in the circuit court of the seventeenth · pdf filepage 2 of 73! background this action seeks...

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.:

TIMOTHY J. WOLTERING, as the Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF OLGA WOLTERING, Plaintiff, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., and ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, and ALLIED UNIVERSAL CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, and BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS d/b/a FORT LAUDERDALE-HOLLYWOOD INT’L AIRPORT, and BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendants. ____________________________________________/

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, TIMOTHY J. WOLTERING, as the Personal Representative

of THE ESTATE OF OLGA WOLTERING (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), by and through the

undersigned counsel, hereby sues Defendants, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., ALLIEDBARTON

SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, ALLIED UNIVERSAL CORP., and UNIVERSAL

PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC,

BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS d/b/a FORT LAUDERDALE-

HOLLYWOOD INT’L AIRPORT, and BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE (collectively

“DEFENDANTS”), and respectfully alleges, states, and prays as follows:

Filing # 66260361 E-Filed 01/08/2018 05:31:07 PM

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BACKGROUND

This action seeks damages by TIMOTHY WOLTERING as the personal representative

for his mother, OLGA WOLTERING’s, estate, for her wrongful death. OLGA WOLTERING

was one (1) of five (5) people senselessly shot and killed by DELTA AIR LINES passenger

Esteban Santiago-Ruiz on January 6, 2017, at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International

Airport.

A mass shooting at an airport is a foreseeable threat. DEFENDANTS had knowledge of

the dangerous and long-standing flaws in the airline and airport security. Yet, DEFENDANTS

failed to take reasonable action to prevent harm to passengers. All DEFENDANTS are jointly

and severally liable for the wrongful death of OLGA WOLTERING because they were

negligent, careless, wanton, and reckless in failing to develop, implement, and maintain adequate

airline and airport security systems, failed to implement reasonable and effective security

measures to deter and prevent individuals from easily accessing dangerous and deadly weapons

capable of causing injury or death, and failed to take the necessary measures to protect and

secure the baggage claim area and comply with applicable Florida law.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

1. This is an action for damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00),

exclusive of interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

2. OLGA WOLTERING was a resident of Georgia. TIMOTHY WOLTERING

serves as Personal Representative for OLGA WOLTERING’s Estate.1

3. DELTA AIR LINES, INC. is a corporation engaged in the business of air

transportation of passengers for hire. At all times relevant to the Complaint, DELTA AIR 1 Letter Appointing Timothy Woltering Personal Representative of Olga Woltering’s Estate in Georgia attached as Exhibit “A.”

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LINES, INC. operated regularly scheduled flights to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International

Airport in Broward County, Florida, including the flights that transported decedent OLGA

WOLTERING and shooter Esteban Santiago-Ruiz to Broward County, Florida.

4. ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC is a corporation engaged in the

business of, and assumed responsibility for, implementing, developing, owning, operating,

managing, maintaining and supervising the airline and airport security systems at Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

5. ALLIED UNIVERSAL CORP. is a parent corporation exercising control over

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, which is engaged in the business of, and

assumed responsibility for, implementing, developing, owning, operating, managing,

maintaining and supervising the airline and airport security systems at Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport.

6. UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL

SECURITY SERVICES, LLC. is a parent corporation exercising control over

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, which is engaged in the business of, and

assumed responsibility for, implementing, developing, owning, operating, managing,

maintaining and supervising the airline and airport security systems at Fort Lauderdale-


7. BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS d/b/a FORT

LAUDERDALE-HOLLYWOOD INT’L AIRPORT is a government entity duly organized to

develop, control, manage and contract for administrative services for Broward County, Florida,

including those required for the operation of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International

Airport.

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8. BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE is a political subdivision of the State of Florida

and the chief law enforcement agency of Broward County, Florida. At all times relevant to the

Complaint, the BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE assumed responsibility for implementing,

developing, operating, managing, maintaining and supervising on-site security services at the

Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

9. Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport is located at 100 Terminal

Drive, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33315.

10. Venue is proper in Broward County, Florida because the actions giving rise to this

cause of action took place in Broward County, Florida. Specifically, the Defendants transacted

business in Broward County, Florida, and OLGA WOLTERING’s wrongful death occurred in

Broward County, Florida.

11. All conditions precedent to filing this lawsuit have been performed, waived, or

otherwise satisfied.2

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS AND FACTUAL THEORY

The Parties

12. Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, was a fare-paying passenger aboard DELTA

AIR LINES Flight Number DL 1465.

13. Plaintiff, TIMOTHY WOLTERING, is the duly appointed Personal

Representative of the Estate of OLGA WOLTERING, and thereby has standing to maintain this

action.

14. Defendant, DELTA AIR LINES, is a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Georgia.

2 Notice provided to each respective Defendant pursuant to Fla. Stat. §768.28(6)(a) and Affidavit of Service attached as Exhibit “B.”

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15. At all times relevant to the Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES was a common

carrier engaged in the business of transporting passengers by air and operated regularly

scheduled flights to and from Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

16. At all times relevant to the Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES was jointly, severally,

and contractually liable by and through its agents, employees, and contractors for maintaining

the airline and airport security systems at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

17. Defendant, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, is a corporation

organized and existing under the laws of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business

in Florida.

18. At all times relevant to the Complaint, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY

SERVICES was contractually obligated to, engaged in the business of, and assumed

responsibility for implementing, developing, owning, operating, managing, maintaining and

supervising the airline and airport security systems at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International

Airport.

19. Defendant, ALLIED UNIVERSAL CORP., is a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Florida.

20. At all times relevant to the Complaint, ALLIED UNIVERSAL was the parent

corporation exercising control over ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, who was

contractually obligated to, engaged in the business of, and assumed responsibility for

implementing, developing, owning, operating, managing, maintaining and supervising the airline

and airport security systems at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

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21. Defendant, UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED

UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC., is a corporation organized and existing under the

laws of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.

22. At all times relevant to the Complaint, UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES,

LLC d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC. was the parent corporation

exercising control over ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, who was

contractually obligated to, engaged in the business of, and assumed responsibility for

implementing, developing, owning, operating, managing, maintaining and supervising the airline

and airport security systems at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

23. Defendant, BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, is a

government entity duly organized to develop, control, manage, and contract for administrative

services for Broward County, Florida, including those required for the operation of Fort


24. Defendant, BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, is the chief law enforcement

agency of Broward County, Florida. At all times relevant to the Complaint, the BROWARD

SHERIFF’S OFFICE assumed responsibility for implementing, developing, operating,

managing, maintaining and supervising on-site security services at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport.

The Wolterings

25. OLGA WOLTERING (“OLGA”) was born on March 14, 1932, in Ipswich,

England as Olga Mabel Warren. She grew up in a large family and was one (1) of seven (7)

children.

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26. OLGA met RALPH WOLTERING (“RALPH”) at nineteen (19) years old while

RALPH was stationed in England as a jet mechanic in the United States Air Force.

27. RALPH and OLGA were married on July 19, 1952.

28. RALPH and OLGA had four (4) children: Michael Woltering, Gary Woltering,

Debra Woltering Holcombe, and TIMOTHY WOLTERING. Their family grew to include nine

(9) grandchildren and eight (8) great-grandchildren.

29. After RALPH’s twenty-two (22) years in the Air Force, OLGA and RALPH

retired to Marietta, Georgia in 1969.

30. During their retirement, OLGA and RALPH were heavily involved in the

Transfiguration Catholic Church. They were active members for almost forty (40) years and led

multiple discussions and retreats.

31. OLGA and RALPH enjoyed cruising and went on twenty-seven (27) cruises

together.

32. In September 2016, RALPH celebrated his ninetieth (90th) birthday and

scheduled a family cruise with Holland America for January 2017, leaving out of Fort

Lauderdale, Florida.

33. RALPH and OLGA scheduled their flight from Atlanta, Georgia to Fort

Lauderdale, Florida on January 7, 2017, but, as that date approached, they changed their flight to

January 6, 2017, to avoid potentially bad weather in and near Atlanta, Georgia.

34. On January 6, 2017, OLGA and RALPH flew from Atlanta, Georgia to Fort

Lauderdale, Florida before their family cruise that was scheduled to sail on January 8, 2017.

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35. TIMOTHY WOLTERING and his wife, Sandra Woltering, were scheduled to fly

from Atlanta, Georgia to Orlando, Florida on January 6, 2017, intending to then travel to Fort

Lauderdale, Florida on January 8, 2017.

36. Michael Woltering and his wife, Margaret Woltering, left Atlanta, Georgia on

January 6, 2017, after dropping RALPH and OLGA off at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta

International Airport, and they began driving to Orlando, Florida.

37. RALPH and OLGA arrived at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International

Airport on January 6, 2017, shortly before 1:00 pm via DELTA AIR LINES Flight Number DL

1465.

38. Upon arrival in Fort Lauderdale, OLGA required wheelchair assistance to travel

comfortably from the airplane to the baggage claim area.

39. A porter pushed OLGA from the airplane to the Terminal 2 baggage claim area.

RALPH walked along with OLGA and the porter.

40. Once OLGA and RALPH were situated at the beginning of the appropriate

carousel in the Terminal 2 baggage claim area, the porter left the area with OLGA still in the

wheelchair.

41. After waiting at the carousel next to OLGA for several minutes, RALPH heard

two (2) loud noises that he recognized as gun shots.

42. RALPH immediately dropped to the ground and looked towards OLGA, who was

now laying on the floor and had already sustained a gunshot wound to her head.

43. When the firing stopped, RALPH crawled to OLGA and tried to speak with her,

only to find that she had been killed by the gunfire.

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44. RALPH sat with OLGA’s body while multiple authorities attempted to secure the

scene and began their investigations.

45. RALPH called his son, TIMOTHY WOLTERING, to tell him about the shooting

and that his mother, OLGA, was killed.

46. TIMOTHY WOLTERING and Sandra Woltering switched their flight destination

from Orlando, Florida, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in order to reach RALPH sooner.

47. The Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport shut down following the

shooting, canceling TIMOTHY WOLTERING and Sandra’s flight into Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

48. TIMOTHY WOLTERING and Sandra instead flew from Atlanta, Georgia to

Miami International Airport via DELTA AIR LINES, and then they drove to their hotel in Fort

Lauderdale, Florida late on January 6, 2017.

49. Michael and Margaret Woltering diverted from driving to Orlando, Florida and

instead drove directly to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

50. RALPH was eventually escorted to a different room within the airport for an

interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where they questioned him as to his

observations of the shooting.

51. Hours later, Michael and Margaret Woltering arrived at the Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport and accompanied RALPH until he could leave the airport, after

which they were taken to their hotel in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

52. The Woltering family did not take their cruise with Holland America as

scheduled.

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53. TIMOTHY WOLTERING, Sandra Woltering, Michael Woltering, Margaret

Woltering, and RALPH WOLTERING all drove back from Fort Lauderdale, Florida to Atlanta,

Georgia on January 7, 2017.

54. OLGA was killed just six (6) months shy of her and RALPH’s sixty-fifth (65th)

wedding anniversary.

55. Since OLGA’s death on January 6, 2017, RALPH has suffered daily from the

premature loss of his wife’s companionship and has experienced a loss of purpose.

56. RALPH constantly lives with the violent images of OLGA’s traumatic death and

describes the memory of that day as “living in a nightmare.”

57. The Woltering family describes OLGA as loving, caring, easygoing, friendly,

humble, and enjoyable to be around. She was the center of the Woltering family, keeping the

family together and enjoying her children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren.

Esteban Santiago-Ruiz

58. Esteban Santiago-Ruiz (“Santiago”) was born on March 16, 1990, in New Jersey,

and moved to Puerto Rico in 1992.

59. In 2007, Santiago joined the Puerto Rico National Guard and served in the Iraq

War from April 2010 to February 2011.

60. The Puerto Rico Police confiscated Santiago’s firearms in March 2012, and did

not return them until May 2014.

61. Santiago moved to Alaska and joined the Alaska Army National Guard, serving

from November 2014 to August 2016.

62. After his discharge from the Alaska Army National Guard, Santiago worked as a

security guard at a private company in Alaska until November 2016.

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63. From January 2016 to October 2016, Santiago was accused of domestic violence,

with one (1) or more of the accusations resulting in criminal charges.

64. In November 2016, Santiago entered the FBI field office in Anchorage, Alaska to

report that the United States government was controlling his mind and forcing him to watch

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) videos and join their group.

65. The FBI notified the Anchorage Police Department to initiate an investigation and

a mental health evaluation.

66. The Anchorage Police Department confiscated Santiago’s firearm in November

2016, but returned it just three (3) weeks later in December 2016.

67. Santiago purchased a one-way ticket on DELTA AIR LINES that was scheduled

to arrive at La Guardia Airport in Queens, New York on December 31, 2016, New Year’s Eve.

68. Presumably, Santiago planned to commit a mass shooting in New York City on

New Year’s Eve, but did not due to La Guardia Airport’s procedures that would have prevented

his retrieval of the firearm at the airport.

69. Santiago canceled that one-way ticket to Queens, New York, and instead

purchased his one-way ticket to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

70. On January 5, 2017, Santiago arrived at Ted Stevens Anchorage International

Airport for his one-way flight to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

71. Santiago arrived at the airport four (4) hours before his flight was scheduled to

depart at 9:30 pm.

72. Santiago was traveling alone.

73. Santiago only checked one item at the airport: his gun case containing his Walther

9mm semiautomatic handgun and two magazines.

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74. Approximately four (4) hours after arriving at the airport, Santiago boarded

DELTA AIR LINES Flight Number DL 2182 heading to his next flight in Minneapolis,

Minnesota.

75. Santiago landed at Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport on January 6,

2017.

76. After his approximately one (1) hour and sixteen (16) minute layover in

Minneapolis, Minnesota, Santiago boarded DELTA AIR LINES Flight Number DL 1088,

heading for his final destination in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

77. Upon information and belief, Santiago was disruptive and/or exhibited suspicious

behavior on one or both of these two DELTA AIR LINES flights.

78. Santiago landed at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on January

6, 2017, at approximately 12:15 pm.

79. After landing, Santiago proceeded to the Terminal 2 baggage claim area and

waited at Carousel 3 for his firearm.

80. DELTA AIR LINES paged Santiago to claim his firearm from DELTA AIR

LINES’ Baggage Service Office.

81. Santiago retrieved his firearm from the Baggage Service Office, then returned to

the baggage claim area unattended.

82. Santiago then entered a men’s restroom in the baggage claim area with his

firearm.

83. Santiago entered a stall within the men’s restroom, removed his firearm from its

case, loaded it with one of the magazines, placed it in his waistband, and exited the men’s

restroom into the baggage claim area.

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84. At approximately 12:56 pm, Santiago began firing his handgun at people in the

baggage claim area of Terminal 2, specifically aiming for their heads.

85. Santiago emptied his first magazine, reloaded, and then emptied his second

magazine.

