In defence of Europe

The support for European integration process among elites and masses

in the EU

Miguel Jerez Mir

(University of Granada)

José Real Dato

(University of Almería)

Rafael Vázquez García

(University of Granada)

Paper to be presented at the IPSA 21st World Congress of Political Science

(Santiago de Chile, Chile)

12-16 July 2009

(Draft version. Please, so not quote without permission of the authors)

2

Abstract

Elite perceptions and mass opinion about Europe are central points in order to

understand the current European integration process, as well as the future perspectives

for the continent. The paper we propose is a first descriptive exploration of the

differences and similarities between the perceptions political and economical elites as

well as citizens in several European countries have about the European Union process

and its mechanisms, according with data obtained in the first wave of interviews of the

INTUNE project survey (see below). The main goal is to identify the differences in

positions of elites and masses as well as the variations among countries or geographical

areas about the support for the integration process in the EU.

The data we use in this paper come from the INTUNE (Integrated and United?

A quest for Citizenship in an ¨ever closer Europe¨) Project survey on European elites

and masses, funded by the Sixth EU Framework Programme. The questionnaire was

applied between February and May 2007, in a total of 18 European countries (including

Serbia as a non EU member). The national teams got a total of almost 2000 valid

responses at European level regarding elites and almost 15000 for masses.

In the analysis we will show some general descriptive statistics about the support

for Europe taking as a reference some variables related to the main dimensions of the

analysis. In this sense, we will focus in such elements as the level of satisfaction of

being an EU member, the pro/anti European position, the preferences about power

sharing in policy-making, allocation of funds and taxes or the best territorial level to

deal with community problems, and some other variables as the opinion about the future

evolution of the integration process. The results are presented by distinguishing between

political elites (national MP’s in low/single chambers), economic elites (presidents of

corporations, general managers…) and public opinion and, at the same time, among 17

EU member-states, divided into three areas of countries: Western Europe, Southern

Europe, and Post-communist nations.

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In defence of Europe. The support for European integration process

among elites and masses in the EU∗∗∗∗

Miguel Jerez-Mir

José Real-Dato

Rafael Vázquez-García

“To achieve success we shall need a great deal of tenacity and patience, both within our own

countries and in negotiations between the Governments themselves. But, whatever the result we

achieve, the problem of the unification of Europe has been raised, and it can no longer be

elude.”

(Speech by Robert Schuman, in Council of Europe - Consultative Assembly)

(Strasbourg, December 10, 1951)

INTRODUCTION

It seems quite clear that the processes of European integration and EU’s political

development and institution building are shaped by interactions between elites and

masses. However, while large empirical evidence is available revealing mass attitudes

and orientations towards processes of European integration and identity building (see

Eurobarometer Series, McLaren 2002; and Díez 2003), there is still a serious deficit of

systematic comparative research on European elites. (Best, Cotta and Verzichelli, 2005).

This paper is a first descriptive exploration of the differences and similarities

between the perceptions political and economical elites as well as citizens in several

European countries have about the European Union process and its mechanisms

obtained in the first wave of the Intune project survey. 1

We have adopted a comparative perspective presenting the results in four

clusters of countries: Southern Europe (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain),

postcommunist states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,

∗

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Francisco J. Alarcón-González in the

management of data used in this paper. 1 “Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe”. Project, approved under the

6th Framework Programme of the European Commission. For details, see the official website:

www.intune.it.

4

Slovakia, and Slovenia)2, Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany,

France, United Kingdom)3, and the whole EU. Why this approach?. One of the things

that catch our eye is that, in general terms -with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Poland

for political elites and mass public opinion, respectively- the average level of support

among both elites and public in Central-Eastern European post-Communist countries

(CEEPC) is below the European mean. In contrast, all those countries traditionally

grouped under the category of Southern Europe -Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain

(Malefakis 1995; Bruneau et al. 2001)- display levels of support above that average.

Besides, regional patterns maintain along different types of interviewees, and elite and

public opinion views do not differ substantially within countries, with the exceptions of

Spain, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Thus, higher levels of Euroscepticism have been found

in CEEPC countries (i.e., Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2002; Rohrschneider and

Whitefield 2006, 2008), while Southern Europe has been traditionally more supportive

of the EU (i.e., Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004; Llamazares and Gramacho 2007). In

the case of Western Europe countries, both types of elites maintain central positions,

with the exception of the United Kingdom, showing lower means.

In our view both Inter-regional differences and intra-regional similarities make

these geographical areas suitable for comparison. Such features are directly related to

the conditions experienced during the process of accession to the EU for these groups of

countries. Despite the fact that both CEEPC and Southern European countries joined –

respectively – the EU and the EEC shortly after experiencing transitional processes

from non-democratic regimes4, there were different conditions surrounding such

processes. Regarding CEEPC countries, their societies have some characteristics that

differentiate them from those of the countries involved in previous stages of European

integration (Bozoki 2003). They shared the same fate during almost half of the century

following WWII, while they were kept under the close and vigilant observation of the

Soviet Union.

2 The mass survey includes does not include, Lithuania and Czech Republic. The elite survey does not

include Slovenia. 3 Austria has been included later on in the mass survey and data are not ready to be used for this report.

Therefore we will only include data on Austrian elites. 4 This particular condition does not apply to Italy, a founding member of the EEC.

5

In the case of Southern European countries, democratic transition and

consolidation were facilitated by the moderation shown by both the general public and

elites (Malefakis 1995, p. 75), which included a clearly pro-European stance, resulting

in political systems with little resemblance to their pre-democratic predecessors

(Bruneau et al. 2001, p. 81). Besides, democratisation processes in these countries (with

the exception of Italy, for obvious reasons) were favoured by the support they received

from other European countries and European international organizations. In this respect,

for Greece, Portugal, and Spain the advantages of joining the EEC clearly outnumbered

the effects of conditionality.

