in metaphysics ii (english translation)

8/11/2019 In METAPHYSICS II (English Translation)

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METAPHYSICSBOOK II

THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND CAUSES

CONTENTS

LESSON 1: The Acquisition of Truth: Its Ease and Its Difficulty

LESSON 2: The Supreme Science of Truth, and Knowledge of Ultimate Causes

LESSON 3: The Existence of a First Efficient Cause and of a First Material Cause

LESSON 4: The Existence of a First in Final and Formal Causes

LESSON 5: The Method to Be Followed in the Search for Truth

LESSON 1

The Acquisition of Truth: Its Ease and Its Difficulty

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 993a 30 -993b 19

[993 α] [30] ἡ περ ὶ τῆς ἀληθε ίας θεωρ ία τῇ μὲν χαλε πὴ τῇ δὲ ῥᾳδ ία .

144. Theoretical, i.e., speculative, knowledge oftruth is in one sense difficult and in another, easy.

σημε ον δὲ τὸ μήτ ̓ ἀξίως μηδ ένα δ ύνασθαι θιγε ν α ὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχ άνειν , [993 β] [1] ἀλλ ̓ ἕκαστον λ έ γειν τι περ ὶ τῆς φ ύσεως ,

145. An indication of this is found in the fact that,while no one can attain an adequate knowledge of it,all men together do not fail, because each one is ableto say something true about nature.

κα ὶ καθ ̓ἕνα μὲν ἢ μηθ ὲν ἢ μικρ ὸν ἐπιβ άλλειν α ὐτῇ,ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομ ένων γί γνεσθα ί τι μέ γεθος :

146. And while each one individually contributesnothing or very little to the truth, still as a result ofthe combined efforts of all a great amount of truthbecomes known.

ὥστ ̓ εἴ περ ἔοικεν ἔ χειν καθ άπερ τυγχ άνομεν παροιμιαζ όμενοι , [5] τ ίς ἂν θ ύρας ἁμάρτοι ; τα ύτῃ μὲν ἂν εἴ η ῥᾳδ ία , τὸ δ ̓ ὅλον τι ἔ χειν κα ὶ μέρος μὴ δ ύνασθαι δηλο τὸ χαλε πὸν α ὐτῆς .

147. Therefore, if the situation in the case of truthseems to be like the one which we speak of in theproverb “Who will miss a door?” then in this respectit will be easy to know the truth.

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ἴ σως δὲ κα ὶ τῆς χαλε πότητος ο ὔσης κατ ὰ δ ύο τρ όπους , ο ὐκ ἐν το ς πρά γμασιν ἀλλ ̓ ἐν ἡμ ν τὸ αἴ τιον α ὐτῆς:

148. But the fact that we cannot simultaneouslygrasp a whole and its parts shows the difficultyinvolved.”

ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερ ίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ [10]φ έ γγος ἔ χει τὸ μεθ ̓ἡμέραν , ο ὕτω κα ὶ τῆς ἡμετ έρας ψυχ ῆς ὁ νο ῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φ ύσει φανερ ώτατα πάντων .

149. However, since the difficulty is twofold,perhaps its cause is not in things but in us; for justas the eyes of owls are to the light of day, so is oursoul’s intellective power to those things which areby nature the most evident of all.

ο ὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔ χειν δ ίκαιον το ύτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοιν ώσαιτο τα ς δόξαις , ἀλλ ὰ κα ὶ το ς ἐπι πολαι ότερον ἀποφηναμ ένοις : κα ὶ γὰρ ο ὗτοι συνεβ άλοντ ό τι : τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν προ ήσκησαν ἡμῶν:[15] εἰ μὲν γὰρ Τιμ όθεος μὴ ἐ γένετο , πολλ ὴν ἂν μελο ποι ίαν ο ὐκ εἴ χομεν : εἰ δὲ μὴ Φρ ῦνις , Τιμ όθεος ο ὐκ ἂν ἐ γένετο . τὸν α ὐτὸν δὲ τρ όπον κα ὶ ἐπὶ τῶν περ ὶ τῆς ἀληθε ίας ἀποφηναμ ένων : παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐνίων παρειλ ήφαμ έν τινας δόξας , οἱ δὲ το ῦ γεν έσθαι το ύτους αἴ τιοι γεγ όνασιν .

150. Now it is only right that we should be gratefulnot merely to those with whose views we agree butalso to those who until now have spoken in asuperficial way; for they too have made somecontribution because they have made use of thehabit which we now exercise. Thus if there had beenno Timotheus, we would not have a great part ofour music; and if there had been no Phrynis, therewould have been no Timotheus. The same is true ofthose who have made statements about the truth;for we have accepted certain opinions from some ofthem, and others have been the cause of themattaining their knowledge as they have been thecause of us attaining ours.

COMMENTARY

Postquam philosophus reprobavit opinionesantiquorum philosophorum de primis principiisrerum, circa quae versatur principaliter philosophiprimi intentio, hic accedit ad determinandumveritatem.

273. Having criticized the ancient philosophers’ opinionsabout the first principles of things, with which firstphilosophy is chiefly concerned, the Philosopher now beginsto establish what is true.

Aliter autem se habet consideratio philosophiaeprimae circa veritatem, et aliarum particulariumscientiarum. Nam unaquaeque particularis scientiaconsiderat quamdam particularem veritatem circadeterminatum genus entium, ut geometria circarerum magnitudines, arithmetica circa numeros. Sedphilosophia prima considerat universalem veritatementium. Et ideo ad hunc philosophum pertinetconsiderare, quomodo se habeat homo ad veritatemcognoscendam.

First philosophy considers truth in a different way than theparticular sciences do. Each of the particular sciencesconsiders a particular truth out a definite class of beings;e.g., geometry deals with the continuous quantities ofbodies, and arithmetic with numbers; whereas firstphilosophy considers what is universally true of things.Therefore, it pertains to this science to consider in whatrespects man is capable of knowing the truth.



Dividitur ergo ista pars in partes duas. In primaparte determinat ea quae pertinent adconsiderationem universalis veritatis. In secundaincipit inquirere veritatem de primis principiis etomnibus aliis, ad quae extenditur huius philosophiae

consideratio; et hoc in tertio libro, qui incipit,necesse est nobis acquisitam scientiam et cetera.

274. This part is divided into two sections. In th first (144:C 274) he deals with the things that belogn to a universalconsideration of truth. In the second (176:C 338) he beginsto investigate what is true of first principles and ofeverything else with which this philosophy deals. He does

this in Book III, which begins with the words “With a viewto.”

Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres. In primadicit qualiter se habet homo ad considerationemveritatis. In secunda ostendit ad quam scientiamprincipaliter pertineat cognitio veritatis, ibi, vocarivero philosophiam veritatis et cetera. In tertia parteostendit modum considerandae veritatis, ibi,contingunt autem auditiones et cetera.

The first part is again divided into three parts. In the first ofthese he explains in what respects man is capable ofknowing the truth. In the second (151: C 290) he indicatesto what science the knowledge of truth principally belongs("It is only right to call"). In the third (171: C 331) heexplains the method by which truth is investigated (“Theway in which people are affected”).

Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit facilitatemexistentem in cognitione veritatis. Secundo ostenditcausam difficultatis, ibi, forsan autem et difficultateet cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo homines seinvicem iuvant ad cognoscendum veritatem, ibi, nonsolum autem his dicere et cetera.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows inwhat respect it is easy to know the truth. Second (149: C279), he gives the reason for the difficulty involved(“However, since the difficulty is twofold”). Third (150: C2876), he shows how men assist each other to know thetruth (“"Now it is only right”).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit intentum,

dicens, quod theoria, idest consideratio vel speculatiode veritate quodammodo est facilis, et quodammododifficilis.

In regard to the first, he states what he intends to prove. He

says that “theoretical knowledge,” i.e., the contemplative orspeculative understanding of truth, is in one sense easy andin another, difficult.

275. An indication of this (145).

Secundo ibi signum autem manifestat propositum. Etprimo quantum ad facilitatem. Secundo quantum addifficultatem, ibi, habere autem totum et partem et

cetera. Facilitatem autem in considerando veritatemostendit tripliciter.

Second, he explains what he intends to prove: first, in whatsense it is easy to know the truth; and second (278), in whatsense it is difficult (“But the fact”). He shows in what sense

it iseasy to know the truth, by giving three indications:

Primo quidem hoc signo, quod licet nullus homoveritatis perfectam cognitionem adipisci possit,tamen nullus homo est ita expers veritatis, quinaliquid de veritate cognoscat. Quod ex hoc apparet,quod unusquisque potest enuntiare de veritate etnatura rerum, quod est signum considerationisinterioris.

The first is this: while no man can attain a completeknowledge of the truth, still no man is so completely devoidof truth that he knows nothing about it. This is shown bythe fact that anyone can make a statement about the truthand the nature of things, which is a sign of intellectualreflection.



276. And while each one individually (146).

Secundum signum ponit ibi et secundum dicens quodlicet id quod unus homo potest immittere velapponere ad cognitionem veritatis suo studio etingenio, sit aliquid parvum per comparationem adtotam considerationem veritatis, tamen illud, quodaggregatur ex omnibus coarticulatis, idest exquisitiset collectis, fit aliquid magnum, ut potest apparere insingulis artibus, quae per diversorum studia etingenia ad mirabile incrementum pervenerunt.

Here he gives the second indication. He says that, while theamount of truth that one man can discover or contribute tothe knowledge of truth by his own study and talents is smallcompared with a complete knowledge of truth, neverthelesswhat is known as a result of “the combined efforts” of all,i.e., what is discovered and collected into one whole,becomes quite extensive. This can be seen in the case of theparticular arts, which have developed in a marvelousmanner as a result of the studies and talents of differentmen.

277. Therefore, if the situation (147).

Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplumvulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens expraemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potestcognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita se haberevidetur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiterdicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quisdelinquet? Interiora enim domus difficile est scire, etcirca ea facile est hominem decipi: sed sicut circaipsum introitum domus qui omnibus patet et primo

occurrit, nullus decipitur, ita etiam est inconsideratione veritatis: nam ea, per quae intratur incognitionem aliorum, nota sunt omnibus, et nulluscirca ea decipitur: huiusmodi autem sunt primaprincipia naturaliter nota, ut non esse simulaffirmare et negare, et quod omne totum est maiussua parte, et similia. Circa conclusiones vero, ad quasper huiusmodi, quasi per ianuam, intratur, contingitmultoties errare. Sic igitur cognitio veritatis estfacilis inquantum scilicet ad minus istud modicum,quod est principium, per se notum, per quod intraturad veritatem, est omnibus per se notum.

Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing acommon proverb. He concludes from the foregoing thatsince anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, eventhough it be little, the situation in the case of knowledge islike the one that we speak of in the pro verb “Who will missa door?” i.e., the outer door of a house. For it is difficult toknow what the interior of a house is like, and a man is easilydeceived in such matters; but just as no one is mistakenabout the entrance of a house, which is evident to all and is

the first thing that we perceive, so too this is the case withregard to the knowledge of truth; for those truths throughwhich we enter into a knowledge of others are known to all,and no man is mistaken about them. Those first principleswhich are naturally apprehended are truths of this sort, e.g.,“It is impossible both to affirm and deny something at thesame time,” and “Every whole is greater than each of itsparts,” and so on. On the other hand, there are many waysin which error may arise with respect to the conclusionsinto which we enter through such principles as through anouter door. Therefore, it is easy to know the truth if weconsider that small amount of it which is comprised of self-evident principles, through which we enter into othertruths, because this much is evident to all.

278. But the fact that we cannot (148).

Deinde cum dicit habere autem manifestatdifficultatem; dicens, quod hoc ostendit difficultatemquae est in consideratione veritatis, quia nonpossumus habere circa veritatem totum et partem.Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod hocdixit omnibus esse notum, per quod in alia introitur.

Here he explains in what sense it is difficult to know thetruth. He says that our inability to grasp the whole truthand a part of it shows the difficulty involved in the searchfor truth. In support of this we must consider his statementthat the truth through which we gain admission to othertruths is known to all. Now there are two ways in which we



Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionemveritatis.

attain knowledge of the truth.

Una quidem per modum resolutionis, secundumquam procedimus a compositis ad simplicia, et a totoad partem, sicut dicitur in primo physicorum, quodconfusa sunt prius nobis nota. Et in hac via perficiturcognitio veritatis, quando pervenitur ad singulaspartes distincte cognoscendas.

The first is the method of analysis, by which we go fromwhat is complex to what is simple or from a whole to a part,as it is said in Book I of the Physics that the first objects ofour knowledge are confused wholes. Now our knowledge ofthe truth is perfected by this method when we attain adistinct knowledge of the particular parts of a whole.

Alia est via compositionis, per quam procedimus asimplicibus ad composita, qua perficitur cognitioveritatis cum pervenitur ad totum. Sic igitur hocipsum, quod homo non potest in rebus perfectetotum et partem cognoscere, ostendit difficultatemconsiderandae veritatis secundum utramque viam.

The other method is that of synthesis, by which we go fromwhat is simple to what is complex; and we attain knowledgeof truth by this method when we succeed in knowing awhole. Thus the fact that man is unable to know perfectly inthings a whole and a part shows the difficulty involved inknowing the truth by both of these methods.

279. However, since the difficulty is twofold (149).

Deinde cum dicit forsan autem ostendit causampraemissae difficultatis. Ubi similiter considerandumest, quod in omnibus, quae consistunt in quadamhabitudine unius ad alterum, potest impedimentum

dupliciter vel ex uno vel ex alio accidere: sicut silignum non comburatur, hoc contingit vel quia ignisest debilis, vel quia lignum non est benecombustibile; et similiter oculus impeditur a visionealicuius visibilis, aut quia est debilis aut quia visibileest tenebrosum. Sic igitur potest contingere quodveritas sit difficilis ad cognoscendum, vel propterdefectum qui est in ipsis rebus, vel propter defectumqui est in intellectu nostro.

