index: emergency operations centers

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INDEX: Emergency Operations Centers Project Development and Capabilities Assessment

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Historical Context 1.2 Purpose of an E.O.C. 1.3 Research Sources 1.4 Database

Chapter 2. Planning for EOC Development 2.1 EOC functions 2.2 Survivability Requirements 2.3 EOC staff and organization 2.4 Space requirements 2.5 Suitability of Existing Space vs. New 2.6 Facility Location 2.7 EOC Design/layout 2.8 Communications Capability 2.9 Redundancy/Infrastructure Systems 2.10 EOC Supplies and Equipment

Chapter 3. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Hazards Identification 3.3 Vulnerability Assessments

Chapter 4. Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need 4.1 The Process 4.2 Space Standards 4.3 Multi-Use Opportunities 4.4 Involving Your Staff

Chapter 5. Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities

5.1 Architectural Character 5.2 Facility Success/The Protective envelope 5.3 Exterior Wall Protection 5.4 The Roof: The Weakest Link 5.5 Glass: A Part of the Protective Envelope 5.6 Facility Illustrations 5.7 Specialized Facility Construction Details

Chapter 6. Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems

6.1 Power/Emergency Generators 6.2 Water/Redundant Water Systems 6.3 Sewer/Waste Water Systems 6.4 Communications/Secondary Systems 6.5 Air Handling Systems

INDEX Page 2


Chapter 7. Communications Capability 7.1 EOC Communications consists of 4 functional areas 7.2 Internal Communications 7.3 External Communications 7.4 Public Communications 7.5 Environmental requirements 7.6 Location 7.7 Environment Communications Rooms/Dispatch Centers 7.8 Power/Redundancy 7.9 Air Quality 7.10 Self Containment 7.11 Psychological Issues 7.12 Support Assistance

Chapter 8. EOC Security Concepts and Requirements

8.1 EOC Site Characteristics 8.2 Site Selection 8.3 Site Design 8.4 Controlled Access 8.5 Surveillance 8.6 Control Points and Physical Barriers 8.7 Parking 8.8 Site Utilities 8.9 Entry Control, Vehicular Access and Circulation 8.10 Building Envelope 8.11 Signage 8.12 Physical Security Lighting 8.13 Space Design 8.14 Building Security 8.15 Biological Acts of Terrorism 8.16 Summary

Chapter 9. Evaluation of Existing EOC Facilities 9.1 How to Use the Checklist Chapter 10. Development Options: “New, Remodel or Adaptive Reuse”

10.1 Development Option: New Construction 10.2 Development Option: Remodeling of Existing Facilities 10.3 Development Option: Addition to Existing Facilities 10.4 Development Option: Addition and Renovation to Existing Facilities 10.5 Development Option: Acquisition of an Existing Building (Adaptive Re-Use)

Chapter 11. Delivery Options: “How Facilities Can Be Constructed” 11.1 The “Traditional” Method: Design-Bid-Build 11.2 The Construction Management Method 11.3 The Design-Build Method Chapter 12. Human Factors

12.1 The Intelligent Use of Color

INDEX Page 3


Chapter 13. Funding Opportunities and Facility Costs 13.1 Federal Grants “Home Land Security” 13.2 State Grants 13.3 Development Impact Fees 13.4 Voter Referendums/Tax Base 13.5 Tax Exemption Programs 13.6 Community Redevelopment 13.7 Developer “Set Asides” 13.8 Capital Improvement Bonds 13.9 Capital Improvement Programs 13.10 USDA/Grants and Loans 13.11 Facility Costs Chapter 14. Psychological Aspects of EOC Environments 14.1 The Intelligent Use of Color Chapter 15. How to Obtain Professional Services 15.1 Selection Team 15.2 Formal R.F.P.’s 15.3 Obtaining Qualified Firms 15.4 Interview Process 15.5 Summary Chapter 16. “Standards” and Accreditation 16.1 Facility Standards/Recommended Space Allocation 16.2 Efficiency Factor 16.3 Specific Standards and Accreditation Requirements Chapter 17. Existing Facilities/Floor Plans Chapter 18. Bibliography/Appendix 18.1 Publications 18.2 News Publications 18.3 Codes and Design and Construction Standards 18.4 Data and Information Sources

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Chapter 1 Introduction: 1.1 Historical Context: This guidance publication is intended to inform the “first-time” designer and those

involved in Emergency Preparedness of the requirements of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). These facilities are unique and, in essence, provide the physical environment for critical response in the event of a natural or man-made emergency. Historically, EOC facilities were accommodated in a wide variety of structures, most of which were buildings adaptively reused to accommodate emergency response functions.

During the “cold war” period the threat of a nuclear strike accelerated the planning process and understanding of how emergency response structures should be designed to withstand these unique and dynamic forces. Specific guidelines were developed for facilities, relative to their “protection factor”, or ability to withstand exceptional events such as a nuclear strike. Structures became, in a sense, bunkers consisting of thickened and reinforced exterior surfaces (walls, roofs, etc.) and, in many cases, additional protection added by the utilization of earthern berms. Since the 1970’s the design and construction of EOC’s has been the subject of an intense and analytical study by Architects, Engineers and Emergency Management personnel. Coupled with a better understanding of the varied forces associated with natural events (such as hurricanes and tornadoes) the design focus of facilities shifted from nuclear protected facilities to those that could survive natural events and continue to function prior to, during and after an event. Hurricane Andrew clearly demonstrated the necessity to increase our understanding of “survivable buildings” and became the basis for greater scientific analysis, while incorporating numerous lessons learned as existing structures were analyzed as to why they did, or did not, survive this storm event. Most recently, we have observed another major shift in facility planning, based upon the impact of world-wide terrorism and, in particular, the change in the American Psyche brought about by the 9/11 attacks in New York City, Washington and Pennsylvania. We now view building design in terms of a multi-discipline approach toward survivability, considering how to protect against natural and man-made events, with the latter being considered in the context of sabotage and not solely an Act of War. This has had a profound impact upon the design of facilities, the security associated with these facilities, and has enhanced our understanding of systems redundancy as a critical factor in the ability of an EOC to continue to provide for emergency response.

1.2 Purpose of an EOC: The basic purpose of an EOC is to provide a facility, located in an appropriate centralized location, in which government can continue to function and “provide interagency coordination and executive decision making for managing disaster

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 2


response and recovery”. An EOC, above all must be “survivable” during and after an incident, be it a man-made or natural event. There are specific criteria relative to the location, sighting and design of such facilities, as reflected in this publication. This document, in that respect, is intended to be a “best practices” guide, rather than a technical standard and is not intended to supercede existing building codes, rules and/or standards. It’s purpose is to provide an overview of facility requirements and design criteria, rather than a step-by-step manual.

1.3 Research Sources: Contained in the Appendix of this publication is a listing of technical sources,

research reports and documents relative to the many issues concerned with EOC’s. The following is a brief summary of those which are of particular relevance to facility designers:

• Emergency Operations Centers Handbook (with Appendix I), FEMA, CPG

1-20, May 1984 • EOC Assessment Checklist, Attachment IX, FEMA, 2002 • Survivable Crisis Management Plan Development Guide, FEMA, April

1993 • Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361,

July 2000 • Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496,

January 2002 • State of Florida, Model Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection

Guidelines, DCA/DEM, October 1997 • Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-98 • Florida Building Code 2001, section 423.25-Public Shelter Design Criteria • Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for

Department of Energy Facilities, DOE-STD-1020-202, January 2002 • Installation Force Protection Guide, USAF, WDBG • Protecting Buildings and Occupants from Airborne Hazards, USACE, TI

853-01, October 2001 • Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological,

and Radiological (CBR) Agents, USACE, ETL 1110-3-498, February 1999 • Hurricanes of 1992: Lesson Learned and Implication for the Future,

American Society of Engineers, 1994

You are encouraged to review these publications, the general “guidance” information presented in this publication, as well as the other publications noted in the Appendix.



1.4 EOC Data Base:

As a prelude to this publication a detailed questionnaire was submitted to all 67 Florida Counties as well as an additional 45 cities. The questionnaire delt with a diversity of subjects, ranging from their status of existing EOC’s and their systems to the issue of accreditation. Excerpted from the responses was the following information:

1.4.3 Size of the Facility: In the estimation of the respondentsthe overwhelming majority (67.6%)of the facilities are overcrowded fortheir functional needs. This is due,in all probability, to the age offacilities and the increase infunctions that facilities of this naturenow provide.

1.4.1 Age of Facilities: As reflected on this chart almost halfof all EOC’s all over 20 years old,and as such, have had to adapt to therapidly changing technology that hastaken place over the past two decades. Additionally, the increaseddemands of emergency response hashad a direct impact upon the viabilityof existing facilities.

1.4.2 Original Building Function: Equally important is the fact thatover half of these facilities (55.9%)were originally constructed for afunction other than an EmergencyOperations Center. Many diversetypes of buildings have beenconverted to an EOC function, witha variety of success, but clearly theadaptive reuse of existing structures for an EOC poses the question ofappropriateness.

Age of facility

Other8.6%

20+ yrs48.5%

10-19 yrs14.3%

0-9 yrs28.6%

Originally constructed as an E.O.C.

No55.9%

Yes44.1%

Size of facility appropriate for its function

No67.6%

Yes32.4%



Sanitary sewer (Secondary System).

Other3.0%

No67.6%

Yes29.4%

Potable water (Secondary System).

No58.8%

Yes41.2%

1.4.4 Facility Redundant Services: The importance of facilities being

provided with redundant services(power, water, etc.) is noted throughoutthis document, and is generallyunderstood by most entities, all existing facilities (100%) have back-up emergency generators, yet only 41.2%have secondary water systems and lessthan 30% have back-up sanitary sewer systems.

Emergency power back-up.

No0.0%

Yes100.0%

1.4.5 Facility Redundant Services: The importance of facilities being

provided with redundant services(power, water, etc.) is noted throughout this document, and is generallyunderstood by most entities, allexisting facilities (100%) have back-up emergency generators, yet only 41.2%have secondary water systems and lessthan 30% have back-up sanitary sewer systems.

Back-up communication tower(s).

No29.4%

Yes70.6%



1.4.6 Natural Light: The development of new

window/glazing systems over the pastdecade permits EOC facilities toincorporate natural light systems, yetover half (58.8%) of all existingfacilities do not have any provisions forintroducing natural light into theirinteriors spaces. This is generallyattributable to the age of most facilitiesbut is equally a product of a moreconservative philosophical approach toward facility design.

Natural light (Windows).

Other3.0%

No58.8%

Yes38.2%

1.4.7 Appropriate Heating and Cooling: The vast majority of existing facilities

are apparently successful (85.3%) interms of the efficiency of their heatingand air-conditioning systems. However,almost 15% of facilities surveyedexpressed dissatisfaction with theirbuilding mechanical systems, which hasdirect impact upon staff performance,especially during the response to anevent.

Appropriate Heating and Air Conditioning

No14.7%

Yes85.3%

1.4.8 ADA Accessibility: Universal Accessibility is mandated by

both Federal and State codes and lawand the vast majority of facilities are, inthe perception of the respondents, incompliance with ADA requirements. Itis important, however, to evaluatefacilities on an ongoing basis as ADArequirements are an ever-evolving process and governmental facilities mustbe designed to accommodate specialneeds.

Adequate security (Site and Building).

No47.1% Yes

52.9%



1.4.9 Security/Site and Building: The necessity for EOC facilities to be

secure environments is universallyunderstood yet almost half of therespondents (47.1%) indicated that theirfacilities do not meet this very importantcriteria. This fact is perhaps the mostsurprising in the survey and one thatrequires immediate attention and/orcorrective action, particularly relative tonational and international events of thepast two years.

Adequate security (Site and Building).

No47.1% Yes

52.9%

1.4.10 Protected Emergency ResponseVehicle Facility:

All Emergency Operations Centers havea wide variety of response equipment,including emergency response command vehicles. Typically these areinvestments of some expenses yet thevast majority (85.3%) are notaccommodated in a protected (covered) environment.

Protected (enclosed) emergency response vehicle parking.

No85.3%

Yes14.7%

1.4.11 General Vehicle Parking: It is important to provide sufficient

parking for staff, visitors and emergencyresponse personnel. Yet over half of therespondents (55.9%) indicated thatinsufficient parking was provided. This disparity becomes even greater when anactivation occurs and additionalpersonnel are required to be at thefacility.

Sufficient parking.

No55.9%

Yes44.1%



Facility has been subjected to flooding.

No88.2%

Yes11.8%

1.4.12 Issues Related to Air Quality: The Premise of a “sick building

syndrome” is one of obvious concern, particularly in Florida as a result of ourhot and humid environment. Therespondents indicated that this issue ofsome concern (29.4%), a one whichshould be addressed as quickly aspossible.

Issues related to air quality.

Other3.0%

No67.6%

Yes29.4%

1.4.13 Flood Hazard Area: Several facilities are located in areas of a

known flood hazard (20.6%) which hasan obvious impact upon their ability toappropriately function during such anevent. This correlates primarily to thosefacilities which were not originallydesigned as an EOC, rather the adaptivereuse of an existing building. Facility located in a known

flood hazard area.

No79.4%

Yes20.6%

1.4.14 Facility Subject to Flooding: A significant number of facilities

(11.8%) are actually being subjected toflooding, in essence resulting in theirfailure to function as an EOC during thatcritical period. It is also of concern ifsurrounding areas are subject to floodingas it impacts upon the ability of staff and related response personnel to gain accessto the facility.



Recent events (9/11) impacted facility.

No64.7%

Yes35.3%

Anticipate the need for a new facility.

Yes67.6%

No32.4%

1.4.15 Located in “Conflict” Area: Almost half of all respondents (47.1%)

indicated that their facility was locatedin an area of potential conflict such as apower plant, major roadways, rail line,chemical/industrial facility, etc.

Located in an area of potential conflict (i.e. power plant, major

roadway, etc.)

No52.9%

Yes47.1%

1.4.16 New Facility Need: For many of the reasons stated, a

significant majority of respondents(67.6%) indicated that, in theirestimation, a new EOC facility waswarranted. As EOC facilities arerelatively expensive facilities toconstruct this represents a substantive“back-log” of financial infrastructureneeds.

1.4.17 Impact of 9/11: The events of 9/11 has had an impact

upon the functional requirements ofEOC’s (35.3%), yet a majority (64.7%)do not believe that it has adverselyaffected either their facility or its abilityto function appropriately.



Man-made event (fire, chemical spill, etc.)

Other5.9%

No26.5%

Yes67.6%

Act of terrorism (potential or real).

Other5.9%

No64.7%

Yes29.4%

Hurricane.

Other3.0%

No2.9%

Yes94.1%

Anticipate an increase in staffing within the next 5

years.

Other5.8%

No67.6%

Yes61.8%

1.4.19 Facility Activations: Almost all EOC facilities have been

activated for an event, ranging from ahurricane (94.1%) to an man-made event such as a fire or chemical spill. Asnoted in the accompanying charts, EOCfacilities continue to serve theirrespective communities during very critical periods.

Other natural disaster.

Other5.8%

No11.8%

Yes82.4%

Facility has been activated for a specific event.

Other2.9%

No0.0%

Yes97.1%

Other* "Yes" answers identified the following: Y2K, exercise, flood,

superbowl, search and rescue, special events.)

Other5.9%

No58.8%

Yes*35.3%

1.4.18 Staffing Impact: Related to the issue of facility size is the

potential growth of staffing within thenext five years. A majority ofrespondents (61.8%) indicated that theirEOC staff is anticipated to increase, withan impact on the adequacy of spacecurrently being provided.



1.4.20 Survivability of a Facility:

This question is, the most critical,as it addresses the issue of facilityfeasibility. As reflected in thechart a surprising percentage ofEOC’s are designed to withstandonly a category 2 storm (23.5%)while a higher percentage of(35.3%) respondents indicated thattheir facilities were capable ofsurviving a category 5 storm.

Estimated survivability of facility.

23.5%

2.9%

35.3%

11.8%

26.5%

Category 2(96-110 mph)Category 3(111-130 mph)Category 4(131-155 mph)Category 5(156+ mph)Unknow n

1.4.21 Facility Size vs. Population/Service Area: There exists a direct relationshipbetween service area andpopulation of the geographical arearelative to the size of the EOC.This provides some insight into a“rule of thumb” evaluation for bothexisting and proposed facilities.Clearly, facility space requirementsmust be established to meetspecific needs and be a product of adetailed analysis that defines eachspace, and its size, that is to be incorporated into the facility. Thisformula, however, can serve as apreliminary tool for evaluating spatial need.

Facility Size = 106.5 sq. ft./per 1000 population.

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Chapter 2 Planning for EOC Development: 2.1 EOC Functions:

The generally accepted premise is that a modern Emergency Operations Center has five primary functions, identified as follows:

• Direction and Control, consisting of broad guidance, not tactical operations.

• Situation assessment, i.e. the ability to overview an incident and understand its broader implications.

• Coordination; to involve the response personnel in a coordinated effort • Priority Establishment; to prioritize the response to an incident or event • Resource Management

The EOC is the location of the “Voice of Government” during (and in some cases after) an emergency or disaster. It exists to protect the general population, to protect property and to provide the capabilities for the community to return to normal. Direction, Control and Warning are the essential functions of EOC operation. The Emergency Management Institute provides an in-depth ICS/EOC Interface workshop (Unit 4) specifically on the subject of EOC functions. The reader of this document, and the potential designer of an EOC facility, is encouraged to become familiar with these criteria and, if possible, to attend workshops at the National Emergency Training Center.

2.2 Survivability Requirements: The issue of facility survivability is of paramount importance. In that context it is important to understand the premise that an EOC is only as strong (i.e. capable of survivability) as its “weakest link”. Thus the importance of perceiving the entire facility envelope in terms of protecting the critical functional aspects of the personnel that it accommodates. Experience indicates that the loss or failure of any part of the exterior protective system can result in overall facility failure. Contained in this publication are criteria and details relative to this issue, discussing typical wall construction, roof types, doors and windows, fresh air intakes, exhausts, etc., all of which become critically important components in building survivability.

2.3 EOC Staff and Organization: There are two primary staffing considerations for the design of an EOC; those personnel that are functionally at the facility on a day-to-day basis and those that are accommodated there in direct response to an event. 2.3.1 Emergency Management Staff:

The spatial needs and functional characteristics of the Emergency Management staff is, in many respects, a product of the size of the County

Chapter 2 Planning for EOC Development Page 2


or the City involved. Larger jurisdictions have both the need and the financial resources, to provide staffing levels that are proportional to population. Determining the specific spatial need of these personnel is a product of a detailed Spatial Needs Assessment (as discussed in this publication, Chapter 4) in which function equates to specific square footage requirements. A detailed listing of spaces that are typically provided is contained in Chapter (___). The spatial needs of each jurisdiction are, however, unique and, most importantly, need to be established in conjunction with emergency management staff that will utilize the facility.

2.3.2 Incident Command Staff: Prior to, during and after an incident designated personnel are accommodated at the EOC. They provide coordination with their respective organizations and assist in formulating response. Representatives, based upon accepted Federal and State protocols include Law Enforcement, Fire Response, Public Works, the Red Cross, etc. These individuals/organizations are typically located in the area of the EOC identified as the Incident Command Center. Experience suggests that this space be designed to provide maximum flexibility as compared to more fixed auditorium type seating. It is important to note, however, that multi-use capability of such a space may become the governing factor, when cost, community acceptance and political considerations come into play.

2.4 Space Requirements: As noted, facility space allocation is a product of analysis of function and

personnel to be accommodated. Recent study has, however, suggested that the allocation of approximately 105-110 gross square feet per 1000 population of the jurisdiction will generally provide sufficient area. Extremely small (population) Counties and Cities will generally exceed this value as there are certain basic facilities that must be provided.

CPG-120, as an example originally allocates 50-85 square feet per EOC staff member, but since the publication of that document (1984) numerous code and ADA requirements have been adopted, suggesting that a figure of 150-200 gross square feet per staff may be appropriate. It is equally important to note that the physical protection of redundant building systems, such as housing for an emergency generator system within the EOC, has also had an impact upon facility size and, importantly, upon overall building costs.

2.5 Suitability of Existing Space vs. New: Most existing EOC’s were developed several years ago and have not been capable

of updating systems, technology, and survivability, as mandated by current



standards. Most existing buildings do not lend themselves for adaptive reuse as the cost to accomplish the degree of facility protection desired can, in some instances, exceed the cost of a new facility.

Additionally, and as previously noted, the basic premise of an EOC and the

potential of man-made incidents directed toward such a facility, has also affected the ability of existing facilities to accommodate emerging technology and functional requirements.

