implications of the werther effect on the suicide epidemic in alaska by paul hannan

Implications of the Werther Effect on the Suicide Epidemic in Alaska

Paul F. Hannan

Sacred Heart University

December 21, 2015

Running head: THE WERTHER EFFECT IN ALASKA 1

Implications of the Werther Effect on the Suicide Epidemic in Alaska

Surely there are happier subjects to write about than Alaska’s suicide epidemic. Yet for

those families dealing with the stark realities of the crisis, there is no escaping the issue. And for

the innumerable Alaskans finding themselves unable, if not unwilling, to stare this issue dead in

the face, it is a problem that will not soon depart; placing our heads in the sand and pretending it

does not exist will only make matters worse. Indeed, if allowed to burgeon unchecked, it may

soon be the case that--as with all epidemics--the effects of this tragedy will strike next at this

reader’s door. Few, if any, among us are immune to this insidious disease, and with the instant

epidemic there is no known inoculation or cure. Nonetheless, I shall posit that, as was the case

with Goethe’s (2012) The Sorrows of Young Werther nearly 250 years ago, as readily as literature

has the power to giveth--to introduce a contagion into society the likes of which have never been

seen before--literature likewise has the power to take, or rather, to extricate that contagion as

well.

Evincing the true cause of this present contagion is no easy task, as even the most notable

of erudites on this issue writes; “The scholar requires all sorts of observations and experiments to

solve even one question...human volition is the most complex of all phenomena” (Durkheim,

2013, p. 148). Yet once the research presented herein has been fully deliberated, the reader is

sure to join with Durkheim (2013) in asserting, as is the case with all suicidal epidemics, it is “a

state of crisis and perturbation not to be prolonged with impunity” (p.369). This proclamation

nevertheless begs the question; what precisely is the solution? Which remedy, if any, constitutes

the “silver bullet” that will, if not reverse this insidious epidemic, provide an effectual bulwark to

stem the tide of its tragic spread?

THE WERTHER EFFECT IN ALASKA 2

I do not possess the breadth of knowledge to provide solutions for every disparate issue

related to the Alaska suicide epidemic, and indeed these are legion. I wrote previously (Hannan,

2012) on the suicide crisis among Alaska Natives, discussing its nexus to Alaska Native

educational experiences conjoined with their forced assimilation into white culture. And to those

assertions I still hold fast. Yet, likened to a diamond with countless facets, there are many facets

to this crisis. And education and assimilation is only one of them or perhaps, at most, two. In

the instant paper I will not approach this issue as an educational philosopher; as a Dewey,

Washington, or James would. Nor will I assess this epidemic as a psychological scientist,

drawing from the schools of Freud, Adler, or Jung, among others. Rather, I shall herein join the

ranks of the learned and, in so many respects, pioneering sociologists who dedicated their lives--

and appreciable cerebral capacities--to this issue; individuals providing a far broader perspective

on this topic than any other discipline could ever hope achieve.

David Lester (1972), an experimental psychologist analyzing more suicidal studies than

anyone else on earth, was the first to conclude: “Sociological theories of suicide have achieved a

measure of complexity and sophistication not equaled by psychological theories” (p. 322). As

the reader will soon discover, this broadened viewpoint afforded by the sociological scientist

offers significant advantages. And this proves particularly true when analyzing the etiology of

suicidal epidemics. For, astonishingly, epidemics of this stripe derive not from the mental illness

of a societies’ citizens individually, but rather from an illness percolating within the society itself.

Suicidal contagions, therefore, find their genesis in sociological breakdowns rather than in

human psychopathology (Durkheim, 2013). Hence, it is the sociological dysfunction within the

society that must first be cured if one should ever hope to stem this suicidal tide of death. And


who better to cure these societal ills than the very doctors of sociology themselves. Yet before

we delve into this--sorely needed--sociological analysis, it is utterly essential that the reader

engage in a brief perusal of the life and work of perhaps the greatest literary genius of all time,

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. And in particular, his book The Sorrows of Young Werther, first

published in 1774.

Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther

In Werther (2012) Goethe had his hero commit suicide. This novel, some say his first,

was read all throughout Europe. Tragically, people in several countries decided to imitate,

perhaps on a whim, young Werther's manner of death (Phillips, 1974). And this imitation

included not merely Werther’s form of dress, but the very colors of his clothing as well (Phillips,

1974). Nonetheless, this exactitude in suicidal imitation is far from atypical. Indeed, even “In

families where repeated suicides occur, they are often performed almost identically. They take

place not only at the same age but even the same way” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 97). Goethe himself

observed; "My friends...thought that they must transform poetry into reality, imitate a novel like

this in real life and, in any case, shoot themselves; and what occurred at first among a few took

place later among the general public” (Phillips, 1974, p. 340). To provide an indication to the

reader of the full extent of this literary-incited epidemic, fearing similar contagions in their own

communities, authorities banned “the book in several areas, including Italy, Leipzig, and

Copenhagen” (Phillips, 1974, p. 340).

After sifting through reams of available data on the issue of suicide contagions,

Phillips’ (1974) deduced, “the best available explanation of the Werther effect is that it is caused

by suggestion” (p. 350). Which comports with the deductions of the famed and, as many will


assert, father of sociology, Emile Durkheim. In his seminal work on Suicide published in 1897,

Durkheim asserts, “The contagious power of example is enough to cause it...suicide is very

contagious (2013, p. 96). Durkheim (2013) then proclaims; “No fact is more readily

transmissible by contagion than suicide” (p. 141-42). And surely, writes Durkheim (2013) “No

field exists over which [imitation] has more sway” (p. 133). Lester (1972), after reviewing all of

the suicidal research ostensibly available to man, concluded, “Imitation does appear to play a

role in “epidemics” of suicidal behavior” (p. 187). For instance, Lester (1972) offered, “the use

of plastic bags became popular for a brief time after reports of accidental deaths resulting from

their use appeared in the press” (p. 188).

