27 percent, and


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below the intended target of 33 percent, despite measures taken such as sensitization and awareness raising,

and putting in place lotteries for employment, etc. Workers employed under the project to conduct LIPW

have been empowered through employment generated by the project. More than 50 percent of the LIPW

beneficiaries surveyed attested that these revenues have enabled them to obtain basic necessities

(mattresses, beds, cooking utensils, clothes, radios, and telephones); 26 percent said they used it to build a

decent home; 19 percent to provide health care for their families; 16 percent for food; and 13 percent for the

child’s schooling. 35 percent of beneficiaries surveyed invested in agricultural activities (e.g. acquisition of

seeds and other inputs) and 32 percent have used it to purchase livestock.10

22. Beyond the chosen project indicators, the following are illustrative outputs that bear testimony to the project’s

achievements with a limited amount of funds (photographs are included in Annex 4):

a. Construction of Bamingui Bridge: The main achievement of the project was the construction of a 45-meter

and 4.20-meter wide bridge over the Bamingui River. The bridge, which was completed in May 2019, links the

locality of Bamingui to Ndélé, an axis which is heavily used by MINUSCA, merchants from Sudan, South Sudan

and Bangui. Before the project, it was identified as a major bottleneck as the road had been almost impassable

during the rainy season because of the rising waters from the Bamingui River. The bridge was constructed

using a participatory and inclusive approach through LIPW, mobilizing about 1,200 people and creating 11,000

man-days of employment over 9 months.11 This approach has revitalized the local economy and ensured the

construction has the full support of the surrounding communities. One beneficiary woman who worked on-

site commented. “When it rains, the old bridge is flooded. This makes it invisible and therefore impractical.

The construction of the bridge has really boosted the economy, since the work began, I’m selling better, and

my business is doing well.”12 The completion of the bridge is a notable achievement particularly given the

challenges faced around the precarious security conditions in the area, the low capacity of enterprises in the

area, and the excessive rain which disrupted works during the construction period. Photographs of the bridge

are included in Annex 4.

b. Rehabilitation of Bridges and Culverts: Priority was given to critical points along the 333km road section. Out

of 78 structures identified by UNOPS for potential intervention, a total of 81 have been

constructed/rehabilitated under the project.

c. Supply and Installation of Rain Barriers and Road Signs: The project built and laid 12 barriers along the road,

out of the 14 initially planned. In addition, UNOPS installed 56 road signs in strategic points. These were made

according to safety and traffic code standards enforced in CAR.

d. Rain Barrier Management: For the management of the 12 installed rain barriers under the project, 12

managers were recruited and trained (3 women and 9 men). Given the objective is to re-establish the national

system of operating rain barriers, MINTP will take over supervision following project closure. At the time of

project closure, 11 of the 12 barriers were functional; and 1 is occupied by armed groups.

e. Establishment of Community Maintenance System (“cantonnage”): The project set up 13 maintenance

teams, composed of 143 people, consisting of 159,660 man-days for light maintenance along the 333-km

road.

10 Ibid. 11 UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019 12 Ibid.


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f. Institutional Strengthening of MINTP: Given responsibilities are handed over to MINTP following project

closure, it was necessary to rehabilitate and equip the offices of the prefectural services in Kaga-Bandoro and

Ndélé as well as strengthen the technical capacity. Under the project, two offices were rehabilitated (see

photographs in Annex 4). They were equipped with adequate working equipment (computers, furniture,

office supplies, motorcycles, etc.), however utilization of offices was low given security problems. Four

training workshops for MINTP managers were held on (i) procurement; (ii) management of infrastructure

projects; (iii) management of safety, health, environment, and social aspects; and (iv) road maintenance.

g. The reopening of the road has stimulated activity along the road, including access to markets and other

social services. In contrast to project initiation, when activity along the road was limited, according to data

collected at project closure, there are 12 markets on the road section, of which 9 are currently functional. Of

the 49 schools along the road section, 44 are currently in operation, consisting of 88 school buildings and 177

classrooms, serving 16,053 pupils, 6,212 of which are girls. 23 of the 26 health facilities are operational,

serving an average of 5,077 patients per month.

23. Despite the challenges faced, the project substantially achieved its overall outcome of reestablishing connectivity

with the Northeast region in an emergency context. This was primarily achieved with the completion of the

construction of Bamingui Bridge, the project’s main activity, and a critical point on the RN8 between Kaga-Bandoro

and Ndélé. Looking forward and given the emergency nature of the intervention, the results achieved under the

project would need to be consolidated by follow-on operations to ensure the sustainability of investments and to

ensure all-weather access on the entire stretch of road.

