G.R. No. L-20392      December 18, 1968

MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-appellants

MAKALINTAL, J.:

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a

certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead

hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows:

1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00

2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00

3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00

4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00

5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00

6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior;B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:    (1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.F. Concussion, cerebral.

EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:    (1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.B. Abrasions, multiple:    (1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third

C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.

G.R. No. 85331 August 25, 1989

KAPALARAN BUS LINE, petitioner, vs.ANGEL CORONADO, LOPE GRAJERA, DIONISIO SHINYO, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents,

Leopoldo M. Consunto for petitioner.

Danilo S. Cruz for intervenor-appellee.

Conrado Manicad for private respondents.

 

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Kapalaran Bus Line ("Kapalaran") seeks the reversal or modification of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA G.R. CV No. 12476 and the absolution of petitioner from all liability arising from the collision between one of petitioner's buses and a jeepney owned by respondent Coronado, driven by respondent Grajera and in which jeepney respondent Shinyo was a passenger.

The facts of this case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are summarized in the trial court's decision and quoted in the Court of Appeals' own judgment in the following terms:

The accident happened on the National Highway at 10:30 A.M. on August 2, 1982. The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then corning from Pila, Laguna on its way towards the direction of Sta. Cruz, traversing the old highway. As it reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped and cautiously treated the intersection as a "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. The regular itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded with passengers and can no longer accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL bus neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio Llamoso admitted that there was another motor vehicle ahead of him.

The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way as against a feeder road. Another general rule is that the vehicle coming from the right has the right-of-way over the vehicle coming from the left. The general rules on right-of-way may be invoked only if both vehicles approach the intersection at almost the same time. In the case at bar, both roads are national roads. Also, the KBL bus was still far from the intersection when the jeepney reached the same. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera.

Behind Manicad were two vehicles, a car of his client and another car. A Laguna Transit bus had just entered the town of Pila ahead of Atty. Manicad.

The sketch marked Exhibit 'E' indicates very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. As testified to by Lope Grajera, the KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles of Atty. Manicad and the other vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both vehicles at the intersection, therefore, causing the accident.

Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about this time, the KBL bus was approaching the intersection and its driver was engaged in determining from his conductor if they would still pass through the town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they were already full, he turned his attention to the road and found the stopped vehicles at the intersection with the jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. The gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post (pp. 3-4, Decision; pp. 166167, Record). 1

On 14 September 1982, Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense was offense, filed a complaint for damage to property and physical injuries through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado and Lope Grajera in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Respondents answered with their own claims (counter-claims) for damages. A third-party complaint and/or a complaint for intervention was also filed in the same case against Kapalaran by jeepney passenger Dionisio Shinyo.

On 15 October 1986, after trial, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private respondents and ordering Kapalaran

(a) to pay Angel Coronado the sum of P40,000.00 as compensation for the totally wrecked jeepney, plus the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and

(b) to Dionisio Shinyo the sum of P35,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by said intervenor for his treatment including his car-hire, the further sum of P30,000.00 representing the expenses said defendant will incur for his second operation to remove the intramedulary nail from his femur, the additional sum of P50,000.00 to serve as moral damages for the pain and suffering inflicted on said defendant, plus the sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff, may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement, and the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

From the above judgment, Kapalaran appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court's findings on the issue of fault and the award of damages. The Court of Appeals, on 28 June 1988, affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages by setting aside the grant of exemplary damages as well as the award of attomey's fee and litigation expenses made to Dionisio Shinyo. 2

This decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us on a Petition for Review, a motion for reconsideration by Kapalaran having been denied by that court on 13 October 1988.