As for the instant study’s application to Alaska’s suicide crisis, Hezel (1989), who stands

as chief among our modern experts specializing in the etiology of suicidal epidemics, devoted

the greater portion of his life to the study of suicide epidemics in Micronesia, a place where some

of the highest suicide rates in the world are recorded. He queried,

Is it possible that the well-publicized high suicide rates among some Native American

peoples, whose suicide patterns have much in common with the Micronesian patterns

described here, might be rooted in the same causes? In the light of our research findings

on Micronesia, these questions would seem to deserve closer examination (p. 70).

Thus, with Hezel’s blessing (he is, additionally, a Jesuit Priest) we shall tread forward into the

mire of this unhappy subject, without questioning the suitability--or subsequent application--of

these deliberations to the Alaskan epidemic underway.

Few would doubt the assertion that the most effectual means for solving a problem, in

this instance an epidemic, is first to identify, and then aim at whatever constitutes the “bulls eye”


of the issue. Yet oftentimes we discover, in numerous instances far too late to cure the resulting

ills, not only that we strayed from the bull’s eye’s center, but that we missed the target altogether.

One shall soon discover this analogy to be highly applicable to the Alaskan crisis. For a

significant portion of the theory presented herein involves the assertion that in our present day,

particularly within the Alaska Native community, we define something as a mental illness when

it is clearly not.

In Werther, Goethe offers the following musings on the issue of suicide,

“Human nature,” I continued “has its limits. It is able to endure a certain degree of joy,

sorrow, and pain, but becomes annihilated as soon as this measure is exceeded. The

question, therefore, is, not whether a man is strong or weak, but whether he is able to

endure the measure of his sufferings. The suffering may be moral or physical; and in my

opinion it is just as absurd to call a man a coward who destroys himself, as to call a man a

coward who dies of a malignant fever (p. 31).

In the aforesaid deliberations Goethe likens suicide to the breakdown of the body’s immune

system. To his consternation, perhaps, Goethe would discover that some of these subsequent

musings on the subject--sprinkled throughout the pages of Werther--help evince how utterly

mistaken the foregoing deliberations truly are. For individuals would soon be ending their lives

at something akin to the drop of a hat, or using the physical terminology apropos to Goethe’s

analogy; the stubbing of a toe, a common cold, or even a headache. These later physical

maladies, however, rarely if ever cause death. Thus, Goethe’s analogy proves woefully

inadequate. Yet what could be the cause of this weakening state of spirits? How could a mere

ninety-three page book cause so much misery: 2,000 suicidal deaths in Europe over the mere


course of a year (Phillips, 1974)? Of far greater concern, this contagion was, as Thomas Carlyle

notes in his introduction to Goethe’s (2012) Werther, not contained within Europe’s borders.

Carlyle asserts, “though the epidemic, after a long course of years, subsided in Germany, it

reappeared with various modifications in other countries, and everywhere abundant traces of its

good and bad effects are still to be discerned” (pp. v-vi). After deliberating the foregoing

circumstances, one query naturally presents: from where are the seeds of this epidemic derived?

I will proffer that these seeds are sown, albeit inadvertently, by the hand of Goethe himself.

Thus, while “no imitation can exist without a model to imitate; no contagion without a central

hearth in which it necessarily displays its maximum tendency,” Durkheim, 2013, p. 133, that

which gave birth to this contagionous fire is not be discovered solely in young Werther’s suicidal

act.

Significantly, in spite of the physical-psychic analogy aforementioned in Werther, Goethe

speaks of suicide elsewhere in the book in a noticeably matter-of-fact manner. Suicide was, for

Goethe (2012), an option often considered, and quite casually at that. Yet what my reader shall

soon discover is that the foregoing triviality conveyed proves highly problematic on a

sociological level--particularly when one considers how astronomically influential Werther was.

For when suicide is presented in a culture as a viable, or perhaps even reasonable, option then the

suicide rate in that culture invariably soars. Nonetheless, there are additional considerations of

culture that lend to this influence as well. For instance, where a society publicly condones the

suicidal act, or quietly acquiesces to the same.

In cultures where there are few if any stigmas attached to the act of suicide some of the

highest self-murder rates in the world are discovered. For instance, on the Philippine Island of


Palawan, a village known to have the second highest suicide rate in the world, MacDonald

(2003) writes, “No specific stigma or consequence is attached to suicide” (p. 436). He further

observes; “No sanction whatsoever and no definite condemnation are pronounced against the

suicide” (p. 436). Lester (1972), the experimental psychologist cited earlier, observes; “The

Danes condemned suicide less and had the higher suicide rate” (pp. 120-21). This nexus

between communications of condoning and indications of acquiescence to a nation’s rate of

suicide led Emile Durkheim (2013), arguably the father of sociology, to proclaim “the principle

that homicide of one’s self should be reproved must be maintained” (p. 338).

It is one thing to ascertain the origins of a problem, but the challenges may become

altogether different when it comes time to discover its remedy. Surely, a mere refrain from

condoning acts or acquiescent inferences proves insufficient; some form of societal censure is

required. Echoing these sentiments, Durkheim (2013) states, “It remains to determine by what

external tokens this reprobation is to be shown” ( p. 338). He subsequently proffers that at “the

Council of Prague in 563...it was decided that victims of suicide would be ‘honored with no

memorial in the holy sacrifice of the mass, and the singing of psalms should not accompany their

bodies to the grave’” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 327). Thus, for reasons utterly sociological rather than

religious, Durkheim (2013) recommends that Christian churches “refuse the suicide the honors

of a regular burial” (p 371). And with these sentiments I wholeheartedly concur. Concurring as

well is Lester (1972) who, devoid of religious motivations altogether, perceived; “The official

view of the church on suicide may have a strong effect on the suicidal behavior of the people...A

church that has a very negative attitude toward suicide may produce strong social sanctions

against it” (p. 279). In concert with the foregoing deductions, Durkheim concludes, “Where such


acts are loathed, the feelings they arouse penetrate the recital of them and thus offset rather than

encourage individual inclinations” (2013, p. 141). Hence, when one deliberates the etiology of

suicidal epidemics, he readily discover a nexus between the epidemic itself and a society’s

suicidal sanctions, or lack thereof.