86. Santiago killed five (5) people and wounded six (6) additional people.

87. Santiago surrendered on scene to the BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, was

arrested, and is currently charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Florida3 with the following:

a. Five (5) counts of Violence at an International Airport Resulting in Death, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. section 37(a)(1);

b. Six (6) counts of Violence at an International Airport Resulting in Serious Bodily

Injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 37(a)(1);

c. Five (5) counts of Causing the Death of a Person in the Course of a Violation of

18 U.S.C. section 924(c), in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 924(c)(1)(A) and

924(j)(1); and

d. Six (6) counts of Use of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1)(A).

Defendant Delta Air Lines

88. DELTA AIR LINES began in 1928 and quickly grew to serve three hundred and

six (306) destinations in fifty-two (52) countries as of 2017. DELTA AIR LINES services more

than one hundred and eighty million (180,000,000) passengers per year, and employs more than

3 Case Number 2017R00048 and Court Docket Number 17-CR-60022.

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eighty thousand (80,000) people. In 2016 alone, DELTA AIR LINES’ pre-tax income was over

six billion dollars ($6,000,000,000.00).4

89. DELTA AIR LINES’ first basic business principle is to “Put safety first –

always.”5

90. On and prior to January 5, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES, by its officers, agents,

employees or representatives, operated, controlled, and supervised the airline and airport security

system at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport and the ticketing, check-in, and boarding

processes, including identification and document checks for its aircrafts and flights.

91. On and prior to January 5, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES, by its respective officers,

agents, employees or representatives, selected, hired, trained, instructed, and supervised the

individuals who operated, maintained, and controlled the airline and airport security system at

Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport.



system at Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport and the ticketing, check-in, and boarding

processes, including identification and document checks for its aircrafts and flights.




Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport.

4 Delta News Hub, Corporate Stats and Facts, http://news.delta.com/corporate-stats-and-facts, updated October 31, 2017. 5 Delta Rules of the Road, Apply our Basic Business Principles, page 4.

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system at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and the ticketing, check-in, and

boarding processes, including identification and document checks for its aircrafts and flights.





96. Prior to January 6, 2017, regular meetings were held among all DEFENDANTS

to address, review and discuss airline and airport security and details about potential security

breaches and threats.

97. On and prior to January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES, its agents, associates, and

partners, were acting within the purpose or scope of such agency or employment, and all acts or

omissions alleged of all DEFENDANTS were authorized, adopted, approved, or ratified by each

of the other DEFENDANTS.

98. On and prior to January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES was fully informed of the

actions of their respective officers, agents, employees or representatives, and no officer, agent,

employee or representative of DEFENDANTS repudiated those actions.

99. Prior to January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES knew or should have known of the

high risk of attacks upon aviation generally, and specifically to commercial aircraft and airports.

100. On and prior to January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES knew or should have

known that recent evaluations of the airline and airport security systems had revealed that its

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systems constituted a high security risk, and that DELTA AIR LINES failed to adequately train

its employees in this regard.

101. DELTA AIR LINES held a unique position to mitigate obvious security risks

apparent in today’s evolving threats in aviation, particularly involving active shooters such as

Santiago.

102. DELTA AIR LINES operated Flight Number DL 2182, which departed from Ted

Stevens Anchorage International Airport on January 5, 2017, and arrived at Minneapolis-Saint

Paul International Airport on January 6, 2017.

103. Esteban Santiago-Ruiz was a fare-paying passenger on Flight Number DL 2182.

104. DELTA AIR LINES operated Flight Number DL 1088, which departed from

Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport on January 6, 2017, and arrived at Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport that same day.

105. Esteban Santiago-Ruiz was a fare-paying passenger on Flight Number DL 1088.

106. DELTA AIR LINES operated Flight Number DL 1465, which departed from

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport on January 6, 2017, and arrived at Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport that same day.

107. Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, and her husband, RALPH WOLTERING, were

fare-paying passengers on Flight Number DL 1465.

108. DELTA AIR LINES, by its officers, agents, employees, or representatives, owed

Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to safeguard its passengers and prevent

individuals from breaching the airline and airport security system, so as to not cause injury or

death.

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109. DELTA AIR LINES Domestic General Rules Tariff, Rule 190(H)(9)(b) states, in

part, that “[f]irearms must be unloaded and packed in a locked, hard side case with a key or

combination in possession of the passenger only. Small arms ammunition must be packed in the

manufacturer’s original package or securely packed in fiber, wood or metal boxes, or other

packaging specifically designed to carry small amounts of ammunition.”

110. On January 5, 2017, Santiago checked his firearm with a DELTA AIR LINES

Representative at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport.

111. Upon information and belief, at the time Santiago checked his firearm with

DELTA AIR LINES, the ammunition was already placed within each of the two (2) magazines.

112. Upon information and belief, Santiago was in view of DELTA AIR LINES

employees for four (4) hours at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport before his flight

departed.

113. DELTA AIR LINES Domestic General Rules Tariff, Rule 35(F), states, in part,

that DELTA AIR LINES “may refuse to transport any passenger, or may remove any passenger

from its aircraft, when refusal to transport or removal of the passenger is reasonably necessary in

Delta’s sole discretion, for the passenger’s comfort or safety, for the comfort or safety of other

passengers or Delta employees, or for the prevention of damage to the property of Delta or its

passengers or employees.”

114. Rule 35(F) also provides examples of situations wherein DELTA AIR LINES

may refuse to transport or may remove passengers from its aircraft, including, but not limited to,

when the passenger’s conduct “is disorderly, abusive or violent,” “may be hazardous to

himself/herself, the crew, or other passengers,” “creates an unreasonable risk of offense or

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annoyance to other passengers,” or “creates a risk of harm or damage to the carrier’s aircraft

and/or property, or the property of other passengers.”

115. Upon information and belief, Santiago was disruptive and/or exhibited suspicious

behavior on one or both of his flights from Anchorage, Alaska to Fort Lauderdale, Florida via

Minneapolis, Minnesota, in plain view of DELTA AIR LINES employees.

116. When DELTA AIR LINES Flight Number DL 1088 arrived in Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport, a DELTA AIR LINES employee transported Santiago’s

firearm directly from the airplane to DELTA AIR LINES’ Baggage Service Office.

117. A DELTA AIR LINES employee called Santiago’s name over the intercom for

him to claim his firearm from their Baggage Service Office.

118. In the Baggage Service Office, a DELTA AIR LINES employee returned

Santiago’s firearm to him before Santiago left the office with his firearm unattended, entered the

men’s restroom in the baggage claim area, and he prepared his firearm for the shooting.

119. DELTA AIR LINES’ policy for firearms cases on January 6, 2017, was to deliver

them to the carousel with all other baggage.6

120. DELTA AIR LINES’ policy as of the date of this Complaint is to deliver all

firearms checked as baggage to the Baggage Service Office for pickup at the passenger’s final

destination with a valid form of identification.7

6 Megan O’Matz, SunSentinel, Delta Revises Procedure to Retrieve Guns from Checked Luggage, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fort-lauderdale-hollywood-airport-shooting/fl-reg-delta-guns-20170425-story.html, April 25, 2017. 7 Delta, Special Items Are Baggage, Too, https://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/traveling-with-us/baggage/before-your-trip/special-items.html, updated 2017.

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121. DELTA AIR LINES, by its officers, agents, employees or representatives, owed

Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to follow all applicable law, including the

Florida Statutes.

122. Florida Statutes section 790.06(12)(a)(14) states that a concealed carry license

“does not authorize any person to openly carry a handgun or carry a concealed weapon or

firearm into . . . [t]he inside of the passenger terminal and sterile area of any airport, provided

that no person shall be prohibited from carrying any legal firearm into the terminal, which

firearm is encased for shipment for purposes of checking such firearm as baggage to be lawfully

transported on any aircraft.” (Emphasis added.)

123. Florida Statues section 790.06(12)(a)(14) specifically, and intentionally, does not

include carrying a firearm from the passenger terminal and sterile area of an airport.

124. On January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES did authorize Santiago to carry a

concealed firearm inside the passenger terminal for purposes other than checking such firearm as

baggage to be lawfully transported on an aircraft.

125. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of DELTA AIR LINES, all

DEFENDANTS are jointly and severally liable for damages sustained by Plaintiff, as the

Personal Representative of the Estate of OLGA WOLTERING, and Plaintiff is entitled to

recover such damages to the extent allowed by law.

The Security Defendants

126. Defendants BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,

BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, ALLIED

UNIVERSAL CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED

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UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC are hereinafter referred to collectively as the

SECURITY DEFENDANTS.

127. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS and BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, by their officers, agents,

employees, or representatives, operated, controlled, and supervised the airline and airport

security system at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, including security

checkpoint operations and controlling access to secure areas of the airport.

128. On January 6, 2017, BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

and BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, by their officers, agents, employees, or representatives,

owed Decedent OLGA WOLTERING a duty of care to safeguard DELTA AIR LINES Flight

Number DL 1465 and its passengers to prevent individuals from breaching the airline and airport

security system.

129. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY

SERVICES, LLC, ALLIED UNIVERSAL, CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION

SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC were engaged in

the business of owning, operating, managing, maintaining, and supervising airline and airport

security for various airlines at numerous airports, including DELTA AIR LINES for its flights

arriving at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, including Flight Number DL 1465

and Flight Number DL 1088.

130. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY

SERVICES, LLC, ALLIED UNIVERSAL CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION

SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC were engaged in

the business of owning, operating, managing, maintaining, and supervising airline and airport

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security for various airlines at numerous airports, including the baggage claim areas for

passengers arriving at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

131. On January 6, 2017, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, ALLIED

UNIVERSAL CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED

UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, by their officers, agents, employees, or

representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to prevent individuals

from breaching the airline and airport security system.

132. On and prior to January 6, 2017, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES,

LLC, ALLIED UNIVERSAL CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a

ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC were in a contractual relationship with

BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS to provide security services at Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per

week, including holidays. (See Article 5.1 of Agreement Between Broward County and

AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC for Security Officer Services for Port Everglades,

Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, and North Perry Airport, attached

herein as Exhibit “C”.)

133. On and prior to January 6, 2017, the SECURITY DEFENDANTS, by their

respective officers, agents, employees, or representatives, separately and collectively, selected,

hired, trained, instructed, and supervised the individuals who operated, maintained, and

controlled the airline and airport security system at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International

Airport.

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134. Prior to January 6, 2017, regular meetings were held among all DEFENDANTS

to address, review, and discuss airline and airport security and details about potential security

breaches and threats.

135. On and prior to January 6, 2017, SECURITY DEFENDANTS, their agents,

associates, and partners, were acting within the purpose or scope of such agency or employment,

and all acts or omissions alleged of DEFENDANTS were authorized, adopted, approved, or

ratified by all DEFENDANTS.

136. On and prior to January 6, 2017, SECURITY DEFENDANTS were fully

informed of the actions of their respective officers, agents, employees, or representatives, and no

officer, agent, employee, or representative of DEFENDANTS repudiated those actions.

137. Prior to January 6, 2017, SECURITY DEFENDANTS knew or should have

known of the high risk of attacks upon aviation generally, and specifically to commercial aircraft

and airports.

138. SECURITY DEFENDANTS held a unique position to mitigate obvious security

risks apparent in today’s evolving threats in aviation, particularly involving active shooters such

as Santiago.

139. On and prior to January 6, 2017, SECURITY DEFENDANTS knew or should

have known that evaluations of the airline and airport security systems as they existed on and

prior to January 6, 2017, revealed that their systems constituted a high security risk, and that all

Defendants failed to adequately train their employees and failed in security evaluations.

140. On January 6, 2017, the SECURITY DEFENDANTS, by their officers, agents,

employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to follow

all applicable law, including the Florida Statutes.

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141. Specifically, ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, ALLIED

UNIVERSAL, CORP., and UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ALLIED

UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LLC “shall comply with all applicable federal, state, and

local laws, codes, ordinances, rules, and regulations in performing its duties, responsibilities, and

obligations” pursuant to their contract with BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS. (See Article 14.12 of Agreement Between Broward County and

AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC for Security Officer Services for Port Everglades,

Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, and North Perry Airport, attached

herein as Exhibit “C”.)







143. On January 6, 2017, SECURITY DEFENDANTS did authorize Santiago to carry

a firearm inside the passenger terminal for purposes other than checking such firearm as baggage

to be lawfully transported on an aircraft.

144. On January 6, 2017, SECURITY DEFENDANTS had inadequate policies,

procedures, and instructions to properly investigate threats of a second shooter at the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, nor did they follow the policies and procedures

they did have in place.

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145. SECURITY DEFENDANTS’ failure to properly investigate threats of a second

shooter led to widespread panic amongst officials and civilians at the Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport, as well as a diversion and waste of SECURITY

DEFENDANTS’ resources.

146. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of SECURITY DEFENDANTS,

all DEFENDANTS are jointly and severally liable for damages sustained by Plaintiff, as the

Personal Representative of the Estate of OLGA WOLTERING, and Plaintiff is entitled to

recover such damages to the extent allowed by law.

SHOOTING FORESEEABILITY

147. The Florida Supreme Court has determined that the State of Florida “has an

important interest in regulating firearms as a matter of public safety,” finding Florida’s

restrictions on the open carry of firearms to be constitutional.8

148. In Florida, no person may carry a firearm, neither openly nor concealed, in the

following locations:

a. Any place of nuisance;

b. Any police, sheriff, or highway patrol station;

c. Any detention facility, prison, or jail;

d. Any courthouse;

e. Any courtroom (except that the judge may carry a concealed weapon);

f. Any polling place;

g. Any meeting of the governing body of a county, public school district,

municipality, or special district;

h. Any meeting of the Legislature or a committee thereof; 8 Norman v. Florida, 215 So. 3d 18, 22 (Fla. 2017).

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i. Any school, college, or professional athletic event not related to firearms;

j. Any elementary or secondary school facility or administration building;

k. Any career center;

l. Any portion of an establishment licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages for

consumption on the premises, which portion of the establishment is primarily

devoted to such purpose;

m. Any college or university facility;

n. The inside passenger terminal and sterile area of any airport (except that a person

may carry any legal firearm into the terminal that is encased for shipment for

purposes of checking such firearm as baggage to be lawfully transported on

aircraft);

o. Any place where the carrying of firearms is prohibited by federal law.9

149. In the enumerated locations where firearms are prohibited, individuals do not

have the ability to defend themselves with a firearm against the threat of deadly force, as they

would in other locations where firearms are not prohibited. Therefore, these locations also

constitute a partially higher security risk.

150. Therefore, preventative security measures and responses in these enumerated

locations are expected to protect against foreseeable safety threats.

