S202512

In the

Supreme Court of the

State of California

IN RE SERGIO C. GARCIA ON ADMISSION

BAR MISCELLANEOUS 4186

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF AND PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CALIFORNIA LATINO LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS IN SUPPORT OF SERGIO C. GARCIA

HOWARD B. MILLER (31392) GIRARDI | KEESE 1126 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90017 (213) 977-0211 Telephone (213) 481-1554 Facsimile Email: hmiller@girardikeese.com

NINA A. RABIN (229403) Bacon Immigration Law & Policy Program UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA JAMES E. ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW 1145 North Mountain Avenue Tucson, Arizona 85719 (520) 621-9206 Telephone (520) 626-5233 Facsimile Email: rabin@email.arizona.edu

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae California Latino Legislative Caucus

COUNSEL PRESS · (800) 3-APPEAL PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... ii

CALIFORNIA LATINO LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT SERGIO C. GARCIA ........................... A-1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................................................ A-1

CALIFORNIA LATINO LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS’S SUPPLEMENTAL AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT SERGIO C. GARCIA ............................................................. 1

SERGIO C. GARCIA, UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW ...................................................... 4

A. The passage of AB 1024 answers all the issues set forth in this Court’s initial Order to Show Cause of May 16, 2012 ................................................ 7

B. Any restrictions on Mr. Garcia for certain types of federal practice or other federal limits only operate as limited exceptions to Mr. Garcia’s right in California to practice law under AB 1024 and B & P Code § 6064(b) ........................................... 9

C. AB 1024 and B & P Code § 6064(b) are consistent with rights generally accorded undocumented persons ............................................... 12

D. AB 1024 and Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(b) are consistent with California laws encouraging equal treatment of all residents, without regard to immigration status and the California legislative policy of inclusion of undocumented persons ........................................................................ 15

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES

Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1998) ....................................................... 12, 13

City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) ..................................................................... 14

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ......................................................................... 12

Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 13, 14

Martinez v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1277 ..................................................................... 16

Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948) ......................................................................... 12

U.S. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (2012) ................................................................. 13, 14

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

8 U.S.C. § 1324 ........................................................................................... 11

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) ....................................................................................... 10

8 U.S.C. § 1621 ............................................................................................. 5

8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) ................................................................................. 4, 5, 6

8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) ................................................................................. 4, 6, 7

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ................................................................................... 12, 13

Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 6064(a) ................................................... 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 18

Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 6064(b) ................................................. 1, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17

Cal. Educ. Code § 66021.6 .......................................................................... 17

Cal. Educ. Code § 68130.5 .......................................................................... 16

Civ. Code § 3339 ......................................................................................... 16

Gov’t Code § 7285 ...................................................................................... 16

iii

Lab. Code § 1171.5 ..................................................................................... 16

8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) ..................................................................................... 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Assembly Bill 4 ........................................................................................... 15

Assembly Bill 60 ......................................................................................... 15

Assembly Bill 263 ....................................................................................... 16

Assembly Bill 524 ....................................................................................... 16

Assembly Bill 666 ....................................................................................... 16

Assembly Bill 1024 .............................................................................. passim

Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration Law: A Broader View, 65 Stanford L. Rev Online 1 (2012) ................................................................................ 12

Senate Judiciary Committee, citing In the Matter of Ravindra Singh Kanwal, D2009-053 (OCIJ July 8, 2009) .................................... 9, 10

A-1

CALIFORNIA LATINO LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT SERGIO C. GARCIA

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA:

Pursuant to Rule 29.l(f) of the California Rules of Court, the

California Latino Legislative Caucus (“CLLC”) respectfully requests

permission to file, pursuant to the Court’s order of October 16, 2013, the

accompanying supplemental amicus curiae brief in support of Applicant

Sergio C. Garcia.

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The interest of Amicus Curiae CLLC was set out in the in the initial

application of the Caucus to file an amicus brief.

The Caucus is comprised of 23 members of the California State

Legislature: 8 California State Senators and 15 California State Assembly

Members, including the current Speaker of the Assembly. Founded nearly

40 years ago, the CLLC’s mission is to represent and improve the lives of

California’s working families, support California communities, and

increase educational and economic opportunities for all Californians.

