implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem,...

Psychological Review1995, Vol. 102, No. 1,4-27

Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0033-295X/95/S3.00

Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes

Anthony G. GreenwaldUniversity of Washington

Mahzarin R. BanajiYale University

Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control.However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in animplicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experienceinfluences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion—that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation—extendsboth the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of socialpsychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures—which areimperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping isconsistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. Thefinding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges' attention on their judg-ment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducingsuch unintended discrimination.

Long before they became central to other areas of psycholog-ical theory, concepts of cognitive mediation dominated the anal-ysis of social behavior. The constructs on which this article fo-cuses achieved early prominence in social psychological theorywith formulations that were partly (attitude) or entirely (stereo-type) cognitive. By the 1930s, Allport (1935) had declared atti-tude to be social psychology's "most distinctive and indispens-able concept" (p. 798), Thurstone (1931; Thurstone & Chave,1929) had developed quantitatively sophisticated methods forattitude measurement, and Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) hadintroduced a method that is still in use to investigate stereo-types. Self-esteem, an attitudinal construct to which this articlegives separate treatment because of its prominence in recent

research, also has a long-established history (e.g., James, 1890;see overview in Wylie, 1974, 1979).

Through much of the period since the 1930s, most social psy-chologists have assumed that attitudes, and to a lesser extentstereotypes, operate in a conscious mode. This widespread as-sumption of conscious operation is most evident in the near-universal practice of operationalizing attitudes (including self-esteem) and stereotypes with direct (instructed self-report)measures. The pervasiveness of direct measurement for atti-tudes and stereotypes was documented by Greenwald (1990)and by Banaji and Greenwald (1994) and is further reviewedbelow. In contrast, this article describes an indirect, uncon-scious, or implicit mode of operation for attitudes andstereotypes.1

Anthony G. Greenwald, Department of Psychology, University ofWashington; Mahzarin R. Banaji, Department of Psychology, YaleUniversity.

Preparation of this report as well as conduct of some of the researchreported in it were supported by National Science Foundation GrantsDBC-9205890 and DBC-9120987 and by National Institute of MentalHealth Grant MH-41328. We thank Icek Ajzen, John Bargh, R.Bhaskar, Irene Blair, Robert Bernstein, Marilynn Brewer, RobertCrowder, Leonard Doob, Russell Fazio, Klaus Fiedler, Deborrah Fra-ble, Daniel Gilbert, Jack Glaser, Richard Hackman, Curtis Hardin,Roger Hughes, John Jost, Larry Jacoby, John Kihlstrom, Mark KJinger,David Myers, Delroy Paulhus, Richard Petty, Alex Rothman, Peter Sa-lovey, Eric Schuh, Norbert Schwarz, Constantine Sedikides, JerzyTrzebinski, James Uleman, Wendi Walsh, Timothy Wilson, JoanneWood, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on a draft of thisarticle, and we thank Mitzi Johnson both for comments and for permis-sion to use the data presented in Figure 1.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Tom Ostrom, a dear col-league who continues to have a profound influence on both of theauthors.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to An-thony G. Greenwald, Department of Psychology, NI-25, University ofWashington, Seattle, Washington 98195. Electronic mail may be sent [email protected].

Implicit Social Cognition: Introduction and Overview

Implicit social cognition is offered as a broad theoretical cat-egory that integrates and reinterprets established research find-ings, guides searches for new empirical phenomena, promptsattention to presently underdeveloped research methods, andsuggests applications in various practical settings. This sectionsummarizes the goals of the review, starting from a definition ofimplicit social cognition.

Definition

The signature of implicit cognition is that traces of past ex-perience affect some performance, even though the influential

' The terms implicit-explicit capture a set of overlapping distinctionsthat are sometimes labeled as unaware-aware, unconscious-conscious,intuitive-analytic, direct-indirect, procedural-declarative, and auto-matic-controlled. These dichotomies vary in the amount and nature ofimplied theoretical interpretation. This article uses the implicit-explicitpair because of that dichotomy's prominence in recent memory re-search, coupled with the present intention to connect research on atti-tudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes to memory research.

IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION

earlier experience is not remembered in the usual sense—thatis, it is unavailable to self-report or introspection (cf. Graf &Schacter, 1985; Greenwald, 1990; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Ja-coby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982;Kihlstrom, 1990; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989; Schacter,1987). As an illustration of implicit cognition, consider a resultthat is readily obtained with the task of generating completewords in response to incomplete letter strings (word stems orword fragments). The completion responses are more likely tobe words from a list to which subjects were casually exposedearlier in the experiment than to be equally likely words thatwere not presented. This effect of prior exposure occurs despitesubjects' poor ability to recall or recognize words from the ear-lier list. The word-completion task provides an indirect measureof the effect of the prior experience. That is, even though thesubject is not instructed to retrieve the earlier presented mate-rial and is presumably not trying to do so (and may well beincapable of such retrieval), the subject's responses indicate aresidual effect. (For further reviews of indirect measurement inmemory research, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988;Roediger, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Tulving& Schacter,1990. For further discussion of direct and indirect measures inother contexts that involve unconscious cognition, see Jacoby,Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Reingold & Merikle, 1988.)

A template for definitions of specific categories of implicitcognition is: An implicit C is the introspectively unidentified (orinaccurately identified) trace of past experience that mediatesR. In this template, C is the label for a construct (such as atti-tude), and R names the category of responses (such as object-evaluative judgments) assumed to be influenced by thatconstruct.

To the extent that implicit cognition differs from self-repor-table (conscious or explicit) cognition, direct measures—that is,measures that presume accurate introspection—are necessarilyinadequate for its study. Rather, investigations of implicit cog-nition require indirect measures, which neither inform the sub-ject of what is being assessed nor request self-report concerningit. The usual justification for indirect measures in social psy-chological research is the empirical one of minimizing reactiv-ity of research situations to avoid demand characteristics (Orne,1962) and sources of self-presentational artifacts such as evalu-ation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969). When used in this wayto minimize reactivity, indirect measures are empirically desir-able but not theoretically essential. By contrast, in studying im-plicit cognition, indirect measures are theoretically essential.

Theory: Relation to Other Treatments of UnconsciousAspects of Social Cognition

Much of the present review concerns unconscious cognitiveinvolvement in (and especially interference with) deliberatejudgments. This focus is still infrequent in social cognition lit-erature, perhaps because the range of deliberate judgments thatare affected by unconscious cognition has only recently becomeapparent, as a consequence of the explosion of interest in im-plicit memory. The existing work to which the present treat-ment is closest is that of Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby &Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; Jacoby &Witherspoon, 1982). Jacoby's group has pioneered theory and

methods to identify implicit memory influences and haseffectively established an important role of unconscious cogni-tion in deliberate judgments. The phenomena investigated byJacoby have often been ones in which the research subject mis-takenly attributes ease of perception on reexposure to a stimu-lus (perceptual fluency) to some characteristic of the stimulusother than an unremembered recent encounter. The presentanalysis of implicit social cognition uses the same basic misat-tribution principle, while focusing on the social domain to lo-cate influential prior experiences and affected target judgments.

The following paragraphs review the various ways in whichunconscious cognition has already been integrated into socialpsychological theory. After considering the three categories thatare focal to this review—attitudes, self-esteem, and stereo-types—the focus shifts to some related topics.

Attitudes. Recent work has established that attitudes are ac-tivated outside of conscious attention, by showing both that ac-tivation occurs more rapidly than can be mediated by consciousactivity (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, San-bonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) and that activation is initi-ated by (subliminal) stimuli, the presence of which is unrepor-table (Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989). The present analysisof implicit attitudes extends work on automatic activation toexplain how the attitude activated by one object can be (mis)at-tributed to another. An implicit attitude can be thought of as anexisting attitude projected onto a novel object. The interpreta-tion of several important existing findings as implicit attitudeeffects substantially expands the predictive and construct valid-ity of social psychology's attitude construct. It also prompts theempirical search for further members of the potentially largeclass of implicit attitude effects. In the domain of attitudechange, two recent theoretical analyses (Chaiken, 1987; Petty &Cacioppo, 1986) have distinguished relatively thoughtful (cen-tral or systematic) from relatively thoughtless (peripheral orheuristic) roles of cognition in persuasion. The implicit pro-cesses conceived in the present analysis are, in part, subsumedby the notions of peripheral or heuristic processing, but alsoinvolve processes operating even further from the range of con-scious thought than conceived in these analyses.

Self-esteem. The broad importance of self-esteem has beenrecognized in many works over the past century (e.g., Allport,1937;Cooley, 1902/1964; Epstein, 1973; James, 1890; Rogers,1951; Rosenberg, 1979;Sherif&Cantril, 1947). Recent reviewshave further expanded the case for importance of the self-atti-tude (e.g., Beck, 1979; Greenwald &Pratkanis, 1984;Seligman,1991; Steele, 1988; S. E. Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988).In the course of examining available evidence for the implicitoperation of attitudes, evidence for implicit operation specifi-cally of the attitude toward self was so prominent as to prompttreatment of implicit self-esteem as a distinct topic. The presentreview of implicit self-esteem phenomena demonstrates the per-vasiveness of projections of the self attitude onto other objects,while also indicating the need for a class of measures that pres-ently does not exist—measures of individual differences in im-plicit self-esteem.

Stereotypes. Recent reviewers have very effectively docu-mented the unconscious or automatic operation of stereotypes(Banaji & Greenwald, in press; Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989;Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Fiske, 1989; Geis, 1993; Gilbert

ANTHONY G. GREENWALD AND MAHZARIN R. BANAJI

& Hixon, 1991; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Perdue & Gurt-man, 1990). This article's use of the "implicit" label for stereo-types serves primarily to emphasize the connection of the exist-ing body of social cognition research on stereotypes to recentcognitive psychological research on implicit memory (cf. E. R.Smith & Branscombe, 1988). The present treatment of stereo-types also includes new findings that demonstrate this connec-tion, using the methods of implicit memory research to revealimplicit gender stereotypes.

Effortless or automatic social cognition. Single words havebeen shown to result in effortless activation of attitudes (dis-cussed in the next paragraph), and behavior-describing sen-tences produce spontaneous trait inferences (Uleman, 1987;Winter & Uleman, 1984). These and other effortless activationeffects often contribute importantly to, but are not synonymouswith, implicit social cognition. As will be seen below, an impliciteffect can occur when an actor (a) notices some aspect of anautomatic effect caused by one stimulus and (b) mislabels it ina way that that influences the judgment of either that stimulusor some other stimulus. Discussions of effortless aspects of so-cial cognition can be found in Bargh (1989), Brewer (1988), Ep-stein (1991), Gilbert (1989), and Lewicki (1986).

Priming and context effects. In common with implicit so-cial cognition, priming and context effects involve the effect ofprior events on the response to a current stimulus. However,whereas priming and context function as designations for oper-ationally defined categories of effects, implicit cognition desig-nates a theory-defined category of effects. Some establishedpriming and context effects fall well within the boundaries ofimplicit social cognition. Others should not be grouped withimplicit effects because of the subject's likely awareness of theeffect of prior experience on behavior or judgments. Becausethe existing literatures on priming and context effects are verylarge, analysis to sort implicit effects from other effects withinthose literatures is beyond the scope of this article. Recent the-oretical discussions of priming and context effects can be foundin Higgins (1989), Schwarz (1990), Strack (1992), Martin andTesser (1992), and Petty and Wegener (1993).