151. In Florida, “a legal duty will arise whenever a human endeavor creates a

generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others.”10

9 Section 790.06(12)(a), Florida Statutes. 10 McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992).

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152. Further, “[w]here a defendant’s conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law

generally will recognize a duty placed upon defendant either to lessen the risk or see that

sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.”11

153. “As the risk grows greater, so does the duty, because the risk to be perceived

defines the duty that must be undertaken.”12

154. Florida appellate courts have followed section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of

Torts (1965) when dealing with negligent entrustment of a firearm, specifically relying on

comment (b) to that section, which states: “[O]ne who supplies a chattel for the use of another

who knows its exact character and condition is not entitled to assume that the other will use it

safely if the supplier knows or has reason to know that such other is likely to use it dangerously,

as where the other belongs to a class which is notoriously incompetent to use the chattel safely,

or lacks the training and experience necessary for such use, or the supplier knows that the other

has on other occasions so acted that the supplier should realize that the chattel is likely to be

dangerously used, or that the other, though otherwise capable of using the chattel safely, has a

propensity or fixed purpose to misuse it.”13

155. “[F]oreseeability of harm, rather than ownership, determined whether an action

existed for negligent entrustment” in a case that imposed liability on a bystander who handed a

gun owner his gun during an altercation, “because the bystander should have foreseen the risk of

a shooting under the circumstances.”14

156. Mass shootings are foreseeable events, as they may be reasonably anticipated.

11 Id. at 503. 12 Id. 13 Foster v. Arthur, 519 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) 14 Williams v. Bumpass, 568 So. 2d 979, 981-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)

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157. Notable mass shootings prior to January 6, 2017, include, but are not limited to,

the following:

a. June 12, 2016, at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, killing forty-nine (49)

people and injuring fifty-eight (58) people;

b. November 29, 2015, at Planned Parenthood in Colorado Springs, Colorado,

killing three (3) people and injuring nine (9) people;

c. June 18, 2015, at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston,

South Carolina, killing nine (9) people;

d. December 14, 2012, at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut,

killing twenty-seven (27) people and injuring one (1) person;

e. July 20, 2012, at the Century 16 movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, killing twelve

(12) people and injuring fifty-eight (58) people;

f. November 5, 2009, at Fort Hood in Fort Hood, Texas, killing thirteen (13) people

and injuring thirty-two (32) people;

g. April 16, 2007, at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia, killing thirty-two (32)

people and injuring seventeen (17) people;

h. April 20, 1999, at Columbine High School in Columbine, Colorado, killing

thirteen (13) people and injuring twenty-four (24) people.15

158. Mass shootings specifically at airports are also foreseeable events.

159. Notable airport shootings prior to January 6, 2017, include, but are not limited to,

the following:

a. November 15, 2016, at Oklahoma City’s Will Rogers World Airport;

15 LOS ANGELES TIMES, “Deadliest U.S. mass shootings, 1984-2017,” http://timelines.latimes.com/deadliest-shooting-rampages/, published October 2, 2017.

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b. June 28, 2016, at Ataturk Airport in Turkey;

c. March 22, 2016, at Brussels Airport in Zaventem in Belgium;

d. December 23, 2015, at Sabiha Gokcen Airport in Turkey;

e. June 8, 2014, at Jinnah International Airport in Pakistan;

f. November 1, 2013, at Los Angeles International Airport;

g. May 17, 2013, at Jacksonville International Airport;

h. October 14, 2011, at La Mesa International Airport in Honduras;

i. March 2, 2011, at Frankfort Airport in Germany;

j. April 27, 2006, at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport;

k. July 4, 2002, at Los Angeles International Airport;16

160. Esteban Santiago-Ruiz was a twenty-six (26) year old man traveling alone, on a

one-way flight, purchased the same day, with no change of clothes despite the great weather

differences in Anchorage, Alaska and Fort Lauderdale, Florida in January, and with only a

firearm and ammunition.

161. DELTA had direct knowledge that Santiago had a gun. Despite the foreseeable

risk presented, DELTA failed to provide adequate security.

COUNT I – BREACH OF CONTRACT (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)

162. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint.

163. DELTA AIR LINES and Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, entered into a binding

and enforceable contract when of OLGA WOLTERING purchased a ticket for air transport from

16 FOX NEWS, “Timeline: The worst airport shootings in the last 15 years,” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/06/timeline-worst-airport-shootings-in-last-15-years.html, published January 6, 2017.

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DELTA AIR LINES on January 5, 2017. (See Receipt for Olga Woltering’s Airfare attached

herein as Exhibit “D”.)

164. The contract terms agreed to by OLGA WOLTERING and DELTA AIR LINES

as a result of this ticket purchase are set forth in her ticket, the Conditions of Carriage (also

referred to as “Delta’s Domestic General Rules Tariff”) and DELTA AIR LINES’ published fare

rules and regulations. (See Rule 1(A) of Domestic General Rules Tariff, attached herein as

Exhibit “E”.)

165. DELTA AIR LINES transported Esteban Santiago-Ruiz, who also purchased a

ticket for air transport from DELTA AIR LINES.

166. DELTA AIR LINES transported Santiago despite his firearm being improperly

packaged.

167. DELTA AIR LINES transported Santiago’s firearm and ammunition in direct

violation of their Domestic General Rules Tariff, Rule 190(H)(9)(b).

168. DELTA AIR LINES failed to inspect Santiago’s firearm and ammunition to

ensure they were packed in such a manner that they were suitable for transport and did not pose

an unreasonable risk of harm to other baggage, cargo or passengers, in breach of their valid and

enforceable contract with OLGA WOLTERING. (See Rule 190 of Domestic General Rules

Tariff, attached herein as Exhibit “E”.)

169. DELTA then returned Santiago’s firearm to him in violation of Florida Statutes

section 790.06(12)(a)(14).

170. DELTA AIR LINES failed to act on several indications that Santiago posed a

danger to other DELTA AIR LINES passengers.

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171. DELTA AIR LINES breached their contract with OLGA WOLTERING by

continuing to transport and subsequently failing to report or act on the disturbing and hostile

behavior of Santiago to the detriment of other DELTA AIR LINES passengers.

172. DELTA AIR LINES’ breaches of contract resulted in damages to OLGA

WOLTERING and her family, namely the untimely loss of her life.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, TIMOTHY J. WOLTERING, as the Personal Representative of

the Estate of OLGA WOLTERING, prays that this Court enter judgment against

DEFENDANTS, jointly and severally, for actual and compensatory damages at an amount to be

determined at trial, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and such other and further

relief in equity or in law that Plaintiff may be entitled to or that this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II – BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


174. DELTA AIR LINES is a corporation engaged in the business of air transportation

of passengers for hire. At all times relevant to this Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES sold and

contracted with passengers for the service of air transportation.


and enforceable contract when OLGA WOLTERING purchased a ticket for air transport from

Atlanta, Georgia to Fort Lauderdale, Florida from DELTA AIR LINES on January 5, 2017.

(See Receipt for Olga Woltering’s Airfare attached herein as Exhibit “D”.)



referred to as “Delta’s Domestic General Rules Tariff”), and DELTA AIR LINES’ published

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fare rules and regulations. (See Rule 1(A) of Domestic General Rules Tariff, attached herein

as Exhibit “E”.)

177. DELTA AIR LINES expressly warranted that the air transportation they provided

to OLGA WOLTERING on January 6, 2017, would comply with all required safety and

regulatory laws and Florida Statues.

178. Similarly, DELTA AIR LINES expressly warranted that the air transportation

they provided to Santiago on January 5, 2017, and January 6, 2017, would comply with all

required safety polices, laws, and Florida Statutes.

179. While in the scope of providing air transportation services on January 5, 2017,

and January 6, 2017, to OLGA WOLTERING and Santiago, DELTA AIR LINES maintained

the power, ability, authority, and duty to ensure the safety of the passengers it transported.


DELTA AIR LINES maintained the power, ability, authority, and duty to ensure Santiago’s

firearm was transported in compliance with Domestic General Rules Tariff, Rule 190(H)(9)(b),

and Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).

181. Despite said power and duty, for the reasons set forth above, DELTA AIR LINES

negligently failed to stop the acts of Santiago described herein, or to prevent or to prohibit such

acts or to otherwise to protect OLGA WOLTERING, thereby breaching their express warranty

to her.

182. As a direct and proximate result of DELTA AIR LINES’ breach of express

warranty, OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed.



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relief in equity or in law that Plaintiff may be entitled to or that this Court deems just and

proper.

COUNT III – BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


184. DELTA AIR LINES is a corporation engaged in the business of air transportation

of passengers for hire. At all times relevant to this Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES sold and

contracted with passengers for the service of air transportation.


and enforceable contract when OLGA WOLTERING purchased a ticket for air transport from

Atlanta, Georgia to Fort Lauderdale, Florida from DELTA AIR LINES on January 5, 2017. (See

Receipt for Olga Woltering’s Airfare attached herein as Exhibit “D”.)



referred to as “Delta’s Domestic General Rules Tariff”), and DELTA AIR LINES’ published

fare rules and regulations. (See Rule 1(A) of Domestic General Rules Tariff, attached herein

as Exhibit “E”.)

187. At all times relevant to this Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES maintained an

implied duty to provide air transportation in compliance with all required safety polices, laws,

and Florida Statutes.


agents, employees, or representatives, selected, hired, trained, instructed and supervised the

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189. DELTA AIR LINES warranted that their officers, agents, employees, or

representatives would be adequately trained in airport and airline security measures and educated

on airport and airline security protocols and policies.

190. Thereby, DELTA AIR LINES also warranted that their officers, agents,

employees, or representatives would comply with airport and airline security protocols and

policies.

191. While in the scope of providing air transportation services on January 6, 2017, to

OLGA WOLTERING and Santiago, DELTA AIR LINES maintained the power, ability,

authority, and duty to ensure their officers, agents, employees, or representatives were

adequately trained in airport and airline security measures and educated on airport and airline

security protocols and policies.

192. Furthermore, DELTA AIR LINES maintained the power, ability, authority, and

duty to ensure their officers, agents, employees, or representatives complied with airport and

airline security protocols and policies.


DELTA AIR LINES maintained the power, ability, authority, and duty to ensure Santiago’s

firearm was transported in compliance with Domestic General Rules Tariff, Rule 190(H)(9)(b),

and Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).

194. Despite said power and duty, for the reasons set forth above, DELTA AIR LINES

negligently failed to stop the acts of Santiago described herein, or to prevent or to prohibit such

acts, or otherwise to protect OLGA WOLTERING, thereby breaching their warranty to her.

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195. Despite Santiago’s disruptive and/or suspicious in-flight behavior, he was

provided his improperly packaged firearm directly by DELTA AIR LINES’ Baggage Service

Office.

196. Immediately subsequent to DELTA AIR LINES’ failed compliance with security

measures, Santiago used his firearm to shoot and kill OLGA WOLTERING in the Terminal 2

baggage claim area of Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

197. As a direct and proximate result of DELTA AIR LINES’ breach of implied

warranty, OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed.






COUNT IV – NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)

198. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegation in this Complaint.

199. At all times relevant hereto, DELTA AIR LINES by its officers, agents,

employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to comply

with all applicable laws and Florida Statutes.

200. DELTA AIR LINES, through its officers, agents, employees, or representatives,

breached the duty of care owed to OLGA WOLTERING by directly facilitating and authorizing

Santiago to carry a firearm in the baggage claim area at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport in violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).

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201. OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed as a direct and proximate result of

DELTA AIR LINES’ breach of duty to its passenger, OLGA WOLTERING.

202. Plaintiff, TIMOTHY WOLTERING, as the Personal Representative of the Estate

of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of DELTA AIR LINES’ breach of its

duty of care.






COUNT V – NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Alliedbarton Security Services, LLC, Allied Universal Corp., And Universal

Protection Services, LLC d/b/a Allied Universal Security Services, LLC) (Hereinafter “Allied”)

203. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegation in this Complaint

204. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ALLIED, by its officers, agents,

employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to maintain

airport and airline security and comply with all applicable policies, laws, and Florida Statutes to

ensure the safety of all passengers.

205. ALLIED, through its officers, agents, employees, or representatives, breached the

duty of care owed to OLGA WOLTERING, by facilitating and authorizing Santiago to carry a

firearm in the baggage claim area at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport in

violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).

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ALLIED’s breach of duty to its traveler, OLGA WOLTERING.


of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of ALLIED’s breach of their duty of care.






COUNT VI – NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Broward County Board of Commissioners

d/b/a Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Int’l Airport) (Hereinafter “Broward County”)


209. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BROWARD COUNTY, by its officers,

agents, employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to

maintain airport and airline security and comply with all applicable policies, laws, and Florida

Statutes to ensure the safety of all passengers.

210. BROWARD COUNTY, through its officers, agents, employees, or

representatives, breached the duty of care owed to OLGA WOLTERING, by facilitating and

authorizing Santiago to carry a firearm in the baggage claim area at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport in violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).


BROWARD COUNTY’s breach of duty to its traveler, OLGA WOLTERING.

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of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of BROWARD COUNTY’s breach of its

duty of care.






COUNT VII – NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Broward Sheriff’s Office)

(Hereinafter “BSO”)


214. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BSO, by its officers, agents, employees, or

representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty of care to maintain airport and

airline security and comply with all applicable policies, laws, and Florida Statutes to ensure the

safety of all passengers.

215. BSO, through its officers, agents, employees, or representatives, breached the

duty of care owed to OLGA WOLTERING by directly facilitating and authorizing Santiago to

carry a firearm in the baggage claim area at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport in

violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).


BSO’s breach of duty to its traveler, OLGA WOLTERING.


of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of BSO’s breach of its duty of care.

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COUNT VIII – NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


219. On or about January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES was a tenant of the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, leasing space from the BROWARD COUNTY

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS for the benefit of its business and passengers, such as OLGA

WOLTERING.

220. As a tenant of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, DELTA AIR

LINES maintains control over common areas, such as the baggage claim terminal area.

221. On or about January 6, 2017, OLGA WOLTERING, a passenger of DELTA AIR

LINES, was an invitee at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

222. On or about January 6, 2017, DELTA AIR LINES failed to adequately provide

security measures to ensure the safety of business invitees – its passengers – while in the Fort


223. The security measures utilized by DELTA AIR LINES, if any, were not sufficient

to provide reasonably safe conditions for its passengers, airport travelers, business invitees, or

other individuals at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

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224. DELTA AIR LINES breached the duty of care it owed OLGA WOLTERING in

the following ways:

a. Failure to devise, implement, and follow a proper security plan, reasonably

designed to protect invitees from harm;

b. Failure to properly employ and deploy an adequate number of security personnel

to reasonably protect persons on the premises;

c. Failure to utilize reasonable and appropriate measures to protect persons on the

premises when it knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the

premises.

225. A shooting at an airport is a foreseeable event, as previously established.

226. Had the aforementioned security measures been in place, the deadly shooting

could have been averted as Santiago would have been deterred and/or prevented from

committing the crime.

227. As a direct and proximate result of DELTA AIR LINES’ negligent failure to

provide adequate security, OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed.






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COUNT IX – NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY (Alliedbarton Security Services, LLC, Allied Universal Corp., and Universal



229. On or about January 6, 2017, ALLIED was in a contractual relationship to

provide security at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

230. On or about January 6, 2017, ALLIED received financial compensation in

exchange for providing security at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.



232. On or about January 6, 2017, ALLIED failed to adequately provide security

measures to ensure the safety of business invitees – airport travelers – while in the Fort


233. The security measures utilized by ALLIED, if any, were not sufficient to provide

reasonably safe conditions for airport travelers, business invitees, or other individuals at the Fort


234. ALLIED breached the duty of care it owed OLGA WOLTERING in the

following ways:



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premises when it knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the premises.