Concerning Western Europe, the term has geographic, political, and cultural

aspects. Since the end of World War II, the term has been used to describe the high-

income developed countries of Western Europe, characterized by democratic political

systems, mixed economies combining the free market with aspects of the welfare state,

alliance with the United States, and membership in NATO. Three of these six countries

are founding members (Belgium, France and Germany), two of them (United Kingdom

and Denmark) joint in 1973 and Austria in 1995.

Regarding dimensions, we have distinguished the three main ones in the Intune

Project plus a general one. As we will see later, this refers to general questions on

membership, benefits from being a member of the EU and the prospective for

enlargement.

Identity can be understood both as a feature (or a set of features) attributed to a

group of individuals on the basis of which they can be observed and perceived from the

outside as having significant elements of commonality, and as a feeling -or an array of

feelings- shared by individuals, which defines their belonging to a group of similar

people. Identities are multiple in nature. Hence, one may have a single identity, but it

could be made up of many levels of loyalty and identification. It often implies an

implicit or explicit comparative dimension (one’s group identity emerges more strongly

when compared to another group’s identity). Identity normally has a positive

connotation for those who share it, but it can have a negative image when attributed to

individuals from other groups. (Müller-Härlin 2003, pp. 269-271). Closely linked to

patriotism is an attitude that is often associated with citizenship -and identity as well-,

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and indicates a pride or predisposition to expressing enthusiasm towards symbols of the

polity. It presupposes an intense identification with the community. It is difficult to

conceive patriotism without strong feelings of identity. However, there may be feelings

of identity without patriotism. The discussion in the European Constitutional

Convention about the religious and cultural identity of Europe shows that, even if this

topic has become increasingly relevant, it is not easy to find a strong consensus on the

elements of a European identity. Meanwhile, it is important to note that, according to

surveys, feelings of a common European identity –which coexist with feelings of

national identity– already exist and have a greater or lesser intensity among the

populations of the old continent (Eder 2001; Delanty 2005). It is clear that increasing

numbers of Europeans do identify in one way or another with Europe, and claim to have

some kind of European identity, often alongside a national identity. Moreover, many

other scholars have emphasized how multiple identities –local, regional, national and

European– reinforce, rather than exclude, each other (Bruter 2005). The question of a

European identity and demos must therefore be seen in relation to entrenched national

identities (Fossum 2001). In this sense, studying European identity requires a

simultaneous consideration of other types of territorial identification.

Regarding representation, it can be said that this concept is still the dominant

instrument through which citizens exercise their prerogatives of self-government and by

which political elites of a community are legitimized in their governing role and kept

accountable (Pitkin 1967; Manin 1997; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). In the modern

democratic state, the experience of representation is limited to citizens. Only citizens as

members of the polity are represented. Viewed from the other side of the relationship,

representation has a crucial role in the construction of citizenship. While performing

such representative roles, elites contribute to the “production” and “reproduction” of

citizenship (both as members of the community and as a system of entitlements) and of

identity. Hence, European elites and institutions play a central role in the construction of

the representative link with European citizenship. In this sense, alignments and

aggregations among MEPs within the European Parliament along ideological rather

than purely territorial lines show that, to some extent, European representation exists

(Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). In this respect, here we use the degree to which

interviewees trust EU institutions as a proxy for the existence of such a European

representation link.

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Finally, when using scope of governance, we refer to some different variables as

the subjective impact of being European, the preference for national and/or European

army, the national-power sharing and the kind of evolution of the EU in the next years,

that is, what type of Europe are we supporting.

ANALYSIS

The data we use in this paper come from the INTUNE (Integrated and United?

A quest for Citizenship in an ¨ever closer Europe¨) Project survey on European elites

and masses, funded by the Sixth EU Framework Programme. The questionnaire was

applied between February and May 2007, in a total of 18 European countries (including

Serbia as a non EU member). The national teams got a total of 2145 valid responses at

European level regarding elites and almost 15000 for masses. Taking advantage of the

fact that some of the questions in both survey questionnaires are identical, for this study

we will concentrate on such questions to emphasize the comparison between the elite

and the common citizens’ perceptions.

General questions

Comparing territorial groupings, data in Table 1 shows clearly that Southern

European citizens evaluate positively the EU membership. More than three quarters of

the interviewees think EU membership has been a good thing for their country and that

it has benefited from it. In other geographic areas favorable opinions are also, on

average, above 60 percent, though citizens in the post-communist area are clearly the

most skeptical (on average, a 39.6 think that EU membership is not a good thing). More

interestingly, skepticism clearly rises when considering the impact of EU membership

on citizens own lives. Again, Southern Europeans appear to have the most positive

view, but the percentages clearly are lower compared with the opinions with respect to

their country (54 percent against 77.6 percent). In Western and Post-communist

countries, Euro-skeptic positions concerning individual effects of EU membership are

clearly a majority: on average, a 62.2 percent of citizens in Post-communist countries,

8

and a 55.5 of Western Europeans think common people has not benefited from EU

membership.

Concerning the general support for advancing EU integration (measured through

a 0-10 scale), it is evident from Table 1 that there is a strongly favorable opinion among

European citizens, particularly in Southern European countries.

Table 1. EU membership, benefits and enlargement views. Mass Survey

(Percentages)

South Postc. West Eur.

EU membership has been a good thing 76,1 61,4 68,8 67,8

[NAT] has benefited from EU membership 77,6 63,7 64,6 67,7

People like me have benefited from EU membership 54 38,8 44,5 44,7

EU gone too far…strengthen EU (0-10 scale) 7,96 7,62 6,48 7,33

Favor enlargement of EU very much/somewhat 67,1 67 49,1 61,1

Turkey’s membership of EU a good thing 36,6 22,8 32,6 29,7

Note: South: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain; Postc: Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria;

West: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, UK; EU: all countries

Concerning the enlargement issue, Table 1 shows how opinions in Southern

European and Post-communist converge, and two thirds – on average – of the citizens in

these areas favor the enlargement of EU.5 In contrast, citizens in Western European

countries are much more contrary to a further enlargement (almost a 51 percent).