Introspective access. Nisbett and Wilson (1977a) arguedpersuasively that psychology's reliance on verbal self-reportmeasures was unwarranted in the face of evidence showing thepoverty of introspective access to the causes of behavior. Wegnerand Vallacher (1977, 1981) also drew attention to influences onsocial behavior that escape introspective notice. They presentedan "implicit psychology," drawing on and extending Bruner andTagiuri's (1954) concept of implicit personality theory. How-ever, because their work preceded the past decade's wave of re-search on implicit memory, Wegner and Vallacher did not sharethe present article's focus on empirical studies that use indirectmeasures. More recently, in several works, E. R. Smith (e.g.,1984, 1990, 1994) has emphasized the importance to socialcognition of nonverbalized procedural knowledge. The presentwork shares Smith's emphasis on examining the introspectivelyinaccessible underpinnings of social cognition. In related work,Smith (see E. R. Smith & Branscombe, 1988) has also noted therelevance of implicit memory to social cognition. The researchreviewed here sheds new light on the nature of causes that arehidden from introspection and provides some methods for ob-serving them. In this respect, research in social cognition now

appears to be taking an important further step along the paththat was laid out by Nisbett and Wilson (1977a).

Empirical Assessment

Falsifiability. Of any newly offered theoretical construct, itshould be asked: How does the new construct differ from exist-ing ones (or is it only a new label for an existing construct)?The preceding paragraphs show that implicit social cognition,although strongly rooted in existing constructs, offers a theoret-ical reorganization of phenomena that have previously been de-scribed in other ways and, in some cases, not previously identi-fied as having an unconscious component. The relations to priortheorization are emphasized in this article by using establishedconstruct terms—attitude and stereotype—as labels for twomajor categories of implicit social cognition.

When a new construct indeed differs from existing ones, thenew construct should provide a basis for either (a) predictingpreviously unobserved empirical phenomena or (b) guiding re-search to show a gain in the efficiency with which existing phe-nomena can be explained. Importantly, the construct should bewell enough linked to research operations that its predictions,especially its predictions that differ from those afforded by ex-isting constructs, can be disconfirmed.

This article's strategy is to identify parallels of method andfindings between the domains of social cognition and implicitmemory. The ease with which such parallels are discovered isthe main evidence for value of the implicit social cognition con-structs. This convergence-seeking strategy provides little oppor-tunity for falsification of the general thesis that social cognitionoperates in implicit fashion. Rather, results that appear not tofit the thesis can be set aside as possibly involving inappropriateoperationalizations. However, as parallels between the two do-mains of phenomena are increasingly established, there shouldbe increased confidence in interpretations of research opera-tions for social cognition constructs, and, consequently, resultsthat fail to fit with theory will increasingly call theory intoquestion.

Challenge to measurement method. The present accountsupposes that individual differences in manifestations of im-plicit cognitive effects should be predicted by individual differ-ences in the strength of theorized representations that underliethose effects. Measurement of those individual differences is be-yond the means of present assessment technology; conse-quently, a large subset of the empirical implications of the pres-ent analysis are currently untestable. The need for new mea-surement methods and these methods' relation to availablemethods are discussed later in this article.

Application potential. The empirical phenomena of im-plicit social cognition involve introspectively inaccessibleeffects of current stimulus or prior experience variations onjudgments and decisions. As will be shown, these effects oftenresult in subjects making judgments that they would regard asnonoptimal if made aware of the source of influence. Further-more, these effects are likely to occur in situations that involveeconomically and socially important decisions, such as hiring,educational admissions, and personnel evaluations. Conse-quently, a strong test of the empirical value of the analysis ofimplicit social cognition will be its ability to generate applica-


tions that can minimize these unwanted intrusions on judg-ment. This important application topic is considered brieflynear the end of this article.

Generalizability. It will be obvious that the great majorityof evidence reviewed in this article comes from experimentalstudies done in late-20th-century North America. As a result,it is very likely that some of the specific properties of implicitattitudes, implicit self-esteem, and implicit stereotypes in-cluded in this review are culture bound and time bound. At thesame time, there is no reason to believe that, as a general classof phenomena, implicit social cognition should be confined tomodern North American culture. Furthermore, although thepresent treatment focuses on just the three categories of implicitattitudes, implicit self-esteem, and implicit stereotypes, implicitcognition is also expected to be involved broadly in other socialphenomena.

The next three sections consider phenomena of implicit so-cial cognition in the categories represented by construct desig-nations of attitude, self-esteem, and stereotype. Following thosecomes a section that considers principles underlying potentialapplications that seek to reduce unintended implicit cognitiveintrusions on judgment. Last, problems associated with mea-surement of implicit social cognition are discussed before gen-eral conclusions are stated.

Implicit Attitudes

Attitudes are favorable or unfavorable dispositions towardsocial objects, such as people, places, and policies. Attempts toestablish the validity of the attitude construct have most oftensought to demonstrate positive correlations between measuredattitudes and the favorable-unfavorable aspect of observed be-havior toward their objects. The frequently weak correlationsobserved in these attempts define the predictive validity prob-lem for attitudes (documented especially by Wicker, 1969; seealso Festinger, 1964, and LaPiere, 1934). A notable accomplish-ment of modern research on attitudes has been the solution ofthis predictive validity problem. That is, conditions underwhich attitudes strongly correlate with behavior have now beenwell identified (especially by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fazio,1986, 1990b; Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974;Zanna & Fazio, 1982). In particular, this research has estab-lished that attitudes have predictive validity in situations inwhich they are strongly activated and/or when the actor clearlyperceives a link between attitude and behavior. Myers (1990)summarized these and related programs of research as showingthat "our attitudes predict our actions. . .if, as we act, we areconscious of our attitudes" (Myers, 1990, p. 40, emphasisadded). Similarly, in the description of attitude-behavior re-lations in their recent treatise on the attitude construct, Eaglyand Chaiken (1993, pp. 208-211) referred to the importance ofattitudes "[coming] to mind" and the "perceived relevance" ofattitude to action.

Although the modern synthesis achieved by the Fishbein-Aj-zen (1974) and Fazio-Zanna (1981) research programs is nowwell established, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the atti-tude construct lost scope in the process. For those who can re-member it, there might be justifiable nostalgia for an era inwhich Allport (1935) was able to proclaim that attitude was so-

cial psychology's "most indispensable concept." In an undis-guised effort to restore this prominence, the present articleseeks to preserve the modern synthesis while asserting that itsopposite is also valid (cf. McGuire's [1973] Koan 7: "The op-posite of a great truth is also true"); that is, attitudes of whichthe actor is not conscious at the moment of action (implicit at-titudes) are also strongly predictive of behavior.

Ignored Consciousness in Conceptual Definitionsof Attitude

The following list gives several definitions that have been in-fluential in guiding scholarly and empirical treatments of atti-tudes, as indicated by their frequent citation in other works. Al-though the list may appear dated (the most recent entry is from1962), it nevertheless remains current. Recent works (e.g.,Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 1986; McGuire, 1985; Petty &Cacioppo, 1981; Zanna & Rempel, 1988) continue to draw onthem and remain within their boundaries.

Attitude is the affect for or against a psychological object. (Thur-stone, 1931, p. 261)

An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organizedthrough experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influenceupon the individual's response to all objects and situations withwhich it is related. (Allport, 1935, p. 810)

Attitude is . . .an implicit, drive-producing response consideredsocially significant in the individual's society. (Doob, 1947, p. 136)

An attitude is a predisposition to experience, to be motivated by,and to act toward, a class of objects in a predictable manner. (M. B.Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956, p. 33)

[Attitudes] are predispositions to respond, but are distinguishedfrom other such states of readiness in that they predispose towardan evaluative response. (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957, p.189)

[An attitude is] a disposition to react favorably or unfavorably to aclass of objects (Sarnoff, 1960, p. 261).

Attitudes [are] enduring systems of positive or negative evalua-tions, emotional feelings, and pro or con action tendencies withrespect to social objects. (Krech, Crutchfield, & Ballachey, 1962,p. 139)

The lack of mention of consciousness in this collection of at-titude definitions accurately reflects a long scholarly tradition ofnonconcern with the distinction between conscious and uncon-scious operation of attitudes. At the same time, nothing in thisscholarly tradition actively opposes either the possibility or theimportance of unconscious operation of attitudes.

Standing starkly in the above list as suggesting unconsciousoperation is Doob's (1947) definition, which labels attitude asan "implicit, drive-producing response." In spite of Doob's as-sociation with a behaviorist theory (Hull, 1943) that had no usefor conceptions of either conscious or unconscious cognition, itis clear that Doob did conceive attitude as operating uncon-sciously (May & Doob, 1937, p. 13). In a recent communicationto the present authors (October 27, 1992), Doob commented,"before World War II we all were impressed by psychoanalysisin addition to behaviorism," suggesting that, even though it mayhave gone unmentioned in many published treatments, the idea

ANTHONY G. GREENWALD AND MAHZARIN R. BANAJI

that attitudes operated unconsciously was quite acceptable inthe 1940s and earlier. That conclusion is supported also by sev-eral passing references to the possibly unconscious nature ofattitudes in Allport's (1935) review chapter.

Implied Consciousness in Operational Definitions ofAttitude

The present authors conducted a census of studies publishedin all issues of European Journal of Social Psychology, Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology, and Personality and Social Psychology Bul-letin for a single year (1989). The aim of this census was to com-pare the levels of use of direct and indirect measures of attitudesin published research literature. Studies that included attitudemeasures were categorized in terms of whether they measuredattitude directly or indirectly. Direct measures included self-re-port procedures such as multi-item Thurstone, Likert, or se-mantic differential scales of the sort that are described in textson attitude measurement (e.g., A. L. Edwards, 1957; Fishbein,1967), as well as more informal single-item and multi-item self-report procedures. Indirect measures are identifiable chiefly bytheir lack of the defining feature of direct measures, that is, bytheir not alerting the subject to the identity of the object of theattitude being measured. Discussions and illustrations of indi-rect measures can be found in Hammond (1948), Campbell(1950), Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook (1951), Sherif and Hovland(1961, p. 93ff.), Dawes and Smith (1985), Pratkanis(1988), andDovidio and Fazio (1992).

The authors' 1989 census included not only studies that ob-viously dealt with attitudes (as indicated by title or abstract),but also ones that more incidentally included measures of eval-uation toward the self, others, or social objects, for example instudies of person perception and in-group bias. Each of the 47studies found to include an attitude measure was judged forpresence of both direct and indirect attitude measures. All 47(100%) used at least one direct measure of attitude, and only 6(13%) used some form of indirect measure. An important classof attitudes discussed in this article is self-esteem. It is not nec-essary to conduct a census of publications to assert with confi-dence that self-esteem is generally assessed with direct measures(see Wylie, 1974, 1979). In summary, the observed high level ofreliance on direct measures of attitudes indicates a widespread(even if not widely stated) assumption that attitudes operate pri-marily in a conscious mode.

Definition of Implicit Attitude

Evidence concerning the strength of attitude-behavior re-lations has generally been regarded as the primary evidencebearing on predictive validity of the attitude construct. How-ever, there are other categories of studies in which strong pre-dictive effects that involve attitudes are routinely obtained. Ex-amination of these now will indicate that some strong effects ofattitude can and do occur when the actor is not attentionallyfocused on the attitude. These findings play a central role injustifying the concept of implicit attitude.

Implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified (or inaccuratelyidentified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or un-favorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects.2

Relation to stimulus-response theory. To those familiarwith behavior theory of 30-50 years ago, the debt of this defi-nition both to Doob's (1947) analysis of attitude as an implicitresponse and to subsequent mediationist stimulus-responsetheories will be obvious. The earliest mediationist stimulus-re-sponse formulations (mature statements of which appear inHull, 1952;Spence, 1956) had proposed the existence of covertstimulus-producing responses (called "fractional anticipatorygoal responses") as a means of explaining findings achievedwithin Tolman's (e.g., 1959) cognitive approach to learning the-ory. Dollard and Miller (1950), Osgood (e.g., 1957), and Mo-wrer (1960) most fully adapted these mediationist principles tothe analysis of human social behavior. Campbell's (1963) trea-tise on the attitude construct preserved some of the implicit,mediationist character of the later behaviorist treatments, de-claring that acquired dispositions such as attitudes "[retain] res-idues of experience of such a nature as to guide, bias, or other-wise influence later behavior" (p. 97). In retrospect, it is appar-ent that the conception of covert, stimulus-producing,mediating events did not take hold in social psychology whenmediationist theory was dominant in learning-behavior theory.Nevertheless, that conception is a virtual equivalent of the viewthat reappears in the present definition of implicit attitude.

Direct versus indirect measures. Experiments that demon-strate implicit attitudes rely on indirect measures to detect theiroperation. The distinction between direct and indirect mea-sures depends only on the relation between what the subject isinformed about the purpose of a measure and what the re-searcher chooses to infer from the subject's response. If the sub-ject is advised that A is being measured, but the researcher usesthe response to infer something about B, the direct measure ofA is an indirect measure of B. In the case of nonreactive indirectmeasures, the subject is unaware that anything is being mea-sured and, accordingly, there is no direct-measure interpreta-tion of the subject's response. Only a small portion of the re-search considered in this article involves the use of nonreactiveindirect measures.

An implicit attitude toward B may be indirectly indicated bya (direct) measure of evaluation of A, when A and B have somerelation that predisposes the implicit influence. Possibly, theevaluative content of this implicit attitude may disagree withresults from a direct measure of attitude toward B; such dis-agreement, referred to as a dissociation of implicit and explicitattitudes, is especially interesting and perhaps most dramati-cally indicates the value of the implicit attitude construct. Nev-

2 Some notes on this definition: First, it was generated from the earlierstated template for definitions of implicit cognition. Second, alternatedefinitions of the attitude response class might be substituted for thestated one ("favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action towardsocial objects"). Third, the qualification "[introspectively] inaccuratelyidentified" includes an important class of cases in which a prior experi-ence is identifiable, but its influence on an evaluative response is not.For example, a student may be aware of having been graded highly in acourse, but not suspect that this experience influences responses to thecourse's end-of-term course evaluation survey.


ertheless, the occurrence of dissociation is not a necessary con-dition for identifying an attitude as implicit. More critical is thatthe effect of an attitudinal manipulation on an indirect measuremay be reduced, eliminated, or reversed when subjects aremade aware of the nature of the manipulation. Further treat-ment of this point appears below, in considering effects of atten-tional manipulations on expressions of implicit social cognition(i.e., on indirect measures).

Implicit Attitudes: Empirical Findings

Halo Effects

Thorndike (1920) named the halo effect, after noticing thatpersonality ratings showed a tendency for positive characteris-tics to be associated with other positive characteristics morethan they should be if experience is the only guide. Subse-quently, the halo effect came to be regarded as the tendency forjudgment of a novel attribute (A) of a person to be influencedby the value of an already known, but objectively irrelevant,attribute (B). In this case, the direct measure of evaluation of Aimplicitly expresses the attitude toward B. The attitude towardB is implicit, in present terms, when the subject does not iden-tify the attitude toward B as the source of the evaluation of A.

In much halo effect research, physical attractiveness plays therole of the objectively irrelevant attribute that influences evalu-ative judgment on various other dimensions. For example,Dion, Berscheid, and Walster (1972) reported that attractivemales and females are judged to be kinder, more interesting,more sociable, happier, stronger, of better character, and morelikely to hold prestigious jobs. Similarly, Landy and Sigall(1974) found that essays attributed to a female student werejudged by male students to be of higher quality when the stimu-lus materials included a photo that showed the author to bephysically attractive, rather than unattractive. Downs and Ly-ons (1991) reported that defendant attractiveness was associ-ated with judges levying smaller fines and lower bail levels inactual misdemeanor cases (although this relationship wasweaker or absent in felony cases).

Physical attractiveness-based halo effects have been found tobe greater for female than male targets (Bar-Tal & Saxe, 1976;Wallston & O'Leary, 1981). As Berscheid (1985) has pointedout, however, halo effect research is grossly imbalanced in itspredominant use of male subjects and female targets—a strat-egy that may reflect both popular belief and evidence showingthat physical attractiveness of an opposite-sex partner is moreimportant for men than for women (Feingold, 1990). Al-ternately, the imbalance may indicate that attractiveness is amore potent implicit attitudinal cue component of females thanmales. The physical attractiveness-based halo effect has beenreplicated in subject populations of Black Americans (Cash &Duncan, 1984) and Japanese (Onodera & Miura, 1990), as wellas across the life span (Adams & Crane, 1980). Eagly, Ashmore,Makhijani, and Longo (1991) concluded from their meta-ana-lytic review that a component of the physical attractiveness haloeffect can be explained by assuming that perceivers (con-sciously) expect physically attractive people to be socially adept;however, Eagly et al. also reported a sizeable halo effect for judg-ments on intellectual competence dimensions (mean effect size

d = .46), for which there is no known basis in beliefs aboutabilities associated with physical attractiveness.

Nisbett and Wilson (1977b) demonstrated a reversal of thedirection of the usual halo effect by presenting to subjects amale teacher who was coached to act in either an interpersonallywarm or an interpersonally cold fashion. Subjects in the warmcondition later judged the teacher to be more attractive in ap-pearance, accent, and mannerisms than did subjects in the coldcondition. Subjects denied that the teacher's likeableness influ-enced the other judgments. Quite the opposite, subjects in thecold condition incorrectly believed that the (unvaried) accent,mannerisms, and physical unattractiveness of the teacher hadreduced the teacher's likeableness. The importance of this find-ing derives from the subject's inaccurate identification of theeffect of one attribute on judgment of another, despite these be-ing "attributes for which we generally assume we are capable ofrendering independent assessments" (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977b,p. 250).

Despite the focus of much halo effect research on physicalattractiveness as the cue, the range of potential halo effect cuesis quite broad. For example, P. R. Wilson (1968) manipulatedacademic status by introducing a male stimulus person as a stu-dent, demonstrator, lecturer, senior lecturer, or professor, todifferent groups of observers at Cambridge University. The ob-servers' subsequent memory estimates of the person's heightwere an increasing function of the status variable, with the stu-dent recalled to be shortest and the professor tallest. Anothervariant of the halo effect was demonstrated by Howard (1992),who showed that evaluation of a product was positively influ-enced by first encountering it in an attractively gift-wrappedpackage rather than in a plain package. Still a different haloeffect was reported by Frank and Gilovich (1988), in showingthat black color of sports uniforms is associated with both self-perceptions and observers' perceptions of aggressiveness. An-other variant appeared in a controversial study by Peters andCeci (1982), who submitted manuscripts to journals that hadpreviously published them, using fictitious authors' names anddeliberately unimpressive (fictitious) institutional affiliations.The subsequent rejection of most of these manuscripts has sev-eral possible explanations, but the majority of the publishedcommentary that accompanied the Peters and Ceci article con-cluded that the institutional cue was a likely cause of negativeevaluations.

As a general interpretation of halo effects, the present analysissupposes that the subject's learning that an unfamiliar targetperson possesses Attribute B tends to produce a diffuse positiveor negative attitude (depending on the affective value of B) to-ward the target person; that attitude is then likely to generalizeto any specific attribute (A) that the subject is asked to judge.The attitude toward B is said to operate implicitly when the sub-ject does not notice that B is influencing the judgment of A.The halo effect is of great practical significance, being appliedthousands of times a day just in the world of advertising. Adver-tisements typically set their products in contexts that containattractive other objects, especially famous entertainers andphysically attractive models. Because advertising audiences areaware that the advertiser is trying to influence attitude, theremay be little likelihood of the audience misidentifying thesource of positive reactions to the advertising message. But, as a

10 ANTHONY G. GREENWALD AND MAHZARIN R. BANAJI

reader of an earlier draft of this article reminded the authors,advertising audiences are frequently inattentive and, in that cir-cumstance, may be susceptible to implicit effects of an extrane-ous attractiveness cue. A common situation in which haloeffects are likely to be more generally potent is in managers'evaluations of workers; job-unrelated attractiveness may rou-tinely affect such performance evaluations (e.g., Balzer & Sul-sky, 1992; Cooper, 1981; Tsui & Barry, 1986).

Other Implicit Attitude Effects

Mere exposure. In a review that established the relationshipbetween frequency of encounter and liking for a wide variety ofstimuli in a wide variety of contexts, Zajonc (1968) named andestablished the mere exposure effect. For most of the time since,the mere exposure effect has been an enigma, a robust effectwithout a generally accepted explanation. However, several re-cent findings now indicate that the mere exposure effect is animplicit attitude effect. Bornstein and D'Agostino (1992), pur-suing a lead that came from Bernstein's (1989) meta-analyticreview, established that mere exposure effects are strongestwhen conditions reduce subjects' memory for the effect-produc-ing exposures. Under these circumstances, it appears that in-creased perceptual fluency of a repeatedly presented stimulus(that is, increased ease of its identification on re-exposure) ismisattributed to liking, yielding a positive evaluation of thestimulus.3 Some other results that indicate the same type of im-plicit effect are the effect of ease of comprehension on judg-ments of a statement's validity (Gilbert, 19914; Sherman,Mackie, & Driscoll, 1990) and the effect of repeated encounterswith a statement on its judged truth (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu,1991; Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985; Hasher, Goldstein, & Top-pino, 1977; Hawkins & Hoch, 1992).

Subliminal attitude conditioning. Several researchers havesought to induce positive or negative attitudes to neutral stimuliby presenting a very briefly flashed pleasant or unpleasant stim-ulus just before presenting each clearly visible neutral stimulus.Subsequent affective judgments of the initially neutral stimuliprovide a test of whether the affective value of the flashed stim-ulus transfers to the neutral stimulus. Although reliable proce-dures for obtaining this result are not yet well described, a fewresearchers have reported successful efforts (K. Edwards, 1990;Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, & Lynn, 1992; Niedenthal, 1990; Mur-phy & Zajonc, 1993). This procedure has occasionally been de-scribed as attitude conditioning; however, the "conditioning" la-bel may be unwarranted because of both the small number oftrials used and the reversal of the usual neutral-stimulus-firstordering of conditioning procedures. The result may better beunderstood as an implicit attitude effect, in which an attitudeevoked by the first (briefly flashed) stimulus is mistakenly at-tributed to the second stimulus.