237. As a direct and proximate result of ALLIED’s negligent failure to provide

adequate security, OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed.






COUNT X – NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY (Broward County Board of Commissioners



239. On or about January 6, 2017, BROWARD COUNTY owned and operated the


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241. On or about January 6, 2017, BROWARD COUNTY failed to adequately provide

security measures to ensure the safety of business invitees – airport travelers – while in the Fort


242. The security measures utilized by BROWARD COUNTY, if any, were not

sufficient to provide reasonably safe conditions for airport travelers, business invitees, or other

individuals at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

243. BROWARD COUNTY breached the duty of care it owed OLGA WOLTERING

in the following ways:






premises when it knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the premises.





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246. As a direct and proximate result of BROWARD COUNTY’s negligent failure to

provide adequate security, OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed.






COUNT XI – NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY (Broward Sheriff’s Office)



248. On or about January 6, 2017, BSO was in a contractual relationship to provide

security at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

249. On or about January 6, 2017, BSO received financial compensation in exchange

for providing security at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.



251. On or about January 6, 2017, BSO failed to adequately provide security measures

to ensure the safety of business invitees – airport travelers – while in the Fort Lauderdale-


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252. The security measures utilized by BSO, if any, were not sufficient to provide

reasonably safe conditions for airport travelers, business invitees, or other individuals at the Fort


253. BSO breached the duty of care it owed OLGA WOLTERING in the following

ways:






premises when it knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the

premises.





256. As a direct and proximate result of BSO’s negligent failure to provide adequate

security, OLGA WOLTERING was shot and killed.




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COUNT XII- COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


258. At all times relevant to this Complaint, OLGA WOLTERING was a paying

customer of DELTA AIR LINES and was lawfully in the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood


259. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport, including the baggage claim area, was under the care, custody, and control

of all DEFENDANTS.


International Airport posed an unreasonably dangerous risk to paying customers, such as OLGA

WOLTERING, because DELTA AIR LINES failed to ensure that the airport was safe and secure

for its paying customers and was free of violent crime and the risk of violent crime.

261. At all times relevant to this Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES was on notice that

the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport posed an unreasonably dangerous risk to

paying customers, because airports had previously been the site of shootings and other violent

crimes.

262. DELTA AIR LINES’ conduct of returning a firearm to Esteban Santiago-Ruiz in

the airport on or about January 6, 2017, created a foreseeable zone of risk.

263. DELTA AIR LINES’ conduct of allowing Esteban Santiago-Ruiz to remain in the

Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport with his firearm on or about January 6, 2017,

created a foreseeable zone of risk.

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264. DELTA AIR LINES had a duty on or about January 6, 2017, “either to lessen the

risk or see that sufficient precautions [were] taken to protect others from the harm that the risk

poses.”17

265. On or about January 5, 2017, and on or about January 6, 2017, Santiago was, as a

fare-paying passenger, in DELTA AIR LINES’ care, custody, and control, and was in contact

with multiple DELTA AIR LINES employees, who were acting within the scope of their

employment.

266. DELTA AIR LINES knew or should have known of the threat that returning a

firearm within the baggage claim area of the airport posed.

267. DELTA AIR LINES knew or should have known of the threat that allowing a

firearm to remain within the baggage claim area of the airport after its return posed.

268. DELTA AIR LINES breached these duties on or about January 6, 2017, by failing

to lessen the risks or to take sufficient precautions to protect others from the risks of harm that

Santiago’s possession of and continued presence with a firearm within the Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport posed.

269. Santiago continued shooting his firearm throughout the baggage claim area until

eventually he emptied his ammunition and the shooting stopped.

270. No security personnel or employee of DELTA AIR LINES was present at the

time and location when Santiago had possession of his firearm in the baggage claim area.

271. No action was taken by DELTA AIR LINES to attempt to stop Santiago from

continuing to shoot his firearm.

272. No action was taken by DELTA AIR LINES to safely evacuate its many

passengers in the baggage claim area. 17 McCain at 503.

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273. DELTA AIR LINES had no plan of action to prevent the foreseeable threat of a

mass shooting within the airport.

274. DELTA AIR LINES had no plan for action in response to the foreseeable threat

of a mass shooting within the airport.

275. DELTA negligently failed to provide proper security on or about January 6, 2017.

276. DELTA AIR LINES proximately caused the wrongful death of OLGA

WOLTERING by failing to protect her from the risks of harm that they created by returning the

firearm to Santiago and then allowing Santiago to remain with his firearm in the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on or about January 6, 2017.






COUNT XIII- COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Alliedbarton Security Services, LLC, Allied Universal, Corp., And Universal








of ALLIED.

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280. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ALLIED was contracted to provide

security services in the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, including for the

baggage claim area.



WOLTERING, because ALLIED failed to ensure that the airport was safe and secure for its

paying customers and was free of violent crime and the risk of violent crime.

282. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ALLIED was on notice that the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport posed an unreasonably dangerous risk to paying

customers, because airports had previously been the site of shootings and other violent crimes.

283. ALLIED’s conduct of allowing Esteban Santiago-Ruiz to remain in the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport with his firearm on or about January 6, 2017,


284. ALLIED had a duty on or about January 6, 2017, “either to lessen the risk or see

that sufficient precautions [were] taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.”18

285. On or about January 6, 2017, Santiago was in ALLIED’s care, custody, and

control while in the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, and was in contact with

multiple employees of ALLIED, who were acting within the scope of their employment.

286. ALLIED knew or should have known of the threat that DELTA AIR LINES’

returning a firearm within the baggage claim area of the airport posed.

287. ALLIED knew or should have known of the threat that allowing a firearm to

remain within the baggage claim area of the airport after its return posed.

18 McCain at 503.

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288. ALLIED breached these duties on or about January 6, 2017, by failing to lessen

the risks or to take sufficient precautions to protect others from the risks of harm that Santiago’s

possession of and continued presence with a firearm within the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport posed.



290. No security personnel or employee of ALLIED was present at the time and

location when Santiago had possession of his firearm in the baggage claim area.

291. No action was taken by ALLIED to attempt to stop Santiago from continuing to

shoot his firearm.

292. No action was taken by ALLIED to safely evacuate the many passengers in the

baggage claim area.

293. ALLIED had no plan of action to prevent the foreseeable threat of a mass

shooting within the airport.

294. ALLIED had no plan for action in response to the foreseeable threat of a mass


295. ALLIED proximately caused the wrongful death of OLGA WOLTERING by

failing to protect her from the risk of harm that they created by allowing Santiago to remain with

his firearm in the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on or about January 6, 2017.




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COUNT XIV- COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Broward County Board of Commissioners,







International Airport was owned by BROWARD COUNTY.



of BROWARD COUNTY.



WOLTERING, because BROWARD COUNTY failed to ensure that the airport was safe and

secure for its paying customers and was free of violent crime and the risk of violent crime.

301. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BROWARD COUNTY was on notice that

the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport posed an unreasonably dangerous risk to

paying customers, because airports had previously been the site of shootings and other violent

crimes.

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302. BROWARD COUNTY allowing and condoning airlines, such as DELTA AIR

LINES’, to return a firearm to passenger Esteban Santiago-Ruiz on or about January 6, 2017 in

the Baggage Service Office, created a foreseeable zone of risk.

303. BROWARD COUNTY knew or should have known about DELTA AIR LINES’

policies for returning firearms at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

304. BROWARD COUNTY’s conduct of allowing Esteban Santiago-Ruiz to remain in

the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport with his firearm on or about January 6,

2017, created a foreseeable zone of risk.

305. BROWARD COUNTY had a duty on or about January 6, 2017, “either to lessen

the risk or see that sufficient precautions [were] taken to protect others from the harm that the

risk poses.”19

306. On or about January 6, 2017, Santiago was, as a fare-paying passenger, in

BROWARD COUNTY’s care, custody, and control, and was in contact with multiple

BROWARD COUNTY employees, who were acting within the scope of their employment.

307. BROWARD COUNTY knew or should have known of the threat that returning a

firearm within the baggage claim area of the airport posed.

308. BROWARD COUNTY knew or should have known of the threat that allowing a

firearm to remain within the baggage claim area of the airport after its return posed.

309. BROWARD COUNTY breached these duties on or about January 6, 2017, by

failing to lessen the risks or to take sufficient precautions to protect others from the risks of harm

that Santiago’s possession of and continued presence with a firearm within the Fort Lauderdale-

Hollywood International Airport posed.

19 McCain at 503.

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311. No security personnel or employee of BROWARD COUNTY was present at the

time and location when Santiago had possession of his firearm in the baggage claim area.

312. No action was taken by BROWARD COUNTY to attempt to stop Santiago from

continuing to shoot his firearm.

313. No action was taken by BROWARD COUNTY to safely evacuate the many

passengers in the baggage claim area.

314. BROWARD COUNTY had no plan of action to prevent the foreseeable threat of

a mass shooting within the airport.

315. BROWARD COUNTY had no plan for action in response to the foreseeable

threat of a mass shooting within the airport.

316. BROWARD COUNTY proximately caused the wrongful death of OLGA

WOLTERING by failing to protect her from the risks of harm that they created by returning the

firearm to Santiago and then allowing Santiago to remain with his firearm in the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on or about January 6, 2017.






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COUNT XV- COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH) (Broward Sheriff’s Office)








of BSO.



WOLTERING, because BSO failed to ensure that the airport was safe and secure for its paying

customers and was free of violent crime and the risk of violent crime.

321. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BSO was on notice that the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport posed an unreasonably dangerous risk to paying

customers, because airports had previously been the site of shootings and other violent crimes.

322. BSO’s conduct of allowing DETLA to return a firearm to Esteban Santiago-Ruiz

in the airport on or about January 6, 2017, created a foreseeable zone of risk.

323. BSO’s conduct of allowing Esteban Santiago-Ruiz to remain in the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport with his firearm on or about January 6, 2017,


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324. BSO had a duty on or about January 6, 2017, “either to lessen the risk or see that

sufficient precautions [were] taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.”20

325. On or about January 6, 2017, Santiago was, as a fare-paying passenger, in BSO’s

care, custody, and control, and was in contact with multiple BSO employees, who were acting

within the scope of their employment.

326. BSO knew or should have known of the threat that returning a firearm within the

baggage claim area of the airport posed.

327. BSO knew or should have known of the threat that allowing a firearm to remain

within the baggage claim area of the airport after its return posed.

328. BSO breached these duties on or about January 6, 2017, by failing to lessen the

risks or to take sufficient precautions to protect others from the risks of harm that Santiago’s

possession of and continued presence with a firearm within the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport posed.



330. No security personnel or employee of BSO was present at the time and location

when Santiago had possession of his firearm in the baggage claim area.

331. No action was taken by BSO to attempt to stop Santiago from continuing to shoot

his firearm.

332. No action was taken by BSO to safely evacuate the many passengers in the

baggage claim area.

333. BSO had no plan of action to prevent the foreseeable threat of a mass shooting

within the airport. 20 McCain at 503.

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334. BSO had no plan for action in response to the foreseeable threat of a mass


335. BSO proximately caused the wrongful death of OLGA WOLTERING by failing

to protect her from the risks of harm that they created by returning the firearm to Santiago and

then allowing Santiago to remain with his firearm in the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

International Airport on or about January 6, 2017.






COUNT XVI – NEGLIGENCE PER SE (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


337. At all times relevant to this Complaint, DELTA AIR LINES, by their officers,

agents, employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty to comply

with all applicable laws, including Florida Statutes, to ensure the safety of all passengers.

338. DELTA AIR LINES, through their officers, agents, employees, or representatives,

breached this duty owed to OLGA WOLTERING by violating Florida Statute section

790.06(12)(a)(14).




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340. DELTA AIR LINES violated Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14) by

returning Esteban Santiago-Ruiz’s firearm to him inside the passenger terminal of the airport for

a purpose other than checking it on a flight.


DELTA AIR LINES’ violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).


of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of DELTA AIR LINES’ failure to follow

all applicable laws, including Florida Statutes.






COUNT XVII – NEGLIGENCE PER SE (Alliedbarton Security Services, LLC, Allied Universal, Corp., and Universal



344. At all times relevant to this Complaint, ALLIED, by their officers, agents,

employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty to comply with all

applicable laws, including Florida Statutes, to ensure the safety of all travelers.

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345. ALLIED, through their officers, agents, employees, or representatives, breached

this duty owed to OLGA WOLTERING by violating Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).







347. ALLIED violated Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14) by condoning and

facilitating the return of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz’s firearm in the baggage claim and allowing him

to remain inside the passenger terminal of the airport with his firearm.


ALLIED’s violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).


of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of ALLIED’s failure to follow all

applicable laws, including Florida Statutes.






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COUNT XVIII – NEGLIGENCE PER SE (Broward County Board of Commissioners,



351. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BROWARD COUNTY, by its officers,

agents, employees, or representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty to comply

with all applicable laws, including Florida Statutes, to ensure the safety of all travelers.

352. BROWARD COUNTY, through its officers, agents, employees or

representatives, breached this duty owed to OLGA WOLTERING by violating Florida Statute

section 790.06(12)(a)(14).







354. BROWARD COUNTY violated Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14) by

condoning and facilitating the return of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz’s firearm in the baggage claim

and allowing him to remain inside the passenger terminal of the airport with his firearm.


BROWARD COUNTY’s violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).


of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of BROWARD COUNTY’s failure to

follow all applicable laws, including Florida Statutes.

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COUNT XIX – NEGLIGENCE PER SE (Broward Sheriff’s Office)



358. At all times relevant to this Complaint, BSO, by its officers, agents, employees, or

representatives, owed Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, a duty to comply with all applicable

laws, including Florida Statutes, to ensure the safety of all travelers.

359. BSO, through its officers, agents, employees, or representatives, breached this

duty owed to OLGA WOLTERING by violating Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).







361. BSO violated Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14) by condoning and

facilitating the return of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz’s firearm in the baggage claim and allowing him

to remain inside the passenger terminal of the airport with his firearm.

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BSO’s violation of Florida Statute section 790.06(12)(a)(14).


of OLGA WOLTERING, suffered damages as a result of BSO’s failure to follow all applicable

laws, including Florida Statutes.






COUNT XX – NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


365. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Decedent, OLGA WOLTERING, was

married to her husband, RALPH WOLTERING, who has suffered losses as a result of DELTA

AIR LINES’ wrongful conduct.

366. TIMOTHY WOLTERING, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of OLGA

WOLTERING, brings this claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress on behalf of his

father, RALPH WOLTERING, after OLGA WOLTERING’s death was caused by the wrongful

act, negligence, default, or breach of warranty of DELTA AIR LINES as described herein.

367. RALPH WOLTERING was married to OLGA WOLTERING for over sixty-four

(64) years, from July 19, 1952, to January 6, 2017.

