implicit boycott the call for patriotic consumption in interwar austria

8/12/2019 Implicit Boycott the Call for Patriotic Consumption in Interwar Austria

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MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY Vol 5(2): 165195DOI: 10.1177/1744935910361649 The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navhttp://moh.sagepub.com

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Implicit boycott: The call for patrioticconsumption in interwar Austria

Oliver Khschelm Universitt Wien

AbstractIn 1927 entrepreneurs associations and the Ministry of Trade started the Buy Austrian

Goods working group, which deployed a broad array of propaganda activities. It was

moulded after similar initiatives in other countries, above all the Swiss Week and the

British Empire Marketing Board. As with Switzerland and the UK, Austria pursued a

free trade policy. Protectionist measures seemed out of question, but an effort at edu-

cating consumers should help to overcome the endemic trade deficit. The working

group emphasized the defensive nature of its propaganda, claiming not to instigate a

boycott of foreign products. But neither the rhetoric nor the administrative measures

promoted by the working group were always devoid of aggressiveness. Consumers

were told to act as responsible citizens, to contribute to the reduction of unemploy-

ment by shopping Austrian.Yet, the appeal to state consciousness was thwarted by

the ambivalent feelings towards a state that in the eyes of many Austrians was no

viable alternative to unification with Germany.

Key words buycott citizen-consumer corporatism national identity propaganda

protectionism trade policy unemployment

By no means we can speak about a movement that might get out of hand into a boycottof foreign products assured an article inDie Industrie, the organ of the Federation ofAustrian Industry (Hauptverband der Industrie sterreichs), reacting to a critique

uttered by the Klnische Zeitungwhen the initiative was having its start in autumn1927.1 At a press conference on 8 July 1927, when presenting the initiative to thepublic, Friedrich Tilgner, the president of the Viennese Chamber of Commerce,2 theother leading institutional partner in the Buy Austrian goods venture, had explained,with a side blow to a Hungarian movement of the first decade of the 20th century:The movement that we want to initiate should not be chauvinistic in the mould ofthe Tulip movement. We do not wish to ban all foreign goods from the Austrianmarket.3 Not a word about a boycott of foreign goods! concluded the introductionof a teacher brochure published in 1934, one of the major publications of the initiative.4

Statements in the same vein can be found during the whole life span of Buy Austriangoods, at all levels of communication: press conferences, newspaper articles, internalcommunication with participating organizations as well as external correspondence.

M&OH


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So if this was the mantra of Buy Austrian Goods, it might seem dubious that anarticle about the call for patriotic consumption in the Austria of the 1920s and 1930sfits in the frame of a special issue on boycott. In order to show how it is related to the

general topic we have to sketch the field in which the call to buy Austrian was set andoutline what shape such a call may take on. First, it may highlight preference of domesticproducts or else put the emphasis on urging not to consume foreign products. Bothaspects are but two sides of one coin, although it is highly relevant to determine if thecampaign moves more into the direction of a boycott, that is not buying foreign goods,or if it is more in line of what may be designated a buycott,5 the urge to purchase adetermined set of good products, in our case of national origin.

A main objective of this article will be to show that the idea of an outright boycottof imported goods lingered just around the corner, although the proponents of BuyAustrian Goods made quite an effort to keep it there: around the corner. Present but

not quite; whenever the word boycott was mentioned it signified an economic optionthat was not to be exercised, above all because of fear of retaliation by commercialpartners. Boycott drew a line that should not be crossed, but thereby it played a crucialrole for defining the goal and the instruments of the initiative.

Although the dialectic relation of buycott and boycott is a fundamental aspectof the Buy Austrian campaign (the same probably holds true for any buy-nationalinitiative), some additional variables must be taken into consideration to understandits specific nature: a call to buy national can limit itself to propaganda, that is verbaland visual mass media communication, but it can also involve physical action, for

example deploying sentinels at the doors of non-national shopkeepers in order to pre-vent customers from entering. And it can go as far as to administrative measures if ithas the backing of government agencies. Apart from that a buy-national campaign canbe a grass roots movement or a movement launched by corporate bodies; it can bemostly or entirely private or run by the state. If the latter is the case and if it includesadministrative measures, the question of patriotic consumption is closely connected tothe discussion and the enforcement of a typical set of protectionist measures such astariffs, quota, and the like. It is against the backdrop of these different possibilitiesthat we have to analyse the Buy Austrian campaign. Furthermore, there is a crucial

problem any buy-national initiative has to deal with if it aspires to attain credibilityamong its fellow citizens: highly heterogeneous interests of diverse social and eco-nomic actors have to be integrated into an organization that pretends to act on behalfof the common national good.

Shopping decisions are at the heart of a buy-national campaign. The call to buyAustrian relied on assumptions about the consumer, his or her interests, his or her readi-ness to act as consumer-patriots. Talking abouttheconsumer, we have to admit that thisis very large notion. It encompasses people from different social strata and regional back-ground; men and women; children, adults, the elderly; people of different political affil-iation and ideological persuasions; Jews, Catholics, Protestants; Austrians with Germanmother-tongue and others whose first language was Slovene, Croatian, Hungarian,Czech; citizens of the Austrian Republic and residents who had opted for the citizenship


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of other successor states of the Monarchy. All these distinctions make good candidatesfor variables that affected the individual reception of the call to buy Austrian goods. Asfor some of the distinctions, we can show their insertion into the propaganda discourse,

but by saying this we have to acknowledge a limitation of the research. From the sourcesthat it draws on we mainly get a hold on discursive constructions elaborated by theprotagonists of the campaign. We do not gain direct access to knowledge about howpeople reacted to the subject positions offered to them and about how they adapted thoseelements to their own needs. There is also little information as to the actual shoppingbehaviour of consumers. This already was a worry for those who orchestrated the BuyAustrian campaigns. They made their claim to the effectiveness of the propaganda, butthey did not bring up much convincing data. Buy Austrian Goods is not an interestingtopic because it can be proven to have exerted a compelling force on consumers, butquite the contrary because of its many weaknesses and ambivalences that made the success

of a buy-national campaign especially unlikely.Interwar Austria was a deeply troubled society that did not succeed in solving its

many political, social, and economic problems. In the revolutionary days of 1918 andduring the brief period of social democratic dominance in 1919 the middle classes lostmuch of their previous status because of the democratization of politics. War andhyperinflation wiped out monetary assets and sharply reduced the purchase power ofwhat had once been good salaries. On the other hand labour profited from new sociallaws, the freeze on rents, and later also from the housing politics of Red Vienna. Yet,even in the mid-1920s, in many respects the best years for the First Republic, unem-

ployment remained high. Austria achieved a certain stability, but when the decadedrew to a close, political conflicts were fuelled by economic depression and in the early1930s the Christian Socialist government turned into an authoritarian regime.

Prior Experience with Nationalist Boycotts

From the times of the Habsburg Empire, Austrian commerce and industry had largeexperience with boycotts, mainly as the target of nationalist groups that wished to

battle Austrian German dominance. In the Austrian half of the Monarchy the Slavicpeoples rallied to the call each to his own. The slogan (Svuj k svmu in Czech) waswidely used by the Czech national movement,6 which served as a model for Slavic groupssuch as the Slovenes in less developed provinces.

The buy-national movements of Czech and Slovenes were orientated against thestate although they could draw on support of local or regional authorities. They sub-verted the existing state, and this is an important difference to the Buy Austrianinitiative of the 1920s, which was backed by the state. The Hungarian Tulip move-ment came much closer in this respect.7 As its Slavic counterparts the movement,which was launched in 1906, directed itself against Austrian German industry and itlikewise presented a conflict within the interior market of the Habsburg Monarchy.But although the Tulip movement was promoted by oppositional political forces it


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could reasonably aspire to the support of government agencies because the HungarianState formed a more than uneasy partnership with Cisleithania, the Austrian half ofthe Empire. Yet, once the opposition came to power, it quickly turned town the volume

of its former boycott-rhetoric. In one decisive aspect the Tulip movement and theother pre-war boycott-initiatives differed from Buy Austrian goods: they were firedby nationalist ambitions and relied on comparably clear-cut national identities, bothof which was lacking in the Austrian case two decades later.