2.3 Efficiency

Rating: Substantial

24. No cost-benefit analysis or estimate of the economic rate of return was undertaken during preparation, given the

emergency nature of the project and the general lack of recent data for most of the territory. The project design

was based on cost effectiveness, i.e. maximizing the Bank’s added value and minimizing costs without forfeiting the

quality of outputs.

25. From the outset, it was recognized that a business-as-usual approach would not work in the given context. Private

companies possessing the necessary equipment, machinery and skills were hard to come by, and were unlikely to go

beyond the capital without security ensured, resulting in a high-risk premium. This would impact value-for-money

and imply procurement challenges. UNOPS was already engaged in the scale-up of activities in CAR, and had the

capacity and means to implement the project swiftly. Overall project costs were not known as part of the works were

undertaken by MINUSCA through force account. Therefore, standard models (e.g. Road Economic Decision (RED)

model) do not apply.13 Moreover, as experienced under the LONDO Project (P152512), the use of labor-based method

was proven to be a cost-effective alternative to equipment-based methods for road maintenance.

13 Project Paper, March 2016


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26. The project faced some shortcomings during project implementation due to competing priorities of MINUSCA and

the worsening security situation. Mechanized works under the project were to be carried out by MINUSCA, however

they were hampered due to the low quality of work and lack of alignment with MINUSCA’s schedule and itinerary.

MINUSCA was unable to complete the full 333 km because of the worsening security situation and diversion of

resources, and therefore UNOPS had to find an alternative solution to complete the works. Since mechanized works

needed to be done upstream, this impacted other project activities such as the LIPW and the installation of the rain

barriers. The completion of the construction of Bamingui Bridge was prioritized.

27. The change in the design of the Bamingui Bridge was the primary reason for the escalation in project costs.

Following the completion of technical studies (hydraulic, geotechnical, topographical, structural, environmental, and

economic), the design of the bridge was amended from 23m to 45m in length and included a pedestrian walkway.

This new and more robust design of the bridge was validated by the project’s technical committee. The financial

impact was an increase of $400,000 (US$1.6 million versus US$1.2 million). A project restructuring was undertaken

so primarily the project’s budget contingencies could be used to cover the additional costs.

28. The overall rationale for the project of improving connectivity and development in the region remains valid. At the

time of project closure, traffic remains extremely limited on the road. However, as mentioned earlier, activity is

picking up along the road including the operation of markets, schools, and health facilities. The main socio-economic

benefits include reduced transport costs, improved access to services such as schools, markets, and health clinics,

employment creation through construction activities, and greater state presence. Despite the lack of data, anecdotal

evidence collected through interviews with beneficiaries point to the broader social and economic impacts of the

project, which go beyond the individual to stimulate the recovery of communities. According to one beneficiary

interviewed, “We the people of Bamingui had never seen such a project in the area. The bridge will really benefit the

whole community.”14 In addition, the project enabled greater state presence thanks to the rehabilitation and the re-

equipment of the MINTP offices in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé.

29. The substantial rating is justified as even with a relatively small amount ($4.9 million), the project was able to have

a large impact. Despites its challenges, without the project it is likely the Northeast region would continue to be

isolated from the rest of the country. The construction of Bamingui Bridge has transformed the region, and

improvements along the road has reduced travel times, benefiting approximately 37,000 beneficiaries. Without the

project, it would have remained unpassable during part of the year particularly during the rainy season.

2.4 Overall Outcome Rating

30. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The project achieved substantial efficacy, substantial

efficiency, and remained highly relevant throughout its duration.

14 UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019


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2.5 Other Outcomes and Impacts

31. The LCEP supported the mobilization of additional funding and strengthened the dialogue with the Government

and donors. The pilot led to the preparation of a larger project, the $45 million IDA-financed Rural Connectivity Project

(RCP). This project was designed to further strengthen the results achieved under the emergency grant in the

Northeast basin, and incorporate the lessons learned. Replicable best practices and implementation arrangements

had been developed under the grant which facilitated preparation of the new operation. The project served as a pilot

for other projects and reflects how operations should be envisioned in such contexts – simple design, flexible and

pragmatic execution, adaptable in high-risk environment, with a satisfactory result. The team engaged on the project

were closely involved in the policy dialogue with the Government and contributed to the preparation of Development

Policy Financing (DPF), the SCD, CPF, and the RCPCA for CAR. Moreover, the WB team has played a critical role as

convener in coordinating with other donors in the transport sector to ensure alignment and to develop a broader

road sector program for the country (under RCP). Sectoral engagement, implemented in parallel to the project,

complemented the project and contributed in further strengthening institutional capacity.