2.6 Facility Location:

This guidance publication attempts to define criteria relative to the physical location of an EOC. Identified are specific criteria for site finish floor elevation with, as an example, the need to locate the first floor above the level of a category 5 storm. It is equally relevant to consider the means of vehicle access (roadways) being at such an elevation as to provide staff with the capability to gain access to the facility when a natural event occurs. This publication attempts to provide numerical criteria for site selection but clearly the most critical need is to locate a facility at a location that will permit it to continue to function and remain survivable.

2.7 EOC Design/layout: The design or layout of an EOC is a functional consideration dealing with numerous criteria, such as security, access, code requirements for exiting, ADA requirements and, most importantly, function. Contained in this report are floor plans for existing EOC’s which appear to meet basic facility criteria. Both City and County EOC’s are represented as are smaller/larger jurisdictions. It is important, in that respect, to understand the need to separate public and press access from critical areas, such as the Incident Command Center and associated spaces. Access to this area should be limited to ICS personnel so that critical functions can be provided without distraction or interruption.

2.8 Communications Capability: The ability for an EOC to accommodate and retain communications capability is of significant importance. These are highly specialized areas, generally self-contained and with access limited to communications staff and related administrative personnel. Additionally, Communications areas are, by their nature, technologically sophisticated and continually evolving to be able to incorporate emergency technology. These spaces, similarly to the Incident Command Center, are highly specialized and should be designed by individuals with previous experience with communications facilities.



2.9 Redundancy/Infrastructure Systems:

One of the significant lessons learned, as a result of hurricane Andrew, was the need to provide facilities with redundant facility systems, including power, sewer, water, communications, etc. In many instances it is equally critical to consider additional redundant systems such as dual emergency generators, as an example. Standard Electrical power to an EOC will, in all probability, be lost during an event. An emergency generator must be capable of providing power for 100 percent of the facility electrical needs. A failure in this “back-up” system can result in the inability of the facility to function, thus the need to consider the provision of dual emergency generators as an additional safeguard.

2.10 EOC Supplies and Equipment: EOC’s are designed to be self-contained facilities, capable of remaining functional (and survivable) over what can be sustained period of days or weeks. In that respect the facility must be provided with “stockpiled” supplies such as food, water, medications, fuel for emergency generators, etc., that will permit the staff to respond without outside assistance. In some instances there may not be the ability for exterior sources to respond, depending upon the character of the incident. The need to accommodate supplies must be thought of in terms of this premise, i.e. to ensure continued and uninterrupted functional capability. EOC’s are also highly technical facilities, incorporating sophisticated technology and equipment. Each such system needs to be identified early in the planning process, defined in terms of its own requirements (power, cooling, water, access, etc.) as well as any unique requirements that it may require. Service areas for specialized equipment, as an example, have a direct impact upon facility size. The location of an U.P.S. system (uninterrupted Power Source), as an example is of importance as is the service area surrounding this type of system. The designer, as well as the emergency manager should document, to the extent possible, all required and/or anticipated pieces of equipment and do so in the initial stages of programming and design, to insure that appropriate space is provided and that the project budget is comprehensive.

These are just some of the issues, noted in a summary form, that are discussed in greater detail in this publication. The best experience and insight is to be gained by the on-site tours of new EOC’s and by discussing “lessons learned” with the staff after they have established the operational capabilities of the facility in question.

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Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment

3.1 Introduction:

Emergency operations centers (EOCs) are essential for the effective direction, control, and coordination of emergency response operations. In order to provide Survivable Crisis Management (SCM) capabilities, an EOC should meet the following characteristics: 1) Flexibility (ability to satisfy mission requirements for all-hazards); 2) Sustainability (ability to support operations for an extended duration); 3) Security (ability to guard against potential risks and protect operations from the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information); 4) Survivability (ability to sustain the effects of a disaster and continue operation); and 5) Interoperability (ability to communicate with other EOCs and responders).

The purpose of this chapter is to: 1) identify potential hazards (natural, man-made, civil) that may potentially impact an EOC in Florida (Hazards Identification); 2) characterize the impacts on the EOC facility and supporting infrastructure (Vulnerability Assessment); and 3) assess the probabilities of these hazards impacting the State of Florida (Risk Assessment).

3.2 Hazards Identification:

The Florida Division of Emergency Management has organized potential hazards that may impact the state of Florida into three categories: Natural (flood, hurricanes and coastal storms, severe storms and tornadoes, wildfires, erosion, sinkholes); Technological (hazardous materials accidents, nuclear power plant accidents, loss of functionality of key infrastructure, computer malfunction); and Civil (terrorism acts – including blast, incidents involving release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear agents). The following section identifies natural hazards in Florida, profiles these hazards, and assesses the vulnerability of EOCs to these hazards.

3.2.1 Natural Hazards:

Due to its unique geographical setting, the State of Florida is vulnerable to a wide array of natural hazards that threaten life and property. The following hazards were included in this study: • Flood • Hurricanes & Coastal Storms • Severe Storms and Tornadoes • Wildfire

Some of these hazards are interrelated (i.e., hurricanes can cause flooding and tornadoes), and some consist of hazardous elements that are not listed separately (i.e., severe thunderstorms can cause lightning; hurricanes can cause coastal erosion). This section provides a brief overview of the hazards, and their historical occurrences. Appendix A provides additional

Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 2


descriptive information on each hazard outlined above, and other hazards, including erosion, dam/levee failure, and sinkholes.

3.2.1.1 Flood:

Flooding is the most frequent and costly natural hazard in the United States and has caused over 10,000 deaths since 1900. Nearly 90 percent of presidential disaster declarations result from natural events in which flooding was a major component. Floods are generally the result of excessive precipitation, and can be classified under two categories: flash floods, the product of heavy localized precipitation in a short time period over a given location; and general floods, precipitation over a given river basin for a long period of time. The severity of a flooding event is determined by the following; a combination of stream and river basin topography and physiography, precipitation and weather patterns, recent soil moisture conditions and the degree of vegetative clearing.

Florida is affected by a large number of tropical weather systems. Although storm surge has the greatest potential for loss of life, recent research indicates that inland flooding was responsible for the greatest number of fatalities over the last 30 years. Studies

0 50 100

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Total number of facilitiesindicated in red

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Hendry

Desoto

Lee

Pinellas

Pasco

Manatee

Jackson

CalhounGadsdenWashington

Holmes

LibertyBay

Franklin

WakullaJefferson

Leon

Gulf

Madison

Taylor

Lafayette

HamiltonNassau

Dixie

SumterHernando Orange

Brevard

Sarasota

Collier Broward

Volusia

OkaloosaWalton

Escambia

Santa Rosa

Miami-Dade

Monroe

208208208208208208208208208

989898989898989898

145145145145145145145145145

% Facilities in FloodProne Areas per County

70 to 10040 to 7020 to 40

5 to 20Less than 5No Q3 Data Availableor Zero Facilities

Figure 1. Percentage of Facilities in Flood Prone Areas: By County



show that 59 percent of the tropical cyclone deaths in the United States resulted from severe inland flooding. Appendix A provides detailed information on the flood history in Florida, including a description of major storms that have occurred since 1994, and the damages incurred.

3.2.1.2 Hurricanes and Coastal Storms:

Hurricanes, tropical storms, nor’easters, and typhoons, also classified as cyclones, are any closed circulation developing around a low-pressure center in which the winds rotate counterclockwise in the Northern Hemisphere (or clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere) and whose diameter averages 10 to 30 miles across. Hurricanes and tropical storms can form in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico from the months of June to November. The peak of the Atlantic hurricane season is in early to mid-September and the average number of storms that reach hurricane intensity per year in this basin is about six (6).

Florida has experienced the greatest number of hurricane landfalls of any state in the nation. The state’s flat topography also makes it susceptible to the full force of hurricane winds and powerful

0 50 100

miles

Gulf

Bay

Washington

Calhoun

Walton

Liberty

Highlands Saint Lucie

Indian River

Martin

Okeechobee

Glades

Desoto

Hardee

Leon

Jefferson

TaylorWakulla

Gadsden

Suwannee

MadisonHamilton

ColumbiaBaker

Lafayette

Gilchrist

Union

Dixie

Levy

Alachua

Franklin

Holmes Jackson

Okaloosa

Clay

Duval

Nassau

Marion

Sarasota

Manatee

Charlotte

Palm BeachHendryLee

Saint Johns

Putnam

Volusia

Flagler

Collier

Miami-Dade

Broward

Sumter

Citrus Lake

Pasco

Hernando Orange

Monroe

BrevardPolk

Osceola

Escambia

Santa Rosa

HillsboroughPopulation Distribution[Census 2000]

1,000,000 to 2,300,000500,000 to 1,000,000200,000 to 500,000100,000 to 200,000

50,000 to 100,000Less than 50,000

Figure 2. Potential Areas Covered by Surge: Category 3 Hurricane



storm surge. Between 1900 and 2002, Florida was impacted by 65 hurricanes, 24 of which were major hurricanes (Category 3 or higher). Generally, the lower intensity hurricanes have made landfall in the northwest portion of the state. Hurricane intensity is classified by the Saffir-Simpson Scale, which rates hurricane intensity on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most intense. The Saffir-Simpson scale is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Saffir-Simpson Scale

Category Maximum Sustained Wind Speed

(mph) Minimum Surface Pressure

(millibars) Storm Surge

(feet)

1 74-95 Greater than 980 3-5 2 96-110 979-965 6-8 3 111-130 964-945 9-12 4 131-155 944-920 13-18 5 155+ Less than 920 19+

Source: National Hurricane Center

Damage and loss of functionality can also occur as a result of storm surge. A storm surge is a wave that has outrun its generating source and become a long period swell. The surge is always highest in the right-front quadrant of the direction in which the hurricane is moving. As the storm approaches shore, the greatest storm surge will be to the north of the hurricane eye. Such a surge of high water topped by waves driven by hurricane force winds can be devastating to coastal regions, causing severe beach erosion and property damage along the immediate coast. Appendix A provides additional information on historical occurrences of hurricanes and coastal storms in the State of Florida.

3.2.1.3 Severe Storms and Tornadoes: A third category of natural hazards that affects the State of Florida is severe storms and tornadoes. According to the National Weather Service, there are over 100,000 thunderstorms every year, though only about 10 percent are classified as “severe.” Although thunderstorms generally affect a small area when they occur, they are very dangerous because of their ability to generate tornadoes, hailstorms, strong winds, flash flooding and damaging lightning. While thunderstorms can occur in all regions of the United States, they are most common in the central and southern states because atmospheric conditions in those regions are most ideal for generating these powerful storms.



A tornado is a violent windstorm characterized by a twisting, funnel-shaped cloud extending to the ground. It is most often generated by a thunderstorm (but sometimes result from hurricanes and other coastal storms) when cool, dry air intersects and overrides a layer of warm, moist air forcing the warm air to rise rapidly. The damage from a tornado is a result of the high wind velocity and wind-blown debris, also accompanied by lightning or large hail. According to the National Weather Service, tornado wind speeds normally range from 40 to more than 300 miles per hour. The most violent tornadoes have rotating winds of 250 miles per hour or more and are capable of causing extreme destruction and turning normally harmless objects into deadly missiles.

3.2.1.4 Florida Tornadoes: While no place in the United States is immune to tornadoes, there are areas where they occur much more frequently – including the state of Florida. According to the NOAA’s Storm Prediction Center (SPC), the highest concentration of U.S. tornadoes has been in Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas and Florida respectively. Although the Great Plains region of the Central United States does favor the development of the largest and most dangerous tornadoes (earning a designation of “tornado alley”), Florida experiences the most number of tornadoes per square mile of all states (SPC, 2002). Figure 3 shows tornado activity in the State of Florida, by county.

Figure 3. Tornado Activity in Florida: By County

0 50 100

miles

Gulf

Bay

Washington

Calhoun

Walton

Liberty


Indian River

Martin

Okeechobee

Glades

Desoto

Hardee

Leon

Jefferson

TaylorWakulla

Gadsden

Suwannee

MadisonHamilton

ColumbiaBaker

Lafayette

Gilchrist

Union

Dixie

Levy

Alachua

Franklin

Holmes Jackson

Okaloosa

Clay

Duval

Nassau

Marion

Sarasota

Manatee

Charlotte

Palm BeachHendryLee

Saint Johns

Putnam

Volusia

Flagler

Collier

Miami-Dade

Broward

SumterCitrus Lake

Pasco

Hernando Orange

Monroe

BrevardPolk

Osceola

Escambia

Santa Rosa

Hillsborough

Historical TornadoFrequency [F0 & Greater]

100 to 15070 to 10040 to 7020 to 405 to 200 to 5



Florida has averaged approximately 75 tornadoes per year since 1950, with an average of 3 deaths and 60 injured per year. According to the National Climatic Data Center, the state of Florida experienced 3,983 tornado events from 1950 through February of 2003. These events caused 183 deaths, 3,183 injured, and a total of approximately $1,148,782,000 in property damage (NCDC, 2003). Table 1 in Appendix A (Volume II) depicts the number of tornadoes in Florida by county, the number of deaths from tornadoes, and property damage.

3.2.1.5 Wildfire: A wildfire is any fire occurring in wild lands (i.e. grassland, forest, brush land) except for fire under prescription. Prescription burning, or controlled burn, undertaken by land management agencies is the process of igniting fires under selected conditions, in accordance with strict parameters. Wildfires are part of the natural management of the earth’s ecosystems, but may also be caused by natural or human factors. Over 80 percent of forest fires are started by negligent human behavior such as smoking in wooded areas or improperly extinguishing campfires. The second most common cause for wildfire is lightning.

0 50 100

miles

Gulf

Bay

Washington

Calhoun

Walton

Liberty


Indian River

Martin

Okeechobee

Glades

Desoto

Hardee

Leon

Jefferson

TaylorWakulla

Gadsden

Suwannee

MadisonHamilton

ColumbiaBaker

Lafayette

Gilchrist

Union

Dixie

Levy

Alachua

Franklin

Holmes Jackson

Okaloosa

Clay

Duval

Nassau

Marion

Sarasota

Manatee

Charlotte

Palm BeachHendryLee

Saint Johns

Putnam

Volusia

Flagler

Collier

Miami-Dade

Broward

Sumter

Citrus Lake

Pasco

Hernando Orange

Monroe

BrevardPolk

Osceola

Escambia

Santa Rosa

HillsboroughAnnual Probability for Wind

Speed of 115 mph or Higher [%]

2.0 to 3.01.6 to 2.01.2 to 1.60.8 to 1.20.4 to 0.80.2 to 0.4

Figure 4. Annual Probability for Wind Speed of 115 mph or Higher: By County



There are three different classes of wildland fires: surface fire, ground fire and crown fire. A surface fire is the most common type and burns along the floor of a forest, moving slowly and killing or damaging trees. A ground fire (muck fire) is usually started by lightning or human carelessness and burns on or below the forest floor. Crown fires spread rapidly by wind and move quickly by jumping along the tops of trees. Wildland fires are usually signaled by dense smoke that fills the area for miles around. Of Florida’s approximately 36.3 million acres, 50% is forestland (including woodland brush and grassland), about 19% is urban, industrial or wetland, and another 31% is for agricultural use. Approximately 25.2 million acres are protected forest and wildlands in Florida. Florida’s population continues to grow at a rate of approximately 3 million persons per year. From 1981 through 1996, an average of 6,080 wildfires occurred per year, burning 219,725 acres. Because of changing weather conditions, the yearly figures range from a low of 3,985 wildfires (with 86,944 acres burned) in 1991 to a record high of 14,042 wildfires (with 587,400 acres burned) in 1981. Since 1998, more than 21,000 wildfires have devastated over 1.3 million acres and destroyed more than 1,000 structures. In 1998, the previous El-Nino conditions subsided, causing drought conditions and 4,890 wildfires which burned 506,350 acres. The drought continued in 1999, with 5,636 wildfires destroying 355,197 acres. In 2000, another drought stricken year, 212,415 acres were burned from 6,718 wildfires. In 2001, the drought continued with 403,740 acres burned from 4,804 wildfires. These fires resulted in numerous fire complexes being developed each of those four years. This taxed the state’s firefighting resources, those of other agencies in the state, and required assistance from other states. The largest contingent of air firefighting resources ever collected responded to the wildfires of 1998 in Florida. The Mallory Swamp fire, one of the single largest and most costly wildfires in Florida history, burned 57,200 acres near Perry, Florida in May 2001, costing an estimated $6.7 million.

3.2.2 Technological Hazards:

The term “technological hazards” refers to the origins of incidents that can arise from human activities such as the manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. The Florida DEM identifies the following examples of technological hazards: computer viruses, critical



infrastructure (damage or loss of functionality), hazardous materials, and nuclear power plants (damage or loss of functionality).

Incidents involving hazardous materials are the most common technological hazard in the State of Florida. The State Emergency Response Council (SERC) oversees the state’s Hazardous Materials program, and compiles data on the location of hazardous materials, number and location of reported incidents, the location of facilities and store or process hazardous materials, and other data. Table 2 captures the key indicators of the exposure of the state to hazardous materials accidents. For the purposes of this study, important findings include:

1) Sulfuric acid, chlorine and ammonia are the hazardous materials

that are found in the greatest quantities in the State of Florida. 2) Over 60 percent of all risk management plans that are conducted in

Florida address potential accidents involving anhydrous ammonia, sulfuric dioxide, and chlorine at water and wastewater treatment operations.

3) Approximately 14 percent of risk management facilities in Florida use anhydrous ammonia as a refrigerant (including food processing plants, food distributors).

4) Chorine, sulfur dioxide, and anhydrous ammonia are the hazardous substances most commonly stored or used at chemical repackaging and distribution facilities.

Table 2

Hazardous Materials Exposure: Profile of LEPC Districts in Florida

District

Total # of Reported Incidents

Top Reported Extremely Hazardous

Material

Total # of Toxic Release

Inventory Facilities

Total Section 311-312

Facilities

1 191 Nitric Acid 43 710 2 56 Sulfuric Acid 16 356 3 82 Sulfuric Acid 30 326 4 187 Sulfuric Acid 53 862 5 85 Sulfuric Acid 32 383 6 199 Sulfuric Acid 135 1426 7 135 Sulfuric Acid 62 654 8 275 Ammonia 156 1280 9 158 Sulfuric Acid 31 600

10 153 Sulfuric Acid 47 744 11 205 Chlorine 100 1147

Source: Compiled from 2002 Annual Report, State Emergency Response Council (SERC) for Hazardous Materials.



District 1 West Florida Regional Planning Council (Pensacola) 2 Apalachee Regional Planning Council (Blountstown) 3 North Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Gainesville) 4 Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council (Jacksonville) 5 Withlacoochee Regional Planning Council (Ocala) 6 East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Maitland) 7 Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Bartow) 8 Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council (St. Petersburg) 9 Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council (North Fort Myers) 10 Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council (Stuart) 11 South Florida Regional Planning Council (Hollywood)

3.2.3 Civil Hazards:

Civil emergencies include civil/political unrest, bomb threats, information warfare, and acts of terrorism. In assessing the potential threats to an EOC, acts of terrorism are of primary concern. Terrorism refers to intentional, criminal, malicious acts, which may involve the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including biological, chemical, and radiological weapons; arson, incendiary, explosive, and armed attacks; industrial sabotage and intentional hazardous materials releases; and “cyberterrorism.” In assessing the potential threats that are posed by human-caused hazards to the functionality of EOCs and staff, local emergency managers can take the following steps: 1) form an EOC Working Group that brings together expertise in hazards analysis, EOC (facilities and operations), and mitigation; 2) coordinate with the Florida Division of Emergency Management and Florida Homeland Security to incorporate threat assessments of WMD into the EOC assessments; 3) develop profiles of human-caused hazards that provide information on the characteristics of the hazards, the extent of their effects; and 4) identify steps that can be taken to prevent human-caused hazards, or at least minimize their impacts.

Planning Team. In conducting an EOC Assessment, it will be useful to call on expertise (State and local) in the following areas:

• Counter- and anti-terrorism (law enforcement and military) • Chemical emergency planning • Fire protection engineering • Force protection • Emergency management • Electrical engineering • Protective/defensive architecture • Site planning, urban design, and landscape design • Structural engineering, design, and construction



Specialized expertise in these fields can be found at a number of sources, including the Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

3.2.4 Threat Assessments:

Identification and characterization of terrorist threats is the first step in developing and implementing mitigation and force protection measures for your Emergency Operations Center. The purpose of a threat assessment is to gather and analyze information on known domestic threats (similar to the hazards identification for natural hazards). Accordingly, threat assessments need to be closely coordinated with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Florida Homeland Security Council. Once local officials understand the potential threats to the EOCs and other facilities, anti-terrorism and force protection strategies can be developed and implemented. Threat identification involves three components: 1) Aggressors; 2) Tools, weapons, and explosives; and 3) Tactics.