It is worth noting that Austrian German entrepreneurs, merchants and craftsmenwere far from being only passive objects of nationalist boycotts in the HabsburgMonarchy. German nationalism also ushered in calls to buy only from good Germans,8

a request that was often accompanied by rampant anti-Semitism, which characterizedthe boycott movements on all sides.9 The alert against the Slavic threat remained onthe agenda of German Austrian economic nationalism in the interwar period. For

example the acquisition of Austrian companies by Czechoslovakian competitorsaroused storms of nationalist protest.10 The call to buy only from Christians or Aryansalso survived the break-up of the Empire. Local and regional boycotts against Jewishbusinesses stayed to be a part of the social and economic history of Austria.11

The Political and Economic Background

While the other successor states gained something from the break-up of the Habsburg

Empire: emancipation from Vienna, the new Republic of Austria was seen by its elitesas an unfortunate result of the Empires disintegration, a process described as demo-lition.12 Previous dominance over the Slavic peoples of Cisleithania was gone, the ter-ritory had been drastically reduced, and German-nationalist dreams could not findtheir fulfilment in an Austrian Republic. Hence, joining the German Reich seemedto make more sense than ever before. There quickly evolved a broad consensus that theAnschluss was badly needed, not least as a cure to the economic difficulties causedby the loss of a huge interior market.13

Austria indeed had to face severe problems due to the disintegration of the

Empire. New power relations had been established and trade barriers reshaped the for-mer regional division of labour. Among the successor states Austrias economic struc-ture was the least balanced.14 Vienna had been the administrative and financial centreof the Monarchy. But the head was now cut off from most parts of its body. So therewere lots of state functionaries whom nobody needed any more and major banks thatdesperately, albeit vainly clung to their former influence and were to aggravate thedepression of the 1930s.15 As for the production of iron, metal, locomotives, and carsAustria now a small market of 6.5m people possessed huge excess capacities. Yet,other industries of vital importance such as sugar and textiles were lacking almostcompletely or to an important extent.16 Vienna had always relied on Hungarian foodand on coal from what was now Czechoslovakia, and it continued to do so after theFirst World War. The dependence of those provinces that became the Austrian


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Republic on imports from for example Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, had once beenmatched by the selling of finished products. The complementary relations within theeconomic texture of the Empire had been seen as happy ones by the Austrian-German

bourgeoisie,

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but this view had not been shared by their upcoming Slav and Hungariancounterparts, and it was certainly not how the newly formed nation states were thinkingabout the matter.18

In the 1920s Austria pursued a markedly liberal foreign trade policy in order tomaintain the industrial structure inherited from the Empire.19 Politicians and businesselites alike were unwilling to accept the fact that the other successor states of theHabsburg Empire showed no interest whatsoever to let the Austrian industry (orAustrian banks) play its former role.20 Their goal was strong national economies eman-cipated from former peripheral positions. So they opted for protectionist policies andrestricted access to their interior markets with the help of high tariff barriers and quo-

tas. In 1925 the average tariff was 18 per cent for goods imported to Austria.21 Austriantariffs were comparable to Switzerland, and to Scandinavian countries such as Swedenand Denmark, but not to its most important trade partners, the successor states, whichthen absorbed 43 per cent of Austrian exports.22 Poland had tariffs of 32 per cent,Czechoslovakia of 29 per cent, Hungary of 27 per cent, and Yugoslavia of 23 per cent.23

A Cautious Move Towards Buy-national Propaganda

In the mid 1920s the Austrian Ministry of Trade wished to do something about theendemic trade balance deficit but apparently wanted to avoid making a u-turn on foreigntrade policy. It probably seemed the right moment to look for ways of furthering thesale of goods on the home market, not least because after having lived through hyper-inflation and the ensuing stabilization crisis Austria had finally entered a period ofmoderate prosperity. In June 1926 the Ministry of Trade suggested to the VienneseChamber of Commerce that it thoroughly study the buy-national propaganda measuresof foreign states in order to become clear about the possibilities of adapting them toAustrian needs.24

There had been a flow of complaints by Austrian companies about the difficultiesthey encountered when trying to sell their goods abroad. For example, in April 1926the Vereinigte Papierwarenfabriken AG, a paper producer, had informed the Federationof Austrian Paper Producers that even

England, which has always granted full freedom of trade in every respect, hasbeen resorting for some time to the slogan Buy only British goods. NorthAmerica advertises in a similar manner national products, and to our dismaytoday we have received a letter from the Netherlands where the postal stamprequests: Use only Dutch products.25

What had provoked the outrage of the Vereinigte Papierwarenfabriken AG was tobe the first propaganda project in the line of strengthening the economic patriotism


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of Austrians: an advertising stamp. The implementation of the idea by the VienneseChamber of Commerce showed that it was all but easy to find a common ground evenfor a relatively insignificant measure. First of all, business interests were heteroge-

neous and therefore no particular branch of industry should be mentioned by thestamp. Furthermore, as the Austrian provinces were notoriously jealous of Vienna thisaspect had also to be taken into account. The Viennese Chamber had made it clear thatthe stamp idea meant just following the model furnished by foreign states such as,among others, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Nevertheless, many par-ticipants in the discussion, which started in November 1926, expressed concern aboutan excessively outspoken call for economic patriotism. It was feared that this mightengender retaliation by other countries: The Federation of Austrian Exporters wel-comed the idea of the stamp, provided it did not ask Austrians to buy exclusivelyAustrian goods. This would be seen as affecting export interests.26 Likewise, the Salzburg

and the Carinthian Chambers of Commerce warned not to use a stamp that requestedBuy only Austrian goods.27 Also an Austrian version of the slogan British goods arebest, though considered effective in advertising, was considered out of question. Inthe end, without having achieved full consensus, the Viennese Chamber of Commerceordered two stamps from the General Directorate of the Austrian Post Office. Onesaid Buy Austrian goods and the other Visit Vienna and Austrias marvellous Alps.28

It is important to pay attention to the subtleties of the wording. The omission of theparticle only expressed a cautious attitude infused by a general sense of weakness ofpoor Austria. Furthermore the reference to Vienna and the Alps was an attempt to

achieve equilibrium between the interests of the capital and its provinces.

The Creation of a Working Group

When considering propaganda on behalf of national goods, the activities of othercountries in this vein were of the greatest interest. Therefore, the Ministry of Trade,the Chamber of Commerce, and the Federation of Industry gathered a survey of buy-national measures sponsored by foreign governments. Maybe the most exciting exam-

ple was provided by British campaigns. A call to buy Austrian had to be perfectlylegitimate, its proponents suggested, if in the United Kingdom, the stronghold offree trade (Emporium des Freihandels), consumers were asked to mind the nationalorigins of goods.29 Already in 1911 there had been held an All British ShoppingWeek, albeit without much success in the first place. The dominant perspective inmatters of foreign exchange still was free trade whose significance went well beyondmere trade policy. It also expressed a liberal concept of the consumer as citizen. Butthings changed with the First World War. Patriotic shopping became an increasinglyacceptable idea and in the 1920s there were ever more Empire Shopping Weeks.30 Yetthe British government still refrained from a protectionist turn in trade policy. Insteadof introducing tariff barriers to keep off imports from countries outside the Empire,in spring 1926 the Empire Marketing Board was created that tried to win over


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consumers to imperial shopping. The board used a broad array of propaganda meansand at its peak it employed about 120 people.31

An example that in many respects came much closer to the situation of the

Austrian Republic was found in the Swiss Week. After the disintegration of the HabsburgEmpire Austria now was what Switzerland had been all along: a small, export orientedstate with a liberal foreign trade regime. The Swiss Week, which had been inspiredby British initiatives, was first organized in 1917 when over 20,000 retail firms par-ticipated in the activities. This is a far more impressive number than the one that wasreached by the first Austrian Week 10 years later, but strong national pride amongthe Swiss and the special circumstances of World War One, when Switzerland waspartially cut off from the world market, have to be taken into account. The SwissWeek stressed a sense of national solidarity: the well-being of the national economy isin the best interest of all citizens, went the argument, which did not leave room for

class conflict. The propaganda was set against the background of increasing coopera-tion between employers and labour organizations.32

In early 1927 the Austrian Ministry of Trade invited industrial associations, theChambers of Commerce, of Agriculture, and of Labour to discuss propaganda onbehalf of Austrian goods. The meeting on 14 February 1927 was well attended, aboveall by industrialists. In his opening statement Dr Johann Weinczierl, a high rankingcivil servant at the Ministry of Trade,33 explained: The results of last years trade bal-ance have recently drawn the attention of the public to the importance of the interiormarket. Therefore it is especially relevant to ask if and in how far in the interest of an

increase of sales on the home-market and therewith a reduction of unemployment inAustria a systematic propaganda for the preferential use of Austrian made products isdesirable. Admittedly, the question Weinczierl put forward had already been answeredpositively, at least partially, by the mere fact of the meeting which the Ministry ofTrade had organized and which demonstrated its intention to lay the ground for moresystematic measures on behalf of Austrian goods.34

After the initial meeting and another one of a smaller committee,35 a series of over20 talks with representatives of diverse industry branches followed. Efforts were madeto bridge conflicts between production and trade in order to win over the representatives

of retail and wholesale trade; and more generally sceptics who doubted the efficiencyof Buy Austrian propaganda or feared retaliation measures by foreign countries hadto be persuaded.36,37 In the end the Working Group of Economic Bodies Buy AustrianGoods was formed by the organizations that had already participated in the meetingon 14 February. A propaganda bureau was set up in the house of the Federation ofIndustry and put in charge of one of its employees, Dr Theodor Schneider.38 The dailybusiness of the working group was to be run by Dr Leo Klemensiewicz from theViennese Chamber of Commerce.39 This bi-headed executive reflected who was mostinterested in the workgroup.40

The Chamber of Commerce, which had been founded in 1849, traditionallyrepresented the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. In 1920, Chamber electionswere democratized, but small-scale producers still suspected that the Chambers of


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Commerce, especially the Viennese Chamber, were pandering to big business andfavouring economic liberalism over protectionist measures.41 Industrialists indeedheld leading positions in the Chambers. Nevertheless they preferred the Federation of

Industry, which had been created in 1919, as their instrument of lobbying.

