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July 28, 2009 In the Cloud Security Greg Day Principal Security Analyst EMEA AVERT member

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Page 1: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 2009

In the Cloud Security

Greg DayPrincipal Security Analyst EMEAAVERT member

Page 2: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20092 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

The Tsunami

• Decades of threats, surely we have a handle on this?

• Estimated in excess $1trillion loss through Cybercrime and data loss in 2008McAfee Unsecured Economies Report 2009

• Q1 2009 - 12 million new IP’s zombied since January!50 percent increase since 2008 McAfee Quarterly threat Report Q1 2009

• Koobface - more than 800 new variants in March 09!McAfee Quarterly threat Report Q1 2009

Page 3: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20093 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Understand the motivation, to understand the methodology

Source: Chat Interview with the Dream Coders Team, the developers of MPackhttp://www.robertlemos.com/2007/07/23/mpack-interview-chat-sessions-posted/

Page 4: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20094 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Today anyone can be a cyber criminal!

Page 5: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20095 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Over 20 years of Anti-Virus

• Dr Solomon’s Anti-virus from 1990

• Looking for string match against known malware

Page 6: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20096 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

The age old question - Is anti-virus dying?

1991 : Michelangelo : 6 months ?1997 : WM/Cap : 2 months ?1999 : WM/Melissa : 1 Day ?2000 : VBS/Loveletter : 4 hours ?2001 : CodeRed/Nimda : 1 hour ?2003 : Slammer : 3 mins ?2008 : Mass Web compromises : secs ?

Anti-Virus protection (%) of 2003 Medium+ threats

0

20

40

60

80

100

AV

AV software% Proactive protection % Reactive Protection

Anti-Virus protection (%) of 2004 Medium+ threats

0

20

40

60

80

100

AV software

%

% Proactive protection % Reactive Protection

Page 7: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20097 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

From Elephant to Chameleon How threats have changed

Page 8: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20098 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Evolution of threats

1987 – Brain & Stoned (Early BSV)1990 – Vienna modified to be polymorphic1991 – Polymorphism hits the wild (Tequila)1995 – WM/Concept (first Macro Virus)1999 – Melissa Mass Mailer & ExploreZip reply mailer2000 – Phage (Virus for Palm Pilot)2001 – CodeRed & Nimda (utilise security vulnerabilities)2002 – Klez & Elkern, Bugbear (Droppers)2003 – Slammer (Speed), Slapper (Unix, directed attack)2004 – Turf wars (Bagle Netsky, Sober, BOTs)2005 – System & data theft (Trojan’s & Rootkit)2007 – Rootkits, Packers, Recycling (Threat Longevity)2008 – Drive-by infections,

Page 9: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 20099 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Early proactive techniques

Page 10: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200910 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Heuristics (behavioural analysis)

•Positive & Negative analysis•Protection against new file and/or macro viruses•Checks for virus like characteristics•Block execution of possible virus code (OAS)•No cleaning as no exact match•Tangible sample to send to virus lab

Page 11: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200911 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Speed…

The blended/zero day attack, bought the new solutions

Page 12: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200912 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Page 13: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200913 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Page 14: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200914 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Proactive behavioural protection(HIPS, NIPS, FW, Whitelisting etc…)

• Known Vulnerably detection• Behavioural controls

– RFC non-compliance– Anomaly detections– Policy controls

• Define web/email usage• Lockdown Windows & Windows system folder• Registry Modification• Block un-used ports

– Proactive or Reactive?• Blacklist non-corperate high risk appsConficker – AutoRun.inf

Page 15: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200915 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Proactive Behavioural Controls - limitations

• What did I really stop?• Did it stop all of the attack?• What else could it have done?