He gives the reason for this difficulty. Here too it must benoted that, in all cases in which there is a certainrelationship between two things, an effect can fail to occurin two ways, i.e., because of either one of the things

involved. For example, if wood does not burn, this mayhappen either because the fire is not strong enough orbecause the wood is not combustible enough. And in asimilar way the eye may be prevented from seeing a visibleobject either because the eye is weak or because the visibleobject is in the dark. Therefore, in like manner, it may bedifficult to know the truth about things either (1)because thingsthemselves are imperfect in some way or (2)because of some weakness on the part of our intellect.

Et quod quantum ad aliquas res difficultas contingatin cognoscendo veritatem ipsarum rerum ex parteearum, patet. Cum enim unumquodque sitcognoscibile inquantum est ens actu, ut infra in nonohuius dicetur, illa quae habent esse deficiens etimperfectum, sunt secundum seipsa parumcognoscibilia, ut materia, motus et tempus propteresse eorum imperfectionem, ut Boetius dicit in librode duabus naturis.

280. (1) Now it is evident that we experience difficulty inknowing the truth about some things because of the thingsthemselves; for since each thing is knowable insofar as it isan actual being, as will be stated below in Book IX (1894) ofthis work, then those things which are deficient andimperfect in being are less knowable by their very nature;e.g., matter, motion, and time are less knowable because ofthe imperfect being which they have, as Boethius says in hisbook The Two Natures .

Fuerunt autem aliqui philosophi, qui posueruntdifficultatem cognitionis veritatis totaliter provenireex parte rerum, ponentes nihil esse fixum et stabile

281. Now there were some philosophers who claimed thatthe difficulty experienced in knowing the truth is whollyattributable to things themselves, because they maintained



in rebus, sed omnia esse in continuo fluxu ut infra inquarto huius dicetur. Sed hoc excludit philosophus,dicens, quod quamvis difficultas cognoscendaeveritatis forsan possit secundum aliqua diversa essedupliciter, videlicet ex parte nostra, et ex parte

rerum; non tamen principalis causa difficultatis estex parte rerum, sed ex parte nostra.

that nothing is fixed and stable in nature but thateverything is in a state of continual change, as will be statedin Book IV (683) of this work. But the Philosopher deniesthis, saying that even though the difficulty experienced inknowing the truth can perhaps be twofold because of

different things, i.e., our intellect and things themselves,still the principal source of the difficulty is not things butour intellect.

Et hoc sic probat. Quia, si difficultas essetprincipaliter ex parte rerum, sequeretur, quod illamagis cognosceremus, quae sunt magis cognoscibiliasecundum suam naturam: sunt autem maximecognoscibilia secundum naturam suam, quae suntmaxime in actu, scilicet entia immaterialia et

immobilia, quae tamen sunt maxime nobis ignota.

282. He proves this in the following way. If this difficultywere attributable principally to things, it would follow it wewould know best those things which are most knowable bynature. But those things which are most knowable by natureare those which are most actual, i.e., immaterial andunchangeable things, yet we know these least of all.

Unde manifestum est, quod difficultas accidit incognitione veritatis, maxime propter defectumintellectus nostri. Ex quo contingit, quod intellectusanimae nostrae hoc modo se habet ad entiaimmaterialia, quae inter omnia sunt maximemanifesta secundum suam naturam, sicut se habentoculi nycticoracum ad lucem diei, quam videre nonpossunt, quamvis videant obscura. Et hoc est propterdebilitatem visus eorum.

Obviously, then, the difficulty experienced in knowing thetruth is due principally to some weakness on the part of ourintellect. From this it follows that our soul’s intellectualpower is related to those immaterial beings, which are bynature the most knowable of all, as the eyes of owls are tothe light of day, which they cannot see because their powerof vision is weak, although they do see dimly lighted things.

Sed videtur haec similitudo non esse conveniens.Sensus enim quia est potentia organi corporalis,corrumpitur ex vehementia sensibilis. Intellectusautem, cum non sit potentia alicuius organi corporei,non corrumpitur ex excellenti intelligibili. Undepost apprehensionem alicuius magni intelligibilis,non minus intelligimus minus intelligibilia, sedmagis, ut dicitur in tertio de anima.

283. But it is evident that this simile is not adequate; forsince a sense is a power of a bodily organ, it is madeinoperative as a result of its sensible object being toointense. But the intellect is not a power of a bodily organand is not made inoperative as a result of its intelligibleobject being too intelligible. Therefore, after understandingobjects that are highly intelligible our ability to understandless intelligible objects is not decreased but increased, as isstated in Book III of The Soul .

Dicendum est ergo, quod sensus impeditur acognitione alicuius sensibilis dupliciter. Uno modoper corruptionem organi ab excellenti sensibili; ethoc locum non habet in intellectu. Alio modo exdefectu proportionis ipsius virtutis sensitivae adobiectum. Potentiae enim animae non sunt eiusdemvirtutis in omnibus animalibus; sed sicuti homini hocin sua specie convenit, quod habeat pessimumolfactum, ita nycticoraci, quod habeat debilem visum,

quia non habet proportionem ad claritatem dieicognoscendam.

284. Therefore it must be said that a sense is preventedfrom perceiving some sensible object for two reasons: first,(1) because a sensory organ is rendered inoperative as aresult of its sensible object being too intense (this does notoccur in the case of the intellect); second, (2) because ofsome deficiency in the ability of a sensory power to perceiveits object; for the powers of the soul in all animals do nothave the same efficacy. Thus, just as it is proper to man bynature to have the weakest sense of smell, in a similar way it

is proper to an owl to have the weakest power of vision,because it is incapable of perceiving the light of day.



Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit ultima in ordinesubstantiarum intellectivarum, minime participat devirtute intellectiva; et sicut ipsa quidem secundumnaturam est actus corporis, eius autem intellectivapotentia non est actus organi corporalis, ita habet

naturalem aptitudinem ad cognoscendumcorporalium et sensibilium veritatem, quae suntminus cognoscibilia secundum suam naturampropter eorum materialitatem, sed tamen cognoscipossunt per abstractionem sensibilium aphantasmatibus. Et quia hic modus cognoscendiveritatem convenit naturae humanae animaesecundum quod est forma talis corporis; quae autemsunt naturalia semper manent; impossibile est, quodanima humana huiusmodi corpori unita cognoscat deveritate rerum, nisi quantum potest elevari per eaquae abstrahendo a phantasmatibus intelligit. Perhaec autem nullo modo potest elevari adcognoscendum quidditates immaterialiumsubstantiarum, quae sunt improportionatae istissubstantiis sensibilibus. Unde impossibile est quodanima humana huiusmodi corpori unita, apprehendatsubstantias separatas cognoscendo de eis quod quidest.

285. Therefore, since the human soul occupies the lowestplace in the order of intellective substances, it has the leastintellective power. As a matter of fact, just as it is by naturethe actuality of a body, although its intellective power is notthe act of a bodily organ, in a similar way it has a natural

capacity to know the truth about corporeal and sensiblethings. These are less knowable by nature because of theirmateriality, although they can be known by abstractingsensible forms from phantasms. And since this process ofknowing truth befits the nature of the human soul insofar asit is the form of this kind of body (and whatever is naturalalways remains so), it is possible for the human soul, whichis united to this kind of body, to know the truth aboutthings only insofar as it can be elevated to the level of thethings which it understands by abstracting from phantasms.However, by this process it cannot be elevated to the levelof knowing the quiddities of immaterial substances becausethese are not on the same level as sensiblesubstances. Therefore it is impossible for the human soul,which is united to this kind of body, to apprehend separatesubstances by knowing their quiddities.

Ex quo apparet falsum esse quod Averroes hic dicitin commento, quod philosophus non demonstrat hic,res abstractas intelligere esse impossibile nobis, sicutimpossibile est vespertilioni inspicere solem. Et ratiosua, quam inducit, est valde derisibilis. Subiungitenim, quoniam si ita esset, natura otiose egisset, quiafecit illud quod in se est naturaliter intelligibile, nonesse intellectum ab aliquo; sicut si fecisset solem noncomprehensum ab aliquo visu.

286. For this reason the statement which Averroes makes atthis point in his Commentary is evidently false, i.e., that thePhilosopher does not prove here that it is just as impossiblefor us to understand abstract substances as it is for a bat tosee the sun. The argument that he gives is whollyridiculous; for he adds that, if this were the case, naturewould have acted in vain because it would have madesomething that is naturally knowable in itself to beincapable of being known by anything else. It would be thesame as if it had made the sun incapable of being seen.

Deficit enim haec ratio. Primo quidem in hoc, quod

cognitio intellectus nostri non est finissubstantiarum separatarum, sed magis e converso.Unde non sequitur, quod, si non cognoscantursubstantiae separatae a nobis, quod propter hoc sintfrustra. Frustra enim est, quod non consequiturfinem ad quem est. Secundo, quia etsi substantiaeseparatae non intelliguntur a nobis secundum suasquidditates, intelliguntur tamen ab aliis intellectibus;sicut solem etsi non videat oculus nycticoracis, videttamen eum oculus aquilae.

This argument is not satisfactory for two reasons. First, the

end of separate substances does not consist in beingunderstood by our intellect, but rather the converse.Therefore, if separate substances are not known by us, itdoes not follow that they exist in vain; for only that exists invain which fails to attain the end for which it exists. Second,even though the quiddities of separate substances are notunderstood by us, they are understood by other intellects.The same is true of the sun; for even though it is not seenby the eye of the owl, it is seen by the eye of the eagle.

287. Now it is only right (150).



Deinde cum dicit non solum ostendit quomodo sehomines adinvicem iuvant ad considerandumveritatem. Adiuvatur enim unus ab altero adconsiderationem veritatis dupliciter. Uno mododirecte. Alio modo indirecte.

He shows how men assist each other to know the truth; forone man assists another to consider the truth in two ways — directly and indirectly.

Directe quidem iuvatur ab his qui veritateminvenerunt: quia, sicut dictum est, dum unusquisquepraecedentium aliquid de veritate invenit, simul inunum collectum, posteriores introducit ad magnamveritatis cognitionem.

One is assisted directly by those who have discovered thetruth; because, as has been pointed out, when each of ourpredecessors has discovered something about the truth,which is gathered together into one whole, he alsointroduces his followers to a more extensive knowledge oftruth.

Indirecte vero, inquantum priores errantes circa

veritatem, posterioribus exercitii occasionemdederunt, ut diligenti discussione habita, veritaslimpidius appareret.

One is assisted indirectly insofar as those who have

preceded us and who were wrong about the truth havebequeathed to their successors the occasion for exercisingtheir mental powers, so that by diligent discussion the truthmight be seen more clearly.

Est autem iustum ut his, quibus adiuti sumus intanto bono, scilicet cognitione veritatis, gratiasagamus. Et ideo dicit, quod iustum est gratiamhabere, non solum his, quos quis existimat veritateminvenisse, quorum opinionibus aliquis communicat

sequendo eas; sed etiam illis, qui superficialiter locutisunt ad veritatem investigandam, licet eorumopiniones non sequamur; quia isti etiam aliquidconferunt nobis. Praestiterunt enim nobis quoddamexercitium circa inquisitionem veritatis. Et ponitexemplum de inventoribus musicae. Si enim nonfuisset Timotheus qui multa de arte musicae invenit,non haberemus ad praesens multa, quae scimus circamelodias. Et si non praecessisset quidamphilosophus nomine Phrynis, Timotheus non fuissetita instructus in musicalibus. Et similiter estdicendum de philosophis qui enuntiaveruntuniversaliter veritatem rerum. A quibusdam enimpraedecessorum nostrorum accepimus aliquasopiniones de veritate rerum, in quibus credimus eosbene dixisse, alias opiniones praetermittentes. Etiterum illi, a quibus nos accepimus, inveneruntaliquos praedecessores, a quibus acceperunt, quiquefuerunt eis causa instructionis.

288. Now it is only fitting that we should be grateful tothose who have helped us attain so great a good asknowledge of the truth. Therefore he says that “It is onlyright that we should be grateful,” not merely to those whomwe think have found the truth and with whose views we

agree by following them, but also to those who, in thesearch for truth, have made only superficial statements, eventhough we do not follow their views; for these men too havegiven us something because they have shown us instances ofactual attempts to discover the truth. By way of an examplehe mentions the founders of music; for if there “had been noTimotheus,” who discovered a great part of the art of music,we would not have many of the facts that we know aboutmelodies. But if Timotheus had not been preceded by a wiseman named “Phrynis,” he would not have been as well off inthe subject of music. The same thing must be said of thosephilosophers who made statements of universal scope aboutthe truth of things; for we accept from certain of ourpredecessors whatever views about the truth of things wethink are true and disregard the rest. Again, those fromwhom we accept certain views had predecessors from whomthey in turn accepted certain views and who were the sourceof their information.

LESSON 2



The Supreme Science of Truth, and Knowledge of Ultimate Causes

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 993b 19 -994b 11

ὀρθῶς δ ̓ἔ χει κα ὶ τὸ καλε σθαι [20] τὴν φιλοσοφ ίαν ἐπιστ ήμην τῆς ἀληθε ίας . θεωρητικ ῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλ ήθεια πρακτικ ῆς δ ̓ἔργον : κα ὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ πῶς ἔ χει σκο πῶσιν , ο ὐ τὸ ἀΐδιον ἀλλ ̓ ὃ πρός τι κα ὶ ν ῦν θεωρο ῦσιν οἱ πρακτικο ί. ο ὐκ ἴ σμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθ ὲς ἄνευ τῆς αἰτ ίας : ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα α ὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθ ̓ ὃ κα ὶ [25] το ς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συν ώνυμον (ο ἷ ον τὸ π ῦρ θερμ ότατον : κα ὶ γὰρ το ς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴ τιον το ῦτο τῆς θερμ ότητος ): ὥστε κα ὶ ἀληθ έστατον τὸ το ς ὑστ έροις αἴ τιον το ῦ ἀληθ έσιν ε ἶ ναι . δι ὸ τὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκα ον ἀεὶ ε ἶ ναι ἀληθεστ άτας (ο ὐ γάρ ποτε ἀληθε ς , ο ὐδ ̓ἐκε ίναις αἴ τι όν τ ί ἐστι το ῦ [30] ε ἶ ναι , ἀλλ ̓ ἐκε ναι το ς ἄλλοις ), ὥσθ ̓ἕκαστον ὡς ἔ χει το ῦ ε ἶ ναι , ο ὕτω κα ὶ τῆς ἀληθε ίας .