Instant attitudes? An "instant attitude" can be defined as anear-immediate liking or dislike for a novel object on first en-counter with it (see Fiske, 1982, for a similar idea captured bythe term schema-triggered affect). Although little studied in re-search, instant attitudes may be very common. For example, itis common—at least for the present authors—to experience asense of almost immediate sympathy or antipathy for charac-ters in drama, fiction, or news reports, and also with individual

performers or teams in athletic competitions. In some cases, anexplicit basis for the instant attitude may seem obvious to itspossessor: there is apparent self-other similarity, or an athleticteam is from one's home town or university, or a fictional char-acter is depicted in blatantly admirable or despicable terms. Inother cases, the instant attitude may have no introspectively ac-cessible basis and, therefore, likely merits identification as animplicit attitude.

Context effects in survey research. Schwarz and Clore(1983) reported that quality-of-life judgments by telephone-in-terviewed subjects were greater for persons called on sunny daysthan for those who were called on rainy days. In a related study,Schwarz, Strack, and Mai (1991) asked groups of survey re-spondents about both their happiness with marriage and theirhappiness with life as a whole. When the marital question pre-ceded the quality of life question, expressed life satisfaction in-creased for respondents who reported happy marriages, but de-creased for those who reported unhappy marriages, as com-pared with the respondents who answered the life-as-a-wholequestion first. These effects may represent implicit influences ofperipheral information on evaluative judgments, but may alsobe explainable as consequences of introspectively availableknowledge. One means of supporting the interpretation of im-plicit influence is to show that drawing attention to the influ-ential cue reduces the effect, which is precisely what was shownby Schwarz and Clore (1983); when subjects were asked to de-scribe the weather early in the interview, the effect of weather onthe later quality-of-life question was eliminated.

As just illustrated, a means of pressing the argument that theeffects described in this section merit an "implicit" designationis to show that they weaken or disappear when subjects aremade aware of the implicit attitudinal stimulus. The case forthat conclusion is developed further in the section below, Atten-tion as a Moderator of Implicit Cognition.

Implicit Self-Esteem

Studies done in the last few decades have established that amajority of almost any group of research subjects reports favor-able judgments when asked to provide self-evaluations, includ-ing the self-evaluative responses to items on inventory measuresof self-esteem. This very reliable result provides the basis forconcluding that most people have a positive attitude toward self(Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Baumeister, 1982; Greenwald, 1980;Myers & Ridl, 1979; S. E. Taylor & Brown, 1988). Consequently,an expectable form of implicit attitude effect is that novel ob-jects that are invested with an association to self should be pos-itively evaluated. As in the case of the halo effect, it is assumed

3 The mere exposure effect does not share a major feature of the otherimplicit attitude effects reviewed here, namely, evaluation of one objectdisplaced onto another. Even though recent research has greatly ad-vanced understanding of the mere exposure effect, the basis for its eval-uative character remains obscure.

4 Gilbert (1991) does not interpret the effect of comprehension onjudged validity to be due to a misattribution of familiarity to validitybut, rather, to a direct effect of comprehension. Establishment of anempirical test that can distinguish between these interpretations may bedifficult.

IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION 11

that the judgment of any previously unevaluated attribute (A)of the object is influenced by the (usually positive) attitude as-sociated with self (Attribute B). The resulting positive evalua-tion of Attribute A is an implicit effect in the same sense thatthe halo effect is—it is assumed to occur without the subject'sawareness of the influence and despite the objective irrelevanceof the self-association to the subject's judgment task.

Implicit self-esteem is the introspectively unidentified (or inaccu-rately identified) effect of the self-attitude on evaluation of self-as-sociated and self-dissociated objects.

Three categories of effects lend themselves to interpretationin terms of implicit self-esteem. Experimental implicit self-es-teem effects compare evaluations of novel stimuli that are arbi-trarily associated with self or not; greater liking for self-associ-ated objects is interpretable as an implicit self-esteem effect.Naturally mediated implicit self-esteem effects are similar, ex-cept that the association with self is made by means of objectattributes that have a preexisting association to self. In a cate-gory that can be labeled second-order implicit self-esteemeffects, the subject arrives at a judgment that has an inferentiallink to self-esteem; the self-esteem-consistent nature of thisjudgment can be regarded as an implicit manifestation of self-esteem.

Experimental Implicit Self-Esteem Effects

Role playing in persuasion. In experimental demonstra-tions of role-playing effects in persuasion, subjects are inducedto present arguments supporting an arbitrarily assigned contro-versial position. Compared with control subjects who are ex-posed to similar arguments from an external source, role-play-ing subjects tend to credit greater validity to the novel argu-ments or to the position that those arguments support (e.g.,Janis & King, 1954). This effect occurs both when subjects areinduced to play a creative role in producing the arguments (e.g.,Greenwald & Albert, 1968; King & Janis, 1956) and when sub-jects merely judge the validity of novel issue-relevant argumentsafter accepting the role assignment (Greenwald, 1969). The in-terpretation of this result as an implicit self-esteem effect isbased on assuming, first, that the subject's acceptance of therole-playing assignment creates a link of the assigned positionto self (this is a psychological unit formation, in the sense ofHeider, 1944) and, second, that positivity toward self generalizesto a positive evaluation of the assigned position.

Mere ownership. In a procedure introduced by Feys (1991;see also Beggan, 1992), subjects first learn to discriminate fourcomputer-displayed graphic icons (which represent the subjectin a computerized game) from four others that represent thesubject's opponent (the computer). When subjects subsequentlyjudge all eight patterns for aesthetic attractiveness, the self-asso-ciated patterns receive higher ratings. The mere ownership labelfor this effect comes from an explanation suggested by Nuttin(1985, 1987) for the name letter effect (discussed later in thissection). A similar result that likely also merits an implicit self-esteem interpretation is the "instant endowment" effect de-scribed in several experiments by Kahneman, Knetsch, andThaler (1990). Those experiments established that the value at-

tached to such objects as mugs, pens, and chocolate bars in-creased sharply as soon as the subject was given the object.

Minimal group effect. In-group bias is the tendency to judgemembers of one's own group (in-group) more favorably thancomparable persons who are members of another group (out-group). (This itself is a finding that could be included in thelist, below, of naturally mediated implicit self-esteem effects.)Compelling demonstrations of a type first produced by Tajfel(1970) establish that in-group bias occurs even when care istaken to assure that in-group and out-group members are ob-jectively similar in every respect other than group member-ship—for example, by allowing subjects to observe the randomassignment of persons, themselves included, to groups withinthe experimental situation. In this form, in-group bias is identi-fied as the minimal group effect. Recent discussions of in-groupbias and minimal group effects can be found in Brewer (1979),Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, and Pomare (1990), Mes-sick and Mackie (1989), Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992), Os-trom and Sedikides (1992), Tajfel and Turner (1986), andWilder and Shapiro (1984). The minimal group effect indicatesthat shared group membership provides a sufficient link to selfto permit implicit operation of self-esteem. Further evidencethat minimal in-group cues may suffice as a basis for transfer ofpositive affect comes from a study by Perdue, Dovidio, Gurt-man, and Tyler (1990), who reported that in-group pronouns(us and we) served as affectively positive primes in a subliminalactivation procedure.

Naturally Mediated Implicit Self-Esteem Effects

Similarity-attraction. Perceived similarity of opinions withanother person has been demonstrated to be a powerful deter-minant of attraction (see Byrne, 1969, for an overview of theseries of studies that initially demonstrated this phenomenon).In typical similarity-attraction experiments, the subject makesjudgments about a stranger (stimulus person) after having seena sample of the stranger's responses to a series of opinion ques-tions. Surreptitiously, the stranger's opinion responses havebeen constructed so as to define varying levels of similarity tothe subject's own previously recorded opinion responses. Themeasure of attraction consists of summed responses to twojudgment items, one indicating liking and the other a judgmentof how enjoyable it would be to work together with the stranger.In a representative experiment by Byrne (1962), 0-7 opinionresponses by the stimulus person were manipulated to agreewith those of the subject. Attraction was directly and stronglyinfluenced by the number of these agreements. The interpreta-tion of similarity-attraction findings as implicit self-esteemeffects depends on the assumption that increasing numbers ofopinions shared with the stranger constitute increasing strengthof the link of the stranger to self.5

5 There has recently been some debate over the relative contributionof similarity versus dissimilarity cues to similarity-attraction findings(Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1986). The opposingviews in this debate fit equally with an interpretation in terms of implicitself-esteem, but differ in their assumptions about the relative impor-tance of dissimilarity-induced negative attitudes and similarity-inducedpositive attitudes.


Unlike "experimental" implicit self-esteem effects, for thesimilarity-attraction effect, the link of the novel stimulus object(stranger) to self is mediated by attributes of this object thathave a preexisting association to self. An interesting variant ofthe similarity-attraction effect was created by Finch and Cial-dini (1989), who led subjects to believe that they either shared ordid not share a birthday (same day and month) with a notorioushistorical character, Rasputin. Subjects were more lenient injudging the deeds of Rasputin when the shared birthdate cre-ated a link to self. Subsequently, Prentice and Miller (1992) usedFinch and Cialdini's shared birthday technique to increasebonds between the subject and another participant in a prison-er's dilemma negotiating situation. Subjects who believed thatthey shared a birthdate with the other player cooperated sig-nificantly more than did subjects who were not provided this(false) information.

Cognitive responses to persuasion. Novel persuasive argu-ments tend to be accepted as valid to the extent that their con-clusions agree with one's existing opinions. This effect was es-tablished in the late 1960s (e.g., Cullen, 1968; Greenwald,1968). A strong demonstration of the effect appeared in a studyby Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), in which students in favor ofor opposed to capital punishment examined two sets of evi-dence, one set supporting capital punishment and one oppos-ing. Students' judgments of the relative convincingness of thetwo sets of evidence were strongly shaped by their preexistingopinions. Each opinion group found that the evidence, on bal-ance, favored their own position. This is due to the combina-tions of tendencies to be attracted to the arguments supportingone's own position and to be repelled by those supporting theopposing position. It is therefore apparent that the cognitive re-sponse effect is a close relative of the similarity-attraction effect.Instead of opinions being credited to a hypothetical stranger(the similarity-attraction effect), they are included in a persua-sive communication. Instead of the effect being greater liking ordisliking for the stranger with agreeable or disagreeable opin-ions, it is greater liking for the communication. The tendency toreject a communication that does not support one's own viewsis shown especially strongly in the form of the hostile mediaphenomenon (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985), in which each oftwo politically opposed groups interpreted the same (presum-ably unbiased) news media report of a terrorist attack as objec-tionable because of its lack of support for their own position.