• We still want to identify the threat• We sometimes need to clean up

• Assumes clean at point of install

Page 16: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200916 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

• 246% growth from 2006 to 2007

• 400%+ growth projected for 2008

• 2008 exceed projections

2006

900,000 -

800,000 -

700,000 -

600,000 -

500,000 -

400,000 -

300,000 -

200,000 -

100,000 -

0 -

271,197

78,381

2007 2008

1,500,000+

~350,000 projected for ‘08

# of

thre

ats

Source: McAfee Avert Labs

Volume…

Page 17: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200917 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

The Great Zoo: McAfee Known Malware Samples

17

Count of dirty samples/hashes in the McAfee zoo

Page 18: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200918 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Shark – Compliable multi system back door TrojanNow anyone can be a cyber criminal!

1. Setup server

2. Compile threat

3. Infected systemstalk home!

4. See what you have!

5. Full control!

6. Enable keylogger

7. Control processes

Page 19: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200919 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Buy the deployment tools

Page 20: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200920 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Mass infection of public web pages globally (13 March 08 )

• 200,000 web pages compromised– SQL injection– Vuls in .ASP pages running phpBB

• Inserted JS to write IFRAME in header or body– MS06-014– RealPlayer (ActiveX Control)– Baofeng Storm (ActiveX control)– Ourgame GL World GlobalLink Chat (ActiveX Control)

• Daisy chains to China server– Drops down loaders– Steals gaming credentials

Page 21: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200921 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Booby-trapped legitimate sitesBooby-trapped legitimate sites

MPack C&C centerMPack C&C center

(1): connection to a legitimate site

(1): connection to a legitimate site

(2): silent redirect

(2): silent redirect

(3): exploitation(3): exploitation

(4): HTML infection(4): HTML infection

Botnet,RockPhish,Fast-Flux,DDoS,Identity theft,…

(4): machine under control(4): machine under control

1. The victim visits a legitimate site that has been booby-trapped with hidden redirect code (hidden iFrame).

2. They are silently redirected to the server hosting the attack tool.

3. Depending on the browser, various vulnerabilities may be tested. Various malware are downloaded and executed.

4. The web pages accessible from the victim's workstation are in turn booby-trapped.

Example: IFrame & MPack

Page 22: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200922 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Regular “Protection Gap”

Protection gap of 24-72 hours with current solutions

Malware in the wild

Malware discovered

Protection is available

Protection is downloaded

Protection is deployed

t1 t2 t3t0 t4

Page 23: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200923 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Security in the Cloud

Page 24: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200924 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Next Gen “In the cloud” detection

Internet

FingerprintDatabase

Page 25: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200925 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

End-node reporting

Very little system overhead

Meta-data

What is “in the Cloud scanning”?

Page 26: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200926 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

In the cloud security -Blocking what we already know!

Non-replicating malware is static

And some replicating is static too (e.g. worms)

Can be detected with a fingerprint (MD5,SHA-1,SHA-2, etc.)

Black List of fingerprints

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Replicating vs Non-Replicating Malware

Page 27: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200927 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

How does in the Cloud anti-virus work?

Internet

No detection with existing DATs, but the file is “suspicious”

2

3 Fingerprint of file is created and sent using Artemis

4 Artemis reviews this fingerprint and other inputs statistically across threat landscape

5 Artemisidentifies threat and notifies client

User receives new file via email or web1

6 VirusScan processes information and removes threat

Artemis

Collective Threat Intelligence

Page 28: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200928 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

In the Cloud in action

Page 29: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200929 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

In the cloud security -Identifying what we don’t know!

Software may be deemed “suspicious” based onObserved behaviours

SourceDetections by other products

Behaviours, sources, detections can be assigned a weight

Based on the resulting weight, software may be classified as “suspicious” with different degrees of certainty

Page 30: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200930 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Closing the loop

Page 31: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200931 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Malware case study – Spy-Agent.bw

First seen – 15th October 2008, 22:24:28

Auto-blacklisted – 15th October 2008, 22:57:01

Artemis clients sent fingerprints ~2 hours before regular submission saw the file

Page 32: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200932 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Security & privacy