Kapalaran assails the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals, and insists before this Court that respondent Grajera, driver of the jeepney, was at fault and not the driver of Kapalaran's bus. It must be remembered that it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence presented by the parties all over again and that our jurisdiction is in principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. Kapalaran has made no compelling showing of any misapprehension of facts on the part of the Court of Appeals that would require us to review and overturn the factual findings of that court. On the contrary, examination of the record shows that not only are the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals and the trial court on who — the bus driver or the jeepney driver — had acted negligently and was at fault in the collision of their vehicles, amply supported by the evidence of record, but also that Kapalaran's bus driver was grossly negligent and had acted wantonly and in obvious disregard of the applicable rules on safety on the highway.

Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and travelling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. — (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. _1 (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at any railway grade crossing, or at any intersection of highways, unless such intersection or crossing is controlled by traffic signal, or unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking or passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent 3 a presumption Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.

Petitioner's contention that the jeepney should have stopped before entering the "Y-intersection" because of the possibility that another vehicle behind the cars which had stopped might not similarly stop and might swerve to the left to proceed to the highway en route to Manila, is more ingenious than substantial. It also offers illustration of the familiar litigation tactic of shifting blame from one's own shoulders to those of the other party. But the jeepney driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on the opposite side of the highway come to a stop to give way to him, had the right to assume that other vehicles further away and behind the stopped cars would similarly come to a stop and not seek illegally to overtake the stopped vehicles and come careening into the intersection at an unsafe speed. 4 Petitioner's bus was still relatively far away from the intersection when the jeepney entered the same; the bus collided head on into the jeepney because the bus had been going at an excessively high velocity immediately before and at the time of overtaking the stopped cars, and so caught the jeepney within the intersection. It was also the responsibility of the bus driver to see to it, when it overtook the two (2) cars ahead which had stopped at the intersection, that the left lane of the road within the intersection and beyond was clear. The point of impact was on the left side of the intersection (the light lane so far as concerns the jeepney coming from the opposite side), which was precisely the lane or side on which the jeepney had a right to be.

Petitioner Kapalaran also assails the award of moral damages against itself, upon the ground that its own bus driver, third-party defendant, was apparently not held liable by the trial court . 5 Hence, Kapalaran argues that there was no justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering that such liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence and that petitioner "as mere employer" was not guilty of such

negligence or imprudence. 6 This contention in thoroughly unpersuasive. The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver, 7 Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, 8 it should have appealled from that portion of the trial court's decision which had failed to hold the bus driver is not "merely subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the employee "cannot pay his liability" nor are private respondents compelled frist to proceed against the bus driver. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. 9 So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest consideirng Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

The Court of Appeals deleted the award of exemplary damages which the trial court had granted in order "to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff [Kapalaran], may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement." The Court of Appeals held that htere was no basis for this award of exemplary damages, stating that it was not "such a reprehensible act to try to gather witnesses for one's cause" and that there was no evidence of use of "presure or influence" to induce the accident victims to perjure themselves While that might have been so, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlook another and far more compelling basis for the award of exemplary damages against petitioner Kapalaran in this case. There is no question that petitioner's bus driver was grossly and very probably criminally negligent in his reckless disregard of the rights of other vehicles and their pasangers and of pedestrian as well The Court is entitled to take judicial notice of the gross negligence and the appalling disregard of the physical safety and property of others so commonly exhibited today by the drivers of passanger bussses and similar vehicles on our highways. The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence incarrying and transporting their passanger safely "as far as human care and foresight can proved, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances." 10 In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. 11 While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways. 12 The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether

passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence." Thus we believe that the award of exemplary damages by the trial court was quite proper, although granted for the wrong reason, and should not only be restored but augmented in the present case. The Court is aware that respondent Shinyo did not file a separate petition for review to set aside that portion of the Court of Appeals'decision which deleted the grant by the trial court of exemplary damages. It is settled, however, that issues which must be resolved if substantial justice is to be rendered to the parties, may and should be considered and decided by this Court even if those issues had not been explicitly raised by the party affected. 13 In the instant case, it is not only the demands of substantial justice but also the compelling considerations of public policy noted above, which impel us to the conclusion that the trial court's award of exemplary damages was erroneously deleted and must be restored and brought more nearly to the level which public policy and substantial justice require.