To say that researchers and policy makers alike are terribly concerned about the suicidal

epidemic plaguing Alaska is sure to be an understatement. Shockingly, over the course of merely

sixteen days four suicides occurred in the small fishing village of Hooper Bay, Alaska, a town

with a population less than 1,200 (Boots, 2015). However, rather than being one of the rarest

tragedies ever to confront this state, the foregoing incident is beginning to have an heir of

typicality; contagious events are, in Alaska, gaining a near-ubiquitous status. To top it off, as if

to say in protest “enough is enough,” a week later an Alaska Native jumped off the third story

balcony to his death in the middle of the annual Alaska Federation of Natives convention (Boots,

2015). With this knowledge in hand, one is compelled to echo Durkheim’s (2013) conclusion

that; “All proofs combine therefore to make us consider the enormous increase in the number of

voluntary deaths within a century as a pathological phenomenon becoming daily a greater

menace” (p. 370). And thus to join his query, “By what means shall we try to overcome it?” (p.

370).

The Remedies

Rubinstein (1992) asserts, “Because suicide is the leading cause of death for young men

aged 15-29 in parts of Micronesia and Samoa, there is a continuing need for prevention efforts

that are based upon a well-informed analysis of the social and cultural dynamics of this

problem” (p. 72). Yet the foregoing lines find equal applicability to Alaska. I previously noted


that literature “hath the power to giveth.” It therefore follows that it has the power to take away.

As in the case of Young Werther, where literature surely evidenced this formidable power to give;

to introduce a suicidal contagion into a society, it likewise has the power to take away; to

extricate that contagion as well. Rubinstein (1992) observed, that “every social thing...tends to

expand in its social environment” (p. 27). Yet he further perceived, “This tendency...often proves

abortive through the competition of rival tendencies” (p. 27). Thus, policy makers need to

introduce a competing, more life affirming, stream of thought into the Alaska Native culture.

And this can be accomplished in a manner likened to Goethe’s--albeit inadvertent--message in

Werther (2012). It can be introduced through literature.

If a society wishes to stem the burgeoning crisis that all suicide epidemics surely are, that

society must do more than merely refrain from condoning suicidal behavior. Indeed, to counter

this negative societal stream of thought, one must infuse that society with a never-ending,

positive, life-affirming message. Thus, my policy recommendation is as follows: To introduce

positive and inspiring literature into the Alaska Native culture that will have the effect of staving

off these disastrous suicidal contagions, if not in the near, then in the coming future. Foremost,

the literature should be targeted at the youth. Admittedly, this will not solve Alaska’s suicide

crisis in every respect. But if not a striking blow it will, nevertheless, create an appreciable dent

in the foundation of a crisis now deemed epidemic. For, likened to leaven in a loaf of bread,

even a modest portion of this positive, life-affirming yeast of positivity will go a long way in

lifting the spirits of a society strewn with pessimistic ills. As is the case with nearly all societal

phenomena, imitation constitutes the chief active ingredient; the pervasive yeast imbuing the


societal fabric. With this knowledge in hand, a society must utilize this phenomenon of imitation

for its own good, rather than passively allow it to create more ill. Durkheim (2013) observed,

A sort of leveling occurs in the consciousness of different individuals which leads

everyone to think or feel in unison. The name of imitation has very often been given the

whole number of operations resulting in this harmony. It then designates the quality of

the states of consciousness simultaneously felt by a given number of different persons

leading them so to act upon one another or combine among themselves as to produce a

new state (p. 124).

It was, in truth, Durkheim’s chief rival, Gabriel Tarde, who tutored him on this phenomenon of

imitation. Tarde (2014) writes:

At the same time, too, every germ of imitation which may have been secreted in the brain

of any imitator in the form of a new belief or aspiration, of a new idea or faculty, has

been steadily developing in outward signs, in words and acts which, according to the law

of the march from within to without, have penetrated into his entire nervous and muscular

systems (p. 540).

With these aforementioned perceptions in mind, one can see how pervasive imitation truly is.

Once introduced, new concepts are readily infused within that society’s peripheral

psyche. Yet it is the pervasive nature of imitation that causes these new concepts to find

themselves, before long, not only within the societal currents of thought, but soon embedded

within that cultures very fiber. Rubinstein (1992), adding to the wealth of imitation theories

proffered by Tarde and Durkheim, asserted “that the social being, in the degree that he is social,

is essentially imitative, and that imitation plays a role in societies analogous to that of heredity of


organic life or to that of vibration among inorganic bodies” (p. 19). Significantly, Rubinstein

(1992) observes, “that repetitions are also...self-spreading contagions” (p. 26). Hence, in the

same manner that contagions of negativity, despair, and death self-spread, contagions of life-

affirming positivity can be readily disseminated as well. As the foregoing sociologists noted,

imitation stands high on the list of human behavioral penchants. The chief among them asserts;

“Reciprocal imitation is a highly social phenomenon” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 130). And further,

“The idea of suicide may undoubtedly be communicated by contagion” (Durkheim, 2013, p.

131). Durkheim (2013) continues,

“Pinel tells of a priest hanging himself in the neighborhood of Etampes; some days later

two other [priests] killed themselves and several layman imitated them. When Lord

Castelreagh threw himself into Vesuvius, several of his companions followed his

example. The tree of Timon in Athens has become proverbial” (p. 131).

As Hezel (1989) observes, “In any epidemic the element of contagion serves to explain the rapid

spread of the disease, and that element is undeniably strong in recent Micronesian suicides “(p.