151. It is only right to call philosophy the science oftruth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth,whereas that of practical knowledge is action; foreven when practical men investigate the way inwhich something exists, they do not consider it initself but in relation to some particular thing and tothe present moment. But we know a truth only byknowing its cause. Now anything which is the basisof a univocal predication about other things has thatattribute in the highest degree. Thus fire is hottestand is actually the cause of heat in other things.Therefore that is also true in the highest degreewhich is the cause of all subsequent things beingtrue. For this reason the principles of things thatalways exist must be. true in the highest degree,because they are not sometimes true and sometimesnot true. Nor is there any cause of their being, butthey are the cause of the being of other things.Therefore insofar as each thing has being, to thatextent it is true.

Chapter 2

[994 α] [1] ἀλλ ὰ μὴν ὅτι γ ̓ἔστιν ἀρχ ή τις κα ὶ ο ὐκ ἄπειρα τὰ α ἴ τια τῶν ὄντων ο ὔτ ̓εἰς ε ὐθυωρ ίαν ο ὔτε κατ ̓ε ἶ δος , δῆλον . ο ὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐξ ὕλης τ όδ ̓ἐκ το ῦδε δυνατ ὸν ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον (ο ἷ ον σάρκα μὲν ἐκ γῆς , γῆν δ ̓ἐξ ἀέρος , ἀέρα δ ̓ἐκ πυρ ός , [5] κα ὶ το ῦτο μὴ ἵ στασθαι ), ο ὔτε ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κιν ήσεως (ο ἷ ον τὸν μὲν ἄνθρω πον ὑπὸ το ῦ ἀέρος κινηθ ῆναι , το ῦτον δ ̓ ὑπὸ το ῦ ἡλ ίου , τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὑπὸ το ῦ νε ίκους , κα ὶ το ύτου μηδ ὲν ε ἶ ναι πέρας ): ὁμο ίως δὲ ο ὐδὲ τὸ ο ὗ ἕνεκα εἰς ἄπειρον ο ἷόν τε ἰέναι , βάδισιν μὲν ὑ γιε ίας ἕνεκα , τα ύτην δ ̓ ε ὐδαιμον ίας , τὴν δ ̓ ε ὐδαιμον ίαν [10] ἄλλου , κα ὶ ο ὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου ἕνεκεν ε ἶ ναι :κα ὶ ἐπὶ το ῦ τ ί ἦν ε ἶ ναι δ ̓ὡσα ύτως .

152. Further, it is evident that there is a [first]principle, and that the causes of existing things arenot infinite either in series or in species. For it isimpossible that one thing should come fromsomething else as from matter in an infinite regress,for example, flesh from earth, earth from air, airfrom fire, and so on to infinity. Nor can the causesfrom which motion originates proceed to infinity, as

though man were moved by the air, the air by thesun, the sun by strife, and so on to infinity. Again,neither can there be an infinite regress in the case ofthe reason for which something is done, as thoughwalking were for the sake of health, health for thesake of happiness, and happiness for the sake ofsomething else, so that one thing is always beingdone for the sake of something else. The same is truein the case of the quiddity.

COMMENTARY



Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter se habet homoad considerationem veritatis, hic ostendit quodcognitio veritatis maxime ad philosophiam primampertineat.

289. Having shown how man is disposed for the study oftruth, the Philosopher now shows that the knowledge oftruth belongs pre-eminently to first philosophy.

Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod adphilosophiam primam maxime pertineat cognitioveritatis. Secundo excludit quamdam falsamopinionem, per quam sua probatio tolleretur, ibi, atvero quod sit principium.

Regarding this he does two things. First (290), he showsthat knowledge of the truthbelongs pre-eminently to firstphilosophy. Second (152: C 299), he rejects a false doctrinethat would render his proof untenable (“Further it isevident”).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod adphilosophiam primam pertineat cognitio veritatis.Secundo quod maxime ad ipsam pertineat, ibi,

nescimus autem verum sine causa et cetera.

In regard to the first he does two things. First he showsthat knowledge of the truth belongs to first philosophy.Second (290), that it belongs in the highest degree to this

science (“But we know a truth”).

Haec autem duo ostendit ex duobus, quae supraprobata sunt in prooemio libri: scilicet quod sapientiasit non practica, sed speculativa: et quod sitcognoscitiva causarum primarum.

He proves these two propositions from two thingsestablished above in the prologue of this book, i.e.,that wisdom is not a practical but a speculative science(53), and that it knows first causes (48).

Ex primo autem horum sic argumentatur ad primamconclusionem. Theorica, idest speculativa, differt a

practica secundum finem: nam finis speculativae estveritas: hoc enim est quod intendit, scilicet veritatiscognitionem. Sed finis practicae est opus, quia etsipractici, hoc est operativi, intendant cognoscereveritatem, quomodo se habeat in aliquibus rebus, nontamen quaerunt eam tamquam ultimum finem. Nonenim considerant causam veritatis secundum se etpropter se, sed ordinando ad finem operationis, siveapplicando ad aliquod determinatum particulare, et adaliquod determinatum tempus. Si ergo huicconiunxerimus, quod sapientia sive philosophia primanon est practica, sed speculativa, sequetur quod rectedebeat dici scientia veritatis.

290. He argues from the first of these to the firstconclusion in this way. Theoretical, i.e., speculative,

knowledge differs from practical knowledge by its end; forthe end of speculative knowledge is truth, because it hasknowledge of the truth as its objective. But the end ofpractical knowledge is action, because, even though“practical men,” i.e., men of action, attempt to understandthe truth as it belongs to certain things, they do not seekthis as an ultimate end; for they do not consider the causeof truth in and for itself as an end but in relation to action,either by applying it to some definite individual, or tosome definite time. Therefore, if we add to the above thefact that wisdom or first philosophy is not practical butspeculative, it follows that first philosophy is mostfittingly called the science of truth.

Sed quia multae sunt scientiae speculativae, quaeveritatem considerant, utpote geometria etarithmetica, fuit necessarium consequenter ostendere,quod philosophia prima maxime consideret veritatem,propter id quod supra ostensum est, scilicet quod estconsiderativa primarum causarum. Et ideoargumentatur sic. Scientia de vero non habetur nisi percausam: ex quo apparet, quod eorum verorum, dequibus est scientia aliqua, sunt aliquae causae, quaeetiam veritatem habent. Non enim potest sciri verum

291. But since there are many speculative sciences, whichconsider the truth, such as geometry and arithmetic,therefore it was necessary to show that first philosophyconsiders truth in the highest degree inasmuch as it hasbeen shown above that it considers first causes (48).Hence he argues as follows. We have knowledge of truthonly when we know a cause. This is apparent from the factthat the true things about which we have some knowledgehave causes which are also true, because we cannot knowwhat is true by knowing what is false, but only by



per falsum, sed per aliud verum. Unde et demonstratio,quae facit scientiam, ex veris est, ut dicitur in primoposteriorum.

knowing what is true. This is also the reason whydemonstration, which causes science, begins with what istrue, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics .

Deinde adiungit quamdam universalem propositionem,quae talis est. Unumquodque inter alia maxime dicitur,ex quo causatur in aliis aliquid univoce praedicatum deeis; sicut ignis est causa caloris in elementatis. Unde,cum calor univoce dicatur et de igne et de elementatiscorporibus, sequitur quod ignis sit calidissimus.

292. Then he adds the following universal proposition.When a univocal predicate is applied to several things, ineach case that which constitutes the reason for thepredication about other things has that attribute in thefullest sense. Thus fire is the cause of heat in compounds.Therefore, since heat is predicated univocally both of fireand of compound bodies, it follows that fire is hottest.

Facit autem mentionem de univocatione, quiaquandoque contingit quod effectus non pervenit adsimilitudinem causae secundum eamdem rationemspeciei, propter excellentiam ipsius causae. Sicut solest causa caloris in istis inferioribus: non tameninferiora corpora possunt recipere impressionem solisaut aliorum caelestium corporum secundum eamdemrationem speciei, cum non communicent in materia. Etpropter hoc non dicimus solem esse calidissimum sicutignem, sed dicimus solem esse aliquid amplius quamcalidissimum.

293. Now he says “univocal” because sometimes it happensthat an effect does not become like its cause, so as to havethe same specific nature, because of the excellence of thatcause; for example, the sun is the cause of heat in theselower bodies, but the form which these lower bodiesreceive cannot be of the same specific nature as thatpossessed by the sun or any of the celestial bodies, sincethey do not have a common matter. This is why we do notsay that the sun is hottest, as we say fire is, but that it issomething superior to the hottest.

Nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicui speciei,sed se habet communiter ad omnia entia. Unde, quiaillud quod est causa veritatis, est causa communicanscum effectu in nomine et ratione communi, sequiturquod illud, quod est posterioribus causa ut sint vera,sit verissimum.

294. Now the term truth is not proper to one class ofbeings only, but is applied universally to all beings.Therefore, since the cause of truth is one having the samename. and intelligible structure as its effect, it follows thatwhatever causes subsequent things to be true is itselfmost true.

Ex quo ulterius concludit quod principia eorum, quaesunt semper, scilicet corporum caelestium, necesse estesse verissima. Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem,quia non sunt quandoque vera et quandoque non, etper hoc transcendunt in veritate generabilia etcorruptibilia, quae quandoque sunt et quandoque nonsunt. Secundo, quia nihil est eis causa, sed ipsa suntcausa essendi aliis. Et per hoc transcendunt in veritateet entitate corpora caelestia: quae etsi sintincorruptibilia, tamen habent causam non solumquantum ad suum moveri, ut quidam opinati sunt, sedetiam quantum ad suum esse, ut hic philosophusexpresse dicit.

295. From this he again concludes that the principles ofthings which always exist, i.e., the celestial bodies, mustbe most true. He does this for two reasons. First, they arenot “sometimes true and sometimes not true,” andtherefore surpass the truth of things subject to generationand corruption, which sometimes exist and sometimes donot. Second, these principles have no cause but are thecause of the being of other things. And for this reasonthey surpass the celestial bodies in truth and in being; andeven though the latter are incorruptible, they have a causenot only of their motion, as some men thought, but also oftheir being, as the Philosopher clearly states in this place.

Et hoc est necessarium: quia necesse est ut omniacomposita et participantia, reducantur in ea, quae sunt

296. Now this is necessary, because everything that iscomposite in nature and participates in being must



per essentiam, sicut in causas. Omnia autem corporaliasunt entia in actu, inquantum participant aliquasformas. Unde necesse est substantiam separatam, quaeest forma per suam essentiam, corporalis substantiaeprincipium esse.

ultimately have as its causes those things which haveexistence by their very essence. But all corporeal thingsare actual beings insofar as they participate in certainforms. Therefore a separate substance which is a form byits very essence must be the principle of corporeal

substance.

Si ergo huic deductioni adiungamus, quod philosophiaprima considerat primas causas, sequitur ut priushabitum est, quod ipsa considerat ea, quae suntmaxime vera. Unde ipsa est maxime scientia veritatis.

297. If we add to this conclusion the fact that firstphilosophy considers first causes, it then follows, as wassaid above (291), that first philosophy considers thosethings which are most true. Consequently this science ispre-eminently the science of truth.

Ex his autem infert quoddam corollarium. Cum enim

ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sintmaxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut sehabet ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam se habet ad hoc quodhabeat veritatem. Ea enim, quorum esse non sempereodem modo se habet, nec veritas eorum sempermanet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiamveritatis causam habent. Et hoc ideo, quia esse rei estcausa verae existimationis quam mens habet de re.Verum enim et falsum non est in rebus, sed in mente,ut dicetur in sexto huius.

298. From these conclusions he draws a corollary: since

those things which cause the being of other things aretrue in the highest degree, it follows that each thing istrue insofar as it is a being; for things which do not alwayshave being in the same way do not always have truth inthe same way, and those which have a cause of their beingalso have a cause of their truth. The reason for this is thata thing’s being is the cause of any true judgment whichthe mind makes about a thing; for truth and falsity are notin things but in the mind, as will be said in Book VI (1230)of this work.

Deinde cum dicit at vero removet quoddam, per quodpraecedens probatio posset infringi: quae procedebatex suppositione huius, quod philosophia primaconsiderat causas primas. Hoc autem tolleretur sicausae in infinitum procederent. Tunc enim non essentaliquae primae causae. Unde hoc hic removere intendit:et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit intentum.Secundo probat propositum, ibi, mediorum enim extraquae est aliquid et cetera.

299. He rejects a position that would render the aboveproof untenable; for this proof proceeded on thesupposition that first philosophy considers first causes.But if there were an infinite regress in causes, this proofwould be destroyed, for then there would be no first cause.So his aim here is to refute this position. Concerning thishe does two things. First (152), he points out what heintends to prove. Second (300, he proceeds to do so.

Dicit ergo primo: palam potest esse ex his, quaedicentur, quod sit aliquod principium esse et veritatisrerum; et quod causae existentium non sunt infinitae,nec procedendo in directum secundum unam aliquamspeciem causae, puta in specie causarum efficientium;nec etiam sunt infinitae secundum speciem, ita quodsint infinitae species causarum.

He says, first, that from what has been said it can clearlybe shown that there is some [first] principle of the beingand truth of things. He states that the causes of existingthings are not infinite in number because we cannotproceed to infinity in a series of causes belonging to oneand the same class, e.g., the class of, efficient causes. Noragain are causes infinite in species, as though the classesof causes were infinite in number.

Exponit autem quod dixerat causas infinitas esse indirectum. Primo quidem in genere causae materialis.Non enim possibile est procedere in infinitum in hoc,

300. Then he explains his statement about an infinitenumber of causes in a series. He does this, first, in regardto the class of material causes. For it is impossible to have



quod aliquid fiat ex aliquo, sicut ex materia, puta utcaro fiat ex terra, terra vero ex aere, aer ex igne, et hocnon stet in aliquo primo, sed procedat in infinitum.

an infinite series in the sense that one thing always comesfrom something else as its matter, e.g., that flesh comesfrom earth, earth from air, and air from fire, and that thisdoes not terminate in some first entity but goes on toinfinity.