Postdecisional spreading of choice alternatives. In this pro-cedure, subjects are asked to rate several members of a productcategory (such as music recordings), then to choose to receiveone of two that were initially rated close to one another, andfinally to rate all of the alternatives again. In comparison withcontrol subjects who make no choice, choice subjects show anincrease in rated attractiveness of the chosen alternative relativeto the nonchosen one (Festinger & Walster, 1964; Steele, Spen-cer, & Lynch, 1992). This, again, is a pattern of increased posi-tivity toward a stimulus that has a link with self. In this case thelink to self is established by the subject's choosing to receive theobject.6 A powerful variant of this effect was demonstrated byLanger (1975), who sold lottery tickets to office workers for $ 1and later approached them to sell the ticket to another buyer.Langer varied whether, on the initial purchase, subjects hadbeen allowed to choose their own ticket or were merely handed

ATTRACTIVENESS RATING (9-polnt scale)

TYPE OF LETTER• Initial •Non-Initial DNon-name letter

A B C D E F G H K L M N P R S T V W MEAN

Figure 1. An implicit self-esteem effect (the initial letter effect). Sub-jects judged letters in their names to be more attractive than those notin their names, with most of this effect being explained by liking for firstand last initial letters. (Data provided by 597 subjects, with means basedon a minimum of 13 observations; from M. M. S. Johnson, 1986.)

one. The dependent variable was the price the subject was will-ing to accept to sell the ticket. In the "choice" condition, theaverage price asked for the ticket was $8.67, compared with$1.96 in the "no-choice" condition. Here, a link of the item toself, however created, increased monetary value above the $ 1purchase price (cf. the mere ownership effect, above), but theincrease was much greater with the stronger link produced byactive choice.

Liking for name letters. When subjects are asked to choosea preferred letter from each of several pairs consisting of oneletter from their name and one not (with subjects not beingalerted to this aspect of the pairs' composition), they tend reli-ably to prefer letters from their name (Nuttin, 1985). Of severalpossible explanations for the effect, the most successful has beenone based on ego attachment; that is, the preference for lettersin one's name reflects a positive attitude to self (Hoorens, 1990;M. M. S. Johnson, 1986; Nuttin, 1985). Using a letter-attrac-tiveness rating task to test this name letter effect, M. M. S. John-son (1986) obtained the previously unpublished data shown inFigure 1. These results reveal a statistically significant (butweak) name letter effect and a considerably stronger initial lettereffect, that is, enhanced liking for letters that constitute the ini-tials of one's name. Because initial letters are linked morestrongly to self than are other name letters, M. M. S. Johnson'sfinding strengthens the interpretation of the name letter effectas a manifestation of implicit self-esteem.7

6 Postdecisional spreading of choice alternatives is well known as aprediction of cognitive dissonance theory. Interpretations of cognitivedissonance reduction as often occurring in the service of maintaining apositive self-image (e.g., Aronson, 1968, 1992), or in the service of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988), or in the service of maintaining self-esteem(Deutsch, Krauss, & Rosenau, 1962; Greenwald & Ronis, 1978) poten-tially place the entire class of dissonance-reducing cognitive changesinto the category of implicit self-esteem effects.

7 It might be supposed that greater frequency of exposure to initialletters than other name letters can explain why the name letter effect isstrongest for initials. However, this interpretation is implausible bothbecause empirical exposure frequency effects asymptote at much lowerfrequencies than the huge frequencies characteristic of letters of the al-phabet, and any frequency advantage for initials over other name lettersmust be quite small when computed as a percentage difference in totalexposures to the letters.


Second-Order Implicit Self-Esteem Effects

Self-positivity in judgment. There have been many researchdemonstrations of judgment biases that work to cast a positivelight on the self. These findings of self-positivity biases are notreviewed here because earlier works (cited in the next para-graph) have documented several of them thoroughly. Self-posi-tivity biases have special significance for the present analysis be-cause they do more than express self-esteem implicitly; theyalso provide support for self-esteem and are, therefore, second-order implicit self-esteem effects.8

The tendencies to accept responsibility for desired outcomeswhile finding external causes for undesired outcomes and, moregenerally, to construct judgments and revise memory in a fash-ion consistent with a positive self-image were identified byGreenwald (1980) as symptoms of one of a trio of cognitivebiases (egocentricity, beneffectance, and cognitive conserva-tism) of the self. These biases, which share characteristics withthe operation of a totalitarian society's propaganda apparatus,were described as adaptive, functioning to preserve the integrityof the self as a knowledge organization. S. E. Taylor and Brown(1988) more recently reviewed evidence for self-positive illu-sions, strongly documenting the case for the adaptive functionsof these biases. And, on the basis of their analyses of cognitiveprocesses of depressive patients, Beck (1979), Scheier andCarver (1992), and Seligman (1991) have indicated both theprominence and the adaptiveness of self-positivity in normal(nondepressive) cognitive functioning.

One example of self-positivity in judgments warrants men-tion here because of its special relevance to this article's focus(in a section to follow) on stereotypes and prejudices. This isCrosby's (1984) finding that members of disadvantaged groups,even though viewing other members of their own group astargets of discrimination, tend not to see themselves as havingbeen so victimized. This phenomenon, which can be linked tojust-world illusions (Lerner, 1980), has been confirmed in vari-ous samples in the United States (Crosby, Pufall, Snyder,O'Connell, & Whalen, 1989), Francophones in Quebec (Gui-mond & Dube-Simard, 1983), and Haitian and Indian immi-grants in Canada (D. M. Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & La-londe, 1990).

Implicit affiliation and rejection. Festinger's (1954) theoryof social comparison was based on a supposition that peoplecompare themselves with others in order to gain an accurateassessment of their opinions and abilities (see also Suls & Wills,1991). In more recent variations of the theory, especially Tes-ser's self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988; Tesser &Campbell, 1983) and Wills's (1981) analysis of downward com-parison, the potential for social comparisons to occur in theservice of self-enhancement has been emphasized. This modernview of social comparison describes self-esteem as influencedby the interrelationship of perceived relation of self to other(person or group) and evaluation of other. High self-esteem ac-companies either association to positively valued others or dis-sociation from negatively valued others.

This general principle that affiliations and rejections are inthe service of self-esteem is supported by the previously de-scribed (naturally mediated) implicit self-esteem phenomena ofsimilarity-attraction, in-group bias, and biased cognitive re-

sponse to persuasion, all of which involve effects of variationsof perceived relation to another (person or communication) onattraction. It equally encompasses several well-established phe-nomena in which perceived relation to other is the dependentvariable, rather than a manipulated independent variable. Sev-eral studies have varied the other's good or bad fortune and ob-served the consequences for both perceived association with andliking for the other. Basking in reflected glory (Cialdini et al.,1976) is perceiving a positive association with (and presumablyadmiring) a fortunate or successful other, whereas results char-acterized as showing downward comparison (Suls, 1991; Wills,1981) involve distancing oneself from and being critical of adisadvantaged, unsuccessful, or unfortunate other.

Phenomena of implicit affiliation and rejection also revealsecond-order implicit self-esteem, because either associationwith an attractive other or distancing from an unattractive othershould bolster self-esteem. Support for this interpretationcomes from studies in which tendencies to bask in reflectedglory or to engage in self-enhancing downward comparisonwere increased by procedures, such as failing at an ego-involv-ing task or learning that one possesses undesirable personalitytraits, that temporarily lowered subjects' self-esteem (e.g., Cial-dini & Richardson, 1980; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & In-german, 1987). Further support comes from studies in whichsubjects are shown to be biased toward embracing, as self-de-scriptive, whichever of two opposing traits (extraversion or in-troversion) is presented as being predictive of personal success(Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).

Displaced self-esteem. Displaced self-esteem (which hasnot previously been identified as a distinct class of findings) is arelative of well-known reciprocity and ingratiation effects thatinvolve reciprocal exchange of gifts, favors, or praise (Jones,1964; Regan, 1971; see Cialdini, 1993, for an overview of reci-procity effects). Displaced self-esteem starts with an act of re-ceived praise, but thereafter deviates from reciprocal exchangephenomena in that the subsequent return praise is perceived asan independent judgment that has no relation to the receivedpraise. Displaced self-esteem appears to have been central toa well-known finding by Aronson and Linder (1965). In thatexperiment, a stimulus person who switched from criticizing topraising the subject was liked better than one who continuouslypraised the subject, even though the latter gave more totalpraise. Aronson and Linder proposed that the switch from crit-icism to praise prompted greater liking because it made thepraiser seem more discriminating in interpersonal judgments.The present (related) interpretation is that the switch from crit-icism to praise provided a more potent boost to the subject'sself-esteem than did the continuous praise, with the return lik-ing then being a second-order implicit self-esteem effect; that is,it further supported the subject's self-esteem by boosting thecredentials of the person who offered praise.

8 Some of the naturally mediated implicit self-esteem effects de-scribed previously also likely serve to support self-esteem, but even lessdirectly than do those considered in this section. For example, by help-ing to assure that one's acquaintances will express agreeable views, thesimilarity-attraction effect protects against exposure to opinion dis-agreements that might undermine confidence in the wisdom of one'sopinions.


In as-yet-unpublished studies conducted at the University ofWashington, a strong displaced self-esteem effect has been iden-tified in a natural setting that routinely calls for two parties totake turns evaluating each other—the end-of-course studentratings of instructors (Greenwald, 1992b). In analyses bothwithin and across course sections, higher grades of student byinstructor have been strongly associated with higher ratings ofinstructor by student. The positive evaluation of an instructorby a student who expects to receive a high grade appears to pro-vide support, implicitly, for the student's self-esteem.

Alternative Interpretations of ImplicitSelf-Esteem Effects

Each of the implicit self-esteem effects just reviewed is wellestablished in multiple studies. Furthermore, several of thesefindings meet established criteria of being statistically strongeffects (that is, they correspond to product-moment corre-lations of at least .50, or to treatment mean differences on adependent measure of at least 0.8 standard deviations; Cohen,1988). Also, these effects come from broadly diverse areas ofresearch, including attitude change (role playing and cognitiveresponse effects), decision making (postdecision spreading of al-ternatives), group process (minimal group effect), interpersonalattraction (similarity-attraction, implicit affiliation or rejection,and displaced self-esteem effects), personality (self-positivitybiases), and social cognition (name or initial letter and mereownership effects). Not surprisingly, this diverse collection offindings has a correspondingly diverse collection of existing the-oretical interpretations, including reinforcement theory (sim-ilarity-attraction), cognitive balance or consistency theory (cog-nitive response and similarity-attraction), cognitive dissonancetheory (role playing and postdecision spreading of choice alterna-tives), and social comparison theory (downward comparison).

Interpreting various findings in terms of implicit self-esteemdoes not require abandoning their other, existing theoretical in-terpretations. In some cases, the existing interpretations de-scribe plausible mechanisms by which implicit self-esteem mayoperate.9 However, the implicit self-esteem interpretation goesbeyond other interpretations in predicting that the variouseffects should be moderated by self-esteem. That is, thereshould be stronger implicit manifestations of self-esteem forsubjects who are higher in self-esteem.10

Unfortunately, the hypothesized moderating role of self-es-teem cannot be tested confidently with existing self-esteemmeasures. The problem is that standard self-esteem inventories(e.g., Helmreich, Stapp, & Ervin, 1974; Rosenberg, 1965) usea direct measurement strategy that assesses an introspectivelyaccessible representation of self-esteem. The hypothesizedmoderating role of self-esteem in implicit self-esteem effects isexpected to be effectively testable only with the aid of a proce-dure for (indirectly) measuring implicit self-esteem. Such ameasure does not now exist.'' Below, the state of available tech-nology for indirect measurement of implicit social-cognitiveconstructs is discussed.