In much the same vein, we believe that the award by the trial court of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, deleted by the Court of Appeals, should similarly be restored, being both authorized by law 14 and demanded by substantial justice in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, except (1) that the award of exemplary damages to Dionisio Shinyo shall be restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be restored. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

FLORDELIZA MENDOZA,

Petitioner,

 

 

 

- versus -

 

 

 

MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her natural mother and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 164012 

Present:

 

QUISUMBING, J.,* Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,**

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

 

 

Promulgated:

 

June 8, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner

asks this Court to reverse and set aside the Decision1[1] dated November 17, 2003

*

*

1

and the Resolution2[2] dated May 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 69037. The appellate court found petitioner, as employer of Lomer Macasasa,

liable for damages.

The facts are as follows:

At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano, while crossing

Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon City, was hit by a speeding

Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was thrown five meters away,

while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. Gerard

Villaspin, one of Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the

hospital, but after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the

FX, only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical Center

where he later died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor recommended the

filing of a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide against

Macasasa.3[3]

On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano,

Soriano’s wife and daughter, respectively, filed a complaint for damages against

Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle.

The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. C-18038 in the Regional Trial Court

of Caloocan City, Branch 121. Respondents prayed that Macasasa and petitioner be

ordered to pay them: P200,000 moral damages; P500,000 for lost income; P22,250

for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and lapida; P8,066

for hospitalization, other medical and transportation expenses; P28,540 for food and

2

3

drinks during the wake; P50,000 exemplary damages; P60,000 indemnity for

Soriano’s death; and P25,000 for attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance.4[4]

In her answer, petitioner Mendoza maintained that she was not liable since

as owner of the vehicle, she had exercised the diligence of a good father of a

family over her employee, Macasasa.

Upon respondents’ motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa was

dismissed.

After trial, the trial court also dismissed the complaint against

petitioner.5[5] It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue

by using a small gap in the island’s fencing rather than the pedestrian

overpass. The lower court also ruled that petitioner was not negligent in the

selection and supervision of Macasasa since complainants presented no evidence to

support their allegation of petitioner’s negligence.6[6]

Respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The

dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED, and another one is hereby rendered ordering [petitioner] Flordeliza Mendoza to pay [respondents] Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano the following amounts:

1.      Hospital and Burial Expenses P80,926.252.      Loss of earning capacity P77,000.003.      Moral Damages P20,000.004.      Indemnity for the death of Sonny Soriano P50,000.00

4

5

6

Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts should, however, be reduced by twenty (20%) per cent due to the presence of contributory negligence by the victim as provided for in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.7[7]

While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also found

Macasasa negligent for speeding, such that he was unable to avoid hitting the

victim. It observed that Soriano’s own negligence did not preclude recovery of

damages from Macasasa’s negligence. It further held that since petitioner failed to

present evidence to the contrary, and conformably with Article 21808[8] of the Civil

Code, the presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and

supervision of employees stood.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in a

Resolution9[9] dated May 24, 2004.

Hence, this appeal where petitioner alleges that:I.

THE TOTAL AMOUNT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

II.

[COROLLARILY], THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS [HAS] NO BASIS IN LAW.10[10]

The issues are simple: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to try

the case? and (2) Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?

7

8

9

10

Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the

jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. She posits that to determine the

jurisdictional amount, what should only be considered are the following: P22,250

for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and lapida;

P8,066 for hospitalization and transportation; P28,540 for food and drinks during

the wake; and P60,000 indemnity for Soriano’s death. She maintains that the sum

of these amounts, P179,006, is below the jurisdictional amount of the Regional

Trial Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of the Judiciary Reorganization

Act of 1980, the following claims of respondents must be excluded: P200,000

moral damages, P500,000 for lost income; P50,000 exemplary damages; P25,000

attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance. Petitioner thus prays that the

decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the dismissal of the case by the

trial court be affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,11[11] as amended by Republic

Act No. 7691, states the pertinent law.