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TheViennese Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Industry both maintained closerelations to the Ministry of Trade.43

A look at the budget of the working group for 1927 confirms its nature as a jointventure of the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Industry, sponsored by theMinistry of Trade, which otherwise thought it prudent to keep in the background.29,700 Shillings (28 per cent) came from the state budget, roughly the same was duefrom the Federation of Industry, and another 30,000 Shillings from the Chambers ofCommerce, of which the Viennese Chamber paid the lions share (21,000 Shillings).44

The Chamber of Agriculture, which had been expected to contribute 30,000

Shillings, was not willing to pay more than 5000, and it did not raise its share in lateryears either, although the initiatives propaganda paid a lot of attention to food.45 Evenless (2000 Shillings) was paid by the Chamber of Labour. Efforts by the VienneseChamber of Commerce to persuade its partner organizations into increased funding ofthe propaganda activities seem to have been to little avail. It proved even difficult to getmoney from the sister organizations in the provinces.

The first major undertaking of the working group was the organization of anAustrian Week, which was prepared by a wide range of promotional activities a leafletfor teachers, posters in the streets, at townhouses, post offices, schools, etc.; and an

advertising film which was shown at about 170 cinemas throughout the country.During Austrian Week around 2300 firms participated in competitions of patrioti-cally decorated shop windows; the winners were awarded money, badges and diploma.46

Furthermore, military bands played public concerts, leaflets Your Shilling can workwonders were distributed, and representatives of the workgroup talked on the radioabout the necessity to buy Austrian.

A practical problem for the patriotic consumer was to recognize Austrian goods asopposed to foreign merchandise. Consumers were urged to ask retailers about the ori-gins of products and the workgroup published lists of Austrian goods. Nevertheless the

lack of a label constituted a serious threat to the effectiveness of the Buy Austrian prop-aganda. In 1930 an amendment to the law on trademarks enabled associations to regis-ter a brand,47 so eventually the working group created her own logo, a stylized eagle,configured by the letters of the word Austria. The new label came to be widely used byAustrian firms.48 Apart from making the Austrian provenance visible to customers, thequestion of identifying domestic merchandise also required criteria of deciding on theAustrian nature of a business. Already in 1927 the working group took over the defini-tion of the association that organized the Swiss Week: as Swiss counted all goods whichhad been produced in Switzerland or which had gained a substantial distribution on theSwiss market.49 Yet, this obviously left much leeway for interpretation.

The working group Buy Austrian Goods had been initiated by the Ministry ofTrade and business organizations, but they tried to draw in labour and consumer


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organizations. This was in line with a corporatist way of handling social and economicconflicts. Corporatism had a longstanding tradition in Austria, which led amongother things to the creation of a system of Chambers and after the Second World War

to the establishment of a corporatist policy network called Sozialpartnerschaft. Yet,during the First Austrian Republic corporatist cooperation was severely hampered bythe absence of a basic political consensus.50 Although the Chamber of Labour, an insti-tution with a strong Social Democratic leaning, joined the working group, already atthe first meetings in early 1927 the Chamber of Labour demonstrated an obviouslysmaller commitment to the Buy Austrian project. The prospects for an initiative thatemphasized patriotic consumption as a common duty of all citizens, regardless of theirideological affiliation, diminished when on 15 July 1927 a demonstration of SocialDemocrats, who had been enraged by the acquittal of the defendants in the Schattendorftrial, rightly seen as a justice scandal, led to the burning-down of the Palace of Justice.

At the end of the day about ninety people had been killed in the confrontation withthe police.51

The Austrian Week, which took place from 3 to 11 November 1927, was not cov-ered by theArbeiterzeitung, the organ of the Social Democratic Party. It probably wasnot the right moment for a Social Democratic newspaper to support an endeavour thathad been conceived and promoted by its political opponent and its business allies. Theparty convention in Linz had just come to an end and, not surprisingly, theArbeiterzeitungstill dedicated a lot of space to this event, then switching over to a planned display ofthe Social Democrats hold on the masses, which was organized for the National Day

on 12 November. The only eye-catching references to the buy-national propagandawere a few adverts: two by department stores, one by the automobile industry, anotherone by Semperit, a producer of car tyres. The advertisings surely cannot be interpretedas Social Democratic enthusiasm for patriotic consumption but constituted an effortby business enterprises to reach out to workers as citizen-consumers. In the case of carsthe average reader of theArbeiterzeitunghardly counted among the actual consumersof this product, but the advertising fitted well with a gradual opening-up of productcommunication to the masses, even if they could not yet buy the offered goods.52

At a session of the Viennese Chamber of Commerce after the Austrian Week the

participants were informed that the event had received a favourable reception, exceptfrom papers close to Social Democracy.53 As a reaction it was suggested to remove thepropaganda bureau from the House of Industry, the Federation of Industrys head-quarters, to the building of the Chamber of Commerce in order to improve the imageof the Buy Austrian Goods initiative among workers.54 Yet, moving the bureau wouldhardly have helped in a political context of ever more conflict, and at any rate the ideawas never carried out. Still, one should not overlook the fact that there was a certainextent of cooperation across party lines in the activities of the Buy Austrian workinggroup. The Chamber of Labour contributed to a series of radio talks which promotedthe first Austrian Week,55 and it did the same on the occasion of the second AustrianWeek in March 1929, when Edmund Palla, the Chambers secretary general, explainedthat buying Austrian goods was a patriotic duty of Austrians.56


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As the Buy Austrian propaganda should incite people to prefer Austrian goods,consumers somehow had to be included into the corporatist setting. Immediately afterthe war the Social Democratic Party, which counted many consumer cooperatives

among its affiliated organizations, had developed plans for a chamber of consumers,but this project was not pursued any further by the conservative governments whichtook office in 1920.57 Therefore the consumer cooperatives, increasingly powerfulplayers in wholesale and retail trade, could rightfully consider themselves the fore-most consumer organization. While the wholesale organization of the cooperativescontributed a small amount of money to the Buy Austrian initiative,58 it was aboveall women organizations that the executive of the working group wanted to summonto the undertaking. At every level of discourse a standard phrase was used to explainthe relevance of womens participation: 80 per cent of all goods are bought by women.The Chamber of Commerce first invited women organizations to discuss the topic

on 8 July 1927, when the propaganda project was presented to the public at a pressconference. Subsequently housewives organizations formed part of the workinggroup;59 in 1930 a housewives advisory committee was constituted.60

The eagerness of male organizers to have female participants in their newlyfounded working group can be seen as an empowerment of women in accordance withthe rising significance of the connection between citizenship and consumption.61

Admittedly, it remains an open question how much influence the participatingwomen organizations could exert on decision-making. At any rate, when turning toordinary women the propaganda was entirely built on traditional gender construc-

tions. Women were cast as actual or in the case of underage future housewives;advertisements tried to appeal to their innate mother instinct.62 It can be said thatwomen were not addressed as citizens with consumer rights but as purchasers to bepatronized.63 When economic nationalism turns to the issue of consumers patrioticduties, women are always ascribed a crucial, albeit ambivalent role.64 While the patri-otism of producers is often taken for granted (as for retailers and above all wholesalers,their patriotic fervour may also be questioned), consumer choices, especially thosemade by women, are seen as a potential threat to the national well-being.65

Common sense held that women were easily influenced by advertising,66 an assump-

tion that could lead to an argument such as the following one which was brought for-ward in an article about the teaching of economic self-esteem:67 women succumb tothe magic of advertising without resistance, and once won over they unconditionallysurrender to the overtures made by foreign producers who dispose of more money to bespent on advertising. When the author of this article called the consuming public acapricious deity (eine launische Gottheit), we can assume that he was really thinkingof a dangerous goddess.

Although in principle a call to buy Austrian turned to anyone who was about tomake a shopping decision, obviously the working group elaborated explicit andimplicit criteria about whom the propaganda should target most. As a consumer youmight always have a choice, but those who are better off than just working class will havemore choices, especially if we are talking about interwar Austria whose transformation


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into a society of fully fledged mass consumption was hindered by severe economic setbacks.Inevitably a call to buy Austrian was very much concerned with reaching the middleand upper (middle) classes.68 Combining criteria of gender and class, then adding the

cleavage between the cities and the countryside, the figure that emerged as the maintarget was the urban middle-class housewife.Apart from women it was children and teenagers whom the proponents of the work-

ing group wanted to imbue with a greater sense of economic patriotism. Of course chil-dren themselves were not given a voice in the working group. Teachers should performthe task of conveying pupils the importance of Austrian minded consumption; hence theworking group closely co-operated with the Ministry of Education. Children were hardlyaddressed as consumers in their own right, they were taken into account as the consumersof tomorrow or as an influence on their parents.69 In the choice of women and childrenas main audience and in its treatment of those two target groups the Austrian initiative

resembled very much the strategy of the Swiss Week, which in this respect again provesto be a close (but older and better established) relative of Buy Austrian.70

Stereotypical Answers to a Crucial Question:Why are

Foreign Goods so Popular?