Throughout its history, CLLC has advocated for and endeavored to protect

the rights of all Californians, regardless of citizenship, on issues of

education, health care access, and civil rights.

Given its representation of diverse geographical regions and

communities across California, its history of support for extending rights to

all Californians, and its mission to address issues affecting California

working families, the CLLC offers an important and unique perspective on

California law and policy addressing immigrants, including undocumented

individuals. For these reasons, the CLLC respectfully requested that the

Court accept the initial brief for filing, which the Court did.

The interest of the Caucus is, if anything, even greater now. The

Caucus was the prime sponsor of AB 1024, which supplemental briefs are

to address. The Court may consider the Caucus's intention and

understanding of the meaning and effect of AB 1024 to be relevant to the

decisions it now faces.

The Caucus respectfully requests that the Court accept this

application and the accompanying brief.

Other than counsel for CLLC, no party or counsel for any party

has authored the proposed brief in whole or in part, or funded preparation

of the brief.

Dated: November 13, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

GIRARDI I KEESE

rz4vtMdB~&~ By ______________________ ___ Howard B. Miller Attorney for Amicus Curiae, California Latino Legislative Caucus

A-2

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CALIFORNIA LATINO LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS’S SUPPLEMENTAL AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT SERGIO C. GARCIA

The Latino Caucus, whose members were the major sponsors of

AB 1024 submit this supplemental Amicus Brief on their intention in

supporting AB 1024.

AB 1024 passed the Legislature with a vote of 63-0 in the Assembly

and 28-5. The language of the bill is clear:

“Upon certification by the examining committee that an applicant who is not lawfully present in the United States has fulfilled the requirements for admission to practice law, the Supreme Court may admit that applicant as an attorney in all the courts of this state and may direct an order to be entered upon its records to that effect. A certificate of admission thereupon shall be given to the applicant by the clerk of the court.” (Cal. Bus. & Professions Code Section 6064(b))

That broad language of 6064(b) mirrors exactly the language of

6064(a), which applies to any other applicant for admission “to practice

law”, and therefore an applicant, though not lawfully present in the United

States, has exactly the same right under the law of California “to practice

law . . . as an attorney at law in all the courts of this state” as does any other

member of the State Bar of California.

The intention of the Caucus in supporting AB 1024 was to authorize

the full admission of Mr. Garcia and others covered by 6064(b) to the full

scope of law practice in California.

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Of course one not lawfully present may be subject to power of

the United States to begin an administrative deportation proceeding, but the

possible exercise of that power does not limit the right to practice law.

Nor is the right to be admitted to practice law limited by any

potential future federal restrictions on practice relationships.

Even those regularly admitted under 6064(a) may be subject to

federal restrictions on their right to practice. For example, they may not

practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office without having

additional qualifications, nor represent veterans in certain administrative

proceedings in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs without additional

training and certification. But no one has ever suggested that because there

might be some restrictions, including federal restrictions, on the scope of

law practice that is reason to deny admission in California to the practice

of law.

No matter what the restrictions, there are valuable parts of the

practice of law Mr. Garcia could clearly do.

First, Mr. Garcia could practice law on a pro bono basis, which has

meaning for access to justice for many in California. His personal

experience and status would inspire a unique sense of trust and

understanding with undocumented immigrants in California in need of legal

help, and allow him to provide much needed legal assistance in a manner

few other members of the Bar could match.

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Second, though it may be a corporation could not hire Mr. Garcia in

its in house counsel’s department, absent that explicit relationship, a client,

as such, with whom a retainer agreement is entered into, is not an employer.

There is no provision of the California Labor Code, other statute or cases,

or any other law that makes a client an “employer” of a lawyer. There are

no employer obligations of clients regarding worker’s compensation

coverage, unemployment insurance, withholding of taxes, meal or rest

breaks, or any other obligation that defines an “employer- employee”

relationship. Absent an explicit employer-employee relationship Mr. Garcia

would be as able to have clients, as any other person admitted “to practice

law . . . as an attorney at law in all the courts of this state”.

There is the presence of a broader principle at work here. Simply

being in the country without legal immigration status is not a crime. The

rights of undocumented persons to be free from discrimination in education

and other public facilities, to enter into contracts, own and inherit property,

and be protected in their civil rights are all well established.

