improvements in epr arrangements after fukushima daiichi

Improvements in EPR arrangements after Fukushima Daiichi Accident

in Hungary Presented by:

Dr. Kristóf Horváth

[email protected]

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

Prepared by:

Sándor Kapitány, Anita Kantavári

8 June 2016

Eighth Meeting of the Representatives of Competent Authorities identified under the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention

Content

Roles and responsibilities of Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

Actions to evaluate the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

Feedback of lessons learned

8 June 2016 8 th CA Meeting 2

HAEA roles

HAEA serves as decision support to the government

– Diagnosis and prognosis of facility status

– Estimation of release and dispersion analysis

– Recommend protective actions

– Republic, member of European Union

Media information as a professional organization

International contact point

– IAEA, EU

– Bilateral agreements (Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia)

REPSEC support to the EC


HAEA regular activities during Fukushima

Public information via HAEA website – Short briefings with due frequency (2-3/day)

– TV/Radio interviews, discussions

Emergency Response Organization was activated between March 12-15 during daytime – Information collection

– Analysis of situation

– Follow-up of events

Later: processing of Hungarian environmental measurement data and publication on website


RESPEC assistance

Radiological Emergency Support Project for the European Commission

– Service Contract with European Commission on assitance to any radiological emergency that occur in or affect the EU or neighboring countries or affect EU citizens

– Tasks: Information about the accident; Analysis of situation and evaluation of member state actions; Assistance in preparation of media releases.

Regarding the special case:

– Gathering all available information about Fukushima NPPs

– Weather forecasts (trajectories) couple of times a day

– Specific questions on

• Explosion

• How the source term change if MOX fuel is used

• Collection and first evaluation of measurement data

– No assistance was requested for public communication


Actions following Fukushima accident

Stress test of NPP (2011)

– ENSREG “Compilation of Recommendations and Suggestions”

– 2nd Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) Extraordinary Meeting

– Updated WENRA Safety Reference Levels

– Changes in IAEA guides (SSR-2/1, GSR Part 4)

– WENRA RHWG Report - Safety of new NPP designs

National Action Plan 2012 (51 measures)

– Chapter 3: improvements on on-site EPR (23 measures)

– Chapeter 5: improvements on off-site EPR (-)

2012 Annual Program of Govermental Co-ordinational Committe for Disaster Management

– Making proposal for the impovements of EPR applicable outside of the facility based on lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident.

• Proposal for the impovements of the National EPR by HAEA (2012)

• HAEA’s presentation on the lessons learned to the High Level Workig Group of Govermental Co-ordinational Committe for Disaster Management (2013)


EPR areas identified to be reviewed

1. Management of emergency situations occuring outside the country

2. Management of serious emergency situations affecting the whole country

3. Operation in early and late phase 4. Response times for inteventions 5. Preparadness of HNERS Organs 6. Operation of HNERS in case of damaged

infrastructure 7. Communication in case of electrical power supply

failure


Projects initiated

Participation in Review of Current Off-site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements in EU Member States and Neighbouring Countries (No. ENER/D1/2012-474 EU) (2012)

Study on the lessons learned from EU ERP review, in order to improve the management of events occuring outside the country (2012)

Technical support project launched by HAEA in 2013: Summary of national and international EPR lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Institute of Nuclear Techniques). (Published in August 2014)

Technical support project launched by HAEA in 2014: Study on Preparadness of HNERS Organs (March 2016)


Study on the lessons learned from EU ERP review, in order to improve the management of events

occuring outside the country (2012)

Measures for Hungarian citizens being in the territory of the country of accident: Limiting entry and stay; Orientation, information, communication; Rules of conduct; On-site situation analysis by expert delegation; Preparing for precautionary measures (Iodine prophylaxis, seclusion, evacuation)

Measures for citizens, packages an transportations coming from country affected by the accident: Radiation monitoring of citizens and packages; Measurement of possible incorporation of citizens; Monitoring of food imported from country affected by the accident; Monitoring of other goods imported from country affected by the accident; Radiation monitoring of vehicles

Measures for Hungarian territories: Enviromental monitoring; Information of the public; Precautionary measures for the public


Summary of national and international EPR lessons

learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident (2014)

Recommendations concerning organs of National Emergency Response System

– Operation of regional and local bodies of HNERS organs in case of communication failure affecting central bodies of one or more HNERS organs.

– Decision-making process at national level in case of communication failure of monitoring networks.




Recommendations concerning preparedness for the early phase – Improvement the of reliability of radiological and meteorological

monitoring network in case of extreme conditions. – The subdivision of the urgent protective action planning zone

around Paks NPP into radial sectors should be considered to optimize the evacuation taking into account the meteorological and the radiological conditions.