56). And Durkheim (2013) concludes, “Imitative suicides are very numerous. Perhaps no other

phenomenon is more readily contagious” (p. 132). Thus with contagions “it is all-

comprehensive; the new act is a mere echo of the original...Not merely does it repeat, but this

repetition has no causes for existence outside itself, only the total of characteristics which make

us imitative creatures under certain circumstances” (Durkheim, 2013, P. 129). Durkheim (2013)

further observes,

This explanation is made yet more probable by numerous cases of the same character

whereby heredity is not in question and where contagion is the only source of the


evil...There is the well-known story of the fifteen patients who hung themselves in swift

succession in 1772 from the same hook in a dark passage of the hospital. Once the hook

was removed there was an end to the epidemic. Likewise, at the camp of Boulogne, a

soldier blew out his brains in a sentry-box; in a few days others imitated him in the same

place; but as soon as this was burned, the contagion stopped. All these facts show the

overpowering influence of obsession, because they cease with the disappearance of the

material object which evoked the idea. Thus, when suicides, obviously springing from

one another, all seem to follow the same model, they may fairly be attributed to the same

cause (p. 97).

Keeping this wealth of sociological pathological knowledge in mind, Phillips (1974),

who famously termed these pathological contagions the “Werther effect,” asserts; “The best

available explanation of the “Werther effect” is that it is caused by suggestion” (p. 350). Diving

even deeper into this etiology of imitation, May (2015) posits that “Any behavioral contagion

observed in these settings is likely driven by unconscious, unintentional processes rather than by

purposeful imitation. Perhaps we can “catch” behaviors without even trying.” May (2015)

further observes, “effects of negative contagion were evident up to a week after the initial

exposure, suggesting a fairly long infectious period for negative behaviors.” Hence, contagions

are--rather than mere fiction or fanciful extrapolations--an unquestionably real phenomenon.

And they spread, moreover, like any other infectious disease, achieving lasting effects,

particularly within the first two weeks of the triggering event (May, 2015).

Yet how is it that the many aforementioned trivial events can cause individuals to commit

self-murder, and en masse? Rubinstein (1992), researching the island populations of Micronesia,


observed; “Very few, if any, of the suicides are occasioned by a family crisis or the death of a

parent. Typically the situations leading to suicide, as described briefly above, are rather minor

rejections and disappointments experienced by adolescents” (p. 58). Hezel (1989), working

among this same populace observed;

The most frequent causes of tension reported in the data are parents' denial of food or

material support to their children, parents' refusal to approve a marriage partner, and

scoldings or other forms of rebuff; but these have always been points of conflict between

Micronesian parents and their children (p. 55).

Commenting on these deleterious contagion-istic effects, Durkheim was the first to observe,

“The incidents of private life which seem the direct inspiration of suicide and are considered its

determining causes are in reality only incidental causes. The individual yields to the slightest

shock of circumstance because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide” (2013,

p. 215). Therefore, Durkheim (2013) asserts,“the suicidal tendency can be created by the social

environment” (p. 215). Seeing the societal pathology for what it is, Durkheim (2013) concludes,

when suicides “become chronic, they only prove that the structural characteristics of society have

simultaneously suffered profound changes” (p. 146).

When the act of suicide achieves a common familiarity among one’s fellows, when self-

murder becomes as trite as it is trivial, then its choice is sure to reside among the more

plausible--if not preferred--options under consideration by an individual experiencing even the

slightest degree of external hardship or a scant amount of emotional turmoil within. Yet

everyone who breathes experiences these hardships, and to an appreciably equivalent extent.

And the discouragement accorded to such trials is not psychopathology; it is this very thing we


call life. Yet when life itself becomes the very source of death, which is commonly the case

when suicide turns commonplace, this causes epidemics to spread--and with deadening speed.

Depression is often “characterized by feelings of hopelessness” (Lester, 1972. p. 271). Yet when

individuals experience depressive bouts stemming from the innumerable, often external, trials

common to man find themselves in an environment where suicide is not merely commonplace,

but burgeoning to epic proportions, they are sure to “perceive suicide as a possible solution to

their problem” (Lester, 1972, p. 271). Shocked at the alarming repercussions foreseen,

Durkheim (2013) presciently insists that suicide contagions constitute “a state of crisis and

perturbation not to be prolonged with impunity” (p.369).

Equally cognizant of the significant fuel a state of triviality provides for suicidal fires,

MacDonald (2003) observed the explosive effect that an atmosphere of suicidal

commonplaceness has on contagions of suicide,

In a small society like the Kulbi population set, every child grows up being exposed to

occurrences of suicide and suicidal behavior amongst a very close circle of kin and

neighbors. The child grows up accustomed to the idea. He sees or hears about elders,

uncles, aunts, older cousins, friend’s parents killing themselves. Even if the “official”

explicit social discourse speaks disparagingly of it, an unspoken and intimate adhesion to

the idea of suicide might prevail in the minds of the young. Thus suicide becomes an

accepted model of behavior, albeit one that may be condemned by explicit social and

cultural rules. Direct imitation and clustering will then look more like “wavelets” that

create a superficial turbulence added to waves propagating themselves through successive

generations (p. 439).


Yet not only are such contagious streams of suicidality dangerous in and of themselves. As

Rubinstein recently noted “once begun, the suicidal acts seem to have acquired a psychological

contagion of their own. Evidently the idea of suicide has become increasingly commonplace and

compelling, and young children are now acquiring this idea at earlier ages” (MacDonald, 2003,

p. 440, fn 1). MacDonald’s (2003) own observations were as follows:

There was one single feature though that I could not fathom. Ever since I set foot on that

remote corner, I heard constant references to self-inflicted death. I was bewildered by

remarks to the effect that “one would just take a length of rattan, tie it to the roof-beam

and...that’s it!” A number of recent occurrences of suicide were pointed out to me.

Suicide seemed to be an ever-present topic of conversation. People were threatening to

commit suicide and they said it with no apparent levity. They could name victims (p.

421).