32. The LIPW has helped affected populations to reduce their vulnerability and contributed to the reconciliation

process. Amid the crisis, the works was an effective way to stabilize critical areas by providing a source of

employment, where security and government presence was weak. The public lottery method ensured equal

treatment with a view of empowering vulnerable groups. Women were encouraged to submit their nominations.

Although women’s participation was generally low due to the scarcity of women working in infrastructure (27 percent

share of man-days created for women versus a target of 33 percent), opportunities were given to women to work on

sites, for example in food preparation, as part of the overall strategy to encourage women’s involvement in the

project.

33. The project intervention area is highly exposed to Gender-Based Violence (GBV), and the project incorporated best

practices in implementation. Due to the remoteness of the area and the general security context, there was already

a high incidence of GBV. UNOPS, who was already well advanced on the matter, implemented specific provisions

based on their own internal practices and on the recommendations of the WB’s Good Practice Note for Addressing

GBV in Investment Projects Involving Major Civil Works (June 2018), as well as the CAR’s legal framework, the national

strategy to combat GBV developed by the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Family, and Protection of Children,

with the involvement of other departments such as the Ministries of Justice, Health, and Education, in partnership

with other UN agencies. During implementation, attention was paid to both GBV and compliance with Occupational

Health and Safety, which was included in the subcontract provisions. There were no incidents of GBV reported during

implementation of the project.

34. With a project component dedicated for institutional strengthening, the intervention has contributed to enhancing

the longer-term development of CAR’s capacity and institutions. Specifically, the rehabilitation and reequipment of

MINTP offices in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé, the training of the Chefs de Service, and the redeployment of MINTP staff

to conduct proper supervision of the project will enhance the Government’s ability to manage and supervise such

projects in the future. In addition, UNOPS’ On-Track approach was executed during project implementation, whereby


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hands-on technical assistance and inclusion of the government counterpart were part of the execution and

monitoring of the project. This would also ensure the sustainability of project investments.

3. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

35. The project was prepared under challenging circumstances amid civil unrest and growing tension. The

project aimed to mitigate the geographic divide between the isolated Northeast part of CAR by reopening the

strategic RN8 between Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé. This was intended to prevent the de facto partition of the

country and to re-establish state presence and security, ultimately contributing to reconciliation and

stabilization efforts. Humanitarian relief had been largely confined to stable areas, thereby reinforcing the

disparity. The project’s intervention area and targeted beneficiaries were therefore considered appropriate.

36. The team overcame multiple challenges during preparation. The crisis and insecurity prevailing in the project

area meant there was a general lack of data obtained from the Government. Key pieces of information, such

as an updated map of access constraints in the country, were obtained by expanding consultations to UN

agencies and NGOs. A map of the project intervention is included in Annex 6. Furthermore, the joint

WB/UNOPS/MINUSCA survey of the Kaga-Bandoro to Ndélé road during preparation15 allowed the team to fill

core gaps including the need for the construction of the Bamingui Bridge and the overall costing of the project.

Partnerships and synergies between the Government, UNOPS, MINUSCA, and the World Bank were

formalized during the implementation through Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs).

37. The lack of state presence shaped the project’s design and activities. At the time of preparation, many

regional representatives of the MINTP were based in Bangui due to security concerns as well as the lack of

proper facilities and equipment to work in the field. This added to the challenge of supervising projects

financed by the Government in those regions. This was the key rationale for the capacity building activities

financed under Component 3 of the project.