However, when considering the specific case of Turkey as a candidate to become an EU

member, European citizenship is clearly against it (just a 29.7 percent of interviewees

think Turkey’s membership would be a good thing). Positions are, on average, more

intransigent among interviewees in Post-communist countries – maybe related to the

historical legacies of the occupation of some of these countries by the Ottoman Empire

during centuries.

The elite survey included two equivalent questions to those shown in Table 1,

and this will allow us to compare their perceptions with the common mass ones. Table 2

depicts the results of 17 countries included in the elite survey by type of elite. At a first

sight, it is evident that elites mostly perceive EU membership as a benefit for their

5 It would be interesting to explore if the motivations behind these opinions are the same for both groups

of countries, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

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country in a much greater extent than their citizens. Elites in Southern European

countries manifest a positive perception – average of almost 95 per cent-. The

percentage for Western Europe is slightly lower, but clearly above 90 per cent of

interviewees agree. Post-Communist countries are a little below, although almost nine

out of ten of the elite interviewed think positively about their countries becoming an EU

member. Finally, the row for the whole sample of countries, excluded Serbia, shows

that there is a clear consensus on the subject. Comparing these results with those shown

in Table 1, elites are undoubtedly much more convinced that EU membership has

benefited their own countries than the common citizens.

Considering each elite type separately, we find quite similar results, being

economic elites prone to a positive opinion on their countries being EU members, but

with percentages over 90 per cent in all the groups and for both type of elites. Political

elites in Southern Europe show a bit stronger support for the idea of being benefited

from Europe with Postcommunists and Western political elites with very similar

percentages behind it. In the case of economic elites, there are no clear differences with

a great consensus among them about the some idea.

Table 2 also shows how a majority of the interviewees (both in political and

economic elites) were in favour of strengthening the European Union. Once more,

Southern elites manifest a more pro-European attitude, being followed by Western

European elites. In the post-Communist countries, elite opinion in favour of a stronger

European Union seems to be less accentuated. Nevertheless, the mean is quite high (6.7

out of 10). However, in contrast with the former question, elites’ positions in Southern

European and particularly in Post-communist countries are milder compared with those

of common citizens, while in Western Europe elites appear to be more committed than

public opinions.

Table 2. Benefits from being an EU member and enlargement views. Elite Survey

(Percentages).

South Postc. West Eur.

My country has benefited from EU Political Elite 96,8 93,8 93,3 94,4

10

Economic Elite 98,2 97,5 99,1 98,2 membership

Total Elite 97,3 95 95,3 95,7

Political Elite 7,57 6,02 6,60 6,61

Economic Elite 7,37 6,24 7,02 6,78 EU gone too far…strengthen EU (0-10

scale)

Total Elite 7,5 6,10 6,75 6,67

Note: South: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain; Postcommunists: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,

Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria; West: Austria Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, UK; EU: all the countries.

Concerning the possibility of including Turkey as a new member in the future,

there are substantial differences among groups of countries regarding this issue. While

in Southern Europe only a 30.8 per cent of the elite think Turkey membership would be

a threat, this proportion is much higher in the other groups (about a 50 per cent). The

sample average is 45.2 per cent, which indicates the disparity of opinions about the

issue (see Table 3). Though the question included in the mass survey questionnaire asks

whether the respondent considers that Turkey’s accession would be a good thing, the

results can be compared with the results of the elites’ question we have just seen. In this

sense, higher shares of elites view Turkey’s accession as a threat (Post-communist and

Western Europe countries) correspond to lower shares of common citizens viewing

Turkey’s accession as a good thing (Post-communist, Western, and also Southern

countries). Hence there is a concordance between elites and citizens attitudes in the

different territories, with the exception of the Southern countries, where the citizens’

pattern of response is closer to the postcommunist and Western countries one while the

elites’ pattern of responses is lower.

Table 3. Turkey/ Other countries accession to the EU as a threat. Elite Survey

(Percentages)

South Postc. West Eur.

Political Elite 25,3 49,6 46,8 42,3

Economic Elite 42 54,7 52 50,6 The enlargement of EU include Turkey is

a big / quite a big threat

Total Elite 30,8 51,4 48,6 45,2

Political Elite 19,5 21,6 39,1 26,3

Economic Elite 34,9 23,7 41,3 32,3

The enlargement of EU to include other

countries (than Turkey) is a big / quite a

big threat Total Elite 24,8 22,3 39,9 28,4

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When we compare the positions of the different types of elites, we observe that

the economic elites have an enhanced perception of Turkey as a threat, irrespectively of

the geographic area. It is specially important the gap between economic and political

elites in Southern Europe, where political elite, as we have shown before, are much less

prone to consider Turkey as a threat. In Western Europe and post-Communist countries,

political and economic elites seem to manifest much closer opinions.

Finally, although questions in Table 1 and 3 concerning Turkey are not directly

comparable, it could be argued that public opinions in the three country areas follow the

general trends of their elites, although these seem to be more open to consider the reality

of Turkey’s accession in the future.

Identity

This section focuses on the set of questions on national and European identities. In the

first row of Table 4 we can see whether respondents feel their daily life affected by the

fact they are Europeans. A little more than a half of the Southern Europeans (53.6 per

cent) agree with this sentence. In the remaining parts of Europe the percentage of people

feeling this way does not reach the 50 per cent, being citizens in Post-communist those

who feel less affected (38.9 percent).

Secondly, when respondents were asked to what extent they feel European or

identify with their nation state, Table 4 shows how citizens in Southern European

countries appear to be the less exclusively identified with their nation-state (29.1 per

cent) compared with those in the other country areas. In this respect, exclusive national

identification is higher, on average, among citizens in Post-communist countries, being

the percentage feeling only national higher than those with mixed (national and

European) identities. In contrast, this type of identification clearly prevails among

respondents in Southern Europe (56.9 plus 6.7 percent) and Western Europe (46.3 plus

9.7). Finally, exclusive European identification is residual in all areas, particularly

among citizens in Post-communist countries (just 1.7 percent, on average, feel just

European).