Following the advice by Hanns Kropff and Bruno W. Randolph, renowned advertisingexperts,71 and in view to the planned Austrian Week, the working group organized an

essay competition.72 The participants should answer the question: Why are foreign goodsso often preferred to Austrian products, and why should we buy more Austrian goodsthan hitherto?.73 The goal as explained by Leo Klemensiewicz, chief clerk of the work-ing group, was to locate the bacillus causing the illness Austrias economy suffered from.

Judging from the winning submissions, the working group got more or less the answersit had expected. One can also have it the other way round: the prizes were granted toworks in line with the presuppositions of the jury.74 Two of the first three ranks empha-sized the cosmopolitan attitude of Austrians as a historic legacy of the HabsburgEmpire.75 While reaching back into history, this kind of explanation worked well with

assumptions about essential character traits of peoples: Therefore, the old, typicallyGerman vice to hold what is foreign in higher esteem than what is ones own has deeperroots among Austrians than among other German tribes.76 Another supposed attributeof the homo austriacus, defined as a subtype of the homo germanicus, was his easygoingnature: The Austrian is happy-go-lucky. He enjoys the day and seizes the hour and heavoids worries as far as possible.77

Among Austrians the principal target of critique was the Viennese. The stereotype ofthe people of Vienna as leading carefree existences given to eating and drinking, was wellestablished by the early 19th century and could easily be turned into a reproach for thesake of Buy Austrian. Cosmopolitan Vienna had always been mistrusted by conservativeprovincial elites and the far right despised it for its as they called it racial impurityadding to all the alleged vices of urban life.


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A typical example of this outlook is given by the articles on economic patriotismin theDeutschsterreichische Tages-Zeitung, the organ of the NSDAP (Hitler-movement).78

Its author, the economist Otto Erwin von Scala, was living in the provincial capital of

Graz, a German-nationalist stronghold with strong anti-Viennese feelings. Approvingof the recently formed working group Buy Austrian goods, von Scala expressed hissurprise at the fact that the propaganda had originated in Vienna, where carelessness,spoiling, and enthusiasm for everything foreign were reigning supreme and where the

Jews, as von Scala asserted, had made themselves particularly comfortable.79 He under-pinned his observation with scorning remarks relevant to the Buy-national-issue inquestion: Vienna, jolly Vienna of course cannot do without the fine Hungarian flour[Nussermehl].80

Can Goods from Germany be Austrian?

The National-Socialist interpretation of the propaganda for Buy Austrian goods drewheavily on resentment against foreigners and their products, but was connected witha seemingly rational economic discourse. As the Nazi party championed the most rad-ical version of a German-nationalist creed, for Otto von Scala it was a pressing neces-sity to answer the question if the call for an Austrian-minded consumption could beseen as orientated against Germany and German goods. He dismissed this concern byechoing the official version that the campaign did not direct itself against any foreign

state, and certainly not against Germany. Nevertheless this was pure rhetoric, and ifthe Deutschsterreichische Tages-Zeitungwent further by prompting its readers to buyAustrian buy German goods81 (the headline of an article) it refused to see the obvi-ous: The call to Buy Austrian, which referred to goods manufactured or grown onAustrian territory, could hardly be made compatible with a pan-German solidaritydemonstrated by an equal treatment of products of German provenance, all the moreso as Austrian industry had good reasons to fear competition from its bigger neigh-bour. As state and nation did not correspond from the German nationalist standpoint,inevitably its approach at Austrian protectionism was full of contradictions. Otto von

Scala had to go to some length to explain why one should support a claim to buyAustrian and deplore a lack of state consciousness if the Austrian state, the viability(Lebensfhigkeit) of which Von Scala as many others denied,82 was nothing morethan a temporary solution. Von Scala brought forward three arguments: (1) The ini-tiative to foster sales on the interior market would help Austria to survive until theunification with Germany. (2) It would prevent Austria, when finally married to itsstronger neighbour, from being a liability for Germany. (3) Strengthening the Austrianeconomy would facilitate its eventual integration into the German economy.83

It would be a mistake to think that these questions were of interest only to anextremist group on the margins of the political scene, as the National Socialists then were.On the contrary, von Scala s reasoning was all but far off. Throughout the 1920s the GreaterGerman Peoples Party (Grodeutsche Volkspartei),84 an avowedly German-nationalist


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party, was the junior partner in the governing coalition with the Christian Socialists andfrom 1923 to 1929 it was holding the Ministry of Trade. Friedrich Tilgner, president ofthe Viennese Chamber of Commerce from 1925 to 1930, relentlessly promoted unifica-

tion with Germany. In 1938 he was awarded a low, illegal number of membership of theNSDAP because of his staunch commitment to the Anschluss.85

When considered from abroad, reconciling the call to buy Austrian with Germannationalism along the line of von Scala must have looked far fetched. Reacting to the incip-ient Buy Austrian propaganda Dr Karl Janovsky, a German-speaking economist fromTeplitz-Schnau (Teplice-anov) in Bohemia suggested that if Austrians were determinedto focus on Austrian goods, then consumers in Czechoslovakia might stop buying Austrianchocolate, knitted materials, and hats among other things.86 Bohemia had been the indus-trial powerhouse of the Monarchy and after the war the Austrian Republic continued to bean important market. Industrialists who considered themselves as ethnic Germans had

belonged to the elite among what had been the first nation of the Austrian part of theHabsburg Empire. In Czechoslovakia they found themselves relegated to a minoritystatus and felt threatened by Czech nationalist aspirations.87 As Janovsky was the economicpolicy expert of the German Central Association of Industry in Czechoslovakia,88 we cansafely assume that the critique he voiced in several articles reflected a highly unfavourablereception that the first Austrian Week in 1927 had met among German-speaking business-circles of this neighbouring state.

Stressing the Defensive Orientation of the Initiative

The call for Austrian-minded consumption fused economic analysis with discourses onthe duties of citizens (to be precise: on citizens as consumers), and on Austrians asa people. On the one hand, trade balance figures and the assessment of import-export-relations, on the other hand, assumptions about the behaviour of Austrianconsumers, which were often presented as being determined by character traits of theAustrians as a German tribe. Thehomo austriacuswas deemed to lack self-esteem, andtherefore he was prone to buy foreign goods.89 The diagnosis requested a cure of

national pride and justified action on behalf of Austrian goods.The same set of arguments was used for other buy-national campaigns, not surpris-ingly, for example, for a German counterpart of the Buy Austrian Goods-workinggroup. In a leaflet, dating from around 1930, the Political Economy Education Service(Volkswirtschaftlicher Aufklrungsdienst) stated:

In Germany there exists a bias for the foreign; this becomes obvious by goodswhich are of foreign provenance or are advertised as foreign often beingpreferred to domestic products even if in quality or price they are not inferior oractually superior to foreign goods or to those which sale under a foreign flag. 90

In 1906 Count Ludwig Batthnyi, a leading representative of the Hungarian Tulipmovement, well remembered by Austrian industrialists as an aggressive move against


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their interests, had answered to critique by Austrian-German business circles: Whileabroad everything that comes from the outside has to struggle with national distrust,among us quite the contrary everything which is of Hungarian origin is met with

inexplicable distrust.

91

A key argument is the assertion that co-nationals tend to buy foreign goods evenif they are more expensive or of worse quality. It was not all imports that had to betargeted, but an excess of foreign influence. A buy-national campaign typically con-tended that it did not take away anything from others but was just claiming what wasrightfully ones own, a domain endangered by the invasion of foreign goods. It was tokeep this flood at bay that the citizens, especially women and children, had to beinformed about. But already before the working group Buy Austrian Goods cameinto being, an article in Die Industrie had suggested: Where the fondness of foreignmerchandise cannot be broken by good advice, if need be tariffs should help to edu-

cate consumers.92 Yet, this had to remain a protectionist dream while Austria was stillsticking to her free trade policy.93

A poster that was produced in 1927 on the occasion of the Austrian Week showsa section of the terrestrial globe. The picture is separated by a white line against a redbackground. In its foreground the contours of Austria, which are set against theoutlines of the European continent, catch the viewers eye. While Europe wears a verydark colour, Austria shows a beaming white and thereby seems to float somewhatabove its continental background. Her borders are marked by a thick red line, discon-necting luminous Austria from her dark continental surrounding. It is important to

note that red and white are the colours of the national flag, which is also shown erectedin the centre of the schematic representation of Austria. Composition and colours fitwell with the positioning of the picture in the upper two thirds of the poster: theviewer is confronted with a patriotic ideal, whereas in the lower part of the poster thecall to Buy Austrian Goods! specifies what is requested from the Austrian citizen.94

The poster does not formulate an aggressive message, but it speaks the language ofprotectionist isolation against neighbouring states.