38. Given the low capacity of the Government, it was agreed to use the Fiduciary Principles Accord (FPA) which

enables a UN agency to implement the project on behalf of the Government. Under the FPA, the WB

contracted UNOPS to implement the project according to UN fiduciary, procurement, and environmental and

social safeguards policies, as stipulated in the FPA. UNOPS was selected as the implementer of the project due

to (i) the general lack of state presence in the targeted area; (ii) the availability of UN facilities and resources;

(iii) the capacity of UNOPS for rapid deployment in the area; (iv) UNOPS’ expertise in conflict areas and

infrastructure, as the UN agency mandated in this field of expertise. Having UNOPS carry out these works was

beneficial also for security reasons because the road passes through territory under control of different armed

groups. A MoU was signed between the Government, MINUSCA, and the WB on August 4, 2016. This

arrangement was designed to enable UNOPS to leverage MINUSCA’s presence and security support to

implement the project in a highly volatile context. MINUSCA would also undertake the mechanized works for

the project using their equipment. MINUSCA was assessed as the most optimal and available option that could

15 The preparation mission took place from February 2 to 10, 2016.


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provide a balance of expertise, machinery, and security necessary to carry out the force account works under

the project’s budget constraints, and in an extremely volatile security environment of the project. Reopening

the same road was also identified as a priority for MINUSCA following the 2016 rainy season.

39. Considering the urgent needs in CAR, the project was prepared under emergency procedures (Operational

Policy (OP) 2.30 Development Cooperation and Conflict, OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies,

and OP 10.00 Paragraph 12 Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance. From initiation to effectiveness, the

total project preparation time was only four months, and the first disbursement followed two months later.

The project benefited from an expedited and simplified approval process which shortened the overall

preparation time.

40. Key lessons from other WB engagements in CAR were considered during preparation. Given the successful

implementation of the LONDO Project, which provides temporary employment through LIPW throughout the

country, the project utilized the same approach. This provided the opportunity to revive the local economy,

engage with local stakeholders, and foster community ownership. The project also incorporated lessons from

existing WBG activities in CAR including the Emergency Public Services Response Project, the Emergency

Urban Infrastructure Project, and the CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Project.16

41. The project was recognized as a high-risk intervention at the outset. Three of the main risks identified at

preparation eventually materialized during implementation: (i) technical issues emerging from the

construction of Bamingui Bridge; (ii) stakeholder risk and the need to coordinate closely among civil and

military actors, notably with MINUSCA for the provision of military escort and mechanized works; and (iii) the

volatile security environment.

42. With these risks in mind, an appropriate set of stakeholders (WB, MINTP, MINUSCA, UNOPS) were engaged

during preparation and implementation of the project, underscoring the importance of collaboration in a

fluid environment. The project’s technical coordination and steering committees ensured information sharing

among the main actors and provided a platform for issues to be identified and resolved swiftly. Following the

first MoU between the WB, MINUSCA, and the Government on August 4, 2016 to frame a common

understanding of the collaboration required during implementation, a second MoU was signed between

UNOPS and MINUSCA on December 22, 2016 to outline the technical description and quality of tasks to be

completed by each party.

43. During implementation the country experienced an upsurge in clashes between armed groups competing

for territory and access to resources. Each episode of violence brought more casualties and displacement,

overstretching MINUSCA’s resources across the country, to the detriment of the project timeline and delivery.

In practice, the MoU did not work well and MINUSCA was unable to fulfill its obligations. The mechanized

works and the treatment of critical points undertaken by MINUSCA was incomplete and accounted for only

70 percent, or 230km of the road, with the quality standards below those agreed with UNOPS and referred to

in the MoU. Furthermore, MINUSCA deviated from the agreed itinerary on RN8 and carried out works on the

16 Project Paper, March 2016


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Kaga-Bandoro-Balakete/Azene-Bamingui- Ndélé route, isolating the locality of Mbrès. Given the security

situation, the costs of the mechanized works that was proposed by local companies to complete the works

significantly exceeded the available budget set aside for the work. Given the burden fell on UNOPS, it was

decided to concentrate efforts on finalizing the major works (e.g. Bamingui Bridge and the two large concrete

box culverts in Mbrès) which would still achieve the project objective of restoring connectivity. The rains have

also damaged sections of the road where there had been no mechanized works. In view of the lack of financial

resources and the emergency nature of the interventions, this project will be followed by a consolidation

phase along the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Ndélé section under the currently ongoing WB Rural Connectivity

Project (P160500, RCP).

44. High insecurity hindered project execution and results. Dozens of armed groups operated in the Kaga

Bandoro – Ndélé, making works even more challenging, and prevented the full operation of the rain barriers

along the entire road.17 For example, the construction of the large concrete box culverts in Mbrès involved

multiple unsuccessful call for tenders due to the deteriorating security situation in the work area. The contract

was finally signed with a local company in June 2018 but works began only in December 2018. The project

financed the rehabilitation and re-equipment of offices in both Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé, and training on

maintenance and management of rain barriers. However, the Chef de Service position in Kaga-Bandoro

remained vacant for extended periods of time, despite promises made by the Ministry, and the Ndélé position

was never filled. Reports indicate armed groups have reportedly taken control of some offices.18 These

examples highlight the unique challenges of operating in FCV.

4. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

4.1 Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

45. The Bank played a major role in facilitating preparation and recovery during the post-conflict transition. The

preparation time of just four months from initiation to approval was highly compressed. Despite the tight

timeframe, the quality at entry was considered adequate for an emergency operation with a focus on simple

design and objectives. The Bank brought sound technical design and expertise and recognized the capacity

challenges on the ground, engaging an appropriate set of stakeholders.

46. Supervision was effectively undertaken from the World Bank side. On average, two supervision missions

were undertaken a year. The Aide Memoires and Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) present clear

recommendations for project implementation. Task Team Leader (TTL) turn-over was low, with the same TTL

in charge for the project lifetime which helped ensure continuity, particularly as the UNOPS team leader in

CAR changed three times over the course of the project. The Bank also took advantage to participate in

sessions of the steering committee when they coincided with the missions.

17 UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019 18 Ibid.


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47. Field visits remained a challenge as basic logistics and planning took a lot of coordination and planning with

UNOPS and MINUSCA. Kaga-Bandoro and Birao are considered to be hotspots of violence. Most areas require

the use of armed escorts, lodging on the MINUSCA base and the use of armored vehicles. In addition, the

timing of field missions was almost always dependent on the UN and/or MINUSCA flight schedules and

availability, which changed frequently. Supervision remains costly and challenging given the security

constraints.

4.2 Compliance Issues

48. Environmental and social safeguards, and fiduciary responsibilities were transferred to UNOPS under the

FPA. An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan

(ESMP) and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) were prepared for the project. A team of experts from MINTP

carried out monthly monitoring and missions to ensure mitigation measures were effectively being

implemented according to the reports. General reporting, including on environmental/social safeguards

compliance, was generally satisfactory, and provided essential required information, although it was succinct

and would have benefited from being more exhaustive.

49. The compensation of Project-Affected Persons (PAPs) took time to implement, particularly as a re-

evaluation of the PAPs was carried out to take into account the new design of Bamingui Bridge. The span

increased from 22m to 45m, generating new loss of assets by the local populations. The ESMP and RAP were

updated to reflect this change. Financing for compensation, to be borne by the Government, finally came from

the Fonds d’Entretien Routier (FER), the road fund.

50. To facilitate implementation, the project put in place a robust communication and community mobilization

plan. Information and community awareness raising covered complaint mechanisms, dangers on the road,

HIV/AIDS prevention, sensitization on the need to install rain barriers and prevent the deterioration of the

road, and explanation on the criteria for selection for the LIPW and the equipment made available. These

mechanisms helped to ensure trust was built among community and between the community and project

stakeholders. (See photographs in Annex 4).

4.3 Quality of Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)

M&E Rating: Modest

51. Design. The PDO was too ambitious in its wording: “reconnect the rural population of the Northeast part of

the Central African Republic to urban centers and local markets”. The project seemed to concentrate on

connectivity to urban areas even though one of the PDO objectives was to also increase connectivity to

markets. The PDO indicators were not well-developed vis-a-vis the objectives as there were no PDO indicators

for market connectivity. In addition, the PDO was not constructed well enough to incorporate the institutional

support and capacity building aspect of the project.


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52. Implementation. One of the main weaknesses in the M&E system was the challenging circumstances to collect

data on-the-ground. As noted during preparation, the main risk identified for the M&E framework was limited

resources as data needed to be collected in the field and would require monitoring on a large scale of territory

(e.g. number of beneficiaries). The security situation in the project area limited the collection of detailed

information such as the socio-economic impacts of the project and indicators were not reported on regularly.

53. Utilization. The project was not able to demonstrate improved market connectivity, access to social services,

or the capacity building activities as this information was not captured in the PDO indicators. Assessment of

the project relies heavily on limited data, physical completion of works (e.g. the bridge) and anecdotal

evidence, given the shortcomings in the M&E framework. In addition, there was no comprehensive post-

project impact assessment. The project would have benefited from more systematic beneficiary surveys to

capture the wider socio-economic benefits, as well as the use of remote monitoring tools.

