independent orbiter assessment - nasa · independent orbiter assessment m m assessment ofthe...

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

m

m

ASSESSMENT

OFTHE

INSTRUMENTATION

SUBSYSTEM

FMEA/CIL

w

lib 18 FEBRUARY 1988

_z

m

u

= =

m

Ill

m

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900001656 2019-03-22T01:23:12+00:00Z

i

am

m

[]

ii

i

i

= =

aiD

i

i

i

i

i

Hi

m

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY

HOUSTON DIVISION

SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT

WORKING PAPER NO. 1.0-WP-VA88003-07


ASSESSMENT OF INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM FMEA/CIL

N

w

18 FEBRUARY 1988

This Working Paper is Submitted to NASA under

Task Order No. VA88003, Contract NAS 9-17650

u

h

m

PREPARED BY:

Analyst

Independent OrbiterAssessment

PREPARED BY:

A.W _. Addis

Instrumentation

Subsystem Lead


L_

H

A'J. Mar_no"

Section/Manager-FMEA/CILIndependent OrbiterAssessment

APPROVED BY: .W. Knogi

Technical Manager


/

J,5. Mciher_oh

_oject Manager

_SEOS

i

i

i

il

i

iL

Ham

i

I

i

I

ibm

i

=1

m

w

1

u1

u

1

CO_E_S

3.0

4.0

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

Purpose

Scope

Analysis ApproachGround Rules and Assumptions

SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION

3.13.2

3.3

Design and Functioninterfaces and Locations

Hierarchy

ASSESSMENT RESULTS

4.1

4.2

4.34.4

4.5

4.6

4.74.8

4.9

4.10 Assessment Results - MADS

4.11 ASsessment Results - Sensors

Page

19

Assessment Results - MTU 22

Assessment Results - PCMMU 22Assessment Results - MDMs 22

Assessment Results - DSCs 22

Assessment Results - PDI 22

Assessment Results - Operations Recorder 22

Assessment Results - Payload Recorder 23Assessment Results -Orbital Timing Buffer 23

Assessment Results - Payload Timing Buffer 232323

5.0 REFERENCES 24

APPENDIX A ACRONYMS A-1

APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS B-I

B.1 Definitions B-2

B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions B-4B.3 Subsystem Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions B-7

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS

CRITICAL ITEMS

ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS

NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS

REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS

C-1

D-1

E-1

F-I

1

i

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

List of Figures

1 - INSTRUMENTATION FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT

2a - INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW

2b - OI DETAILED SYSTEM OVERVIEW

2c - MADS DETAILED SYSTEM OVERVIEW

3 - MTU DETAILED REPRESENTATION

4 - PCMMU DETAILED REPRESENTATION

5 - OI MDM DETAI_D REPRESENTATION

6 - DSC DETAILED REPRESENTATION

7 - PDI DETAILED REPRESENTATION

8 - STR DETAILED REPRESENTATION

9 - OI FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM

i0 - MADS FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM

A

I -

II -

IIi -

List of Tables

INSTRUMENT EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS

SUMMARY OF FMEA ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE

CRITICALITIES

SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS

IOA WORKSHEETS

Page

2

3

4

5

Ii

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

-Page

I0

19

20

21

21

22

mm

U

mm

mm

mg

i

I

R

mm

u

m

b

l

u

n

ii

U

w

t

u

m

m

H

. =

w

Independent Orbiter Assessment

Assessment of the Instrumentation Subsystem FMEA/CIL

1.0 EXECUTXVE SUMMARY

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in

June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of

the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items

List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE

Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the

instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206.

_nst_uctions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. I0 October 1986,

with changes i, 2, 3, and 4.

The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation

hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical

items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished

without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA

FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to

the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy

from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as

required. This report documents the results of that comparison

for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware.

The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of one

hundred-seven failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in twenty-

two critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the

pre-51L NASA baseline with fourteen Post-51L FMEAs added, which

consists of ninety-six FMEAs and eighteen CIL items. The

comparison dete_ined if there were any results which had been

found by IOA but were not in the NASAbaseline. This comparison

produced agreement on all but twenty-five FMEAs which caused

differences in fiveiigIL items. Reference Figure i.

The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA

FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground

rules document which has since been Superseded by the NSTS 22206

used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies

found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining

issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.

w

u

1

unm

O

Zun

==__

Figure 1 - INSTRUMENTATION ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

2

I

mI

!

mW

I

mqlm

l

m

I

m

l

iI

g

III

Dmm

mmm

I

I

w

_J

L_

W

ling

w

m

m

LJ.J>

I.L.J>0

i--

Z0!

F--

I..--Z

n,-

Z

i

i--,<I--Z1.1.1X

Zm

rr">-

--<<u.J_-';_'-I--

=S<

Z_o_

I--- LLJ

Z

Iml

m

elm

Figure 2a - ZNSTR_TATZON SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW

3

l

u.J

CCU_

0

Z0

Zu_09WcCa_t12cc

t_h--CO>-CO

c%U2..J

U2

Z0

ZU2

cc

O9Z

._J

Z0m

cCLI2El.

0

Z

0-.2 w

ZF-- ,,,

0 CO

i,

0

=E

o

11.

_"xuJ W

o.I--___.--J

|

0

z111

O_

0

0

o _...u.l,

Z

i11

O0

J

0

o

OZ__u_,-___

I..-

0

_w

0

i

I

i

g

D

i

l

ig

mm

i

m

i

m

mi

I

u

I

Figure 2b - OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATIONDETAILED SYSTEM REPRESENTATION OVERVIEW

4

J

w

_me

w

H

Er_

w

E_

L

mmm

m

O

Z

i _ .

--I

N

w_

o-,'_

ZX

>__

u. _ "?

wX

-4

i

Figure 2c - MADS DETAIL SYSTEM REPRESENTATION OVERVIEW

5

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Purpose

The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress

safety policies, concepts, and ratlonale being used in the

National Space Transportation System (NSTS)_ The NSTS office

has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the

Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent

assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for

completeness and technical accuracy.

2.2 Scope

The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity

encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware

identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment

Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses

hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and

operational requirements for all mission phases.

2.3 Analysis Approach

The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis

utilizing as'built drawings to breakdown the-respectlve-subsystem

into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item

is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These

data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,

and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL

reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in

the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the

assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is

performed and documented at a later date.

Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization

I.i Define subsystem functions

1.2 Define subsystem components

1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and

assumptions

Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram

2.1 Define subsystem

2.2 Define major assemblies

2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations

Step 3.0 Failure events definition3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes

3.2 Document IOA analysis results

mm

mm

g

g

mm

mm

mmm

m

M

l

mm

I

g

l

g

i

I

6

I

I

w

w

w

w

Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL4.1 Resolve differences

4.2 Review in-house

4.3 Document assessment issues

4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager

2.4 Instrumentation Ground Rules and Assumptions

The Instrumentation ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA

are defined in Appendix B.

L_

L

E

w

w

u

W

L

W

7

3.0 BUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION

3.1 Design and Function

The subsystem consists of the hardware required for data

acquisition, conditioning, timing, f0_a££ing, and routing for

checkout and display as needed, and for recording or downlinking

by telemetry as required.

3.1.1 Operational Instrumentation

. Sensors and transducers acquire data representing

measurements or status of individual parameters

throughout the vehicle and convert quantities sensed to

electrical signals.

• Signal conditioners normalize or standardize the sensor

outputs either to range for analog measurements or to

set levels for discretes (ON/OFF, HIGH/LOW). There are

13 Dedicated Signal Conditioners (DCSs) handling

approximately 1200 individual measurement channels.

• Reference junctions provide a reference potential for a

known temperature for thermocouple sensors.

. The seven OI Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs) format

incoming data from signal conditioners and feed it into

the OI data buses, which in turn route the formatted

data to the active PCMMU.

• The active Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit accepts

incoming data from the OI MDMs, combines that data with

GPC downlist data and payload data (if any) from the

PDI. The PCMMU formats the data into a serial bit

stream and routes it to the communications subsystem

for further processing/routing. (A "cold standby"

PCMMU is available as a backup.)

• The Master Timing Unit (MTU) is a very stable and

accurate source of timing for Orbiter and payload

operations. It provides time in IRIG B GMT and IRIG B

MET formats, and also provides synchronizing/timing

signals for many Orbiter LRUs.

. The Orbi£er Timing Buffer (OTB) amplifies and splits

one IRIG B GMT signal and one IRIG B MET signal to

produce eight GMT and four MET outputs for use by theOrbiter.

• The Payload Timing Buffer (PTB) performs the same

functions as the OTB, but for payload users•

1

1

D

I

I

1

I

1

u

I

1

l

1

w

8I

1

w

w

J

Li J

U

w

w

w

=--

w

• Two operational tape recorders are used to alternately

record and dump OI data and voice. They are identical

14-track wideband units capable of recording analog or

digital data and voice.

10. The Payload Recorder (PLR) is identical to the two OPS

recorders, and is used to record payload data.

3.1.2

io

Modular Auxiliary Data System

Sensors and transducers perform the same function for

MADS as for OI.

• Strain Gage Signal Conditioners (SGSCs) accept the

outputs of completion bridges and condition the

signals for handover to the MADS PCM MUX.

• The PCMU accepts the outputs from the SGSCs and

multiplexes, encodes, and formats the data for outputto the T-O umbilical or to the MADS Control Module

(MCM) for further routing to the MADS recorder.

• Wideband Signal Conditioners (WBSCs) handle high-

frequency signals and with wide variations in output

amplitude, such as from transducers sensing vibratory,

acoustic, and POGO phenomena•

•

outputs.

The Frequency Division Multiplexer (FDM) accepts WBSC

Each individual channel measurement signal

modulates a voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO)

subcarrier signal. The individual modulated VCO

subcarriers are summed and the composite FDM output is

passed to the MADS Control Module (MCM) for eventual

routing to the MADS recorder•

• The MCM controls power to the various MADS LRUs and

selects recorder speeds, modes, tape direction, tape

tracks, and PCM Mux formats and data rates.

3.2 Interfaces and Locations

The Instrumentation hardware is located through the Orbiter. The

precise location for each component is shown in Table A.

m

w

3.3 Hiezazchy

Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, illustrate the hierarchy of the

instrumentation subsystem. Figures 3 - i0 are detailed system

diagrams for specific references.

u

_=_

9

OI

OI ¢qS'FALLED OI INSTALLED

NOIVENCLATU RE LOCATION NOMENCLATURE LOCATION

1B

DSCs

OF1 AV BAY 1

OF2 AV BAY 2I

OF3 i AV BAY 3OF4 , F'WD RCS MODULE

I

OA1 i AV BAY 4OA2 i AV BAY 5

OA3 i AV BAY 6I

OM1 i IV_ FUSELAGEOM2 i MID FUSELAGE

I

O!.1 i LEFT OMS POD

OL2 , LEFT OMS PODi

OR1 i RIGHT OMS PODOR2 i RIGHT OMS POD

......................... _,t ......................... L.

OF1 i AVBAY 1

OF2 _ AV BAY 2I

, OF3 ; AV BAY 3OF4 _ FLTDECK

' OA1 I AV BAY 4OA2 , AVBAY 5

OA3 i AVBAY 6I

MDMs

!

PDI , AV BAY 1!

I

i

PCMMUs 1 ' AvBAY 12 !I AV BAY 2

I

MTU _ AV BAY 3BiI

!

!

OPSI , AVBAY 2RCDRs oPs 2 'i AV BAY 2

' P/L ' AV BAY 1iI

1

I I

I

OrB- , BIB-_D PANEL L16

FFB ', BEHND PANEL L16I

I

I

BIB

1

m

1

lib

lib

I

1

MADS

MADS INSTALLED

NOMB4CLATURE LOCATION

WBSC MID BODY

8GSC MID BODY

PCMU MID BODY

FDM MID BODY

....................... i..........................