The Nature of Evidence for Implicit Attitudes andImplicit Self-Esteem

In the absence of individual-difference measures for implicitattitudes, supporting evidence for that construct has focused on

situations in which it can be assumed that subject samples areapproximately homogeneous in the content of their implicit at-titudes. For example, the interpretation of physical attractive-ness halo effects as implicit attitude effects requires the assump-tion that physical attractiveness is positively evaluated by a largemajority of most research samples. Similarly, empirical dem-onstrations of implicit self-esteem require the assumption thatpositive self-regard is widespread within research samples. Inthis respect, research on implicit social cognition is on a similarfooting with research on other forms of implicit cognition. Inimplicit memory research, for example, it is assumed thatexposure to a given set of experimental materials produces anapproximately uniform effect across subjects in establishingtraces that can later influence performance on indirectmeasures.

Implicit Stereotypes

A stereotype is a socially shared set of beliefs about traits thatare characteristic of members of a social category. Whereas anattitude implies a consistent evaluative response to its object, astereotype may encompass beliefs with widely diverging evalua-tive implications. For example, the stereotype of members of acertain group (e.g., cheerleaders) may simultaneously includethe traits of being physically attractive (positive) and unintelli-gent (negative). Stereotypes guide judgment and action to theextent that a person acts toward another as if the other possessestraits included in the stereotype.

As was the case for attitudes, scholarly definitions of stereo-types have generally not specified their conscious or uncon-scious operation. This can be seen, as it was for the attitude con-struct, by examining a list of influential definitions.

A stereotype is a fixed impression, which conforms very little tothe fact it pretends to represent, and results from our defining firstand observing second. (Katz & Braly, 1935, p. 181)

A stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category.(Allport, 1954, p. 191)

A categorical response, i.e., membership is sufficient to evoke thejudgment that the stimulus person possesses all the attributes be-longing to that category. (Secord, 1959, p. 309)

9 As one example, Heider's (1958) balance theory analyzes the triadcomposed of (a) a perceiver and (b) a positively evaluated other who isassociatively linked to (c) a previously neutral object. Substituting selfinto the role of other yields the implicit self-esteem effect (liking for aself-associated object) as the result of Heider's theorized tendency to-ward cognitive balance (with all links positive) in this triad.

10 This prediction of the moderating role of self-esteem is in somecases quite compatible with existing theories. For example, it is readilytranslated into the terms of both balance theory and cognitive disso-nance theory. Nevertheless, with only occasional exceptions (e.g., Aron-son&Mettee, 1968; Crocker etal., 1987;Steeleetal., 1992;Suls, 1991),those theories have not guided searches for evidence to evaluate possiblerelationships of their predicted effects to individual differences in self-esteem.

" This unavailability of measures of implicit self-esteem may be rec-tified by efforts currently underway (Wood, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus,1993).


An ethnic stereotype is a generalization made about an ethnicgroup, concerning a trait attribution, which is considered to be un-justified by an observer. (Brigham, 1971, p. 13)

A set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people.(Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 16)

In stereotyping, the individual: (1) categorizes other individuals,usually on the basis of highly visible characteristics such as sex orrace; (2) attributes a set of characteristics to all members of thatcategory; and (3) attributes that set of characteristics to any indi-vidual member of that category. (Snyder, 1981, p. 415)

A cognitive structure that contains the perceiver's knowledge, be-liefs, and expectancies about some human group. (Hamilton &Trolier, 1986, p. 133)

As in the case of attitudes, it is useful to examine the extent towhich stereotypes operate implicitly, outside of consciouscognition.

Implicit stereotypes are the introspectively unidentified (or inaccu-rately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributionsof qualities to members of a social category.

Although research on stereotypes has often used direct or ex-plicit measures (see Judd & Park, 1993), there are also substan-tial research programs on stereotypes that use indirect mea-sures—ones in which a stigmatizing feature with which a ste-reotype is associated (e.g., weight, race, or gender) is peripheralto the respondent's judgment task (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983)or in which the purpose of investigation is otherwise disguised(e.g., Hamilton & GifFord, 1976). Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe(1980) were able to locate enough research using indirect mea-sures of prejudicial stereotypes to conclude that "anti-Blacksentiments are much more prevalent among White Americansthan the survey data [i.e., direct or explicit measures of stereo-types] lead one to expect." Although the use of indirect mea-sures in these studies often reflects the researchers' intent toavoid intrusion of unwanted demand or impression-manage-ment artifacts (which would plausibly suppress accurate ex-pressions of conscious stereotypes), some of the research that issummarized just below was designed specifically to investigateunconscious operation of stereotypes. These studies suggest thatstereotypes are often expressed implicitly in the behavior of per-sons who explicitly disavow the stereotype. The next two sec-tions focus attention on race and gender stereotypes becausethese, having been much more heavily investigated than otherstereotypes, have provided the most persuasive evidence for im-plicit stereotyping.

Implicit Race Stereotyping

Numerous findings have established automatic operation ofstereotypes. Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) presented sub-jects with pairs of letter strings, requesting a yes judgment ifboth were words, and no otherwise. Using speed of yes re-sponses to measure strength of existing associations between thetwo words in a pair, they found that White subjects respondedreliably faster to white-positive word pairs than to black-posi-tive pairs (e.g., white-smart vs. black-smart). This difference didnot emerge on judgments of negative traits (e.g., white-lazy vs.black-lazy). These results occurred similarly for subjects who

scored high and for ones who scored low on a direct (i.e., stan-dard self-report) measure of race prejudice. In a related study,Dovidio et al. (1986) used the procedure of presenting a prime(black or white) followed by a target (a positive or negative trait)and asking subjects to judge if the target trait could "ever betrue" or was "always false" of the prime category. Again, sub-jects responded reliably faster to positive traits that followed theprime white than black, and in this study they also respondedfaster to negative traits that followed the prime black than white.These results were interpreted by Gaertner and Dovidio (1986)as evidence for aversive racism, which they defined as a conflict"between feelings and beliefs associated with a sincerely egali-tarian value system and unacknowledged negative feelings andbeliefs about Blacks" (p. 62).

Automatic operation of stereotypes provides the basis for im-plicit stereotyping. Devine (1989) reported that, after being sub-liminally exposed to a series of words, 80% of which were ste-reotypically associated with Black Americans (e.g., poor, jazz,slavery, Harlem, and busing), White subjects, in an ostensiblyunrelated second task, judged a race-unspecified male target tobe more hostile than did subjects for whom only 20% of thewords had the stereotype association. Again, as was the case inthe Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) study, this result occurredequally for subjects who scored high and low on a direct mea-sure of prejudice. Because Devine's subjects may have imagineda White target on the second task, it is possible that this resultwas due to some consequence of the priming procedure otherthan its activation of a Black stereotype (for example, it mighthave activated hostility). Nevertheless, Devine's study pio-neered in identifying an implicit social cognition effect and insuggesting the role of automatic (unconscious) processes in ste-reotyping and prejudice. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) showed thata racial stereotype, presumably activated by including an Asianwoman in a videotaped sequence seen by subjects, influencedsubsequent word-fragment completions (a type of measure usedfrequently in implicit memory research). In the context of con-sidering phenomena of implicit social cognition, this finding,along with Devine's, might be well described as revealing im-plicit racism.

Implicit Gender Stereotyping

Some of the methods used in studies of automatic compo-nents of ethnic and race stereotypes have begun to appear instudies of gender stereotypes (e.g., Jamieson & Zanna, 1989;Klinger &' Beall, 1992; Paulhus, Martin, & Murphy, 1992).Also, a well-established line of research based on the findingthat essays were judged more favorably when attributed to au-thors with male rather than female names (Goldberg, 1968) canbe interpreted as indirectly assessing a gender stereotype thatassociates men with greater achievement than women.12 Therepeated finding of lower ratings of the same achievements

12 In a meta-analytic review of this research, Swim, Borgida, Maru-yama, and Myers (1989) concluded that evidence for this indirect formof gender stereotyping was, on average, weak. However, examination ofthe portions of their meta-analysis that corresponded most closely toGoldberg's (1968) original procedures does support the conclusion thatGoldberg's finding is well established (cf. Banaji & Greenwald, 1994).


when credited to women rather than to men might also be in-terpreted as reflecting greater attitude positivity toward men.However, because of several findings that show greater attitudi-nal positivity toward women than men (Eagly & Mladinic,1989; Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1991; also unpublished findingsobtained by the present authors), the stereotype interpretationappears preferable.

Stereotypical Gender Bias in Fame Judgments

The stereotypic association of gender with achievement pro-vided a basis for the present authors to adapt methods of im-plicit memory research to investigate implicit stereotypes. Ja-coby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989; see also Jacoby &Kelley, 1987) demonstrated the operation of implicit memoryin fame judgments. In their research, on Day 1 of a two-sessionexperiment subjects read a list that contained names of bothfamous and nonfamous people. On Day 2, 24 hr later, the samesubjects were presented with a list containing old (previouslyseen on Day 1) and new (unseen on Day 1) nonfamous names,interspersed with old and new famous names. Subjects judgedeach name on the Day 2 list in response to the question: Is thisperson famous? (to be answered yes or no). Jacoby et al. hypoth-esized that, although episodic memory (i.e., explicit, consciousrecollection) for the nonfamous names would fade over the 24-hr delay, residual perceived familiarity due to the priorexposure could lead to erroneous judgments of fame. That is,subjects might misattribute the familiarity of a name to fameand, as a consequence, would judge more old (than new) nonfa-mous names as famous. As they predicted, Jacoby et al. (1989)found a higher false-alarm rate for old nonfamous names thanfor new ones. This effect, described by Jacoby et al. (1989) asmaking nonfamous names "become famous overnight," indi-cates a potent unconscious influence of memory.

Adapting the Jacoby et al. (1989) procedure, Banaji andGreenwald (in press) used equal numbers of male and femalenames (Jacoby et al., 1989, had used a large majority of malenames) and varied the gender of nonfamous names by attachinga female or male first name to a common last name (e.g., PeterWalker or Susan Walker). Data from each subject's judgmentsfor each of the four within-subject conditions (old male, newmale, old female, and new female) were reduced to a hit rate(proportion of famous names correctly judged famous) and afalse-alarm rate (proportion of nonfamous names mistakenlyjudged famous). Signal-detection analysis (Green & Swets,1966) permitted decomposition of the hit and false-alarm datainto measures of sensitivity (d') to the stimulus variable (namefame in this case), and threshold or criterion (0) for assigningthe judgment. The analyses used these two derived measures,replacing ft with its logarithm, which is better suited for statisti-cal analyses because of the greater approximation to normalityof its distribution.

The main findings are graphed in Figure 2. As previouslymentioned, hit rates (correct identifications of famous names)were greater for male than female names; false alarms weregreater for old (previously seen) nonfamous names than for newones; and the boost in false-alarm rates for old names wasgreater for male than female names. The signal-detection anal-ysis indicated significantly greater sensitivity to the fame varia-

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Figure 2. An implicit stereotyping effect. (Data from Banaji &Greenwald, in press, averaged over four experiments, total TV = 186;procedure described in text.) Signal-detection analysis indicated thatsubjects were somewhat more sensitive (d1) to male than female famefor "new" names, which were presented for the first time in Session 2.However, the most substantial result was that subjects had a lower crite-rion (/3) for judging fame for male than female names, especially for"old" names, which had been increased in familiarity by being pre-sented in Session 1. (Hit and false-alarm rates are, respectively, the talland the short bars in the top panel.)

tion (d') for new (i.e., not previously seen) male names thanfor any other category. However, the strongest results from thesignal-detection analysis were on criterion (indexed by log beta).The criterion for fame judgments was lower (i.e., names weremore readily judged famous) for old than new names and formale than female names. In addition to these two main effectson criterion, there was a significant interaction effect such thatthe familiarization procedure (presentation on Day 1) had agreater effect of lowering criterion for male than for femalenames.