4.3 Risk to Development Outcome

54. The overall risk to development outcomes is rated High. The project closed against a backdrop of sporadic

and uneven improvement in the security situation in the country. The recurrence of large-scale outbreaks of

violence, if this were to happen, are likely to affect project investments. About 75 percent of the country’s

territory remain under control of rebel groups. The social contract remains weak with no or little state

presence in a large part of the country. Although the project funded capacity building activities, attacks are

constantly being reported, included some targeting civil servants, presenting problems for staff retention. The

probability that results will be maintained also depend on the ability of the Government to maintain the road

and sustain LIPW. The lack of history of maintenance, the limited devoted funding, and a constrained macro-

economic context presents an overall risk. However, through its engagement in the DPF and the RCP (which

is preparing an additional financing), the WB is supporting CAR to improve its maintenance practices.

Improved maintenance would be required to fully support the continued flow of benefits from the

rehabilitated roads in the longer term. The project was not necessarily designed for sustainability of

outcomes, given the emergency nature and the rapid response intended, but the project sought to assure it,

where possible, by emphasizing a hands-on approach and technical assistance for counterparts.

5. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

55. A pilot project, such as this one, is an effective method to scale up small, targeted investments to

incrementally build a larger portfolio. This $4.9 million investment led to the preparation of the $45 million

IDA-financed RCP. The project design was developed based on this pilot, and the same team was involved in

the preparation both on the government and WB side, therefore leveraging efficient use of resources and

carrying forth institutional knowledge and key lessons learned.

56. A simple, flexible, and focused project design works best in fragile and evolving contexts. In an emergency

context with low capacity in-country, even simple, concrete interventions can have a substantial impact on


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the population. The project also benefited from the shortened processing timeline and simplified procedures,

with overall positive development outcomes, despite the small dollar amount. Flexible project arrangements

are important in achieving results. It is with this modular perspective in mind that the new RCP was designed

to include two different geographies, involving both UNOPS and the Government as implementing partners.

The use of contingency funds to account of the design changes on the Bamingui Bridge highlights the

importance of allocating and maintaining a contingency budget from the beginning, particularly for projects

operating in volatile and data-scarce contexts such as CAR.

57. Collaboration across Global Practices (GPs) and institutions is important, particularly early in the

preparation and design stages. Important cross-GP collaboration and field missions during preparation

allowed the team to (i) tailor interventions based on specific criteria (e.g. security situation and prospects,

accessibility to sites, costing within budget); (ii) find, link and select key partners for the project (MINTP,

MINUSCA, UNOPS), and (iii) address the data gap with consultations with UN agencies and NGOs, as well as

the carrying out of a field mission facilitated by UN peacekeeping logistics and security. On this project, the

Governance and Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience (SURR) GPs as well as the FCV Cross-Cutting Solutions

Areas added value in both the design and the implementation of the project, thanks to their respective

knowledge and lessons learnt of (i) CAR environment of Civil Society Organizations/NGOs; (ii) the LONDO

Project (including LIPW); and (iii) UN system, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and

security requirements to operate in such environment.

58. Institutional strengthening and capacity building take time to realize benefits. The project had a capacity

building component, yet for the initial investment to pay off requires long-term engagement to ensure that

institutional support is secured over more than one short project lifecycle. The RCP provides a good platform

to continue institutional strengthening and building the capacity with the same set of stakeholders. There is

a balance between realization of activities in a short amount of time and investment on capacity building for

sustainability. Keeping this in mind, projects should consider how capacity can be transferred to national

authorities following closing so that governments can decrease reliance on external assistance over time. This

would also ensure greater ownership within the government.

59. The Bank has an important role to play as a convener and in coordinating donor efforts. This is key

particularly when a large amount of funds is flowing in from multiple donors as the country emerges from

conflict. The Bank is playing a vital role in CAR in the transport sector. At a strategic level, the WB continues

to participate in donor’s conferences (e.g. the Brussels Conference which took place on November 17, 2016

US$2.06 billion was pledged for CAR). At an operational level, the follow-on RCP is financing a study to develop

a road sector investment program which will be relevant for other donors in the sector to ensure

complementary and efficiency in investments.