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368. At all relevant times, DELTA AIR LINES owed OLGA WOLTERING and her

husband RALPH WOLTERING a duty to act with reasonable care, and/or the injury to OLGA

WOLTERING was reasonably foreseeable.

369. At all relevant times, DELTA AIR LINES had the power, ability, authority and

duty to stop the acts of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz described herein and to intervene to prevent or

prohibit such acts.

370. At all relevant times, DELTA AIR LINES knew, or reasonably should have

known, that Santiago’s conduct described herein would proximately result in OLGA

WOLTERING’s death, causing RALPH WOLTERING physical and emotional distress.

371. Despite said knowledge, power, and duty, DELTA AIR LINES negligently failed

to stop the acts of Santiago described herein or to prevent or to prohibit such acts or otherwise to

protect OLGA and RALPH WOLTERING, thereby breaching their duty to them.

372. RALPH WOLTERING was directly next to his wife, OLGA WOLTERING,

when she was fatally shot in the head at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on

January 6, 2017.

373. Ralph then sat with his wife’s body until authorities intervened.

374. As a direct and legal result of DELTA AIR LINES’ negligent and wrongful acts,

RALPH WOLTERING has suffered and will continue to suffer significant injury, pain and

suffering, extreme and severe mental anguish, and emotional distress.




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COUNT XXI – NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (Alliedbarton Security Services, LLC, Allied Universal Corp., and Universal




married to her husband, RALPH WOLTERING, who has suffered losses as a result of

ALLIED’s wrongful conduct.




act, negligence, or default of ALLIED as described herein.



379. At all relevant times, ALLIED owed OLGA WOLTERING and her husband

RALPH WOLTERING a duty to act with reasonable care, and/or the injury to OLGA


380. At all relevant times, ALLIED had the power, ability, authority and duty to stop

the acts of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz described herein and to intervene to prevent or prohibit such

acts.

381. At all relevant times, ALLIED knew, or reasonably should have known, that

Santiago’s conduct described herein would proximately result in OLGA WOLTERING’s death,

causing RALPH WOLTERING physical and emotional distress.

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382. Despite said knowledge, power, and duty, ALLIED negligently failed to stop the

acts of Santiago described herein, or to prevent or to prohibit such acts, or otherwise to protect

OLGA and RALPH WOLTERING, thereby breaching its duty to them.



January 6, 2017.


385. As a direct and legal result of ALLIED’s negligent and wrongful acts, RALPH

WOLTERING has suffered and will continue to suffer significant injury, pain and suffering,

extreme and severe mental anguish, and emotional distress.






COUNT XXII – NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (Broward County Board of Commissioners,





BROWARD COUNTY’s wrongful conduct.

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act, negligence, default, or breach of warranty of BROWARD COUNTY as described herein.



390. At all relevant times BROWARD COUNTY owed OLGA WOLTERING and her

husband RALPH WOLTERING a duty to act with reasonable care, and/or the injury to OLGA


391. At all relevant times, BROWARD COUNTY had the power, ability, authority and

duty to stop the acts of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz described herein and to intervene to prevent or

prohibit such acts.

392. At all relevant times, BROWARD COUNTY knew, or reasonably should have

known, that Santiago’s conduct described herein would proximately result in OLGA

WOLTERING’s death, causing RALPH WOLTERING physical and emotional distress.

393. Despite said knowledge, power, and duty, BROWARD COUNTY negligently

failed to stop the acts of Santiago described herein or to prevent or to prohibit such acts or

otherwise to protect OLGA and RALPH WOLTERING, thereby breaching its duty to them.



January 6, 2017.


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396. As a direct and legal result of BROWARD COUNTY’s negligent and wrongful

acts, RALPH WOLTERING has suffered and will continue to suffer significant injury, pain and

suffering, extreme and severe mental anguish, and emotional distress.






COUNT XXIII – NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (Broward Sheriff’s Office)




married to her husband, RALPH WOLTERING, who has suffered losses as a result of BSO’s

wrongful conduct.




act, negligence, default, or breach of warranty of BSO as described herein.



401. At all relevant times, BSO owed OLGA WOLTERING and her husband RALPH

WOLTERING a duty to act with reasonable care, and/or the injury to OLGA WOLTERING was

reasonably foreseeable.

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402. At all relevant times, BSO had the power, ability, authority, and duty to stop the

acts of Esteban Santiago-Ruiz described herein and to intervene to prevent or prohibit such acts.

403. At all relevant times, BSO knew, or reasonably should have known, that

Santiago’s conduct described herein would proximately result in OLGA WOLTERING’s death,

causing RALPH WOLTERING physical and emotional distress.

404. Despite said knowledge, power, and duty, BSO negligently failed to stop the acts

of Santiago described herein or to prevent, or to prohibit such acts, or otherwise to protect OLGA

and RALPH WOLTERING, thereby breaching its duty to them.



January 6, 2017.


407. As a direct and legal result of BSO’s negligent and wrongful acts, RALPH

WOLTERING has suffered and will continue to suffer significant injury, pain and suffering,

extreme and severe mental anguish, and emotional distress.






COUNT XXIV – LOSS OF CONSORTIUM (Delta Air Lines, Inc.)


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married to her husband, RALPH WOLTERING, who has suffered losses as a result of DELTA

AIR LINES’ wrongful conduct.


WOLTERING, brings this claim for loss of consortium on behalf of his father, RALPH

WOLTERING, after OLGA WOLTERING’s death was caused by the wrongful act, negligence,

default, or breach of warranty of DELTA AIR LINES as described herein.


(64) years, from July 19, 1952, to January 6, 2017, when their marriage was abruptly and

traumatically ended by a fatal bullet.

412. Both RALPH WOLTERING’s marital relationship and marital association with

OLGA WOLTERING have ended due to DELTA AIR LINES’ wrongful and negligent conduct.

413. For the reasons set forth herein, RALPH WOLTERING has lost his beloved

wife’s irreplaceable support, companionship, services, society, love, and affection. RALPH

WOLTERING describes his life after losing OLGA as “living a nightmare.”

414. Since January 6, 2017, RALPH WOLTERING has suffered great emotional pain

and mental anguish as a direct and proximate result of the death of his wife, OLGA

WOLTERING.

415. As a direct and proximate result of DELTA AIR LINES’ wrongful conduct

described herein, RALPH WOLTERING is suffering and will continue to suffer severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, pain and suffering, impairment of personal relationships, and

other damages.

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COUNT XXV – LOSS OF CONSORTIUM (Alliedbarton Security Services, LLC, Allied Universal Corp., and Universal





ALLIED’s wrongful conduct.



WOLTERING, after OLGA WOLTERING’s death was caused by the wrongful act, negligence

or default of ALLIED as described herein.





OLGA WOLTERING have ended due to ALLIED’s wrongful and negligent conduct.




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WOLTERING.

423. As a direct and proximate result of ALLIED’s wrongful conduct described herein,

RALPH WOLTERING is suffering and will continue to suffer severe emotional distress, mental

anguish, pain and suffering, impairment of personal relationships, and other damages.






COUNT XVI – LOSS OF CONSORTIUM (Broward County Board of Commissioners,





BROWARD COUNTY’s wrongful conduct.



WOLTERING, after OLGA WOLTERING’s death was caused by the wrongful act, negligence,

or default of BROWARD COUNTY as described herein.

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OLGA WOLTERING have ended due to BROWARD COUNTY’s wrongful and negligent

conduct.






WOLTERING.

431. As a direct and proximate result of BROWARD COUNTY’s wrongful conduct

described herein, RALPH WOLTERING is suffering and will continue to suffer severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, pain and suffering, impairment of personal relationships, and

other damages.






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COUNT XVII – LOSS OF CONSORTIUM (Broward Sheriff’s Office)




married to her husband, RALPH WOLTERING, who has suffered losses as a result of BSO’s

wrongful conduct.



WOLTERING, after OLGA WOLTERING’s death was caused by the wrongful act, negligence

or default of BSO as described herein.





OLGA WOLTERING have ended due to BSO’s wrongful and negligent conduct.






WOLTERING.

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439. As a direct and proximate result of BSO’s wrongful conduct described herein,

RALPH WOLTERING is suffering and will continue to suffer severe emotional distress, mental

anguish, pain and suffering, impairment of personal relationships, and other damages.






DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, TIMOTHY J. WOLTERING, as the Personal Representative of THE ESTATE

OF OLGA WOLTERING, demands that the issues herein be tried by a jury.

Dated this 8th day of January, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

DI PIETRO PARTNERS, LLP 101 NE 3rd Ave., Suite 1410 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Primary Service Email: [email protected] Telephone: (954) 712-3070 Facsimile: (954) 337-3824 /s/ David Di Pietro DAVID DI PIETRO, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 10370 [email protected] NICOLE M. MARTELL, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 100172 [email protected] MARIA R. SCHIUMA, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 105543 [email protected]

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JAY SPECHLER, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 270342 [email protected] GARY COWART, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 370525 [email protected]

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT B

Exhibit 2 Page 1 of 74

AGREEMENT

Between

BROWARD COUNTY

and

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC

for

SECURITY OFFICER SERVICES FOR PORT EVERGLADES, FORT LAUDERDALE-HOLLYWOOD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT,

AND NORTH PERRY AIRPORT

RFP # R1311116P1

EXHIBIT C


INDEX

Article Page

1 RECITALS ........................................... ...... ...... ... ... ....... .......... ............. 2

2 DEFINITIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS .. ............ ......... .......... ........ ..... 2

3 SCOPE OF SERVICES ........ ........... .............. .... ....... .... .... ..... ... .... ....... 5

4 TERM AND TIME OF PERFORMANCE ............. ................................. 6

5 OBLIGATIONS OF ALLIEDBARTON .. ..................... .... .... ..... .... ... ... .. ... 7

6 OFFICE SPACE ..... ................... .. ... ... ....... .... ........ .. ............................ 10

7 COMPENSATION ... ..... ...... ... ... .... ................................................. ..... 1 0

8 OPERATIONAL STANDARDS ..... ............................ ..... .......... .. ..... .... 14

9 INDEMNIFICATION ....................... ... ..... ... .. ..... ... ................... ..... .. ... .. 15

10 INSURANCE .......... ....... ............. ........ ...... .. ... ... .................................. 16

11 TERMINATION ........ ........ ........ ... ..... ............ .. .. .................................. 17

12 EEO AND CBE COMPLIANCE ..... .. ...... .... ... ... .. ... .... ................. ......... 19

13 SECURITY .... .. ... ... ... ... ........ ... ...... ... .. .... ........ ... ....................... .. ......... 23

14 MISCELLANEOUS .. .............. .......... ................................................... 25

Exhibits and Attachments: Exhibit A Scope of Services Exhibit B Hourly Rate of Pay Schedule Exhibit C Statement of Compliance- Prevailing Wage Rate Ordinance Exhibit D Letters of Intent - Schedule of CBE Participation Exhibit E Certification of Payments to Subcontractors and Suppliers Exhibit F Certificate of Insurance Attachment I Nondiscrimination Requirements Attachment II Provisions Pertaining to Airport Projects


AGREEMENT

Between

BROWARD COUNTY

and

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC

for

SECURITY OFFICER SERVICES FOR PORT EVERGLADES, FORT LAUDERDALE-HOLLYWOOD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT,

AND NORTH PERRY AIRPORT

RFP # R1311116P1

This is an Agreement ("Agreement"), made and entered into by and between: BROWARD COUNTY, a political subdivision of the state of Florida, hereinafter referred to as "COUNTY,"

and

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware corporation authorized to transact business in the state of Florida, hereinafter referred to as "ALLIEDBARTON," (collectively referred to as the "Parties").

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, COUNTY is the owner and operator of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport , the North Perry Airport, and appurtenant facilities (hereinafter referred to as "Airports") and Port Everglades, a deepwater port and appurtenant facilities (hereinafter referred to as "Port") , both of which are located in Broward County, Florida; and

WHEREAS, COUNTY is required to maintain continuous and uninterrupted law enforcement and security services to safeguard persons and property at the Airports and the Port; and

WHEREAS, a Request for Proposal ("RFP") was issued requesting proposals for Security Officer Services for the Airports and the Port; and

-1-


WHEREAS, ALLIEDBARTON represents that it is experienced in the business of providing the security officer services required under this Agreement; and

WHEREAS, the COUNTY desires to engage ALLIEDBARTON to provide security officer services at the Airports and the Port under an agreement containing mutually satisfactory terms and covenants; NOW THEREFORE

IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual terms, conditions, promises, covenants, and payments hereinafter set forth, the Parties agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

RECITALS

1.1 . The above recitals are true and correct and are incorporated herein as set forth in full hereunder.

1.2 COUNTY finds that the provision of security officer services at the Airports and the Port as set forth in this Agreement is in the best interest of the public and the residents of Broward County.

ARTICLE 2

DEFINITIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS

The following definitions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase is used requires a different definition:

2.1 Access Control Points shall mean checkpoints, designated by the Port, which may change from time to time, and staffed by security personnel requiring persons seeking entry to the Controlled Access Area to present necessary identification.

2.2 Agreement shall mean this Agreement, which includes Articles 1 through 14, the exhibits, and documents that are expressly incorporated herein by reference.

2.3 Airports shall mean the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and the North Perry Airport , located in Broward County, Florida.

2.4 Airport Operations Area or AOA shall mean a portion of an airport, specified in the Airport Security Program, in which security measures specified in 49 CFR Part 1500 are carried out. This area includes aircraft movement areas , aircraft parking areas, loading ramps, and safety areas for use by aircraft regulated by adequate security systems, measures, or procedures. This area does not include the Secured Area .

-2-


2.5 Airport Security Plan (ASP) shall mean a security program approved by the TSA under 1542.101 of 49 CFR Chapter XII.

2.6 Aviation Security Contingency (AVSEC) Level shall mean when the Department of Homeland Security declares an Imminent Measures threat condition that requires airport operators to implement immediately the corresponding security measures contained in the airport's AVSEC plan and any other appropriate security directives.

2.7 Aviation Department shall mean the Aviation Department of Broward County.

2.8 Airport Director shall mean the duly appointed Director of Broward County's Department of Aviation .

2.9 Board shall mean the Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida.

2.10 Breaches of Security shall mean incidents that have not resulted in a "transportation security incident" in which security measures have been circumvented, eluded, or violated .

2.11 Controlled Access Area shall mean the area in Port Everglades within Access Control Points

2.12 Contract Administrator - As to the Department of Aviation, the contract administrator is the Airport Director or such person authorized by the Airport Director to act as the contract administrator. As to Port Everglades, the contract administrator is the Port Director or such person authorized by the Port Director to act as the contract administrator.

2.13 County shall mean Broward County, a body corporate and a political subdivision of the state of Florida.

2.14 County Administrator shall mean the administrative head of COUNTY appointed by the Board.

2.15 County Attorney shall mean the chief legal counsel for COUNTY appointed by the Board .

2.16 County Business Enterprise or "CBE" shall mean a small business located in Broward County, Florida, which meets the criteria and eligibility requirements of Broward County's CBE Program and must be certified by Broward County's Office of Economic and Small Business Development.