– The possible extension of evacuation zone due to the aggravation of the accident should be taking into account when decision is made on the target sites of evacuation.

– Preparation of information sheet on evacuation for the public. – Review of distribution of iodine tablets in case of failure of

infrastructure. 8 June 2016 8 th CA Meeting 11



Recommendations concerning preparadness for the late phase

– Preparation to evacuation up to 50 km in the late phase of accident (urgent protective action planning zone is 30 km)

– Defining criteria to moving back the residents have been evacuated


Technical support project launched by HAEA in 2014: Study on

Preparadness of HNERS Organs (March 2016)

Recommendations to modify the last version of National Emergency Preparedness Plan (2015) and the Technical Guide No. 3.1 on Tasks of National Emergency Response System in order to make more effective the operation of the system.

Recommendations to improve the toolkits for EPR Recommendations to survey the personnel can be involved in EPR for each

of the organs of National Emergency Response System Recommendations to survey the deficiency of operational circumstances

(responsibility, organizational structure and staffing) of organs of National Emergency Response System

Recommendations for each of the organs of National Emergency Response System to survey the deficiency communication tools, monitoring devices, personal protective equipment, protective equipment of public members.

Review of fulfillment of trainings and exercises.


Feedbacks

New Verison of National Emergency Preparadness Plan was issued in November 2015.

Technical guidances related to National Emergency Preparadness Plan are under revision.

The next revision of National Emergency Preparadness Plan has been initiated by HAEA.


Invitation (1)

ECURIE exercise 2016-2018 (RESPEC contract)

Looking for host-country 2016 and 2018


Coordinator Organizer Host country

European Commission

ENER D.3

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

? HUNGARY

(CONVEX-3, 2017)

?

Invitation (2)

Host country:

– Member of EU

– Provide the scenario:

• Nuclear accident or

• Radiological event

– Can be joint with a national exercise


Good chance to verify the international coordination

mechanisms for the exchange of information


Thanks for your

attention!

Improvements in Implementation of Emergency Conventions in Japan

For 8th Competent Authority Meeting under Emergency Conventions

Naoto Ichii

Nuclear Regulation Authority Japan

1

Overview

• Improvement from Lessons of Fukushima Daiichi Accident

– Improvement of notification

– Defining Concept of International Assistance

• Experience in Implementation of conventions

– Early Notification Convention

– Assistance Convention

2

IMPROVEMENT FROM FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT

3

Improvement of Notification

• MOFA takes roles of NWP and NCA

• NRA takes role of NCA

• Establishment of International Relations Team in Emergency Response Center in NRA

– To connect routine notification function and emergency response

4

Improvement of International Assistance

• Establish internal scheme in NRA to address overseas nuclear disaster

• International Affairs Office become a hub to activate and arrange experts in NRA for international assistance

• As the first step, “advice for accident response” is registered to RANET as NAC of NAA

5

Mechanism of Assistance

• To generate advice for accident response, communication between request country and provide country should be established

– Dispatch liaison staff to request country for better communication

– Activate experts of event analysis in NRA HQs for effective use of resources

• This mechanism has been tested in the occasion of nuclear emergency exercise in Korea in 2014

6

EXPERIENCE REGARDING EMERGENCY CONVENTIONS

7

Implementation of Early Notification Convention

• Criterion of “radiological safety significance for another State” can take various definition

• Notification criteria; Japanese interpretation

– Based on the Article 2: Notify the event accompanies significant radiation hazard to other countries

– Based on the Article 3: Notify the event identified as emergency class in Nuclear Emergency Response Guide

8

Experience of International Assistance

• Emergency assistance was offered before request

– Convention expects providing assistance based on request

– Difficult to match making under emergency

• Agreeing assistance condition is vital for effective assistance

9

CONCLUSION

10

Conclusion

• Notification Convention – System has been improved after Fukushima Daiichi

Accident – Effort to fill gap on implementation of convention among

CPs is important

• Assistance Convention – NRA establish internal scheme for NAA – Match making on assistance is vital to perform effective

assistance

• Japan will continue to contribute achieving effective operation of Emergency Conventions using experience from Fukushima Daiichi accident

11

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SPATIAL PLANNING

SLOVENIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Improvements in EPR arrangements in Slovenia

Marjan Tkavc

Head, Emergency Preparedness Division



www.ursjv.gov.si

Slovenia - The Smallest Nuclear Country

2

TRIGA The Krško NPP



www.ursjv.gov.si

3

EPR is not proportional to country size

EPR (SI) = EPR (DE)



www.ursjv.gov.si

This is a challenge for small countries

• Therefore we have the biggest challenge!