In the essay competition mentioned earlier, the texts which were awarded the firstprizes had a moderate, albeit conservative tone (with authoritarian undertones), but a

poem in a notably sharper key was given one of four 500 Shilling prizes. Its titleAbrahama Sancta Clarapaid homage to a famous 17th-century Catholic preacher who buoyed thespirits of the people of Vienna in times of plague and war and chastised them for theirpenchant for good living.95 The poem was full of resentment against everything foreignbut especially against the other successor states,96 and the Allied countries.97 It usheredin the call to delete an ugly, foreign word from the lexicon: import.

When drafting official communication in writing, the working group avoidedmessages that could be interpreted by foreign observers as instigating Austrians toboycott imported merchandise, but members of the group were less cautious whenspeaking on the radio. Dr Klemensiewicz explained on Radio Vienna in October1927: The Austrian Week intends to teach egoism to Austrians. Certainly,Klemensiewicz did not propagate boundless chauvinism and he admitted that many


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imports were necessary, especially those of raw materials, which did not exist inAustria. But he also stated: Every good that you buy, from A to Z, from the automobileto the toothbrush [vom Automobil bis zum Zahnbrster], should be produced in

Austrian workshops, should be products of Austrian industriousness and taste. Themetaphor of the alphabet is one of self-sufficiency that is at least close to the idea ofautarchy. Klemensiewicz concluded with the request: Show that you are patriotic egoists.98

But in 1927 the initiative was only beginning. Some years later, with economicdepression and a sharp rise of restrictive trade policies everywhere, in Austria too anopen request to boycott foreign goods was not taboo anymore. In early 1934, whenthe transformation of the Austrian Republic into an authoritarian, semi-Fascist regimewas well under way, M.J. Pasztor, a functionary of the Fatherlands Front (VaterlndischeFront), the would-be Fascist mass organization formed by the government, complainedin an article that the Buy Austrian campaign so far had been using only images and

texts as noble and discreet as the homo austriacus [der sterreichische Mensch] him-self.99 Now in the era of a newly awakened Austrian patriotism slogans in a sharperkey were recommended. The only existing propaganda item that Pasztor judged asaggressive enough was a poem that told people to overcome economic depression byforsaking everything foreign (Lass Fremdes in Ruh). But Pasztor preferred more pos-itive wording moulded after the model Be British and buy British. This slogan in hisopinion was a battle cry and a resounding call for national pride. An Austrian versionsoon came to be used in a brochure, with a circulation of 30,000, which was distrib-uted among teachers at the beginning of classes in September 1934.100

Patriotic Consumption as a Means to Fight Unemployment

Nationalism always heightens the common of the nation as a whole and downplays the sig-nificance of conflicts, which split up the imagined community. The teacher brochure from1934 says apodictically: Therefore, to every Austrian applies the principle: Be Austrian,buy Austrian goods!.101 The two sentences are highlighted against the surrounding text,thus the message is meant to be taken very seriously: belonging to the Austrian collective

comes first; the necessity to act accordingly second. But only compliance with the maximconfirms the status of the consumer as a good Austrian. It is a request and an implicitthreat. Just some lines above readers have been told how to conceive the state: It is like ona boat. The next sentence elucidates the message of the age-old metaphor of the state as aship: Getting out really is impossible (Ein Aussteigen ist tatschlich unmglich). Whatwill happen to someone who leaves a ship in open water? He will probably drown. Thisconclusion is not made explicit but it is what the picture is pointing out to.

Who was presented as the beneficiaries of patriotic consumption? Above alllabour. Unemployment acquired enormous proportions in the depression of the1930s, but was high even in the best years of the interwar period. Buy-national prop-aganda asked: Is it inevitable that unemployment grows? and underlined that thepurchase of Austrian goods will create work and bread, ban poverty and misery


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(Schafft Arbeit und Brot, bannt Armut und Not! Kauft sterreichische Waren!)102 Astreet poster from 1929 showed what was supposed to be a private letter by anemployee: Dear Poldi! I am so happy that my job has not been axed. If people buy

more Austrian goods, no jobs will ever be axed again.103

Buy Austrian Goods typi-cally used slogans that were cast in a pessimistic mood and exploited the fears ofAustrians regarding their economic prospects.104 Many propaganda items tried to moti-vate parents by reminding them of their childrens future: Parents! If your home-coun-try shall be able to give your children bread and work Buy Austrian goods!.

Foregrounding the problem of unemployment is typical of buy-national campaigns,thus neither a speciality of Austria nor of the 1930s. In the 1980s American consumerswere exhorted to Buy American The Job you save may be your own; and neigh-bouring Canada told citizens to shop Canadian, because every time you buy some-thing made here, you help a fellow Canadian keep a job. Often such requests areconnected with racist and xenophobic undertones.105

The Austrian propaganda certainly was as we have seen before not free of such con-notations, but the generalized sense of vulnerability as a small country which should notannoy more powerful nations discouraged an intensive use of open xenophobia. The officialBuy Austrian-propaganda also did not have an anti-Semitic bias, at least not for the perioduntil 1934 that is well documented. Yet, already in the 1920s merchants, craftspeople, andprofessionals that were deemed to be Jewish, whatever their own opinion on this matter,could not be sure that they represented Austrian production and trade in the eyes of an everlarger part of society; and the state definitely ceased to be neutral ground when the demo-

cratic republic was turned into an authoritarian regime. The proclamation of a new consti-tution in May 1934 completed the transformation: Austria now was officially a Christianstate.106 The true faith of course was meant to be Catholicism. Whoever was not a Catholic,or worse not even Christian, could not aspire to see him/herself as embodying the Austrianidea or the Austrian mission.107 Anti-Semitic prejudice had always been part of craftsprotectionism, but buy-Christian propaganda increased significantly since 1936. Boycottinitiatives directed against businesses that were considered as Jewish enjoyed the backing ofparts of the ruling elite or even originated among prominent figures of the regime.108 TheZionist journal Der Jude rightly observed that economic anti-Semitism, of which Buy-

Christian campaigns were a highly visible form, ran contrary to civil rights still granted bythe constitution.109 But the situation reflected the contradiction enshrined in the constitu-tion of 1934 between liberal remnants and the avowed wish of transforming Austria intoan authoritarian Catholic state. It became more and more palpable that this state would nothave a place for Jews. In 1938, the ground for Nazi rule was well prepared.

Administrative Action: Stepping Up a Boycott

The Buy Austrian Goods-initiative acted in two different spheres: on the one handthere was propaganda which the working group set up and directed to the commonpublic; as well as, though to a lesser degree, to traders and producers. On the other


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hand the government, where it disposed of the means to decide this matter by decree,took more immediate action to ensure the preference of Austrian goods. Already in 1909the government of Cisleithania, the Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, had

issued a provision that the state administration should purchase goods and servicesonly from companies seated in the provinces of Cisleithania, unless their offers weredisproportionately more expensive. Contractors were obliged to provide just commodi-ties that had been produced from domestic materials and to furnish proof thereof ifdemanded.110 In 1919, the decree was adapted to the shrunken territory of the Republicof German Austria,111 and seems to have fallen into oblivion in the time of hyperin-flation. Yet in 1926 the Ministry of Trade reminded all bodies of the state adminis-tration that this provision was of utmost importance, and from then on it intensifieddedication to its enforcement.112 The provision of 1909 had established a rule only forgovernmental consumption, but it laid the ground for efforts to reach out into the

domain of private consumption as well.In 1930 the Chambers of Commerce published an index of school supplies of

Austrian provenance. Thirty-five thousand copies were distributed to teachers andschool authorities. This specialized guidebook should enable them to obey to a decreeissued by the Ministry of Education, which regulated not only purchases by the schoolitself but also exhorted teachers to work towards the exclusive use of Austrian schoolsupplies in their class rooms. If the decree was taken seriously at an authoritarian insti-tution, as schools of the early 20th century were, this meant a boycott on foreign schoolsupplies. No wonder the Buy Austrian Goods-working group prided itself with the

success of this move and claimed that there was an increase in the use of Austrian schoolsupplies. At least some teachers really seem to have controlled their pupils economicpatriotism. For example the Czech embassy complained that it had learned about highschool teachers who threatened their pupils with punishment if they used schoolsupplies of Czechoslovakian provenance. Confronted with this allegation, the Ministryof Education played the incriminated action down as spirited (temperamentvoll) andrefused to admonish the teachers in order not to contradict the issued decree.113

The classification of goods as Austrian or foreign was stricken with problems. Theguidebook was supposed to provide orientation, but this bible of Austrian school sup-

plies had some defects. The firm Gnther Wagner, producing in Hanover and Vienna,complained that because the index mentioned only the ink produced by a competitor,his business interests had already suffered damage.114 And the Czech embassy wasannoyed because the decree by the Ministry of Education mentioned the pencils of L &.C. Hardtmuth, a firm with seat in Budweis (cesk Bude jovice), as an example of for-eign products to be avoided. This was no lapse: The Ministry wanted to inform con-sumers that the well known brand Koh-i-noor was not a domestic product as it hadbeen before the break-up of the Empire. These types of mistakes, rooted in consumerhabits from before the war, were one of the many problems of correctly identifyingAustrian which the Buy Austrian-initiative had to tackle.