POA MID BODY

MCM CABIN MIDDECK

RCDR CAB_ MIDDECK

1

i

i

mBi

i

1

1

TABLE A - INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT LOCATION

i0

lib

BIB

w

= =

i

E_

u

M

m

J

L=aF_

w

i

i ]

w

w

ZO

ZLIJ

O9t_

CCa_UJ

CC

W

¢'_

09

..J

U2

D

v--

U.

O

y..

____E

_F--

Ou.

w ,I>-_ I

-'=oIII I

u-

O_

(D i

I

tU

J

I uJ I

I O I

II

IdlJO

011

.-

0

m

m

fI,--

0-

e

0

wI--

m

I--"It

A --v d

IJJ-- m

I--..Io

__.m

0

ZIJ_ n

o It-- 1

¢,,._

0

iii

0

I--

uiJlU

!

F-

1

!

I u_

i >

t

i ,

_t °'Idl.I I

f

,,- (0 II-- I

-,J I

0

u

w

L

Figure 3 - MASTER TIMING UNIT

DETAIL SYSTEM REPRESENTATION

ii

ZO

ZW

09

CCEL

CC

LLJ

09>-09

_.J

tLJ

c_

<DQ_

UUZ

09

m

o

ZO

p-

Io

QC Z

w

t9w

O9

mmJ

D

M

Q

mI

I

m

i

m

m

m

z

I

ug

m

i

m

I

m

Figure 4 - PCMMU DETAILED REPRESENTATION

12

l

Lm

w

:=

i

F_

w

W

_2

L

W

ZOn

ZU_

09UJ

a-U_

U_

O9>-09

U_

--J

i

O

II

O

,, i==

_°

uu

o_=> _

•_4 m 0 m

O

f

"-II

_u..I

0

LJIJ m,-- I

,1 .,_

m

w

Figure 5 - OI MDM DETAILED REPRESENTATION

13

Z0m

I--<I--ZI.LI

ill

inl

Cj

D

0

__L__ i

I

__K I

!:

I I I _,._o

w..._|_ "-

Jr_

W

ZZ

-I-

"_0in

x

i_::__._ r-_ r% w-_

I I I i I !

Z

ooo o_

II111.11111 II It111 I I I I I I I I I I l_J

J

U

i

I

m

D

i

D

I

I

D

W

I

D

m

D

g

Fibre _6 - DSC DETAILED REPRESENTATION

14

m

mm

L_

W

w

L

J

=

r_

M

z

W

W

Z

O

Z

O9

Q_-uJ

u_

09>-09

-.J

C_

m

a_

u_

Zw

i

o.

>.

wtt

Z

i Zi >-

_J

i O

IIIl

o

_Jo

Z

oO

W.J

w

_uZ.-4w

C._--o

0

oe_

Z0

w

_x J

i

Z

l"

en

Im!

_.,.J,'nO

L,_ r"-_7

A v

u

W

u

Figure 7 - PDI DETAILED REPRESENTATION

15

ZOi

ZU_

09U_

Q_U_

UU

GO>-09

C_

..J

i,l

ec

o9

C"

ooZZ_

I--

I.I_I

__I

I.I_I

l.II.I

#-_-r

w_

i:8

___5

.-I

I--- O-

I-- 0Q.

mI

I

I

I

I

I

mI

I

mmm

I

I

I

IIII

mI

I

I

I

I

Figure 8 - S_R DETAILED REPRESENTATION

16

I

iI

u

m

w

w

=

_=u

w

2

m

w

w

w

i

D

[ r

Figure 9 - OI FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM

17

m

I

I-,-

3:

i

B

I

m

I

m

mm

m

I

mm

OI-- __(n_ mZCl-,,,7

g

z

Eli

mm

i

m

wm

Figure i0 - MADS FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM

18

m

l

i

i

4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS

The IOA analysis of the Instrumentation hardware initially

generated eighty-eight failure mode worksheets and identified eight

Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment

process. These analysis results were compared to a NASA

baseline which was frozen as of 1 January 1988, with fourteen

post 51L FMEAs included in a total of ninety-six FMEAs and

eighteenCIL items, which were generated using the referenced

FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of the assessment,

eighty-two of the one-hundred-seven FMEAs were in agreement.

Of the twenty-five that remained, four are 2/2 criticality and

not currently on the NASA CIL list, one CIL is assigned a

different criticality and seven new FMEAs were generated which

had no NASA match. The remaining fourteen FMEAs are of a

different criticality than the NASA interpretation. None of

these fourteen FMEAs affect the CIL listing.

A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the

recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified are presented

in Table I.

I Table I

i Component

MTU

PCMMU

MDM

DSC

PDI

OPS REC

P/L REC

OTB

PTB

MADS

SENSORS

TOTAL

SUMMARY OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT

NASA

.u_nm_m_mmm,

4

II

9

I0

4

9

7

3

5

18

16

96

IOA

4

Ii

14

15

4

9

7

3

5

19

16

107

Issues

u

5

5w

u

l

i

1

ii

I

I+

m

u

19

A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the

recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified are presented

in Table II.

I Table II SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT I4

I Component_.i_emlmmm

MTU

PCMMU

MDM

DSC

PDI

OPS REC

P/L RECOTB

PTB

MADS

SENSORS

TOTAL

NASA Issues I

E

4i

m

J

w

m

IOA

3 3

7 7

5 9

3 3

18 22

Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each

failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the

NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix

E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous

analysis results reported in Space Transportation System

Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.

1.0-WP-VA86001-017, Analysis of the Instrumentation, 19 December

1986. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA

FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations

are also summarized.

I

m

i

I

um

i

Imm

b

m

m

m

m

mi

I

m

u

2Om

l

n

Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failurecriticalities for tee Post 51-L FMEA baseiine. Further

discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable

failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.

m

m

U

g

=

N

u

w

gum

I Table III4

SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES

Cri_ality: I I/i

PCMMU

MDM _ -

DSC _ -PDI !- _

OPS

P/L

OTB

PTB

MADS

SENSOR

2/IRm

2

w

w

+

q 2

2/23

4

5

w

12

3/IR

3

4

7

3/2R

1

3

4

6

4

5

23TOTAL

,uu_wm_

3/3

4

5u

9

2

3

5

19

16

63

TOTAL

4

ll

14

15

4

9

7

3

5

19

16

107

Of the failurt

critical items

is presented i_

I Table IV4

SU_.

Criticality:

MTU

PCMMU

MDM

DSC

PDI

OPS REC

P/L RECOTB

PTB

MADS

SENSORS

TOTAL

lyzed, twenty-two were determined to be

rY-of the IOA recommended critical items

RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS

R 2/234

5

w

w

3/IR

2

u

w

2

3/2R

3

3

6

3/3 TOTAL

3

7

9

3

w

w

22

n

w

i

21

The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.

I._--mmmm_mmm_mgn---

I Component+

MTU

PCMMU

MDM

DSC

PDI

Ops Rec

P/L RecOTP

PTB

MADS

Sensors

Table V IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS

IOA ID Number.--m_m m

131-134

121-128, 231-233

112-118

i01-iii, 302-305

161-164

171-177

181-186

151-153

141-144, 154

201-214, 221-222, 241-256

218, 261-301

4.1 MTU Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced four FMEAs, three of which were given

a 2/2 criticality as CILs.

4.2 PCMMU Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced eleven FMEAs, four of which were

given 2/2 criticality and three given 3/2R criticality as CILs.

m

m

m

mm

M

m

m

m

B

4.3 MDM Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced fourteen FMEAs, of which two were

given 2/1R, five 2/2, and two 3/1R criticality as CILs. One of

the IOA 2/IR CILs was an issue with the NASA 2/2 criticality.

4.4 DSC Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced fifteen FMEAs, of which none were

given CIL status.

4.5 PDI Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced four FMEAs, of which three were

given 3/2R criticality as CILs.

4.6 Operations Recorder Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced nine FMEAs, none of which were of CIL

criticality.

m

m

m

i

m

[]

22

M

wnw

[]

W

i

4.7 Payload Recorder Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced seven FMEAs, none of which were of CIL

criticality.

4.8 OTB Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced three FMEAs, none of which were of CIL

criticality.

4.9 PTB Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced five FMEAs, none of which were of CIL

criticality.

4.10 MADS Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced nineteen FMEAs, none of which were of

CIL criticality.

4.11 Sensors Assessment Results

The IOA assessment produced sixteen FMEAs, none of which were of

CIL criticality.

m

= .

w

m

w

=

n

u

23

5.0 REFERENCES

Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used

in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:

i. JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C,9-12-85

2. JSC-18611, INCO/COMM Systems Brief, Rev. C, PCN-3,

8-15-83

3. Shuttle Flight Operations Manual Volume 4E -

Instrumentation, 7-85

4. JSC-12820, STS Operational Flight Rules, PCN-1, 2-14-86

5. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure

Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items

List (CIL), 10-10-86

6. Schematic VS70-974099 (OI)

7. Schematic VS72-978099, EO AI4 (MADS)

8. Schematic VS72-978102 (MADS)

9. Schematic VS72-941102 (FASCOS)

10. Main Engine ICD 13M 15000 (FASCOS)

Ii. NSTS 08171, Operations and Maintenance Requirements and

Specifications Document (OMRSD), 10-15-86

12. TD203, Communications/Instrument Workbook COM/IN2102,

2-85 (Crew Training Workbook)

13. MC476-0130, Specification, Master Unit, Pulse Code

Modulation, Rev. D, 4-30-82

I

rI

i

mm

mm

m

g

I

mm

I

I

l

D

I

m

24I

u

APPENDIX is,ACRONYM8

u

i

= =

r..-

L_J

W

I

=

r--

W

m

L

U

F_m

ACIP

AOA

ARPCS

AVBFS

Calibr

CCTV

CILCRIT

DFI

DFLDk

DOD

DSC

EIUEna

ET

F

FASCOSFDM

Flt

FMEAFwd

GMT

GPCGSE

IFM

INCO/COMM

INSTIOA

ipsIRIG B

LRUMADS

Man

MCMMDAC

MDM

MET

MIAMTU

MUX

NANASA

NSP

OA

OF

Aerodynamics Coefficient Instrumentation PackageAbort Once Around

Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control SystemAvionics

Backup Flight SystemCalibrationClosed Circuit Television

Critical Items List

Criticality

Development Flight InstrumentationDecommutator Format Load

Deck

Department of DefenseDedicated Signal Conditioner

Engine Interface UnitEnable ....

External Tank

Functional

Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff SystemFrequency Division Multiplexer

Flight

Failure Modes and Effects AnalysisForward

Greenwich Meridien Time

General Purpose Computer

Ground SupportEquipment

In-Flight MaintenanceInstrumentation and Communication Officer -Communications

Instrumentation

Independent Orbiter Assessment

Inches per secondInterrange*_Instrumentation Group B-format

Line Replacement UnitModular Auxiliary Data SystemManualMADS Control Module

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company

Multiplexer/Demultiplexer

Mission Elapsed Time

Multiplexer Interface AdapterMaster Timing Unit

Multiplex

Not Applicable

National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNetwork Signal Processor (Communications Subsystem)

Operational Aft

Operational Forward

A-I

w

OlOMRSD

OMS

OPS

OTBPCI

PCM

PCMMUPCMU

PDA

PDI

PL, P/LPnlPOGO

PTBPWR

QCRTLS

SFOMSGSC

SM

SPFSRB

SSSH

STRSTS

SW

SYS

T-OTAL

TFL

TPS

VCOWBSC

ACRONYMS

Operational InstrumentationOperational Maintenance Requirements and

Specifications DocumentOrbital Maneuvering System

Operations, OperationalOrbiter Timing BufferPotential Critical ItemPulse Code Modulation

PCM Master Unit (OI)

PCM Multiplexer Unit (MADS)

Power Distribution Assembly

Payload Data Interleaver

PayloadPanel

Acceleration/Vibration Along Thrust AxisPayload Timing BufferPower

Quality ControlReturn to Launch Site

Shuttle Flight Operations Manual

Strain Gage Signal Conditioner

Systems ManagementSingle Point of FailureSolid RocketBooster

Space Shuttle Systems HandbookShuttle Tape Recorder

Space Transportation System .......switch

SystemTime Zero

Trans-Atlantic Abort Landing

Telemetry Format Load

Thermal Protection SystemVoltage-Controlled Oscillator

Wideband Signal Conditioner

I

I

i

i

U

mR

m

I

iU

ll

I

ms

l

u

J

mmm

A-2J

I

w

w

Is,PPENDTX B

wDEFINITZONSe GROUND RULESo _ _SSUHPTZONS

u

B.I

B.2

B.3

Definitions

Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions

m

=

w

mmm

m

u

m

l

H

u

B-I

w

APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.I Definitions

Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For Preparation

qf FMEA/C_L, i0 October 1986, were used with the following

amplifications and additions.

INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:

RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition

to OPS 9, post-flight

TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends attransition to OPS 9, post-flight

AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at

transition to OPS 9, post-flight

ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at

transition to OPS 9, post-flight

CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in

anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an

event where multiple failures must first occur to result inenvironmental extremes

CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond

the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue

cards

EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to

planned end of mission

EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the

highest criticality

HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality

determined in the phase-by-phase analysis

_OR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence(oPs)

MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System

(PASS)

MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with

payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and

altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,

middeck P/L, etc.)

g

g

g

l

I

mm

[]

lmm

mm

i

mm

mm

E

u

I

u

B-2U

m

Fm

L_

w

_--qm

m

[]I

I

MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single

cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)function

_FF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond

the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cuecards

OPS - software operational sequence

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-

tives are equal to mission objectives

_HASE DEFINITIONS:

PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count'down Orbiter

power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)

_ LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE = begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) andends at transi£ion-out Of oPs 1 (Synonymouswith ASCENT)

ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 andends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8

DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown

LANDING/$A_NG PHASE- begins at first main geartouchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing

safing operations

E

m

u

m

i

w

mmm

B-3

r_

D

APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for

p_reparation of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, was employed with the

following amplifications and additions.

Io

•

•

•

5_

The operational flight software is an accurateimplementation of the Flight System Software Requirements

(FSSRs).

RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope ofthis task.

After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system

management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and

Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy

Screen B for its corresponding hardware item=.

RATIONALE: Analysls of on-board parameter availabilityand/or the actual monitoring by the crew

is beyond the scope of this task.

Any data employed with flight software is assumed to befunctional for the specific vehicle and specific mission

being flown.

RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope ofthis task.

All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and

assembled to the design specifications/drawings.

RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing isdesigned to detect and identify problems

before the item is approved for use.

All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed

performed as written, and will not include human error intheir performance.

RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational errorare out-of-scope of this task.

i

mm

m

g

I

m

B

l

U

i

g

I

B

R

mm

l

B-4

I

B

m

m

i

u

=_i

m

mgw

m

i

L

w

.

•

0

.

i0.

ii.

All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed atthe level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor

Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greaterhardware detail levels but not lesser.

RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with

other analyses requires that both analyses

be performed to a comparable level ofdetail.

Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually

monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not

required.

RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry

availability and/or the actual monitoring ofapplicable data by ground-based personnel is

beyond the scope of this task.

The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the

worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.

The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in

any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case

effects for the phase of interest•

RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a

thorough and complete analysis.

Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectorsto determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performednor FMEAs assessed.

RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior

to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•

Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected

will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.

RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior

to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and

will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressurerelief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•

RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems toensure consistency throughout IOA project•

_=

m

F_

r

m

B-5

APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONSI

B.3 Instrumentation Subsystem - Specific Ground Rules and

Assumptions

i• Sensors and transducers and associated individual or

integral signal conditioners used within a subsystem will be

analyzed by specialists assessing that subsystem.

Rationale: The subsystem analyst is the person best

qualified to identify credible failure

modes/causes and to assess the effects/

criticalities of those failures.

2. Human error (e.g., misconfiguration by crew or ground) will

not be considered.

•

Rationale: Possible misconfigurations are out of scope

for this analysis.

Inadvertent misconfigurations (e.g., accidental body contact

by crew member with a switch in zero-g operations) will notbe considered.

Rationale: Most critical switches have guards, or are

lever-lock type. Possible inadvertent

misconfigurations are out of scope for this

analysis•

4. Hardware items have been properly qualified, have passed

applicable acceptance testing, and have been properly

installed in the Orbiter. Exception: if analysis of

LRU/subassembly/piece-part failure history discloses

multiple failures for a particular item, that item will be

individually examined for design/QC deficiencies, and will

be flagged for special attention.

Rationale: Baseline assumption is that programcontrols have resulted in hardware that is

properly qualified and installed.

5. The criticality of an Instrumentation SS hardware item will

be assigned on the basis of the highest criticality of any

parameter or measurement traversing it.

Rationale: Instrumentation exists as a service to

other subsystems and to give insight into

their status; the criticality of any

path(s) within it is determined by the

criticality of measurements utilizing it.

n

u

mm

mm

mm

mm

mm

mi

mm

m

mm

I

U

I

B-6 I

m

I

B

u

w

L _

w

r_L=

u

L

T--

u

z

m

t

u

APPENDIX C

DETAILED ASSESSMENT

This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated

during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on

these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL

(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets

included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the

NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet

ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,

and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed

hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies

noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the

discrepancy occurred.

LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS

Hardware Criticalities:

1 = Loss of life or vehicle

2 _ Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item

(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle

3 = All others

Functional Criticalities:

IR _ Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,

if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle

2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,

if failed, could cause loss of mission

Redundancy Screens A, B and C:

P _ Passed Screen

F - Failed Screen

NA = Not Applicable

NASA Data :

Baseline

New- NASA FMEA/CIL

- Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes

CIL Item :

X = Included in CIL

Compare Row :

N = Non compare for that column (deviation)

=

m

E

L .

_ji

C-I

APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-101

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220200-1

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION

MDAC ID: i01

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

DSC OF4, OM2, OLI/2, OR1/2

LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3

IOA [ 3 /3

] [ ] [ ] [ ]] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

COMP_Z C / ] C " 3 [ N ] [ " ]

C ] *C ]

[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ](ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [

INADEQUATE [REMARKS:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS IMPROPERLY APPLIED IN IOA.

D

I

u

mm

i

mm

i

i

g

Bm

mm

l

g

me

i

m

i

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-2

I

mmm

mm

w

F_

m

i

1

u

m

==i

w

m

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM".

INSTRUMENTATION

102

DSC OF1, OF2, OF3

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ 3 12R ]" [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADDIDEI]ETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO NASA FMEA COUNTERPART. ERRONEOUS DATA COULD CAUSE MISSION

ABORT.

w

wmm


APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87

ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-103

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220200-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

103

DSC OF1, OF2, OF3


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ / ]

[ ] [ ][P] [P]

IN] [N]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

C

[ ][P]

[N]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

I

l

B

im

m

I

m


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

CORRESPONDS TO NASA GENERIC FMEA. NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE )

C ]C ]

B

J

D

mD

I

i

I

m

D

mD

B

I


B

B

E

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

104

DSC OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [

CIL

ITEM

C

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

m

m

m


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS :

NO NASA COUNTERPART FMEA IN PRE-51L BASELINE. THESE DSC's HANDLE

CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT COULD PROMPT

UNNECESSARY MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU, _QUIRING ABORT. FAILS

SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED DSC CHANNEL COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.


D

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-I05

NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

105

DSC OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI


ASSESSMENT:

NASA [ / ]

IOA [ 3 /IR ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL

FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

C ] C ] C ][P] [P] [P]

[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

m

I

ms

l

m

I


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)

* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

_ INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS :

NO NASA COUNTERPART FMEA IN PRE-51L BASELINE. THESE DSC's HANDLE

CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT COULD PROMPT

UNNECESSARY MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU, REQUIRING ABORT. FAILS

SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED DSC CHANNEL COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.

m

z

mm

R

mm

I

m

I

m


I

g

m

D

L

=

i

u

i

m

w

E

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-106

NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220204-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION

106

CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)

LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS

ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

C ] *[ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ 3 /2 R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:

REMARKS:

[ ](ADD/DE LETE )

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. CRITICAL ARPCS

MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSCs OF1 AND OF4. LOSS OF FUNCTION

AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM

MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.


APPENDIX CASSESSMENT WORKSHEET



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220200-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

106

DSC 0F4, OM2, OLI/2, OR1/2


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] C ]C ] C ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


.C / ] [ ] [- ] [


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

[ ][ ]

m

I

i

g

m

m

m

m

m

m

ram.

"m

m

m


mR

mm

m

i

w

i

_=

u

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220206-I

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


107


NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [[P] [P] [P] [

] *

]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS :

IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA EVALUATION. ARPCS CRITICAL

MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSCs OF2 AND OF3. LOSS OF FUNCTION

AFTER SECOND _FAIL_ cO_ULD AF?ECT MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM

MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.

m


APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-108NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220201-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:MDAC ID:

ITEM:

EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION108

POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT DSC OAI, 2, 3 (3)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

NASA [ 3 /3 ]IOA [ 3 /IR ]

COMPARE [ /N ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A B

C P ] C P ]

CP] [P]

C ] [ ]

c

[p][p]

[ ]

CILITEM

[ ]*

[ ]

[ ]


[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]REMARKS-IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. CRITICAL APU

MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSCs OAI, OA2_D OA3. LOSS OFFUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF

SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.

SEE RELATED IOA 104.

i

i

Bmm

mm

ms

ms

mm

mm

i

z

m

mm

mm

I

U

B


mm

zl

w

w

I

w

U

l

w

z

D

LZi

w

r_

n

mm_

u

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220205-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


109



ASSESSMENT-.


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]

IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

[ ] *[ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ 3 /IR-] [ P ] '[ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS*.

IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. CRITICAL APU

MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSC OMI. LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER

SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF SUBSYSTEM

MEASUREMENTS WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-II

APPENDIX CASSESSMENTWORKSHEET


ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II0

NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220203-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

EPDC/INSTRUMENTATIONii0

POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT DSC OR1 AND 2 (3)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL

ITEM

A B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ / ]

C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

I

I

U

mm

B

mm

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[ /

(If different from NASA)

] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

I

m

l

g

u

i

i


D

mm

I

rw

T

m

w

E

m

_4

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-111NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220202-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


iii

POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, DSC-OLI & 2 (3)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC


ITEM

A B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ]IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ /

C ] C ] C ] C ] *C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] C ] [ ] C ] C ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[ /


] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS :NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

m

w



ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-II2

NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

112

MDM OF1, OF2


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ / ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [


ITEM

A B C

[ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *CP] [P] [P] [ ]

IN] IN] IN] [ ]

I

Q

i

I

I

U

RECOMMENDATIONS :

[ 3 /2R ]


[P] [p] [P] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO NASA FMEA COUNTERPART.HANDLED BY THESE MDM's.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]INADEQUATE [ ]

CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE

mm

m

im

mm

z

ms

m

i


m

I

mm

w

w

w

w

zw

=_=

w

w

m

m

w

APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WO_HEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-II3

NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

113

MDM OF4, OAI, OA2, OA3


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]. [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]_ _ (ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA _A ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR BECAUSE INITIAL MDM FAILURE PLUS A

SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF A FUEL CELL HEATER RELAY OR APU FUEL LINE

HEATER RELAY IMPROPERLY LEAVING HEATER ON COULD CAUSE UNDETECTED

CONDITION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION. AGREE WITH

NASA _A.

w

E_J_

F

m

u

i


w


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-II4NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-6-1


MDAC ID: 114

ITEM: MDM OF3


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[P] [ ]*[ P ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] C ] C ]

L.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

mm

mm

z

mm

mm

I

R

I

z

M

mm

mm

mm

m

mm

l

l

ImI


n

mm

m

g

N

m

u

w

D

m

w

L_

APPENDIX C




NASA FME #: 05-6R-221502-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


CIRCUIT BREAKER 7.5 A


ASSESSMENT".