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Another identity measure refers to the degree of attachment to different

territorial levels (from their own town to Europe). Here there is a clear contrast between

the degree of attachment to Europe and that to the rest of territorial settings. Less than

two thirds of interviewees feel attached to Europe in all areas, whereas the degree of

identification to other levels is greater than 80 percent in all groups and territories (with

the exception of regional level in Western Europe countries). In this respect, citizens

feel mostly attached to their country (particularly in Post-communist countries),

followed by the local level. Nevertheless, differences between the local and regional

levels are quite short (at most a 5 percent in Western Europe).

Table 4 also includes the results of a battery of eight questions related to the

components of national and European identity. It appears that, concerning national

identity, what could be termed as civic features (respecting laws and institutions,

feeling national, and mastering the national language) are considered the most relevant

components: on average, more than a 90 percent of interviewees in all country areas

agree these are important elements to be national, with the exception of ‘feeling

national’ in Western European countries. Besides, sharing cultural traditions (which it is

not a purely civic feature, but could be interpreted as such in some contexts) is

considered very important (above all in Southern and Post-communist countries), even

more important than exercising political rights (which is a pure civic manifestation). In

contrast with civic features, ascribed features (having national parents and being born in

the country) are comparatively considered to be less important in all areas, particularly

in Western Europe. Finally, religion (being Christian) is the least important component

of national identity in all areas, although there are significant differences between

country areas (i.e. religion is much more important, on average, among Southern

European citizens than in Western European countries).

Table 4. National and European Identities. Mass Survey (Percentages)

South Postc. West Eur.

Being European affects my feelings of daily life 53,6 38,9 49,9 46,4

Feels [NAT] only 29,1 47,2 36,3 38,7

Feels [NAT] and European 56,9 42,9 46,3 47,7

Feels European and [NAT] 6,7 5,3 9,7 7,1

Feels European only 4,9 1,7 5,2 3,7

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None of the above (spontaneous) 1,6 1,8 2,1 1,9

Feel attached to.

The town or village 85.4 88.9 83.3 86.1

The region 84 85.9 78 82.8

The country 89.8 93.7 87 90,4

Europe 64,8 64,5 62,4 63,8

For being [NAT] it is very/somewhat important:

To be Christian 55 49,6 36,2 46,6

To share [NAT] cultural traditions 89,8 90,7 82,3 87,7

To be born in [NAT] 77,8 76,4 55,7 69,9

To have [NAT] parents 77,2 77,6 51,9 69

To respect [NAT] laws and institutions 94,7 94,3 96,3 95,1

To feel [NAT] 90,8 92,7 81,7 88,6

To master [NAT] language 91,8 96,4 95,1 94,7

To exercise [NAT] political rights 82,7 70,4 76,2 75,6

For being European it is very/somewhat

important:

To be Christian 47,6 41,3 31,6 39,8

To share European cultural traditions 73,2 78,2 69,6 74,0

To be born in Europe 68,9 66,5 52,6 62,5

To have European parents 62 62,1 47,6 57,3

To respect European laws and institutions 89,5 88,4 87,3 88,3

To feel European 79 82,2 70,8 77,5

To master a European language 87,9 86,7 88,8 87,7

To exercise European political rights 79,2 64,3 64,3 68,2

Trust in fellow nationals (0-10 scale) 7,43 7,15 7,62 7,38

Trust in other Europeans (0-10 scale) 6,78 6,95 6,82 6,86

Trust in others outside Europe (0-10 scale) 6,00 6,45 6,17 6,24

The same set of questions was used to ask respondents about the content of

European identity. It is interesting here how the results parallel with those on the

content of national identities: civic features are considered the most relevant

components of European identity, followed by ascribed ones, while the opinion that

religion is considered important by a minority (with also substantive differences

between groups). The only remarkable difference is that sharing the cultural traditions is

less important to be European than to be national. Besides, it is also evident from Table

4 that the level of agreement in all these items are lower concerning the elements of

European identity than those of the national one. Thus, it can be concluded that what

defines Europeanness is less clear than what defines nationhood, which makes sense up

to the point that Europe contains a variety of different customs and traditions.

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Finally, the last three rows in table 4 show the degree of respondent’s trust in

their fellow nationals, trust in other Europeans, and trust in people from outside Europe.

It can be seen how the ordering follows a proximity logic in all areas: those most trusted

are fellow nationals, then other Europeans, and finally people from outside Europe.

Besides there are also clear differences between country groups. The difference between

the levels of trust Western and Southern Europeans have on their fellow nationals and

the other categories (0.8 and 1.45 for Western European citizens, and 0.65 and 1.43 for

Southern European ones) are much higher than those for respondents in Post-communist

countries (0.20 and 0.7).

Studying European identity also requires paying attention to other types of

territorial identification. First of all, we explore how interviewees feel attached to

national and sub-national territorial levels. There is a clear unanimity among political

elites about being attached to their own cities, with a percentage above 90 points in all

cases. Southern European elites’ degree of attachment is only slightly lower. In contrast,

public opinion shows a lower level of attachment to their local community than political

elites, although the minimum is also quite high. Once more, the highest levels

correspond to Post-Communist countries, where publics show a tighter bond to their

town than in Southern and Western Europe. Differences between types of interviewees

within countries favour in all cases the political elites

There is no pattern regarding geographic areas. The wide range clearly suggests

the different perceptions of the regional realities existing in each country, independently

of the geographic area we consider (if looking for regularities, political elites in

Southern Europe usually show more homogeneous positions, all above the European

average). Public opinion is more heterogeneous both among and within countries.

Regarding the degree of attachment to one’s country, once more we observe

heterogeneity within geographical areas, with Western elites less prone to be attached to

their own country than Southern and Post-communist ones. When comparing with

public opinion, we see that public in Post-communist countries show a stronger

attachment than people in Southern and Western Europe. Finally, both types of elites in

the three groups of countries express a quite strong identification with the European

level, around 85%, while pro-European positions are more visible among political elites

15

(with the exception of Western countries) than economic ones, and particularly in

Southern Europe. At the some time, the difference in this level between masses and

elites is quite visible, with almost 20 points of difference in favor of elites.