Secundo exemplificat in genere causae efficientis;dicens, quod nec possibile est ut causa, quae diciturunde principium motus, in infinitum procedat: putacum dicimus hominem moveri ad deponendum vestesab aere calefacto, aerem vero calefieri a sole, solemvero moveri ab aliquo alio, et hoc in infinitum.

Second, he gives an example of this in the classof efficient cause. He says that it is impossible to have aninfinite series in the class of cause which we define as thesource of motion; e.g., when we say that a man is movedto put aside his clothing because the air becomes warm,the air having been heated in turn by the sun, the sunhaving been moved by something else, and so on toinfinity.

Tertio exemplificat in genere causarum finalium; etdicit, quod similiter non potest procedere in infinitumillud quod est cuius causa, scilicet causa finalis; ut sidicamus quod iter sive ambulatio est proptersanitatem, sanitas autem propter felicitatem, felicitasautem propter aliquid, et sic in infinitum.

Third, he gives an example of this in the classof final causes. He says that it is also impossible to proceedto infinity in the case of “the reason for which” somethingis done, i.e., the final cause; for example, if we were to saythat a journey or a walk is undertaken for the sake ofhealth, health for the sake of happiness, happiness for thesake of something else, and so on to infinity.

Ultimo facit mentionem de causa formali: et dicit quod

similiter non potest procedi in infinitum in hoc quodest quod quid erat esse, idest in causa formali quamsignificat definitio. Sed exempla praetermittit, quiasunt manifesta, et probatum est in primo posteriorum,quod non proceditur in infinitum in praedicatis, putaquod animal praedicetur de homine in eo quod quidest, et vivum de animali, et sic in infinitum.

Finally, he mentions the formal cause. He says that it is

also impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of the“quiddity,” i.e., the formal cause, which the definitionsignifies. However, he omits examples because these areevident, and because it was shown in Book I ofthe Posterior Analytics that it is impossible to proceed toinfinity in the matter of predication, as though animalwere predicated quidditatively of man, living of animal,and so on to infinity.

LESSON 3

The Existence of a First Efficient Cause and of a First Material Cause

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 994a 11 -994b 9

τῶν γὰρ μέσων , ὧν ἐστ ί τι ἔσχατον κα ὶ πρότερον ,ἀναγκα ον ε ἶ ναι τὸ πρότερον αἴ τιον τῶν μετ ̓ α ὐτό.εἰ γὰρ εἰπε ν ἡμ ς δέοι τ ί τῶν τρι ῶν αἴ τιον , τὸ

153. For intermediate things in a series limited bysome first and last thing must have as their cause the

first member of the series, which they follow; becauseif we had to say which one of these three is the cause



πρῶτον ἐρο ῦμεν : ο ὐ γὰρ δὴ τ ό γ ̓ἔσχατον , ο ὐδεν ὸς γὰρ τὸ [15] τελευτα ον : ἀλλ ὰ μὴν ο ὐδὲ τὸ μέσον ,ἑνὸς γάρ (ο ὐθὲν δὲ διαφ έρει ἓν ἢ πλε ίω ε ἶ ναι , ο ὐδ ̓ἄπειρα ἢ πεπερασμ ένα ). τῶν δ ̓ἀπείρων το ῦτον τὸν τρ όπον κα ὶ ὅλως το ῦ ἀπείρου πάντα τὰ μόρια μέσα ὁμο ίως μέ χρι το ῦ ν ῦν: ὥστ ̓ εἴ περ μηδ έν ἐστι πρῶτον , ὅλως αἴ τιον ο ὐδέν ἐστιν .

of the others, we would say that it is the first. Whatis last is not the cause, since what is last is not acause of anything. Neither is the intermediate thecause, because it is the cause of only one; for it makes

no difference whether one or several intermediatesexist, or an infinite or finite number. Indeed, in seriesthat are infinite in this way or in the infinite ingeneral, all parts are intermediates to the samedegree right down to the present one. Therefore, ifthere is nothing first in the whole series, nothing inthe series is a cause.

ἀλλ ὰ μὴν ο ὐδ ̓ἐπὶ τὸ κ άτω [20] ο ἷόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι , το ῦ ἄνω ἔ χοντος ἀρχ ήν, ὥστ ̓ ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν

ὕδωρ , ἐκ δὲ το ύτου γῆν , κα ὶ ο ὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλο τι γί γνεσθαι γένος .

154. Neither is it possible to proceed to infinity in adownward direction, where there is a starting-pointin an upward direction, so that water comes fromfire, earth from water, and some other class of thingsalways being generated in this way.

διχῶς γὰρ γί γνεται τόδε ἐκ το ῦδε — μὴ ὡς τ όδε λ έ γεται μετ ὰ τόδε , ο ἷ ον ἐξ Ἰσθμ ίων λ ύμπια , ἀλλ ̓ ἢ ὡς ἐκ παιδ ὸς ἀνὴρ μεταβ άλλοντος ἢ ὡς ἐξ ὕδατος ἀήρ .

155. Now there are two ways in which one thingcomes from ( ex ) another. I do not mean from in thesense of after, as the Olympian games are said tocome from the Isthmian, but either in the way inwhich a man comes from a boy as a result of a boychanging, or in the way in which air comes fromwater.

[25] ὡς μὲν ο ὖν ἐκ παιδ ὸς ἄνδρα γί γνεσθα ί φαμεν ,ὡς ἐκ το ῦ γιγνομ ένου τὸ γεγον ὸς ἢ ἐκ το ῦ ἐπιτελουμ ένου τὸ τετελεσμ ένον (ἀεὶ γάρ ἐστι μεταξ ύ, ὥσπερ το ῦ ε ἶ ναι κα ὶ μὴ ε ἶ ναι γένεσις , ο ὕτω κα ὶ τὸ γιγν όμενον το ῦ ὄντος κα ὶ μὴ ὄντος : ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μανθ άνων γιγν όμενος ἐπιστ ήμων , κα ὶ το ῦτ ̓ἐστ ὶν ὃ λ έ γεται , [30] ὅτι γί γνεται ἐκ μανθ άνοντος ἐπιστ ήμων ): τὸ δ ̓ὡς ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ , φθειρομ ένου

θατ έρου .

156. We say, then, that a man comes from a boy inthe sense that what has come into being comes fromwhat is coming into being, or in the sense that whathas been completed comes from what is beingcompleted. For generation is always midwaybetween being and non-being, and thus whatever iscoming into being is midway between what is andwhat is not. Now a learner is one who is becominglearned, and this is the meaning of the statement that

the man of science comes from the learner. But watercomes from air in the sense that it comes into beingwhen the latter ceases to be.

δι ὸ ἐκε να μὲν ο ὐκ ἀνακ άμπτει εἰς ἄλληλα , [994 β][1] ο ὐδὲ γί γνεται ἐξ ἀνδρ ὸς πα ς (ο ὐ γὰρ γί γνεται ἐκ τῆς γεν έσεως τὸ γιγν όμενον ἀλλ ̓ <ὃ> ἔστι μετ ὰ τὴν γένεσιν : ο ὕτω γὰρ κα ὶ ἡμέρα ἐκ το ῦ πρω ΐ, ὅτι μετ ὰ το ῦτο : δι ὸ ο ὐδὲ τὸ πρω ῒ ἐξ ἡμέρας ): θάτερα δὲ ἀνακ άμπτει .

157. This is why changes of the former kind are notreversible, and thus a boy does not come from a man.The reason is that the thing which comes into beingdoes not come from generation but exists aftergeneration. This is the way in which the day comesfrom the dawn, i.e., in the sense that it exists after

the dawn; and this is why the dawn cannot comefrom the day. On the other hand, changes of the



latter sort are reversible.

ἀμφοτ έρως δὲ ἀδ ύνατον εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι : τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων μεταξ ὺ [5] ἀνά γκη τέλος ε ἶ ναι , τὰ δ ̓εἰς ἄλληλα ἀνακ άμπτει : ἡ γὰρ θατ έρου φθορ ὰ θατ έρου ἐστ ὶ γένεσις .

158. Now in neither way is it possible to proceed toinfinity; for existing intermediaries must have someend, and one thing may be changed into the otherbecause the corruption of one is the generation of theother.

ἅμα δὲ κα ὶ ἀδ ύνατον τὸ πρῶτον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθαρ ῆναι :ἐπεὶ γὰρ ο ὐκ ἄπειρος ἡ γένεσις ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω , ἀνά γκη ἐξ ο ὗ φθαρ έντος πρώτου τι ἐ γένετο μὴ ἀΐδιον ε ἶ ναι .

159. At the same time it is impossible that an eternalfirst cause should be corrupted; for since generationis not infinite in an upward direction, then a firstprinciple by whose corruption something else isproduced could not be eternal.

COMMENTARY

Postquam philosophus praemisit quod causae entium nonsunt infinitae, hic probat propositum. Et primo, quod nonsint infinitae in directum. Secundo, quod non sintinfinitae secundum speciem, ibi, sed si infinitae essent etcetera.

301. Having assumed above that the causes of beingsare not infinite in number, the Philosopher now provesthis. First (153:C 300, he proves that there are not aninfinite number of causes in a series; and second (170:C330), that the classes of causes are not infinite in

number (“Again, if the classes of causes”).

Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo ostendit propositumin causis efficientibus vel moventibus. Secundo in causismaterialibus, ibi, at vero nec in deorsum. Tertio in causisfinalibus, ibi, amplius autem quod est cuius causa etcetera. Quarto in causis formalibus, ibi, sed nec quodquid erat esse et cetera.

In regard to the first he does four things. First, heproves his assumption in the case of efficient or movingcauses; second (154:C 305), in the case of materialcauses (“Neither is it possible”); third (160:C 316), in thecase of final causes (“Again, that for the sake of which”);and fourth (164:C 320), in the case of formal causes(“Nor can the quiddity”).

Circa primum sic procedit. Primo proponit quamdampropositionem: scilicet, quod in omnibus his, quae suntmedia inter duo extrema, quorum unum est ultimum, etaliud primum, necesse est quod illud quod est primum,sit causa posteriorum, scilicet medii et ultimi.

In regard to the first he proceeds as follows. First, helays down this premise: in the case of all those thingswhich lie between two extremes, one of which is lastand the other first, the first is necessarily the cause ofthose which come after it, namely, what is intermediateand what is last.

Et hanc propositionem manifestat per divisionem: quia, sioporteat nos dicere quid sit causa inter aliqua tria, quaesunt primum, medium et ultimum, ex necessitatedicemus causam esse id quod est primum. Non enimpossumus dicere id quod est ultimum, esse causam

302. Then he proves this premise by a process ofelimination. For if we had to say which of the three, i.e.,the first, the intermediate, or the last, is the cause of theothers, we would have to say that the first is the cause.We could not say that what is last is the cause of all the



omnium, quia nullius est causa; alioquin non estultimum, cum effectus sit posterior causa. Sed necpossumus dicere quod medium sit causa omnium; quianec est causa nisi unius tantum, scilicet ultimi.

others, because it is not a cause of anything; for in otherrespects what is last is not a cause, since an effectfollows a cause. Nor could we say that the intermediateis the cause of all the others, because it is the cause ofonly one of them, namely, what is last.

Et ne aliquis intelligat, quod medium nunquam habeatpost se nisi unum, quod est ultimum, quod tunc solumcontingit, quando inter duo extrema est unum mediumtantum, ideo ad hoc excludendum concludit quod nihil adpropositum differt, utrum sit unum tantum medium, velplura: quia omnia plura media accipiuntur loco unius,inquantum conveniunt in ratione medii. Et similiter nondiffert utrum sint media finita vel infinita; quia dummodohabeant rationem medii, non possunt esse prima causa

movens. Et quia ante omnem secundam causammoventem requiritur prima causa movens, requiriturquod ante omnem causam mediam sit causa prima, quaenullo modo sit media, quasi habens aliam causam ante se.Sed, si praedicto modo ponantur causae moventesprocedere in infinitum, sequitur, quod omnes causae suntmediae. Et sic universaliter oportet dicere, quodcuiuslibet infiniti, sive in ordine causae, sive in ordinemagnitudinis, omnes partes sint mediae: si enim essetaliqua pars quae non esset media, oporteret, quod velesset prima vel ultima: et utrumque repugnat rationiinfiniti, quod excludit omnem terminum et principium etfinem.

303. And lest someone should think that anintermediate is followed by only one thing, i.e., what islast (for this occurs only when there is a single thingbetween two extremes), in order to exclude thisinterpretation he adds that it makes no difference to thepremise given above whether there is only oneintermediate or several, because all intermediates aretaken together as one insofar as they have in commonthe character of an intermediate. Nor again does it make

any difference whether there are a finite or infinitenumber of intermediates, because so long as they havethe nature of an intermediate they cannot be the firstcause of motion. Further, since there must be a firstcause of motion prior to every secondary cause ofmotion, then there must be a first cause prior to everyintermediate cause, which is not an intermediate in anysense, as though it had a cause prior to itself. But if wewere to hold that there is an infinite series of movingcauses in the above way, then all causes would beintermediate ones. Thus we would have to say withoutqualification that all parts of any infinite thing, whetherof a series of causes or of continuous quantities, areintermediate ones; for if there were a part that was notan intermediate one, it would have to be either a first ora last; and both of these are opposed to the nature of theinfinite, which excludes every limit, whether it be astarting-point or a terminus.

Est autem et ad aliud attendendum: quod, si alicuiusfiniti sint plures partes mediae, non omnes partes similiratione sunt mediae. Nam quaedam magis appropinquant

primo, quaedam magis appropinquant ultimo. Sed ininfinito quod non habet primum et ultimum, nulla parspotest magis appropinquare vel minus principio autultimo. Et ideo usque ad quamcumque partem, quammodo signaveris, omnes partes similiter sunt mediae. Sicigitur, si causae moventes procedant in infinitum, nullaerit causa prima: sed causa prima erat causa omnium:ergo sequeretur, quod totaliter omnes causae tollerentur:sublata enim causa tolluntur ea quorum est causa.