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS :

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [

INADEQUATE [

L

r

w

F

U

w

w

L=

w


u

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-!!5

NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-I

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

115

MDM OAI, OA2, OA3

LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

CIL

ITEM

C

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]

E

m

m

m

m


[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA ASSIGNS FAIL TO SCREEN B BECAUSE SOURCE OF ERRONEOUS

OUTPUT CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.

I

D

m

mm

m

m

m

m


i

w

i

=

= =

w

u

m

u

m

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221503-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


CIRCUIT BREAKER 7.5A (2)


ASSESSMENT:

NASA

IOA


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

- ADEQUATE [

INADEQUATE [

_=

. J

m

w


APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II7NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221501-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/INSTRUMENTATIONMDAC ID: 117ITEM: POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM OAI, 2, 3,

CRITICALITY 3 COMPONENTS


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 3 /2R ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

[P] [P] [P] [[ ] [ ] [ ] [

] *

]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS :

[3 /IR ]


C P] C F ] [ P ] [ A ](ADD/DE LETE )

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:DISAGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY ASSIG_NT BECAUSE LOSS OF

ALL INSIGHT INTO CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS HANDLED BY MDMs OA1,

OA2, OA3 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. FAILS SCREEN BBECAUSE ONE OF THE REDUNDANT RPC OUTPUTS FOR AN MDM COULDBE LOST WITH NO INDICATION TO CREW OR GROUND.

im

u

g

i

M

m

u

I

m

imm

m

i

---- Zz

mm

g

I

m


mm

zm

w

w

m

!

=

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221504-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2T


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]


[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

CRITICAL APU AND FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS ARE HANDLED BY THE

AFFECTED MDM's, AND THEIR LOSSCOULD THREATEN C_W/VEHICLE

SAFETY, BECAUSE CRITICAL CONDITiONS/FAILURES COULD BE MASKED.

RECO_ND UPGRADING TO 2/IR. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE THERE WOULDBE

NO INSIGHT INTO THOSE MASKED CONDITIONS DURING FLIGHT.

m

m

m


i

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220400-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW[X]

SUBSYSTEM:MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

121

PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]


[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA BECAUSE ONE UNIT IS IN INACT!_ STANDBY.

NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR BECAU_SS QF BQ_ P_,s COULDCAUSE LOSS OFFAU-LTDETE_iONPARAMETE_T_T COULD AFFECT

CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY. AGREE WITH NASA CRIT. NOTE: PRESENTFLIGHT RULES CALL FOR MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT ON LOSS OF FIRST_PCMMU.

I

l

m

I

m

mm

mm

I

mm

mm

mm

I

i

B

m

mmmm

mm

i

m


D

m

B

m ,

w

r

w

m

m

E' _

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220400-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

122



ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

w

7

u

m


[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ i [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA BECAUSE ONE UNIT IS IN INACTIVE STANDBY.

NASA HAS UPGRADED THIS TYPE OF FAILURE MODE FROM 3/2R TO 2/IR ONPREMISE THAT LOSS OF BOTH PCMMUs COULD CAUSE LOSS OF FAULT

DETECTION PARAMETERS THAT COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.

AGREE WITH NASA CRIT. NOTE: PRESENT FLIGHT RULES CALL FOR

MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT ON LOSS OF FIRST PCMMU.

L

m


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220400-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

123



ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 2 /IR ]IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

CP]CP]

C ]

B

[p][ NA]

CN]

C

[P][p]

[ ]

ClL

ITEM

[ x ] *[ ]

[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[ /


] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS".SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA BECAUSE ONE UNIT IS IN INACTIVE STANDBY.

NASA HAS UPGRADED THIS TYPE OF FAILURE MODE FROM 3/2R TO 2/1R ONPREMISE THAT LOSS OF BOTH PCMMUs COULD CAUSE LOSS OF FAULT

DETECTION PARAMETERS THAT COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.

AGREE WITH NASACRIT. NOTE_ _ PRESENT FLIGHT RULES CALL FORMINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT ON LOSS OF FIRST P_.

m

m

m

m

m

[]

I

m

mm

II

mi

B

iI

B

I

=

I

z

D

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-24I

!l

B

m

m

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220402-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

• NEW [ X]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

124

PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

IX] *IX]

lRECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

C / ] C ] [ ] C


INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

[ ][ ]


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220402-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

125



ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

I

mm

mm

m

m

mm

B

mm


C / ] C ] [ ] [


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

[ ][ ]

zmm

mm

ms

I

m

m

m


l

u

i

B

m

I

m

w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220402-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

126



ASSESSMENT:

REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFERENCES.

C ]C ]

m

m


APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-127NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220401-I

NASA DATA:


SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

COMPONENTS (3)


PCM POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, CRITICALITY 3


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITYFLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /2R ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

[P] [P] [P][P] [P] [P]

] *

]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [INADEQUATE [

REMARKS:

AGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.

mm

B

B

ms

ms

mm

ms

ms

I

mm

l

mm

I


mm

l

mm

=_

=umm

i

H

m

k

M

APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WORKSH_



NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220402-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


SWITCH TOGGLE, 3P3T (i)


ASSESSMENT".


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LATEST NASA FEMA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR ON PREMISE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE

IN A CRITICAL SUBSYSTEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, BECAUSE

PCMMU_D_S _I DATA/ AND_ITICAL SUBSYSTEM FAILURES COULD BE

CANCELED. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.

B

w

L_

n

w


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-321200-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

131

MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 2 /IR ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ]

COMPARE [ /N ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A B

[ P ] [ P ]

[ ] [ ]

[N] [N]

C

[ F ]

[ ]

[ N ]

CIL

ITEM

[X]*

ix]

[ ]

m

l

mm

m

m

m

zmm


[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [


] [ ](ADD/DELETE)

ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY OF OPINION WITHIN

NASA ON MTU CRIT. THESE ARE SPF's THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MTU

FUNCTION. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE LOSS OF MTU PREVENTS BFS

OPS AND MTU FAILS SCREEN C BECAUSE OF SPF's.

mm

l

u

I

m

I

mm

m


m

i

m

u

I

m

w

w

m

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-321200-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

132



ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY OF OPINION WITHIN

NASA ON MTU CRIT. THESE ARE SPF's THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MTU

FUNCTION. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE LOSS OF MTU PREVENTS BFS

OPS AND MTU FAILS SCREEN C BECAUSE OF SPF's.

m

w

R

w

m


E-

ra

APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WO_SHEET


NASA FMEA #: 05-4-321200-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

133



ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY CIL

FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

[ X] *IX]

I

I

z

I

m

l

I

i

I


[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY OF OPINION WITHIN

NASA ON _ ¢RI3_ THE_E _ SPF's _T COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MTUFUNCTION. AGREE WITH NASA _EA BECAUSE LOSS OF _ PREVENTS BFS

OPS AND _ FAILS SCREEN C BECAUSE OF SPF's.

mm

mm

mm

i

g

i

mm

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-32zmm

mm

=

m

w

N

r_

u

warn

w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221201-I

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

_w [ ]


POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, MTU (2)


ASSESSMENT:

NASA

IOA


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ][ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ]*[ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA 05-6R-221201-I, PRE-51L BASELINE, ASSIGNS CRIT 3/IR,

BUT WRITE-UP DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT CRIT ("LOSS OF MTU WILL NOT

AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE" AND "POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION"). RECOMMEND

CRIT 3/2R.

w


APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID:

NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 3 /3 ]IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ / ]

INSTR-14105-4-221400-1

INSTRUMENTATION

141

PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)

A. W. ADDIS

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

[ ]C ]

[ ]

B C

[ ] [ ]C ] [ ]

C ] [ ]

NASA DATA:


CIL

ITEM

C ] *[ ]

[ ]

I

i

g

J

l

Lg


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [

INADEQUATE [

ms

mm

g

mm

t


l

I

I

w

ms

w

w

L

w

w

w

-z:z

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221400-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

142



ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

w

J

L_w


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [

INADEQUATE [

E

w


APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID:

NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

INSTR-143

05-4-221400-2

INSTRUMENTATION

143


A. W. ADDIS

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

CIL

ITEM

B C

C ] C ] [ ] *[ ] [ ] [ ]

C ] [ ] [ ]


[ I ] [ ] [ ]


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

g

I

mm

I

mm

mm

U

m

mm

m

I

m

m

m

m

m

M

l

i


mm

m

mm

w

w

APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-144XNASA FMEA #: 05-4-221401-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:MDAC ID:

ITEM:

EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION144

CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5-AMP, PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUND_CY _S_EENS

A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

C ] *[ ]

[ ]


[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATEREMARKS:

[ ][ ]




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221500-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

151

ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITYFLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] [ ]C ] [ ]

C ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

g

m

mm

M

i

B

D

U


C / ] C ] C ] [


INADEQUATEREMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

[ ][ ]

mm

D

B

I

m

m

m

z

l


ig

U

mm

w

u

w

m

.-_.•

w

w

m

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID:

NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

INSTR-152

05-4-221500-2

INSTRUMENTATION

152


A. W. ADDIS

RE'DUND_CY SCREENS .........

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [

B C

] C ]] C ]

] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

CIL

ITEM

C ] *[ ]

[ ]


C / ] C ] [ ] C ]


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

C ](ADD/DE LETE )

[ ][ ]

w

w


i

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221500-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

153



ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

m

MI

g

i

mm

i

I


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:NO DIFFERENCES.

C ]C ]

mm

I

I

I

I

m

mm

wmm


w

w

i

gum

L_

i,

t_

Fw

w

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-154X

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221501-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION

154


LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDiS

ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C

IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [

COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. [ ]- _ _ _ (ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [, ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

w

L_

w

Fmw

_ =

m_m





NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221300-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

161

PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

[ ] C ] C ][ P ] [ NA] [ P ]

[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

NASA [ 2 /2 ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]

[ X] *[ ]

[ N ]

D

l

I

I

ml

U

l


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA CRIT CONSIDERED AVAILABILITY OF SPARE PDI CARRIED ON FLIGHTS

FOR WHICH PDI IS MISSION CRITICAL, BUT PDI SUBSTITUTION REQUIRES

OFF-NOMINAL CREW ACTIVITY. AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.

mm

mm

mm

m

l

m

mm

g

l

B

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-42E

I

zI

w

w

1

W

1

= =

=

1

1

w ,

E

n

W

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221300-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

INSTRUMENTATION

162



ASSESSMENT-.


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS-.


FOR WHICH PDI IS MISSION CRITICAL, BUT PDI SUBSTITUTION REQUIRESOFF-NOMINAL CREW ACTIVITY. AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.

W

1





NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221300-2

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

163



ASSESSMENT:

NASA [ 2 /2 ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

[ ] [ ] ix][ P ] [ NA] [ P ]

IN] IN] IN]

[ x ] *

[ ]

[N]

m

m

m

I

mm

D

D


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


FOR WHICH PDI IS MISSION CRITICAL, BUT PDI SUBSTITUTION REQUIRES

OFF-NOMINAL CREW ACTIVITY. AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.

I

B

D

I

mm

I

im

ms

l

D


,,m

mm

m

m

w

=

L

_=


ASSESSMENT DATE:l/28/87

ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-164NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221301-I

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEw [ ]


POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, PDI (2)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

V3 ]]

/N ]

12R ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A B

[ ] [ ][P] [P]

[N] [N]

C

[ ][ P ]

[N]


[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

CILITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

_ION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

CIRCUIT IS REDUNDANT. LOSS OF POWER TO PDI AND

T LOSS OF PDI FUNCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION

:S.