Keep in mind that the foregoing observations were made within the very society boasting, as

MacDonald (2003) asserts, the world’s second highest suicide rate. Let the reader take note of

the commonality evidenced in his observations; “He drank,” means “he committed suicide by

drinking poison” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 435). And people referred “to suicide with a gesture

measuring a length of rattan or rope and say ‘I’ll tie it to the roof-beam, and that’s it!’ Frequent

quotes regarding the possibility or risk of suicide are made in public meetings, during litigation,

and in private talks” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 435). In light of the numerous discoveries

aforementioned, the reader can now ascertain the common connection between

commonplaceness and death by suicide. Yet to drive the final nail into the proverbial

commonplace coffin, Rubinstein (1983), respecting the dangers of suicidal triviality, observes;


Suicide ideation among adolescents appears widespread in certain Micronesian

communities and is popularly expressed in recent songs composed locally and aired on

Micronesian radio stations, and in graffiti adorning T-shits and high school walls. Thus

as suicide grows more frequent in these communities the idea itself acquires a certain

familiarity if not fascination to young men, and the lethality of the act seems to be

trivialized. Especially among some younger boys, the suicide acts appear to have

acquired an experimental almost recreational element (p. 664).

Again, these are observations made within a society possessing the world’s second highest

suicide rate (Rubinstein, 1993). And as shocking as this crisis is, when deliberating applicable

remedies, one must surely keep in mind Durkheim’s perspicacious observation that “The

productive cause of the phenomenon naturally escapes the observer of individuals only; for it lies

outside of individuals” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 324). Hence, we should be looking to find solutions

beyond that field of expertise concerning itself with individual psychopathology. Rather,

because it is a societal pathology we seek to cure, policymakers must seek solutions largely

within the realm of sociology.

Mental Illness is Not the Primary Cause of Contagion Related Suicides

Lester (1972) writes, “It used to be thought that all individuals who attempted or

completed suicide were mentally disturbed and the view still prevails today” (p. 193). Yet

Durkheim (2013) observed; “Suicide may be seen to be for us only a phenomenon resulting from

many different causes and appearing under many different forms; and it is clear that this

phenomenon is not characteristic of disease” (p. 58). Thus, rather than mental illness being the

chief cause of suicidal contagions, Phillips (1974) asserts that “the best available explanation of


the Werther effect is that it is caused by suggestion” (p. 350). Durkheim (2013) posits, “If

suicide can be shown to be a mental disease with its own characteristics and distinct evolution,

the question is settled; every suicide is a madman” (p. 59). As this is surely not the case, he

consequently provides that “Not every suicide can therefore be considered insane, without doing

violence to language” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 66). And in regard to the abuse of the term “mental

illness” so defined, Durkheim (2013) writes,

The soldier kills himself at the least disappointment, for the most futile reasons, for a

refusal to leave, a reprimand, an unjust punishment, a delay in promotion, a question of

honor, a flush of momentary jealousy or even simply because other suicides have

occurred before his eyes or to his knowledge. Such is really the source of these

phenomena of contagion often observed in armies...it cannot be chance which caused the

appearance in precisely this regiment or that locality of so many person predisposed to

self-homicide by their organic constitution (pp. 238-39).

As for the proposition that such untenable rates of suicide--presenting within such close

proximity--should be attributed to psychopathology, Durkheim (2013) concludes, “Then it may

be attributed not to a blind chance which from all points of the compass assembled in one

barracks or penitentiary a fairly large number of persons all with the same mental affliction, but

to the influence of the common environment in which they live” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 140-41).

Cognizant of the implausibility for such high prevalence rates of mental illness residing--

literally--under one roof, Durkheim (2013) concludes, “the suicidal tendency can be created by

the social environment” (p. 140). Indeed, when pondering the foregoing examples, one may

readily deduce that the probability for so many mentally ill individuals showing up in this close


proximity solely by chance would represent odds equivalent to that of a stack of cards being

haphazardly disperesed into the air, yet landing in sequential perfection.

Durkheim (2013) asserts that suicides resulting from mental illness “differ from others as

illusions and hallucinations differ from normal perceptions and automatic impulses from

deliberate acts” (p. 66). Significantly, Durkheim (2013) writes, “It is true that there is a gradual

shading from the former to the latter; but if that sufficed to identify them one would also,

generally speaking, have to confuse health with sickness, since the latter is but a variety of the

former” (p. 66). And under these latter circumstances, as Durkheim (2013) suggests,

considerable injury would be inflicted upon the term “mental illness” in the case it were allowed

to be strewn about with such utter and carefree liberality. Indeed, should the term “mental

illness” find permissible application to any one of the innumerable quiddities or peccadillos

known to man, then that very term will lose all effectual meaning in our society. “An

imperfection is not a disease; otherwise disease would have to be postulated everywhere, since

imperfection is everywhere” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 362). It was John Stuart Mill (2002) who, in

his Essays on Liberty, perhaps said it best when he asserted, “Eccentricity has always abounded

when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society

has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigor, and moral courage which

it contained” (p. 75).

It may be the case that pharmaceutical companies are happy to frame each and every

eccentricity known to man as a psychopathology in need of medication. Yet for those holding no

financial interests in these same corporations, such broad definitions prove unhelpful at best and,

at their wors, utterly strewn with dangers. The human race is in possession of a multifarious


array of varieties that, when given the liberty to breath, appear atypical to those unfamiliar with

exploring their truest selves. Yet the pressure to conform exerted by this latter group often

causes this uniqueness of personhood to reside beneath a mask of normalcy so-called, created to

survive, adapt, and conform to the expectations of others. Yet it was Steve Jobs (2005) who

famously observed, “Life can be much broader once you discover one simple fact: Everything

around you that you call life was made up by people that were no smarter than you and you can

change it.” Jobs, a man who thought and acted differently than most, went on to create his own

definition of “normal.” However, in a society deeply attached to psychopathological definitions,

if Jobs had not achieved his extraordinary level of success, and somehow stumbled into a

psychotherapist’s office in that state of discouragement common to all who transverse

humanity’s innumerable viscittudes, Job’s would have likely walked out--not only with

medication in hand--with a diagnosis he would thereafter define himself by, perhaps for life. Yet,

“An imperfection is not a disease; otherwise disease would have to be postulated everywhere,

since imperfection is everywhere” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 362).