2.17 Disincentive Charges shall mean the fees established pursuant to Section 5.9 of this Agreement.

-3-


2.18 Maritime Security (MARSEC) Level shall mean the security level set to reflect the prevailing threat environment to the marine elements of the national transportation system, including ports.

2.19 Performance Monitoring shall mean, including, but not limited to, methods used by the Contract Administrator or third party on behalf of COUNTY to monitor ALLIEDBARTON's performance using typical techniques such as, but not limited to, random and planned sampling, surveys, scheduled and unscheduled inspections, audits, security tests conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration , the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and review of records and reports.

2.20 Port shall mean the geographical area known as Port Everglades, Florida .

2.21 Port Department shall mean the Port Everglades Department of Broward County.

2.22 Port Director shall mean the duly appointed Director of Broward County's Port Everglades.

2.23 Port Jurisdictional Area ("PJA") shall mean that certain real property encompassing areas within the municipal boundaries of Dania Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Hollywood, and Broward Municipal Services District, which together comprises the seaport known as "Port Everglades" and which property and improvements are more particularly described in the Port Jurisdictional Area in Chapter 89-427, Laws of Florida, as amended, or as subsequently amended by Legislative Act.

2.24 Port Everglades District shall mean the geographic boundaries of Port Everglades as defined within the Port Jurisdictional Area.

2.25 Port Security Plan (PSP) shall mean the plan approved by the Port Director to ensure the application of operational and physical security measures designed to protect port facilities at the respective MARSEC levels.

2.26 Project shall mean the Project consisting of the services described in Article 3.

2.27 Restricted and Secure Areas shall mean those areas, as designated in the Port Everglades Port Security Plan, which meet the criteria for being designated a restricted or secure area under Florida Statute § 311 .12 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act 33, CFR part 105.

2.28 Restricted and Secure Area Access shall mean checkpoints staffed by security personnel requiring person(s) seeking entry to present necessary identification and meet other requirements of the Port Security Plan for entry into designated restricted and secure areas.

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2.29 Security Identification Display Area or SIDA shall mean a portion of the Airports specified in the Airport Security Program, in which security measures specified in 49 CFR Part 1540 are carried out. These areas include the secured area and may include other areas of the Airports.

2.30 Security Infrastructure shall mean the security equipment and facilities owned by the Port and Airports including technology and facilities that contribute to the overall security of the Port and Airports.

2.31 Security Officer Services shall mean comprehensive professional services, including all necessary, incidental and related support services provided each and every day of the year, on a twenty-four (24) hour per day basis, and shall encompass duties and functions as defined in Exhibit "A."

2.32 Sheriff shall mean the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida.

2.33 Shift shall mean the duration of a security officer's daily assignment to provide security services to the Airports and the Port.

2.34 SIDA Access Media shall mean the appropriate , authorized access credentials for the SIDA.

2.35 Subcontractor shall mean a firm, partnership, corporation, or combination thereof having a direct contract with ALLIEDBARTON for all or any portion of the Security Officer Services, but not those who merely furnish equipment or materials.

2.36 Surge Related Incidents shall mean a period of heightened security requiring additional staffing by security personnel exceeding normal levels, for indefinite periods of time.

2.37 Term shall mean the specified period of time for ALLIEDBARTON's performance pursuant to this Agreement.

2.38 Transportation Security Incident shall mean a security incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption.

2.39 TWIC shall mean Transportation Worker Identification Credential.

ARTICLE 3

SCOPE OF SERVICES

3.1 ALLIEDBARTON shall perform all work identified in this Agreement and Exhibit "A." The Scope of Services is a description of ALLIEDBARTON's obligations and

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responsibilities and is deemed to include preliminary considerations and prerequisites, and all labor, materials, equipment, and tasks, which are such an inseparable part of the work described that exclusion would render performance by ALLIEDBARTON impractical, illogical, or unconscionable.

3.2 ALLIEDBARTON acknowledges that the Contract Administrator has no authority to make changes that would increase, decrease, or otherwise modify the Scope of Services to be provided under this Agreement except as expressly authorized by the Broward County Procurement Code (Chapter 21 of the Broward County Administrative Code) .

3.3 Throughout the term of this Agreement, ALLIEDBARTON shall keep fully informed of and comply with all federal, state, county and local laws, ordinances, codes, and regulations, and all orders and decrees of bodies or tribunals having jurisdiction or authority which, in any manner, affect services to be provided under the terms of this Agreement. ALLIEDBARTON, its subcontractors, and their officers, agents, and employees shall at all times observe and comply with all such laws, ordinances, codes, rules, regulations, orders, and decrees in performing its duties, responsibilities, and obligations related to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

TERM AND-TIME OF PERFORMANCE

4.1 The Term of this Agreement shall begin on October 1, 2015, and shall end on September 30, 2018. The continuation of this Agreement beyond the end of any fiscal year shall be subject to both the appropriation and the availability of funds in accordance with Chapter 129, Florida Statutes. The COUNTY's Director of Purchasing may renew this Agreement for up to two (2) one-year periods, upon the same terms and conditions, by giving notice of the renewal to ALLIEDBARTON at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to the end of the initial term or any renewal term.

4.2 All duties, obligations, and responsibilities of ALLIEDBARTON required by this Agreement shall be completed no later than September 30, 2018, unless renewed as provided herein. Time shall be deemed to be of the essence in performing the duties, obligations, and responsibilities required by this Agreement.

4.3 In the event services are scheduled to end due to the expiration of this Agreement, ALLIEDBARTON agrees that it shall continue service upon the request of the Contract Administrator. The extension period shall not extend for greater than three months beyond the term of the Agreement. ALLIEDBARTON shall be compensated for the service at the rate in effect when the extension is invoked by the COUNTY upon the same terms and conditions as contained in this Agreement as amended. The Purchasing Director shall notify

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ALLIEDBARTON of an extension authorized herein by written notice delivered prior to the end of the term of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 5

OBLIGATIONS OF ALLIEDBARTON

5.1 ALLIEDBARTON shall provide Security Officer Services at the Airports and the Port, according to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The hours during which ALLIEDBARTON is to conduct its operations shall be twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, including holidays. ALLIEDBARTON shall provide adequate personnel at all times, and this requirement shall be reflected in its Staffing Plan as described below. ALLIEDBARTON shall provide additional or reduced staffing at such times as may be determined by the Aviation Department and Port Department. ALLIEDBARTON shall provide all personnel, equipment, uniforms, and related office equipment and supplies for the uninterrupted and safe performance of duties, as described in Exhibit "A." ALLIEDBARTON shall guarantee and provide evidence, that all security officers have completed the MTSA training to comply with 33 CFR 105.210, as referenced in the materials presented during the RFP evaluation prior to being assigned to Port Everglades. Vehicles must be cleaned and maintained in accordance with the Airport's ramp access program. Further, ALLIEDBARTON shall perform in accordance with the Annual Staffing Plan, as described below, approved by the Aviation Department and Port Department.

5.2 Licenses. Prior to commencement of operations pursuant to this Agreement and throughout the Term and any renewal, ALLIEDBARTON shall secure and maintain any and all permits and licenses; ensure that such permits and licenses list ALLIEDBARTON as the permittee and/or licensee. ALLIEDBARTON shall maintain and provide upon request by COUNTY satisfactory documentary evidence of all such requisite licenses, legal permits, and notifications as hereinabove required.

5.3 Staffing Plan. ALLIEDBARTON shall prepare and submit for review and approval by the Aviation Department and Port Department a Staffing Plan setting forth the plan intended for use by ALLIEDBARTON at the Airports and the Port in performing the services required by this Agreement. The initial plan will be provided prior to the commencement date of security services at the Airports and the Port. Following approval by the Aviation Department and the Port Department, ALLIEDBARTON agrees to update the Staffing Plan annually and submit such updated plan sixty (60) days prior to the anniversary date of this Agreement. Such updates are subject to review and written approval by the Aviation Department and Port Department. ALLIEDBARTON agrees to comply with the procedures, rules, and regulations established in the approved plan , as updated, and agrees that failure to do so shall constitute a default of this Agreement. In the event the COUNTY exercises its option and extends this

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Agreement for one or more Renewal Terms, ALLIEDBARTON shall submit a proposed Annual Staffing Plan for such Renewal Term within thirty (30) days of receipt of the COUNTY's notice of such extension. The Aviation Department's and Port Department's approval shall be in writing, and the staffing level shall thereafter be binding upon ALLIEDBARTON . ALLIEDBARTON shall submit with its proposed Staffing Plan the resumes of all of its managerial and supervisory personnel.

5.4 The approved annual staffing may be increased or decreased by the Aviation Department or Port Department from time to time, but only if and to the extent that Aviation Department or Port Department, in its sole discretion, deems such revisions necessary and appropriate under this Agreement. ALLIEDBARTON shall maintain an adequate number of SIDA badged personnel as approved by the Aviation Department.

5.5 Employees of ALLIEDBARTON and subcontractors shall use the parking facilities provided or authorized by the COUNTY, in common with employees of other concessionaires and users of the Airports and the Port, at no cost to ALLIEDBARTON.

5.6 ALLIEDBARTON shall implement its Quality Control Program that was included in its response to the Request for Proposals pursuant to which this Agreement was awarded (the "Quality Control Program"), which assesses and measures security service performance . ALLIEDBARTON will provide a monthly operations report to include vehicle usage data. ALLIEDBARTON shall promptly address any concerns raised by the Airports or Port pertaining to the Quality Control Program for the duration of this agreement

5.7 If the Airports or Port incur any fines or civil penalties from a state or federal agency related to a security breach and such breach is the result of incompetence or negligence, as determined by mutual agreement by the Airports or Port and ALLIEDBARTON, on the part of ALLIEDBARTON personnel, ALLIEDBARTON shall pay the fine on the Airports' or Port's behalf. In addition, ALLIEDBARTON agrees to pay and/or reimburse to COUNTY for all costs and expenses, including , but not limited to, costs of administrative proceedings, court costs, and attorneys' fees incurred by COUNTY in defending itself related to the fines or civil penalties caused by ALLIEDBARTON and in enforcing this provision .

5.8 ALLIEDBARTON, its employees, agents, and subcontractors shall maintain the confidentiality of all Sensitive Security Information ("SSI") including , but not limited to, post orders, staffing levels, and patrol frequency and safeguard these and any other SSI in accordance with applicable regulations and policies. ALLIEDBARTON shall ensure that all employees execute nondisclosure agreements.

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5.9 Disincentive Charges. One of COUNTY's primary goals in entering into this Agreement is to ensure that service provided to the Airports and the Port is of the highest caliber. COUNTY will thus suffer damage if ALLIEDBARTON fails to meet these standards and its obligations under this Agreement, and that, due to the nature of certain breaches, the actual damage to COUNTY would be impractical or difficult to remedy.

(a) In addition to all other remedies available under this Agreement commencing on November 1, 2015, ALLIEDBARTON shall be subject to the disincentive charges set forth in subparagraph (b) below, if ALLIEDBARTON does not meet or satisfy the performance standards specified in subparagraph (b) below. COUNTY's actual damages if ALLIEDBARTON fails to meet or satisfy the performance standards would be impractical or difficult to determine. Thus, the amounts set forth in subparagraph (b) below are the Parties' reasonable estimate of COUNTY's damages in the event of such failure. COUNTY's acceptance of a disincentive payment, as a result of a Performance Standard Breach, will not prevent COUNTY from exercising any other right or remedy for default available to COUNTY under this Agreement, or under the at law or in equity.

(b) Performance Standard Breaches. The following specified breaches are "Performance Standard Breaches." ALLIEDBARTON shall pay to COUNTY the amount specified below as a disincentive charge for the applicable breach.

(i) NO SHOWS. Failure of ALLIEDBARTON's employees, including, but not limited to, security officers, to appear for duty at the place of performance leaving a post or posts vacant, with a fine of three times the base hourly rate for each employee who fails to appear multiplied by the duration time the employees were supposed to be on duty.

(ii) TARDINESS. Failure of ALLIEDBARTON's employees, including, but not limited to, security officers, to appear on time leaving a post or posts vacant, with a fine of three times the base hourly rate for each employee who fails to appear multiplied by the duration time the employees were tardy.

5.1 0 Procedure for Determining a Performance Standard Breach. Except as otherwise provided for under this Agreement, the determination as to whether performance standards have been met is at the reasonable discretion of the Airports and the Port, as applicable .

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(a) Upon determining the existence of a Performance Standard Breach, the Airports and the Port, as applicable, shall issue a written notice to ALLIED BARTON of the occurrence of the breach and COUNTY's claim for disincentive payment.

(b) The notice of Performance Standard Breach will become final unless, no later than ten ( 1 0) days after ALLI EDBARTON receives the notice of Performance Standard Breach, ALLIEDBARTON provides the Airports and the Port, as applicable, with a written statement from ALLIEDBARTON, accompanied by ALLIEDBARTON's evidence that the breach did not occur. The Airports and the Port, as applicable, shall review that evidence and determine, in his or her reasonable discretion, whether ALLIEDBARTON has demonstrated that the breach did not occur.

(c) The Airports and the Port, as applicable, shall review ALLIEDBARTON's evidence as soon as reasonably possible after timely receipt of the evidence.

(d) The Airports and the Port, as applicable, shall render a decision sustaining or reversing the determination that a breach occurred and the claim for disincentive payment. A written notice of that decision will be delivered to ALL I EDBARTON.

(e) If the written evidence is not received by the Airports and the Port, as applicable, within ten (1 0) days of the date of the notice of Performance Standard Breach, the determination is final and the applicable disincentive charges is immediately due and payable.

ARTICLE 6

OFFICE SPACE

The COUNTY will provide designated office space at the Airports and the Port to include water, sewer, electric, and janitorial services.

ARTICLE 7

COMPENSATION

7.1 Maximum Amount Not-To-Exceed Compensation

COUNTY agrees to pay ALLIEDBARTON, as compensation for performance of all services for both the Airports and the Port as related to Exhibit "A," required under the terms of this Agreement, the maximum hourly billing rates as described in Exhibit "B," up to a maximum not-to-exceed amount of Seventeen Million Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($17,700,000.00) during the Term of this

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Agreement for Security Officer Services. In the event that the COUNTY renews this Agreement as provided in Section 4.1, COUNTY agrees to pay ALLIEDBARTON, as compensation for performance of all services for both the Airports and the Port as related to Exhibit "A," required under the terms of this Agreement, the maximum hourly billing rates as described in Exhibit "B," up to a maximum not-to-exceed amount of Twelve Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($12, 180,000.00) during the two (2) one-year renewal periods of this Agreement. The method of compensation shall be that of "maximum amount not-to-exceed," which means ALLIEDBARTON shall perform all services set forth herein for total compensation in the amount of or less than that stated above. The maximum hourly billing rates payable by COUNTY for each of ALLIEDBARTON's employee categories shall be shown on Exhibit "B." Notwithstanding any prov1s1on of this Agreement to the contrary, ALLIEDBARTON shall provide a supervisor for the Airports at no expense to COUNTY.