AB 1024, about the practice of law, is intended to implement those

broader principles, and subject only to the federal power of deportation and

other narrow limitations, extend to undocumented persons “the blessings of

liberty”, among which are the right to have a profession, and provide for

themselves, their families, and their communities.

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SERGIO C. GARCIA, UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Sergio C. Garcia’s parents brought him to this country as a minor.

Mr. Garcia, since the age of 17, has lived in the United States. He attended

high school, college, and law school. Mr. Garcia sat for and passed the

California Bar Examination. The California Committee of Bar Examiners

found that Mr. Garcia is of good moral character and recommended him for

admission to the practice of law. Because Mr. Garcia has not yet been

granted permanent residence here in the United States, this Court on May

16, 2012 issued an Order to Show Cause to address the issue of whether his

status as an undocumented person prohibited his admissions to the practice

of law in California. Since he has met every other requirement for

admission, Mr. Garcia’s status is the only reason the recommendation of

the Committee would be denied.

The Court also invited amicus curiae, either in support or opposition

of Mr. Garcia’s petition to address the following issues:

1. Does 8 U.S.C. section 1621, subdivision (c) apply and

preclude this court’s admission of an undocumented immigrant to the State

Bar of California? Does any other statute, regulation, or authority preclude

this admission?

2. Is there any legislation that provides – as specifically

authorized by 8 U.S.C. section 1621, subdivision (d) – that undocumented

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immigrants are eligible for professional licenses in fields such as law,

medicine, or other professions, and, if not, what significance if any, should

be given to the absence of such legislation?

3. Does the issuance of a license to practice law impliedly

represent that the licensee may be legally employed as an attorney?

4. If licensed, what are the legal and public policy limitations,

if any, on an undocumented immigrant’s ability to practice law?

5. What, if any, other public policy concerns arise with a grant

of this application?

Petitioner, and the Committee of Bar Examiners, along with

numerous Amici, submitted briefs in response to these questions. On

September 4, 2013, this Court heard oral arguments on the matter. Much of

the argument addressed a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. §1621, applicable to

this very question. That statute, also known as the Personal Responsibility

and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, prohibits certain categories of

individuals not lawfully present in the United States from receiving

specified public benefits, including “any grant, contract, loan, professional

license, or commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local

government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.”

(8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)).

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However, under federal law, a state may render “an alien who is not

lawfully present in the United States . . . eligible for any State or local

public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible . . .

through the enactment of a State law after the date of the enactment of this

Act which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” (8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)).

At oral argument the Court asked whether § 1621(c) prohibited

the Court from granting Mr. Garcia a law license and whether there was a

California statute on point that would bring Mr. Garcia under the savings

clause in § 1621(d).

Daniel Tenney, arguing on behalf of the United States, who opposed

Mr. Garcia’s admission, specifically acknowledged that Congress under

§ 1621(d), allowed states to legislate in this area, and effectively, by state

statue, permit the admission to practice of undocumented persons

In response to oral argument, the California Legislature, drafted

and passed AB 1024. On September 26, 2013, the Governor of California

signed AB 1024. On October 16, 2013, this Court vacated its submission

in this matter in light of AB 1024 and requested that the parties file

supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the recently enacted legislation.

This Amicus brief by the California Latino Legislative Caucus

(“CLLC”) directly addresses that question.

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A. The passage of AB 1024 answers all the issues set forth in this Court’s initial Order to Show Cause of May 16, 2012.

AB 1024 expressly extends eligibility for those not present in the

United States to obtain a license to practice law, thus definitively placing

Mr. Garcia within the 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) section of the statute.

Both in its brief and in its oral argument before the Court in

September, the United States explicitly stated that federal law allows the

California legislature to enact laws making undocumented immigrants

eligible for the public benefit of law licensure. Br. for the Dep’t of Justice

as Amicus Curiae, p. 12, In Re Sergio C. Garcia on Admission, Bar Misc.

4186, S202512, S. Ct. Cal. (2013); Oral Argument at 58:20, In Re Sergio C.