304. Now there is another point that must be noted, i.e.,that if there are several intermediate parts in any finitething, not all parts are intermediate to the same degree;

for some are closer to what is first, and some to what islast. But in the case of some infinite thing in whichthere is neither a first nor last part, no part can becloser to or farther away from either what is first orwhat is last. Therefore all parts are intermediates to thesame degree right down to the one you designate now.Consequently, if the causes of motion proceed to infinityin this way, there will be no first cause. But a first causeis the cause of all things. Therefore it will follow that allcauses are eliminated; for when a cause is removed thethings of which it is the cause are also removed.



305. Neither is it possible (154)

Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit, quod non est possibileprocedere in infinitum in causis materialibus. Et primoproponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi,dupliciter enim fit hoc ex hoc et cetera.

He shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity inthe case of material causes. First (154:C 300, he stateswhat he intends to prove. Second (155:C 308), heproceeds with his proof (“Now there are two ways”).

Circa primum considerandum est, quod patiens subiicituragenti: unde procedere in agentibus est sursum ire,procedere autem in patientibus est in deorsum ire. Sicutautem agere attribuitur causae moventi, ita patiattribuitur materiae. Unde processus causarummoventium est in sursum, processus autem causarummaterialium est in deorsum. Quia ergo ostenderat, quod

non est in infinitum procedere in causis moventibus quasiin sursum procedendo, subiungit, quod nec possibile estire in infinitum in deorsum, secundum scilicet processumcausarum materialium, supposito, quod sursum ex partecausarum moventium inveniatur aliquod principium.

In regard to the first it must be noted that a patient issubjected to the action of an agent. Therefore to passfrom agent to agent is to proceed in an upwarddirection, whereas to pass from patient to patient is toproceed in a downward direction. Now just as action isattributed to the cause of motion, so is undergoingaction attributed to matter. Therefore among the causes

of motion the process is in an upward direction, whereasamong material causes the process is in a downwarddirection. Consequently, since he showed amongmoving causes that it is impossible to proceed toinfinity, as it were, in an upward direction, he adds thatit is impossible to proceed to infinity in a downwarddirection, i.e., in the process of material causes, grantedthat there is a starting-point in an upward directionamong the causes of motion.

Et exemplificat de processu naturalium, qui est indeorsum: ut si dicamus quod ex igne fit aqua, et ex aquaterra, et sic in infinitum. Et utitur hoc exemplosecundum opinionem antiquorum naturalium, quiposuerunt unum aliquod elementorum esse principiumaliorum quodam ordine.

306. He illustrates this by way of the process of naturalbodies, which proceeds in a downward direction, as ifwe were to say that water comes from fire, earth fromwater, and so on to infinity. He uses this example inaccordance with the opinion of the ancient philosophersof nature, who held that one of these elements is thesource of the others in a certain order.

Potest autem et aliter exponi, ut intelligamus, quod incausis moventibus manifesti sunt ad sensum ultimieffectus, qui non movent: et ideo non quaeritur, siprocedatur in infinitum in inferius secundum illud genus,sed si procedatur in superius. Sed in genere causarummaterialium e converso supponitur unum primum, quodsit fundamentum et basis aliorum; et dubitatur utrum ininfinitum procedatur in deorsum secundum processumeorum quae generantur ex materia. Et hoc sonatexemplum propositum: non enim dicit ut ignis ex aqua,et hoc ex alio, sed e converso, ex igne aqua et ex hocaliud: unde supponitur prima materia, et quaeritur, an sitprocessus in infinitum in his quae generantur ex materia.

307. However, this can also be explained in anotherway, inasmuch as we understand that in the case ofmoving causes there are evident to the senses certainultimate effects which do not move anything else.Therefore we do not ask if there is an infinite regress inthe lower members of that class, but if there is aninfinite regress in the higher ones. But in regard to theclass of material causes, he assumes that there is onefirst cause which is the foundation and basis of theothers; and he inquires whether there is an infiniteregress in a downward direction in the process of thosethings which are generated from matter. The examplewhich he gives illustrates this, because he does not saythat fire comes from water and this in turn from

something else, but the converse, i.e., that water comesfrom fire, and something else again from this. For thisreason first matter is held to exist; and he asks whether



the things that are generated from matter proceed toinfinity.

308. Now there are two ways in which (155)

Deinde cum dicit dupliciter autem probat propositum: etcirca hoc quatuor facit. Primo distinguit duos modos,quibus fit aliquid ex aliquo. Secundo ostendit duplicemdifferentiam inter illos duos modos, ibi, ergo sic ex puero.Tertio ostendit quod secundum neutrum eorumcontingit procedere in infinitum, ibi, utroque autemmodo impossibile est et cetera. Quarto ostenditsecundum quem illorum modorum ex primo materialiprincipio alia fiant, ibi, simul autem impossibile et cetera.

He proves his original thesis. Concerning this he doesfour things. First (155:C 308), he distinguishes betweenthe two ways in which one thing comes from somethingelse. Second (156:C 310), he shows that these two waysdiffer in two respects (“We say, then, that a man”).Third (158:C 312), he shows that it is impossible toproceed to infinity in either of these ways (“Now inneither way”). Fourth (159:C 314), he shows in which ofthese ways other things come from the first materialprinciple (“At the same time”).

Dicit ergo primo, quod duobus modis fit aliquid ex aliquoproprie et per se. Et utitur isto modo loquendi, utexcludat illum modum, quo dicitur improprie aliquid fieriex aliquo ex hoc solo, quod fit post illud: ut si dicamus,quod quaedam festa Graecorum, quae dicebanturOlympia, fiunt ex quibusdam aliis festis, quae dicebanturIsthmia, puta si nos diceremus quod festum Epiphaniaefit ex festo natalis. Hoc autem non proprie dicitur, quia

fieri est quoddam mutari: in mutatione autem non solumrequiritur ordo duorum terminorum, sed etiamsubiectum idem utriusque: quod quidem non contingit inpraedicto exemplo: sed hoc dicimus, secundum quodimaginamur tempus esse ut subiectum diversorumfestorum.

He says, first, that one thing “comes from” anotherproperly and essentially in two ways. He speaks thus inorder to exclude that way in which something is said inan improper sense to come from something else only byreason of the fact that it comes after it as when it is saidthat certain feasts of the Greeks called the Olympiancome from those called the Isthmian, or as we were tosay that the feast of Epiphany comes from the the

Nativity. But this is an improper use of the word,because the process of coming to be is a change, and in achange it is not only necessary that an order existbetween the two limits of the change but also that bothlimits have the same subject. Now this is not the case inthe above example, but we speak in this way insofar aswe think of time as the subject of different feasts.

Sed oportet proprie dicere aliquid fieri ex aliquo, quandoaliquod subiectum mutatur de hoc in illud. Et hocdupliciter. Uno modo sicut dicimus, quod ex puero fit vir,inquantum scilicet puer mutatur de statu puerili instatum virilem: alio modo sicut dicimus, quod ex aqua fitaer per aliquam transmutationem.

309. Now properly speaking it is necessary to say thatone thing comes from something else when somesubject is changed from this into that. This occurs intwo ways: first, as when we say that a man comes froma boy in the sense that a boy is changed from boyhoodto manhood; second, as when we say that air comesfrom water as a result of substantial change.

310. We say, then, that a man (156).

Deinde cum dicit ergo sic ostendit duas differentias interpraedictos modos. Quarum prima est, quia dicimus expuero fieri virum, sicut ex eo quod est in fieri, fit illudquod iam est factum; aut ex eo quod est in perfici, fit illud

He explains the twofold sense in which these two waysdiffer. First, we say that a man comes from a boy in thesense that what has already come into being comes fromwhat is coming into being, or in the sense that what has



quod iam est perfectum. Illud enim quod est in fieri et inperfici, est medium inter ens et non ens, sicut generatioest medium inter esse et non esse. Et ideo, quia permedium venitur ad extremum, dicimus, quod ex eo quodgeneratur fit illud quod generatum est, et ex eo quod

perficitur, fit illud quod perfectum est. Et sic dicimus,quod ex puero fit vir, vel quod ex addiscente fit sciens,quia addiscens se habet ut in fieri ad scientem. In alioautem modo, quo dicimus ex aere fieri aquam, unumextremorum non se habet ut via vel medium ad alterum,sicut fieri ad factum esse; sed magis ut terminus a quorecedit, ut ad alium terminum perveniatur. Et ideo exuno corrupto fit alterum.

already been completed comes from what is beingcompleted. For anything in a state of becoming and ofbeing completed is midway between being and non-being, just as generation is midway between existenceand nonexistence. Therefore, since we reach an extreme

through an intermediate, we say that what has beengenerated comes from what is being generated, and thatwhat has been completed comes from what is beingcompleted. Now this is the sense in which we say that aman comes from a boy, or a man of science from alearner, because a learner is one who is becoming a manof science. But in the other sense, i.e., the one in whichwe say that water comes from fire, one of the limits ofthe change is not related to the other as a passage orintermediate, as generation is to being, but rather as thelimit from which a thing starts in order to reachanother limit. Therefore one comes from the otherwhen the other is corrupted.

311. This is why changes (157)

Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit ex praemissadifferentia, aliam differentiam. Quia enim in primo modounum se habet ad alterum ut fieri ad factum esse, etmedium ad terminum, patet, quod habent ordinemnaturaliter adinvicem. Et ideo non reflectunturadinvicem, ut indifferenter unum fiat ex altero. Unde nondicimus quod ex viro fiat puer sicut dicimus e converso.Cuius ratio est, quia illa duo ex quorum uno secundumistum modum dicitur alterum fieri, non se habentadinvicem sicut duo termini mutationis alicuius; sed sicutea, quorum unum est post alterum. Et hoc est quod dicit,quod illud quod fit, idest terminus generationis, scilicetesse, non fit ex generatione, quasi ipsa generatio muteturin esse; sed est post generationem, quia naturali ordineconsequitur ad generationem, sicut terminus est postviam, et ultimum post medium. Unde, si consideramus

ista duo, scilicet generationem et esse, non differunt abillo modo quem exclusimus, in quo consideratur ordotantum; sicut cum dicimus, quod dies fit ex aurora, quiaest post auroram. Et propter istum naturalem ordinem,non dicimus e converso, quod aurora fit ex die, idest postdiem. Et ex eadem ratione non potest esse, quod puer fiatex viro. Sed secundum alterum modum, quo aliquid fit exaltero, invenitur reflexio. Sicut enim aqua generatur exaere corrupto, ita aer generatur ex aqua corrupta. Et hocideo, quia ista duo non se habent adinvicem secundumnaturalem ordinem, scilicet ut medium ad terminum; sedsicut duo extrema quorum utrumque potest esse etprimum et ultimum.

He infers another difference from the foregoing one.For since, in the first way, one thing is related to theother as generation is to being, and as an intermediateto a limit, it is evident that one is naturally ordained tothe other. Therefore they are not reversible so that onecomes from the other indifferently. Consequently we donot say that a boy comes from a man, but the reverse.The reason for this is that those two things, of whichone is said to come from the other in this way, are notrelated to each other in the same way as the two limitsof a change, but as two things one of which comes afterthe other in sequence. And this is what he means whenhe says that “what has come into being” (i.e., theterminus of generation or being) does not come fromgeneration as though generation itself were changedinto being, but is that which exists after generation,

because it follows generation in a natural sequence; justas one’s destination comes after a journey, and as whatis last comes after what is intermediate. Therefore, if weconsider these two things, i.e., generation and being, theway in which they are related does not differ from theone we have excluded, in which sequence alone isconsidered, as when we say that the day comes from thedawn because it comes after the dawn. Moreover, thisnatural sequence prevents us from saying in an oppositeway that the dawn comes “from the day,” i.e., after theday; and for the same reason a boy cannot come from aman. But in the other sense in which one thing comesfrom another, the process is reversible; for just as wateris generated by reason of air being corrupted, in a



similar way air is generated by reason of water beingcorrupted. The reason is that these two are not relatedto each other in a natural sequence, i.e., as anintermediate to a limit, but as two limits, either one ofwhich can be first or last.

312. Now in neither way (158).

Deinde cum dicit utroque autem ostendit quod non sitprocedere in infinitum secundum utrumque istorummodorum. Et primo secundum primum, prout dicimus expuero fieri virum. Illud enim ex quo dicimus aliquid fieri,sicut ex puero virum, se habet ut medium inter duoextrema, scilicet inter esse et non esse: sed positis

extremis impossibile est esse infinita media: quiaextremum infinitati repugnat: ergo secundum istummodum non convenit procedere in infinitum.

He shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity ineither of these ways. First, in the way in which we saythat a man comes from a boy; for the thing from whichwe say something else comes as a man comes from aboy has the position of an intermediary between twolimits, i.e., between being and non-being. But an infinite

number of intermediates cannot exist when certainlimits are held to exist, since limits are opposed toinfinity. Therefore, it is impossible to have an infiniteseries in this way.

Similiter etiam nec secundum alium; quia in alio modoinvenitur reflexio extremorum adinvicem, propter hocquod alterius corruptio est alterius generatio, ut dictumest. Ubicumque autem est reflexio, reditur ad primum, itascilicet quod id quod fuit primo principium, postea sit

terminus. Quod in infinitis non potest contingere, inquibus non est principium et finis. Ergo nullo modo exaliquo potest aliquid fieri in infinitum.

313. In like manner it is impossible to have an infiniteseries in the other way; for in that way one limit isconverted into the other, because the corruption of oneis the generation of the other, as has been explained.Now wherever a reversible process exists there is a

return to some first thing in the sense that what was atfirst a starting-point is afterwards a terminus. Thiscannot occur in the case of things that are infinite, inwhich there is neither a starting-point nor a terminus.Consequently, there is no way in which one thing cancome from another in an infinite regress.

314. At the same time it is impossible (159).

Deinde cum dicit simul autem ostendit quodpraedictorum modorum ex prima materia aliquid fiat.Ubi considerandum est, quod Aristoteles utitur hicduabus communibus suppositionibus, in quibus omnesantiqui naturales conveniebant: quarum una est, quod sitaliquod primum principium materiale, ita scilicet quod ingenerationibus rerum non procedatur in infinitum exparte superiori, scilicet eius ex quo generatur. Secundasuppositio est, quod prima materia est sempiterna. Exhac igitur secunda suppositione statim concludit, quod exprima materia non fit aliquid secundo modo, scilicet sicutex aere corrupto fit aqua, quia scilicet illud quod estsempiternum, non potest corrumpi.