Concerning the components of national and European identities, when we turn to

the answers of the political and economic elites, we can see in Table 5 that there is a

considerable degree of variation in the nation-state identity between both types of elites

and, above all, among geographic areas. Regarding the importance of ‘being Christian’

in order to be a truly national citizen, only a 20.6 per cent of political elites and 23.9 of

economic ones in Western Europe seems to agree, while higher shares Southern Europe,

post-Communist counterparts consider that this attribute is relevant (36.9 and 48.6

respectively). With respect to the economic elites, in Southern countries, economic elite

puts similar emphasis on being Christian while, on the contrary, in post-Communist

countries Christianity is much less important for this type of elite than for the political

one (more than 15 points below). Considering the whole sample average, being

Christian is more important for the political than for the economic elites.

Concerning the attribute of “mastering the language of the country”, there is a

great homogeneity in the opinions both between elites and among geographic areas. In

all cases it is considered a fundamental attribute. It is also evident the consensus on

“respecting national laws and institutions” as an attribute of being national.

Interviewees who agree to this point are above 90 per cent in all geographic areas and in

both types of elites, with some lower percentages in Western Europe.

Table 5. Attributes to be a truly national and a truly European. Elite Survey

(Percentages)

South Postc. West Eur.

Polit. Econ. Total Polit. Econ. Total Polit. Econ. Total Polit. Econ. Total

Feel attached to.

The town or village 94,7 83,9 91,1 97,8 85,1 93,4 95,3 74,6 88,3 96,2 81,4 91,2

The region 93,6 67,6 85,1 89,8 71,4 83,4 85 68,9 79,5 89,2 69,6 82,6

The country 96,2 97,6 96,7 99,1 93,7 97,2 90,4 90,5 90,4 95,5 93,6 94,9

Europe 90,1 87,5 89,2 85,9 80,9 84,2 84,3 84,3 84,3 86,5 83,7 85,5

For being truly

national (Important +

somewhat important)

To be Christian 36,9 37 37 48,6 31,5 42,7 20,6 23,9 21,7 36,4 30,5 34,4

16

To share [NAT]

cultural traditions 85,3 88 86,3 97,4 91,2 95,3 80 84,4 81,5 88,6 88,3 88,5

To be born in [NAT] 67 63 65,8 68,7 59,8 65,7 32 36,3 33,4 56,4 53 55,2

To have [NAT]

parents 71,3 68 70,3 78,9 71 76,2 33 47,9 38,2 62,1 62,7 62,3

To respect [NAT]

laws and

institutions 96,5 95 96,1 95,5 88,3 93,1 96 93,1 95 95,9 91,6 94,5

To feel [NAT] 93,5 94 93,7 98,3 91,5 96 80 85,2 81,8 91,2 90,1 90,8

To master [NAT]

language 89,2 94 95,9 96,7 96,8 96,7 95 97,7 90,8 94,2 96,4 94,7

To be a [NAT]

citizen 83,6 77 81,6 81,4 72,4 78,3 78 76,2 81,6 80,9 74,9 78,8

For being truly

European (important

+ somewhat

important)

To be Christian 27,1 28 27,3 44,7 25,4 38 19 21,5 19,8 31,8 24,7 29,4

To share European

cultural traditions 81,5 85 82,8 91,2 90,2 90,9 78 83,4 79,6 84,3 86,8 85,1

To be born in Europe 59,6 57 58,6 55 53,3 54,4 33 38,6 35,2 49,2 49,3 49,3

To have European

parents 52,4 51 51,9 60,8 53 58,1 32 48,6 37,7 49,3 51 49,9

To respect European

laws and institutions 94,7 97 95,5 93,2 92,3 92,9 92 92,8 92,2 93,2 93,7 93,3

To feel European 96,5 95 96,1 96,3 94,4 95,7 88 89,9 88,9 93,8 93,2 93,6

To master an

European language 91,9 92 92 92,6 95,8 93,7 93 96,4 94,1 92,5 95,1 93,4

With regards to European identity, we find a great consensus on three attributes

to be a truly European (to respect European laws and institutions, to feel European, and

to respect European laws and institutions) in both economic and political elites and

across Europe, with the exception of political elite in Western countries. It seems to be

something less important the question about sharing European cultural traditions,

particularly for Western political elites again. As well as in Mass survey, to be Christian

is the least important attribute in order to be a truly European citizen.

The comparison between elites and citizens responses shows that, in general,

smaller shares of elites than common citizens tend to consider relevant the ascribed

features of both identities. Additionally, higher proportions of elites think that the civic

and voluntaristic features are more relevant for both nation-state and European

identities. Elites, hence, seem more leaned than common citizens to stress the more

inclusive features of identity.

Representation

17

Table 6 reports some attitudes on political institutions and actors at the national

and the European Union levels. The first two questions correspond to the satisfaction

with the way democracy works in the interviewees’ own country and in the EU.

Everywhere the percentage of population satisfied with how democracy works in the

EU is higher than the share satisfied with democracy in their country. However, there

are significant differences between both items along country areas. Thus, in Western

Europe there are only 5.1 percentage points of difference, on average; while in Southern

Europe and Post-communist countries (where a majority of citizens are not satisfied

with democracy – 59.2 and 62.2 percent, respectively) the differences between the level

of satisfaction with EU and national democracy are 22.7 and 20.7 percent, respectively).

However, these positions on democracy do not undermine the majority perception of

voting as a civic duty, both at a national and European level. However, the strength of

this perception is lower in the European case. Besides, there are substantial differences

between the opinions of citizens in Southern and Western European countries and those

in Post-communist countries, where the perception of voting as a civic duty is much

weaker.

Although a majority of citizens in all three country groups are satisfied with

democracy in EU, there is a strong alienation feeling with respect to EU decision-

makers (on average, a 66.5 percent of respondents declares EU decision makers don’t

care about what they think). However, the comparatively positive evaluation of the EU

with respect to national decision makers maintains in Southern and Post-communist

areas. In contrast, Western European citizens believe, on average, that their national

decision-makers “don’t care” about what they think less than European ones.