Garcia on Admission, Bar Misc. 4186, S202512, S. Ct. Cal. (September 4,

2013) (the United States, during oral argument stated that there would be

no federal prohibition on issuing a law license – that 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)

provides an outlet in the event the state enacted such legislation) Given the

United States position with regard to the enactment of state legislation

conclusively placing the matter within the purview of 8 U.S.C. §1621(d),

the passage of AB 1024, and this Court’s authority to admit to the practice

of law those recommended by the Committee of Bar Examiners, there

should be no remaining question on this issue.

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Further, the language of AB 1024, through what is now California

Business and Professions Code § 6064(b) impacts every question asked by

this Court in is Order to Show Cause

“Upon certification by the examining committee that an applicant who is not lawfully present in the United States has fulfilled the requirements for admission to practice law, the Supreme Court may admit that applicant as an attorney at law in all the courts of this state and may direct an order to be entered upon its records to that effect. A certificate of admission thereupon shall be given to the applicant by the clerk of the court.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(b).

That language is an exact mirror of the language of B & P

§ 6064(a), which governs the admission of all other persons to the practice

of law in California:

“Upon certification by the examining committee that the applicant has fulfilled the requirements for admission to practice law, the Supreme Court may admit that applicant as an attorney at law in all the courts of this state and may direct an order to be entered upon its records to that effect. A certificate of admission thereupon shall be given to the applicant by the clerk of the court.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(a).

Under both sections the examining committee (Committee of Bar

Examiners) certifies that the “applicant has fulfilled the requirements for

admission to practice law” and this Court then “may admit that applicant as

an attorney at law in all the courts of this state”.

The rights of an applicant admitted under 6064(b) are exactly the

same as an applicant admitted under 6064(a). And under California law

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there are no restrictions on the practice of law set out as part of the

admission to practice by this Court.

Whatever the arguments before the passage of AB 1024 about any

difference in California law between granting a license and the right to

practice have been removed by AB 1024 using the mirror language in

6064(b) as in 6064(a). Nor do we need to engage in the dark arts of

statutory interpretation. The language in the statute supported by the

Amicus Latino Caucus, and adopted by over two-thirds of the legislature,

is clear: Mr. Garcia, or anyone else admitted under 6064(b) can practice

law, as a matter of California law, in the same way as any one admitted

under 6064(a) – “as an attorney in all the courts of this state”.

B. Any restrictions on Mr. Garcia for certain types of federal practice or other federal limits only operate as limited exceptions to Mr. Garcia’s right in California to practice law under AB 1024 and B & P Code § 6064(b)

The Senate Judiciary Committee, in enacting AB 1024, considered

the impact of federal law. Specifically, the Committee indicated that the

ability of those not lawfully present in the United State who have been

granted law licenses “may be automatically disqualified from representing

certain clients and taking on some types of cases because of their

immigration status. For example, federal law may preclude attorneys not

lawfully present in the U.S. from representing others in matters before the

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agency.” (Senate Judiciary

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Committee, citing In the Matter of Ravindra Singh Kanwal, D2009-053

(OCIJ July 8, 2009).

But there are restrictions even on those admitted under Bus. & Prof.

Code § 6064(a). Lawyers regularly admitted in California may not, for

example, practice before the Unites States Patent and Trademark Office

without having additional qualification and passing a separate exam; to

represent veterans in administrative proceedings in the Veterans

Administration requires separate certification; and there are restrictions

in other states for attorneys admitted in California who did not graduate

from ABA accredited law schools.

No one has ever suggested that restrictions on the practice of law

that apply to those admitted under Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(a) should be

a basis for this Court to deny admission to practice law “as an attorney

in all the courts of this state”.

The United States, in its original opposition Amicus brief citing

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), also claimed that attorneys not lawfully present in the

United States but licensed to practice law may be precluded by federal law

from being employed by a law firm, corporation, or public agency.

Whether that is accurate or not, certainly it would not prohibit

Mr. Garcia from representing clients on a pro bono basis. The importance

of this cannot be emphasized enough. Mr. Garcia would have a unique

identity and trust with other undocumented persons who need pro bono

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legal assistance and often find it difficult to obtain necessary legal help.

Mr. Garcia, and others with his status, as members of the State Bar, can

make a real difference in providing access to justice which, for practical

reasons, often is otherwise denied.