3.2.5 Aggressors:

Aggressors generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities, and equipment. Their objectives include: 1) inflicting injury or death people; 2) destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources; 3) stealing equipment, material, or information; and 4) creating publicity for their cause. Aggressors may use the first three objectives to accomplish the fourth.

3.2.6 Tools, Weapons, and Explosives:

To achieve their objectives, aggressors use various tools, weapons, and explosives, as follows:

• Tools such as forced entry tools, vehicles, and surveillance tools. • Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons

and mortars, and nuclear, chemical, biological, and nuclear agents, also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

• Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and vehicle bombs.

3.2.7 Tactics:

Tactics refer to the offensive strategies employed by the aggressors, reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more common tactics include:



• Moving-vehicle bomb. The moving-vehicle bomb is a suicidal attack where an explosive-laden vehicle is driven into a facility, and detonated.

• Stationary vehicle bomb. This type of bomb may be detonated by time delay or remote control.

• Exterior attack. This attack is at close range of a facility or exposed asset. Using improvised incendiary devices or hand-placed bombs, the aggressor attempts to inflict destruction and death.

• Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter the facility covertly using false credentials. The aggressor may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the facility.

• Airborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the air supply of a facility or community.

• Waterborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or community.

Table 3 is intended to provide the EOC Work Groups with a better understanding of the ways in which human-caused hazards can interact with the built environment, including the application mode, duration of the hazard, the dynamic/static characteristics of the hazard (which describes the effects of the hazard, whether it remains confined to the place it occurs – such as a bomb explosion – or expands or changes direction, as occurs with releases of gases).

3.2.8 Event Profiles for Human-Caused Hazards:

In identifying hazards and assessing threats to EOCs from natural, technological and civil emergencies, it is important to understand the fundamental differences between these hazards, their impacts, and the steps can be taken to eliminate or minimize their consequences.

By “profiling” human-caused hazards, the EOC Work Groups can begin to assess these impacts, including: contamination (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards), energy (explosives, arson), or failure or denial of service (sabotage, infrastructure breakdown, transportation service disruption). The following sections provide a brief description of two human-caused hazards: blast effects and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents.

3.2.9 Blast Effects:

In the context of other hazards such as earthquakes, winds, or floods, an explosive attack has the following distinguishing features:



• The intensity of the pressures acting on a targeted building can be several orders of magnitude greater than these other hazards. It is not uncommon for the peak incident pressure to be in excess of 100 psi on a building in an urban setting for a vehicle weapon parked along the curb. At these pressure levels, major damages and failure are expected even for relatively small close-in weapons.

• Explosive pressures decay extremely rapidly with distance from the

source. Therefore, the damages on the side of the building facing the explosion may be significantly more severe than on the opposite side. As a consequence, direct air-blast damages tend to cause more localized damage. In an urban setting, however, reflections off surrounding buildings can increase damages to the opposite side.

• The duration of the event is very short, measured in thousandths of

a second, or milliseconds. This differs from earthquakes and wind gusts, which are measured in seconds, or sustained wind and flood events, which may be measured in hours. Because of this, the mass of the structure has a strong mitigating effect on the response because it takes time to mobilize the mass of the structure. By the time the mass is mobilized, the loading is gone, thus mitigating the response. This is the opposite of earthquakes, whose imparted forces are roughly in the same timeframe as the response of the building mass, causing a resonance effect that can worsen the damage.

Table 3.

FACILITY HAZARD ASSESSMENT: HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS FLORIDA EOC SELF-ASSESSMENT

HAZARD

APPLICATION MODE

HAZARD DURATION

EXTENT OF EFFECTS

MITIGATING CONDITIONS/STEPS

Conventional Bomb

Detonation of explosive device on or near the EOC; delivery via person, vehicle, or projectile

Instantaneous; additional secondary devices may be used, lengthening the duration of the hazard until the attack site is determined to be clear.

Extent of damage is determined by type and quantity of explosive. Effects generally static other than cascading consequences, incremental structural failure, etc.

Restrict and control access to EOC; place barriers and/or shielding (terrain, forestation, structures can provide shielding by absorbing and/or deflecting energy and debris); minimize opportunities for concealment of devices through improved security. Note: Energy from the explosion decreases logarithmically as a function of distance from seat of device.

Chemical Agent

Liquid/aerosol contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers or other aerosol generators; liquids vaporizing from

Chemical agents may pose viable threats for hours to weeks, depending on the agent and the conditions in which it exists.

Contamination can be carried out of the initial target area by persons, vehicles, water and wind. Chemicals may be corrosive

Train staff in protective actions to take for WMD events, including shielding in the form of sheltering in place to protect people and property from the harmful effects of these agents. Note: Air temperature can affect



puddles/containers; or munitions

or otherwise damaging over time if not remedied.

evaporation of aerosols. Ground temperature affects evaporation of liquids. Humidity can enlarge aerosol particles, reducing inhalation hazard.

Arson/Incendiary Attack

Initiation of fire or explosion on or near the target via direct contact or remotely via projectile.

Typically minutes to hours.

Extent of damage is determined by type and quantity of device/accelerant and materials present at or near target. Effects are generally static (remains confined in time, as opposed to expanding)

Mitigation factors include built-in fire detection and protection systems and fire resistive4 construction techniques. Inadequate security can allow easy access to the EOC, easy concealment of an incendiary device and undetected initiation of a fire. Non-compliance with fire and building codes as well as failure to maintain existing fire protection systems can substantially increase the effectiveness of a fire weapon.

Table 3 (con’t) FACILITY HAZARD ASSESSMENT: HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS

FLORIDA EOC SELF-ASSESSMENT HAZARD

APPLICATION MODE

HAZARD DURATION

EXTENT OF EFFECTS

MITIGATING CONDITIONS/STEPS

Biological Agent

Liquid or solid contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers/aerosol generators or by point or line sources such as munitions, covert deposits and moving sprayers.

Biological agents may pose viable threats for hou9rs to years, depending on the agent and the conditions in which it exists.

Depending on the agent used and the effectiveness with which it is deployed, contamination can be spread via wind and water. Infection can be spread via human or animal vectors.

Early detection is critical. Altitude of release above ground can affect dispersion; sunlight is destructive to may bacteria and viruses; light to moderate wind will disperse agents but higher winds can break up aerosol clouds; the micrometeorological effects of buildings and terrain can influence aerosolization and travel of agents.

Radiological Agent

Radioactive contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers/aerosol generators, or by point or line sources such as munitions, covert deposits and moving sprayers.

Contaminants may remain hazardous for seconds to years, depending on the material used.

Initial effects will be localized to site of attack; depending on meteorological conditions, subsequent behavior of radioactive contaminants may be dynamic.

Early detection is critical. Duration of exposure, distance from source of radiation, and the amount of shielding between source and target determine exposure to radiation.

Hazardous Materials Release (fixed facility or transportation)

Solid, liquid and/or gaseous contaminants may be released from fixed or mobile containers.

Hours to days.

Chemicals may be corrosive or otherwise damaging over time. Explosion and/or fire may be subsequent. Contamination may be carried out of the incident area

As with chemical weapons, weather conditions will directly affect how the hazard develops. The micrometeorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter travel and duration of the agents. Shield in the form of sheltering in place can protect people and property from harmful effects. Non-compliance with fire and



by persons, vehicles, water and wind.

building codes as well as failure to maintain existing fire protection containment features can substantially increase the damage from a hazardous materials release.

Source: Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning, (FEMA 386-7, 2002)

3.2.10 Building Damage:

The extent and severity of damage and injuries in an explosive event cannot be predicted with certainty. What is known is that the shock wave is the primary damage mechanism in an explosion. The pressures it exerts on building surfaces may be several orders of magnitude greater than the loads for which the building is designed. The shock wave also acts in directions that the building or EOC may not have been designed for, such as upward on the floor system. In assessing potential damage to an EOC from a blast, the following should be noted: 1) floor failure is common in large-scale vehicle-delivered explosive attacks, because floor slabs typically have a large surface area for t he pressure to act on and a comparably small thickness; 2) glass is often the weakest part of a building, breaking at low pressure compared to other components such as the floors, walls, or columns. Past incidents have shown that glass breakage may extend for miles in large external explosions. High-velocity glass fragments have been shown to be a major contributor to injuries in such incidents.

3.2.11 Exposure to CBRN Effects:

The vulnerability an EOC facility to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and blast hazards is a function of multiple factors, including: site design and layout, vehicular access and circulation, utility systems design and configuration, and the structural integrity of the EOC facility itself. The following is a checklist of key factors that need to be addressed in assessing threat and protective measures for building systems.



Figure 6. SLOSH Map for Florida Figure 6 provides an example of a SLOSH map that delineates the boundaries of storm surge for five hurricane scenario events (Categories 1 through 5). SLOSH maps can be used to estimate potential EOC damage and loss of functionality for scenario events (see Table 4 – EOC Vulnerability Assessment Checklist – Section 1 – Storm Surge Inundation). SLOSH maps can be used in conjunction with other tools to answer the following questions: • What is the maximum predicted storm surge height at the EOC’s site? • Which major access roads to the EOC are subject to storm surge from

scenario events? • Will electric utilities and water supply be inundated in a Cat 2 or greater

hurricane event?

VULNERABILITYZONE

135,880

POPULATION IMPACTED

33,094Hospital

Site of Release

Fire Station

Police StationVULNERABILITY ZONE

Figure 5. Use of HAZUS-MH and ALOHA to model the exposure of EOCs and other critical facilities to chemicalhazards.



3.3 Vulnerability Assessments:

The purpose of an EOC vulnerability assessment is to analyze the effects of natural, technological and civil hazards on EOCs – including direct damage and loss of functionality – to determine the impacts of these hazards on: 1) Survivability of the EOC (and alternate facilities); 2) Security of the EOC against potential risks from all-hazards; 3) Sustainability of the EOC, including the ability to maintain operations for an extended period of time following a major event (natural, technological, civil); and 4) Interoperability of the EOC.

The survivability of an EOC depends to a great extent on the ability to withstand the effects of natural hazards – including high winds, flooding and storm surge, and to provide adequate protection from blast effects and the effects from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) agents. The security of an EOC – examined in more detail in Chapter 8 – is a function of several factors: siting and design of the EOC, and characteristics of the structural systems, building envelop, and utility and mechanical systems that support the operation of the EOC. The EOC Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Table 4) examines the potential impacts of natural, technological, and civil/human caused hazards that can threaten the survivability of an EOC. These hazards and their impacts are organized into the following categories:

Natural Hazards 1 Storm Surge Inundation 2 Rainfall Flooding/Dam 3 Lay-Down Exposure 4 Wind and Debris Exposure 5 Wildfire Exposure

Technological Hazards 6 Hazmat and Nuclear Plant Considerations (Technological)

Civil/Human-Caused Hazards 7 Blast 8 Chemical, Radiological, Biological, Nuclear

3.3.1 How to Use the EOC Vulnerability Assessment Form:

The EOC Vulnerability Assessment Form is a screening and evaluation tool that is designed for use by state and local officials to assess the vulnerability of their EOCs to natural and technological hazards and civil/terrorist threats. The format and content is patterned after hurricane evacuation shelter surveys, and incorporates evaluation criteria that addresses: 1) EOC survivability, security, sustainability, and interoperability; and 2) potential impacts from civil/terrorist threats,



including blast effects, and the effects from the release of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. The checklist has nine sections:

0 EOC Identification and Site Characteristics 1 Storm Surge Inundation 2 Rainfall Flooding/Dam Safety 3 Lay Down Hazard Exposure 4 Wind and Debris Exposure 5 Wildfire Exposure 6 Hazardous Materials and Nuclear Facilities 7 Human-Caused Hazards – Blast Effects 8 Human Caused Hazards – Chemical, Biological, and Radiological

Releases Each section contains a set of questions related to the vulnerability of the EOC to each of the hazards/threats outlined above. The assessment uses a modular format that facilitates expansion and modification. The objective is to identify specific potential impacts from these three categories of hazards/threats on the EOC, and to incorporate this information into mitigation actions/protective measures that will improve the functionality, security, interoperability and survivability of the EOC.



Table 4

Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Natural, Technological and Civil/Human Caused Hazards

Section 0 Identification & Site Characteristics 0.1 EOC Facility Name: Building ID #: Street Address: City: State, Zip+4: 0.2 Latitude: Longitude: 0.3 County: 0.4 Facility Type: Primary EOC __ Alternate EOC __ Survey Date: ____________ Surveyor: _____________________

0.5 Contact: Title: Phone: Alt. Phone: Alternate 1: Title: Phone: Alt. Phone: Alternate 2: Title: Phone: Alt. Phone: 0.6 Name of power company:

______________________

0.7 What is the building/structure type? ___ Unreinforced Masonry ___ Reinforced Masonry ___ Steel ___ Wood ___ Concrete ___ Other (specify)



Vulnerability Assessment Form

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 0 Identification & Site Characteristics REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 • Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January 2002 • State of Florida, Model Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection Guidelines, DCA/DEM,

October 1997 Site Characteristics – Natural Hazard Vulnerability 0.8 According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map, is the EOC’s site above the 100-year flood plain? ___ Yes ___ No. 0.9 Is the EOC or supporting infrastructure located on a coastal barrier island? ___ Yes ___ No 0.10 According to the appropriate Storm Tide Atlas, is the EOC’s site located above any Category 4 storm surge zone? ___ Yes ___ No 0.11 Is the EOC's first floor elevation on an equal or higher elevation than that of the base flood elevation level for site? ___ Yes ___ No 0.12 According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map(s), is the Facility’s site subject to isolation due to riverine and/or ponding inundation of roadways? 0.13 Is the building that houses the EOC close to or set back from a tree line?

___ Yes ___ No Vulnerability Assessment Form

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 0 Identification & Site Characteristics REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• EOC Assessment Checklist, Attachment IX, FEMA, 2002 • FEMA 426. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High

Occupancy Buildings • Installation Force Protection Guide, USAF, WDBG, 1997



Site Characteristics – Human-Caused Hazards Vulnerability (Security and Blast) 0.20 Is the EOC space dedicated (set aside and configured for EOC use only) or multiuse (not dedicated)? ___ Yes ___ No 0.21 Does the EOC occupy its own building/shelter or does it share a building/shelter with another organization; e.g., State or local police headquarters, emergency medical services facility, National Guard armory, commercial building? 0.22 Is the EOC in a Government owned or leased facility? ___ Yes ___ No 0.23 Is the EOC located in an area where it can quickly be secured? ___ Yes ___ No 0.24 Is the EOC in the proximity of a government center (i.e., city hall, county courthouse, State capitol, etc.)? ___ Yes ___ No 0.25 Are vehicle access and parking managed in a way that separates vehicles and structures? ___ Yes ___ No 0.26 Is the EOC designed with security in mind – both site specific and with regard to adjacent land uses? ___ Yes ___ No 0.27 Does the EOC have a secure communications room? Is the space adequate to support cleared EOC staff and secure communications requirements? ___ Yes ___ No. 0.28 Is the EOC located near an adequate road network for ease of access? ___ Yes ___ No 0.29 Are perimeter barriers capable of stopping vehicles? ___ Yes ___ No

Site Characteristics – Human-Caused Hazards Vulnerability (Security and Blast) 0.30 Is the Alternate EOC located in an area where it can quickly be secured? ___ Yes ___ No 0.31 Is the Alternate EOC located in a facility that has structural integrity? ___ Yes ___ No 0.32 Does the Alternate EOC have a secure communications room? ___ Yes ___ No 0.33 Does the EOC have special structural capabilities that improve its survivability? ___ Yes ___ No 0.34 Does the EOC have a collective protection system for Chemical, Biological, or Radiological agents?



___ Yes ___ No 0.35 Does the terrain surrounding the EOC place the buildings in a depression or low area (that can trap heavy vapors and inhibit natural decontamination by prevailing winds)? ___ Yes ___ No 0.36 In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park

unacceptably close to the EOC?

___ Yes ___ No

0.37 Is a perimeter fence or other types of barrier controls in place? And is the4re vehicle and pedestrian access control at the perimeter of the EOC site?

___ Yes ___ No

0.38 Is there any potential access to the EOC site or facility through utility paths or water runoff? ___ Yes ___ No 0.39 Is there an anti-ram buffer zone stand-off distance from the EOC to unscreened vehicles or parking? ___ Yes ___ No Vulnerability Assessment Form

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 1 Natural Hazards Impacts - Storm Surge Inundation REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• SLOSH maps, prepared by the U.S Army Corps of Engineers, that illustrate coastal flooding and inundation limits as a result of each hurricane classification from a Category 1 through a Category 5 hurricane.

• HAZUS-MH, FEMA’s multi-hazard loss estimation tool • Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 • Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January 2002

1.1 According to the appropriate Storm Tide Atlas, is the EOC’s site located above any Category 4 storm surge zone? ___ Yes ___ No



1.2 What is the site elevation above Mean Sea Level (MSL)? feet above MSL. What is the EOC’s ground floor elevation above MSL? feet above Mean Sea Level (MSL)? 1.3 What is the maximum predicted storm surge height at the EOC’s site? Cat. 2 feet MSL Cat. 3 feet MSL Cat. 4/5 feet MSL 1.4 What is the maximum height of surge expected in the EOC building? Cat. 2 feet MSL Cat. 3 feet MSL Cat. 4/5 feet MSL 1.5 According to the Storm Surge Atlas, is the EOC’s site subject to isolation due to storm

surge activity? ___ Yes ___ No Storm Surge Inundation (con’t) 1.6 According to the Storm Surge Atlas, are the major access roads to the EOC subject to storm surge activity that would impede access to the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 1.7 According to SLOSH maps and other analysis, will the electric utilities and water supply be inundated in a Cat 2 or greater hurricane event? ___ Yes ___ No 1.8 Summary Assessment (Storm Surge hazard, and impacts on survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of the EOC): Sample: The objective of this section of the EOC assessment is to identify storm surge conditions that would impact the survivability, security and functionality of the EOC. The analysis determined that the EOC is vulnerable to flooding associated with a Category 4 or greater hurricane. The access road to the EOC will be inundated in a Category 3 or greater storm, resulting in potentially limited access for vehicular traffic. According to analysis of SLOSH maps and other references - and experience from previous floods – it has been determined that electric utilities and water supply to EOC will be interrupted in a Category 4 or



greater storm. Corrective actions: (List)


Section 2 Natural Hazards Impacts - Rainfall Flooding/Dam Safety REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) • Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 • HAZUS-MH Flood Module •

2.1 What flood zone is the EOC’s site located within? ‘ A; ‘ B; ‘ C; ‘ D; ‘ X; ‘ V; ‘ Panel Not Printed; ‘ Area Not Surveyed 2.2 Is the EOC’s site subject to inundation due to failure of containment of levees, dams and reservoirs following hurricane-related flooding? ___ Yes ___ No 2.3 Is the EOC’s site subject to isolation due to failure of containment of dams and

reservoirs following hurricane-related flooding? ___ Yes ___ No 2.4 Is there a history of minor flooding/ponding at the facility’s site under normal rainfall conditions? (minor flooding is the water level where water actually enters buildings) ___ Yes ___ No 2.5 If the lowest floor of the EOC is below the BFE, are there openings in the walls to allow

water to pass through the wall, thus avoiding pressure buildup on foundation and first floor walls?

___ Yes ___ No



2.6 Are the heating, electrical, and other utilities located in a basement or on a slab area that is below the BFE? ___ Yes ___ No 2.7 Are access roads to the building site sufficiently elevated and will not be closed during

periods of high water? (Based on local flooding history and/or FIRM panel information.) __ Yes

__ No 2.8 According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map, is the EOC’s site above the 100-year flood plain? ___ Yes ___ No. 2.9 Is there a history of minor flooding/ponding at the Facility’s site under normal

rainfall conditions? ___ Yes ___ No 2.10 Summary Assessment ( Rain/Dam Failure hazards, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC):


Section 3 Natural Hazards Impacts – Lay Down Hazard Exposure REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 • Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January 2002

3.1 Is there a lay-down hazard in close proximity to the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 3.2 Are there large/tall trees within lay-down range of the EOC?