DATE 02/18/88 C-45


ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-171

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221000-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

171

SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER OPS l&2


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )



REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCE IN CRIT ASSIGNMENT. THE SCREENS SHOULD NOT BE

RATED FOR A 3/3 CRITICALITY.

U

mm

i

mm

mm

B

B

m

[]

m

mm

[]

i

mm

lms

l

m

I

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-46 -- im

APPENDIX C


m

L1u

z

i

=

m

i

n

u

w

ASSESS_NT DATE: 1/28/8VASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-172

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221001-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

OPS 2 STRS

INSTRUMENTATION

172

SWITCH MODE RECORD/STANDBY/PLAYBACK FOR OPS 1 &


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C

IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[ /


] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

w





NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221003-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

173

SWITCH MODE, OPS 1 & 2 ANOMALY START/OFF/ERASE


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ( ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA SHOULD HAVE ASSIGNED 3/3 CRITICALITY. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.

m

mm

U

mm

,,m

B

,,m

Z

D

B

m

Jmm

I

m


m

I

m

[]

m,,

_ r

w

m

m

w

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221002-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

174

SWITCH, MODE LOOP/MAINT OPS 1 & 2 STRS

LEAD ANALYST : B. HOWARD

ASSESSMENT:

NASA

IOA


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

C 3/3 ] C ] C ] C ]C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ]*

[ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA SHOULD HAVE ASSIGNED 3/3 CRITICALITY. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.

w


APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-175X

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221004-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

175

EVENT INDICATOR - OPS RECORDER CONTROL MODE


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

I

mm

I

I

I

m


C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)

ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

[ ][ ]

E

mm

z

I

mm

m

iI

N

m

I

li


I

B

w

w

W

u

m

[]

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221001-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, OPS RCDR I, (2)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY. THE SCREEN SHOULD NOT BE RATED FOR

3/3 CRIT.

w


APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-176X

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221004-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

176

EVENT INDICATOR, OPS RECORDER OPERATIONAL MODE


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

C ] *C ]

[ ]


C / ]" [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

[ ][ ]

m

mm

m

U

m

Im

=

g

I

M

rU

I

I

II


g

I

w

r_

W

m

pm

W

i

APPENDIX C ............ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET



NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221001-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, OPS RCDR 2, (2)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY ..... REDUNDANCY SCREENS

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ / ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

[ ] [ ] [ ][ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY. THE SCREENS SHOULD NOT BE RATED

FOR 3/3 CRIT.

i


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221004-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

177

EVENT INDICATOR - ANOMALY SEQUENCE TALKBACK


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

I

I

I

l

mm

l


C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


REMARKS :

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

g

m

i

m

m

J

g


mm

m

I

w

r_

w

[]

E

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221100-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

181

SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER-PAYLOAD


ASSESSMENT".

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ]IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ /N ]

C ] C ]CP] CP]

CN] CN]

[ ][P]

IN]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]REMARKS :

LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ROUTE PAYLOAD DATA TO GROUND, EITHER

VIA PLAYBACK OR REAL-TIME, COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION _

OBJECTIVES.

u





NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221103-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

182

SWITCH, ROTARY P/L STR MODE SELECT


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

C ] [ ] [ ]CP] [P] [P]

[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ /N ]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


[ 3 /2 R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PAYLOAD RECORDER MODE COULD

CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.

i

i

i

i

i

M

R

im

um

i

m

g

i

i

i

mm


i

[]mm

i

w

W

w

Ew

w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221101-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

183

SWITCH, OPERATE/ERASE-PAYLOAD STR


ASSESSMENT".

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ /N ]


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

C ] C ] C ][ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

[ ] *C ]

[ ]


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT OPERATE/ERASE FUNCTION COULD


w

u

=


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221102-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

184

SWITCH, ROTARY P/L STR SPEED CONTROL


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

u

U

D

I

I

rmm

m


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PAYLOAD RECORDER SPEED COULD


J

g

=

m

I

mm

l

U

m

=_

nm


um

U

= =

W

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID; EPDC/INSTR-185

NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221101-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


185

POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT PAYLOAD RECORDER (2)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

m


[ 3 /2R ] [ P j [ P ] '[ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. LOSS OF PAYLOAD DATA

WILL NOT AFFECT CREW OR VEHICLE. BUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION

OBJECTIVES IN SPECIFIC CASES.

z :

w

=


APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-!85X

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221104-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:ITEM:

SOURCE

INSTRUMENTATION

185EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER CONTROL


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CILITEM

C ] *C ]

[ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

[ ][ ]

g

mm

u

B

D

i

I

I

z

m

g

i

mR

ms

I

alto

i


mm

mm

w

w

w

L

W

w

W

E--

W

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221104-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

186

EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER MODE TALKBACK


ASSESSMENT".

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] C ]C ] C ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

C ] *C ]

[ ]


C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

[ ]C ]

w

w

w

W

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-_1 /- Lt__ -

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220300-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITYFLIGHT

HDW/nmC

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

INSTRUMENTATION

201

WIDE-BAND SIGNAL CONDITIONER (WBSC)

A. W. ADDIS

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

B

g

LI

u

mm

i


C / ] [ ] C ] C ]

* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:


[ ](ADD/DELETE)

(If applicable)


g

zI

J

I

mi

I

I

m

i


ms

mg

= =

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238501-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION _,

202

POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT WBSC EQUIPMENT (I)


ASSESSMENT".

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] [ ]C ] [ ]

C ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

C ] *C ]

[ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

[ ][ ]

w

w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238500-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM"

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


203

POWER DISTRIBUTION ASSEMBLY


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

J

I

D

g

m

m

glum

D

m

g

In

Ru

u

m

U


mid

mm

g

= =

L

---4

u

w

r_

w

w

w

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238501-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

211

WIDE BAND ACIP PCM SWITCH


ASSESSMENT:

NASA

IOA


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C

CIL

ITEM

] [ ] .] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.

C ]C ]

w

Lw

%--


APPENDIX C



ASSESS_NT ID: INSTR-212

NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230100-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

212

STRAIN GAGE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS (SGSC'S)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

g

U

I

g

I

i


C / ] C ] [ ] [


INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

[ ][ ]

J

m

I

mm

w

i

i

m

mm


I

Imm

w

w

w

= =

l

1

1

1

w

m_a

l

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238502-I

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

INSTRUMENTATION

213

MADS STRAIN GAGE CONTROL SWITCH


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


ADEQUATE

.... INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE )

[ ][ ]

W


1

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238502-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


214

POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT SG/PCM (i)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE )

[ ][ ]

w

L

I

I

b

i

Lm

g

mm

g

m

J

u


m

m

mg

m

w

7

w

w

w

m

APPENDIX C

ASSESS_MEI_WORKSHEET



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220700-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]


MDAC ID: 218

ITEM: FASCOS


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [

] [ ] ,] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

w

=

w


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220600-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:

INSTRUMENTATION

221

FREQUENCY DIVISION MULTIPLEXER

A. W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ / ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

C ]C ]

[ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

w

m

l

l

m

I

b

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[" /


] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ][ ]

g

mm

Im

z

g

ul

g

J

i

mm

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-70l

mm

%.d

= :

w

m

w

L_

w

W

w

=

m

APPENDIX C--

ASSES_$MENT WORKSH

Z


ASSESSMENT ID: INSTRr2_2NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230601-1, -230602-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUM__NTATION .....

MDAC ID: 222

ITEM: FDM CALIBRATION CONTROL

LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS --

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDWlFUNC

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ / ]

.... D D cY_ SCREENS

A B C

[ ] [ ] [ ][ ] C _ ] C ]

[ ] C_] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If d_fferent from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

i ](ADD/DELETE)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

u

w

F

w

w


z

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230400-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]


MDAC ID: 231

ITEM: PCM MUX


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [

COMPARE [ / ] [

REDUNDANCY SC_ENS CIL

ITEM

B C

] C ] C ] [ ] *] C ] [ ] [ ]

] [ ] [ ] [ ]

l

g

_mm

mm

I

I

B

g

B

D


C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

z

Q

mg

i

11

ug

g

Im

m


m

g

=_

i

[]

w

=

1

w

1

J

1

1

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230401-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

INSTRUMENTATION

232

PCMMODE CONTROL SWITCH


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230402-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

233

PCM RECORD MODE SWITCH


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/_JNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] C ]

C ] C ]

C ] C ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *C ]

[ ]

W

I

b

I

l

D

iw


C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

i

D

I

g

U

Z

E

m

I

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-74I

g

w

_z

m

m

I

I

7

u

i

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-238000-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATIoN-

241

MADS CONTROL MODULE (MCM)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

[ ][ ]


i

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238001-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


242

POWER & CONTROL CIRCUIT, MCM (i)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 3 /3 ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ / ]

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

[ ]C ]

[ ]

B C

C ] C ][ ] C ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

w

is

D

m

mm

I

RECOMMENDATIONS :

i /


] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

M

l

U

g

I

mm

mN


ms

mm

m,,m

m

j .|: ]

i:]

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID: _C/INSTR-243

NASA FMEA #: 0S-6R-230601-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


243

CIRCUIT, ET POWER DISTRIBUTION


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

m

E


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230800-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

251

MADS RECORDER


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

C

CC

[

CIL

ITEM

] [ ] *] C ]

] [ ]

m

,,m

mm

mm

mm

mm

i


C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

C ][ ]

mm

m

[]

i

D

LI

[]

m


mm

i

m

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230800-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

252

MADS RECORDER


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUND_CY-S_REENS

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

C

CC

[

CIL

ITEM

] C ] *] [ ]

] [ ]

w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

=


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230800-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

253

MADS RECORDER


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

C

[[

[

CIL

ITEM

] [ ] .] [ ]

] [ ]

mm

mm

g

ms

I

m

M


[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ][ ]

mm

I

I

=m

I

mm

m

i


mm

I

mm

=

m

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230802-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

INSTRUMENTATION

254

MADS RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

u

w


[ / ] C ] [ ] [

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If-applicable)

REMARKS. -

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE )

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

u

L_D

L REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-81

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230802-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

255MADS RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [

COMPARE [ / ] [

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A B C

C ] C ]C ] C ]

C ] C ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

mm

m

mm

g

I

m

mm


[ / ] C ] C ] C [ ]"(ADD/DELETE)


INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ][ ]

mm

i

[]

z

I

I

mmmm

m

mm

l

mm


mm

mmmm

u

l

u

=

z

w

=

L_

m

m




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-230801-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


256

POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, MADS RCDR (i)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] C ][ ] [ ]

C ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] ,[ ]

[ ]

l

w


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DE LETE )

[ ][ ]

w

m


z

m

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230500-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

261

REFERENCE JUNCTIONS


ASSESSMENT".


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

C

CC

C

CIL

ITEM

] [ ] .] [ ]

] C ]

i

mm

mm

m

b

mR


C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

mm

I

mm

mm

I

I

I


m

w

u

z z

w

F_

B

w

mine

u

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230500-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

262

REFERENCE JUNCTIONS


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

C ]C ]

w

w

w

few


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236100-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

263

STRAIN GAGE TRANSDUCER


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / 3 [ 3

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


C / ] C ] C ] C


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ](ADD/DELETE)

C ]C ]

m

m

me

I

llm

I

m

mm

ms

m

mm

Zm

mm


I

m

m

m

m

w

m

m

w

r_

w

w

w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-22400-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

264

ACCELEROMETER


ASSESSMENT".