On behalf of German pencil producers, the German embassy complained abouttheir exclusion from the Austrian market. The embassy argued that the decree by the


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Ministry of Education was not compatible with the trade agreements between the twostates. This was a plausible objection, even if the Ministry of Trade insisted: Theschools decree does not constitute a repressive measure against foreign states.115

Was Buy Austrian Goods a Commercial Success?

When trying to assess the results of the Buy Austrian propaganda of the interwaryears, we should keep in mind that economists so far have not been able to provideconclusive evidence for the effectiveness of buy-national campaigns. It seems to be allbut certain that such campaigns can significantly change consumer behaviour.116

As for the Austrian case, after the first Austrian Week in 1927 a survey was madeamong retailers. On a basis of 160 returned questionnaires the findings were the

following: two-thirds of the firms said that they had observed an increase of customerfrequency during the week. One-third of the shops had also noted a rise in sales ofAustrian goods on an average of 10 per cent.117 In his report Klemensiewicz correctlywarned not to interpret the data as a sweeping success, but they seemed encouragingto him.

Not everyone shared his opinion. Right from the beginning of the Buy Austriancampaign there was expressed critique as to the effectiveness of the propaganda. Somevoices thought that turning to consumers in general was to no avail, others held thattargeting children was of no use because they did not qualify as purchasers in their own

right (Selbstkufer). The starting point of the working group had been the negativetrade balance. Yet the report for the period from December 1927 to October 1928could not but admit that the trade balance had not changed. As the working group didnot want this to be interpreted as a sign that its campaign was a vain effort, it arguedthat propaganda takes a long time to produce even a small effect.118 The same set ofarguments was used by the Empire Marketing Board in the face of rising criticism.119

It was not until 1937 that Austria achieved for the first time a tiny positive balanceof payment,120 but we cannot regard this as an argument that the call to Buy Austrianwas eventually working. In 1931, the Austrian government had taken up a restrictive

foreign trade policy. As a result of depression and the sharp overall reduction of foreigntrade volume the deficit had already decreased, and private consumption never recov-ered throughout the 1930s and thus remained well below 1929, the best year of the inter-war period.121 So there we have an obvious explanation for the changes in trade balance.

We might consider the relatively small budget as an important limitation to theeffectiveness of the working group. In 1934, when the establishment of a conservativedictatorship was seen as auspicious for any kind of patriotic propaganda,Klemensiewicz admitted that the funds put at the workgroups disposal were smallerthan the budget of a medium-sized industrial company. Therefore, it had not beenpossible to commission a market survey that would have allowed assessing the effectsof the propaganda. Klemensiewicz used a drastic metaphor: he described BuyAustrian Goods as an express train that was run on the heat of a stearin candle.122,123


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This may seem a just assessment, if we compare the available budget data to figuresfrom the Empire Marketing Board. In the financial year 19267 the British venturedisposed of 500,000,124 this is 1,724,000 Shillings,125 whereas the working group

spent 104,850 Shillings on its propaganda effort in 1927. In 1928 and 1930 theworking group commanded about roughly the same amount of money and it does notseem likely that its financial situation improved during depression years.126 So theBuy Austrian Goods initiative looks like a poor relation of the Empire MarketingBoard. But this impression changes if we take a per capita approach: in 1927 theEmpire Marketing Board spent 23 Shillings per UK inhabitant, while the figure was65 Shillings per inhabitant for the Austrian working group.

If Buy Austrian was not a huge success, it would be mistaken to attribute thismainly to underfunding. A severer problem of any buy-national campaign, not justthe Austrian one, is the wide scope of the propaganda. It urges consumers to apply a

patriotic criterion to every single purchase he or she is about to make. When in the1950s citizens were again requested to think Austrian whenever you shop, a popularcomedian put the dilemma of patriotic consumption in the mocking question: Whatis it you want? Should I sing the national anthem at the grocerys?.127 Moreover, inthe 1920s it could often be rather difficult for consumers to tell whether a certaingood was Austrian or foreign made. The Austria-label, which was readily acceptedby producers, made this task a lot easier. Another grave obstacle could not be removedthat easily: many or even most citizens lacked sentimental attachment to the Austrianstate, which undoubtedly is a problem for sentimental protectionism.128

Still, Klemensiewicz claimed some success for the activities of the working group:according to him it had been possible to achieve the exclusive use of Austrian schoolsupplies in Austrian schools. This helps us to give a partial answer to the question: towhose benefit? The pertinent decree issued by the Ministry of Education in 1931explained that it had observed a decrease in the use of Austrian school supplies, namelypencils, and it wished to be informed as to which Austrian school supplies, e.g. pencilsby Brevillier & Urban, were used in classes. It is no small detail that the president ofthe Federation of Industry happened to be Ludwig Urban, also director general andpresident of Brevillier & Urban, a company that suffered from low productivity and

overcapacities. In the depression years the firm pinned its hopes on a policy ofretrenchment to the home market.129 No wonder Austrian merchants were exasper-ated about this abuse of the call for patriotic consumption.130

The Empire Marketing Board was abolished in 1933 after Britain had embraceda policy of high tariffs.131 In the 1920s Buy Austrian Goods was seen by many as asubstitute, if a weak one, of high tariffs.132 But the working group did not cease toexist when Austria turned to formal protectionism. Still, it is difficult to say whetherthe propaganda continued on the same level as before. Documentation of the workinggroup during the years from 1934 to 1938 is scarce. This might be due to a signifi-cant decrease in activities, but records might as well have been lost. At any rate, theworking group went on with asking print media to run Buy Austrian slogans andsince 1934 it published theVolkswirtschaftlicher Aufklrungsdienst, a journal with two,


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sometimes three issues per month aimed at leaders of cultural and political corporations.This task was carried out on behalf of the Department of Economic Propaganda (Amtfr Wirtschaftspropaganda), which in 1933 had been established within the Ministry

of Trade.

133

After the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany the working group shared thefate of all other organizations that by the sheer fact of representing a private associa-tion in pursuit of a public goal were perceived as a threat to Nazi dominance. On2 September the Stillhaltekommissar,134 the authority created to deal with the trans-formation and integration of private associations, ordered its dissolution. Obviouslythe call for Austrian-minded consumption now did not make sense any more.135

Conclusion

Was Buy Austrian Goods a boycott campaign? No, it was not if one sticks to whatthe organizers of the working group said. Yet, the propaganda certainly included theperspective of a boycott of foreign goods. Citizens were prompted to buy nationalgoods on a larger scale than before. Officially they were not asked to buy exclusivelyAustrian goods. But in some contexts, especially when turning to children who wereto be inculcated a patriotic attitude in matters of consumption, it turned out that ifthe initiative succeeded there would not be much space left for foreign competitors.And however one looks at the argument, the call to prefer Austrian products always

implied to refrain from buying those of foreign provenance. Furthermore, Buy AustrianGoods took the shape of an outright boycott of imported goods there where it left thesphere of propaganda and used its ties to the government to apply administrativemeasures against the consumption of imported goods. This was the case with the decreeon school supplies.

Was the purpose of Buy Austrian Goods a political or an economic one? If apolitical boycott/buycott is an attempt to use marketplace means to attain a goal thatis beyond the realm of the marketplace, then the campaign was above all about eco-nomics. A positive influence on the trade balance was the avowed goal of the initia-

tive, a goal it failed to achieve. But the working group also constantly talked aboutthe necessity of increasing the citizens state consciousness and patriotism; and toimbue Austrians with pride for their country constituted a political goal. It was notattained either, but inspiring patriotic fervour was a particularly complex task in theAustria of the 1920s and 1930s. The collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy had left thecitizens of the new Republic with many difficult questions regarding state and nation-hood, and political conflict was already on the brink of open violence when the work-ing group started its activities.

Buy Austrian Goods was no grassroots movement, it was an undertaking initi-ated by the Ministry of Trade and executed by corporate bodies such as the Chamberof Commerce and the Federation of Industry. It tried to include the relevant social actorsand partially succeeded in that effort because of Austrias corporatist traditions. But it


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did not seem to have inspired much enthusiasm among the institutions of theSocial-Democrats. And a strong case can be made that the main actors of the workinggroup pursued above all the goals of business enterprises, although the propaganda

put an emphasis on its relevance to the fight against unemployment. The workinggroup tried to mobilize women, but in spite of the participation of womens organi-zations, its propaganda was cast in an entirely paternalistic style.