___ Yes ___ No 3.3 Are there tall structures (e.g., towers, chimneys, steeples, etc.) within lay-down range of

the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 3.4 Are there potential roll-over hazards within 100 feet of the HES building? For example, unanchored relocatable buildings, vehicle parking lot, and unanchored HVAC units ___ Yes ___ No 3.5 Is there at least one access road not tree-lined? ___ Yes ___ No 3.6 Specify quantity and distribution of lay down hazards in relation to the EOC, including utilities, unanchored buildings, tall structures, and other potential hazards that may present a hazard to the EOC. 3.7 Summary Assessment ( Lay Down Hazard Exposure, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC): Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 4 Natural Hazards Impacts – Wind and Debris Exposure REFERENCES & TOOLS:



• Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-98 • HAZUS-MH Hurricane module

4.1 Will the EOC site be exposed to the full force of hurricane winds? ___ Yes ___ No 4.2 Are there unanchored fuel tanks within 300 feet of the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 4.3 Are there buildings with roof gravel within 300 feet of the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 4.4 Are there debris generating sources (e.g., lumber yards, nurseries, and junk yards) within 300 feet of the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No Specify: 4.5 Are there portable classroom/trailers, small frame buildings, HVAV units within 100 feet of the EOC? ___ Yes If yes, specify: ___________________________ ___ No 4.6 Are there large light towers and/or antennas within 300 feet of the EOC? ___ Yes If yes, specify ___________________________ ___ No



4.7 Are the access roads to the EOC tree lined? ___ Yes ___ No 4.8 What is the degree of wind exposure for the EOC?

� Sheltered Exposure � Limited Exposure � Unsheltered Exposure 4.9 Summary Assessment (Wind and Debris Exposure):


Section 5 Natural Hazards Impacts – Wildfire Exposure REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• Assessing Fire Risk in Florida Using Integrated GIS and Remote Sensing Applications, Florida Division of Forestry (2000)

• Fire Risk Assessment System (FRAS), Florida Division of Forestry – identifies “levels of concern” based on wildland fire susceptibility, fire effects, population density, and available measures to manage the fire.

5.1 Has the locality included the wildfire hazard in an all-hazards vulnerability assessment, specifically including an assessment of the vulnerability of the EOC to wildfires? ___ Yes ___ No 5.2 Does the EOC have a fire “safe zone” of at least 75 feet around your EOC? ___ Yes ___ No ___ Not Applicable 5.3 Have potential fuel loads within a two-mile radius of the EOC been identified? ___ Yes ___ No 5.4 Have state and/or local emergency managers coordinated with Florida Division of Forestry to assess the vulnerability of the community and EOC to wildfires, based on fuel load, land development trends, and topography in your area?



___ Yes ___ No 5.5 Is there a fire suppression plan and procedures in place to effectively suppress an EOC threatening fire, regardless of origin? ___ Yes ___ No


Section 6 Hazardous Materials & Nuclear Facilities REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• Annual Reports, State Emergency Response Council (SERT) for Hazardous Materials • Pub No: G-79, Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities at

Fixed Chemical Sites, 2002, Center for Chemical Process Safety, ISBN No: 0-8169-0877-X www.aiche.org/ccpssecurity

6.1 Is the Facility’s site located within the two-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a nuclear power plant? ___ Yes ___ No 6.2 Is there an extremely hazardous material that is processed, stored or transported within ½

mile of the EOC? ___ Yes If yes, specify_________________________________ ___ No 6.3 Is the EOC’s site located within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a nuclear power plant, but outside the two-mile EPZ? ___ Yes ___ No 6.4 Is there a high efficiency air filtration/cleaning system in place in the EOC that will provide a high level of protection in the EOC against an outdoor release of hazardous materials? ___ Yes ___ No



6.5 Are procedures in place to detect the presence of chemical (or other agent) releases into the atmosphere, and for the staff of the EOC to take appropriate protection actions? ___ Yes ___ No 6.6 Has an assessment been undertaken to determine the potential for airborne contaminants, including vapors, aerosols, gases, to enter the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 6.7 Are EOC staff trained and equipped to respond to a release of a biological, radiological, or chemical agent – including gas, vapor, or aerosol? ___ Yes ___ No 6.8 Does the EOC have a plan, program and training in place to address the potential consequences from an airborne release of chemicals (or other agents), including detection, evacuation, sheltering in place, personal protective equipment, filtering and pressurization options, and procedures for purging chemical/other agents from the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 6.9 Summary Assessment (Hazardous Materials Release/Nuclear Facility Accident, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC):


Section 7 Human-Caused Hazards – Blast Effects REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• FEMA 426. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High



Occupancy Buildings • Building Security Through Design: A Primer for Architects, Design Professionals, and

their Clients, November 2001, The American Institute of Architects (book) www.aia.org/security

• Physical Security Assessment for Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities • Dept. of Defense, Unified Facilities Criteria, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for

Buildings, July 31, 2002 7.1 Structural Engineering. Is the EOC’s building envelope designed to be blast resistant?

Does it provide collective protection against chemical, biological and radiological contaminants?

___ Yes ___ No 7.2 Does the EOC have “keep out zones” to ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an

explosion (e.g., a vehicle) and the EOC? ___ Yes ___ No 7.3 Site Perimeter. Is the EOC designed with security in mind, both site specific and with

regard to adjacent land uses? ___ Yes ___ No 7.4 Parking Security. Are vehicle access and parking managed in a way that separates vehicles and EOC structures? ___ Yes ___ No Blast Effects (con’t) 7.5 Building Envelop. Do EOC officials know the designed or estimated protection levels of

the EOC’s exterior walls against a postulated explosive threat? ___ Yes ___ No

7.6 Windows. Is the window system on the exterior façade designed to mitigate the hazardous effects of flying glazing following an explosive event? ___ Yes ___ No



7.7 Utility Systems. Is the source of water for the EOC secure? If not, are there plans and procedures in place to ensure that alternative sources are provided for? ___ Yes ___ No 7.8 Mechanical Engineering. Are utilities and HVAC systems protected from the potential impacts from blast, and/or backed up with redundant systems? ___ Yes ___ No 7.9 Fuel Supply. Is the fuel supply for the EOC secure, or are there provisions for storage of fuel on site to support critical operations? ___ Yes ___ No Blast Effects (con’t) 7.10 Gas Storage. Has the EOC staff evaluated the potential vulnerability of gas storage

tanks and piping to either a moving vehicle or a bomb blast (either direct or by collateral damage)? ___ Yes ___ No 7.11 Electrical Systems. Are there any transformers or switchgears located outside the EOC or accessible from the building exterior? ___ Yes ___ No 7.12 Critical EOC Components and Blast Protection. Are the following elements of the EOC

located at a sufficient distance from main entrances, vehicle circulation or parking – or are they sufficiently hardened/protected?

EOC operations room ___ Yes ___ No

Communications equipment ___Yes ___ No



Water and electric supply ___ Yes ___ No “Pit Area” or Meeting Room ___ Yes ___ No Fuel System/Storage ___ Yes ___ No HVAC ___ Yes ___ No 7.13 Summary Assessment (Blast Effects, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC):


Section 8 Human-Caused Hazards – Chemical, Biological, Radiological REFERENCES & TOOLS:

• Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents, USACE, ETL 1110-3-498, February 1999

• Centers for Disease Control. Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, May 2002, Cincinnati, Ohio



• FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation, September 2002, Planning www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/resources.shtm

• Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a release. LBNL/PUB-51959, January 10, 2003

www.securebuildings.lbl.gov/images/bldgadvice.pdf 8.1 Site Planning. Is there adequate stand-off distance between the perimeter fence and EOC to minimize the risk from a CBR release or blast? ___ Yes ___ No 8.2 Parking. Is vehicle parking and service areas located away from the EOC to minimize the effects of a blast or release of CBR agent? ___ Yes ___ No 8.3 Physical Barriers. Are there sufficient perimeter barrier elements (fence, planters, stand-off zones) to minimize the potential for intrusion? ___ Yes ___ No CBR Effects (con’t) 8.4 Water Supply. Is the source of water protected from potential sabotage or contamination?

Is there sufficient storage of backup water? ___ Yes ___ No 8.5 Air Filtration. Are there provisions for air monitors or sensors for chemical or biological agents? ___ Yes



___ No 8.6 Air Filtration. Is there collective protection for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination? ___ Yes ___ No 8.7 Redundancies in Air System. Is the air supply to critical areas of the EOC compartmentalized which will permit the localization/restriction of contamination? ___ Yes ___ No 8.8 Summary Assessment (CBR agents, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC):

3.3.2 Summary:

The Vulnerability Assessment Form is a tool that can be used by state and local officials to identify hazards and assess the vulnerability of EOCs to natural, technological and human-caused hazards. The modular format will facilitate modification and updating as new research is conducted and new tools become available (e.g., HAZUS-MH). The most important part of the assessment is the final section (Summary Assessment) that encourages local officials to summarize and come to conclusions on the potential impacts of each of the eight hazards on the EOC.

1 Storm Surge Inundation 2 Rainfall Flooding/Dam Safety 3 Lay Down Hazard Exposure 4 Wind and Debris Exposure



5 Wildfire Exposure 6 Hazardous Materials and Nuclear Facilities 7 Human-Caused Hazards – Blast Effects 8 Human Caused Hazards – Chemical, Biological, and Radiological

Releases

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Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need The spatial needs assessment phase is an important part of the comprehensive planning approach to achieving a new facility. The space needs provides four important elements of the process: • Identifies and documents deficiencies of the existing facility. • Provides a detailed space-by-space definition of the elements to be included in the new

facility, including projections for potential future facility needs. • Provides the initial budget analysis and options for identifying the cost of an

appropriate facility. • Initiates the political process necessary to creating a consensus for a new facility. Essentially, the space need assessment defines the functional needs and the scope of facilities to be designed and construction of a new facility. The space needs assessment must be specific to an individual Emergency Management agency is a direct response to the Emergency Management issues affecting your community while also functionally responding to State and Federal protocols. A properly completed analysis will reflect the specific needs of your agency and define the response philosophy of the community and agency. 4.1. The Process: A properly conducted spatial needs analysis is a process that follows a clear

methodology, moving from the very general to the specific. The following are steps that should be followed to assure a valuable study.

4.1.1 Data Collection:

The data collection step assembles all information necessary for a thorough understanding of the agency and area being served. Data collection gathers population and demographic statistics useful projecting future needs. Also helpful in this regard is historical information on size of the agency staff, related response personnel and any other agencies co-sites with the primary E.O.C. Any previous studies should also be provided to the planners. Finally, document the existing facility, including floor plans and maintenance records. If a site selection analysis is part of the study, documentation should be assembled on available sites that include environmental conditions, as noted elsewhere in this publication.

4.1.2 Questionnaire: A formal questionnaire should be developed, and responded to, by key

Department personnel. The questionnaire serves two important objectives.

Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page 2


It documents important information formulated directly by the facility users and, most important, it begins the formal process during which the users begin to think critically about their current facility and what an appropriate facility should be to best serve the department needs.

4.1.3 On-site Interviews: The questionnaire is the start of critically evaluating the existing facility

and the department needs, but is not complete by itself. On-site interviews with the questionnaire respondents are necessary to “read between the lines and fill-in the gaps” of the respondents’ observations. The planners will spend “quality time” working on-site with the agency personnel. They will record in detail what the specific needs for each space and will assist the agency personnel in achieving a deeper understanding of how a modern Emergency Operations facility must function.

4.1.4 Documentation of Needs and Deficiencies: The planner will follow-up the on-site interviews with meeting notes that

document observations that either deviate or are significant additions to the conditions reported by the facility users in the questionnaire response. It is important that any significant misunderstandings about the facility mission are documented prior to moving into the next step of the process. Typical areas of misunderstanding include facility security zones, food services, the need to project emergency response vehicles, etc. Often, these areas can overlap with services of other First Responder.

4.1.5 “Crunch the Numbers”: Once a clear understanding is achieved on the scope of services to be

provided in the facility, the planners quantify the space need in terms of actual square footage. The planner will list each individual space by division of the agency. The space is listed by current square foot need and at least two subsequent future phases of potentially increased square foot needs. The one constant in all of our lives is change and the ramifications of 9/11, in terms of EOC’s is a clear example of how facilities must meet new and emergency technology and function. The planned facility must be able to accommodate change over a minimum 20-year life of the building. The tabulation of space needs should be distributed in “draft” form to allow a detailed review by the department.

4.1.6 Prepare the Options – Build New, Renovate/Addition, Adaptive Reuse: Once the square foot requirements of the agency have been quantified the

planner will begin to develop options to be evaluated for serving the agency deficiencies. Generally, given the potential of 24/7, and the specialized use of an EOC facility, a new building is typically the best option. Realities of life, however, may require that other alternatives, such as adding to an existing facility or the adaptive re-use of an existing building, must be evaluated. The data collection step of the process should



provide the initial documentation about the “political” realities of a new building versus additions or adaptive re-use. Preparation is the key to success during this step. Although generally not understood, the cost of renovation and adaptive re-use can be greater than a new building.

The conclusion of the spatial needs assessment must be to propose a

“realistic project”. In addition to quantifying the needs of the agency, a key element of the study is to determine what the “fiscal threshold” is in the community to achieve a new facility.

Please review chapter 12 for details relative to the various options.

4.2. Space Standards: Generally, the definition of square foot requirements is a combination of art and

science. The artistic element is the careful balance of community resources and the perception of what the agency needs. The scientific aspects is the methodical analysis of the agency, the community and an understanding of the “political will” to provide a new facility. The community will question what the appropriate size of a recommended space should be as well as its cost. It is important to demonstrate an acceptable standard for recommendation of space size.

4.2.1 Consistent and “Defendable” Work Spaces: The planner and the department will be questioned on why a space is

recommended to be a given size. Government has been grappling with this issue for years and an experienced planner will have standard layouts that have been reviewed and accepted by government agencies. The planner will provide pictures of the layout, showing furniture and the need for specialized equipment to be located in the space. A secondary benefit is that a “systems” approach is often implemented for procurement and arrangement of furniture on a City or County-wide facility basis. The “systems” approach allows economical bulk purchase of furniture and equality with other departments. This approach makes defending your agency space requirements feasible.

4.2.2 Avoid the “Taj Mahal Syndrome”: At some point in the process, the motives of the department will likely be

questioned. Elected officials are constantly on guard to stifle empire building and creation of opulent facilities. Although creation of a dignified, professional work place is mandatory, the entire planning team must constantly be on-guard to the perception of creating a Taj Mahal. Space standards are important for diffusing this perception. Do not recommend a 500 square foot office for the Director of Emergency Management and, where possible, plan for open space work spaces, limiting private offices but recognizing that “break-out” spaces are necessary and functionally important. Open-plan work areas are not only



more economical but also allow flexibility for future re-configuration of spaces to accommodate changing needs.

4.2.3 Impact of ADA Guidelines: A significant evolution in Civil Rights law is the legislation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act. The objective of the law is simple: provide universal accessibility to all public facilities to physically challenged citizens. The law affects visitors and employees. The law has had a significant impact on the design of the buildings. Barriers to accessibility are to be eliminated. Not only do toilet rooms become larger but the entire path of travel form parking lot through the buildings is evaluated; including width of corridors, size of doorways and door hardware. The net result is an increase in the size of contemporary facilities.

4.3. Multi-Use Opportunities: An effective strategy toward “selling” the size and spaces of a new facility is to

identify areas that have joint or multi-use capability. Generally, Emergency Management facilities are becoming a focus of community activity, therefore a carefully located Training Room can also serve the needs of a community meeting space and make a new facility more acceptable to elected officials.

Security is now more than ever a major concern of Governmental facilities, with

most communities recognizing the need for an Emergency Operations Center/Emergency Response Facility. Making proper arrangements for telecommunications, “survivable” construction and important ancillary breakout spaces for meetings, breaks and toilet room facilities can establish a facility as a viable EOC.

Joint-use Complexes can also provide valuable multiuse opportunities. At a

minimum, a central air conditioning plant can increase operational efficiencies but depending upon the structure of the organizations, other areas are Entry Lobby, Training Facilities, Community Meeting Room, Food Service, etc. The space savings of a joint use approach can achieve up to 15% of the overall facility area equating to valuable construction cost savings.



4.4 Involving Your Staff:

It may seem abundantly obvious to you that staff involvement in the programming and design of your facility is of paramount importance. We have seen, however, numerous facilities of recent vintage in which it is apparent that there has been little, if any, involvement of Emergency Management personnel.

The fault, if it can be characterized as such, is with both parties....the individual assigned to the project and the design professional. To avoid this pitfall, consider the following.

4.4.1. Assign a Key Person: Everyone in a Emergency Management Department already has a job, a

responsibility to accomplish certain functions on a day to day basis and very critical functions during activation for an event. It is of paramount importance, however, for you to assign one of your key staff members to the responsibility of overseeing this project and coordinating activities with the selected professional who will design your facility. This individual would preferably be in your command staff and empowered to make important decisions.

There is a great deal of detailed research, information gathering and

documentation that will be required. You need a well organized individual, someone with communication skills and someone who is not overburdened by other tasks. They will be critical to the success of your project, so choose carefully.

4.4.2 Division Leaders:

You have typically created a definitive chain-of-command with talented individuals in charge of the various divisions or departments. These individuals need to be briefed as to the “mission” and made aware of the need to have their input in the process. The more time they have to dedicate toward the understanding of the functions and space needs of the facility, the greater the potential that your Architect will be responsive to their needs.

They should be asked to participate in interviews conducted during the

space needs phase, and to carefully review the preliminary space assessment. Attention to detail at this early stage pays valuable dividends later in the project. Changes are easily made on paper, such as adding specialized break-out rooms, or increasing a room to accommodate a larger group. Changes made in construction are costly, generate conflict and are not conducive toward the premise of having a successful project.



4.4.3 Staff Involvement: Obviously you cannot have everyone involved in the programming and

design process or the result will be chaotic. You can, and should, involve individuals that can measurably contribute their unique understanding of functions.

As an example, a communications director knows and understands

important functional requirements and wants underflow ducts for flexibility, the ability to control light levels and temperatures separately from the main facility and restrooms, break areas and lockers that are specific to the communications component.

In essence, those individuals that provide a unique function have unique

information and requirements that must be directly transmitted to your Architect. A failure for this type of information to be transmitted will result in experiencing corrective action in the future. The adage is: The greater the involvement of your staff, the better are your opportunities for a successful project.

4.4.4 Document Need:

Even before you have selected a professional to program and/or design your facility, brief your staff on what you plan. They will appreciate knowing what is ahead, what is expected of them and it will provide the opportunity for them to understand the premise that there is (potentially) “light at the end of the tunnel”. This is a very important consideration and can have a very positive impact upon staff morale.

Staff should be requested to start documenting their needs; creating a file in

which they can assemble functional needs, information about specialized equipment and lessons they have learned over their career that would assist in making their physical environment a more efficient work place.

This information should be given to your professional, preferably by the

person who has assembled it, so that it can be explained and fully understood by both parties.

4.4.5 A Staff Meeting: An Important Beginning:

It is very beneficial when the design professional is provided with the opportunity to discuss the project and the methodology to be utilized, to the entire department at a staff meeting. Recognizing that assembling an entire department at a singular meeting is difficult, it may require multiple presentations at different times to the department. The important premise being that your entire staff hears the same information, and they become informed about what will be required of them. In many respects it is like a team meeting that takes individual knowledge and attempts to focus it toward the ultimate goal of obtaining a new facility.



It is also important to reflect upon the influence that your staff has upon the

community. If your emergency response staff is aware of the project, and if they support its goals, then they become important advocates for its success. These individuals, who are generally respected in their community, can assist in building community awareness and support for their project.

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Emergency Operations Centers This EOC (left) was designed to meet FEMA requirements, and utilized earth being to achieve additional sheltering capability as a result of its proximity to a nuclear power facility. This EOC facility (below) has a lower level EOC which also incorporates earth as an additional protection factor. The upper level was designed as a non-EOC office area but separated from the EOC by a structural concrete slab. Both facilities incorporate an Architectural character that does not reflect a “style” or period despite having been designed and constructed several years ago.

Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities: The planning and design of an EOC is a complicated process, one that mandates a thorough understanding of its unique function characteristics. To put it sufficiently when most other buildings have been rendered unusable by a natural or man-made act, an Emergency Operations Center must remain fully functional and operational. Any good design process involves a team endeavor, utilizing the understanding of function provided by Emergency Response personnel and a team of specialized Architects and Engineers with expertise in this highly unique field of the built environment. All EOC’s “are not equal”, with larger population jurisdiction having the financial ability (and functional requirements) to incorporate 21st century technology as well as a diversity of spaces. The differential between a community of 20,000 inhabitants and one of over 1,000,000 equates to a wide issue. In this report there is an attempt to address basic criteria and to illustrate facilities that vary significantly in size and complexity. 5.1. Architectural Character: Emergency Operation Centers are, in essence, pure function and true proponents of

the architectural premise that “Form follows Function”. They are typically designed to be timeless, a premise that means that a building of this type will typically remain operational far into the future and should not reflect a style of architecture that is dated or inappropriate 10, 20 or 30 years from its construction.