7 .1.1 Overtime Charges - New Site Assignments or Additional Shifts. The COUNTY will make an effort to give ALLIEDBARTON at least twenty-four (24) hours' notice of any new site assignment or additional shift requirements. If the operational needs of the Airports or Port result in less than twenty-four (24) hours' notice being given for any additional shift requirements or new site assignment, then the Airports or Port shall pay ALLIEDBARTON overtime at the "Overtime Rate" set forth on Exhibit "B," for the first eight (8) hours of any new site assignment or additional shift requirement; provided that such coverage is made available by ALLIEDBARTON within the later to occur ("Response Time"): twelve (12) hours of the request by the Contract Administrator, or the time specified by the using agency Contract Administrator. Any delay in providing such coverage by ALLIEDBARTON beyond the Response Time shall reduce the overtime charges on an hour-for-hour basis. The Airports and the Port assignments are the assignments that are currently in effect for the COUNTY as of the commencement of this Agreement and such assignments shall not constitute new assignments or additional shifts.

7.1.2 Overtime Charges - Shifts that are Less than eight (8) Hours. If the Airports or Port require ALLIEDBARTON to provide security services for less than eight (8) hour shift in a 24-hour period, then upon receipt of any such request from the Airports or Port, ALLIEDBARTON shall review its ability to provide such service without using security officers on their days off or past their regular tours of duty. If ALLIEDBARTON determines that it is unable to provide the requested services unless it uses security officers on their days off or past their regular tours of duty, ALLIED BARTON shall give the Airports or Port written notice to that effect within forty-eight (48) hours of the request and the Airports or Port shall pay overtime for the services requested , at the Overtime Rate . If ALLIEDBARTON shall fail to provide such notice within the aforesaid time

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period, no overtime may be charged by ALLIEDBARTON for the services. There shall be no overtime charged to COUNTY for any shift that is eight (8) or more hours in duration in any 24-hour period.

7.2 METHOD OF BILLING AND PAYMENT

7.2.1 ALLIEDBARTON may submit invoices for compensation to COUNTY no more often than on a bi-weekly basis, but only after the services for which the invoices are submitted have been completed. An original invoice plus one copy are due within fifteen (15) days of the end of the month except the final invoice, which must be received no later than sixty (60) days after this Agreement expires. Invoices shall designate the nature of the services performed. ALLIEDBARTON shall submit with each invoice a Certification of Payments to Subcontractors and Suppliers (Exhibit "E") . The certification shall be accompanied by a copy of the notification sent to each subcontractor and supplier listed in item 2 of the form, explaining the good cause why payment has not been made.

7.2.2 COUNTY shall pay ALLIEDBARTON within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of ALLIEDBARTON's proper invoice, as required by the "Broward County Prompt Payment Ordinance" Section 1-51 .6, Broward County Code of Ordinances. To be deemed proper, all invoices must comply with the requirements set forth in this Agreement and must be submitted on the form and pursuant to instructions prescribed by the Contract Administrator. Payment may be withheld for failure of ALLIEDBARTON to comply with a term, condition, or requirement of this Agreement.

7.2.3 ALLIEDBARTON shall pay its CBE subcontractors and suppliers, within fifteen (15) days following receipt of payment from COUNTY for such subcontracted work and pay all other subcontractors and suppliers within thirty (30) days following receipt of payment from COUNTY for such subcontracted work or supplies. If ALLIEDBARTON withholds an amount from CBE subcontractors or suppliers as retainage, such retainage shall be released and paid within fifteen (15) days following receipt of payment of retained amounts from COUNTY. For all other subcontractors or suppliers, if ALLIEDBARTON withholds an amount as retainage, such retainage shall be released and paid within thirty (30) days following receipt of payment of retained amounts from COUNTY.

7.3 Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, COUNTY may withhold, in whole or in part, payment to the extent necessary to protect itself

·from loss on account of inadequate or defective work that has not been remedied or resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Contract Administrator or failure to comply with this Agreement. The amount withheld shall not be subject to payment of interest by COUNTY.

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7.4 Payment shall be made to ALLIED BARTON at:

Check: PNC Bank Lock Box # 828854 Route 38 and Eastgate Drive Moorestown, NJ 08057

Or

EFT: PNC Bank 1600 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Bank Contact: Susan Neilson Treasury Management Phone: 302-429-5697 Fax: 302-429-5698 E-Mail: [email protected]

Account Name: AlliedBarton Security Services ABA Routing Number 031000053 Account#: 8615592272 Beneficiary: Allied Barton Security Services CTX Format

7.5 The services to be provided by ALLIEDBARTON under the terms of this Agreement shall not be performed by anyone other than ALLIEDBARTON approved CBE subcontractor unless the prior written approval from the Aviation Department or the Port Department is given. ALLIEDBARTON shall require all approved subcontractors to keep such records and accounts as may be necessary in order to provide correct entries as to personnel hours and all other amounts charged to ALLIEDBARTON. ALLIEDBARTON shall require the subcontractors to keep all of their books and records of personnel hours and all amounts charged to ALLIED BARTON for a period of three (3) years following the end of each period covered by this Agreement and to make same available at ALLIEDBARTON's Broward County offices , at all reasonable times, for examination and audit by the COUNTY. The COUNTY shall have the right , through its representatives, and at all reasonable times, to inspect and audit any and all books and records.

7.6 ALLIEDBARTON shall receive written notification from the Airports and the Port when required to supply security officers to respond to an AVSEC Level or Surge Related Incidents. Upon receipt of such notification ALLIEDBARTON shall immediately contact the Contract Administrator to discuss implementation procedures and staffing requirements.

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ARTICLE 8

OPERATIONAL STANDARDS

8.1 The performance of the services required under this Agreement shall at all times be under the supervision and direction of an active, qualified competent local project manager, and such other staff as may be necessary to act in the absence of the project manager, who shall at all times be subject to the direction and control of ALLIEDBARTON. A project manager shall be assigned to the Airports and the Port, at ALLIEDBARTON's expense, and shall be available during normal business hours or other hours as designated by the Airports and the Port.

8.2 ALLIEDBARTON shall at all times retain qualified, competent, and experienced employees at the Airport and Port to meet the requirement outlined in Exhibit "A." ALLIEDBARTON's employees shall be clean , courteous, efficient, and neat in appearance. ALLIEDBARTON shall not employ any person or persons in or about the premises who shall use improper language, or act in a loud, boisterous or otherwise improper manner. The Aviation Department and Port Department shall be the sole judge on the question as to whether the conduct of ALLIEDBARTON's representatives is objectionable, and if so judged, ALLIEDBARTON shall take all steps necessary to eliminate the conditions, which have occasioned such judgment.

8.3 ALLIEDBARTON agrees that its employees shall be of sufficient number so as to properly perform the services required under this Agreement. If so directed by the Aviation Department or Port Department, ALLIEDBARTON shall provide for addition or reduction of employees, provided however, ALLIEDBARTON shall be paid only for the costs of the employees actually working at the Airports and the Port. ALLIEDBARTON shall provide its employees with uniforms and credentials, which shall be subject to approval by the Aviation Department and Port Department. All employees shall be required to wear the appropriate approved uniforms and site specific credentials provided by ALLIEDBARTON at all times when on duty.

8.4 ALLIEDBARTON shall immediately remove and keep removed from the Airports and the Port premises any employee who participates in illegal acts, who violates Airport or Port rules and regulations, or the provisions of this Agreement, or who, in the opinion of ALLIEDBARTON, the Aviation Department, or the Port Department is otherwise detrimental to the public interest at the Airports or Port.

8.5 In the event that a defalcation, theft, fraud, or embezzlement or suspicion of same occurs or violation of 49 CFR 1542, it is ALLIEDBARTON's responsibility to immediately notify the Aviation Department or Port Department of the incident or suspected incident. ALLIEDBARTON also agrees to provide full disclosure including, but not limited to , copies of police reports of investigation, reports to bonding company, bonding company's findings, claims filed with crimes

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insurance carrier, and reports of any action taken against an employee. It must be ALLIEDBARTON's policy to prosecute any employee found to be involved in theft, fraud , embezzlement, or any similar activity. All employees of ALLIEDBARTON must sign a pre-employment statement stating they are aware they will be investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law for any theft, fraud, embezzlement, or similar activity.

8.6 ALLIEDBARTON shall provide periodic reports, including, but not limited to, training reports , safety training, and other reports that the Aviation Department or Port Department may request.

8.7 At the Aviation Department's or Port Department's request, ALLIEDBARTON shall meet with the Aviation Department or Port Department to review any complaints or concerns and to promptly correct any deficiencies regarding operations under this Agreement. The Aviation Department's and Port Department's determination as to quality of operation or services shall be conclusive and curative measures shall be implemented by ALLIEDBARTON as expeditiously as possible.

8.8 Within sixty (60) days of execution of this Agreement, ALLIEDBARTON and the Contract Administrator will develop a Hurricane Response Plan in conjunction with the Airports, the Port, and the SHERIFF's Office. The Plan must address the sourcing of additional or replacement security officers from outside the South Florida geographic area to backfill for employees of ALLIEDBARTON affected by a storm.

ARTICLE 9

INDEMNIFICATION

ALLIEDBARTON shall at all times hereafter indemnify, hold harmless, and defend COUNTY and all of COUNTY's current and fo rmer officers, agents, servants, and employees (collectively, "Indemnified Party") from and against any and all causes of action , demands, claims, losses, liabilities, and expenditures of any kind , including attorneys' fees , court costs, and expenses (collectively, a "Claim"), raised or asserted by any person or entity not a party to this Agreement, which Claim is caused or alleged to be caused, in whole or in part, by any intentional, reckless, or negligent act or omission of ALLIEDBARTON, its current or former officers, employees, agents, or servants, arising from, relating to, or in connection with this Agreement. In the event any Claim is brought against an Indemnified Party, ALLIEDBARTON shall, upon written notice from COUNTY, defend each Indemnified Party against each such Claim by counsel satisfactory to COUNTY or, at COUNTY's option, pay for an attorney selected by County Attorney to defend the Indemnified Party. The obligations of this section shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement. To the extent considered necessary by the Contract Administrator and the County Attorney, any sums due ALLIEDBARTON under this Agreement may be retained by COUNTY until all of

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COUNTY's claims for indemnification pursuant to this Agreement have been settled or otherwise resolved. Any amount withheld shall not be subject to payment of interest by COUNTY.

ARTICLE 10

INSURANCE

10.1 ALLIEDBARTON shall maintain, at its sole expense, at all times during the term of this Agreement, at least the minimum insurance coverage designated in Exhibit "F" in accordance with the terms and conditions stated in this Article.

10.2 Such policies shall be issued by companies authorized to do business in the state of Florida, with a minimum AM Best financial rating of A-. Coverage shall be provided on forms no more restrictive than the latest edition of the applicable form filed by the Insurance Services Office . ALLIEDBARTON shall name Broward County as an additional insured under the primary and noncontributory Commercial General Liability policy, Business Automobile Liability policy as well as on any Excess Liability policy. The official title of the Certificate Holder is Broward County. This official title shall be used in all insurance documentation.

10.3 Within fifteen (15) days of notification of award, ALLIED BARTON shall provide to COUNTY proof of insurance in the form of Certificate(s) of Insurance and applicable endorsements, Declaration pages, or insurance policies evidencing all insurance required by this Article. COUNTY reserves the right to obtain a certified copy of any policies required by the Article upon request. Coverage is not to cease and is to remain in force until the COUNTY determines all performance required of ALLIEDBARTON is completed. For Professional Liability Insurance, coverage shall remain in force for two (2) years after the completion of services unless a different time period is stated in Exhibit "F." COUNTY shall be notified of any restriction or cancellation of coverage within thirty (30) days. If any of the insurance coverage will expire prior to the completion of the work, proof of insurance renewal shall be provided to COUNTY upon expiration.

10.4 COUNTY reserves the right to review and revise any insurance requirements at the time of renewal or amendment of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, deductibles, limits, coverage, and endorsements.

10.5 If ALLIEDBARTON uses a subconsultant or subcontractor, ALLIEDBARTON shall ensure that each subconsultant or subcontractor names "Broward County" as an additional insured under the subconsultant's or subcontractor's Commercial General Liability, Business Automobile Liability, and Excess/Umbrella policies.

10.6 Commercial Liability Insurance. The Commercial Liability Insurance policy shall include the following:

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(a) Premises and/or operations;

(b) Independent contractors;

(c) Products and/or completed operations for contracts;

(d) Broad Form Contractual Coverage applicable to this Agreement, including any hold harmless and/or indemnification provision; and

(e) Personal injury coverage with employee and contractual exclusions removed, with minimum limits of coverage equal to those required for Bodily Injury Liability and Property Damage Liability.

10.7 Workers' Compensation Insurance. Workers' Compensation Insurance shall apply for all employees in compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, the Workers' Compensation Law of the state of Florida, and all applicable federal laws. In the event this requirement is not applicable to ALLIEDBARTON, ALLIEDBARTON shall submit in writing on company letterhead, the basis for its exemption .

10.8 Business Automobile Liability. Business Automobile Liability is required if an automobile is used in the performance of services under this Agreement. Coverage, and if required, Business Automobile Liability shall include:

(a) Owned vehicles, if applicable;

(b) Hired and Non-Owned Vehicles, if applicable; and

(c) Employers' Non-Ownership, if applicable.

1 0.9 If any operations are to be undertaken on or about navigable waters, coverage must be included for the U.S. Longshore & Harbor Workers Act and Jones Act.

ARTICLE 11

TERMINATION

11 .1 This Agreement may be terminated for cause by the aggrieved party if the party in breach has not corrected the breach within ten (1 0) days after receipt of written notice from the aggrieved party identifying the breach. This Agreement may also be terminated for convenience by the Board . Termination for convenience by the Board shall be effective on the termination date stated in written notice provided by COUNTY, which termination date shall be not less than thirty (30) days after the date of such written notice. This Agreement may also be terminated by the County Administrator upon such notice as the County Administrator deems appropriate under the circumstances in the event the County Administrator

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determines that termination is necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare. If COUNTY erroneously, improperly, or unjustifiably terminates for cause, such termination shall, at COUNTY's sole election, be deemed a termination for convenience, which shall be effective thirty (30) days after such notice of termination for cause is provided.