The request to Buy Austrian goods was considered a substitute of a protectionistforeign trade policy when the government thought it unwise to use high tariffs andquota. Maybe it is no surprise that the slogan Buy Austrian appeared again after theSecond World War when foreign trade was gradually liberalized and the call for patrioticconsumption gained attractiveness as a device of securing the interior market fornational producers. In 1958, the Chamber of Commerce began to organize an AustrianWeek every year, always around the National Day in October. Circumstances now

were a lot more favourable for a buy-national campaign. As the Austrian society didnot wish to claim heritage of the Nazi past, citizens were no longer told to see Austriaas a part of the German nation but as a stateanda nation of her own right;136 and theeconomic miracle made it easier to identify with the small Republican state.

Abbreviations

AdR Archiv der Republik (Archive of the Republic)

BMHV Bundesministerium fr Handel und Verkehr (Federal Ministry of Trade andTransport)

BMU Bundesministerium fr Unterricht (Federal Ministry of Education)StA sterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Austrian State Archive)WKW Wirtschaftskammer Wien (Chamber of Commerce Vienna)WStLA Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (Municipal and Provincial Archives of Vienna)

Acknowledgements

This article relies on sources from the Viennese Chamber of Commerce and theAustrian state archives, on the booklets for teachers published in 1934, text books ofthe 1930s containing references to the imperative of patriotic consumption, and a cer-tain number of newspaper articles that deal with the initiative Buy Austrian goods.Though this is a sizeable body of sources it is by far not all the material that couldpossibly be gathered. The investigation that the article draws on can be regarded aspreparing the ground for a more comprehensive future research project; an undertak-ing placed within the frame of the scholarly interest in the relation between nationalidentities and consumption that the author has been developing for some time now.Currently the author is doing research on branded goods and the construction of theAustrian nation (195095). Apart from an article by the author (Khschelm 2006),


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the publications by Andrea Morawetz have recently shed some light on the call forpatriotic consumption in Austria (see Gries and Morawetz 2006; Morawetz 2007).

Notes

1. Die Industrie, 2 September 1927. 12,Klnische Zeitung, 25 August 1927. Ludwig Urban, the pres-ident of the association said the same in a speech he probably gave on the radio. WKW, E 27468/2,fascicle 1927: Ludwig Urban, Die Bedeutung des Inlandsmarktes [The significance of the interiormarket], n.d. [1927].

2. The official name was: Kammer fr Handel, Gewerbe und Industrie (Chamber of Trade, Craft andIndustry).

3. Die Bewegung, die wir entfachen wollen, soll nicht nach Art der Tulpen-Bewegung eine chau-vinistische sein. Wir wollen nicht die auslndische Ware vom sterreichischen Markt vollstndig

ausschlieen. WKW, E 27468/2, fascicle 1927, persons AZ: Speech of chamber president Tilgnerat a press conference.

4. Arbeitsgemeinschaft wirtschaftlicher Krperschaften Kauft sterreichische Waren,Kauft sterre-ichische Waren: Wirtschaftlicher Leitfaden fr Lehrpersonen [Buy Austrian goods: Economic guide book forteachers](1934, 4).

5. Monroe Friedman (1999, 11, 20112). In general, Friedmans definitions of boycott are an impor-tant reference for the approach taken in this article.

6. The slogan became popular in the late 1880s. It had been coined by the historian Frantiek Palackwho had adapted a Hungarian nationalist concept (Albrecht 2001, 4767; Boyer 2002, 54) .

7. gnes Pogny (2006, 4650). In extenso, but with a strong Anti-Hungarian bias: Wolf (1979).8. In any of the many German-nationalist local and regional newspapers one can find examples of such

propaganda.9. Albert Lichtblaur (2006, 469), Hillel J. Kieval (1988), Teresa Andlauer (2001, 2458).

10. Christian Klsch (2008). A shorter version of the text, which does not contain the references to eco-nomic nationalism, has been published in: Stefan Eminger and Ernst Langthaler (2008, 565600).

11. Stefan Eminger (2005, 1814), Peter Melichar (2006, 23, 26, 117).12. Kauft sterreichische Waren: Wirtschaftlicher Leitfaden fr Lehrpersonen [Buy Austrian goods: Economic

guide book for teachers](1934, 4).13 Hanns Haas (1995, 47287), Ernst Bruckmller (1996, 294310).14 Fritz Weber (1995).15. Eduard Mrz (1981, 283, 352, 543), Roman Sandgruber (1995, 8790, 366, 38790).16. Weber (1995, 27).

17. The German speaking bourgeoisie considered the Empire as their possession and dominance overSlavic people as their natural right. Bruckmller (1996, 2946).

18. Eduard Kubu (2004).19. Peter Berger (1982, 183205), Jens-Wilhelm Wessels (2007, 226, 14255).20. Mrz (1981, 2837).21. Dieter Stiefel (1988, 323).22. Berger (1982).23. Stiefel (1988, 323).24. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle Federal Ministry of Trade and Transport: Letter to Chamber Vienna,

30 June 1926.25. WKW, E 26.468/2, fascicle companies A-Z, Vereinigte Papierwarenfabriken AG.

26. WKW, E 27.468/1, fascicle associations, Verband sterreichischer Exporteure [Association ofAustrian exporters].


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27. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle chambers, Chamber Salzburg: Chamber Salzburg to ChamberVienna, 21 December 1926; Chamber Carinthia: Chamber Klagenfurt to Chamber Vienna, 23December 1926.

28. The decision was taken in the plenary meeting on 31.3.1927; WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1926:

chamber records 6851/1926 and 6851/1927.29. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1926: Anonymous speech, n.d. [1927]. Without doubt the speech,

held in front of business men, can be attributed to one of the proponents of the working group.30. Frank Trentmann (2008, 22840).31. Stephen Constantine (1998, 198), Robert C. Self (1994).32. Thomas Oberer (1990, 1991).33. Weinczierl was head of the Department of Commercial and Industrial Policy.34. StA, AdR, BMHV, Industrial Department, fascicle 65551/1927, 73763-10/1927: Minutes of the

meeting of 14 February 1927.35. StA, AdR, BMHV, Industrial Department, fascicle 65.551/1927, 75.472-10/1927: Minutes of

the meeting of 24 February 1927.

36. See for example: WKW, E 27.468/1, fascicle Chambers, Chamber Salzburg: Chamber Salzburg toChamber Vienna, 7 July 1927.

37. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1927: Chamber Vienna to all sister chambers, 12 July 1927.38. Born 1885 Vienna, died 1959 Vienna. After the war he figures as an industrial adviser in the

Vienna directory.39. Born Eduard Klemensiewicz 1892 Graz, died 1937 Vienna. Since 1920 he was registered with res-

idence in Vienna, since 1924 under the name of Leo. He does not seem to have used Leopold, thelong form of the name.

40. StA, AdR, BMHV, Industrial Department, fascicle 65.551/1927, 129.65210/1927: Berichtber die Propaganda-Aktion in der Zeit bis November 1927 [Report about the propaganda activ-ities in the period until November 1927].

41. Eminger (2005, 56).42. Peter Berger (1995, 403), Gerald Sturmayr (1995, 346).43. Emmerich Tlos (1995, 381).44. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1927: financial account.45. WKW, E 27.468/3, fascicle year reports: financial account 1928; budget estimate 1930.46. StA, AdR, BMHV, Industrial Department, fascicle 65.551/1927, 129.652-10/1927: Bericht

ber die Propaganda-Aktion in der Zeit bis November 1927 [Report about the propaganda activ-ities in the period until November 1927].

47. Federal Law Gazette, no. 109/1930, Federal law concerning the protection of collective trade marks(Verbandsmarken), 4 April 1930.

48. See Andrea Morawetz (2007, 8).

49. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1927, 9176: Organization of an Austrian Week; statutes of the work-ing group, approved 11 June 1931, 3.

50. Tlos (1995, 385).51. A disabled veteran of World War I and a seven years old child had been shot when Social-

Democratic and conservative paramilitary groups clashed at the small village of Schattendorf. SeeNorbert Leser and Paul Sailer-Wlasits (2002).

52. Rainer Gries (2006, 628).53. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1928: Manuscript without title (speech in the Chamber Vienna in late

1927 or early 1928).54. Ibid., WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1928, 9012/1928: Draft of a letter to the Presidial Conference

of the Chambers of Agriculture.

55. Inlandspropaganda-Radiovortrge [Radio speeches about the propaganda related to the interiormarket], inDie Industrie, 30 September 1927, 7.


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56. This at least is how he was quoted inNeues Wiener Tagblatt, March 2, 1929, 6. The Neues WienerTagblatt, founded in 1867, was along with the Neue Freie Presse the most important newspa-per of the liberal bourgeoisie. It extensively covered the activities of the Buy Austrian Goodsworking group.

57. Fritz Baltzarek (1976, 2213), Andrea Ellmeier (1990, 17883).58. GC, Groeinkaufsgesellschaft sterreichischer Consumvereine, founded in 1905.59. StA, AdR, BMHV, Industrial Department, 65551/1927, 129.652: Bericht ber die Propaganda-

Aktion in der Zeit bis November 1927 [Report about the propaganda activities in the period untilNovember 1927].