U0B6gKhbtiZCoxyh0IneADS/RShS8iRCBSEvwfjekG/q4yDRgqEUXjHWKvnrySGa6QMdftrlpl5pAdJvOUAcNcvCjKvpIfsxv8qBk4uRQQ60r5StRCXOpiA0Qy3fKmLRUZyNq1EyjLLPKgJDZI

0nqHhRWX+TDgPgXRfW9wD06qE

Cryptographically strong actionable responses

Query specific Immune to replay attacks

Example:

Page 33: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200933 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Cloud security compressed “Protection Gap”

Malware in the wild

Malware discovered

Protection is available

Protection is downloadedProtection is

deployed

t1 t2 t3t0 t4

Protection delivered in real-time

t1

Case study – Spy-Agent.bw

• Artemis protection – ~32 minutes• Regular protection – ~8.5 hours

– Not including deployment time

Page 34: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200934 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

I was blind, but now I see

VulnerabilityResearch

Risk andCompliance

HIPs

Malware Research

SPAMResearch

Collective Threat

Intelligence

SiteAdvisor

Internet

CustomerArtemis customers

Page 35: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200935 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Taking it to the next level

Page 36: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200936 Confidential McAfee Internal Use OnlyJuly 28, 2009McAfee Global Threat Intelligence36

Atlanta

London

Hong KongSan Jose

IntelliCenterCyberWorld

IntelligenceProbes

Deploy security probes: Around the globe (firewall, email gateways, web gateways)Global intelligence system: Share cyber communication info. (e.g.: hackers, spammers, phishers)

ResultsEffective - Accurate detection of bad IPs, domainsPro-active - Deny connection to intruders to your enterprise

Collaborative Global Intelligence

PhysicalWorld

CIAFBI

Interpol

PoliceStations

PoliceStations

PoliceStationsIntelligence

Agents

ResultsEffective - Accurate detection of offendersPro-active - Stop them from coming in the country

Deploy agents: Officers around the globe (MI5, MI6, FBI, CIA, Interpol.)Global intelligence system: Share intelligence information. (e.g. criminal history, global finger printing system)

ChicagoFrankfurt

Page 37: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200937 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Global Intelligence, Local Protection

REAL-TIME PROTECTION PLATFORMS

REAL-TIME PROTECTION PLATFORMS AUTOMATED ANALYSISAUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Dynamic ComputationOf Reputation Score

10 Billion Enterprise Messages

Analyzed per Month

Bad Good

IP Domain URL Image Message

GLOBAL DATA MONITORINGGLOBAL DATA MONITORING

IntelliCenter

Chicago

London

Portland Atlanta

Hong Kong

Global Data Monitoring is Fueled by the Network Effect of Real-Time Information Sharing from Thousands of Gateway Security Devices around the World

Ownership• Whois• Zone files• Trademark

Content• Images• Text• Links

Behavior• Social networks• Persistence• Longevity

Edge / Firewall• Traffic Shaping• Attack Blocking

Web Gateways• Anti-Malware• Anti-Spoofing

Messaging Gateways• Outbreak

Detection• Anti-Spam

Identity FraudApplications

• Anti-Phishing• Zombie Alerts

Page 38: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200938 Confidential McAfee Internal Use OnlyJuly 28, 2009McAfee Global Threat Intelligence38

Intelligence: How It All Works….

Internet

Incoming traffic

1

Appliance queries

McAfee Threat Intelligence

2McAfee Threat Intelligence returns reputation info

3

McAfee Threat Intelligence updates records with new reputation info

3

This entire process happens constantly, every second, 7x24x365

TS-enabled appliance

Page 39: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200939 Confidential McAfee Internal Use OnlyJuly 28, 2009TrustedSource Data Mining Technologies39

Responder Architecture

• Legacy protocol based on customized DNS servers

• Enhanced proprietary protocol (UDP over SSL)

Query Data

Reputation

Data

Analysis Systems

Inst

an

t A

naly

sis

Internal & External

Data Sources• Historical data

• Message data/metadata

• Neighborhood data

• Ownership data

• Spamtraps and honeypots

• Blacklists

Page 40: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200940 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

What does it monitor?