In concert with the aforementioned observations, Durkheim (2013) asserts, “Even if it

were proved that the average man never kills himself and that only those who do so show certain

anomalies, this would still not justify considering insanity a necessary condition of suicide; for

an insane person is not simply a man who thinks or acts somewhat differently from the average

(p. 66). And surely, writes Simpson in the introduction to Durkheim’s (2013) work ,“From the

standpoint of psychoanalytic psychiatry, it may be said that every individual has what we may

call a suicide-potential, a tendency to self-murder which varies in degree of intensity from

individual to individual” (p.23). The truth to take away from the foregoing deliberations is that a


far greater percentage of suicides result for reasons other than actual mental illness. Buttressing

the foregoing assertions, Rubinstein--who is arguably the world’s foremost expert in suicidal

epidemics--proclaims that over the course of a human’s lifespan, “the prevalence rate of mental

illness is minimal, therefore, when the suicide-rate is maximal, and prior to that no regular

relation can be found between the variations of the two” (1992, p. 53). And, after comparing

statistics worldwide, Durkheim (2013) concludes that “the countries with the fewest insane have

the most suicides” (p. 73). Thus, when seeking to remedy epidemics of suicide, mental illness is

not the enemy we seek.

Hezel (1987), writing about how young teenage boys customarily hang themselves for

reasons deemed paltry at best, notes the following justification; “one in anger at his mother for

giving away a pet dog, another in shame and terror at injuring an uncle with a rock he had

thrown, and a third for fear he would be beaten for returning home late after watching video” (p.

48). Hezel (1987) asserts,

Even a cursory examination of the case data reveals that Micronesian suicides exhibit an

etiology markedly different from that associated with suicide in the West. There is almost

none of the chronic depression, the vague sense that life is meaningless, or even the

despondency at failure in business or school that seems to play such a large part in

suicides in other parts of the world (p. 48).

Writing in 1897, Durkheim therefore deduced “that there are suicides, and numerous ones at that,

not connected with insanity,” with this latter term equating to the “mental illness” of today (p.

67). Thus, in cases of suicidal contagions at least, rather than mental illness, the chief culprit

resides in the pessimistic undercurrents pervading that particular society. And these currents,


conjoined to an appreciable extent of triviality accorded to the suicidal act, provides the most

effectual recipe for a catostrophic suicidal disaster (Durkheim, 2013).

As for the prevalence of mental illness among completed suicides, in the course of

Lester’s (1972) analysis of a multitude of extant suicidal studies, he found that “estimates of

different writers ranged from 5 to 94 percent estimates”(Lester, 1972, p. 193). Significantly,

Lester (1972) adds the following caveat to this discovery; “If objective data recorded prior to the

suicidal act is used to diagnose the individual then estimates of mental disturbance are lower,

ranging from 5 to 22 percent” (p. 193). Thus, what likely accounts for these former--higher

ranging--postmortem diagnoses is that the suicidal act at issue “may have been used to arrive at a

diagnosis” of psychopathology for the individual (Lester, 1972, p. 197). Thus, to ensure greater

effectuality in future postmortem diagnoses, forensic psychologists must necessarily “control for

the contamination of diagnosis by the self-destructive behavior” (Lester, 1972, p. 197). Residing

on the low end of this statistical spectrum admittedly, MacDonlad (2013) observed only 1 out of

107 suicides being conclusively the result of mental illness. However, it must be noted that this

statistical observation was made in the midst of one of the most expansive suicidal contagions in

the history of mankind; which only serves to buttress my assertion that the prevalence rate for

mental illness in the midst of suicidal contagions is invariably low. Rising above these

assertions, however substantiated, one fact stands with incontrovertible luster; that instances of

mental illness in the midst of suicidal epidemics are far less than any psychological scientist

heretofore imagined. Thus, in consideration of the aforementioned percentages for suicides all

told, one can plausibly deduce a mental illness prevalence rate of 3 to 15 percent for contagion

related suicides. Yet, undeniably, this stands as news to many.


Falling short of a true mental illness diagnosis, Lester (1971), when comparing

neuroticism to extroversion, nonetheless “found that students who had attempted or threatened

suicide had higher neuroticism scores than non-suicidal students” (p. 287). However, a penchant

for neurotic introversion--while not constituting the average psychic constitution of humans in

general--consitutes a considerable percentage of our human populace. Thus, although deemed at

“abnormal” by some, neurotocism nevertheless does, and surely must, fall short of a true mental

illness diagnosis. Hypersensitivity leads to multifarious vocations; cloistered monastics, erudite

scholars, and creative artists of the highest rank, to name but a few. Yet, as Durkheim (2013)

adamantly insists, it would do serious violence to the word “illness” to define so sizable a

percentage of our populace as such.

A Paucity of Evidence Supporting a Genetic Genesis

As far as genetic predispositions for suicide go, Lester (1972), after analyzing hundreds,

if not thousands of suicidal studies, concludes, “There appears to be little evidence that inherited

factors play an important part in the determination of suicidal behavior” (p. 323). Although not

exclusively within the genetic purview, he found that in cases of suicides, “Studies of serotonin

have either been negative or contradictory” (Lester, 1972, p. 34). Astonishingly, perhaps,

MacDonald (2003) garners information that strongly militates against an appreciable genetic

influence for suicide, writing:

The Kulbi situation provides us with a unique natural experiment. Unexpectedly, a

section of a rather homogeneous ethnic group, for no apparent reason, displays a

tremendously high and fairly constant rate of suicide, completely unlike the other

neighboring groups. Does it happen elsewhere? Actually it does. The Aguarunas from


Peru, and the Vaqueiros from northern Spain are strikingly similar in this respect.

Together with small island societies, like the Tikopia, Maenge, and possibly some other

Micronesian societies in the past, they are selfcontained, endogamous, and relatively

isolated populations. They exhibit inordinately high rates of suicide compared to their

closest neighbors and to the surrounding population (p. 438).