60. The security constraints in FCV settings require innovation in monitoring and supervision, as well as during

the design stage. When circumstances make it difficult for TTLs to undertake supervision in certain areas,

other WB projects have contracted out third-party monitoring firms, however this remains a very costly

option. Given the challenges of organizing and conducting field visits, teams operating in fragile and conflict

settings can consider innovations such as the WB’s Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision


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(GEMS) and integrating its remote supervision capacities into the M&E framework. This would also help

ensure improvement of M&E usefulness and accuracy. It could also help to administer perception/beneficiary

surveys and help capture results on intangible outcomes such as social cohesion. In addition, the absence of

project team staff in-country also presented challenges both in high supervision costs and monitoring of

project progress. Recognizing the constraints, the transport team has since filled a full-time staff member

based in Bangui. Moreover, security problems hampered the road project and therefore needs to be

thoroughly assessed and considered during project design. Most of the failures in this project result from the

security conditions which did not allow smooth project implementation or the attainment of the objectives in

terms of traffic, state redeployment, and road rehabilitation.

61. In a difficult and unstable environment and context, road infrastructure projects should focus on essential

works including spot improvement or building critical bridges to restore connectivity, instead of trying to

reopen/rehabilitate a maximum road length. The main achievement of this project was the construction of

Bamingui Bridge. The target of improving 333 km of road was not reached. This is not the only road project

which at the end shifted from road spot improvement to bridge construction because of difficult

circumstances. In addition, bridges are considered more sustainable since they often require less frequent

maintenance compared to earth roads.

62. A stronger partnership with peacekeeping forces (e.g. MINUSCA) is needed to fully embed them in the

project design. The WB did not have enough leverage to alter MINUSCA’s itinerary and work program to fulfill

its obligations as agreed during preparation. MINUSCA’s responsibilities, as spelled out in the MoU, was not

fully fulfilled. This had a detrimental impact on the project and required alternative solutions to complete the

project objectives. Despite the signed MoU and several meetings with high-level officers, including the Chief

Commander, it was difficult to gain leverage for project implementation as the incentives and strategic

priorities of MINUSCA were not aligned perfectly with the WB. The lack of institutional knowledge and

leverage with the DPKO refrained the implementation team in being more effective.

.

The World Bank Local connectivity emergency project (P157923)

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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: The PDO is to reconnect the population of the Northeast CAR to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro –Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road.

Indicator Name Unit of Measure

Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 37000.00 37000.00 37000.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was fully achieved.


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Target


Average daily traffic (all types of vehicle included) (vehicle per day)

Number 3.00 120.00 120.00 20.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was not fully achieved. Security conditions in the region is a major factor for the limited number of vehicles travelling on the corridor. Generally, vehicle ownership in CAR remains very low and consists primarily of intermediate means of transport (bicycles, animal carts, motorcycles), especially in remote and isolated areas. The number of registered vehicles and transport permits and overall traffic levels have declined dramatically because of looting and insecurity. This has discouraged transport firms from operating in CAR. In addition, overloading of vehicles has increased.



Target


Number of man-days created through the Labor Intensive Public Works activities (including share of man-days created for women)

Number 0.00 75000.00 75000.00 100830.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Share of man-days created for women

Percentage 0.00 33.00 33.00 27.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets):


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The target was exceeded. However, the sub-indicator for share of man-days created for women was only partially achieved despite measures taken including awareness raising, sensitization, and lotteries for employment.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Component 1: Drainage Improvement

Component 2: Road Protection and Maintenance



Target


Number of bridges rehabilitated

Number 0.00 13.00 13.00 12.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was largely met.



Target


Number of bridges constructed Number 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018



Page 25 of 37

The target was fully achieved.



Target


Number of culverts rehabilitated

Number 0.00 49.00 49.00 25.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was only partially met (~50%) due to the diversion of MINUSCA's resources and the prioritization of the construction of Bamingui Bridge.



Target


Number of culverts constructed

Number 0.00 57.00 57.00 57.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018




Target



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Number of ditches constructed

Meter(m) 0.00 200000.00 200000.00 63000.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was only partially met due to the diversion of MINUSCA's resources and the prioritization of the construction of Bamingui Bridge.



Target


Number of rain barriers constructed

Number 0.00 14.00 14.00 12.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was largely achieved.



Target


Number of functioning rain barriers

Number 0.00 14.00 14.00 12.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018



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The target was largely achieved.



Target


Number of kilometers of road maintained under the project

Kilometers 0.00 333.00 333.00 333.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was essentially met as even though only 234km of the road was subject to mechanized works (due to the diversion of MINUSCA's resources), the full length of the road (333km) was manually maintained by UNOPS and community-based maintenance schemes.