“Architectural Character” should also be responsive to the very unique demands

made on such a building. The dynamic forces of a category 5 hurricane, as an example, can quickly turn architectural elements into potential hazards. In that respect entry canopies, site features, even site lighting are all subject to forces not normally experienced by most facilities. The challenge is clearly to design these

Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 2


facilities to be functional and aesthetically pleasing and a positive contribution to

the area in which they are located. 5.2 Facility Success/The Protective envelope: A truly successful EOC is one that has remained fully operational during and after

an event. In order to achieve that important goal it is important to consider that even one inappropriate planning decision can result in an inoperable building. An unprotected fresh air intake, a very small part of a total building envelope, has the ability to transform the facility when exterior winds of 200 miles per hour become interior wind forces in spaces that are not designed to accommodate such an impact.

The importance of a protective building envelope in which every surface, and

particularly every opening, has been critically examined, cannot be understated. Doors, windows, fresh air vents, exhaust air vents, and service access panels are just a few of the normal penetrations that exist on buildings. In many cases they

represent a point of access for systems or code requirements that are mandated for life safety reasons. What is then of paramount importance is to review each and every such “opening” and to ensure that they are either designed to resist the forces generated by an event, or that protective elements can be easily applied to provide a secured envelope.

Nothing should be left to chance in this respect, as the building envelope is only as

strong as its weakest element. 5.3 Exterior Wall Protection: The building structure itself must also ensure survivability, including the two

primary elements: the walls and the roof. Of these, the wall system is more easily resolvable, being a product of appropriate architectural and structural design that considers both wind loading and the ability to resist the impact of airborne projectiles and acts of terrorism. A street sign post, when airborne and in a horizontal position, can easily penetrate most building wall types that have not been appropriately designed. Thus, the wall construction of the building becomes an important element in survivability.

Poured-in-space, high strength and reinforced concrete is the material of choice as

it provides a strong and dense surface resistant to most storm and explosive forces. Concrete block or masonry units, when appropriately strengthened with steel reinforcing rods can also provide protection, but to a lesser degree that a monolithic poured-in-place concrete system. It is also of critical importance to insure that the building design provided for lateral support of exterior walls, particularly those of larger spans. In essence, the ability to design appropriate exterior wall systems is also a product of the configuration and location of reinforced walls in the building interior, a factor that must be taken into consideration as the functional characteristics of interior spaces are designed.



5.4 The Roof: The Weakest Link: The roof of a building is, in many respects, the most difficult element of the

exterior envelope to design in such a manner as to be able to resist the forces of wind and water. The experiences of recent storms have clearly shown that the point where the roofing material connects with the exterior wall is the area of critical importance and typically, its weakest link. Once this “connection” fails the roof system begins the process of destruction and inevitability leads to building failure.

There are, however, specialized roofing systems which are appropriate for E.O.C.

facilities, generally being those that are applied to the roof decking in a series of adhered layers with specialized mechanical fasteners as illustrated in this publication. As the roofing elements approach the point of the roof/wall connection, the magnitude of these fasteners increases to provide additional protection.

Our recommendation is to utilize an architectural roofing specialist to design a

roof system for the following uplift pressure; based upon a Category 4 storm:

• Field (general area of roof) 47.8 P.S.F. • Perimeter (entire perimeter edge of roof) 69.0 P.S.F. • Corners (at each place when a corner is formed with building walls) 86.2

P.S.F.

It is also important to note that the design of the sub-roof and roofing insulation must incorporate more restrictive standards for adhesion than is normally provided. The roofing composition must, in essence, be considered as an entire system and not in terms of individual components.

Exterior Wall Protection: This EOC facility was constructed of poured in place concrete walls and roof with limited exterior openings. All penetrations (doors, vents, fresh-air intakes, windows) have closure protection systems. The building, in its entirety was designed as a category 5 facility (200 mph)



5.5 Glass: A Part of the Protective Envelope: The premise of having a window to the outside world generally strikes fear in the

heart of an E.O.C. director. Historically, glass in either windows or doors has been perceived as a point of building vulnerability, easily destroyed in the event of a

storm. Technology has significantly changed in this respect as the industry has made

significant advances in response to other needs and circumstances. Prisons, as an example, have evolved their management philosophy to now provide maximum visual access of inmate activity. Glazing systems generally consist of multiple layers of tempered glass, a poly-carbon inner core, and other similar products, which resist impact. These systems can resist a 45-caliber bullet fired at point blank range without piercing the protective layers.

It is this technology that is recommended for EOC’s. It is, from our experience

important to understand and respect the psychological need of people to have work environments that incorporate natural light and that offer the opportunity to see the outside world.

5.6 Facility Illustrations: In this section are a series of photographs of EOC facilities, illustrating specialized

areas and equipment utilization. The primary purpose of these illustrations is to emphasize the premise that all aspects of the exterior building envelope are to be protected, an important consideration for both new and existing facilities. Those entities engaged in a self assessment of an operating facility must, most importantly, conduct a detailed evaluation (Chapter 4) of their existing facility with this philosophy in mind. These are the facilities that are most vulnerable as most existing EOC’s were constructed prior to the awareness of the need to protect facilities of this type from a wide variety of events.



FACILITY ENTRY Entry to EOC; note protected environment and glassentrance (right) and secured (left) when facility isactivated. The steel closer door is electrically operatedwith a manual over-ride and is designed to resistcategory 5 impact forces.

Protected Vehicle ElementEmergency Response Vehicle protected area with horizontal sliding steel doors. Partially open (right) and closed and secured (left). Additional interior braces are incorporated to support the large door area fromHurricane forces.



Construction Systems Construction photograph of a category 5 EmergencyOperations Center. Photograph on left illustratesforming for a poured-in-place 12” thick concrete wall,utilized for all exterior walls. On right is “enhanced”steel beam to provide interior lateral bracing.

Emergency Generator Criteria Emergency Generator fuel tank (right) in double walled containment environment. The exhaust from emergency generator (left) are protected from impact behind a blast baffle. The exhausts move superheated air, requiring heat hardened concrete at ground level slab.



Communication Towers and Tie DownsSpecial steel tie-down (left) for emergency generatorfuel tank. Center and right photographs illustratesecondary back-up communications towers, all accessible from upper level exterior access doors.

Roof Drainage and Tie Downs Illustration of duplicate roof drains (left) for redundantdrainage in excess of code requirements. Photograph (right) of additional steel tower base plates and anchorsfor enhanced “hold-down” capability.



Incident Command Center Views of command response center with CCTV, power-point and TV systems. It is important to providesufficient “break-out” rooms in adjacent areas for incident response. All individual positions need to beprovided with speaker, telephone and laptops capabilityas well as the ability to easily accommodate emergingand future technology.

Press and Rumor Control Spaces Photograph of press room (left) in which presentationsand announcements can be accommodated. Thesespaces require specialized A/C systems on a separatezone, flexibility, CCTV capability and over-sized conduit connections for exterior feeds. Photograph atright is of rumor control room with multi-line telephonecapability.



Food Preparation and Break Areas Food Service and break rooms are important areas thatneed to be provided in close proximity to the incident command center. Provide sufficient area for long-term food storage and preparation of food.

Public Reception The public reception area of an EOC with the commandcenter to the rear, secured by an electronically operatedSecurity vestibule. Activity in the command center canbe observed without entering into this critical area.

Emergency Generator Area Photograph of dual emergency generators in a protected environment and provided with sufficient clearance areas for access and maintenance.



Service Access/Water Supply/LockersExterior service door of reinforced steel with tripleheavy-duty stainless steel hinges and triple dead boltlocks with extended bolts. Center photograph illustratesredundant water storage tanks located within facility.To the right are staff lockers for use during extendedactivations.

Specialized Elements Exterior fresh air intake (left) with steel closer door toseal building from exterior forces. Center photographshows CCTV feed located on exterior of building toaccommodate feeds to press transmitter vehicles. Theexterior of the building (right) illustrates staff entranceof the building in a sheltered alcove.



5.7 Specialized Facility Construction Details: The development and construction of an EOC mandates the preparation of

documents containing specific details that are unique to EOC’s and which take into consideration the variety of forces impacting a facility. It has been emphasized in this publication all exterior elements of such a facility must be considered in terms of the theory of “The Weakest Link”. A roof handrail that provides access to critical equipment, as an example, must be anchored to the building structure in such a manner that it is protected from failure. A steel handrail, if it becomes airborne, is a projectile capable of causing significant damage.

The roofing system is, as previously noted, the point of considerable vulnerability

and previous experience has shown that a failure of this assembled edge can quickly result in catastrophic failure. Details, relative to this subject, are illustrated on the following pages.

It is important to note, however, that these are recommended “details” and are

subject to review and modification by your selected consultant and in particular, the structural engineer. Seldom are facilities constructed in an exactly similar manner and the change in one part of the assembly quickly changes the dynamics of the entire assembly edge. All construction details become important and, in fact, critical to the success of the whole, providing meaning to the premise that “....success is in the details”.

All new facilities, after the basic design concepts have been completed, evolve into

the construction documents phase of service by the team of Architects and Engineers. These documents, when completed, are utilized by the General Contractor for construction of the building. Changes made during the construction process are expensive, result in delays in project completion and are points of contention between the team of owner/Architect/General Contractor. It is important in that respect, to have construction documents provided to the owner (EOC Administration) at 50 % and 95% completion levels, so that they can be reviewed for appropriateness. Review must be undertaken by those familiar with construction methodologies and if such an individual is not “on staff” it is important to acquire this expertise. As the adage goes “changes on paper are easily accomplished, changes in construction are not”.

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Chapter 6 Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems The nature of an EOC mandates that it remain operational prior to, during and after an event. In order to achieve this goal it is of critical importance that the facility itself be “survivable”, including all of its critical facility systems. The failure of any singular system can, and often does, result in an inability for the facility to remain operational. Few, if any jurisdictions, have back-up facilities to which emergency response functions can be transferred in the event of an inability to continue utilization of the primary facility. Redundant Systems: Redundant Systems, defined as those of a highly critical nature are summarized as follows: • Power/Emergency Generators • Water/Back-up Potable Water Systems • Sewer/Waste Water Systems • Communications/Back-up or Secondary Systems • Air Handling Systems 6.1 Power/Emergency Generators: During an event it is highly probable that standard electrical service to a facility

will be adversely affected or disrupted. The various response systems of an EOC are such that power must continue to be provided to the facility and that it generally provide 100% of the electrical demand.

It is our belief and recommendation that redundant emergency generators be provided so that the failure of a single emergency generator does not result in the facility becoming inoperable. Dual Emergency Generators, while expensive, provide the capability for a facility to continue to provide service, even if one of the generators fails to operate.

It is also important to provide additional “plug-in” capability, so that a portable

emergency generator can be transported to the facility and easily accommodated. Emergency generators must be tested and operated on a regularly scheduled basis

in order to be sure that they are in operable condition. Certain fuels for emergency generators have the characteristic of deterioration over a period of time if they are not utilized. The maintenance and testing of these systems must be part of a comprehensive ongoing facility review process, which is recorded in order to ensure compliance.

It is recommended, as noted above, that size emergency generators be sized to

accommodate 100% of facility electrical needs, including all Mechanical equipment power needs. A/C systems which are not at full capacity, when

needed, quickly render a facility un-useable. Moving air, with a fan system, is not sufficient as the outdoor temperatures in Florida, quickly become indoor

Chapter 6 Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems Page 2


temperatures, despite the thermal mass provided by the building. Higher temperatures begin to adversely affect both equipment performance and the ability of individuals to provide acceptable levels of service.

6.2 Water/Redundant Water Systems: Most water systems that service buildings are part of a pumped or pressurized

system and as such are contingent upon a continued supply of electrical service to pumping stations. Gravity systems, particularly in Florida, are unusual and can equally be disrupted by the dynamic forces of an event. It is important, in that respect, to anticipate that potable water systems, serving the facility on a day-to-day basis, will be unavailable during and after an event.

Potable water is utilized not only for human consumption but for the other critical functions of food preparation, the cooling of certain mechanical equipment systems, for plumbing systems (flushing of toilets) and basic human sanitation (showers).

Many facilities have or should provide water storage facilities, either of a

permanent nature (tanks) or inflatable blatters which can be filled just prior to an event, if such can be anticipated. Man-made events generally are not expected, thus the need to have a storage tank system that can be utilized until such time as a redundant system can be activated and in a mode to provide sufficient capacity to allow even limited functions to be provided.

The inability to have sufficient water, as an example, to flush toilets can result in

the operational failure of a facility within a relatively short time frame as well as providing a health hazard to those within the facility.

Secondary well systems, accommodated in protected environments, should be

incorporated into the design of an EOC complex. Preferably, well systems would be situated within the EOC in order to provide a secure and protected environment, rather than in a secondary building. Most well systems are utilized in conjunction with pumps and there is a need to maintain, repair and/or replace pumps during and after an event. A well system that cannot be accessed for maintenance or repair, as a result of its location may result in a lack of potable water being available.

Some jurisdictions (Health Department) have regulatory guidelines relative to

potable water systems as well as to their location. The treatment of the soil below a building slab for termite protection may, as an example, preclude the ability to locate a well system in that environment. It is critically important, in that respect, to review options with local regulatory agencies prior to selecting and locating a potable water system.

It is also recommended that provisions be made to accommodate water supplies

that may be brought to the site. Transported water should be provided with a receptive building water intake system, without contamination of that system.



6.3 Sewer/Waste Water Systems Standard sewer systems are generally of three types: force-fed in which sewage is

pumped to a central collection system because of geological conditions (elevation); gravity-fed in which the waste water is also transmitted to a treatment system and as a result of elevation flows to that facility by gravity; the third type of system, generally utilized where sewer/waste water systems are not yet available, are septic tanks. These are collection systems, which utilize bacteria to break-down solids and which are then distributed, below ground, in drain fields.

All new and, for that matter, existing EOC facilities should be provided with a

redundant sanitary sewer system in order to remain operational. It is recommended that the secondary system for a septic and/or collection/storage complex be provided to ensure that systems remain functional.

Large holding tanks can be incorporated into a facility complex and pumped when

the opportunity is available. It may be best, in our experience, to incorporate a system that combines both systems; i.e. a septic tank and a holding tank. Some events, such as a hurricane, have the capability of saturating a site with large quantities of water, with an impact upon the ability of septic systems to operate efficiently. Soil testing for such a system is mandated by local regulatory agencies and it is important for those agencies to understand the critical nature of an EOC as well as the importance of remaining fully operational during and after a natural event such as a hurricane.

6.4 Communications/Secondary Systems: EOC’s, by their nature, must retain fully operational communications capability on

a 24/7 basis. Most facilities utilize a primary communications tower which is subject to the forces of a natural and man-made event. Failure of this system poses significant problems, even with back-up capability.

In locating a communications tower on an EOC site it is important to take into

consideration the “fall-down” radius, i.e. does a collapsing tower have the ability to physically damage the Center. If at all possible consider locating your primary tower a sufficient distance from the EOC to ensure that it cannot damage the structure and make it inoperable.

Secondary towers should be designed into the facility, using appropriate tie-down

and/or fold down capability when an event is anticipated. Communication towers can also be stored within a protected environment and deployed when the situation warrants.

The “tie-down” of a communications tower requires additional structural systems

beyond those normally provided (an example of which is illustrated in Chapter 15). It is equally important to locate towers in secure environments that are electronically monitored and covered by a CCTV system, both of which should be alarmed to provide intrusion notification.



6.5 Air Handling Systems: Another critical system for facility survivability is that of the mechanical

equipment. This system should be located within the EOC and within the sheltered environment. An out-door cooling tower, as an example is subject to air borne debris (impact) which can quickly result in the failure of the mechanical system.

While it may not be economically feasible to provide redundant mechanical

systems, it is important to maintain an on-site supply of critical parts, those which experience suggests have the highest potential for failure over a sustained period such as fan belts, lubricants, etc. Maintenance and operational manuals as well as on-site personnel trained in basic systems maintenance are important criteria to consider and to incorporate into your response procedures.

There are, as reflected in this chapter, many variables to consider when designing

critical emergency management facilities. These redundant systems have a direct relationship to facility construction costs and explain the higher costs associated with EOC’s as compared to other governmental facilities.

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Chapter 7 Communications Capability: Communications is an essential function of an EOC that can not effectively function in isolation. The ability to monitor and receive date about the event from many sources is an important operational tool. Communications between the decision-makers both in the EOC and in the field as well as the operational field personnel is essential. A successful EOC will provide an environment in which coordinated, simple, reliable, effective, and efficient communications can be realized at the local, regional, and state wide level. Another very critical communications function is the EOC’s ability to effectively communicate with the general public utilizing resources such as the internet and local as well as national media outlets. Most of the communications will take place in the EOC but a communications room may need to be established to achieve many of these goals. Several different agencies will be represented in the communication room at any one time. The EOC facility may also be utilized to house County 911 dispatch center, or an Emergency Medical Dispatch facility, in order to co-site critical functions. This Chapter addresses a variety of communication functions from a stand-alone EOC to a standard dispatch center. The Communications portion of any EOC is a space requiring specialized equipment, unique physical environments and an appropriate response to the psychological affects of individuals responding to emergency events. Discussed in this chapter, in a summary manner, are these and other criteria, considered to be of importance in the design of this portion of an EOC facility. 7.1 EOC Communications consists of 4 functional areas:

7.1.1 Internal Communications 7.1.2 External Communications 7.1.3 Public Communications 7.1.4 Environmental Requirements

7.2 Internal Communications:

7.2.1 Functional design of the facility to allow for easy face to face or small group communications.

7.2.2 Breakout rooms or space designated for small or medium size groups. 7.2.3 Status boards and or monitor/projector displays showing situation reports

or other pertinent data. 7.2.4 Telephone or intercom systems. 7.2.5 Two-way radio or paging systems. 7.2.6 E-mail and or messaging systems. 7.2.7 Public address system for larger group gatherings or briefings. 7.2.8 Copy machines and printers. 7.2.9 Paper and pen or pencil. 7.2.10 Internal phone directory. 7.2.11 GIS systems or other Electronic media.

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7.3 External Communications:

7.3.1 Two-way radio communications with field personnel both local and mutual aide responders. (interoperable communications systems)

7.3.2 Cellular, Nextel, PCS, voice communications. 7.3.3 Response worker notification system. 7.3.4 Paging System. 7.3.5 Facsimile transmission and receive capability. (blast fax) 7.3.6 Satellite voice and or data communications, State warning point satellite

network. 7.3.7 Wireless data products, laptops, handheld devices. 7.3.8 Internet connectivity, land base as well as satellite. 7.3.9 E-mail and or messaging system. 7.3.10 GIS system or other Electronic media. 7.3.11 NOAA weather radio. 7.3.12 Weather and radar data. 7.3.13 Landline telephone capability, individual numbers to each ESF desk.

(conference calls) 7.3.14 Calling center, information line. 7.3.15 Phone directory and phone book. 7.3.16 RACES or amateur radio.

7.4 Public Communications:

7.4.1 Area designated for media representation. 7.4.2 Local and national TV and radio monitoring capability. (satellite TV) 7.4.3 Location to conduct media briefings or interviews. 7.4.4 Internet web site.

7.5 Environmental requirements:

7.5.1 Conditioned (UPS) power. 7.5.2 Generator power. 7.5.3 Areas designated and to support battery chargers for the various portable

devices. 7.5.4 Operational guides to all equipment at the ESF desks.

7.6 Location: The location of the Communications portion of the building is based, in part, upon

the premise of survivability and security. Generally, communications is located on an upper level (if a multi-story facility), separated from all public access areas, and in an environment which is self contained. The issue of security is paramount, including controlled access, even from other Emergency Management staff. Access that is uncontrolled violates several basic principles and can interrupt functions at a critical time.



7.7 Environment Communications Rooms/Dispatch Centers: The ability of communications personnel to respond to critical issues is based, in

part, upon their given physical environment; including ergonomic equipment, the ability to control lighting levels, the providing of controls for heating and air conditioning that are separate from the main building system and sufficient space in which to perform requiring services.