Indeed, how could it be that neighbors living in such close proximity possess a level of genetic

distinction that would lead them to possess such ostensible immunity to the suicidal contagion

occurring next door. For surely, over the course of the last hundreds, if not thousands of years,

genetic intermingling occurred. It is therefore implausible to suggest that genetics are

appreciably at work in this evil. Hence, likened to the members of the military aforementioned,

who resided in close proximity and suffered the blow of suicidal contagion as a result, it is the

social environment, and its accompanying pathological ills, which provides the genesis for

epidemics of suicide (Durkheim, 2013). In the same manner that individuals residing in army

bunks suffer not even a hint of the suicidal contagion experienced by their comrades a stone’s

throw away, villages in close proximity can exhibit a patent immunity to this societal disease.

Where is it then? What is the active ingredient residing within this phenomenon that proves as

invasive as it is elusive?

Whatever etiological features suicide contagions possess, one thing stands clear; doctors

of sociology and policy makers alike must not rest until a remedy is discovered. “Sociologically

considered, it is necessary to assuage the suicidal proclivities of whatever social environments

we find inducing and aggravating and perpetuating tendencies toward self-murder among

individuals” (Durkheim 2013, p.31). And with the foregoing sentiments I wholeheartedly


concur. For, cognizant that contagions more readily flourish when “the current of pessimism has

reached a degree of abnormal intensity which is due to some disturbance of the social organism,”

the guardians of our society--the elected Statesmen--are obligated to take action with whatever

countermeasures evidence effectual prowess (Durkheim, 2013, p. 370).

Policy Considerations

Rubinstein (1992), suggests, “Let us observe that the successful discoveries and

initiatives of the present vaguely determine the direction of those of the future” (p. 30). Thus,

our positive actions today can beneficially impact the societal health of the future. In spite of the

deliberations regarding societal streams of pessimism and pervasive currents of negativity

heretofore discussed, Rubinstein (1992) notes, significantly, that “In historical importance...no

mental interference equals that of a desire and a belief” (pp. 41-41). Thus, it is this optimistic

current that proves inherently stronger, and even more pervasive, than the streams of pessimism

aforementioned. As Tarde (2014) suggests, “otherwise society would not endure. For the same

reason, and in spite of frequent epidemics of panic, hope is certainly more catching than

terror” (2014, p. 284). And just as “the scattered individual forces which are inherent in the

innumerable beings composing the environment where these forms propagate themselves, have

taken a common direction,” we can--indeed we must--take expeditious and aggressive

action today that will positively determine the direction of those forces in the many years to

come (Rubinstein, 1992, pp. 27-28). In the case of Alaska’s Native community, this is a

direction that beckons, if not indeed shouts: be reversed. For the truth is patent that contagions

more readily occur when “the current of pessimism has reached a degree of abnormal intensity


which is due to some disturbance of the social organism” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 370). Which may,

for instance, be caused by a loss of Native subsistence rights possessed for eons heretofore.

Policy Recommendation. Durkheim (2013) writes, “A child’s taste is formed as he

comes into contact with the monuments of national taste bequeathed by previous generations” (p.

314). Thus, policy makers must take actions today that will ensure the tastes bequeathed to

future generations is the taste of life, rather than suicidal death. Yet to accomplish this, we must

find a way to interject a current of hope within all societies suffering from these terrible and

formidable suicidal epidemics. As Durkheim (2013) asserts,

The only way...is to act directly on the current of pessimism, to lead it back to its normal

bed and confine it there, to relieve most consciences of its influences and confine it there.

Once they have recovered their moral equilibrium they will act appropriately against

whatever offends them (p. 372).

Yet what will constitute that psychic hook; the very element that one can attach these

positive interjected currents to? Durkheim (2013), searching for the same, deliberates thus:

What does oblige them, then? The respect for custom, the authority of past generations?

On that case the cause of the continuity is no longer individuals serving as vehicles for

ideas or practices, but the highly collective state of mind which causes ancestors to be

regarded with an especial respect among a certain people...And this state of mind is

imposed on individuals. Like the tendency to suicide, this state of mind in a given

society even has a definite intensity, depending on the greater or lesser degree with which

individuals conform to tradition (p. 308, fn. 7).


With the aforesaid, there is the suggestion of tapping into that ancestral current of respect, and it

may in fact be this very stream of thought that constitutes the most effectual hammer to drive the

nail at issue. Durkheim (2013) asserts, “One is detached from life because, seeing no goal to

which he may attach himself, he feels himself useless and purposeless” (p. 225). Significantly,

Durkheim (2013) further proffers:

He must feel himself more solidarity with a collective existence which precedes him in

time, which survives him, and which encompasses him at all points. If this occurs, he

will no longer find the only aim of his conduct in himself, and, understanding that he is

the instrument of a purpose greater than himself, he will see that he is not without

significance. Life will resume meaning in his eyes, because it will recover its natural aim

and orientation (pp. 373-74).

In concert with the foregoing deliberations, a goal possessing considerable potentiality

for imbuing Alaska Natives with a life-giving stream of positivity and purpose is the following;

to carry the torch of tradition onward, for the many generations to come. And the realization that

their ancestors are not merely observing their progress in a state of utter passivity but, rather,

actively rooting them on, assisting them with interventions wherever possible. It is this

realization, this happy current of thought, that will greatly assist in infusing this culture with an

appreciable degree of suicidal immunity.

To provide but a few examples, assertions similar to the following should be utilized:

“Your ancestors are cheering you on, assisting you at every turn. Make certain not to disappoint

them,” or, “Carry on and you will celebrate with these ancestors in paradise,” and “Your

ancestors will honor you and your posterity for sticking with the fight, for your courage in


persevering through all of life’s challenges. For this you will be deemed worthy to receive the

crown of life.” And whatever else constitutes a desirable reward within Native culture. Once

implemented, “The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the

lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply” (Durkheim, 2013, p.