These results clearly show that an ambiguous stimulus—aname that elicits a sense of familiarity—is more likely to pro-duce a mistaken judgment of fame if it is male rather than fe-male. This adaptation of an implicit memory experimental pro-cedure provides clear evidence for implicit gender stereotypesthat associate male gender, more than female gender, withachievement. Because names serve as flexible vehicles for com-municating social categories (especially ethnic ones), and be-cause judgments other than the fame judgment can be used asindirect measures of traits other than achievement, the implicitmemory procedure is potentially adaptable to examine a broadvariety of stereotypes (cf. Klinger & Beall, 1992). By using a


large set of names, such procedures are protected against thethreat that stereotyping effects are due to idiosyncratic proper-ties of the particular names selected as representative of largercategories (see Kasof, 1993).

Stereotypical Gender Bias in Judgments of Dependenceand Aggression

Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977; also Srull & Wyer, 1979)demonstrated that the presentation of trait-category informa-tion in one context can influence judgments of an ambiguouslydescribed target person in an unrelated context. Banaji, Hardin,and Rothman (1993) used a variant of Higgins et al.'s procedureto extend the concept of implicit stereotyping. On the basis ofdocumented stereotypes that link males to the trait of aggres-siveness and females to the trait of dependence (see Basow,1986; Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosen-krantz, 1972), Banaji et al. (1993) asked whether activating oneof these traits would differentially influence judgments aboutmale and female target persons. The prediction was that the ac-tivated trait might influence judgments only for the category(male or female) for which the trait was stereotypically appro-priate, thereby demonstrating implicit operation of thestereotype.

In Banaji et al.'s (1993) dependence experiment, subjects whowere exposed to primes that described dependent behaviorsjudged a female target (Donna) as more dependent than did sub-jects who rated the same target after exposure to neutral primes.However, subjects exposed to exactly the same dependenceprimes judged a male target (Donald) as less dependent than didsubjects who rated the target after exposure to neutral primes.In the aggression experiment, subjects who were exposed toprimes that described aggressive behaviors judged the maletarget as more aggressive than subjects who rated the sametarget after exposure to neutral primes. When judging a femaletarget, previous exposure to the same aggression primes did notaffect judgment. A third experiment replicated this pattern ofdata for dependence ratings (i.e., a more extreme judgment of afemale target after exposure to dependence than neutral primes,but no such difference for a male target) and also showed norelationship between such judgments and explicit memory forthe primes.

These experiments demonstrated that a gender stereotypemoderates, and may be a necessary precondition of, the Higginset al. (1977) trait-priming effect. Like the previous demonstra-tion of gender bias in fame judgments, this result involves im-plicit social cognition; it occurs without the subject being con-sciously aware of an influence of recent experience (nameexposure and trait exposure, respectively). At the same time,these effects reveal gender stereotypes because they occur selec-tively when the information content of recent experience ste-reotypically fits the social category (gender) of the target of judg-ment. The lack of subject sex effects in both procedures indi-cates that the stereotypes they reflect are culturally sharedamong both men and women, rather than being stereotypes ofan out-group by an in-group (cf. lost & Banaji, 1994).

Attention as a Moderator of Implicit CognitionDecisions that affect people—for example, personnel evalua-

tions and admissions decisions—comprise a large and very im-

portant class of situations in which implicit cognition can in-trude on deliberate judgment, with the result of producing un-intended discrimination. The decision maker who intends tomaintain a nonprejudicial course in these judgments may havelittle basis for knowing whether or how a specific cue is implic-itly intruding on judgment. Consequently, decision makerscould usefully be acquainted with general strategies for reduc-ing implicit cognitive effects, even when they are ignorant of theprecise form that those effects may take.

Existing research indicates an important role for attention ingeneral strategies for reducing undesired implicit influences onjudgment. The general principle is that attentional focus atten-uates weak automatic influences on judgment. This principlecan be observed in operation in settings in which the weak au-tomatic influence produces both desired and undesired effects.

Effect of Attention on Weak Automatic Influences ThatProduce Desired Responses

In perception research, Wyatt and Campbell (1951; see alsoBruner & Potter, 1964) demonstrated that asking subjects togenerate hypotheses about the identity of a blurred picture re-duced their ability to identify the picture as it was graduallybrought into focus. T. D. Wilson and Schooler (1991; see alsoT. D. Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989) reported that sub-jects who were asked to introspect on their reactions to severalbrands of jelly subsequently rank ordered those brands in a fash-ion more discrepant from expert rankings than did subjects notgiven the opportunity to introspect.

In research on memory, Schooler and Engstler-Schooler(1990) found that, after attempting to verbally describe thememory image of a previously seen face, subjects showed im-paired ability to choose that face from an array that includedseveral foils. Graf and Mandler (1984; see also Overson & Man-dler, 1987) found that deliberate attempts to complete wordstems with words recently seen (but poorly attended) resulted infewer correct responses than a comparison condition in whichsubjects simply attempted to provide completions. Research onhypermnesia has demonstrated that subjects will sometimesshow improved recall after relaxing their efforts to retrieve,compared with sustained retrieval efforts (Erdelyi & Kleinbard,1978; Madigan, 1976). In other words, when memory tracesare weak, active effort to retrieve (using direct measures) mayinterfere with retrieval compared with more relaxed efforts thatapproximate indirect measurement procedures.

For all of these results, it is plausible that subjects' attentionalefforts disrupted the influence of weak cues—either perceptualcues or memory traces—that might otherwise have guidedjudgment. Marcel (1983) observed that subliminal semantic ac-tivation was more evident among subjects who took a relaxedapproach to their experimental task than among those whotried effortfully to extract information from stimuli that weredegraded by backward masking. Mandler (in press) concludedthat the "conscious/deliberate attempt to retrieve . . . sublim-inally presented material. . . seems to interfere with access."In other words, for detecting effects of weak stimuli, direct mea-sures (which focus attention on task stimuli) can be less sensitivethan indirect measures.


Effect of Attention on Automatic Influences That ProduceUndesired Responses

Distraction increases implicit effects. I n the social cognitiondomain, the following several findings have demonstrated thatdecreased attention, due to distraction or time pressure, resultsin increased implicit effects of cues that are peripheral to thesubject's task. Kruglanski and Freund (1983) found that impos-ing time pressure on a judgment task (thereby reducing atten-tional resources available for the task) increased the level of eth-nic stereotyping in subjects'judgments. Similar findings involv-ing gender stereotyping were obtained by Jamieson and Zanna(1989) and Pratto and Bargh (1991). Gilbert and Hixon (1991)used a distracting memory load to reduce attentional resourcesavailable for a word-completion task that was used as an indica-tor of ethnic stereotyping and found increased evidence of ste-reotyping on the indirect measure. (Although Gilbert andHixon reported, as just described, that stereotype expressionwas increased by distraction, they also reported that stereotypeactivation was reduced by distraction.) Paulhus and Levitt(1987) placed affect-arousing words adjacent to trait words thatwere being judged as self-descriptive or not and found that thisprocedure increased self-positive responding (endorsement ofpositive traits or rejection of negative ones). One interpretationof Paulhus and Levitt's finding is that the affect-arousing wordsdiverted attentional resources from the judgment task, allowingimplicit self-esteem to be a stronger influence on judgment thanin the control (nonarousing adjacent words) condition.

Attention to source of implicit effect reduces the effect. Sev-eral studies have demonstrated that when attention is focusedon the source of an implicit effect that interferes with judgment,that interference is reduced or eliminated (and sometimes evenreversed). For example, consistent with the expectation of aphysical attractiveness halo effect, it has been found that sub-jects award lighter sentences to attractive criminal defendants(Efran, 1974; Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). However, when the crimewas related to attractiveness (a swindle), Sigall and Ostrove ob-served a reversal that was presumably related to subjects' in-creased focus on the defendant's attractiveness and consider-ation of its relation to the crime, that is, physically attractivedefendants received harsher sentences. Schwarz and Clore's(1983) finding that quality-of-life judgments were affected byweather was eliminated when subjects' attention was focused onthe irrelevant cue by first asking them to describe the weather.These studies show that a cue that redirects attention to thesource of a possible implicit effect can produce a reduction orreversal of that implicit effect. Research by Fiske and Neuberg(1990; Fiske, 1993; Neuberg, 1989) has shown similarly thatincreased attention (in their case, induced by giving subjects agoal of forming accurate impressions) increases the use of indi-viduating information, rather than category-based stereotypes,in judging stimulus persons.

Recall of implicit cue decreases implicit effect. In the mem-ory domain, implicit cognitive effects have been found either tobe weakened or reversed for subjects who could recall the stim-uli that ordinarily produce those effects. Jacoby et al. (1989)showed that the false fame effect was reduced when the initiallist of non famous names was well enough attended so that sub-jects would recognize nonfamous names as having been en-

countered earlier in the experiment. E. R. Smith, Stewart, andButtram (1992) found that facilitative effects of repeatedly judg-ing the same stimulus were larger when the stimulus was notrecognized as having been judged previously (7 days earlier)than when it was recognized. In a review of much researchshowing that mere exposure to visual objects increases theirjudged attractiveness, Bornstein (1992) observed that this mereexposure effect was increased by procedures that decreasedmemorability of prior exposures. That observation was subse-quently bolstered by an experimental test in which memorabil-ity of exposures was reduced by using very brief presentations(Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992). Lombardi, Higgins, andBargh (1987; see also Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kiibler, & Wanke,1993) reported that effects of a priming procedure on trait in-ferences from an ambiguous description were reversed amongsubjects who could recall some of the priming stimuli. Relat-edly, Martin, Seta, and Crelia (1990) found that this reversal ofpriming for a recallable priming manipulation was itself un-done when subjects had a distracting task concurrent with thetest of the priming effect, indicating that the reversal observedby Lombardi et al. (1987) depended on the availability of atten-tional resources.

Exceptions. It is clear from existing literature that attendingto or recalling a cue does not invariably reduce its cognitiveimpact (see Martin & Achee, 1992; Petty & Wegener, 1993;Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Strack, 1992). In an unpublished repli-cation of Johnson's initial letter effect (see Figure 1) performedby the present authors, subjects were asked to provide theirnames in advance, and it was mentioned that the letters theywere about to rate included ones that were in their names. Theauthors expected that drawing attention to this cue would re-duce its effect, but it did not; rather, the initial letter effect wasundiminished. In retrospect, it was plausible that the effect wasnot altered because subjects had no reason to suppress this par-ticular implicit self-esteem effect. Presumably, one should evenexpect augmentation of an implicit effect if the direction of theeffect is consistent with a conscious motive. For example, con-sider a hypothetical variant on the initial letter effect experi-ment in which students are asked to rate attractiveness of vari-ous colors. If, in advance of the rating, the experimenter pointsout that the university colors are among those being rated, thosecolors might be rated as more attractive than in a control con-dition in which attention is not drawn to the association.