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.–Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

x x x x

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-9412[12] expressly states:

x x x x

11

12

2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Underscoring supplied.)

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and

effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious

acts.13[13] In this case, respondents’ claim of P929,006 in damages and P25,000

attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance represents the monetary equivalent for

compensation of the alleged injury. These money claims are the principal reliefs

sought by respondents in their complaint for damages.14[14] Consequently then, we

hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City possessed and properly exercised

jurisdiction over the case.15[15]

Petitioner further argues that since respondents caused the dismissal of the

complaint against Macasasa, there is no longer any basis to find her liable. She

claims that “no iota of evidence” was presented in this case to prove Macasasa’s

negligence, and besides, respondents can recover damages in the criminal case

against him.

Respondents counter that as Macasasa’s employer, petitioner was presumed

negligent in selecting and supervising Macasasa after he was found negligent by

the Court of Appeals.

13

14

15

The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land

Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid

endangering lives.16[16] Both the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa

overspeeding.17[17] The records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters

away after he was hit.18[18] Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters

from the point of impact.19[19]

Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by

Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid

Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section 55,20[20] Article V of the Land

Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to

the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no

showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the people’s wrath. What

remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a police officer, nor did

he summon a doctor. Under Article 218521[21] of the Civil Code, a person driving a

motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating

traffic regulations.

While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case

and petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and

employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due

16

17

18

19

20

21

diligence in supervising Macasasa.22[22] We must emphasize that this damage suit

is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of

Macasasa, as driver and employee.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages

caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The

liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising

their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good

father of a family to prevent the damage.

In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages

caused by Macasasa.23[23] Respondents could recover directly from petitioner24[24]

since petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a

family in supervising Macasasa.25[25] Indeed, it is unfortunate that petitioner

harbored the notion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the

case and opted not to present her evidence on this point.

Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano

was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while

crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the respondents now admit

this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced by 20% the

amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction26[26] of the amount

earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:

22

23

24

25

26

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and hereby

AFFIRM the Decision dated November 17, 2003 and the Resolution dated May

24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69037.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

JONAS AÑONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, respondent

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement to the rider.  It derives a certain charm from being unencumbered by any enclosure, affording the cyclist the perception of relative liberty.  It also carries some obvious risks on the part of the user and has become the subject of regulation, if not by the government, then by parental proscription.

The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the car which had struck him.  The argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to install safety devices on his bicycle.  However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist himself caused the collision with his own negligence.  The facts are deceptively simple, but the resolution entails thorough consideration of fundamental precepts on negligence.

The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of Pasig City, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.  Both courts adjudged petitioner, Jonas Añonuevo ( Añonuevo ), liable for the damages for the injuries sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia).  Instead, the petition hinges on a sole legal question, characterized as “novel” by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.[1]

As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city).  Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359.  The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan.  Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.  Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC.[2] He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.[3] Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs.[4] Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision[5] dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto[6]. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[7] dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo filed their respective petitions for review with this Court.  Procter and Gamble’s petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997.   Añonuevo’s petition,[8] on the other hand, was given due course,[9] and is the subject of this Decision.

In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC.  Among them: that it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had struck Villagracia;[10] that Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture;[11] that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo was “umaarangkada,” or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad;[12] that considering Añonuevo’s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn.  Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed;[13] and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided.[14] Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia.  Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.  Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of facts,[15] is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are in fact generally binding.[16]

Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions for resolution.  Añonuevo’s arguments are especially fixated on a particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.[17] In the same vein,

Añonuevo insists that Villagracia’s own fault and negligence serves to absolve the former of any liability for damages.

Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument.  Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.[18] Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance.  Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.[19] Before this Court, Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo’s own negligence.[20] Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages.  The Court of Appeals likewise acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but characterized the contention as “off-tangent” and insufficient to obviate the fact that it was Añonuevo’s own negligence that caused the accident.[21]

Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon.  He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy.  The provision reads:

Article 2185.  Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code.[22] Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage.