He shows in which of these ways something comes fromfirst matter. Now it must be noted that in this placeAristotle uses two common suppositions accepted by allof the ancient philosophers: first, that there is a primarymaterial principle, and therefore that in the process ofgeneration there is no infinite regress on the part of thehigher, i.e., of that from which a thing is generated;second, that matter is eternal. Therefore, from thissecond supposition he immediately concludes thatnothing comes from first matter in the second way, i.e.,in the way in which water comes from air as a result ofthe latter’s corruption, because what is eternal cannotbe corrupted.



Sed quia posset aliquis dicere, quod primum principiummateriale non ponitur a philosophis sempiternum,propter hoc quod unum numero manens sitsempiternum, sed quia est sempiternum persuccessionem, sicut si ponatur humanum genus

sempiternum: hoc excludit ex prima suppositione, dicens,quod, quia generatio non est infinita in sursum, seddevenitur ad aliquod primum principium materiale,necesse est quod, si aliquid sit primum materialeprincipium, ex quo fiunt alia per eius corruptionem, quodnon sit illud sempiternum de quo philosophi dicunt. Nonenim posset esse illud primum materiale principiumsempiternum, si eo corrupto alia generarentur, et iterumipsum ex alio corrupto generaretur. Unde manifestumest, quod ex primo materiali principio fit aliquid, sicut eximperfecto et in potentia existente, quod est mediuminter purum non ens et ens actu; non autem sicut aqua exaere fit corrupto.

315. But since someone could say that the philosophersdid not hold that the first material principle is eternalbecause it remains numerically one eternally butbecause it is eternal by succession (as if the human racewere held to be eternal), he therefore excludes this from

the first supposition. He says that since generation isnot infinite in an upward direction but stops at a firstmaterial principle, then if there is a first materialprinciple by reason of whose corruption other thingscome into being, it must not be the eternal principle ofwhich the philosophers speak. The reason is that thefirst material principle cannot be eternal if other thingsare generated by reason of its corruption, and it in turnis generated by the corruption of something else. It isevident, then, that a thing comes from this first materialprinciple as something imperfect and potential which ismidway between pure nonbeing and actual being, butnot as water comes from air by reason of the latter’scorruption.

LESSON 4

The Existence of a First in Final and Formal Causes

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 994b 9 -994b 31

ἔτι δὲ τὸ ο ὗ ἕνεκα τέλος , τοιο ῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου [10] ἕνεκα ἀλλ ὰ τἆλλα ἐκε ίνου , ὥστ ̓εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιο ῦτόν τι ἔσχατον , ο ὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον , εἰ δὲ μηθ ὲν τοιο ῦτον , ο ὐκ ἔσται τὸ ο ὗ ἕνεκα ,

160. Again, that for the sake of which something comes to beis an end. Now such a thing is not for the sake of somethingelse, but other things are for its sake. Therefore, if there issuch a thing as an ultimate end, there will not be an infiniteregress; but if there is no ultimate end, there will be noreason for which things come to be.

ἀλλ ̓ οἱ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιο ῦντες λανθ άνουσιν ἐξαιρο ῦντες τὴν το ῦ ἀ γαθο ῦ φ ύσιν

161. Now those who posit infinity do away with the natureof the good without realizing it.

(κα ίτοι ο ὐθε ὶς ἂν ἐ γχειρ ήσειεν ο ὐδὲν πράττειν μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν ):

162. But no one will attempt to do anything unless he thinkshe can carry it through to its term.

ο ὐδ ̓ἂν εἴ η νο ῦς ἐν [15] το ς ο ὖσιν : ἕνεκα γάρ τινος ἀεὶ πράττει ὅ γε νο ῦν ἔ χων , το ῦτο

163. Nor will there be any intelligence in such matters,because one who has intelligence always acts for the sake ofsomething since this limit is the end of a thing.



δέ ἐστι πέρας : τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστ ίν .

ἀλλ ὰ μὴν ο ὐδὲ τὸ τ ί ἦν ε ἶ ναι ἐνδ έ χεται ἀνά γεσθαι εἰς ἄλλον ὁρισμ ὸν πλεον άζοντα τῷ λ ό γῳ:

164. Nor can the quiddity be reduced to a definition whichadds to the defining notes.

ἀεί τε γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ ἔμπροσθεν μ λλον , ὁ δ ̓ ὕστερος ο ὐκ ἔστιν , ο ὗ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον μὴ ἔστιν ,ο ὐδὲ [20] τὸ ἐ χόμενον :

165. For a prior definition is always more of a definition,whereas a subsequent one is not; and where the first notedoes not apply, neither does a later one.

ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναιρο ῦσιν οἱ ο ὕτως

λ έ γοντες , ο ὐ γὰρ ο ἷόν τε εἰδέναι πρὶν εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθε ν:

166. Again, those who speak in this way do away with

science, because it is impossible to have science until wereach what is undivided.

κα ὶ τὸ γιγν ώσκειν ο ὐκ ἔστιν , τὰ γὰρ ο ὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδ έ χεται νοε ν;

167. Nor will knowledge itself exist; for how can oneunderstand things which are infinite in this way?

ο ὐ γὰρ ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμ ῆς, ἣ κατ ὰ τὰς διαιρ έσεις μὲν ο ὐ χ ἵ σταται , νοῆσαι δ ̓ ο ὐκ ἔστι μὴ στ ήσαντα (δι όπερ [25] ο ὐκ ἀριθμ ήσει τὰς τομ ὰς ὁ τὴν ἄπειρον διεξι ών),

168. This case is not like that of a line, whose divisibility hasno limit, for it would be impossible to understand a line if ithad no limits. This is why no one will count the sections,which proceed to infinity.

ἀλλ ὰ κα ὶ τὴν ὅλην ο ὐ κινουμ ένῳ νοε ν ἀνά γκη . κα ὶ ἀπείρῳ ο ὐδεν ὶ ἔστιν ε ἶ ναι : εἰ δὲ μή, ο ὐκ ἄπειρ όν γ ̓ἐστ ὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ ε ἶ ναι .

169. But it is necessary to understand that there is matter ineverything that is moved, and that the infinite involvesnothingness, but essence does not. But if there is no infinite,what essence [i.e., definition] does the infinite have?

ἀλλ ὰ μὴν κα ὶ εἰ ἄπειρ ά γ ̓ἦσαν πλ ήθει τὰ εἴ δη

τῶν αἰτ ίων , ο ὐκ ἂν ἦν ο ὐδ ̓ ο ὕτω τὸ γιγν ώσκειν : τ ότε γὰρ εἰδέναι οἰόμεθα [30]ὅταν τὰ αἴ τια γνωρ ίσωμεν : τὸ δ ̓ ἄπειρον κατ ὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν ο ὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πεπερασμ ένῳ διεξελθε ν .

170. Again, if the classes of causes were infinite in number, itwould also be impossible to know anything; for we thinkthat we have scientific knowledge when we know the causesthemselves of things; but what is infinite by addition cannotbe traversed in a finite period of time.

COMMENTARY

Postquam probavit philosophus, quod in causismoventibus et materialibus non proceditur in infinitum,hic ostendit idem in causa finali, quae nominatur cuius

316. Having shown that there is no infinite regresseither among the causes of motion or among materialcauses, the Philosopher now shows that the same thing



causa fit aliquid. is true of the final cause, which is called “that for thesake of which” something comes to be (160).

Et ostendit propositum quatuor rationibus: quarumprima talis est. Id, quod est cuius causa, habet rationemfinis. Sed finis est id quod non est propter alia, sed aliasunt propter ipsum. Aut ergo est aliquid tale, aut nihil:et si quidem fuerit aliquid tale, ut scilicet omnia sintpropter ipsum, et ipsum non sit propter alia, ipsum eritultimum in hoc genere; et ita non procedetur ininfinitum: si autem nihil inveniatur tale, non erit finis.Et ita tolletur hoc genus causae, quod dicitur cuiuscausa.

He proves this by four arguments. The first is as follows.That for the sake of which something comes to be hasthe character of an end. But an end does not exist for thesake of other things, but others exist for its sake. Nowsuch a thing either exists or not. If there is something ofsuch a kind that all things exist for its sake and not it forthe sake of something else, it will be the last thing in thisorder; and thus there will not be an infinite regress.However, if no such thing exists, no end will exist; andthus the class of cause called “that for the sake of which”will be eliminated.

317. Now those who posit infinity (161).

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, sed qui, quae derivatur expraemissa ratione. Ex prima enim ratione conclusum estquod qui ponunt infinitatem in causis finalibus,removeant causam finalem. Remota autem causa finali,removetur natura et ratio boni: eadem enim ratio boni etfinis est; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut diciturin primo Ethicorum. Et ideo illi qui ponunt infinitum in

causis finalibus, auferunt totaliter naturam boni, licetipsi hoc non percipiant.

He gives the second argument, which is derived from theforegoing one; for from the first argument he concludedthat those who posit an infinite regress in final causes doaway with the final cause. Now when the final cause isremoved, so also is the nature and notion of the good;because good and end have the same meaning, since thegood is that which all desire, as is said in Book I of

the Ethics . Therefore those who hold that there is aninfinite regress in final causes do away completely withthe nature of the good, although they do not realize this.

318. But no one will attempt (162).

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et nullus, quae talis est. Sisit infinitum in causis finalibus, nullus poterit perveniread ultimum terminum, quia infinitorum non est ultimus

terminus: sed nullus conatur ad aliquid faciendum nisiper hoc, quod se existimat venturum ad aliquid, sicut adultimum terminum: ergo ponentes infinitum in causisfinalibus excludunt omnem conatum ad operandum,etiam naturalium rerum: nullius enim rei motusnaturalis est nisi ad id ad quod nata est pervenire.

He gives the third argument, which is as follows. If therewere an infinite number of final causes, no one couldreach a last terminus, because there is no last terminus

in an infinite series. But no one will attempt to doanything unless he thinks he is able to accomplishsomething as a final goal. Therefore, those who hold thatfinal causes proceed to infinity do away with everyattempt to operate and even with the activities of naturalbodies; for a thing’s natural movement is only towardsomething which it is naturally disposed to attain.

319. Nor will there be (163).

Quartam rationem ponit ibi neque utique quae talis est.Qui ponit infinitum in causis finalibus, excludit

He states the fourth argument, which is as follows. Onewho posits an infinite number of final causes does away



terminum, et per consequens excludit finem cuius causafit aliquid. Sed omne agens per intellectum agit causaalicuius finis: ergo sequetur quod inter causas operativasnon sit intellectus, et ita tolletur intellectus practicus.Quae cum sint inconvenientia, oportet removere

primum, id scilicet ex quo sequuntur, scilicet infinitum acausis finalibus.

with a limit, and therefore with the end for the sake ofwhich a cause acts. But every intelligent agent acts forthe sake of some end. Therefore it would follow thatthere is no intellect among causes which are productive;and thus the practical intellect is eliminated. But since

these things are absurd, we must reject the first position,from which they follow, i.e., that there is an infinitenumber of final causes.

320. Nor can the quiddity (164).

Deinde cum dicit sed nec ostendit quod non sitinfinitum in causis formalibus: et circa hoc duo facit.Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat

propositum, ibi: semper enim et cetera.

He shows that there is not an infinite number of formalcauses. In regard to this he does two things. First (164:C320), he states what he intends to prove. Second (165:C

322), he proves it (“For a prior definition”).

Circa primum considerandum est quod unumquodqueconstituitur in specie per propriam formam. Undedefinitio speciei maxime significat formam rei. Oportetergo accipere processum in formis secundum processumin definitionibus. In definitionibus enim una pars estprior altera, sicut genus est prius differentia, etdifferentiarum una est prior altera. Idem ergo est quodin infinitum procedatur in formis et quod in infinitum

procedatur in partibus definitionis. Et ideo volensostendere quod non sit procedere in infinitum in causisformalibus, proponit non esse infinitum in partibusdefinitionis. Et ideo dicit quod non convenit hoc quodest quod quid erat esse, in infinitum reduci ad aliamdefinitionem, ut sic semper multiplicetur ratio. Puta quidefinit hominem in definitione eius ponit animal. Undedefinitio hominis reducitur ad definitionem animalis,quae ulterius reducitur ad definitionem alicuius alterius,et sic multiplicatur ratio definitiva. Sed hoc nonconvenit in infinitum procedere.

Regarding the first we must understand that each thingderives its particular species from its proper form, andthis is why the definition of a species signifies chiefly athing’s form. Therefore we must understand that aprocession of forms is consequent upon a procession ofdefinitions; for one part of a definition is prior to another

just as genus is prior to difference and one difference isprior to another. Therefore an infinite regress in forms

and in the parts of a definition is one and the same thing.Now since Aristotle wishes to show that it is impossibleto proceed to infinity in the case of formal causes, heholds that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in theparts of a definition. Hence he says that it is impossiblefor a thing’s quiddity to be reduced to another definition,and so on to infinity, so that the defining notes arealways increased in number. For example, one whodefines man gives animal in his definition, and thereforethe definition of man is reduced to that of animal, andthis in turn to the definition of something else, therebyincreasing the defining notes. But to proceed to infinityin this way is absurd.

Non autem hoc dicimus quasi in uno et eodem individuomultiplicentur formae secundum numerum generum etdifferentiarum, ut scilicet in homine sit alia forma a quaest homo, et alia a qua est animal, et sic aliis; sed quianecesse est ut in rerum natura tot gradus formaruminveniantur, quod inveniuntur genera ordinata etdifferentiae. Est enim in rebus invenire aliquam formam,quae est forma, et non est forma corporis; et aliquam

quae est forma corporis, sed non est forma animaticorporis; et sic de aliis.

321. Now we do not mean by this that there are thesame number of forms in each individual as there aregenera and differences, so that in man there is one formby which he is man, another by which he is animal, andso on; but we mean that there must be as many grades offorms in reality as there are orders of genera anddifferences [in knowledge]. For we find in reality oneform which is not the form of a body, another which is

the form of a body but not of an animated body, and soon.