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

C ]C ]


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-232200-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

265

ACCELEROMETER


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

CIL

ITEM

B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

I

I

M

i

g

U


C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

m

mg

B

g

mm

mm

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-8 8 : _ -_.: : =

m

mm

w

z

u

w

Fw

w

L_

w

LJ

L_

F-

w

J

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-237300-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

266

PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

w


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236700-1

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

267RADIOMETER


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B

C ][ ]

[ ]

NASA DATA:


C

CC

[

CILITEM

] [ ] *] [ ]

] [ ]

mm

mm

mm

=_g

g

M

I


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)



(If applicable)ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

m

zl

m

u

g

i

=

i


l

mm

w

w

u

w

L_

w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236400-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

268

THERMOCOUPLE, FUSELAGE TPS


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [

] C ] *] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]


APPENDIX C


ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-269NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236300-1

NASA DATA:


SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

269

THERMOCOUPLE, LEFT WING ELEVON


ASSESSMENT".

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENSFLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CILITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.,

(If applicable)


g

mm

u

I

z

l

ii,m

mm

m

u

R

mm

z

iQ

im

qm

m

mm

mRU


B

m

m_g

i

=

w

M

m

J

I

J

w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236200-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW C ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

270

TEMPERATURE SENSORS


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)

C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

u

w

w

m


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (i)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

C

C[

[

CIL

ITEM

] C ] *] [ ]

] [ ]

h

im

I

I

g

I

I

l


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ][ ]

l

im

l

g

I

g

u


I

i

i

W

i

=

L_

h

w

E

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213501-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:


272

FUSE, FPCA MN BUS A IA (i)

T. EMMONS

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ]

B C

C ] C ]C ] C ]

C ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


REMARKS :

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

i


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213500-I

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


FUSE, FPCA, MN BUS A IA (I)


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

B

D

rm

zl

u

l


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

C ]C ]

m

l

l

g

I

m

g

U

M


D

u

I

il

w

w

=

H

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213400-I

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (i)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY RED_D_CY SCREENS

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]


C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


_ _' ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.


w

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213401-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:


FUSE, FPCA-2, MN B, IA (I)


ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [

COMPARE [ / ] [


ITEM

B C

] [ ] [ ] C ] *] [ ] [ ] [ ]

] [ ] [ ] [ ]


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE

INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

[ ][ ]

I

m

m

l

l

m

[]

|

!I

J

mm

mm

===

l

mm

mmm

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-98mu

mI

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220500-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

301

VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM


ASSESSMENT".


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [

] *

]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ](ADD/DELETE )


REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

n

m





NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220202-1

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

302

DSCs OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI


ASSESSMENT".


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE C /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

B

umm

I

I

m

l

m


C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ](ADD/DE LETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA 107 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 107 AND IS

BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-302X. NO DIFFERENCES.

m

i

mI

mm

mm

I

m

m


I

i

I

m

=

h_m

n

D

m

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: NONE


MDAC ID: 303

ITEM: DSC OF3


ASSESSMENT:

NASA [ / ]

IOA [ 3 /2R ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

C ] C ] [ ][p] [P] [P]

[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

[ ] *[ ]

[ ]

m

w


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-303X. DSC OF3 HANDLES MEASUREMENTS

OF ARPCS DP/DT AND CABIN PARTIAL PRESSURE, OXYGEN. LOSS OF ALL

MEANS OF DETECTION OF CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WOULD CAUSE

MISSION TERMINATION.


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [


MDAC ID: 304

ITEM: DSC OF3


ASSESSMENT:


ITEM

CRITICALITY

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]


[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ](ADD/DE LETE )


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


BEING RESTORE_D AS IOA INSTRr30_. DSCOF3 _DLES MEAS_MENTS

OF ARPCS DP/DT AND CABIN PARTIAL PRESSURE, OXYGEN. ERRONEOUS

MEASUREMENTS AND LOSS OF UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR MONITORING

CABIN PRESSURE COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.

m

I

m

m

ms

B

r

mm

mm

I

ms

I

m

[]

l

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I02m

m

EJm

= z

APPENDIX C



ASSESSMENT ID;oNASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

INSTR-305X

05-5-B03-7-I

NASA [ 2 /2 ]

IOA [ 3 /IR ]

COMPARE [ N /N ]

INSTRUMENTATION

305

MDM OF4, OAI, OA2, OA3

A.W. ADDIS

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ X ]

NEW [ ]


FLIGHT ITEM

HDW/FUNC A B C

[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]

[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]

[ ] [ ] [ ]

[ x] *IX]

[ ]

n


[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ X ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA iii WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C iii AND IS

BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-305X. THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE

CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A

HEATER STUCK ON COULD PROMPT MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU,

REQURING ABORT. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNEL COULD

NOT BE DETECTED. NOTE: NASA FMEA WRITEUP IS INCONSISTENT WITH

2/2 CRIT AND ASSIGNS SCREENS FOR THAT 2/2 CRIT.

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I03

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [


MDAC ID: 306

ITEM: MDM OF3


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *IX]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]


[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A](ADD/DELETE)



REMARKS:


BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-306X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS , MDMOF3 _D-I_S CRITICAL FUEL CELL _ASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO

REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 306X). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS

WOULD REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION.

mm

mm

mm

ms

m.

i

z

[]

z[]

mm

ms

I

mm

m

I

mm


[]

m

u

m

_=_i

APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: NONE


MDAC ID: 307

ITEM: MDM OF3


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA [ / ]

IOA [ 2 /2 ]

[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ]

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ] ....

NEW [ ]

C

[ ][ ]

[ ]

CIL

ITEM

[ ] *IX]

[N]

m

t

RECOMMENDATIONS ."

[2/2


] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

....... INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-307X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM

OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO

REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 307X). ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTS

COULD CAUSE IMPROPER MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF A FUEL CELL, REQUIRING

UNNECESSARY MISSION TERMINATION.


APPENDIX C




NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

308

MDM OF1, OF2


ASSESSMENT:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [

CIL

ITEM


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]

mm

Lmm

mm

I

i

I


[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


BEING _STORED AS INSTR-308X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM

MDM's OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE

MEASUREMENTS (SEE IOA 308). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS WOULD

CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.

mm

mm

J

mi

l

J

mR

U

g


i

mm

w

m

APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

309

MDM OF1, OF2


ASSESSMENT:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [

CIL

ITEM


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]

w

w


[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]

(ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-309X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM MDMs

OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS

(SEE IOA 309). ERRONEOUS MDM OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE

INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION AND COULD PROMPT A MANUAL

FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN THAT COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.

w

w


APPENDIX C



NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-2

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

ITEM:

INSTRUMENTATION

310

MDM OAI, OA2, OA3


ASSESSMENT:


FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC A B

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [

NEW [

CIL

ITEM

C

NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

B

|

m

m

I

l

m

u

mm


[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DELETE)


ADEQUATE [ ]

..... INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:


BEING_STO_D-ASINSTR£31oX_CRITICAL APu FuEL LINE SYSTEM

TEMPERATURES ARE HANDLED BY THESE MDM's. THEIR LOSS WOULD CAUSE

MISSION TERMINATION. THE NASA FMEA WORDING IS INCONSISTENT

WITH ASSIGNED CRITICALITY, AND SCREENS SHOULD NOT BE RATED FOR A

2/2 CRITICALITY.

l

g

m

R

I

mm

m

mm


l

mI

l

i

q

=

m

wAPPENDIX D

_-{

CRITICAL ITEMS

m

_i̧

L_

u

imm

w

r_

z

w

D-I

NASA FMEA

I,I----IIIO_I IIII

05-5-B03-7-I

05-5-B03-7-I

05-6R-221501-I

05-6R-221504-I

05-4-220400-1

05-4-220400-2

05-4-220400-2

05-4-220402-1

05-6R-220402-I

05-4-321200-1

05-4-321200-2

05-4-321200-2

05-4-221300-1

05-4-221300-1

05-4-221300-2

05-5-B03-7-I

NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

05-5-B03-7-2

MDAC-ID

104

113

115

117

118

121

122

123

124

128

131

132

133

161

162

163

3O5

306

307

308

309

310

APPENDIX D

POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

FLIGHT ITEMIIIiiI iIiii

3/IR

3/IR

2/IR

3/3

3/IR

3/2R

3/2R

3/2R

2/2

2/22/2

2/2

2/2

3/2R

3/2R

3/2R3/1R2/2

2/2

2/2

2/2

2/2

DSC OAI, OA2,

OA3, OMI

MDM OF4, OAI,

OA2, OA3

MDM OAI, OA2, OA3

PWR & CNTRL CIRCUIT

SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2TPULSE CODE MODULATION

PULSE CODE MODULATION

PULSE CODE MODULATION

PCMMU FORMAT CNTRL SW

SWITCH TOGGLE, 3P3T (i)MASTER TIMING UNIT

MASTER TIMING UNIT

MASTER TIMING UNIT

PL DATA INTERLEAVER

PL DATA INTERLEAVER

PL DATA INTERLEAVER

MDM OF4, OAI, OA2, OA3MDM OF3

MDM OF3

MDM OF1, OF2

MDM OF1, OF2

MDM OAI, OA2, OA3

FAILURE MODE

mm

im

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

i

LOSS OF OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

OPEN, SHORTEDI

FAILS TO CLOSE

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRATIC OPERATIO_

INTERMITTENT

OPERATION

PHYSICAL BINDING/

JAMMING IFAILS TO CLOSE

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

ERRATIC OPERATION _

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRATIC OPERATIOh

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUTLOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT =

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

I

I

I

I

I

I

D-2

ZI

I

II

w

w

==

L

I

LA

W

W

W

W

r--

APPENDIX E

DETAILED _%IfALYS I S

This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing

previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-

017, Analysis of the Instrumentation Subsystem (12 December

1986). Prior results were obtained independently and documented

before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental

analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously

considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item

being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each

failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and

functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as

described in NSTS 22206. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and

CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the

bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at

the top.

LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS

Hardware Criticalities:

1 I Loss of life or vehicle

2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item

(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle3 = All others

Functional Criticalities:

IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,

if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.

2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,

if failed, could cause loss of mission.

Redundancy Screen A:

1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight

2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight

3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight

NA I Not Applicable

Redundancy Screens B and C:

P _ Passed Screen

F - Failed Screen

NA = Not Applicable

E-I


ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1/26/88

EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION144

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT".

HDW/FUNC

3/3

3/3

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:


OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)9)

INSTRUMENTATION

OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION

PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER

CIRCUIT BREAKER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3

LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3

DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3

LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]

LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

STANDARD SWITCH PANEL

MC454-0026-2050

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,

PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:CIRCUIT BREAKER PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE

PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER. LOSS OF BUFFER FUNCTION BECAUSE OF

CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO

CREW/VEHICLE.

mm

mm

I

m

I

i

mS

gm

D

I

mm

REFERENCES: VS70-750139 m

il

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-2

i

i

g

w

=

E-J

m

= .

m

w

--~

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:


ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_WORKSHEET

1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITIL_LITY HDW/FUNC

EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3

154 ABORT: 3/3L ...........

ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5-AMP, PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)



1)2)3)4)S)6)V)8)9)

INSTRUMENTATION


ORBITAL TIMING BUFFER

CIRCUIT BREAKER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH : 3/ 3 RTLS :

LI FTOFF : 3/ 3 TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]

. T

HDW/FUNC

3/3

3/3

3/3

3/3

B[ ] C[ ]

LOCATION: PANEL 016

PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030

CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, CHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,

PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE , VIBI_VfION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:CIRCUIT BREAKER PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE

ORBITAL TIMING BUFFER. LOSS OF BUFFER FUNCTION BECAUSE OF

CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO

CREW/VEHICLE.