4



www.ursjv.gov.si

Improvements after Fukushima

5

On-site

2011 2016 t

Off-site

2011 2016 t



www.ursjv.gov.si

Improvements at the Krško NPP

2011 Severe Accident Mobile Equipment Pumps, compressors, diesel generators

Quick connection points

EOPs, SMAGs upgrade

2012-2021 Safety Upgrade Program (SUP)

– 2013 Phase I

Passive H2 recombiners (PARs)

Passive filtered venting system

– 2018 Phase II

Additional flood protection

Installation of Emergency Control Room (in BB1) …

– 2021 Phase III

Bunkered Building 2 (BB2) …

6

June 2011



www.ursjv.gov.si

Severe Accident Mobile Equipment (SAME)

7

1. Portable generator AE900AGR-001 0.4 kV / 5 kW

2. Portable generator AE900AGR-002 0.4 kV / 5 kW

3. Portable generator AE900AGR-003 0.23 kV / 2.6 kW

4. Portable generator AE900AGR-004 0.23 kV / 2.6 kW

5. Portable oil free compressor AE900CPR-001 1620 m3/h / 10.3 BAR

6. Portable oil free compressor AE900CPR-002 1620 m3/h / 10.3 BAR

7. Mobile diesel generator AE900DSL-001 0.4 kV / 600 kVA

8. Mobile diesel generator AE900DSL-002 0.4 kV / 1000 kVA

9. Mobile Diesel generator AE900DSL-004 0.4 kV / 150 kVA



12. Portable fire protection pump AE900PMP-001 50 kW / 60 m3/h / 15 BAR

13. Portable fire protection pump AE900PMP-002 50 kW / 60 m3/h / 15 BAR

14. Submersible pump AE900PMP-003 2.8 kW / 7 m3/h / 2 BAR




18. Trailer with HS60* HIGH PRESS AE900PMP-008 60 m3/h / 3 BAR

19. Portable transformer AE900XFR001 230/118 V / 3 kVA

20. Portable transformer AE900XFR001 230/118 V / 3 kVA



www.ursjv.gov.si

SAME

8



www.ursjv.gov.si

SAME – Quick connection points

9



www.ursjv.gov.si

Improvements at the Krško NPP

2011 Severe Accident Mobile Equipment Pumps, compressors, diesel generators

Quick connection points

EOPs, SMAGs upgrade

2012-2021 Safety Upgrade Program (SUP)

– 2013 Phase I

Passive H2 recombiners (PARs)

Passive filtered venting system

– 2018 Phase II

Additional flood protection

Installation of Emergency Control Room (in BB1) …

– 2021 Phase III

Bunkered Building 2 (BB2) …

10

June 2011



www.ursjv.gov.si

SUP Phase I

• Completed in 2013

• Passive Auto-catalytic Recombiners - PARs

– Replacement of active H2 recombiners

• Installation of Passive containment filtered venting system – PCFS

– Filtering 99.9% of volatile fission products and particulates

11



www.ursjv.gov.si

SUP – Phase II

• Additional flood protection of the nuclear island completed in 2015

• Operation support center reconstruction 2016

• Installation of pressurizer PORV bypass 2016

• Spent fuel pool (SFP) alternative cooling 2016

• Alternate cooling of RCS and containment 2018

• Installation of emergency control room, ECR 2018

• Upgrade of BB1 electrical power supply 2018

• Technical support center moved to BB1

• ECR /Technical support center ventilation and habitability system 2018

• Additional independent instrumentation 2018

12



www.ursjv.gov.si

SUP – Phase III

• Construction of Bunkered Building 2 (BB2) 2021

– Installation of additional water sources

– Additional pump for injecting into SG

– Additional pump for injecting into RCS, containment

– Capability to replenish water reservoirs from underground wells

13



www.ursjv.gov.si

Improvements after Fukushima

14

On-site

2011 2016 t

Off-site

2011 2016 t



www.ursjv.gov.si

Improvements off-site

• 2013 - Pre-distribution of KI pills

• 2014 - Reassassing basis for off-site EPR

• 2015 - Improving the SNSA EPR

• 2016 - Simulated EPREV

• 2016 - Revision of national plan

• 2017 - EPREV

15



www.ursjv.gov.si

Pre-distribution of KI pills - 2013

• To population in 10 km zone around the Krško NPP

• Regionally based stockpiles for the rest

• PR campaign

• Dedicated website www.kalijevjodid.si

16

http://www.kalijevjodid.si/



www.ursjv.gov.si

Reassassing basis for off-site EPR – 2014

• Working group

– Established by Inter-ministerial Committee on EPR

– National + Croatia

• Focus on the Krško hazard assessment

• Lessons from the Fukushima accident and the new IAEA guidelines were taken into account