7.7.1 Furniture/Equipment:

Communication Centers are, in large measure, about equipment. The ability to service that equipment, and to introduce new technology when such is needed, are criteria that are mandated. Some of the key factors are that of adequacy of space and the need to plan for equipment flexibility. Provide, as an example, sufficient clearances for maintenance, particularly for console’s, equipment, and printer rooms.

Under-floor duct systems and/or computer flooring that offer full access

for below floor services is an important design consideration. This poses, however, somewhat of a complication relative to the selection of flooring materials, equipment and ADA accessibility and the connection of services to other building systems.

It is recommended that ergonomic consoles be utilized, as they can

readily be adjusted to the physical characteristics of each operator. Both the console surface as well as the chair need to have this important characteristic in order to provide the type of flexibility desired.

7.7.2 Lighting: The desired lighting level (foot candles) at work surfaces should be

capable of being adjusted to that desired by each operator. It should be source lighting with an integral dimmer system and, preferably, incandescent light instead of fluorescent. Each console should be provided with the ability to modify lighting levels in lieu of an overall total room capability.

Communications RoomA CommunicationsRoom with controlled,indirect incandescentlighting. It would bepreferable if smallerunits would also servespecific positions atconsoles for individualcontrol.



7.7.3 Temperature Control: It is important to have a mechanical equipment system, designed to serve

the Communications Center, that is controlled separately from the overall building. Typically, temperatures will be cooler in the Communications area than in other parts of an EOC and a uniform, un-zoned system will not appropriately respond to demand.

The equipment contained in a Communications Center generates a

significant amount of heat, as do lighting systems and the operators themselves. Some facilities augment the A/C system with self contained units serving just the communications area and equipment room.

7.8 Power/Redundancy: Discussed in Chapter 6 is the need to provide redundant capability for systems in

an EOC. In addition to providing 70% redundant electrical power for the Communications Center, it is prudent to provide additional back-up capability with “plug-in” generator units, of a smaller size, specifically for this portion of the EOC. Care must be taken, however, to provide sufficient dedicated exhaust systems that do not permit contamination of the air within the area by fumes from such a system.

7.9 Air Quality: The quality of air is of concern within any facility and a specific issue within a

Communications Center. These are generally “contained” spaces in which the introduction of fresh air must be carefully monitored and controlled. The issue of moisture intrusion is a major factor in the deterioration of air quality as it generally promotes the growth of mold and mildew with a direct impact upon human health.

Fresh air, as an example, must first be heated to remove moisture, then cooled to provide the comfort levels desired. Leaks, either from windows, penetrations, the roof or from moisture condensing from non-insulated air conditioning ducts, can introduce unwanted levels of moisture with an adverse impact upon air quality. Any signs of such moisture must be immediately addressed but the principle of “an ounce of prevention” is the best safeguard and recommended policy.

7.10 Self Containment: Communication Centers are typically designed as self contained areas,

incorporating separate restrooms, locker areas offices, training and staff break areas. The ability to incorporate these spaces within the communications envelope insures that critical staff are in proximity when needed to respond to an emergency.

All facilities, noted above, are to be designed to be ADA compliant and provide ease of access for those that are physically challenged. This is an issue of particular concern during the design phase as flooring levels should be designed to be uniform, avoiding ramps when ever possible.



It is equally important to incorporate oversized doors and corridors in order to

facilitate the installation and/or replacement of large sized equipment. Communication Centers are technically sophisticated and specialized areas and as

such are a point of interest to non-communications staff, and the general public. It is very important, however, to ensure that the security of this “self-contained” area is not compromised by inappropriate access. It is of merit to consider aspects of visual access that allow the EOC visitor to observe activity and the technology without adversely affecting staff performance.

Visual access areas must also be provided with systems that allow this activity to

be limited during response to critical events. The premise of being in a “fish bowl” needs to be understood and addressed by incorporating blinds, curtains or

electronic systems that turn transparent glass into opaque surfaces. It is also recommended, if possible, to provide a discreet point of access to an

exterior area, permitting staff to have fresh access to air. These areas are generally out of the view of the public for perception issues, and must be secured and made non-accessible to non-communications personnel.

7.11 Psychological Issues: As noted in Chapter 14, there are defined issues associated with the Psychological

aspects of environments. This is of particular concern in EOC’s and associated Communication Centers. Color can and does play an extremely important role in areas of a facility which deal with emergencies on an on-going, day-to-day basis. Colors should be calming, particularly in break areas in which staff can decompress or wind-down prior to coming on a shift or after completion of a work period.

For additional information please review the appendix for research literature relative to this important subject.

Visual Control Illustrated on the far left wall is a system to control visual access into the communications. This is of particular importance when staff is responding to an emergency event.



7.12 Support Assistance: As highly specialized areas it is of importance to utilize the services and assistance

of individuals and professional associates with previous experience in the programming and design of facilities. APCO (Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials) is the recognized professional association and provides a monthly publication with information of note. APCO can be contacted as

follows:

APCO 351 North Williamson Boulevard Daytona Beach, Fl 32114 Tel. 88-APCO-9-1-1 or 386-322-2500

Fax. 386-322-2501 Website: http://www.apco911.org

There are also numerous Communication Centers that have been constructed within the recent past, with varying degrees of success. It is of benefit to contact and tour newer facilities to have an understanding of “lessons learned” and to gain the insight of individuals who have recently gone thru the process of obtaining a new or renovated facility.

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Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements: One of the primary objectives in the design and construction (or retrofit) of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is to provide a safe and secure environment that will enable the emergency management staff to effectively carry out their responsibilities and missions. In Chapter 3, discussion centered on the threat assessments, potential objectives of aggressors; the tools, weapons and explosives that have been used; and tactics that have historically been used by terrorists, including: moving vehicle bombs, stationary bombs, exterior attack, airborne contamination, and waterborne contamination. Table 3 (Chapter 3) provides additional details on these hazards, their application modes, the duration and extent of the hazards, and steps to mitigate the effects of the hazard (e.g., e.g, bombs, chemical agents, etc.). This chapter of the guidance document addresses EOC security concepts and requirements. The following sections identify key criteria and issues that need to be examined in assessing the security of an EOC. The information is laid out in a checklist fashion that will allow State and local officials to review the key components of EOC security; to discuss these criteria internally; and to set priorities for the implementation of security measures for the EOC. The following components of EOC security are examined: • EOC Site Characteristics • Site Selection • Site Design • Blast Stand-off Zone • Parking • Site Utilities • Control Points and Physical Barriers • Vehicular Access and Circulation • Building Envelope • Signage • Space Design 8.1 EOC Site Characteristics:

The location of an EOC will have a direct bearing on its vulnerability to any type of hazard, including human-caused hazards. The same applies to the facility site design and layout. This section of the Guide provides the local emergency manager with an overview of the key site and layout design elements of an EOC site that contribute to enhanced force protection; or, conversely, how existing site design and layout can contribute to the vulnerability of an EOC to human-caused hazards.

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In evaluating an EOC’s vulnerability to civil/human-caused hazards, the EOC Working Group should examine the following1 factors that contribute to enhanced security for an EOC.

8.2 Site Selection:

In choosing a site for a new EOC, consider the following:

• Maximize distance from perimeter fence and EOC facilities • Site EOC on higher ground • Avoid areas with adjacent high terrain or structures • Avoid areas with dense adjacent vegetation

8.3 Site Design:

Facility site design encompasses site planning for a specific facility and its site, including the arrangement of the facility footprint, relationship of a building to a specific site, internal circulation, access, parking, landscaping, lighting, and signage. While many different measures can be used to provide force protection for an EOC through facility site design, distance is the most effective and desirable tool because other measures vary in effectiveness, are often costly, and often have unintended consequences (e.g., a blast wall can become the source of fragmentation if an explosion occurs in close proximity to the wall).

The first mode of protection for an EOC is to create “keep out zones” to ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an explosion (e.g., from a vehicle) and the EOC.

8.3.1 Vulnerability to Collateral Damage: Identify potential for collateral damage (examine separation distance between facilities in determining collateral damage from blast).

1 The security principles outlined in this section are drawn from FEMA 426, which integrates existing federal security and force protection standards and requirements into a single document to guide decisions on reducing physical damage to buildings and infrastructure from terrorist assaults.

Blast Stand-Off Zones – The distance between an asset – such as an EOC – and a threat is referred to as a blast stand-off distance. There i no ideal stand-off distance; it is determined by the type and level of the threat, the type of construction, and the desired level of protection. The appropriate stand-off distance for a given building component can be determined using data provided in AFJMAN 32-1071, Volume 1, Appendix C, Blast Resistant Component Selection. This information can be used in assessing or selecting stand-off distances for both conventional (not designed to resist explosives effects) and blast resistant construction.

The following factors should be addressed in assessing the vulnerability of an EOC to human caused hazards relative to site and layout design:



8.3.2 Weapons Concealment: Identify opportunities for concealment of weapons and explosives in landscaping and trash receptacles.

8.3.3 Clustering of Compatible Facilities with Similar Threat Levels:

By clustering compatible facilities with similar threat levels, the perimeter area to be protected is reduced.

8.3.4 Site Lighting:

Ensure adequate site lighting to prevent or minimize intrusion and other potential problems.

8.3.5 Perimeter Security:

Incorporate vehicle barriers such as walls, fences, trenches, ponds/basins, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains into the site planning and design.

8.4 Controlled Access:

8.4.1 Controlled Zones: Achieve levels of protection by establishing controlled zones that define minimum distances between assets and potential threats through installation of barriers.

8.4.2 Stand-Off Zones:

Identify the need for exclusive stand-off zones (area that has controlled entry with highly restrictive access) versus non-exclusive stand-off zones (area controlled with less restrictive measures).

8.5 Surveillance:

8.5.1 Clear Zones: An additional level of security can be provided for an EOC by providing clear zones, which is an area immediately adjacent to the EOC that is free of all visual obstructions or landscaping that could provide concealment.

8.6 Control Points and Physical Barriers:

8.6.1 Barriers: Where physical barriers are required, consider using landscape materials to create barriers that are soft and naturalistic rather than man-made. Consider using a combination of barriers.

8.6.2 Vehicles:

Vehicles can be used as temporary physical barriers by being placed in front of buildings or across access roads.

8.6.3 Moving Vehicle Bombs:

Maintain as much distance as possible between MVB and the EOC.



8.7 Parking:

Parking restrictions can help to keep potential threats away from the EOC. In urban settings, however, curbside or underground parking is often necessary and sometimes difficult to control. Mitigating the risks associated with parking requires creative design measures, including parking restrictions, perimeter buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening, and other architectural and engineering solutions. Among the measures that should be considered:

8.7.1 Underground parking:

If possible, do not allow parking below the EOC. Do not authorize vehicles that have not been inspected to park under a building or within the exclusive zone.

8.7.2 Interior parking:

Parking within the secured perimeter of the EOC should be restricted to employees.

8.7.3 Surveillance:

In select EOCs, assess the need to provide CCTV cameras and adequate lighting capable of displaying and videotaping parking lot activities.

Blast Stand-Off Zone Source: UTD, Inc.



8.7.4 Setbacks:

Provide appropriate setback from parking on adjacent properties if possible. Structural hardening may be required if the setback is insufficient.

8.8 Site Utilities:

Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating staff from the EOC. The following mitigation measures should be considered.

8.8.1 Vulnerability Assessments:

Identify and assess all utility service to the EOC, as well as all utility lines, storm sewers, gas transmission lines, electric transmission lines and other utilities that may cross the EOC perimeter.

8.8.2 Utility penetration in EOC interior:

Utility penetrations within the perimeter of the EOC (including penetrations in the walls, fences, or other perimeter structures) should be screened or secured to prevent their use as unlawful access to the EOC.

8.8.3 Communications Systems:

Decentralization of the EOCs communications resources and the use of multiple communications networks will strengthen the communication system’s ability to withstand the effects of a terrorist attack.

8.8.4 Other Security Measures for Utilities:

• Provide protection at culverts, sewers and pipelines • Provide and check locks on manhole covers • Minimize signs identifying utility systems • Use landscape planting to conceal above ground systems • Install utilities underground • Provide redundant utilities and loop service • Provide utility “quick connects” for portable backup systems • Provide fencing at critical utility complexes • Use multiple communications systems • Conceal and protect network control centers • Provide protection at concrete trenches, storm drains, and duct systems

8.9 Entry Control, Vehicular Access and Circulation:

If a perimeter barrier is employed, it will be necessary to provide points of access through the perimeter for building users (e.g., employees, visitors, etc.). An entry control point or guard building serves well as the designated point of entry for site access. The following measures will improve entry control, vehicular access and circulation:



8.9.1 Vehicle Checks:

Provide pull over lanes at EOC entry gates (if applicable) to check suspect vehicles.

8.9.2 Road Access to EOC:

Design entry road(s) to EOC so they do not provide direct or straight-line vehicular access to high risk resources.

8.9.3 Collateral Damage from Parking Areas:

Locate vehicle parking areas remote from high risk EOC resources to minimize blast effects from potential vehicle bombs.

8.9.4 Limited Access to Service Vehicles:

Provide designated limited entry to EOC for commercial, service and delivery vehicles.

8.9.5 Limit Signage Identifying High Risk Facilities:

Design signage for simplicity and clarity, limiting the identification of high risk facilities.

8.9.6 Cluster Facilities to Enhance Security:

Promote the clustering of most critical facilities and services to minimize control points and limit vehicular access to high risk facilities.

8.9.7 Delivery Access:

Provide separate delivery and service access to the EOC. 8.9.8 High Risk Facilities:

Locate highest risk EOC facilities and critical resources remote from primary roads.

8.9.9 Gate Security:

Provide enhanced protection at entry to the EOC.

8.9.10 General Comments: In this section we have reviewed some of the potential threats to a facility

that are associated with “off-site” services, such as utilities, air quality, etc. This section attempts to review the more immediate issue of security relative to the building site. Many of these principles have been identified and discussed in CPTED (Crime Prevention Thru Environmental Design) publications that are readily available and which should be considered when designing your EOC.

Basically stated it is of significant importance to maintain a zone of “non-

approach” relative to vehicles or transported elements that can pose a threat. Video monitoring of the site at its perimeter, security fencing and intrusion alarm systems are just a few ways in which to provide levels of



security. Clearly all buildings that accommodate critical functions, such as an EOC, should utilize blast containment systems to defect the dynamic forces of an explosion. Some jurisdictions establish specific distances, such as 100 feet, within which vehicles cannot enter. Other methodologies utilize blast baffles to move blast forces away from buildings, but with a varying degree of potential success.

As in all security systems it is important for a facility user to establish

what level of security is appropriate and economically feasible.

8.10 Building Envelope:

8.10.1 Exterior Walls: Design the exterior walls to resist the actual pressures and impulses acting on the exterior wall surfaces from the threats defined for the EOC.

8.10.2 Clodding and Finishes:

Designers should provide blast-resistant walls when a high threat is present; consider reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain walls to minimize flying debris in a blast; and in general substitute strengthened building elements and systems when stand-off distances cannot be accommodated.

Source: Adapted from FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings

Building Envelope Mitigation Measures

• Ensure that exterior doors into inhabited areas open outward. Ensure exit doors only facilitate exiting.• Secure roof access hatches from the interior. Prevent public access to building roofs.• Restrict access to building operation systems• Conduct periodic training of HVAC maintenance and operation staff.• Evaluate HVAC control options.• Install empty conduits for future security control equipment during initial construction or major renovation.• Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior walls.• Minimize interior glazing near high-threat areas.• Establish emergency plans, policies and procedures.• Illuminate building access points.• Restrict access to building information.• Secure HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms.• Limit the number of doors used for normal entry/egress.• Local all utility access openings.• Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting rooms.• Install an internal public address system.• Eliminate hiding places.• Install a second and separate telephone service.• Use a badge identification system for building access.• Install a CCTV surveillance system.• Install rapid response and isolation features into VVAC systems.• Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security.• Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack.• Install call buttons of key public contact areas.• Install emergency and normal electric equipment at different locations.• Avoid exposed structural elements.• Reinforce foyer walls.• Install blast resistant doors or steel doors with steel frames.• Physically separate unsecured areas from the main EOC facility.• Establish ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade.• Ensure active fire system is protected from single-point failure in case of a blast event.

Less ProtectionLess CostLess Effort

Greater ProtectionGreater CostGreater Effort



8.11 Signage:

Signs are an important element of security. They are meant to keep intruders out of restricted areas; however, inadequate signs can create confusion and defeat their primary purpose. Confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site security.

8.11.1 Sign Preparation:

Prepare signs for each entry control building. If possible, comply with local standards. Prepare entry control procedures signs, which explain current entry procedures for drivers and pedestrians.

8.11.2 High Risk Areas:

Minimize the number of signs identifying high risk buildings. A significant number of warning signs should be erected to ensure that possible intruders are aware of entry into restricted areas.

8.12 Physical Security Lighting:

Security lighting should be provided for overall site/building illumination and the perimeter to allow security personnel (or EOC staff) to maintain visual-assessment during darkness. Lighting is relatively inexpensive to maintain and may reduce the time that EOC personnel need to devote to security. The type of site lighting system used depends on the overall size and requirements of the EOC. Four types of lighting: 1) Continuous lighting (most common, consists of series of fixed lights); 2) Standby lighting (lights the area surrounding with lighting that is manually or automatically turned on); 3) Movable lighting (movable searchlights that may be lit during hours of darkness); and 4) Emergency lighting (uses a backup power system; used in times of power failure).

8.13 Space Design:

The protection of the EOC interior can be accomplished through space design, through: 1) functional layout, and 2) structural layout. Generally speaking, the following security guidelines can be used to mitigate potential impacts from explosive forces: • Locate key assets as far into the interior of the EOC as possible. • Place areas of high visitor activity away from key assets (e.g., equipment,

sensitive information, data management systems, etc.). • Locate assets in areas where they are visible to more than one person. • Use interior levels to differentiate levels of security within the building.



• Provide foyers with reinforced concrete walls, and offset interior and

exterior doors. • Consider methods to facilitate the venting of explosive forces and gases

from the interior spaces to the outside structure. • Stairwells that are required for emergency egress should be located as

remotely as possible from areas where blasé events might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into lobbies or loading areas.

8.14 Building Security: Typically, EOC facilities have limited points of access, generally a singular public

entry and a separate point of staff access into the facility. The public point of entry must be controlled with a variety of systems including,

CCTV monitoring, electronic locking devices at doors and voice communication (push-to-call) capability. These systems are generally “discrete” in that they are non-obtrusive while providing the necessary security functions. Scanning of an individual for weapons, can be accomplished in a manner that is less obtrusive than that utilized as an example, in many judicial facilities. It is important, however, to ensure that any weapons that are detectable are not introduced into the EOC facility.

Similarly, all items brought into the facility by the visitor should be screened and

the technology to accomplish these tasks is readily available. Deliveries of products, supplies and mail pose unique threats to a facility, as

recent events have shown. Some entities have elected to locate separate facilities to accommodate these functions in order to protect against total building failure from contaminates such as Anthrax or introduced air borne pathogens.

There is also the option of providing these functions as a part of the primary

building, but utilizing separate building air supply and exhaust systems to avoid introducing negative elements into overall facility systems.

Security Control Center Central location for the visual monitoring of CCTV systems that overview critical exterior and interior areas. Designed for a large facility with specialized access/egress locking devices to control all points of access.



8.14.1 Public/Staff Separation:

There is a clear need to provide separation between public accessible spaces, such as meeting rooms, press briefing areas, public restrooms, lobby areas, and information spaces from those functions which are, by their function, more secured. The general public, as an example, should not be permitted to enter into the communication room for a variety of reasons. Equally important, it is necessary to avoid access from non-emergency response staff, to incident command centers, break-out rooms, etc.

The press as an example, clearly wishes to be on-site to report on events

and emergency management response. While limited activity of this nature may be acceptable it is more appropriate to utilize CCTV systems that feed a real-time video to locations within and without the building that are not located in the inner security envelope. Facilities can also be designed that provide clear lines of vision as well as audio capability but do not permit actual physical access (see Chapter 8 for examples).

The separation of public and non-emergency response staff from those

individuals or groups that are responders to events is of clear importance and is a critical part of any EOC design concept.

8.14.2 Access Systems: There are a wide variety of commercially available access systems, such

as card ID, fingerprint, Code (numerical), swipe cards, video identification etc. with a wide variety in levels of sophistication, costs, reporting capability and flexibility. It is important to remember that staff changes are common and a system that is flexible (and changeable) may best serve your interests.

Your governmental entity may also wish to utilize a system that is

“common” to the entire governmental system and/or which utilizes a common vendor and maintenance personnel. In that respect it is recommended that the entire security system, including site, building, CCTV, etc. be designed by a professional, with proven expertise and not a vendor of specific products.