11 .2 This Agreement may be terminated for cause for reasons including, but not limited to, ALLIEDBARTON's repeated (whether negligent or intentional) submission for payment of false or incorrect bills or invoices, failure to suitably perform the work, or failure to continuously perform the work in a manner calculated to meet or accomplish the objectives as set forth in this Agreement. The Agreement may also be terminated for cause if ALLIEDBARTON is placed on the Scrutinized Companies with Activities in Sudan List or the Scrutinized Companies with Activities in the Iran Petroleum Energy Sector List created pursuant to Section 215.473, Florida Statutes, or if ALLIEDBARTON provides a fa lse certification submitted pursuant to Section 287.135, Florida Statutes. This Agreement may also be terminated by the Board:

11.2.1 Upon the disqualification of ALLIEDBARTON as a CBE by County's Director of Office of Economic and Small Business Development ("OESBD") if ALLIEDBARTON's status as a CBE was a factor in the award of this Agreement and such status was misrepresented by ALLIED BARTON;

11 .2.2 Upon the disqualification of ALLIEDBARTON by County's Director of OESBD due to fraud, misrepresentation, or material misstatement by ALLIEDBARTON in the course of obtaining this Agreement or attempting to meet the CBE contractual obligations;

11.2.3 Upon the disqualification of one or more of ALLIEDBARTON's CBE participants by County's Director of the OESBD if any such participant's status as a CBE firm was a factor in the award of this Agreement and such status was misrepresented by ALLIEDBARTON or such participant;

11 .2.4 Upon the disqualification of one or more of ALLIEDBARTON's CBE participants by County's Director of the OESBD if such CBE participant attempted to meet its CBE contractual obligations through fraud, misrepresentation, or material misstatement; or

' 11.2.5 If ALLIEDBARTON is determined by County's Director of the OESBD to have been knowingly involved in any fraud, misrepresentation , or material misstatement concerning the CBE status of its disqualified CBE participant.

11.3 Notice of termination shall be provided in accordance with the "NOTICES" section of this Agreement except that notice of termination by the County

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Administrator, which the County Administrator deems necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare may be verbal notice that shall be promptly confirmed in writing in accordance with the "NOTICES" section of this Agreement.

11.4 In the event this Agreement is terminated for convenience by COUNTY, ALLIEDBARTON shall be paid for any services properly performed under the Agreement through the termination date specified in the written notice of termination . ALLIEDBARTON acknowledges that it has received good, valuable and sufficient consideration from COUNTY, the receipt and adequacy of which are, hereby acknowledged by ALLIEDBARTON, for COUNTY's right to terminate this Agreement for convenience.

11.5 In the event this Agreement is terminated for any reason, any amounts due ALLIEDBARTON shall be withheld by COUNTY until all documents are provided to COUNTY pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 12·

EEO and CBE COMPLIANCE

12.1 No party to this Agreement may discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, religion , national origin, disability, age, marital status, political affiliation , sexual orientation, pregnancy, or gender identity and expression in the performance of this Agreement. ALLIEDBARTON shall comply with all applicable requirements of the Broward County Business Enterprise ("CBE") Program in the award and administration of this Agreement. Failure by ALLIEDBARTON to carry out any of these requirements shall constitute a material breach of this Agreement, which shall permit the COUNTY, to terminate th is Agreement or to exercise any other remedy provided under this Agreement, or under the Broward County Code of Ordinances, or under the Broward County Administrative Code, or under applicable law, with all of such remedies being cumulative.

ALLIEDBARTON shall include the foregoing or similar language in its contracts with any subcontractors or subconsultants, except that any project assisted by the U.S. Department of Transportation funds shall comply with the nondiscrimination requirements in 49 C.F.R. Parts 23 and 26. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements is a material breach of this Agreement, which may result in the termination of this Agreement or such other remedy as COUNTY deems appropriate.

ALLIEDBARTON shall not unlawfully discriminate against any person in its operations and activities or in its use or expenditure of funds in fulfilling its obligations under this Agreement and shall not otherwise unlawfully discriminate in violation of Chapter 16'Y:!, Broward County Code of Ordinances. ALLIEDBARTON shall affirmatively comply with all applicable provisions of the

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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in the course of providing any services funded by COUNTY, including Titles I and II of the ADA (regarding nondiscrimination on the basis of disability), and all applicable regulations, guidelines, and standards. In addition , ALLIEDBARTON shall take affirmative steps to prevent discrimination in employment against disabled persons.

By execution of this Agreement, ALLIED BARTON represents that it has not been placed on the discriminatory vendor list as provided in Section 287.134, Florida Statutes. COUNTY hereby materially relies on such representation in entering into this Agreement. An untrue representation of the foregoing shall entitle COUNTY to terminate this Agreement and recover from ALLIEDBARTON all monies paid by COUNTY pursuant to this Agreement, and may result in debarment from COUNTY's competitive procurement activities.

12.2 The CBE Program, which is implemented under the Broward County Business Opportunity Act of 2012 Section 1-81, Broward County Code of Ordinances, referred to as the "Act," provides for the establishment and implementation of CBE participation goals, initiatives, and other opportunities for COUNTY contracts. In completing this Project, ALLIEDBARTON shall comply with all applicable requirements of the CBE Program in the award and administration of the Agreement. ALLIEDBARTON acknowledges that the Broward County Board of County Commissioners, acting by and through the Director of the Broward County Office of Economic and Small Business Development, may make minor administrative modifications to the CBE Program , which shall become applicable to this Agreement if the administrative modifications are not unreasonable. Written notice of any such modification shall be provided to ALLIEDBARTON and shall include a deadline for ALLIEDBARTON to notify COUNTY if ALLIEDBARTON concludes that the modification exceeds the authority of this section of this Agreement. Failure of ALLIEDBARTON to timely notify COUNTY of its conclusion that the modification exceeds such authority shall be deemed acceptance of the modification by ALLIEDBARTON.

COUNTY shall have the right to review each proposed amendment, extension, modification, or change order to this Agreement that, by itself or aggregated with previous amendments, extensions, modifications, or change orders increases the initial Agreement price by ten percent (10%) for opportunities to include or increase the participation of CBE firms already involved in this Agreement. ALLIEDBARTON shall make a good faith effort to include CBE firms in work resulting from any such amendment, extension, modification, or change order and shall report such efforts, along with evidence thereof, to the Office of Economic and Small Business Development.

12.3 The Parties acknowledge that subcontract awards to CBE firms are crucial to the achievement of the Project's CBE participation goal. ALLIEDBARTON understands that each CBE firm utilized on the Project to meet the participation goal must be certified by the Broward County Office of Economic and Small

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Business Development. In an effort to assist COUNTY in achieving its established goal for this Project, ALLIEDBARTON will meet the following CBE participation goal by utilizing the CBE firms for the work and the percentage of work amounts described in Section 12.4:

Total CBE Goal 15%

ALLIEDBARTON may not terminate for convenience a CBE firm listed as a subcontractor in ALLIEDBARTON's bid or offer without the COUNTY's prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. ALLIEDBARTON shall inform COUNTY immediately when a CBE firm is not able to perform or if ALLIEDBARTON believes the CBE firm should be replaced for any other reason, so that the Office of Economic and Small Business Development may review and verify the good faith efforts of ALLIEDBARTON to substitute the CBE firm with another CBE firm. Whenever a CBE firm is terminated for any reason, including cause, ALLIEDBARTON shall with notice to and concurrence of the Broward County Office of Economic and Small Business Development, substitute another CBE firm in order to meet the level of CBE participation provided herein. Such substitution shall not be required in the event the termination results from COUNTY changing the Scope of Work hereunder and there is no available CBE to perform the new Scope of Work.

12.4 In performing services for this Project, the Parties hereby incorporate ALLIEDBARTON's participating CBE firms , addresses, scope of work, and the percentage of work amounts identified on each Letter of Intent into this Agreement (Exhibit "D"). Upon execution of this Agreement by COUNTY, ALLIEDBARTON shall enter into a formal contract with the CBE firms ALLIEDBARTON selected to fulfill the CBE participation goal for this Agreement and shall provide copies of its contracts with such firms to the Contract Administrator and the Broward County Office of Economic and Small Business Development.

12.5 ALLIEDBARTON shall allow COUNTY to engage in on-site reviews to monitor ALLIEDBARTON's progress in achieving and maintaining its contractual and CBE Program obligations. Such review and monitoring shall be by the Contract Administrator in conjunction with the Broward County Office of Economic and Small Business Development. COUNTY shall have access, without limitation, to ALLIEDBARTON's books and records, including payroll records, tax returns , and records, and books of account, on five (5) business days' notice, to allow COUNTY to determine ALLIEDBARTON's compliance with its commitment to the CBE participation goal and the status of any CBE firm performing any portion of this Agreement.

12.6 ALLIEDBARTON understands that it is the responsibility of the Contract Administrator and the Broward County Office of Economic and Small Business

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Development to monitor compliance with the CBE requirements. In that regard, ALLIEDBARTON shall report monthly regarding compliance with its CBE obligations in accordance with Section 7.2 of this Agreement.

12.7 In the event of ALLIEDBARTON's noncompliance with its participation commitment to a CBE firm (including, without limitation, the unexcused reduction of the CBE firm's participation), the affected CBE firm shall have the right to the following remedies if the noncompliance is or was alleged to be due to no fault of the CBE firm, and alleged to be due to the willful action or omission of ALLIEDBARTON:

12.7.1 The affected CBE firm shall be entitled to damages pursuant to its agreement with ALLIEDBARTON.

12.7.2 If the CBE firm has the right to arbitrate and institutes arbitration proceedings claiming noncompliance with the Act by ALLIEDBARTON, then the CBE firm may submit the dispute to arbitration. However, arbitration shall not be available as to any dispute between ALLIEDBARTON and COUNTY; nor shall COUNTY incur any cost , fee, or liability relative to any arbitration proceeding.

12.7.3 Nothing under this Section 12.7 shall be construed to limit the rights of and remedies available to COUNTY, including the right to seek its own damages pursuant to this Agreement.

12.8 Nonpayment of a CBE subcontractor or supplier as required by Subsection 7.2.3 of this Agreement shall be a material breach of this Agreement and COUNTY's Contract Administrator may, at its option, increase allowable retainage or withhold progress payments unless and until ALLIEDBARTON demonstrates timely payments of sums due to such subcontractors or suppliers. ALLIEDBARTON acknowledges that the presence of a "pay when paid" provision in its contract with a CBE firm shall not preclude COUNTY or its representatives from inquiring into allegations of nonpayment. The foregoing remedies under this section shall not be employed when ALLIEDBARTON demonstrates that failure to pay results from a bona fide dispute with its CBE subcontractor or supplier.

12.9 If ALLIEDBARTON fails to comply with the requirements of this Agreement, or the requirements of the Broward County Business Opportunity Act of 2012, COUNTY shall have the right to exercise any administrative remedies provided by the Broward County Business Opportunity Act of 2012, or any other right or remedy provided in the Administrative Procedures of the Office of Economic and Small Business Development, this Agreement, or under applicable law, with all such rights and remedies being cumulative.

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ARTICLE 13

SECURITY

13.1 Airport Security Program and Regulations: ALLIEDBARTON agrees to observe all security requirements and other requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations applicable to ALLIEDBARTON, including, without limitation, all regulations of the United States Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration . ALLIEDBARTON also agrees to comply with the COUNTY's Airport Security Program and the Air Operations Area (AOA) Vehicle Access Program, and any amendments thereto, and to comply with such other rules and regulations as may be reasonably prescribed by the County, and to take such steps as may be necessary or directed by the COUNTY to insure that subconsultants/subcontractors, employees, invitees , and guests of ALLIEDBARTON observe these requirements. If required by the Aviation Department, ALLIEDBARTON shall conduct background checks of its employees in accordance with applicable Federal Regulations. If as a result of the acts or omissions of ALLIEDBARTON, its subconsultants/subcontractors, employees, invitees, or guests, the County incurs any fines and/or penalties imposed by any governmental agency, including, without limitation, the United States Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration or the Transportation Security Administration, or any expense in enforcing any Federal regulations, including without limitation, airport security regulations, or the rules or regulations of the COUNTY, and/or any expense in enforcing the COUNTY's Airport Security Program, then ALLIEDBARTON agrees to pay and/or reimburse to COUNTY all such costs and expenses, including all costs of administrative proceedings, court costs, and attorney's fees and all costs incurred by COUNTY in enforcing this provision . ALLIEDBARTON further agrees to rectify any security deficiency or other deficiency as may be determined as such by the COUNY or the United States Department of Transportation , Federal Aviation Administration, the Transportation Security Administration , or any other Federal agency with jurisdiction. In the event ALLIEDBARTON fails to remedy any such deficiency, the COUNTY may do so at the sole cost and expense of ALLIEDBARTON . The COUNTY reserves the right to take whatever action is necessary to rectify any security deficiency or other deficiency.

(a) Access to Security Identification Display Areas and Identification Media: ALLIEDBARTON shall be responsible for requesting the Aviation Department to issue Airport Issued Identification Media to all employees who are authorized access to Security Identification Display Areas ("SIDA") on the Airport, as designated in the Airport Security Program. In addition, ALLIEDBARTON shall be responsible for the immediate reporting of all lost or stolen Airport Issued Identification Media and the immediate return of the media of ALLIEDBARTON's personnel transferred from the Airport, or terminated from the employ of ALLIEDBARTON , or

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upon termination of this Agreement. Before an Airport Issued Identification Media is issued to an employee, ALLIEDBARTON shall comply with the requirements of applicable Federal regulations with regard to fingerprinting for criminal history record checks and security threat assessments, and shall require that each employee complete security training programs conducted by the Aviation Department. ALLIEDBARTON shall pay or cause to be paid to the Aviation Department such charges as may be established from time to time for lost or stolen Airport Issued Identification Media and those not returned to the Aviation Department in accordance with these provisions. The Aviation Department shall have the right to require ALLIEDBARTON to conduct background investigations and to furnish certain data on such employees before the issuance of Airport Issued Identification Media, which data may include the fingerprinting of employee applicants for such media.

(b) Operation of Vehicles on the AOA: Before ALLIEDBARTON shall permit any employee of ALLIEDBARTON or of any subconsultant/subcontractor to operate a motor vehicle of any kind or type on the AOA (and unless escorted by an Aviation Department approved escort), ALLIEDBARTON shall ensure that all such vehicle operators possess current, valid, and appropriate Florida driver's licenses. In addition, any motor vehicles and equipment of ALLIEDBARTON or of any subconsultant/subcontractor operating on the AOA must have an appropriate vehicle identification permit issued by the Aviation Department, which identification must be displayed as required by the Aviation Department.

(c) Consent to Search/Inspection: ALLIEDBARTON agrees that its vehicles, cargo, goods, and other personal property are subject to being inspected and searched when attempting to enter or leave and while on the AOA. ALLIEDBARTON further agrees on behalf of itself and its subconsultant/subcontractors, that it shall not authorize any employee or other person to enter the AOA unless and until such employee or other person has executed a written consent-to-search/inspection form acceptable to the Aviation Department. ALLIEDBARTON acknowledges and understands that the foregoing requirements are for the protection of users of the Airport and are intended to reduce incidents of cargo tampering, aircraft sabotage, thefts, and other unlawful activities at the Airport. For this reason, ALLIEDBARTON agrees that persons not executing such consent-to-search/inspection form shall not be employed by ALLIEDBARTON or by any subconsultant/subcontractor at the Airport in any position requiring access to the AOA or allowed entry to the AOA by ALLIEDBARTON or by any subconsultant/subcontractor.

(d) ALLIEDBARTON understands and agrees that if any of its employees, or the employees of any of its subconsultants/subcontractors, are required in the course of the work to be performed under this Agreement to access or

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