Still, Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles[23]. He points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then.  He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators “must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned,” yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has “inescapably become matter of public concern” so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times.[24]

What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power.  The Court interprets, and not creates, the law.  However, since the Court is being asked to consider the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185 could be interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.

At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata.  These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term “motorized vehicles.” If Añonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument

contradicts historical experience.  The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today.  This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty.  Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.

There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today.  He premises that the need for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these vehicles.  The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles.  A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force.  A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles.  At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision.  This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.

There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle.  As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v. Juanillo[25], the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed, greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, “and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads.”[26] In the same case, the Court emphasized:

A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident.  It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking.  It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts.  An automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances.[27]

American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and the cyclist.  Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists.[28] While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than from the latter.[29]

The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles.  Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations.  If such were indeed the evil

sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians.  Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel.  The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard.  Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.

Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy.  There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction.

Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia, this should not preclude any possible finding of negligence on his part.  While the legal argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia himself.

The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.[30] However, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.[31]

Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety devices thereon.  This view finds some support if anchored on the long standing principle of negligence per se.

The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.[32]  In Teague vs. Fernandez,[33] the Court cited with approval American authorities elucidating on the rule:

“The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained.  However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.”  (65 C.J.S. 1156)

“The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a

legal excuse.  According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation. x x x.”  (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)

“But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation.  If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous.  It is enough that it was prohibited.  Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence.  If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.  This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact.  The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated.  This court has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the manner of driving.”  (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).

“x  x  x  However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be maintained.  The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence.  The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” (38 Am Jur 841)[34]

In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire resulting in fatalities was found negligent, base on her failure to provide adequate fire exits in contravention of a Manila city ordinance.[35] In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[36], the failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances sufficed to support a finding of negligence.[37] In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, [38]the Court found that the failure of the petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with the statute constituted negligence per se, thus holding him liable for the damages for the destruction by fire of a customer’s vehicle garaged therein.

Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance?  It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles.  At face value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated.  Añonuevo argues that Villagracia’s violation should bar the latter’s recovery of damages, and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.

But this is by no means a simple case.  There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident.  This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the

path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists.  We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia.  Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages.  In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[39] a collision between a truck and a privately-owned Cimarron van caused the death of three of the van’s passengers.  The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code[40] at the time of the accident.  Among these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults, including the driver; and the van had only one functioning headlight.  Similar as in this case, petitioner therein invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be presumed negligent.  The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, dismissed these arguments:

[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles.  Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.  He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.  Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.  Petitioner says that “driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,” that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was ”decreased visibility,” and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased its maneuverability.” However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.[41]

Sanitary Steam[42] is controlling in this case.  The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury.  If anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result.  But such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident.  Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances reasonably require.[43] To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap.  The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat.  But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.  Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact.  After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others.[44]

Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief.  In the absence of statutory requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a bicycle.[45] In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a matter of law[46] but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist.[47] The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision;[48] however, the absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated by street lights,[49] if substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible,[50] if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon,[51] or if the motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights.[52] A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a contributing cause of the accident.[53]

The above doctrines reveal a common thread.  The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained.  The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.[54] Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.

On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth citing:

[As] admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters before the accident.  Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided the accident had he [stopped] alongside with an earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee.  But according to [eyewitness] Sorsano, he saw appellant Añonuevo “umaarangkada” and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30).  This earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Añonuevo at an unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia (TSN March 9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he did not blow his horn when he crossed Boni Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p. 47).[55]

By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Añonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia.  Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident.[56] A motorist has been held liable for injury to or death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to cause a collision.[57]

Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself.  Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against Villagracia.  Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracia’s own liability.

Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence.  The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf[58] clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant “in conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury.”[59] To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury.  In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.[61]

As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the accident.  The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed.  It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.  Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns.  The fact that Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.  Moreover, it was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s failure to have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury.  The fact that Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as not proven.

All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.