All security systems must be designed for your specific and unique

needs. An EOC is a very specialized facility and, as such, requires that the security of that facility, be of significant importance.

8.15 Biological Acts of Terrorism: Most biological events can be defined by their respective delivery system, i.e.

airborne, introduction of a substance into a building system or by the deliberate introduction of a hazard into a facility. New and emerging technology is now being utilized in order to counter each of these events and noted as follows:



8.15.1 Systems Protection: Most facilities are served by a wide variety of standardized systems;

water, sanitary sewer, power, gas, etc. Each of these systems, when subjected to a deliberate act of terrorism, has the potential of causing catastrophic failure of a facility by rendering spaces unusable or by impacting directly upon its inhabitants.

As an example the introduction of biological agents into a potable water

supply can contaminate a facility water supply system as well as its users. A newly developed system scans water supply systems for micro-organisms, such as pathogens, like E. Coli or Anthrax, or particles that should not be present in ordinary drinking water.

This information, as documented in a recent article, *2 is then processed

thru a computer program which has the ability to “....instantaneously identify dangerous particles in water”. The system has also been designed to “...scan for living bio-organisms, but not for chemicals. If water was poisoned with chemicals, the system would only tag them as foreign or unidentified...”.

Most importantly if abnormalities are noted, even if they cannot be

specifically identified, they will alert the security monitor. Sewage systems are also subject to attack, given the ability to force

sanitary systems back into a facility if appropriate “back-flow” preventions are not incorporated.

The point to be made is that every exterior system or utility that serves

an EOC is capable of being utilized in a terrorist attack, if such is directed to a specific building. Over-pressurization of gas lines, electrical power surges, contamination of water supply lines, etc. can be accomplished in off-site locations and away from any facility traditional security system, thus the need to carefully evaluate the security or hazard risk and determine what level of security for a facility is pragmatic and/or feasible.

8.16 Summary:

This chapter has highlighted a series of fundamental concepts of security – in several categories – that can be applied to an Emergency Operations Center. The cardinal rule in security planning is to maximize the distance between critical assets, and potential threats. The principles of blast stand-off distance should be used to guide decisions on protecting critical assets within the EOC. The chapter concludes with a summary of select EOC security measures, organized by level of cost, protection and effort. For more detailed information on security strategies,

2 New York Times, March 10, 2003: (Patents, Page C4)



tools and techniques for EOC’s and other critical facilities, the reader is referred to FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings.

Figure __

Source: FEMA 426. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings

Summary of Select EOC Security Measures• Remove any dense vegetation that may screen covert activity.• Use temporary passive barriers to eliminate straight line vehicular access to the EOC. • Identify, secure, and control access to all security services to the EOC.• Conduct periodic training of HVAC maintenance and operation staff.• Evaluate HVAC control options.• Provide open space inside the fence along the perimeter.• Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from all buildings.• Make proper use of signs for traffic control, building entry control, etc. Minimize signs identifying high risk

areas.• Block sightlines through building orientation, landscaping, screening, and landforms.• Illuminate building access points.• Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers during elevated threat conditions.• Use temporary and procedural measures to restrict parking and increase stand-off.• Separate redundant utility systems.• Limit and control access to all crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means of under building access to

the EOC • Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting rooms.• Install quick connects for portable utility backup systems.• Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible from potential vehicle bombs.• Install security lighting.• Install closed circuit television cameras.• Mount all equipment to resist forces in any direction.• Locate critical building components away from the main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or

maintenance area.• Prohibit parking beneath or within a building.• Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack.• In urban areas, push the perimeter out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of ballards, planters, and

other obstacles. For even better stand-off, push the line even further outward by restricting or eliminating parking along curb, or through street closing.

• Provide intrusion detection sensors for all ujtility serves to the EOC. • Provide redundant utility systems to support security, life safety, and emergency operations functions.• Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems. • Install active vehicle crash barriers.

Less ProtectionLess CostLess Effort

Greater ProtectionGreater CostGreater Effort

C:\staging\3F5CA219-37F2-1018D6\in\3F5CA219-37F2-1018D6.doc

Chapter 9 Evaluation of Existing EOC Facilities Previous chapters in this Guide have focused on criteria and methodologies for assessing the vulnerability of an EOC to natural, technological and civil/human caused hazards (Chapter 3); EOC performance objectives (Chapter 4); key elements of a flexible, secure, and survivable EOC, including: architectural and engineering guidelines (Chapter 5); redundancy in EOC facility systems (Chapter 6); survivable communications (Chapter 7); and an overview of key concepts of security (Chapter 8) that need to be incorporated into an EOC Assessment. Chapter 9 provides a checklist for evaluating an EOC, and integrates the key assessment criteria from FEMA’s EOC Assessment Checklist, and vulnerability assessment criteria from Chapter 3. The checklist is organized into two sections: 1) Location and Site Characteristics, which poses a series of questions that State and local government officials can review to assess the vulnerability to their EOC’s to natural, technological, and civil/human-caused hazards and threats; and 2) Structural and Operational criteria, which poses a series of questions on the characteristics of the facility. Questions in this category have an operations focus and are intended to address whether a requirement for a particular capability exists, whether the EOC can provide that capability, and whether the provided capability is adequate. The EOC Assessment Criteria and questions address one or more of the following “dimensions” of a safe and secure EOC: 1) Security of an EOC (and alternate EOC) against the potential impacts of natural, technological, and civil/human caused hazards; 2) Survivability of the EOC (and alternate EOCs); 3) Interoperability of the EOC; and 4) Sustainability of the EOC, including the ability to maintain operations for an extended period of time following a major event (natural, technological, civil). These criteria are not equally weighted. For example, the location of an EOC or alternate EOC relative to a storm surge or flood hazard will have direct implications for functionality of the EOC in a major storm event. For this reason, those criteria that are “major indicators” of a safe, secure, and sustainable EOC are indicated with ***. These assessment criteria should receive special attention. 9.1 How to Use the Checklist:

This consolidated checklist is intended as a guide for State and local officials to assess the security, survivability, sustainability and interoperability of their EOC against natural, technological, and civil/human-caused hazards and threats. It combines questions on EOC facilities (siting, structure, available space, operations area, conference rooms, communications center, secure communications room, multi-use space, etc.) and the vulnerabilities of the EOC to multiple perils. Many of these topics are addressed in this Guide, and noted (by chapter) under the section on References. In addition, the Reference section notes FEMA 426,

Chapter 9 Evaluation of Existing EOC Facilities Page 2


Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings ( June, 2003), an excellent resource that can be downloaded from: http://www..g-and-o.com/safe_building_publications.htm The topics covered in FEMA 426 include: Chapter 1 Threat/Hazard, Vulnerability and Risk Chapter 2 Site and Layout Design and Guidance

2.1 Land Use Considerations 2.2 Site Planning 2.3 Stand-Off Distance 2.4 Controlled Access Zones 2.5 Entry Control and Vehicular Access

Chapter 3 Building Design Guidance

3.1 Architectural 3.2 Building Structural Systems 3.3 Building Envelope 3.4 Summary of Building Envelope Mitigation Measures

Chapter 4 Explosive Blast

4.1 Blast Effects 4.2 Stand-Off Distance 4.3 Predicting Blast Effects

Chapter 5 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Measures

5.1 Evacuation 5.2 Sheltering in Place 5.3 Personal Protective Equipment 5.4 Air Filtration and Pressurization 5.5 Exhausting and Purging 5.6 CBR Detection 5.7 Indications of CBR Detection



1.0 EOC – Location & Site Characteristics (1) EOC ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

1.1 Is EOC in proximity to government center ?

X

X

1.2 Do government executives have ready access

to EOC

X

X

1.3 Is the EOC in a centrally located site allowing rapid response to all parts of the jurisdiction?

X

X

1.4 Is the EOC in an area that avoids congestion (i.e., transportation chokepoints such as inadequate thoroughfares, bridges, etc.) or debris from collapsing buildings?

X

X

FEMA 426, chapter 2

1.5 Is the EOC located in an area where it can quickly be secured?

X

X

Chapter 3 (this guide) FEMA 426, chapter 2

1.6 *** Is the EOC located in a known high-risk area; e.g., floods, earthquakes, nuclear power plant, Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) sites, etc? If yes, explain. Are there any plans to mitigate risk?

X

X

Chapter 3 FEMA 426, chapter 1

1.7 Is the EOC located near an adequate road network for ease of access?

X

X

1.8 *** In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park unacceptably close to the EOC?

X

X

FEMA 426, chapter 2

SEC = Security SUR = Survivability INT = Interoperability SUS = Sustainability



1.0 EOC – Location & Site Characteristics (2)

EOC ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

1.14 *** What is the maximum predicted storm surge height at the EOC’s site? Cat. 2 feet MSL Cat. 3 feet MSL Cat. 4/5 _____ feet MSL

X

Chapter 3

1.15 *** What is the maximum height of surge expected in the EOC building? Cat. 2 feet MSL Cat. 3 feet MSL Cat. 4/5 ______feet MSL

X

Chapter 3

1.16** * According to SLOSH maps and other analysis, will the electric utilities and water supply be inundated in a Cat 2 or greater hurricane event?

X

Chapter 3

1.17 *** According to the appropriate Storm Tide Atlas, is the EOC’s site located above any Category 4 storm surge zone?

X

Chapter 3

1.18 *** According to the Storm Surge Atlas, is the EOC’s site subject to isolation due to storm surge activity?

X

X

Chapter 3

1.19 *** According to the Storm Surge Atlas, are the major access roads to the EOC subject to storm surge activity that would impede access to the EOC?

X

Chapter 3




1.0 EOC – Location & Site Characteristics (3)


SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

1.20 *** What flood zone is the EOC’s site located within? A; ‘ B; ‘ C; ‘ D; ‘ X; ‘ V; ‘ Panel Not Printed; ‘ Area Not Surveyed

X

Chapter 3

1.21 *** Is the EOC’s site subject to inundation due to failure of containment of levees, dams and reservoirs following hurricane-related flooding?

X

Chapter 3

1.22 Is there a history of minor flooding/ponding at the facility’s site under normal rainfall conditions? (minor flooding is the water level where water actually enters buildings)

X

Chapter 3

1.23 If the lowest floor of the EOC is below the BFE, are there openings in the walls to allow water to pass through the wall, thus avoiding pressure buildup on foundation and first floor walls?

X

Chapter 3

1.24 *** Are access roads to the building site sufficiently elevated and will not be closed during periods of high water? (Based on local flooding history and/or FIRM panel information.)

X

Chapter 3

1.25 *** According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map, is the EOC’s site above the 100-year flood plain?

X

Chapter 3




2.0 EOC – Structural and Operational Features (1)


SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

2.1 *** Is the EOC located in a facility that has structural integrity?

Chapter 5

2.2 Is the EOC located in a building (basement, ground floor, upper floor) or below grade in a “shelter”?

Chapter 5

2.3 Is the building/shelter housing the EOC close to or set back from a tree line?

2.4 Does the building/shelter have adequate parking? Is the parking available in a parking lot or garage (above or below ground)?

Chapter 5

2.5 Does the building/shelter have space to accommodate a helicopter landing pad? Is the surrounding area sufficiently clear of obstructions to allow a helicopter to approach and land?

Chapter 4

2.6 Is the EOC in a Government owned or leased facility?

Chapter 1

2.7 Does the EOC occupy its own building/shelter or does it share a building/shelter with another organization; e.g., State or local police headquarters, emergency medical services facility, National Guard armory, commercial building?

Chapter 5

2.8 Is the EOC space dedicated (set aside and configured for EOC use only) or multiuse (not dedicated)? (Multi-use space is usually an office, administrative, or conference area that is used for day-to-day functions and can be made available to support emergency response and management operations. Typically, the day-to-day staff are displaced to another location.)

Chapter 4

2.9 Is the EOC one large room or is it a complex; i.e., several rooms that collectively comprise the EOC?

Chapter 4





2.0 EOC – Structural and Operational Features (2)


SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

2.10 Does the EOC have a dedicated Operations Room? Is the space adequate to support the emergency response and EOC staff?

x

Chapter 4

2.11 Does the EOC have a dedicated conference/media room(s)? Is the conference room size adequate to support meetings and media briefings? Can the conference room be physically separated/isolated from the operations area so that media briefings do not interfere with on-going operations?

x

Chapter 4

2.12 Does the EOC have a dedicated communications room/center? Is the size of the communications room/center adequate to support EOC communications requirements?

x

Chapter 7

2.13 Does the EOC have a secure communications room? Is the space adequate to support cleared EOC staff and secure communications requirements?

x

FEMA 426; chapter 3

2.14 Does the EOC have designated multi-use space? Is the size of this space adequate to support expanded operations? Is the space readily available?

x

Chapter 4

2.15 Can the EOC support augmenting staff from Other Federal or State Agencies in a major disaster or surge situation?

x

Chapter 4

2.16 *** Can the EOC survive the effects of relevant risks; e.g., natural and manmade hazards?

x

Chapter 3 FEMA 426; chapter 3

2.17 *** Does the EOC have special structural capabilities that improve its survivability?

x

FEMA 426; chapters 4 & 5

2. 18 *** Does the EOC have a collective protection system for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) agents?

x

FEMA 426; chapter 5



2.0 EOC – Structural and Operational Features (3) EOC ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

2.19 *** Is there an Alternate EOC location identified to assure continuity of operations (COOP)?

x

Chapter 1

2.20 *** Are physical security measures (barriers, security cameras, etc) presently used in the EOC/Alternate EOC and are these existing security features adequate?

x


2.21 *** What security features, such as access controls, barriers, secure areas, and surveillance devices, are required?

x


2.22 How is access to the EOC/Alternate EOC controlled? Is a badge or card-swipe system in use? Is it adequate to control access to the facility? Is it adequate to control access within the facility?

x

2.23 Does appropriate staff have 24-hours access to the facility?

x

Chapter 1

2.24 Are there any access control systems (card access, elevators, lock-out stairwells) that, if non-operational, could preclude access to the facility? If yes, what alternate plans are in place to ensure access?

x

FEMA 426, chapter 1

2.25 *** Can security capabilities be increased commensurate with higher threat levels (e.g., additional barriers, increased surveillance, additional guards)?

x

FEMA 426, chapter 1

2.26 Can areas where classified and/or unclassified but sensitive information is discussed be isolated from unauthorized/uncleared individuals?

x

FEMA 426, chapter 1

2.27 *** Does the EOC/Alternate EOC have an existing secure communications area/room? Does it meet FEMA-provided security requirements? Is the size (square footage) of the room adequate?

x

Chapter 7




2.0 EOC – Structural & Operational Features (4) EOC ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

2.28 Do State Wide Area Networks (WAN) used in support of emergency operations have adequate protection against cyber attack (e.g., unauthorized access, denial of service, or malicious code)? If not, what capabilities are needed?

x

2.29 Do you have a secure voice capability? If so, is it adequate to support you emergency operations needs?

x

Chapter 7

2.30 Do non-secure telephones have a privacy feature?

x

Chapter 7

2.31 Do you have a secure facsimile capability? If so, is it adequate to support your emergency operations needs?

x

Chapter 7

2.32 Are radio communications protected; i.e., encrypted or have privacy features?

x

Chapter 7

2.33 Are there at least five (5) personnel with security clearances? Are cleared personnel trained to:

Use secure communications equipment? Control and protect classified material? Manage and control communications

security (COMSEC)?

x

2.34 Are individuals with a security clearance identified (e.g., unique marking on ID badge, recognition)?

x

2.35 *** Can the EOC/Alternate EOC support operations 24 hour a day/7 days a week for an extended period of time? Are operational and administrative supplies adequate to sustain operations; e.g., food, water, fuel for backup generators, paper products, office supplies, etc?

x

Chapter 1

2.36 *** Does the EOC/Alternate EOC have backup power? (Backup power typically refers to generator power.)

x

Chapter 6





SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERNCES

2.37 *** Does the EOC/Alternate EOC have an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)? (UPS units typically use batteries to provide power for a limited duration; e.g., 10-20 minutes depending on the load.) If yes, what systems/functions does the UPS support? Is the duration of the UPS adequate to support these systems/functions until the backup power to comes on line?

x


2.38 Are Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems centrally (building-wide) or locally managed?

x

Chapter 6

2.39 Are HVAC systems available and controllable 24-hours a day, seven days a week (24x7)?

x

Chapter 6

2.40 Does the EOC/Alternate EOC have access to support areas; e.g., file rooms, server sites, and the like?

x

Chapter 4

2.41 Are there any special constraints that must be met to sustain operations? Special access needs?

x

2.42 Does the Alternate EOC have the same capabilities as the primary location? If not, what are the differences?

x

Chapter 1

2.43 Is the number of telephones, secure or non-secure, adequate for the EOC/Alternate EOC to conduct emergency response and management operations?

x

Chapter 7

2.44 Are telephones connected to an in-house Private Branch Exchange (PBX)?

x

Chapter 7


X

FEMA 426, chapter 2





SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

2.45 Does the EOC/Alternate EOC have a secure facsimile capability?

x

Chapter 7

2.46 Is the number of printers adequate for the EOC/Alternate EOC to conduct emergency response operations?

x

2.47 *** Does the EOC/Alternate have a requirement to monitor the communications of key emergency services; e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), HAZMAT, and public works? Is there a requirement to monitor the communications of other services? If yes, does the capability exist and is it adequate?

x

2.48 *** Does the EOC/Alternate have a requirement to establish an emergency communications network that includes the key emergency services and local EOCs/jurisdictions? If yes, does the capability exist and is it adequate?

x

Chapter 7

2.49 *** If a requirement exists, can the EOC/Alternate EOC communicate with the following entities:

Local EOCs throughout the State? FEMA ROC and/or FEMA Regional Staff? Federal Disaster Field Office (DFO)? EOC/Alternate EOC of other States? Operations centers of State-level

emergency services organizations? Incident Commander or incident site

command post? Operations centers of regional and local

airport, highway, port, and waterway authorities; hospitals and ambulance service providers; nuclear power plants; dams; private sector utilities (power, telephone, sewerage, and water) and chemical companies?

x

2.50 Are the EOC/Alternate EOC communications means adequate to satisfy communications requirements? (Consider radios, telephones, cell phones, available frequency spectrum, and other issues.)

x




SEC

SUR

INT

SUS

REFERENCES

2.51 Is the EOC operational only when emergency response and management operations are being conducted? Or, is the EOC operational 24x7 (staff and capabilities are present and active) whether or not emergency response operations are being conducted?

x

2.52 Can EOC activation and operations be tailored activities? (For example, a small-scale event might require the activation of fewer staff and capabilities, and the conduct of limited emergency response operations; a large-scale event, the activation of all staff and capabilities, and the conduct of extensive emergency response operations.)to the scale of emergency response

x

2.53 Have the conditions that would cause the EOC to be relocated been identified? Are there procedures for relocating from the EOC?

x

2.54 Are EOC activation and relocation exercises held periodically? Is the level of participation by member agencies sufficient to ensure an efficient and timely activation during actual events? Do participants include key personnel assigned to the EOC?

x

2.55 Is there multi-use space available in the general vicinity of the EOC? Is the square footage adequate? (Multi-use space is usually an office, administrative, or conference area that is used for day-to-day functions and can be made available to support emergency response and management operations. Typically, the day-to-day staff are displaced to another location.)

x

Chapter 2

2.56 Is space dedicated for an Alternate EOC? If not, does the Alternate EOC occupy space within another organization’s facility; e.g., State or local police headquarters, emergency medical services facility, National Guard armory, commercial building?

x

x

Chapter 2





SEC

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STATUS & ACTIONS

2.57 Does the EOC have space, whether in one large room or complex of rooms, for an operations area (to perform emergency response and management functions), conference/media room (for meetings and press briefings), communications room (for centralized facsimiles, radios, and video teleconferencing [VTC]), and secure communications (secure voice, facsimile, and VTC)?

x

Chapter 2

2.58 *** Does the EOC have protection from blast effects?

x

x

Chapter 3 FEMA 426, Chapter 4

2.59 Is the EOC above the ground floor, on the ground floor, or below grade?

x

Chapter 3

2.60 How is access to an existing secure communications area controlled? Are existing controls adequate?

x

Chapter 7

2.61 Do Local Area Networks (LAN) used in support of emergency operations have adequate protection against cyber attack (e.g., unauthorized access, denial of service, or malicious code)? If not, what capabilities are needed?

x

Chapter 7


x

FEMA 426, Chapter 2

2.63 Are telephones connected directly to a local commercial carrier; i.e., draw dial tone from the local switch rather then from the PBX? (These telephones are just like those found in a home or office. The advantage is that if the EOC/Alternate EOC loses power to the PBX, telephones connected directly to the dial central office will continue to function.)

x

Chapter 7


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Chapter 10 Development Options: “New, Remodel or Adaptive Reuse”: The type of construction that your project ultimately utilizes will have a significant impact on the overall cost, efficiency, and day-to-day operational issues that are inherent with the development of a new EOC facility. There are many avenues each project may consider and depending upon your monetary limits or constraints and the availability of land that is suitable for this type of facility, the method of construction may become more readily apparent as these variables are considered. Let’s consider that each Development Option has its pros and cons. The following is an analysis of these options and how they may best suit a project’s specific needs. 10.1. Development Option: New Construction: Most Counties and Cities are aware that the need for new facilities is readily

apparent for some time before the elected officials or the “powers-to-be” become cognizant of the magnitude of the construction effort that the department is about to undertake. When this occurs, typically the existing facilities have become so spatially constrained that the only development option that may be viable is new construction. This may be mandated, as the size of the existing facility may need to be doubled, tripled or more, just to meet the department’s current spatial needs, as well as taking into consideration the inherent need for future expansion. More importantly the existing facility may not be constructed to withstand the impact and forces of a natural or man made event.