Conclusion. The findings summarized in this section sharethe point that conscious attentional effort can weaken the in-fluence of a current or previous cue on performance. However,the method of weakening likely depends on whether, at the timeof the performance measure, the cue is or is not clearly cog-nized. When attentional effort is directed to a weak stimulus ormemory trace, the reduced effectiveness of that cue is likely dueto conscious strategies overriding and interfering with auto-matic cognitive effects. This interpretation is very reminiscentof a principle derived from learning-behavior theories of the1940s and 1950s—that increases in motivation or drive amplifystronger habits relative to weaker ones (e.g., Spence, 1956). Onthe other hand, when the cue in question is cognized clearly,reduction of its implicit effect likely occurs because (and only tothe extent that) the judge can anticipate and compensate forthe event's possible influence. In this case, reversals of potential


implicit effects may occur when the judge overcompensates forthe influence effect, perhaps because the judge overestimates itsmagnitude or is overly zealous in seeking to avoid any appear-ance of having been influenced.

Appraisal of Strategies for AvoidingUnintended Discrimination

Over the last several decades, concern about the prevalenceof social discrimination in employment, education, and otherpublic settings has led to the proposal and implementation ofantidiscrimination strategies that fall into three categories:Blinding denies a decision maker access to potentially biasinginformation. Exactly the opposite of blinding, consciousnessraising encourages the decision maker to have heightenedawareness of potential cues that could elicit discrimination. Thethird strategy, affirmative action, differs from the other two inhaving a deliberate compensatory component: An attribute thatis known to be responsible for adverse discrimination is treatedinstead as if it were a positive qualification for the decision inquestion. The treatment here makes no attempt to acknowledgethe substantial existing research on these three strategies, in-stead considering their possible effectiveness in situations inwhich discrimination might be based on implicit attitudes (forexample, based on halo effects or prejudices) or implicitstereotypes.

Blinding. In principle, blinding appears to qualify as a fool-proof method of avoiding unintended discrimination. If a stig-matizing attribute is unavailable to a decision maker, it wouldseem that it could not possibly influence judgment. The valueof blinding appears to be confirmed by experimental tests thatpermit clean manipulation of presence versus absence of a po-tentially stigmatizing attribute, independent of all other stimu-lus variation (see, e.g., the review by Eagly, Makhijani, & Klon-sky, 1992). However, because natural possession versus nonpos-session of almost any socially stigmatizing attribute tends to becorrelated with possession of other characteristics that are not(and often cannot be) removed by blinding, effective blinding ofthe sort producible in experiments is often not achievable inpractice.

Consciousness raising. Research on the role of attention inweakening the effects of implicit cognition (reviewed above)supports consciousness raising as a strategy for avoiding unin-tended discrimination. That is, when a decision maker is awareof the source and nature of a bias in judgment, that bias mayeffectively be anticipated and avoided. Consciousness raisingmay also have some value in attenuating implicit bias when thesource of implicit bias is not properly identified, as suggested byfindings that attentional effort reduces effects of weak cues.

Affirmative action. The controversiality of affirmative ac-tion is well captured by its frequently being described as "re-verse discrimination." To discriminate in favor of a disadvan-taged group may seem a defect even to those who desire onlynot to discriminate against them. At the same time, research onimplicit social cognition provides several bases for concludingthat unintended discrimination can be avoided only by deliber-ately applying compensatory strategies. Affirmative actionstrategies may therefore be deemed suitable not only as com-pensation to a stigmatized group for past explicit discrimina-

tion by others who intended to discriminate against them, butalso as compensation for past, present, and likely future implicitdiscrimination by persons who have no intent to discriminate.That is, in addition to (or instead of) their interpretation as "re-verse discrimination," affirmative action strategies might be un-derstood as strategies for reversal of discrimination.

The contrast of affirmative action with blinding can be con-sidered in the context of a case reported by Allmendinger andHackman (1993). American symphony orchestras have a longtradition of predominant male membership, and women in-strumentalists have historically not found equal opportunity inobtaining experience that can allow them to compete effectivelywith men. Being alert to possible discrimination, orchestrasnow routinely have candidates for vacant positions performfrom behind a partition, removing all cues other than the soundof the performance. Unfortunately, if the performance reveals(as it should) any benefits accrued from (differential) past expe-rience, then men will maintain relative success, even in hypo-thetical cases of equal aptitude and equal ability to benefit fromexperience. Disadvantages that are inherited from past discrim-ination are not undone by blinding.

Measuring Individual Differences inImplicit Social Cognition

Implicit social-cognitive effects have been demonstrated mostclearly in experimental studies in which a group of subjects isuniformly exposed to cues that influence their subsequent re-sponses on indirect measures; the implicit effect is sought incomparisons between averaged performances of groups ex-posed to different cues. Although such experimental designseffectively demonstrate some basic properties of implicit socialcognition, they do not allow assessment of individual differ-ences. The many existing individual-difference measures of at-titudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes primarily assess introspec-tively accessible self-knowledge (and, sometimes, deliberatelymanaged self-presentations). To measure individual differencesin introspectively inaccessible implicit social cognition, sensi-tive indirect measures are needed. Two categories of such indi-rect measures have received substantial development effort.

Judgment Latency Measures

Uses of judgment latencies to provide indirect measures ofsocial cognition have been based on the contributions of Dond-ers (1868/1969), Steinberg (1969), and Posner (1978). Repre-sentative uses appear in the work of Bargh (1982), Devine(1989), Dovidio and Fazio (1992), Niedenthal (1992), Perdueand Gurtman (1990), and E. R. Smith et al. (1992). Becausejudgment latencies tend to show substantial within-person vari-ability, obtaining measures with adequate reliability requiresaveraging the subject's response latencies to large numbers ofsimilar stimuli. Consequently, latency-based indirect measureshave been used chiefly for hypothesis tests that compare mea-sures averaged over groups of subjects. Recent treatments of theuse of latency measures to assess individual differences in auto-matic operation of attitudes can be found in works by Bargh etal. (1992), Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992), and Fazio(1990a, 1993).


Projective Measures

A very different approach to indirect measurement, based onresearch of Murray (1943) and McClelland, Atkinson, Clark,and Lowell (1953), asks a respondent to generate stories in re-sponse to ambiguous photographs or drawings, or to generatedescriptions of what is seen in abstract stimuli (for example,inkblots). The use of projective measures for implicit motives,and their comparison with measures of explicit motives, was thesubject of an article by McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger(1989), who concluded that projective and direct measures as-sess different constructs. A similar conclusion was reached in ameta-analytic review of achievement motivation measures bySpangler (1992), who also reported that projective measures ofachievement motivation had greater predictive validity than didparallel questionnaire (direct) measures.

Other Indirect Measures

There has been a continuing series of well-justified calls fordevelopment of indirect measures for use in social psychologicalresearch (e.g., Campbell, 1950; Hammond, 1948; Jahodaetal.,1951; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest, & Grove, 1981).Those calls have not gone unheeded, and there is consequentlya substantial history of social psychological uses of indirectmeasures, especially in the domain of prejudice research. Forexample, indirect measures used by Word, Zanna, and Cooper(1974) showed that White interviewers maintained greaterphysical distance, demonstrated less eye contact, and adminis-tered shorter interviews when interacting with Black (as op-posed to White) interviewees. Milgram, Mann, and Harter(1965) showed that stamped envelopes left in various publicplaces ("lost letters") were more likely to be mailed (by the pass-ersby who found them) the more favorable were public attitudestoward the addressee organizations. Gaertner and Bickman(1971) developed an effective telephone version of the Milgramet al. lost-letter technique, showing that it plausibly assessedprejudice toward Blacks. Porter, Geis, and Jennings-Walstedt(1983) showed that greater use of head-of-table seating as anindicator of leadership for male than female stimulus personsprovided an indirect measure of gender stereotyping. J. D.Johnson, Jackson, and Gatto (in press) similarly reported anindirect measure of race stereotyping in the form of greater in-fluence by damaging inadmissible evidence for Black thanWhite defendants in a simulated trial. Campbell, Kruskal, andWallace (1966) observed spontaneous seating aggregation byrace in a large classroom, suggesting that spatial proximity canserve as an indirect indicator of racial attitudes. Greenwald andSchuh (in press) developed a citation analog of the Campbell etal. (1966) aggregation measure, showing that scientific citationsaggregate along lines of author ethnicity (Jewish and non-Jewish).

In summary of existing efforts at indirect measurement ofimplicit social cognition: Research on latency decomposition,projective tests, and miscellaneous other procedures indicatethat indirect measurement of individual differences in implicitsocial cognition is possible. At the same time, such measure-ment has not yet been achieved in the efficient form needed tomake research investigation of individual differences in implicit

social cognition a routine undertaking. When such measures dobecome available, there should follow the rapid development ofa new industry of research on implicit cognitive aspects of per-sonality and social behavior.

Conclusion

Much social cognition occurs in an implicit mode. This con-clusion comes from a reinterpretation of many findings that in-dicate the importance of implicit operation of attitudes, and ofthe self-esteem attitude in particular, and also from existing andnew evidence for the implicit operation of stereotypes. By add-ing this conception of the implicit mode to existing knowledgeof the explicit mode of operation of social psychology's basicconstructs, the scope of those constructs is extended substan-tially. In addition, many possibilities for application in decision-making settings are suggested by interpreting social judgment interms of an interaction of implicit and explicit social cognition.

Implicit social cognition overlaps with several concepts thatwere significant in works of previous generations of psycholo-gists. Psychoanalytic theory's concept of cathexis containedsome of the sense of implicit attitude, and its concept of egodefense similarly captured at least part of the present notion ofimplicit self-esteem. Partly under the influence of psychoana-lytic theory, in the 1930s and 1940s, attitudes were regarded ascapable of unconscious operation. The authoritarian personal-ity concept (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford,1950) extended the psychoanalytic approach to include socialphenomena of prejudice and stereotyping. At a time when theinfluence of psychoanalytic theory in academic psychology wasdeclining, its conceptions of unconscious phenomena that re-lated to implicit social cognition were being imported into be-havior theory (Dollard & Miller, 1950; Doob, 1947; Osgood,1957). The New Look in Perception of the 1950s focused onseveral phenomena that are interpretable as implicit social cog-nition. The developing cognitive approach to these phenomenacan be seen in Bruner's (1957) introduction of the concept ofperceptual readiness. Still later, the New Look approach wastied together with psychoanalytic theoretical influences in a cog-nitive-psychological account by Erdelyi (1974, 1985).

Importantly, the psychoanalytic, behaviorist, and cognitivetreatments just mentioned all lacked an essential ingredient,that is, they lacked reliable laboratory models of their focal phe-nomena that could support efficient testing and developmentof theory. The missing ingredient is now available, as cognitivepsychologists have succeeded in producing several varieties ofunconscious cognition reliably in the laboratory (see overviewsby Greenwald, 1992a; Kihlstrom, 1987), and investigations ofimplicit social cognition are well underway (see Bornstein &Pittman, 1992; Uleman & Bargh, 1989). The methods of re-search on implicit memory, in particular, are applicable to theimplicit attitude, self-esteem, and stereotype phenomena re-viewed in this article. Perhaps the most significant remainingchallenge is to adapt these methods for efficient assessment ofindividual differences in implicit social cognition.

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Received July 20, 1993Revision received December 7, 1993

Accepted April 12, 1994 •

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