322. For a prior definition (165).

Deinde cum dicit semper enim probat propositumquatuor rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Inmultitudine formarum vel rationum semper illa quae estprius est magis. Quod non est intelligendum quasi sitcompletior; quia formae specificae sunt completae. Seddicitur esse magis, quia est in plus quam illa quae estposterior, quae non est ubicumque est prior. Non enimubicumque est ratio animalis, est ratio hominis. Ex quoargumentatur, quod si primum non est, nec habitumidest consequens est. Sed si in infinitum procedatur inrationibus et formis, non erit prima ratio vel formadefinitiva; ergo excludentur omnes consequentes.

He proves his premise by four arguments. The first isthis. Wherever there are a number of forms or definingnotes, a prior definition is alw ays “more of a definition.”This does not mean that a prior form is more complete(for specific forms are complete), but that a prior formbelongs to more things than a subsequent form, which isnot found wherever a prior form is found; e.g., thedefinition of man is not found wherever that of animal isfound. From this he argues that if the first note [of aseries] does not fit the thing defined, “neither does alater one.” But if there were an infinite regress indefinitions and forms, there would be no first definitionor definitive form. Hence all subsequent definitions and

forms would be eliminated.

323. Again, those who speak (166).

Secundam rationem ponit ibi amplius scire quae talis est.Impossibile est aliquid sciri prius quam perveniatur adindividua. Non autem accipitur hic individuumsingulare, quia scientia non est de singularibus. Sedindividuum potest dici uno modo ipsa ratio speciei

specialissimae, quae non dividitur ulterius peressentiales differentias. Et secundum hoc intelligiturquod non habetur perfecta scientia de re, quousqueperveniatur ad speciem specialissimam; quia ille qui scitaliquid in genere, nondum habet perfectam scientiam dere. Et secundum hanc expositionem oportet dicere, quodsicut prima ratio concludebat, quod in causis formalibusnon proceditur in infinitum in sursum, ita haec ratioconcludit, quod non proceditur in infinitum in deorsum.Sic enim non esset devenire ad speciem specialissimam.Ergo ista positio destruit perfectam scientiam.

He gives the second argument, which is as follows. It isimpossible to have scientific knowledge of anything untilwe come to what is undivided. Now in this place“undivided” cannot mean the singular, because there isno science of the singular. However, it can be

understood in two other ways. First, it can mean thedefinition itself of the last species, which is not furtherdivided by essential differences. In this sense hisstatement can mean that we do not have completeknowledge of a thing until we reach its last species; forone who knows the genus to which a thing belongs doesnot yet have a complete knowledge of that thing.According to this interpretation we must say that, justas the first argument concluded that it is impossible tohave an infinite regress in an upward direction amongformal causes, in a similar fashion this second argumentconcludes that it is impossible to have an infinite regressin a downward direction, otherwise it would beimpossible to reach a last species. Therefore this positiondestroys any complete knowledge.

Sed quia formalis divisio non solum est secundum quodgenus dividitur per differentias, per cuius divisionisprivationem species specialissima potest diciindividuum, sed etiam est secundum quod definitumdividitur in partes definitionis, ut patet in primophysicorum; ideo individuum potest hic dici, cuius

definitio non resolvitur in aliqua definientia. Etsecundum hoc, supremum genus est individuum. Etsecundum hoc erit sensus, quod non potest haberi

324. Now a formal division exists not only when a genusis divided by differences (and when such division is nolonger possible the last species can be said to beundivided), but also when the thing defined is dividedinto its definitive parts, as is evident in Book I ofthe Physics . Therefore in this place “undivided” can also

mean a thing whose definition cannot be resolved intoany definitive parts. Now according to this the supremegenus is undivided; and from this point of view his



scientia de re per aliquam definitionem, nisi deveniaturad suprema genera, quibus ignoratis impossibile estaliquod posteriorum sciri. Et secundum hoc concluditratio, quod in causis formalibus non procedatur ininfinitum in sursum, sicut et prius.

statement can mean that we cannot have scientificknowledge of a thing by definition unless we reach itssupreme genera; because when these remain unknown itis impossible to know its subsequent genera. Andaccording to this the second argument concludes, as the

former one did, that it is impossible to proceed to infinityin an upward direction among formal causes.

Vel ad idem concludendum potest aliter exponiindividuum, ut scilicet propositio immediata dicaturindividuum. Si enim procedatur in infinitum indefinitionibus in sursum, nulla erit propositioimmediata. Et sic universaliter tolletur scientia, quae estde conclusionibus deductis ex principiis immediatis.

325. Or, in order to reach the same conclusion,“undivided” can be explained in another way, i.e., in thesense that an immediate proposition is undivided. For ifit were possible to proceed to infinity in an upwarddirection in the case of definitions, there would be noimmediate proposition, and thus science as such, which isabout conclusions derived from immediate principles,

would be destroyed.

326. Nor will knowledge (167)

Deinde cum dicit et cognoscere tertiam rationem ponitquae procedit non solum ad scientiam excludendam, sedad excludendum simpliciter omnem cognitionemhumanam. Et circa hanc rationem duo facit. Primo ponitrationem. Secundo excludit obiectionem quamdam, ibi,

non enim simile et cetera.

He gives the third argument, which proceeds to [showthat such an infinite regress would] destroy not onlyscience but any kind of human knowing whatsoever. Inregard to this argument he does two things. First (167:C326), he gives his argument. Second (168:C 327), he

refutes an objection raised against it (“This case is notlike”).

Ratio autem talis est. Unumquodque cognoscitur perintellectum suae formae: sed si in formis procedatur ininfinitum, non poterunt intelligi; quia infinituminquantum huiusmodi, non comprehenditur intellectu:ergo ista positio universaliter destruit cognitionem.

The argument is as follows. We know each thing byunderstanding its form. But if there were an infiniteregress in forms, these forms could not be understood,because the intellect is incapable of understanding theinfinite as infinite. Therefore this position destroysknowing in its entirety.

327. This case is not like (168).

Deinde cum dicit non enim excludit quamdamobviationem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod illud quodhabet infinitas formas, potest cognosci, sicut et linea,quae in infinitum dividitur. Sed hoc excludit, dicens,quod non est simile de linea, cuius divisiones non stant,sed in infinitum procedunt. Impossibile enim est quodaliquid intelligatur nisi in aliquo stetur; unde linea,inquantum statuitur ut finita in actu propter suosterminos, sic potest intelligi; secundum vero quod nonstatur in eius divisione, non potest sciri. Unde nullus

He disposes of an objection; for someone could say that athing having an infinite number of forms can beunderstood in the same way as a line which is divided toinfinity. But he denies this. He says that this case is notthe same as that of a line, whose divisions do not stopbut go on to infinity. For it is impossible to understandanything unless some limit is set to it. Therefore a linecan be understood inasmuch as some actual limit is givento it by reason of its extremes. However, it cannot beunderstood insofar as its division does not terminate.



potest numerare divisiones lineae secundum quod ininfinitum procedunt. Sed infinitum in formis estinfinitum in actu, et non in potentia, sicut est infinitumin divisione lineae; et ideo, si essent infinitae formae,nullo modo esset aliquid scitum vel notum.

Hence no one can count the divisions of a line insofar asthey are infinite. But as applied to forms “infinite” meansactually infinite, and not potentially infinite as it doeswhen applied to the division of a line. Therefore, if therewere an infinite number of forms, there would be no way

in which a thing could be known either scientifically orin any way at all.

328. But it is necessary (169).

Deinde cum dicit sed materiam ponit quartam rationem,quae talis est. In omni eo quod movetur necesse estintelligere materiam. Omne enim quod movetur est inpotentia: ens autem in potentia est materia: ipsa autem

materia habet rationem infiniti, et ipsi infinito, quod estmateria, convenit ipsum nihil, quia materia secundum seintelligitur absque omni forma. Et, cum ei quod estinfinitum, conveniat hoc quod est nihil, sequitur peroppositum, quod illud per quod est esse, non sitinfinitum, et quod infinito, idest materiae, non sit esseinfinitum. Sed esse est per formam: ergo non estinfinitum in formis.

He gives the fourth argument, which runs thus. Mattermust be understood to exist in everything that is moved;for whatever is moved is in potentiality, and what is inpotentiality is matter. But matter itself has the character

of the infinite, and nothingness belongs to the infinite inthe sense of matter, because matter taken in itself isunderstood without any of kind of form. And sincenothingness belongs to the infinite, it followscontrariwise that the principle by which the infinite is abeing is itself not infinite, and that it does not belong “tothe infinite,” i.e., to matter, to be infinite in being. Butthings are by virtue of their form. Hence there is noinfinite regress among forms.

Est autem hic advertendum quod hic ponit nihil esse deratione infiniti, non quod privatio sit de rationemateriae, sicut Plato posuit non distinguensprivationem a materia; sed quia privatio est de rationeinfiniti. Non enim ens in potentia habet rationeminfiniti, nisi secundum quod est sub ratione privationis,ut patet in tertio physicorum.

329. However, it must be noted that in this placeAristotle holds that the infinite involves the notion ofnothingness, not because matter involves the notion ofprivation (as Plato claimed when he failed to distinguishbetween privation and matter), but because the infiniteinvolves the notion of privation. For a potential beingcontains the notion of the infinite only insofar as itcomes under the nature of privation, as is evident inBook III of the Physics .

330. Again, if the classes (170).

Deinde cum dicit sed si infinitae ostendit quod non suntinfinitae species causarum, tali ratione. Tunc putamusnos scire unumquodque quando cognoscimus omnescausas eius: sed, si sunt infinitae causae secundumadiunctionem unius speciei ad aliam, non erit pertransireistam infinitatem, ita quod possint omnes causaecognosci: ergo etiam per istum modum excludeturcognitio rerum.

He shows that the classes of causes are not infinite innumber, and he uses the following argument. We thinkthat we have scientific knowledge of each thing when weknow all its causes. But if there were an infinite numberof causes in the sense that one class of cause may beadded to another continuously, it would be impossible totraverse this infinity in such a way that all causes couldbe known. Hence in this way too the knowing of thingswould be destroyed.



LESSON 5

The Method to Be Followed in the Search for Truth

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 994b 32 -995a 20

αἱ δ ̓ἀκρο άσεις κατ ὰ τὰ ἔθη συμβα ίνουσιν : ὡς γὰρ εἰώθαμεν ο ὕτως ἀξιο ῦμεν λ έ γεσθαι , [995 α ] [1] κα ὶ τὰ παρὰ τα ῦτα ο ὐ χ ὅμοια φα ίνεται ἀλλ ὰ δι ὰ τὴν ἀσυν ήθειαν ἀ γνωστ ότερα κα ὶ ξενικ ώτερα : τὸ γὰρ σ ύνηθες γν ώριμον .

171. The way in which people are affected by whatthey hear depends upon the things to which they areaccustomed; for it is in terms of such things that we

judge statements to be true, and anything over andabove these does not seem similar but lessintelligible and more remote. For it is the things towhich we are accustomed that are better known.

ἡλ ίκην δὲ ἰσχ ὺν ἔ χει τὸ σ ύνηθες οἱ νόμοι δηλο ῦσιν , ἐν ο ἷ ς τὰ μυθ ώδη κα ὶ [5] παιδαρι ώδη με ζον ἰσχ ύει το ῦ γιν ώσκειν περ ὶ α ὐτῶν δι ὰ τὸ ἔθος .

172. The great force which custom has is shown bythe laws, in which legendary and childish elementsprevail over our knowledge of them, because ofcustom.

οἱ μὲν ο ὖν ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικ ῶς λ έ γῃ τις ο ὐκ ἀποδ έ χονται τῶν λεγ όντων , οἱ δ ̓ ἂν μὴ παραδειγματικ ῶς , οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιο ῦσιν ἐπά γεσθαι

ποιητ ήν. κα ὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβ ῶς, το ὺς δὲ λυ πε τὸ ἀκριβ ὲς ἢ δι ὰ τὸ μὴ δ ύνασθαι [10] συνε ίρειν ἢ δι ὰ τὴν μικρολογ ίαν : ἔ χει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβ ὲς τοιο ῦτον ,ὥστε , καθ άπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολα ίων , κα ὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λ ό γων ἀνελε ύθερον ε ἶ να ί τισι δοκε .

173. Now some men will not accept what a speakersays unless he speaks in mathematical terms; andothers, unless he gives examples; while others

expect him to quote a poet as an authority. Again,some want everything stated with certitude, whileothers find certitude annoying, either because theyare incapable of comprehending anything, orbecause they consider exact inquiry to be quibbling;for there is some similarity. Hence it seems to somemen that, just as liberality is lacking in the matter ofa fee for a banquet, so also is it lacking inarguments.

δι ὸ δε πεπαιδε ῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτ έον , ὡς ἄτο πον ἅμα ζητε ν ἐπιστ ήμην κα ὶ τρ όπον ἐπιστ ήμης :ἔστι δ ̓ο ὐδὲ θάτερον ῥᾴδιον λαβε ν .

174. For this reason one must be trained how tomeet every kind of argument; and it is absurd tosearch simultaneously for knowledge and for themethod of acquiring it; for neither of these is easilyattained.

τὴν [15] δ ̓ἀκριβολογ ίαν τὴν μαθηματικ ὴν ο ὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητ έον , [16] ἀλλ ̓ ἐν το ς μὴ ἔ χουσιν ὕλην . δι όπερ ο ὐ φυσικ ὸς ὁ τρ όπος : ἅπασα γὰρ ἴ σως ἡ φ ύσις ἔ χει ὕλην . δι ὸ σκε πτέον πρῶτον τ ί ἐστιν ἡ φ ύσις : ο ὕτω γὰρ κα ὶ περ ὶ τ ίνων ἡ φυσικ ὴ δῆλον ἔσται [ κα ὶ εἰ μι ς ἐπιστ ήμης ἢ πλει όνων τὰ αἴ τια κα ὶ

175. But the exactness of mathematics is not to beexpected in all cases, but only in those which haveno matter. This is why its method is not that ofnatural philosophy; for perhaps the whole of naturecontains matter. Hence we must first investigatewhat nature is; for in this way it will become evidentwhat the things are with which natural philosophy



[20] τὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρ ῆσα ί ἐστιν ]. deals, and whether it belongs to one science or toseveral to consider the causes and principles ofthings.