Furthermore, even when fees are involved, the lawyer-client

relationship is not one of “employment”. The client is not an “employer”

of the lawyer. There is no employer-employee relationship. There are no

employer obligations of clients regarding worker’s compensation coverage,

unemployment insurance, withholding of taxes, meal or rest breaks, or any

other obligation that defines an “employer- employee” relationship.

And as a technical matter, Amicus agrees with the The Committee

of Bar Examiners in its opening brief, which concludes “independent

contractors” are exempted from §1324. (Opening Br. Of the Committee

of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California RE: Motion for Admission

of Sergio C. Garcia to the State Bar of California pg. 28). The federal legal

framework does not differentiate based on immigration status when it

comes to contractual relationships. The framework of the Immigration

Reform and Control Act (IRCA) is limited to regulating immigration status

in the context of employer-employee relationships, and the statute’s

implementing regulations make explicit that it does not encompass other

contractual relationships. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) (specifically excluding

independent contractors from the definition of “employee” in the statute).

12

C. AB 1024 and B & P Code § 6064(b) are consistent with rights generally accorded undocumented persons

Federal immigration law contains no provisions that address the

ability of undocumented immigrants to make enforceable contracts outside

the employment context. The Supreme Court has characterized the right to

make contracts as a “great fundamental right.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer

Co., 392 U.S. 409, 432 (1968) (citing the legislative history of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866). The statutory basis of the right, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is

explicitly not limited to citizens. On the contrary, it is phrased in terms of

persons rather than citizens: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the

United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make

and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has long held that § 1981 extends “to aliens as

well as to citizens.” Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410,

419 (1948). The legislative history of the Reconstruction Congress that

passed § 1981 indicates that it was “acutely aware of the despicable

treatment of Chinese immigrant workers in California and elsewhere,” and

as a result, sought to provide protection from discriminatory state laws to

immigrants as well as racial minorities. Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination,

Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration Law: A Broader View, 65 Stanford

L. Rev Online 1 (2012); see also Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 178

13

(2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that the legislative history and structure of

Section 1981 support the conclusion that the statute prohibits

discrimination on the basis of alienage and finding no conflict with IRCA).

Recently, the Eleventh Circuit had occasion to consider the question

of the relationship between contract law and immigration status, and found

unequivocally no federal interest in discrimination in the enforcement of

contracts. The Eleventh Circuit considered a state law that included,

among other provisions, a section that sought to make nearly all contracts

with undocumented people unenforceable. In voiding this portion of the

statute on preemption grounds, the Eleventh Circuit described the

restriction on contracting as “extraordinary and unprecedented” and noted

that it would impose a “statutory disability typically reserved for those who

are so incapable as to render their contracts void or voidable.” U.S. v.

Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1293-94 (2012). The court found that

enforcement of the provision would make “the ability to maintain even

a minimal existence . . . no longer an option for unlawfully present aliens

in Alabama.” Id. This power of exclusion is reserved for the federal

government. Since the federal government had not seen fit to impose this

type of disability on undocumented immigrants, the court held that the State

of Alabama could not take it upon itself to do so.

Alabama highlights the importance of the right to contract and the

lack of any federal prohibition on that right. Similarly, in Lozano v. City of

14

Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013), the Third Circuit considered an

ordinance that, among other provisions, extended IRCA’s employment

verification requirements beyond employer-employee relationships to

encompass independent contractors as well. The Supreme Court had

remanded the Third Circuit’s prior decision in the case, See City of

Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). On remand, the Third Circuit

found the expansive employment-related provision preempted by IRCA,

explaining, “We believe that prohibiting such a broad array of commercial

interactions, based solely on immigration status, under the guise of a

“business licensing” law is untenable in light of Congress's deliberate

decision to limit IRCA's reach to the employer-employee relationship.”

Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 308.

Both Alabama and Lozano underscore the well-established principle

that federal immigration law does not permit alien status to be relevant to

the enforcement of contracts outside the employment context. Should

Mr. Garcia decide to provide his professional services on a contractual

basis, these cases suggest that this would be consistent with federal

immigration policy. In fact, they go even further, and strongly indicate that

it would be unlawful for a state to attempt to bar Mr. Garcia from

establishing these types of contracts.

Granting Mr. Garcia the right to practice law would be harmonious

with these stated federal policies and priorities.