Table 6. Attitudes on Political Institutions and Actors. Mass Survey (Percentages)

South Postc. West Eur.

Very/somewhat satisfied with democracy in [NAT] 41,8 38,8 54,2 44,7

Very/somewhat satisfied with democracy in EU 64,5 59,5 59,37 60,7

Agree/somewhat agree that:

EU decision-makers don’t care what I think 64,6 70,5 63,1 66,5

[NAT] decision-makers don’t care what I think 67,6 75,5 58,7 67,8

Agree/somewhat agree that:

18

EU decision-makers are competent 60,4 63,6 58,1 60,9

[NAT] decision-makers are competent 45,5 44,5 57,5 49,1

EU doesn’t take enough account of [NAT] interests 57,2 64,8 55,9 59,9

Agree non voting neglects European civic duty 74,7 59,7 73,1 68,1

Agree non voting neglects national civic duty 81,7 69,5 83,7 77,5

Trust [NAT] parliament (0-10 scale)* 5,67 4,89 6,29 5,56

Trust EU parliament (0-10 scale)* 6,64 6,69 6,05 6,57

Trust Regional government (0-10 scale)* 6,11 6,38 6,56 6,37

Trust [NAT] government (0-10 scale)* 5,57 5,22 6,03 5,58

Trust European Commission (0-10 scale)* 6,88 7,10 6,26 6,76

Despite this vision of EU decision-makers, there is a majority positive

perception among European citizens of their competency. Again, this is in contrast with

views of national decision-makers in Southern and Post-communist countries, where a

majority of interviewees find them to be non-competent.

The last five rows in Table 6 show the mean scores of political confidence.

Looking at the trust levels in the legislative bodies, both in Southern Europe and in the

Post-communist countries, people tend to put more trust in the EU Parliament than in

their respective national parliaments. Again, this trend reverses when citizens of

Western European countries are asked. If we turn to the levels of trust in the executive

branches of nation-states and the EU, the same pattern appears: the European

Commission is more trusted than the national governments. Concerning regional

governments, they are ‘in between’ both in Southern and Post-communist countries,

while in Western Europe these are the most trusted political institutions, even more than

European ones. Thus, summarizing the content of Table 6, it is evident that citizens in

Southern European and Post-communist countries have a more positive view of

European institutions compared with that of national ones. On the contrary, in Western

European countries, national institutions, with the exception of national executives,

slightly prevail on European ones.

The elite survey only includes the political representation questions related to

trust in political institutions. Political elites were just asked about their trust on EU

19

institutions (Parliament, Commission, and Council) while economic elites questions

also included national institutions. Elites are generally more confident with the political

institutions than common citizens, although as we will see, there are some differences

between the trust levels of economic and political elites. Regarding the national

parliament, there are significant differences among geographic areas (see Table 7).

While in Southern Europe the mean (within a scale between 0 – “no trust at all” – and

10 – “complete trust”) is 5.7 points, in the post-Communist countries it is only 4.4, and

in Western Europe, 6.3. With respect to the European Parliament, there are not

significant differences of opinion among geographic areas. Between elites, these

differences are somewhat greater. Thus, with the exception of the political elite of post-

Communist countries, in the rest of country groups the interviewees belonging to this

type of elite assign a similar level of trust to the EP (between 6 and 6.5 points).

Economic elite show also similar responses along geographic areas, although their trust

in the institution is lower than that of political elites (5.4 of average in the whole

sample).

Concerning national government (economic elites only), the results are similar to

those regarding national parliament. Western Europe and Southern nations business

elite show the greater level of trust, a percentage point above the mean score in post-

communist Europe. Regarding regional governments, differences among geographic

areas are also relevant. Western European countries and Postcommunist economic elites

show the high level of trust in this level of government (5.1 and 4.9 points). In contrast,

the Southern European business elite manifest the lowest level of trust in their regional

authorities (4.4 points). Finally, with respect to the European Commission and the

European Council of Ministers, there are not significant differences among geographic

areas neither between types of elites. However, it is also relevant the higher degree of

trust shown by the Mediterranean (including Portugal) elites toward these institutions.

Table 7. Trust in Institutions. Elite Survey (means of 0-10 scales)

South Postc. West Eur.

Polit Econ. Total Polit Econ. Total Polit Econ. Total Polit Econ. Total

[National]

Parliament 5,7 4,4 6,3 5,3

20

European

Parliament 6,4 5,7 6,1 5,8 5,2 5,5 6,4 5,4 6 6,1 5,4 5,8

[National]

Government 5,7 4,7 6,4 5,5

European

Commision 5,9 6,1 5,9 5,7 5,4 5,6 5,2 5,5 5,3 5,6 5,6 5,6

European Council 6 5,8 5,9 5,9 5,4 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,8 5,6 5,7

Regional

Government 4,4 4,9 5,9 5,1

Comparing elites and masses’ opinions (as far as it is possible), some interesting

results appear. Concerning the trust on European parliament, citizens in Southern and

Post-communist countries (particularly in the later) show a greater average level than

their elites, being the contrast outstanding compared with economic elites. On the

contrary, political elites in Western European countries are slightly more confident in

the European parliament than their citizen compatriots, while economic elites are even

less confident than the later. Differences of trust between elites and masses are greater

concerning European Commission. Regarding this item, citizens’ level of trust is higher

than that of elites in all country areas.

Scope of Government

Let’s turn now our attention to the questions related to the scope of governance.

Table 8 presents the opinions of European citizens on the Europeanization of some

policy areas. Concerning the topic of European vs. national army, it is evident how the

option ‘just an European army’ is the less preferred in the three country areas. The

mixed option (national and European) is clearly preferred, on average, by Western

European citizens, while in Post-communist and Southern European countries opinions

national and mixed options have almost the same level of support.