REFERENCES: VS70-750139

w

w



ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET

DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C

SUBSYST_: INSTR_NTATION FLIGHT: 3/3

MDAC ID: 175 ABORT: 3/3

ITS: EVENT INDICATOR - OPS _CORDER CONTROL MODE

FAIL_ MODE: E_TIC OPE_TION, PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING,

E_ONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ET._CTRICAL), FAI_ TO SWITCH, SHORTED

_AD _ALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS _AD: K. SC_CKPEPER

BREAK_ HIE_CHY:

I) INSTR_NTATION

2) oI3) OPS _CORDER

4) CONTROL MODE TA_BACK

s)6)v)8)9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C

P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3




_D_G/SAFING: 3/3

_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]

_CATION: P_EL A1

P_T _BER: MC452-0222-OXXX

CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MIS_DLING/ABUSE, PIECE-P_T FAIL_E,

VIB_TION

EFFECTS/_TIONA_:TA_BACK INDICATES _ETHER OPs RECORDER IS IN CO_D OR P_EL

CONTROL MODE. _SS OF INDICATION WOU_ NOT BE CRITICAL TO

MISSION OR TO C_W/_HIC_.

b

1

l

r

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Z1

_FE_NCES: SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS70-750119 1

i

_RT DATE 02/18/88 E-4

1

1

m

i

m

u

um_

i

rw

J



DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3


ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR, OPS RECORDER OPERATIONAL MODE

FAILURE MODE: :_ ERRATIC OPERATION_PHYSICAL BiNDiNG/JAMMING,

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED



1)2)3)4)S)6)V)8)9)

INSTRUMENTATION

OI

OPS RECORDER

OPERATIONAL MODE TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

PANEL Al

MC452-0222-0XXX

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MIS_DLiNG/ABUSE, PIECE'PART FAILURE,

VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK INDICATES WHETHER OPs RECORDER IS IN RECORD MODE;

STANDBY, STOP, OR UNPOWERED; OR IN PLAYBACK OR REWIND. LOSS OF

INDICATION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.

m REFERENCES: VS70-750119




DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNCSUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3


ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR - ANOMALY SEQUENCE TALKBACK

FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,




i)

2)3)4)s)6)v)8)9)

INSTRUMENTATIONOI

OPS RECORDER

ANOMALY SEQUENCE TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

PANEL A1

MC452-0222-OXXX

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,

VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:TALKBACK IS INTENDED TO INDICATE WHETHER OPS RECORDER IS IN

ANOMALY SEQUENCE OR NOT. LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL

TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.


I

mg

Ill

I

m

I

U

I

I

im

_=I

I

I

I


m

I

i

J

m

i

u

i

_ I

n

Hm

__=-

L _



DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3


ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER CONTROL SOURCE





1)

2)

S)

4)

5)

6)7)8)9)

INSTRUMENTATION

OI

PAYLOAD RECORDER

RECORDER CONTROL SOURCE TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]

LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

PANEL A1

MC452-0222-0XXX

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE'PARTFAILURE,

VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:TALKBACK INDICATES WHETHER PAYLOAD RECORDER IS UNDER PANEL OR MDM

CONTROL. LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO

CREW/VEHICLE.


w


INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET

DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F_C

SUBSYSTEM: INSTR_NTATION FLIGHT: 3/3


ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER MODE TALKBACK



T._AD _ALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER

BREAK_ HIE_CHY :

1 ) INSTR_NTATION

2) OI

3 ) PAYLOAD RECORDER

4) RECORDER OPERATIONAL MODE TALKBACK

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT

P_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS:

LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:

_DING/SAFING: 3/3

_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]

HDW/_NC

3/3

3/3

3/3

3/3

c [ ]

LOCATION: P_EL A1

PART _BER: MC452-0222-0X_

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,VIBRATION

EFFE_S/RATIONAt_:

TA_BACK INDICATES OPERATIONAL MODE OF THE PAYLOAD RECORDER -

_CORD MODE; ST_DBY, STOP, OR _POWE_D; OR IN P_YBACK OR

_WIND. LOSS OF _CTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO

CREW/VEHICLE.

_FE_NCES: VS70-750149

I

m

mm

mm

mm

iiI

EI

I

mm

J

I

mmm

D

m

mmm

mi

mm

=sin

l

_PORT DATE 02/18/88 E-8m

mm

u

m

m

r

Em

u

u

h



DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1/27/88INSTRUMENTATION

301

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/3

3/3

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:


LOSS OF OUTPUT



1)

2)3)4)s)6)_)8)9)

INSTRUMENTATION



CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

VARIOUS LOCATIONS

MC476-0205-0001

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,

TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:THE VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEMIS USED TO CONDITION TRANSDUCER

SIGNALS ROUTED TO MDM's FOR FURTHER PROCESSING. LOSS OF FUNCTION

WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.

m



INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1/27/88INSTR_NTATION

302

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/_NC3/2R3/2R

ITEM:

FAIL--MODE:DSCs OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI_SS OF O_P_

TRAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS _D: K. SC_CKPEPER

B_DO_ HIE_CHY:

i) INSTR_ATION

2) oi3) DSC

4)s)6)7)s)9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT

P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_:

LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:

_DING/SAFING: 3/3-

_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]

HDW/FUNC

3/2R,,

3/2R

3/2R

3/2R

C [ P ]

_CATION: OAI AV BAY 4, OA2 AV BAY 5, OA3 AV BAY 6, OMI MID

_SE_GE

PART _BER: MC476-0131

CAUSES_ T_PE__, VI_T_ON'::C_INATION,:_C_ICAL SHOCK,

PIECE-PART FAIL_

EFFECTS/_TIONA_:

THESE DSCs SUPPLY A VOLTAGE (5 VOLTS DC) TO FLIGHT CRITICAL MDMS

FFI, FF3, FF4 VIA THE AUTO/_ ET SEP SWITCH FOR ET SEP_TION;

AND TO THE S_E MDMs VIA THE AUTO-_/AUTO _B SEP SWITCH FOR SRB

SEP_TION. _SS OF A_ SO_CES FOR T_T VOLTAGE AND

ALL SEPARATION COMMAND CAPABILITY (KEYBOARD AND GROUND) WOULD BE

CATASTROPHIC.

_FE_NCES: SCHE_TIC VS70-760502 (ET & SRB SEP SW CKT), SSSH OI

DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, IPCL, FSSR STS 83-0010A (T._VEL C GNC _),

INCO/CO_ OI BRIEF SB48, STS 83-0026A 4.2.2, 4.2.3


m

i

i

I

[]

iam

mm

m

i

[]

U

i

m

I

I

m

m

[]

[]

m

m

r__

w

u

L

m

m

m

i

L



DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:


303

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R3/3

ITEM".

FAILURE MODE:

DSC OF3

LOSS OF OUTPUT



i) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI

3 ) DSC

4)s)6)v)8)9)

CRITICALITIES



LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3


LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]

LOCATION: AV BAY 3

PART NUMBER: MC476-0131

CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT,

MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE •

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:CRITICAL AIR REVITALIZATION PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM TELEMETRY

DATA IS PROCESSED BY DSC OF3 (CABIN DP/DT AND PARTIAL PRESSURE,

OXYGEN). THE DP/DT MEASUREMENT IS USED BY C&W FOR KLAXON INPUT.NO REDUNDANT DSC PATH IS PROVIDED. LOSS OF MEASUREMENTS

COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION BECAUSE POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC

FAILURES COULD BE CONCEALED.

REFERENCES: SSSH PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM 6.1, IPCL, SSSH OI

DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48

REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-II



DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:MDAC ID:

1/23/87INSTRUMENTATION304

HIGHEST CRITICALITYFLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R3/3

ITEM:FAILURE MODE:

DSC OF3ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD,ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER

mm

l

m

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: mI) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI

3) DSC4) mS)6).7)s)9)

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

3/3 RTLS: 3/33/2R TAL: 3/3

3/2R AOA: 3/3

ATO: 3/3

FLIGHT PHASEPRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:ONORBIT:

DEORBIT: 3/3LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]

LOCATION: AV BAY3PART NUMBER: MC476-0131

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,

TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:CRITICAL AIR REVITALIZATION PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM TELEMETRY

DATA IS PROCESSED BY DSC OF3 (CABIN DP/DT AND PARTIAL PRESSURE,

OXYGEN). THE DP/DT MEASUREMENT IS USED BY C&W FOR KLAXON INPUT.NO REDUNDANT PATH IS PROVIDED. ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTSCOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.


mm

mm

m

W

R

I

u

m

i


m

[]

= =

M

w

==

m

mmm

w

w

J



DATE:

SUBSYSTEM".

MDAC ID:


305

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

3/IR

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MDM OF4, OA1, OA2, OA3

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT



I) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI

3) MDM

4)5)6)7)8)9)

....CRITICALITIES


PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R

LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR

DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR

LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]

LOCATION: OF4 FLT DECK, OAI AV BAY 4, OA2 AV BAY 5, OA3 AV

BAY 6

PART NUMBER: MC615-O04-53XX, 6310

CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,

PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA (FUEL TEST

LINE TEMPERATURE AND FUEL PUMP DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE). AN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A HEATER STUCK IN "ON"

CONDITION COULD PROMPT _AL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU. TWO OF THE

THREE APU's ARE REQURIED FOR LANDING; THEREFORE SHUTDOWN OF ONE

WOULD REQUIRE ABORT DURING LIFTOFF. AN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MASKING

A HEATER STUCK ON COULD RESULT IN EXPLOSION AND CAUSE LOSS OF

CREW/VEHICLE. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNELCOULD NOT BE DETECTED.

REFERENCES: SSSH Oi DSC/MDM DWG. 17.1, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF SB28,

IPCL, VS70-946099


INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


DATE: 1/15/87SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION

MDAC ID: 306

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/2

3/3

ITEM: MDM OF3

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT


mm

zmm

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: ..i) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI

3 ) MDM

4) "s)6)7)8)9)

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


AV BAY 3

MC615-0004-53XX, 6310

LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDM OF3 HANDLES ALL FUEL CELL

CURRENT MEASUREMENTS AND FCI SUBSTACK 3, FC2 SUBSTACK 2, AND FC3

SUBSTACK 1 DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS. THESE MEARUREMENTS ARE

CRITICAL BECAUSE THEIR _ss COUp_CONTROL OXYGEN-HYDROGEN _ _:_CROSSOVER IN A FUEL CELL WHICH IN TURN COULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION

AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW IF THE MALFUNCTIONING FUEL CELL WERE

NOT SHUT DOWN PROMPTLY. (PRIMARY METHOD OF DETECTING FUEL CELL

"HOT'SPOTS ", AND THEREFORE EXPLOSION_ZARD, IS IF

A DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENT RISES RAPIDLY AND GOES OUT OF NORMAL

RANGE - ABOVE 150 MV.) NO REDUNDANT PATHS EXIST FOR THESE

MEASUREMENTS. THEIR LOSS WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.

REFERENCES: SSSH FUEL CELL 3.4, IPCL, SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1,

INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48, SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E, EPS INT SCHEMATICS

VS70-945099, VS70"945102


mm

mm

mm

m

I

D

I

m

I

I

[]

B

w

L.&

mw_

i



DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1/15/e7INSTRUMENTATION

307

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT".

HDW/FUNC

2/2

3/3

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MDM OF3

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, PREMATURE OUTPUT



i) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI3 ) MDM

4)s)6)7)8)9)

CRITICALITIES



LIFTOFF: _ 2/2 TAL: 3/3



LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]

LOCATION: AV BAY 3

PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-53XX, 6310


PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDM OF3 HANDLES ALL FUEL CELL

CURRENT MEASUREMENTS AND DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS FOR FCI

SUBSTACK 3, FC2 SUBSTACK 2, AND FC3 SUBSTACK i. AN ERRONEOUS ORPREMATURE OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE INDICATION OF FUEL CELL

MALFUNCTION, E.G., A SUDDEN INCREASE IN INDICATED SUBSTACK DELTA

VOLTAGE OR CURRENT IMBALANCE AMONG FUEL CELLS. SUCH AN APPARENT

MALFUNCTION COULD PROMPT MANUAL FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN WHICH IN TURN

COULD REQUIRE MISSION CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD CAUSE

MISSION LOSS.