• Report was finalized in June 2015

• Some major changes were recommended

17



www.ursjv.gov.si

Improving the SNSA EPR - 2015

• Re-organizing the SNSA emergency team

– Team management was strengthened

– Emergency management cycle was introduced …

• Dose assessment was removed from critical path

• Enhancing IT support

– Communication platform MKSID upgraded by event status board

– Data link to NPP upgraded + increased number of parameters (from 190 to 900+) …

18



www.ursjv.gov.si

Simulated EPREV - 2016

• As part of preparing for the EPREV mission in 2017

• Conducted by Slovenian team in line with the EPREV methodology

• Two week mission in May 2016

• 35 interviews /29 on location

• 14 site visits

• 77 interviewees

• Action plan is being developed

19



www.ursjv.gov.si

Future?

On-site

• To complete Safety Upgrade Program – 2021

Off-site

• National plan to be revised this year

• EPREV in 2017

20

U.S. Improvements in

EPR after Fukushima

Daiichi Accident JILL ZUBAREV

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY / NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

8TH COMPETENT AUTHORITIES MEETING

JUNE 2016

1

DOE/NNSA Deployment to

Japan

March 14 – DOE/NNSA departs with 33 experts and

17,000 pounds of equipment

March 16 – DOE/NNSA arrives at Yokota Air Base

March 17 – First aerial surveys and field monitoring

March 22 – First aerial data published on DOE website

2

DOE/NNSA Assets Involved

Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) in Washington, DC

DOE/NNSA Consequence Management expertise on the US Agency for International Development Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Tokyo

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) at Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL)

Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) at Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL), Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), LLNL, and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, TN

3

What We Accomplished

Deployed for 2.5 months

Conducted 100 flights for a total of 525 flight hours

Collected 620 air samples, 250 in-situ spectra, and

141 soil samples

Logged 314,000 joint data points

4

DOE/NNSA Aerial Monitoring

What was done:

• Fixed wing and helicopter

• Up to 3 aircraft per day

• DOE & Japan joint survey

Why was it done:

• Map ground deposition out

to 80 km from FDNPP

• Support Humanitarian and

Disaster Relief Operations,

evacuation, relocation,

agricultural decisions

5

DOE/NNSA Ground Monitoring

What was done:

• Mobile mapping

• In-situ & exposure rate

• Air & soil sampling

• Contamination swipes

• DoD & Japan data aggregation

• Fixed sensor real-time network

Why was it done:

• Calibrate aerial measurements

• Define isotopic mix

• Characterize the inhalation component of integrated dose

• Assess vertical and horizontal

migration of deposited material

6

Customers/Partners

United States • Department of State

– American Embassy

• Department of Defense

– U.S. Forces Japan

• White House

• Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

• Advisory Team for

Environment, Food and

Health (EPA, CDC/HHS,

USDA)

Japan • Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Japan Atomic Energy Agency

Ministry of Defense • Ministry of Economy, Trade and

Industry • Nuclear and Industrial Safety

Agency

• Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology

• Nuclear Safety Technology Center

• Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

• Ministry of Health, Labor &

Welfare

7

Five Areas for Improvements

Instrumentation

Analysis Methods

Data Presentation

Training

Procedures

8

Instrumentation

Real-time monitoring

Mobile detection for Consequence Management

9

Infield Monitoring

System (IMS)

•An array of Sodium

Iodide radiation

detectors placed

at key location, as

identified by the

green dots, around

Fukushima Dai-ichi

•The IMS detects

changes in

radiation levels

•IMS continuously

monitored in real

time

Real-time Monitoring

10

Monitoring Results: Sendai to Tokyo 11

Analysis Methods

Evaluation of field measurement results

(aerial and ground)

Initial screening/reality check in the field

Further analysis by Home Team

Caution: You match models to measurements, not the other way around!

Trend analysis and quality control

12

Analysis Methods (continued)

Interpretation of real-world challenges posed by

multiple data sources

DOE, DoD, Japan

Lots of “What if?”

13

Data Presentation

“Its all about the data.”

But, you have to be able to explain it.

Templates

14

Quick Guide

15

Training

2011:

•All personnel in a team received same training

•Need for some personnel with more problem-solving skills

2016:

•Tiered training

•(Type 1, 2, 3)

•(Incident Command System)

•More personnel available

•Less time burden for many

•Core group of higher level problem solvers

•More sustainable

16

Training for Position Type

17

Procedures

Know your mission!

“It’s all about the planning, not the plan.”

Be able to cope with challenges.

Be prepared for anything but be flexible.

Unified team.

18

Conclusion

Robust international cooperation and

collaborative efforts are key to

improving regional and global

emergency response capabilities.

THANK YOU!

19

improvements in epr arrangements after fukushima daiichi

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