Table 8. Attitudes on the Scope of Governance. Mass Survey (Percentages)

South Postc. West Eur.

National Army vs. European Union Army

Have only [NAT] army 34,2 36,4 30 33,7

Have only European army 21,5 17,5 19,9 19,4

21

Have both [NAT] and European army 35,2 34,1 44,4 37,8

Neither (Spontaneous) 4,6 5,2 3,5 4,5

EU should decide on fighting unemployment 23,3 18,8 20,6 20,6

EU should decide on immigration policy 44 37 39,6 39,7

EU should decide on environmental policy 38,6 35,9 52,2 42

EU should decide on the fight against crime 32,3 35,9 38,1 35,6

EU should decide on health care policy 18,2 16,7 19,6 18,1

EU should decide on agricultural policy 22,6 24,3 35,2 27,5

Favour (very/ somewhat) unified EU tax policy in 10 years 61,6 50 50,9 53,3

Favour (very/ somewhat)common EU system of social

security in 10 years 77,4 72,8 61,3 70,4

Favour (very/ somewhat) single EU foreign policy 70,8 70 65,9 68,9

Favour (very/ somewhat) more help for EU regions in

difficulties in 10 years 89,7 85,7 77,5 84

Main aim EU should be greater competition (against better

social welfare) 26,1 25,5 39,7 30,4

When considering the Europeanization of a number of policy areas, it is evident

that, in general terms, there is a clear difference between what could be considered

‘internal’ – health care, fighting unemployment, agricultural policy – and ‘transnational’

– immigration, environment, and fighting against crime – policy issues. A strongest

support to full Europeanization is preferred on the later policy issues (in all cases, above

30 percent) while this option is much less frequent for internal policy issues (always

below 25 percent, with the exception of agriculture policy in Western Europe). Having

this in mind, there are, nonetheless, differences between country areas regarding

specific preferences, which may reflect the prevalence of each topic in national agendas.

Thus, a majority of citizens in Western European countries prefer environmental policy

to be fully Europeanised, while this occurs in Southern Europe for immigration policy.

Concerning the Europeanisation of three policy areas (taxation, foreign policy

and social security) in 10 years, here, Europeanisation is preferred by a majority in all

cases, although there are differences in strength along country groups and policy issues.

Computing the average of the three policy areas by country group, it appears that, in

general terms, Southern European citizens tend to be more favorable to Europeanisation

(as it was expected from the analysis of general attitudes toward EU). In contrast,

22

citizens in Western European countries are the least enthusiastic (although a majority

favors Europeanisation in all three policy areas in 10 years). Concerning policy areas,

the one that generates less support is taxation. Here, positions in Southern European

countries are more favorable (61.6 percent), while public opinions in Post-communist

and Western European are clearly divided half to half. Positions in the three country

areas are more favorable to the Europeanisation of foreign policy and social security.

Foreign policy is the area where opinions are more homogenous, less than five

percentage points between the most (Southern Europe, 70.8) and the least (Western

Europe, 65.9) supportive country areas. Greater differences between groups appear

concerning social security, where Southern European citizens show the greater

enthusiasm (77.4 percent favor the Europeanisation of this policy area in 10 years), with

respondents in Post-communist countries being at a distance of 4.6 percentage points

(72.8). In contrast, citizens in Western Europe are a little milder in their support to the

Europeanisation of social security, with a 61.3 percent favouring this alternative.

Finally, Table 8 also shows data on the opinions concerning the degree EU

should be an instrument of solidarity and redistribution. This is measured by two items:

the EU should offer more help for regions in difficulties, and the main goal of the EU

should be promoting greater competition (against ‘better social welfare’ or ‘both’, as

alternative goals). Here it is evident that there is a great level of support to the

redistributive and solidarity instrument. Again, there are differences between country

groups, with Southern European citizens being the most supportive (89.7) for the EU

helps regions with difficulties, while the percentage of respondents who agree to it in

Western European countries lowers to a 77.5. Accordingly, although they are still a

minority, the proportion of those agreeing with promoting greater competition as the

sole goal of the EU in Western European countries is the highest along the three

geographic areas (39.7 percent), whereas it reduces to almost a quarter of the

interviewees in Southern and Post-communist countries.

The option for a European Army is more supported by economic elites than

political ones, and is more popular among Western and Southern elites than among their

counterparts in Postcommunist countries. The same situation could be said for masses,

although showing lower rates. In any case, elites and public opinion prefer the

combined option of both types of armies working at the same time.

23

We can also observe a similarity between the patterns of elites and masses’

opinions concerning what has been called ‘internal’ and ‘transnational’ policy issues.

However, there are some subtle differences. Concerning transnational policy issues,

there is a stronger support for the Euroepanization of immigration and environmental

policies among elites in all three country areas. In contrast, publics are more favourable

to the Europeanisation of fighting against crime. Regarding ‘internal’ policy issues,

elites’ positions are even more ‘nationalistic’ than their citizen counterparts, particularly

in Western European countries.

When were asked about the possibility of the Europeanization in 10 years of

taxation, social security, and foreign policy, they clearly show a general, majority

support. Again, there are also variations along policies and country groups. Both types

of elites in all geographic areas greatly favour the possibility of a single foreign policy,

particularly among the economic elites (Table 9). In fact, elites are much more

enthusiastic on this topic than their country citizens (i.e., there are 21.4 percentage

points of difference between political elites and citizens in Southern European countries,

14.5 in the Post-communist area, and 16.2 in the Western European countries). The

option of a common system of social security is the second most supported by elites in

Southern and Post-communist countries – where, once more, elites are much more

enthusiastic than the common people. In contrast, despite that approximately a half of

the interviewees in the elite sample in Western Europe favour this option, they are by

large the least supportive of a single system of social security, even in a greater

proportion than their citizen counterparts. Concerning the alternative of a unified tax

system, the views of citizens and political elites are closer in Post-communist and

Western European countries, while in Southern Europe, elites are much more pro-

European in this topic than the respondents to the mass questionnaire. It is also

interesting to observe how economic elites are much more favourable to a unified tax

system in all country areas, particularly in Western Europe, where they are more

supportive for this option than political elites and citizenship. Finally, economic elite

show a higher degree of support for a more competitive economy than politicians, the

difference being particularly great in the South of Europe with almost 50 points of

difference and more that 40 points in Western Europe

24

Table 9. Scope of governance preferences. Elite Survey (Percentages).