15

D. AB 1024 and Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(b) are consistent with California laws encouraging equal treatment of all residents, without regard to immigration status and the California legislative policy of inclusion of undocumented persons

Providing Mr. Garcia with the right to practice law would not

conflict with any California state laws. On the contrary, it would further

California’s clear policy in favor of promoting the integration of

immigrants, regardless of legal status, into the economy and society. Over

the past ten years, and particularly in the last year, the California legislature

has repeatedly emphasized the state’s interest in providing undocumented

residents with equal and fair treatment to the maximum extent possible

within the contours of federal immigration policies.

At the same time that it passed AB 1024, the California legislature

also passed the Trust Act, AB 4, which prohibits local law enforcement

officials from holding immigrants for immigration enforcement purposes

unless they have been charged with or convicted of serious criminal

offenses. This law expresses the interest of the State of California in

allowing undocumented immigrants who are not committing serious crimes

to live free and prosper in the state.

Just days before these laws were passed, on October 3, 2013, the

Governor signed into law AB 60, allowing people to receive drivers

licenses without proof of lawful immigration status or a valid social

security card if “he or she meets all the other qualifications for licensure

16

and provides satisfactory proof to the department of his or her identity

and California residency.” The law acknowledges that public safety is

enhanced by allowing all people, without regard to legal status, to conduct

their daily affairs in above-board transactions, including by lawfully

obtaining drivers licenses.

The legislature has also passed a number of provisions to ensure

that immigrant workers are not exploited in the state. See Civ. Code § 3339

(immigration status is irrelevant for purposes of enforcing state labor,

employment, civil rights, and employee housing laws); Gov’t Code § 7285;

Lab. Code § 1171.5. Just recently, in October 2013, California passed

additional measures to ensure that all California workers, including

immigrant workers, who seek to exercise their workplace rights have strong

protections against employer retaliation. AB 263, AB 524, and SB 666.

These laws bolster the already existing federal framework that

acknowledges that all workers are covered by substantive employment law

protections, without regard to immigration status.

As it did in AB 1024, the State also expressed its support for

furthering the ability of undocumented immigrants to prosper and

contribute to the State in 2001, when it enacted Cal. Educ. Code § 68130.5.

See Martinez v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 50 Cal. 4th 1277,

241 P.3d 855 (2010) (rejecting arguments that the provision exempting

undocumented persons from paying non-resident tuition rates was

17

preempted by federal law). This commitment was further bolstered when

the State enacted Cal. Ed. Code § 66021.6, also called the California

DREAM Act, which allows undocumented students to receive privately-

funded scholarships and state-funded financial aid while attending public

colleges and universities.

CONCLUSION

The California legislature has embraced a policy of inclusion with

respect to all of its residents, regardless of immigration status. Granting

Sergio Garcia the right to practice law would be consistent with the state’s

broad commitment to furthering the ability of all its residents to contribute

as productive members of society.

These are, as the Preamble to our Constitution says, “the blessings of

liberty”, which under AB 1024 and the laws of California, have been

worked for, earned, and are deserved, legally and morally, by Mr. Garcia.

The California Latino Legislative Caucus urges this Court,

consistent with the recommendation of the Committee of Bar Examiners,

and pursuant to AB 1024 and the language of Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(b),

to admit Sergio C. Garcia to the practice of law “as an attorney in all the

courts of this state" with the same order and same language as admission

to the practice oflaw under Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6064(a).

Dated: November 13, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

GIRARDI I KEESE

~/~fJ~;ee.et By ______________________ _ Howard B. Miller Attorney for Amicus Curiae, California Latino Legislative Caucus

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Counsel of Record hereby certifies that pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(l)

or 8.504(d)(l) of the California Rules of Court, the enclosed Supplemental

Amicus Curiae Briefis produced using 13-point or greater Roman type,

including footnotes, and contains 3,978 words, which is less than the total

words permitted by the rules of court. Counsel relies on the word count

of the computer program used to prepare this brief.

Dated: November 13, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

GIRARDI I KEESE

Byq~ jl_~/_,/f6

State of California ) County of Los Angeles )

)

Proof of Service by: US Postal Service

.f Federal Express

I, Stephen Moore , declare that I am not a party to the action, am over 18 years of age and my business address is: 354 South Spring St., Suite 610, Los Angeles, California 90013.