210). This unifying bond can be forged by the realization that their ancestors live eternally and

thus continue to cheer them on, while those still in the flesh valiantly seek to overcome the

necessary and invariable obstacles placed in their path--challenges to test their mettle. Yet,

through it all, their ancestors--and the providence of God--are helping them to prevail by

constant acts of divinely orchestrated intervention. Yet it remains the responsibility of those in

the midst of these trials to persevere. Hence they must not lose faith.

A perspective like the foregoing one, when imbued within Native culture, will provide

individuals with the necessary fuel to remain in the fight of life, particularly when the going gets

rough. As M. Scott Peck (2004) famously quipped, “Life is Difficult!” Indeed, “Life is said to be

intolerable unless some reason for existing is involved, some purpose justifying life’s

trials” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 210). The realization of an individual’s connectivity--with the

ancestors of the past and the posterity of the future, will provide that most essential impetus.

The Infusion of Positive Literature. To ameliorate these epidemics of suicide, I

propose that we, like Goethe, introduce literature into whichever society happens to be, however

inadvertantly, courting such societal ills. Thus, rather than to the masses in general, which may

bring little effect, social scientists and policy makers must target the society suffering the brunt

of the suicidal epidemic’s effects. And, as the greatest effects are being felt among Alaska


Native villages and communities, these societal areas will warrant the uttermost concentration.

Thus, I shall direct my policy recommendations there.

While policy recommendations involving the infusion of positive literature into a

particular society are undoubtedly novel, Lester (1972) provides that numerous researchers,

including; “McClelland (1961), Rudin (1968), Lester (1968), and Barret and Franke (1970),”

individuals making the study of suicide their very lives’ work, believed that an appreciable nexus

existed between childrens’ stories and the suicide rate suffered by the readers or listeners of these

stories several years later. Evidencing the extent of their convictions, they compared children’s

stories from no less than seventeen nations (Lester, 1972, p. 268). And while “Barret and Frank

concluded that national psychological motives [evidenced by the youthful literature of that

nation] were not associated with death rates cross-nationally” they did leave room for the impact

of literature on a smaller societal scale, for instance, among villages (Lester, 1972, p. 268).

In light of these discoveries, and considering the multifarious issues presented heretofore,

I propose that we introduce literature specifically engineered to counter the present suicidal

contagion’s societally deleterious effects within the Alaska Native community. This can be

achieved through the creation of writings that specifically address the relevant societal

challenges at issue, utilizing the best Alaska Native writers and artists, in concert with other

Native American authors and illustrators and, if necessary, non-native artists and writers as well.

The Writings. The writings will include stories that specifically address the issues

undermining the Native Alaska’s societal vitality. In these stories life will be deemed a sacred

and honored trust, the loss of which is to be ranked among Native culture's greatest tragedies.

The GOAL in life will be to persevere, refusing to turn one’s back on life, so that individuals can


fulfill an honored task; the mission of carrying the sacred torch of that Native culture’s tradition

one generation further, helping to ensure that one’s village or tribe’s survival will, in the future,

be secured.

Ancestral Cheerleaders. The ancestors of these individuals living in the physical world

today are observing their every move. The elders are surely watching. Yet what proves more

significant is the fact that they are cheering thier own related members of the Native community

on and thus inspiring them. They are assisting them with divine encouragement and providential

interventions at each and every turn. Indeed, the elders now reside with God, and therefore have

great powers to intervene, helping to ensure not only their posterity’s continuance, but their

entire Native culture’s survival as well. These stories must, and will be filled with lessons

illustrating the value of perseverance, the sacredness of life, and the duty one has to carry the

torch of their tradition onward into the future.

Of perhaps the greatest significance, efforts put forth by these participants in the flesh

will help keep alive the Alaskan Native lineage for eons to come. Yet, rather than merely Alaska

Native specific goals, these stories will, additionally, convey universal objectives. They will

inform how the entire world’s future depends on the success of these Alaskan Native warriors;

that our world will fail to exist without the tremendous equilibrium, spirituality, and wisdom

provided by this world’s indigenous people’s. They are, being among the most spiritually

minded people inhabiting the earth, instrumental for the success of God’s divine plan for the

world. Indeed, there will be no race of people, no wisdom of the ages, capable of filling the

eternal void left behind if the Alaska Native lineage is lost. Thus, the Alaska Native peoples

must, with the help of their ancestors, and the loving and willing intervention of God, persevere


in the fight, and carry on to live another day, month, year, decade, century, eon. Yet they must

not do so solely for their own personal benefit--to receive a great crown of reward in return.

They must act and live in this way to ensure that their own posterity will--rather than being

saddled with shame--speak with only the highest regard and exuberant pride of their members’

heroic lives; so that one’s posterity will retell the astonishing accomplishments of those who

chose to live bravely, daringly, and fully in this world. Those persevering courageously to the

end will be honored and celebrated throughout the ages to come. Of tremendous significance,

this literature will, in addition to conveying the greatest extent of honor and respect for native

culture, religious practices, and language, hold Native Alaskan harvesting and subsistence rights

in uttermost regard.

Conclusion

Like all suicide epidemics of the past, the chief active element is not mental illness. It is,

rather, the inherent human proclivity to imitate. And what does an individual in society imitate?

She imitates the very society that surrounds her, whether this be steeped in a pathological

sickness or imbued with health and enlivening vigor. Yet we must not acquiesce to a passive

observation while innumerable individuals discard their very lives as readily as one would a

handkerchief. Alaska’s suicide epidemic is a circumstance that, rather than suggests, screams for

remedy. The gatekeepers of our society, the very Statesmen in our midst, people entrusted by the

citizens--Alaska Natives included--to secure the common good, must necessarily take action! As

this paper has made patent, there are unequivocal remedies that exist. Thus, all that remains

necessary is the willingness to pick up these finely crafted weapons of societal warfare and put

them to ready use. In doing so, we can rest assured that the target is, for once, the correct one.


Statesmen, take heed of the foregoing deliberations. Employ all the effectual stratagems you can

muster against this most formidable societal enemy, a beast that will soon become

unmanageable. For if we do not, rather than beast, it will burgeon into one of society’s most

dreadful nemesis.


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