South Postc. West Eur.

Polit Econ. Total Polit Econ. Total Polit Econ. Total Polit Econ. Total

National Army vs.

European Union

Army

Have only [NAT] army 16,4 14,6 15,8 38,3 26 34,1 33,8 16,1 27,8 31,3 19,8 27,3 Have only European army 34,2 40,9 36,5 15,6 25,6 19 33,3 47,2 38,1 26,2 36,6 29,8 Have both [NAT] and

European army 46,2 41,5 44,6 44,1 45,8 44,7 29,6 33,9 31 39,9 40,8 40,2

Neither (Spontaneous) 3,2 2,9 3,1 2 2,5 2,2 3,3 31 3,1 2,8 2,7 2,7

EU should decide on fighting

unemployment

20,5 21,6 20,9 10 13,1 11,1 14,5 15,5 14,9 14,2 16,1 14,9

EU should decide on

immigration policy 48,4 59,3 51,9 39,6 36,2 38,4 49,6 50,7 50 45,1 46,7 45,7

EU should decide on environmental policy

45 55,1 48,2 34,5 40,3 36,5 56,7 62,6 58,8 44,4 51,3 46,7

EU should decide on

the fight against crime 25,6 26,7 26 18,6 24 20,4 30 36,4 32,1 24,1 28,7 25,6

EU should decide on

health care policy 4,9 18,2 9,2 4 10,3 6,2 6,2 11,8 8,1 4,9 12,7 7,6

EU should decide on taxation policy

19,6 34,3 24,4 9,5 19 12,8 20,7 29,3 23,6 15,7 26,1 19,3

Favour (very/

somewhat) unified EU tax policy in 10 years

71,2 75,3 72,6 52,1 53,7 52,7 51,9 59,6 54,5 57,1 61,1 58,4

Favour (very/

somewhat)common

EU system of social security in 10 years

87,7 83,6 86,3 64,9 62,9 64,2 50,7 48,9 50 66,3 63,5 65,3

Favour (very/

somewhat) single EU

foreign policy

92,2 93,1 92,4 84,5 91,2 86,8 82,1 87,4 83,9 85,7 90,4 87,3

Favour (very/ somewhat) more help

for EU regions in

difficulties in 10 years

95,9 93 94,9 93,7 89 92 80,5 66,1 75,5 90 82,5 87,4

Main aim EU should

be greater competition (against better social

welfare)

18,4 62,8 33,3 53 75,9 60,9 34,4 75,8 49 38 72,6 49,9

Concerning the view of the EU as a redistributive and solidarity instrument, such

idea is strongly supported among elites, being those in Southern European and Post-

communist countries the more enthusiastic. In contrast, political, and particularly,

economic elites in Western Europe are less enthusiastic. Besides, with the exception of

the later, in all cases elites are more favourable to this redistributive view than their

fellow citizens in their respective country areas.

25

When comparing elites’ views with those of common citizens, we find that

similar proportions of both groups support the creation of a unified tax system and to

increase help for regions in economic or social difficulties. Differences arise in the

remaining two issues: on the one hand, elites seem everywhere more convinced than

common citizens about the necessity to create a single EU foreign policy; and on the

other hand, common citizens from Southern, Post-communist and Western countries are

more in favour of a common system of social security than their respective elites.

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS

The previous pages offer a general view of the results obtained by the first wave

INTUNE project surveys on the attitudes and opinions of European masses and elites

concerning different dimensions of the European integration process. Of course,

subsequent explanatory work is needed in order to get a more complete view of the

causal vectors explaining the different attitudes and opinions the paper refers to.

However, it is the authors’ opinion that the descriptive results are significant enough to

receive a separate and extensive treatment, as this paper confirms.

Concerning the chosen style of presentation along broad geographic areas, it is

evident that such option may be subject to discussion – mainly as within group

differences are not taken into account. However, as it has been argued, this is a widely

legitimated strategy in the literature and, above all, it is a useful instrument to what is

the main purpose of this paper – that is, to reduce complexity and offer a first quick and

general view of the opinions of European citizens and elites on the questions of interest.

Thus, some interesting features appear from the previous pages. Concerning

general support to the European integration process, although citizens widely support

the process (mainly in Southern countries) they perceive, in general, a low individual

impact of EU membership. In addition, elites also mostly perceive EU membership as a

benefit for their country in a much greater extent than their citizens, although they are

comparatively more reluctant than their citizenships (particularly in Southern European

and Post-communist countries) to support advancing EU integration.

26

With respect to the identity dimension, as expected, elements of European

identity are weaker than those of lower territorial levels (particularly compared with

national. This occurs both for elites and masses, although elites offer a much stronger

pro-European stance. Concerning the components of both national and European

identity, both public and (in a greater extent) elites think that civic elements are much

more important than ascribed or religious ones.

The syndrome of general support but individual alienation mentioned in

reference to public’s general opinions is also reflected when examining the

representation dimension. Although a majority of citizens in all three country groups are

satisfied with democracy in EU, there is however a strong feeling that EU decision

makers do not care about what they think. Nevertheless, the perception of the

competency of EU decision-makers seems to compensate such potentially dangerous

feeling, and a much more negative view of national institutions (particularly in Southern

and Post-Communist countries). In contrast, elites have a much more negative view of

EU decision makers and institutions (with the exception of Western elites concerning

the European Parliament).

Finally, regarding the scope of governance dimension, there is a clear difference

between ‘internal’ (health care, fighting unemployment, agricultural policy) and

‘transnational’ (immigration, environment, and fighting against crime) policy issues

both for elites and public, although there are subtle differences between them on

specific subjects (i.e. fighting crime).

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