60. WKW, E 27.468/3, annual reports: Annual report of the Working Group of Economic Bodies for year 1930, 3.

61. On the relationship of gender, citizenship and consumption see: Victoria DeGrazia and EllenFurlough (1996, 27586), Sheryl Kroen (2003).

62. See the explication of a poster subject given by the account on the working groups activities in1930: WKW, E 27.468/3, annual reports: Annual report of the Working Group of Economic Bodies

for year 1930, 19. The headline of the poster Mother and child read: Every good mother cares forthe future of her children and buys Austrian goods.

63. On the opposition between the citizen consumer ideal and the concept of the purchaser consumersee: Lizabeth Cohen (2004).

64. Two monographic works on cases from different centuries and continents: Lisa Tiersten (2002),Laura C. Nelson (2000).

65. On alleged differences of the patriotism of male producers and female consumers in the case ofChina see: Karl Gerth (2003, 285354).

66. Franz X. Eder (2003, 210). Charles McGovern (2006, 37), Alexander Schug (2009, 362).67. Otto Bhm (1929).68. The same point can be made for Britain: Trentmann (2008, 236).

69. StA, AdR, BMU, fascicle 4171, 25.015-I/3/1934: Working Group to Minister of Education, 14July 1934; Kauft sterreichische Waren: Wirtschaftlicher Leitfaden fr Lehrpersonen [Buy Austrian goods:Economic guide book for teachers](1934, 3). Before the 1950s the opportunities for autonomous con-sumption of children were rather small. See: Andreas Weigl (2004).

70. Oberer (1991, 8392).71. For the biography of Kropff, an advertising theorist and practician in Austria and Germany, see

Bernd Semrad (2005): 5862. Kropff and Randolph were about to finish an important book onmarket analysis, the first comprehensive account of this technique available to German-speakingadvertisers: Hanns Kropff and Bruno W. Randolph (1928). See Reinhardt (1993, 47).

72. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1927: File note about the meeting with Messrs. Kropff and Randolph,22 July 1927 (The date given is certainly wrong. Probably the meeting took place on 22 June 1927).

73. StA, AdR, BMHV, Industrial Department, 65551/1927, 129.652: Bericht ber die Propaganda-Aktion in der Zeit bis November 1927 [Report about the propaganda activities in the period untilNovember 1927], 1.

74. See the statement by Friedrich Tilgner at his press conference on 8 July 1927: WKW 27.468/1,fascicle Persons A-Z: Friedrich Tilgner. Tilgner did not take part in the jury, but the vice presidentof the Chamber did. Another member of the jury was Engelbert Dollfu, the future Christian-Socialist chancellor turned dictator, then Secretary of the Chamber of Agriculture of Lower Austria.

75. The third submission was a poem that exhorted Austrians to buy Austrian goods.76. Die alte, allgemein deutsche Untugend, das Fremde hher zu schtzen als das Eigene, ist deshalb

beim sterreicher tiefer eingewurzelt als in den anderen deutschen Stmmen.77. Der sterreicher ist leichtlebig. Er geniet den Tag und die Stunde, wie sie kommen, und geht

den Sorgen mglichst aus dem Wege.78. Hitler pressurized on the Austrian NSDAP to accept his leadership. In 1926 this led to a split-up

into two Nazi parties, the Schulz-party and the Hitler-movement.


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79. Und schlielich trgt das in Wien sich besonders breitgemachte Judentum auch das Seinige bei.80. Otto Erwin von Scala Wirtschaftspatriotismus und Wiener Messe [Economic Patriotism and the

Vienna Fair], in Deutschsterreichische Tages-Zeitung,11 October 1927, 9.81. Kauft sterreichische kauft deutsche Waren [Buy Austrian, buy German goods], in

Deutschsterreichische Tages-Zeitung, 8 November 1927, 9.82. Mrz (1981, 2759), Marion Aichinger (1990).83. Otto Erwin von Scala Wirtschaftspatriotismus und Anschluss [Economic patriotism and unifica-

tion with Germany], inDeutschsterreichische Tages-Zeitung, 11 October 1927, 9. See also Morawetz(2007, 13).

84. An old fashioned type of a party, which apart from German nationalist craftsmen and retailersattracted above all civil servants and teachers. Eventually it lost out to more youthful and energeticNazism. Ernst Hanisch (1994, 1459).

85. Eminger (2005, 136, 234).86. WKW, E 27.468/2, fascicle 1928: Letter to Janovsky, 1 February 1928; E 27.468/1, fascicle asso-

ciations: Verband der sterreichischen Hutindustriellen [Association of Austrian Hat Industrialists].

87. Christoph Boyer (2006, 211).88. (18951972). Later Janovsky also acted as an economic adviser for the extremist Sudeten German

Party and under the Nazi regime he was chief executive of the Federation of Wholesale and ForeignTrade in Berlin. After the war he spent ten years in Czechoslovak prison. Janovsky, Karl (1984).

89. One of many examples that could be quoted: Leo Klemensiewicz (n.d. [1930], 3). Unfortunatelythe Austrian lacks self-esteem. Therefore the Austrian does not hold what is produced in Austriain as high regard as the goods coming from abroad. (Der sterreicher hat leider zu wenigSelbstbewusstsein. So kommt es, da der sterreicher alles, was in sterreich selbst erzeugt wird,nicht so hoch einschtzt, wie die Ware, die aus dem Ausland kommt.)

90. WKW, E 27.468/1. This text is also printed in Sigurd Paulsen (n.d. [1931], 85). Paulsen gives anoverview of buy-national propaganda in many countries of the world.

91. Neue Freie Presse, May 18, 1906, 4, Wolf(1979, 2747).92. Alfred Bielka Die Krise der sterreichischen Handelsbilanz [The crisis of the Austrian trade bal-

ance], inDie Industrie7 January 1927, 4, see also Alfred Bielka, Made in Austria, inDie Industrie,18 February 1927, 5.

93. See the staunch commitment to free trade displayed in an article by Trade Minister HansSchrff (1927).

94. The image analysis follows the methodological prescriptions of: Gunther Kress and Theo Leeuwen(2006).

95. Bruckmller (1996, 119).96. On the shores of the Danube the Magyars once bickered with you, they fought for every single

Crown. Is it not enough that you now have to buy their wheat to fill your stomach, do you also need

for heavens sake biscuit and wine from Hungary? Isnt Gumpoldskirchner just as delicious?(Ander Donau und die Magyaren // lagen sich einst mit Euch in den Haaren, // taten um jede Krone oftgeizen. // Ist's nicht genug, dass Ihr jetzt ihren Weizen // kaufen euch msst, um den Magen zufllen, // brauchet Ihr - um des Himmels Willen - // auch noch aus Ungarn Keks und Wein? // IstGumpoldskirchner nicht ebenso fein?). The Crown was the Austro-Hungarian currency. The sen-tence refers to the always difficult negotiations between the Cisleithanian (Austrian) and theHungarian half of the monarchy about the respective contributions to the common expenses of thedouble-state. Gumpoldskirchner is a well known wine from a village south to Vienna.

97. The Yankees do not let you across the sea, but they send you their shaving sticks. (Die Jankeeslassen Euch nicht bers Meer, // doch schicken sie Euch ihre Shaving sticks her.)

98. WKW, E 27.468/1, fascicle Persons A-Z, Leo Klemensiewicz: Speech, 13 October 1927.

99. sterreichs Wirtschaft: Wochenschrift des Niedersterreichischen Gewerbevereins [Austrias Economy: Weeklymagazine of the Crafts Association of Lower Austria], no. 3, January 19, 1934, 41 p.; StA, AdR,BMHV, Industrial Department, fascicle 93.156/1934, 95577/1934.


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100. StA, AdR, BMU, fascicle 4171, 25015-I/3/1934; Kauft sterreichische Waren: WirtschaftlicherLeitfaden fr Lehrpersonen [Buy Austrian goods: Economic guide book for teachers](1934).

101. Fr jeden sterreicher gilt also der Grundsatz: Sei sterreicher, kaufe sterreichische Waren!, Ibid., 67.102. WKW, E 27.468/3, undated leaflet. [late 1920s]

103. WKW, E 27.468/3, fascicle 1929: Bericht ber die zweite sterreichische Woche vom 1.-7. Mrz1929 [Report about the second Austrian Week from 1-7 March 1929].

104. Paulsen, a German observer, saw this as a stark contrast to the more optimistic propaganda of theBritish Empire Marketing Board. Sigurd Paulsen (n. d. [1931], 33).

105. For example in the USA in the 1930s when alerting against Asian products and immigrants. DanaFrank (2000, 187).

106. The constitution began with declaring: In the name of God the Almighty, from whom all lawemanates, the Austrian people receives for its Christian, German Federal State based on the Estates[auf stndischer Basis] this constitution.

107. See Anton Staudinger (2005).108. Eminger (2005, 181).

109. Der Jude [The Jew], September 15, 1936, 2; October 8, 19

implicit boycott the call for patriotic consumption in interwar austria

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