COMMENTARY

Postquam philosophus ostendit, quod consideratioveritatis partim est difficilis et partim facilis, et quodmaxime pertinet ad primum philosophum, hicostendit, quis sit modus conveniens adconsiderandum veritatem: et circa hoc duo facit.Primo enim ponit diversos modos, quos homines

sequuntur in consideratione veritatis. Secundoostendit quis sit modus conveniens, ibi, propter quodoportet erudiri et cetera.

331. Having shown that the study of truth is in one sensedifficult and in another easy, and that it belongspreeminently to first philosophy, the Philosopher nowexposes the propermethod of investigating the truth. Inregard to this he does two things. First (171:C 331), hegives the different methods which men follow in the study

of truth. Second (335), he shows which method is theproper one (“For this reason one must”).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit efficaciamconsuetudinis in consideratione veritatis. Secundoconcludit diversos modos, quibus homines utuntur inconsideratione, propter diversas consuetudines, ibi,alii vero si non mathematicae et cetera.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he showshow powerful custom is in the study of truth. Second (173:C 334), he concludes that the different methods which menemploy in the study of truth depend on the different thingsto which thye are accustomed (“Now some men”).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit virtutemconsuetudinis in consideratione veritatis. Secundomanifestat per signum, ibi, quantam vero vim habeatet cetera.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he showshow powerful custom is in the study of truth. Second(172:C 333), he makes this clear by an example (“The greatforce”).

Dicit ergo primo, quod auditiones contingunt inhominibus de his quae sunt secundum consuetudines.Ea enim, quae sunt consueta, libentius audiuntur etfacilius recipiuntur. Dignum enim videtur nobis, utita dicatur de quocumque, sicut consuevimus audire.Et si qua dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimusaudire, non videntur nobis similia in veritate his quaeconsuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus notaet magis extranea a ratione, propter hoc quod suntinconsueta. Illud enim quod est consuetum, est nobismagis notum.

He says, first, that the way in which people are affected bywhat they hear depends upon the things to which they areaccustomed, because such things are more willingly heardand more easily understood. For things spoken of in amanner to which we are accustomed seem to us to beacceptable; and if any things are said to us over and abovewhat we have been accustomed to hear, these do not seemto have the same degree of truth. As a matter of fact theyseem less intelligible to us and further removed fromreason just because we are not accustomed to them; for it isthe things which we are accustomed to hear that we knowbest of all.

Cuius ratio est, quia consuetudo vertitur in naturam;unde et habitus ex consuetudine generatur, qui

inclinat per modum naturae. Ex hoc autem quodaliquis habet talem naturam vel talem habitum, habet

332. Now the reason for this is that things which arecustomary become natural. Hence ahabit, which disposes us

in a way similar to nature, is also acquired by customaryactivity. And from the fact that someone has some special



proportionem determinatam ad hoc vel illud.Requiritur autem ad quamlibet cognitionemdeterminata proportio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile.Et ideo secundum diversitatem naturarum ethabituum accidit diversitas circa cognitionem.

Videmus enim, quod hominibus secundum humanamnaturam sunt innata prima principia; et secundumhabitum virtutis apparet unicuique bonum, quodconvenit illi virtuti: sicut et gustui videtur aliquidconveniens, secundum eius dispositionem. Sic igitur,quia consuetudo causat habitum consimilem naturae,contingit quod ea quae sunt consueta sint notiora.

sort of nature or special kind of habit, he has a definiterelationship to one thing or another. But in every kind ofcognition there must be a definite relationship between theknower and the object of cognition. Therefore, to theextent that natures and habits differ, there are diverse kinds

of cognition. For we see that there are innate firstprinciples in men because of their human nature, and thatwhat is proper to some special virtue appears good to onewho has this habit of virtue; and, again, that somethingappears palatable to the sense of taste because of itsdisposition. Therefore, since custom produces a habit whichis similar to nature, it follows that what is customary isbetter known.

333. The great force (172)>

Deinde cum dicit quantam vero manifestat quoddixerat per quoddam signum; ostendens, quod legesab hominibus positae ostendunt per experientiam,quantam vim habeat consuetudo: in quibus quidemlegibus propter consuetudinem magis valentfabulariter et pueriliter dicta, ad hoc quod eisassentiatur, quam cognitio veritatis. Loquitur autemhic philosophus de legibus ab hominibus adinventis,quae ad conservationem civilem sicut ad ultimumfinem ordinantur; et ideo quicumque invenerunt eas,aliqua quibus hominum animi retraherentur a maliset provocarentur ad bona secundum diversitatemgentium et nationum in suis legibus tradiderunt,quamvis multa eorum essent vana et frivola, quaehomines a pueritia audientes magis approbabantquam veritatis cognitionem.

Here he makes his previous statement clear by giving aconcrete case. He says that thelaws which men pass arepositive evidence of the force of custom; for the legendaryand childish elements in these laws are more effective inwinning assent than is knowledge of the truth. Now thePhilosopher is speaking here of the laws devised by men,which have as their ultimate end the preservation of thepolitical community. Therefore the men who haveestablished these laws have handed down in them, inkeeping with the diversity of peoples and nations involved,certain directives by which human souls might be drawnaway from evil and persuaded to do good, although many ofthem, which men had heard from childhood and of whichthey approved more readily than of what they knew to betrue, were empty andfoolish.

Sed lex divinitus data ordinat hominem ad veramfelicitatem cui omnis falsitas repugnat. Unde in legeDei nulla falsitas continetur.

But the law given by God directs men to that truehappiness to which everything false is opposed. Thereforethere is nothing false in the divine law.

334. Now some men (173).

Deinde cum dicit alii vero hic ostendit quomodohomines in consideratione veritatis propterconsuetudinem diversos modos acceptant: et dicit,quod quidam non recipiunt quod eis dicitur, nisidicatur eis per modum mathematicum. Et hoc quidemconvenit propter consuetudinem his, qui inmathematicis sunt nutriti. Et quia consuetudo estsimilis naturae, potest etiam hoc quibusdam

Here he shows how men as a result of custom use differentmethods in the study of truth. He says that some men listento what is said to them only if it is mathematical incharacter; and this is acceptable to those who have beeneducated in mathematics because of the habits which theyhave. Now since custom is like nature, the same thing canalso happen to certain men (1) because they are poorlydisposed in some respect, e.g., those who have a strong



contingere propter indispositionem: illis scilicet, quisunt fortis imaginationis, non habentes intellectummultum elevatum. Alii vero sunt, qui nihil voluntrecipere nisi proponatur eis aliquod exemplumsensibile, vel propter consuetudinem, vel propter

dominium sensitivae virtutis in eis et debilitatemintellectus. Quidam vero sunt qui nihil reputent essedignum ut aliquid eis inducatur absque testimoniopoetae, vel alicuius auctoris. Et hoc etiam est velpropter consuetudinem, vel propter defectum iudicii,quia non possunt diiudicare utrum ratio percertitudinem concludat; et ideo quasi non credentessuo iudicio requirunt iudicium alicuius noti. Suntetiam aliqui qui omnia volunt sibi dici percertitudinem, idest per diligentem inquisitionemrationis. Et hoc contingit propter bonitatemintellectus iudicantis, et rationes inquirentis;dummodo non quaeratur certitudo in his, in quibuscertitudo esse non potest. Quidam vero sunt quitristantur, si quid per certitudinem cum diligentidiscussione inquiratur. Quod quidem potestcontingere dupliciter. Uno modo propterimpotentiam complectendi: habent enim debilemrationem, unde non sufficiunt ad considerandumordinem complexionis priorum et posteriorum. Aliomodo propter micrologiam, idest parvorumratiocinationem. Cuius similitudo quaedam est incertitudinali inquisitione, quae nihil indiscussum

relinquit usque ad minima. Imaginantur autemquidam, quod sicut in symbolis conviviorum nonpertinet ad liberalitatem, quod debeant etiam minimacomputari in ratiocinio, ita etiam sit quaedamimportunitas et illiberalitas, si homo velit circacognitionem veritatis etiam minima discutere.

imagination but little intelligence. (2) Then there are otherswho do not wish to accept anything unless they are given aconcrete example, either because they are accustomed tothis or because their sensory powers dominate and theirintellect is weak. (3) Again, there are some who think that

nothing is convincing enough unless a poet or someauthority is cited. This is also a result either of custom or ofpoor judgment, because they cannot decide for themselveswhether the conclusion of an argument is certain; andtherefore, having no faith in their own judgment, as it were,they require the judgment of some recognized authority. (4)Again there are others who want everything said to themwith certitude, i.e., by way of careful rational investigation.This occurs because of the superior intelligence of the onemaking the judgment and the arguments of the oneconducting the investigation, provided that one does notlook for certitude where it cannot be had. (5) On the otherhand there are some who are annoyed if some matter isinvestigated in an exact way by means of a carefuldiscussion. This can occur for two reasons. (a) First, theylack the ability to comprehend anything; for since theirreasoning power is poor they are unable to understand theorder in which premises are related to conclusions. (b)Second, it occurs because of quibbling, i.e., reasoning aboutthe smallest matters, which bears some resemblance to thesearch for certitude since it leaves nothing undiscusseddown to the smallest detail. (c) Then there are some whothink that, just as liberality is lacking when the smallest

details are taken into account in estimating the fee for abanquet, in a similar way there is a lack of civility andliberality when a man also wishes to discuss the smallestdetails in the search for truth.

335. For this reason one must be trained (174).

Deinde cum dicit propter quod ostendit quis sitmodus conveniens ad inquirendum veritatem; et circahoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit, quomodo homopossit cognoscere modum convenientem ininquisitione veritatis. Secundo ostendit, quod illemodus qui est simpliciter melior, non debet inomnibus quaeri, ibi, acribologia vero et cetera.

He exposes the proper method of investigating the truth.Concerning this he does two things. First ( 335), he showshow a man can discover the proper method of investigatingthe truth. Second (336), he explains that the method whichis absolutely the best should not be demanded in all matters(“But the exactness of mathematics”) .

Dicit ergo primo, quod quia diversi secundumdiversos modos veritatem inquirunt; ideo oportetquod homo instruatur per quem modum in singulisscientiis sint recipienda ea quae dicuntur. Et quia nonest facile quod homo simul duo capiat, sed dum ad

He says, first, that since different men use differentmethods in the search for truth, one must be trained in themethod which the particular sciences must use toinvestigate their subject. And since it is not easy for a manto undertake two things at once (indeed, so long as he tries



duo attendit, neutrum capere potest; absurdum est,quod homo simul quaerat scientiam et modum quiconvenit scientiae. Et propter hoc debet priusaddiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logicatradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus

aliis scientiis. Modus autem proprius singularumscientiarum, in scientiis singulis circa principiumtradi debet.

to do both he can succeed in neither), it is absurd for a manto try to acquire a science and at the same time to acquirethe method proper to that science. This is why a manshould learn logic before any of the other sciences, becauselogic considers the general method of procedure in all the

other sciences. Moreover, the method appropriate to theparticular sciences should be considered at the beginning ofthese sciences.

336. But the exactness of mathematics (175).

Deinde cum dicit acribologia vero ostendit quod illemodus, qui est simpliciter optimus, non debet inomnibus quaeri; dicens quod acribologia idest

diligens et certa ratio, sicut est in mathematicis, nondebet requiri in omnibus rebus, de quibus suntscientiae; sed debet solum requiri in his, quae nonhabent materiam. Ea enim quae habent materiam,subiecta sunt motui et variationi: et ideo non potestin eis omnibus omnimoda certitudo haberi. Quaeriturenim in eis non quid semper sit et ex necessitate; sedquid sit ut in pluribus.

He shows that the method which is absolutely the bestshould not be demanded in all the sciences. He says that the“exactness,” i.e., the careful and certain demonstrations,

found in mathematics should not be demanded in the case ofall things of which we have science, but only in the case ofthose things which have no matter; for things that havematter are subject to motion and change, and therefore intheir case complete certitude cannot be had. For in the caseof these things we do not look for what exists always and ofnecessity, but only for what exists in the majority of cases.

Immaterialia vero secundum seipsa sunt certissima,

quia sunt immobilia. Sed illa quae in sui natura suntimmaterialia, non sunt certa nobis propter defectumintellectus nostri, ut praedictum est. Huiusmodiautem sunt substantiae separatae. Sed mathematicasunt abstracta a materia, et tamen non suntexcedentia intellectum nostrum: et ideo in eis estrequirenda certissima ratio.

Now immaterial things are most certain by their very

nature because they are unchangeable, although they arenot certain to us because our intellectual power is weak, aswas stated above (279). The separate substances are thingsof this kind. But while the things with which mathematicsdeals are abstracted from matter, they do not surpass ourunderstanding; and therefore in their case most certainreasoning is demanded.

Et quia tota natura est circa materiam, ideo istemodus certissimae rationis non pertinet ad naturalemphilosophum. Dicit autem forsan propter corporacaelestia, quia non habent eodem modo materiamsicut inferiora.

Again, because the whole of nature involves matter, thismethod of most certain reasoning does not belongto natural philosophy . However, he says “perhaps” because ofthe celestial bodies, since they do not have matter in thesame sense that lower bodies do.

Et, quia in scientia naturali non convenit istecertissimus rationis modus, ideo in scientia naturaliad cognoscendum modum convenientem illi scientiae,primo perscrutandum est quid sit natura: sic enimmanifestum erit de quibus sit scientia naturalis. Etiterum considerandum est, si unius scientiae, scilicetnaturalis, sit omnes causas et principia considerare,aut sit diversarum scientiarum. Sic enim poterit scirequis modus demonstrandi conveniat naturali. Et hunc

337. Now since this method of most certain reasoning isnot the method proper to natural science , therefore in orderto know which method is proper to that science we mustinvestigate first what nature is; for in this way we willdiscover the things which natural philosophy studies.Further, we must investigate “whether it belongs to onescience,” i.e., to natural p hilosophy, or to several sciences,to consider all causes and principles; for in this way we willbe able to learn which method of demonstration is proper



modum ipse observat in secundo physicorum, utpatet diligenter intuenti.

to natural philosophy. He deals with this method in Book IIof the Physics , as is obvious to anyone who examines itcarefully.

in metaphysics ii (english translation)

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