• Email– IP Reputation– Message Reputation

• Web – URL Categories– Web Reputation

• Intrusion/FW – IP/Protocol

Reputation – Geo-Location – IPS Attack Vector

Correlation

July 28, 2009TrustedSource Data Mining Technologies40

Dim

en

sio

ns

Virus

Phishing

Spam

ActiveContent

Malware

HackAttack

IPDomain

URL

AttachmentImage

Message

Connection Reputation Content Reputation

Oth

er

Web

Em

ail Zombies, Botnets,

other sources

Compromised or malicious web sites

or URLs

Hacker sites

Image spam, Virus, worms,

Trojans

ActiveX, Java, VB code from infected

web sites

DoS, DDoS, miscother attacks

Page 41: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200941 Confidential McAfee Internal Use OnlyJuly 28, 2009TrustedSource Data Mining Technologies41

Message Reputation

Mail Gateway

Mail Gateway

New/ Unknown spammer

New/ Unknown spammer

Known spammerKnown

spammer

1. Known spammer sends

message

2. Message is blocked

3. Unknown sender sends similar

message

4. Message is recognized and

blocked

5. Unknown sender sends

different message

6. Message is associated with new machine in

a botnet and blocked

Allows Reputations to Move Across Identities and Protocols

Page 42: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200942 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

TS Web Reputation Breakout

July 28, 2009TrustedSource Data Mining Technologies42

Page 43: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200943 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only

Size

Precision

•TrustedSource for Email

•Domain Registrations•WHOIS data•WebWasher classifiers•SmartFilter categories•Web access logs•Malware URLs•Phishing URLs•Spam URLs•Fortune 1000 websites

•Blacklists•Whitelists

•Correlation Mapping (Joint Conditional Mapping)

•Support Vector Machine classification of all parameters

•Parked Domain Identifier•Neighborhood Classification

•Real-Time Classifier•GEO Location•Host information:

•DNS•WHOIS•OS•Webserver•Certificate information

•75 Million Hosts

•More Precise(-180 - +180)

•Identified zombies, malware, suspicious

AnalysisRaw DataReputation

Service

Tru

sted

So

urc

e f

or

Web

Building Web Reputation

-180

Bad

+180

GoodSuspicious

Reputation Range

Page 44: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200944 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only44

TrustedSource Web Database

• Category-based filtering + reputation based filtering = best protection available

• 96 URL categories

• TrustedSource global intelligence augments numerous categories such as Spam, Malicious Sites, Phishing, Hacking/Computer Crime

• Reputation-based filtering for today’s Web 2.0 threats– Provides an additional layer of security– Malicious sites, Spyware, Hacking, P2P, IM and more

• 31+ Million URLs (contains IPs, HTTP and HTTPS URLs)

• Automated proactive and reactive URL gathering systems

• Human review of URLs by multi-lingual/cultural Web Analysts

– Global coverage (language and regions)

• Real-time updates

44

Page 45: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200945 Confidential McAfee Internal Use OnlyJuly 28, 2009Artemis Q2 2009 QBR45

TS Web Language breakout

Page 46: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

July 28, 200946 Confidential McAfee Internal Use Only46

www.TrustedSource.Org• Public Portal• View reputations for domains, IP

addresses or URLs• Sending patterns of the senders• Analytical information:

– country of origin– network ownership– hosts for known senders within each

domain

• Snapshot of global email trends, including a map illustrating country of origin for email attacks

• Graphs displaying overall email and spam volume trends

• ROI Calculator• ZombieMeter• Domain Health Check• Latest malware threats • Blogs from experts• Top spam senders

46

Page 47: In the Cloud Security - FIRST · In the cloud security - Identifying what we don’t know! Software may be deemed “suspicious” based on Observed behaviours Source Detections by

Greg_Day@McAfee.com01000111011100100110010101100111010111110100010001100001011110010100000001001101011000110100000101100110011001010110010100101110011000110110111101101101