Component: Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building



Target


Number of MINTP offices rehabilitated and re-equipped

Number 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 30-Sep-2019 12-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was fully met.


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Target


Number of technical assistance workshops delivered to MINTP

Number 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00

01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 30-Sep-2019 12-Oct-2018



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B. ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PDO

Objective/Outcome 1 The PDO is to reconnect the population of the Northeast CAR to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road.

Outcome Indicators

1. Direct project beneficiaries (including women) 2. Average daily traffic 3. Number of man-days created through the Labor-Intensive Public Works activities (including share of man-days for women)

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Number of bridges rehabilitated 2. Number of bridges constructed 3. Number of culverts rehabilitated 4. Number of culverts constructed 5. Number of ditches constructed 6. Number of rain barriers constructed 7. Number of functioning rain barriers 8. Number of km of road maintained under the project 9. Number of MINTP offices rehabilitated and re-equipped 10. Number of technical assistance workshops delivered to MINTP

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

Component 1 and 2: 1. Km of roads rehabilitated/maintained 2. Number of bridges constructed/rehabilitated 3. Number of culverts, ditches, rain barriers constructed/rehabilitated 4. Number of man-days created (temporary jobs) Component 3: 5. Number of MINTP offices rehabilitated and re-equipped 6. Number of workshops delivered to MINTP


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. .

ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Component Name Amount at Approval (US$M)

Actual at Project Closing (US$M)

Component 1: Drainage Improvement 2.80 3.37

Component 2: Road Protection and Maintenance

0.50 0.46

Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building

0.40 0.37

Project Management and Contingency Fund

0.86 0.36

UNOPS General Management Support 0.34 0.34

Total Project Cost 4.90 4.90


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ANNEX 3. RECIPIENT, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

UNOPS: A draft of the ICR was shared with UNOPS. Minor comments were provided in track changes and were incorporated in the document. Government: A draft of the ICR was shared with Government. The following comments were received:

Bonjour Madame le Chargé de Projet, Nous avons bien pris connaissance du rapport d'achèvement du Projet d'Urgence de Connectivité Locale et nous apprécions hautement la qualité du rapport qui retrace les points forts et les faibles du dispositif ayant permis le déploiement des activités programmées. Nous souhaitons vivement que les enseignements tirés et les recommandations faites de la réalisation de ce projet puissent être capitalisés et bénéficiés au nouveau projet de connectivité qui se met résolument en oeuvre dans la même zone et dans les mêmes circonstances. Au nom du Coordonnateur Intérimaire, nous approuvons ce rapport et demandons que sa version finale approuvée nous soit communiquée pour toutes fins utiles. Bien cordialement, Bigué-Kola Reginald Expert Principal en Passation des Marchés English Translation: Good Morning Project Manager, We have taken note of the completion report of the Local Connectivity Emergency Project and we highly appreciate the quality of the report, which describes the strengths and weaknesses of the system that enabled the deployment of the planned activities. We sincerely hope that the lessons learned, and the recommendations made during the implementation of this project can be capitalized and benefit the new connectivity project which is being resolutely implemented in the same area and under the same circumstances. On behalf of the Interim Coordinator, we endorse this report and request that its final approved version be communicated to us for all purposes. Yours sincerely Bigué-Kola Reginald Senior Procurement Expert


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ANNEX 4. PHOTOGRAPHS

Old Bamingui Bridge prior to Construction:

Bamingui Bridge during Construction:


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Completed Bamingui Bridge:


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Labor-Intensive Public Works:

Community mobilization/awareness-raising and public lottery activities:


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Old and Rehabilitated Office in Kaga-Bandoro:

One of the Constructed Rain Barriers:

Training Workshops:


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ANNEX 5. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

• UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019 (UNOPS Completion Report) available at:

http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b0876e745f • Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for the Central African Republic, Report No. 125268-CF, June 19, 2019

• Local Connectivity Emergency Project, Project Paper, Report No. PP1759, March 2016

• Country Engagement Note for the CAR FY 2016-2017, Report No. 96209-CF, July 13, 2015

• Rural Connectivity Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. PAD2199, June 2017

http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b0876e745f


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ANNEX 6. MAP OF PROJECT INTERVENTION

Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé Road and Drainage Status (February 2016)

Source: Local Connectivity Emergency Project, Project Paper, Report No. PP1759, March 2016

implementation completion and results...

Documents