Application for Leave to File Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief On 11/15/2013 declarant served the within: and Proposed Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae California

upon: Latino Legislative Caucus in Support of Sergio C. Garcia

1 Copies .f FedEx USPS

To each person listed on the attached Service List.

Copies FedEx USPS

Copies FedEx USPS

Copies FedEx USPS

the address(es) designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing the number of copies indicated above, of same, enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper in a Post Office Mail Depository, under the exclusive custody and care of the United States Postal Service, within the State of California, or properly addressed wrapper in an Federal Express Official Depository, under the exclusive custody and care of Federal Express, within the State of California

I further declare that this same day the original and copies has/have been hand delivered for filing OR the original and 13 copies has/have been filed by .f third party commercial carrier for next business day delivery to:

Office of the Clerk SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 350 McAllister Street, Room 1295 San Francisco, California 94102-4 797

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct:

Signature:~ /ho~

SERVICE LIST GARCIA (SERGIO C.) ON ADMISSION

Case Number S202512 

Robert Cooper Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman and Dicker LLP 555 South Flower Street, Suite 2900 Los Angeles, CA 90071-2407 Attorney for Petitioner, Sergio C. Garcia

J. Starr Babcock Rachel Simone Grunberg Office of General Counsel, State Bar of California 180 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-1614

Attorneys for Non-Title Respondent, Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California

Larry DeSha, Amicus Curiae 5077 Via Cupertino Camarillo, CA 93012

Beth S. Brinkmann Daniel Tenny Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Room 7215 Washington, DC 20530-0009

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, United States of America

Carlos Roberto Moreno Irell and Manella LLP 1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 960 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4201 Attorney for Amici Curiae Los Angeles County Bar Association, et al.

Ross Charles Moody Daniel Joe Powell Office of the Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Kamala D. Harris

Anthony Philip Marquez Lorenzo Patino School of Law 1115 H Street Sacramento, CA 95814-2811 Attorney for Amici Curiae La Raza Lawyers Association of Sacramento and Asian/Pacific Bar Association of Sacramento

Ilyce Sue Shugall Attorney at Law 938 Valencia Street San Francisco, CA 94110-2321 Attorney for Amici Curiae, Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto. Dolores Street Community Services, Educators for Fair Consideration, and Bickel and Brewer Latino Institute for Human Rights at New York University School of Law

Juan Arturo Ramos Mexican American Bar Association of Los Angeles County 714 W. Olympic Boulevard, Suite 450 Los Angeles, CA 90015-1486 Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Mexican American Bar Association of Los Angeles

Raymond A. Cardozo Reed Smith LLP 101 Second Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94105-3659 Attorney for Amici Curiae, Michael A. Olivas, et al

Angela Katherine Perone National Center for Lesbian Rights 870 Market Street, Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102-3009 Attorney for Amici Curiae, National Center for Lesbian Rights and Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc,

Brigit G. Alvarez Joseph A. Vail Center For Immigrant Rights 448 S. Hill Street, Suite 615 Los Angeles, CA 90013-1133 Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Joseph A. Vail Center for Immigrant Rights

Jennifer C. Newell ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111-4805 Attorney for Amici Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, et al.

Jerome B. Falk Arnold and Porter LLP Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-4078 Attorney for Amici Curiae, Erwin Chemerinsky, Christopher Edley, Jr., Victor Gold, Rachel Moran, Drucilla S. Ramey, and Frank H. Wu

Alexis Yee-Garcia Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2625

Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Cesar Vargas

Nicholas David Espiritu Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014-3921 Attorney for Amici Curiae, Dream Bar Association, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fun, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, Asian Law Alliance, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Educational Fund and National Council of La Raza

Nicholas Kierniesky: Amicus Curiae 2 West Harrison Avenue Millville, NJ 08332-2533

Arturo J. Gonzalez Morrison and Foerster LLP 425 Market Street San Francisco, California 94105-2482 Former Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Latino Legislative Caucus in Support of Applicant Sergio C. Garcia

Tia Koonse UCLA Downtown Labor Center 675 South Park View Street Los Angeles, CA 90057-3306 Attorney for Amici Curiae, Dream Team Los Angeles Orange County Dream Team California Dream Network San Fernando Valley Dream Team United We Dream Network