VS70-945099, VS70-945102

REPORT DATE 02/18/88. E-15

INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT"


DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:


308

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/2

3/3

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MDM OF1, OF2

LOSS OF OUTPUT



i) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI

3) MDM

4)s)6)7)8)9)

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]

LOCATION: MDM OF1 AV BAY I, MDM OF2 AV BAY 2



PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDMs OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE FUEL CELL

SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS. EACH OF THESE MEASUREMENTS

IS CRITICAL AND ITS LOSS COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION BECAUSE

THAT LOSS COULD CONCEAL OXYGEN-HYDROGEN CROSSOVER IN A

FUDL CELL WHICH IN TURN COULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF

VEHICLE AND CREW IF THE MALFUNCTIONING FUEL CELL WERE NOT SHUT

DOWN PROMPTLY. NO REDUNDANT PATHS EXIST FOR THESE MEASUREMENTS.

m

mm

i

u

mm

n

l

mm

L

n--

HI

I

m

m

I

u



VS70-945099, VS70-954102

I

g


m

mm

u

w

i

E !

w



DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:


309

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/2

3/3

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MDM OF1, OF2ERRONEOUS OUTPUT


BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :

1 ) INSTRUMENTATION

2) oI3 ) MDM

4)s)6)7)8)9)

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

MDM OF1 AV BAY I, MDM OF2 AV BAY 2

MC615-0004-53XX, 6310

CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDMs OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE FUEL CELL

SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS. AN ERRONEOUS OR PREMATURE

OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION,

E.G., A SUDDEN INCREASE IN ANY SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE AMONGFUEL CELLS. SUCH AN APPARENT MALFUNCTION COULD PROMPT MANUAL

FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN WHICH IN TURN COULD REQUIRE MISSION

CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD RESULT IN MISSION LOSS.

REFERENCES: SSSH FUEL CELL 3.4, IPCL SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1,


VS70-945099, VS70-954102




DATE:

SUBSYSTEM'.

MDAC ID:


310

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT".

HDW/FUNC

2/2

3/3

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MDM OAI, OA2, OA3

LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED


BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :

1 ) INSTRUMENTATION

2) OI

3 ) MDM

4)s)6)7)8)9)

CRITICALITIES






LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


LOCATION: MDM OA1 AV BAY 4, MDM OA2 AV BAY 5, MDM OA3 AV BAY

6



PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS OF FUEL LINE TEMPATURE, FUEL PUMP

OUTPUT TEMPATURE, AND BYPASS LINE TEMPERATURE FOR THE THREE APUs

ARE PROCESSED BY MDMs OAI, OA2, AND OA3. REDUNDANT PAIRS OF

MEASUREMENTS ARE NOT ROUTED VIA SEPARATE MDM PATHS FOR THESE

MEASUREMENTS, THEIR LOSS WOUL[YCAUSELOSS OF INSIGHT INTO APU

OPERATION, WHICH COULD CAUSE MISSION ABORT, OR COULD CONCEAL

MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17'1, INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB28,

INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM AND COMPONENT LIST (IPCL)

D

g

B

u

mm

!

mm

mm

l

mm

--="imR

l

l

mm


Z

= :

APPENDIX F

NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS

This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and

corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.

The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment

Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOArecommendations.

7

Appendix F Legend

Code Definition

1 IOA recommends changing the second failure modedescribed in the effects field.

2 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode.

w

i

F-I

PAGE ISOF. POOR _UALITY 4PPENDIX F

NASA FMEATO IOA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS

: IDENTIFIERS II NASA If IOA RECOMMENDATIONSi

.......... I ................I.................................................j .................................. _ ----- i

I NASA : IDA I!CRIT _ SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS OTHER : ISSUE

I ::MEAr_UMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER_, HWIF ',A B C I; HW/F , A B C (SEE"EBENDCODE) I

0,_-4-,:...J,-.O-1

05-4-220202-!

05-4-220400-I

0_-4-220_00-2

05-4-220402-I

05-4-220500-1

05-4-220600-I

05-4-220700-!

05-4-221000-1

05-4-221002-!

05-_-221003-i

05-4-221004-I

05-¢-221100-!

05-4-221101-I

05-4-221102-i

05-4-221103-I

05-4-221104-I

05-_-221300-2

05-4-221400-I

05-_-221400-2

_-_ 09|A_-1

o5-4-22150!-_

05-4-2_0100-I

EPDC/]NSTR-271

INSTR-I02

!NSTR-!04

:NSTR-i05

INSTR-II2

INSTR-IO!

:NSTR-IO:

INSTR-!06

INSTR-302X

!NS_-201

INSTR-i21

INSTR-122

INSTR-i23

INSTR-124

INSTR-125

:NSTR-12_

INSTR-:OIX

INSTR-22!

IN_R-21B

INSTR-I71

INSTR-172

INSTR-174

IN_TR-175X

!NSTR-iT&X

!NSTR-ITTX

!NSTR-!BI

INSTR-183

INSTR-iB4

:NBTR-!BSX

:NSTR-IO&X

INSTR-161

INSTR-I_2

!NSTR-I_3

INBTR-i41

:_STR-!42

!NSTR-i¢:

EPDC/!NSTR-144X

[NSTR-I:I

!N_TR-i52

INSTR-15:

EPDC/INSTR-!5¢X

IN_,R-_

I! 3/3

" 313

I',:fIRII

,," 211R,," 2/!R

" 2!IR

" 2/2

a/g

II,, 2t2

" 313

I! 3/3

" 3/3

,I

" 3f3II at3

" :t3

II 3/:

" 3i3

II " "_/_

iI 3!__ O/,J

" :/3

" 3i3II

II _"'' 917

II 2!2

" 212

3/3313

:t3

313

II /

I! 3!2R P P P

'I 3i2R p r

,," 312R p c, p

',',3i2R P P P

',I /

I' /

P P P ',I i

P P P II 1 NA

P P P II / HA

P P P II I NAI I

M /

'' /

I I

I: !

I: 3/2R P P P

II 3/2R P P P

" 312R p o p

I! 312R P P P

I I

:I /

I I,

I! !

I! !

i! I

I! !

i! /

I! I

I! /

I! I

I! l

I! !

I!

F-2

I

z

I

I

I

z

I

II

I

I

II

I

II

II

I i

I

I

i

II

I

I

I

=

=

w

=. :

=

=

OF pOOR QLIALITY

I !DE_TIFIERS I! NASA i IDA RECnMME,_DATIO,_]SI '.

:..........................................II..................I ...................................=............I

I NASA I IDA I CRIT C SCREENS I CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER : ISSUE I

I FMEA _UMBER : ASSESSME_4TRUBBER I I_W,"F',A B C I H_!F ',A 9 C I (SEELEGENDC'_DE)I I

05-4-230¢00-i

05-4-230401-Ih_-_-o_fi_o- I

05-4-230500-I

05-4-2_0a0_-I,-2_Oa

05-4-230800-!

05-_-230B02-I

05-4-23_I00-I

05-4-23_300-1

05-4-2Sa700-!

05-4-2:B000-I

05-4-321200-!

05-4-321200-2

05-5-B03-_-!

O.,-._-B03-,-.

05-_R-213400-1

05-aR-213500-1

0_-6R-220201-I

05-_R-220202-I

05-aR-220203-I

05-_R-220204-I

05-&R-220205-I

05-_R-22020_-I

05-6R-220401-I

05-_R-220_02-i

05-&R-221001-I

05-5R-221101-I

0_-_R-221301-!

05-6R-22!501-I

05-_R-22!502-!

05-_R-221503-1

05-_R-221504-1

05-6R-230601-I

O5-6R-230BOI-!

INSTR-231

INSTR-2_2

INSTR-233

!NSTR-251

INSTR-2_2

I_STR-222

I,_=TR-,_,

:NSTR-253

INSTR-254

INSTR-255

INSTR-265

INSTR-263

INSTR-270

INSTR-2&?

INSTR-26B

INSTR-2_7

INSTR-2_

INSTR-241

INSTR-131

!NSTR-IS2

INSTR-133

INSTR-!!4

INSTR-II3

iNSTR-II5

INSTR-3OSX

_N_x-_IuX

EPDC/INSTR-274

EPDC/!NSTR-275

EPDC/INSTR-27_

EPDC/INSTR-272

EPDC/INSTR-!OB

EPDC/IRSTR-111

EPDC/!NSTR-IIO

EPD_/INSTR-I06

EPDCIINSTR-I09_EPDC/INSTRd07

EPDC/INSTR-127

EPDC/INSTR-!2B

EPDC/INSTR-176

EPDC/INSTR-177

EPDC/INSTR-I85

EPDCiINSTR-I34

EFDC/INSTR-164

EPDCIINSTR-iI7

EPDCIINSTR-]I5

EPDC/!NSTR-I16

EPDCIINSTRHIB

EPD_/INSTR-243

EPDCiiNSTR-25&

3/3

3i3

3/3

3/3S,,'3

3/.33/3

3/3

3/,3

3t3:/3

3/3

3/3

.3/3

.3/3

3/3

3/3

3/3

211R

2/IR

211R

3i2R

2/lff

2/IR

2t2

2/23/3

,3/3

3/3'7 ",'O I d

313313

3/3

3/3

3/3

313312R

2/IR

If 313

If 313

',_ 3/IR]i 3/3

II 3/2R

_I 312R

,," 3/2RII 212

If 3!3

'.I _13

I!

I /

I l

I !

I l

I I

i

I l

I /

I l

I l

I I

I I

I /

I I

I I

I I

I /

] I

I !

P P F 1 2/2

P P F I 212

P P F I 212

P P P I !

P P P I t

P F P ' /

P F P :/IR

P F P /

P P P I 3/iR

i' !

P P P I 312R

NA NA NA I 311R

NA NANA l 3/2RP P P I i

P P P I I

' :/2R

_' P P ', .,,,_R

', 3i2R

P P P i :_/IR

P P P II I

P P P I! /

,",211R

I! /

',I

F

P F P

P P P

P P P

P P P

P P P

P P P

P P P

P F P

P F P

F-3

I

IDENTIFIERS II NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS%

I NASA l IOA IICRIT I SCREENS IICRIT t SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE

+'FNEA NUMBER _ ASSESSMENT!_MgER,,"HW/F t A B C +I HW/F I A B _r I ,!SEELEGE_IDCODE) ,' .'

' ' ::::::::::::::::::::::= I ' _ I

05-6R-238001-I

O_-_R-_B_O0-1

05-_R-23BSOi-I

05-6R-23BSO2-I

NONE

EPDCiINSTR-242 II 313

EPDC!INSTR-203 II 313

EPDC/INSTR-202 II 3/3

iNSTR-2_i II 3/3

EPDCIINSTR-2t4 II 3i3

!NSTR-213 ,,"313

iNSTR-;O3X II /

INSTR-304X II I

INSTR-306X II /INSTR-3OTX It /

INSTR-_OB_ II /

INSTR-_OgX II /

II I I

II I I

II / I

II / I

II / I

,," 3/2R I P P P

",, 312R _ P P P

" 212 Iii

_ 9/9 I

,, 217

II 2/2 I

X

X

X

x

.Xx

I

I

I

II

I

I

I

i

I

=--

I

__L PAGE !S

OF _R QUALITY

F-4

I

II

I

I

i

I

I

i!Ii +

Z; Z

Z

: L

II

N

l

i

I

z_im

m

J

g

m

g

m

D

z

m

mm

IB

m

Ill

m

RB

mm

um

wB

g

[]

independent orbiter assessment - nasa · independent orbiter assessment m m assessment ofthe...

Documents