10.1.1 Pros:

This option of new construction is, for obvious reasons, the most sought after during the initial thought process. It offers ultimate spatial flexibility without predetermined physical constraints. This option offers the department the opportunity to re-think how it functions in regards to the optimal location of each inter-departmental division. Adjacencies and the proximity of each division to each other, to the public lobby, and within the secured areas of the facility may all come into consideration in a manner that differs from the existing facility’s layout. Generally, this occurs in response to increased development in the geographic area or as a result of having annexed new areas adjacent to the community’s borders, thus increasing the potential of emergency response. Hurricane hardening of the building envelope, security access controls, CCTV, and structured cabling for computers and telecommunication equipment may all be coordinated and not treated as a retrofit, providing for the most cost-effective implementation. Future expansion can be considered at the design stage, which will take into consideration over-sizing the mechanical equipment, emergency generated power supply, and additional parking; all of which required once the facility is added onto at a later date.

Chapter 10 Development Options: “New, Remodel or Adaptive Reuse” Page 2


10.1.2 Cons: The New Construction Option often may fall victim to the political

decision process about where a new facility may need to be located, or if it is the right time to be spending the monies necessary for the development of a new facility. Economic indicators will most often supercede a department’s needs during the process of considering all of the development options. If a department does not need to double or triple in facility size, than this is not the most suitable option for consideration. Existing EOC’s, once vacated as a department has left to go to a newly constructed facility, have areas that are very labor-intensive and difficult to renovate for other uses. The “abandonment” of the original facility must also be considered. Many EOC’s are located within a multi-use complex, often co-sited under the same roof with other agencies. These offices may not share the need to expand, and thus, are left with unused space until that need arises.

The availability of appropriate land to site the new facility must also be

taken into consideration. Land acquisition costs increase the overall development cost and may make this option more costly. There remains the issue of the value of the property that the existing, now abandoned building is located on. Occasionally, the property does not have a significant re-sale value that could be used to offset some, or all, of the land acquisition costs, or another agency may move in and struggle through the previously noted constraints. When this occurs, it presents a difficult scenario for the local government to respond to.

10.1.3 Development Costs: The range of costs associated with this development option is typically

$225-$350 per square foot depending upon the selected category of protection (see chapter 11). The primary area that affects the cost within this range is the category rating. Facilities of this type utilize hardened walls and ceilings, high impact-resistant glazing products, specialized hardware and lighting components and redundant building systems all of which have a significant impact upon building costs.

The second area within the facility that can increase the construction costs

is the inclusion of a Communications/Dispatch Center, as these areas require computer access flooring, structured cabling, and fiber optics. This is often the location within the facility that houses all of the security monitoring equipment as well.

10.2. Development Option: Remodeling of Existing Facilities: Remodeling of an existing facility often is an option when a department has not

significantly grown in all areas of need; such as when only a single division or two has outgrown their current spatial allocation within the existing facilities. To



alleviate this condition, it may be beneficial to relocate these divisions to an area within the existing facility that is larger than it previously occupied and remodel the interior conditions to meet the current needs. Additionally, it may be possible to add additional protection factors to an existing facility in order to make the facility appropriate for continued utilization.

10.2.1 Pros: The primary positive with this development option is that there are

typically no land acquisition costs. This is the main reason it potentially has the lowest construction costs of the options being presented. There is also limited need to upgrade facility services, such as the mechanical, electrical, and emergency generated power supplies, as these should already be in place.

10.2.2 Cons: This option is only available for the short-term “band-aid” approach.

Departments will continue to have their space and functional needs grow as the local community, new technology, and State and Federal mandates continue to impact upon the services that the Emergency Management community is required to provide their constituents. As time passes and the department continues to develop further needs, this option will no longer be able to meet the growing spatial and/or functional demands.

This option mandates the use of temporary facilities while the existing

building is being renovated. Move management must then take place, which entails organizing the move of computer equipment, telecommunications systems, etc., ultimately disrupting day-to-day operations.

10.2.3 Development Costs: The potential development costs for this option range from $75-$100 per

square foot. These costs are typically the lowest of the development options due to the lack of land acquisition costs and the continued utilization of infrastructure improvements. However, these costs can rise significantly if unforeseen conditions such as inadequate wiring, the presence of asbestos or other harmful materials, or the magnitude of facility, improvements to the exterior “shell” in order to achieve an appropriate level of facility survivability.

10.3. Development Option: Addition to Existing Facilities: Adding additional space to an existing facility is widely considered to be a viable

option to meet the growing needs of any department. This option is often the most politically acceptable to the elected officials as well as the local taxpayers. It provides for the department’s current needs without having to incur land acquisition costs, and ultimately is perceived as the option which is fiscally



responsible while providing for Emergency Management agency’s needs. It is important to note, however that the “self assessment” of your facility may find that adding to an inadequate building may not be a viable or appropriate option.

10.3.1 Pros:

There are benefits of adding on to an existing structure. If the site conditions permit, this option can alleviate current overcrowding issues by adding additional space to those areas experiencing the most critical needs. It also facilitates readily accommodating the addition of “specialized areas”, such protected parking for emergency response vehicles, a new Communications Center, or other administrative office areas, all without disrupting operations. Other areas such as training facilities or bulk storage areas are also easily added, yet are most likely to be stand-alone facilities co-sited on the existing site.

If the existing facility was designed by an Architect with experience in

Master Planning EOC’s, there should have been some level of preliminary planning to accommodate for this future expansion. If so, the infrastructure could already be in place for the additional electrical and mechanical loads that the expansion will generate. This point serves to emphasize the need to ensure that any facility planning be accomplished with the assistance of an experienced consulting team in Emergency Operations Center planning and design.

10.3.2 Cons: Eventually, if a department continues to accommodate increasing needs for

space or emerging technologies through one addition after another, use of the existing structure will become less efficient. There will come a time when dedicating resources to keeping up with these demands outweighs the usefulness of the effort. At this point, the department will need to seek other means to accommodate their needs.

Almost all regulatory agencies have development codes that will require

additional parking be added based on a ration ranging from 1:200 (one parking space per 200 gross square feet added) to 1:350. This also requires land to be available as well as increasing code-required on-site water retention areas. Parking can be accommodated by either utilizing surface parking areas at a cost of approximately $1500-$1800 per space, or through a parking structure at a cost ranging from $5500-$8500 per space, depending upon the size of the structure.

It is important to note that vehicle parking capacity must be based upon

demands during an emergency response when many agencies will be responding to an event and thus impacting upon both the facility as well as site improvements, such as vehicle parking areas.



10.3.3 Development Costs: The costs associated with the addition development option have a wide

range. One can expect the construction costs to be within $175-$225 per square foot. The broad range is due to the variables of what type of spaces are to be provided, the required level of facility “hardening”, the current conditions of the local construction market and the desired level (category) of facility survivability. Preliminary planning for future growth is the best tool for providing for the department’s foreseeable needs with the lowest financial commitment.

10.4. Development Option: Addition and Renovation to Existing Facilities: This option is a similar version of the addition option with the difference being

that once the new facilities are added on to the existing structure, the original facilities are then renovated to update there conditions. This is called a phased development due to the nature that one component must be accomplished and occupied prior to the second phase occurring. This is becoming of the utilized forms of development among Law Enforcement agencies nationwide.

10.4.1 Pros: With this phased development option, a Emergency Response agency can

eliminate the need to utilize temporary facilities during the initial effort thus saving valuable construction dollars. As previously noted, the users of the facility can then move into the newly constructed areas, vacating the existing facility so that the construction crews may then move on to renovating the original facility bringing it up to date and better serving their needs.

Often agencies cannot afford to retrofit, or harden, existing structures for

protection against potential disasters, either man-made or natural. By utilizing this development option, the addition the existing building can serve as the hardened facility at a lower over-all construction cost of a retrofit effort on the existing structure. Elements that require the additional protection, such as Communications and Administration among others, can easily be relocated and provide its occupants this expanded level of security.

10.4.2 Cons: As with the addition option, land development codes come into play setting

regulations on how much development a site can sustain. This amount of permissible development will be indicated early through an in-depth site analysis done by the Consultant.

10.4.3 Development Costs: Again, due to the wide range of options for construction, the associated

development costs can range significantly. The higher end costs would be



assigned to the new construction while the renovation costs, depending on magnitude of the changes, would be at the lower end of the scale.

10.5. Development Option: Acquisition of an Existing Building (Adaptive Re-Use): The option of choosing to Adaptively Re-Use an existing facility for an EOC

agency has not been used widely as most existing facilities are not appropriately designed or hardened. Some exceptions do exist, such as telephone exchange structures, that were initially constructed as “survivable facilities”. A building, either purchased or already owned by the local, is converted into an EOC from its previous use.

10.5.1 Pros: This can be a successful development option when all of the variables fall

in place. A larger, open type of building layout, constructed within no more than 15 years, with qualified mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems, and above all, a sound and leak-free roof, can be successfully adapted to meet the needs of an EOC, but few available buildings have been designed to withstand the dynamic forces of natural or man-made events.

The facility must be thoroughly reviewed for potential issues, referred to as

Unforeseen Conditions, which will impact upon renovation costs. If none are noted during the building inspection, the value of purchasing or utilizing an existing facility can be substantial. The building program, which identifies the interior spaces to be designed into the converted facility, can be manipulated to afford the necessary adjacencies and interior security zoning that are inherent with this type of user agency.

10.5.2 Cons: The main problem agencies will encounter with this development option is

that the space planning of the interior layouts is limited to the physical constraints of the existing building envelope. The construction of the facility may not and, in all probability, will not meet the hardening requirements necessary for a facility of this type. The facility support systems (HVAC) may not be appropriately sized, or of the quality necessary to accommodate the 24 hour, 7 days per week operations that a facility of this type must maintain.

There also remains the issue of bringing the building into code-compliance

of the local and state jurisdictions. Standardized building codes at the National and State level are becoming more widely adopted. The age of the building may dictate that portions of the building, relative to hardening and ADA compliance, be substantially renovated to obtain jurisdictionally-required compliance.



10.5.3 Development Costs: The range of costs for the Adaptive Re-Use of a facility is within $100-

$185 per square foot. Code compliance enhanced survivability, and unforeseen building conditions account for the range of additional construction costs that can be experienced.

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Chapter 11 Delivery Options: “How Facilities Can Be Constructed” At one time, the approach to design and construction of a project was straight forward. Select and hire an Architect, have construction plans (“blue prints”) drawn, hire a General Contractor and build the facility. Usually, the construction documents were issued for competitive bids. This approach is the “traditional” method. However, as with most traditional methods in our culture, the conventional methods are being challenged in attempts to save time, spend less money, reduce conflict (litigation) and enhance the final product quality. Three primary approaches have surfaced in recent years to achieving the design and construction of projects – a process generally stated as project delivery. While minor variations specific to every project make each working arrangement unique, the major differences fall into three categories: Traditional Method, Construction Management and Design-Build. It is important for a governmental entity to understand that generally they are participants in the delivery process as the facility user. The particular project delivery option has a profound impact on how the user can participate in the process. This fact has an influence on the suitability and final quality of the completed project. Each of these project delivery options defines how the various individuals organize their participation and responsibilities to complete a building project. Each option creates certain advantages and has potential limitations. The following discussion identifies the participants and organization of the option; specific characteristics, contractual relationships; a statement on how the option can impact quality; and finally, pros and cons of each approach. 11.1. The “Traditional” Method: Design-Bid-Build: Most building projects still follow this approach. The Owner hires the Architect at

the beginning of the process to develop a design and prepare construction documents needed to build it. The Owner also hires a General Contractor under a separate contract to construct the building. The Owner has a separate contract with each of the two parties, who then act in the Owner’s interest. The Architect is paid a fee proportional to the services rendered while the General Contractor’s compensation is part of the construction cost.

11.1.1 Participants and Organization:

The Design-Bid-Build approach is characterized by its three phases, by its independent contracts between Architect and Owner and the Contractor and Owner and by the linear sequencing of the work. There are three prime players: Owner, Architect and Contractor.

11.1.2 Characteristics: The typical process involves three phases: First, the Owner engages the

Architect to design the project and prepare construction documents. Second, the Construction Documents are issued for competitive bid by

Chapter 11 Delivery Options: “How Facilities Can Be Constructed” Page 2


Contractors. Typically, the project is advertised in local newspapers and construction trade outlets. Third, the Owner selects and hires the Contractor. In the public contracting sector generally the low bid Contactor is awarded the project.

11.1.3 Contract Relationships: The Owner enters into separate contracts with the Architect and Contractor.

No contractual obligations exist between the Architect and Contractor. Independent contract help to avoid potential conflict of interest.

11.1.4 Impact Upon Quality: The Architect is generally selected based upon specialized experience and

qualifications to provide design services. The Architect’s obligation is to design and administer the project in the best interest of the Owner. The user of the facility has significant input into the design of the project, working directly with the Architect. The Contractor is selected based upon the low bid for the project. The Contractor’s personnel may or may not have acquired expertise in the building type. The need of the Contractor to prepare the low bid while still profiting from the contract may be at cross purposes. Achieving the quality designed into the project and still producing a profit for the Contractor can lead to adversarial relationships during construction.

11.1.5 Pros and Cons: Most of the advantages of this method stem from its long and widespread

use, from the clear roles assigned each party and from the ability to clarify the project design prior to construction. The approach also benefits from the Architect’s professional obligation to design a building of quality and to act in the best interest of the project. Once the Contractor makes a cost commitment (submits a bid), it is generally reliable since it is based upon a complete set of design documents. Contractors are familiar with this process and work well under its constraints. The process is linear with clearly understood milestones that allow the Owner and User to carefully review the work.

The disadvantages are generally related to the relatively lengthy process.

Although the linear process is clearly understood and allows for complete review of the work, a delay in any phase can lead to setbacks in the schedule. Construction delays can lead to additional costs for the Owner and Architect. Given the low bid aware process, knowledge of advanced construction technology and building systems may not be readily available to the General Contractor and specialized subcontractors generally are not competitive in a low bid environment. Adversarial relationships and the potential for litigation can develop between the Architect and Contractor due to their separate contracts with the Owner and the low-bid Contractor’s overriding interest in cost.



11.2. The Construction Management Method: Construction Management is a broad term, covering a variety of project delivery

scenarios in which a Construction Manager is added to the building team to oversee such elements as schedule, cost, construction/bidding and special building technology. The Construction Manager (CM) can serve in differing capacities with varying degrees of authority; depending upon how the project is structured. A professional fee is paid to the CM, relative to the services performed, which range from advising during particular phases of the building process to acting as the General Contractor for construction. The most common approach in public sector projects is the “Construction Manager at Risk” scenario where the CM guarantees the construction value of the work and acts as the Contractor to bid and manage the construction phase activities.

11.2.1 Participants and Organization: This project delivery option adds a Project Management Consultant to the

Building Team who acts as an advisor to the Owner. There are typically four prime players with this method; Owner/User, Architect, Construction Manager and Contractor(s). The process typically evolves in four phases, adding the CM to the Team prior to the design being completed. First, the Owner hires the Architect to initiate design. Next, the Owner hires the CM during the design phase to review design activities in terms of implications for schedule, cost and constructability. Construction Documents are then completed for bidding and finally the CM oversees the construction contracts and building activities.

11.2.2 Characteristics and Variations of the Approach: This method adds a Consultant and an associated fee. It is most

appropriate for large complex projects. Public sector owners select the CM based on qualifications. The “CM as Advisor” is appropriate for Owners who want to hire an Architect and Contractor separately but who do not have the time or in-house capabilities to oversee the building process. The “CM as Advisor” has a direct contract with the Owner and oversees the project for the Owner, carefully monitoring cost, schedule and provides continual oversight of the linear process that is easy for Owners to manage.

The “Construction Manager at Risk” or “CM as Constructor” is a common

delivery method that blends the advisor role of the CM with direct responsibility for construction of the project. The “CM at Risk” is hired by qualification but at the relatively complete level of construction document completion, begins to bid the project and arrives at a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) to construct the building. In this scenario, the CM is paid a fee and expenses (including in the GMP) but also acts as Contractor; therefore there are three primary players: Owner/User, Architect and Construction Manager.



11.2.3 Contract Relationships: The main parties in this relationship are Owner, Architect and Construction

Manager. If the Construction Manager is acting solely as an Advisor to the Owner, there will be one or multiple contracts with builders of the project. The Owner holds separate contracts with each party of the relationship. There are no contractual relationships between the Architect, Construction Manager and the prime building Contractors.

11.2.4 Impact on Quality: The delivery method is appropriate for large or complex projects where

maximum cost, value and quality are equally important. Although savings of construction cost can be achieved, this is often off-set by the additional fee paid the CM. This method is also appropriate where the Owner does not have sufficient staff or expertise to oversee the building process. At the outset of the project it is important to clearly define the Owner’s objectives. If the Owner’s priorities concern efficiency, management, cost savings and technical matters only, the design quality of the building is not necessarily improved by this method.

11.2.5 Pros and Cons: Most advantages of this method arise from the added expertise of the CM

as Professional Advisor in the delivery process. Owners with little construction experience or lacking in-house capabilities benefit from the CM expertise when undertaking large complicated projects, the CM-Advisor can reduce management burden on the Owner’s staff. The Architect remains directly responsible to the Owner, protecting the Owner’s interest. At the same time, the Architect can benefit from the CM’s input during design. Cost estimating during the design phase by the CM allows for effective analysis of cost-value for various materials and systems. Supervision of construction activities (CM at Risk) can effectively reduce miscommunications and errors in the construction process. Adversarial relationships and potential litigation is generally reduced, owing to the fact that the CM is a participant in design phase activities; and particularly with the CM at Risk process cost is known, guaranteed and the CM’s contingency funds eliminates or limits Change Orders.

The primary disadvantages of the approach are the overlapping areas of

authority and the additional cost of another player in the process. The fee paid to the CM represents added cost that is not present in traditional design-bid-build. The scrutiny of the CM, who reports to the Owner, can be counterproductive from the vantage of the Architect and prime building Contractors. The Architect may have to justify reasoned aspects of the design that the CM judges to not be cost effective.



11.3. The Design-Build Method: Design-Build is a form of project delivery in which the Owner contracts with a

single entity, the Design-Builder, to provide both design and construction services. The Design Build entity may be a single firm, a consortium of experts or joint-venture undertaking. Typically, the team includes an Architect and a Contractor, who may be partners in the undertaking or one a subcontractor to the other. Principal advantages of Design-Build are the single point of responsibility and the potential to expedite the linear process of design and construction to save valuable time. The primary disadvantage is that the user of the facility may not be actively involved in the process and receive the quality expected.

11.3.1 Participants and Organization:

Typically the Owner enters into a single for design and construction. For public sector projects this single relationship can become complex. The problem lies in the definition of the project. The method is most effective when the Owner defines the scope of work and prepares conceptual, preliminary design documents so that the Designer-Builder can be chosen and a competitive bid price submitted. The preparation of the project scope/preliminary design documents is often prepared by an independent Architect known as the “Design Criteria Architect” and documents produced are commonly known as the “Design Criteria Package”. The Design Criteria Architect is an independent consultant hired by the Owner and is most effective overseeing the final design and construction activities to ensure the quality expected by the Owner is achieved. This modification to the simple Design-Build method is known as “bridging”.

11.3.2 Characteristics: In this project delivery method the services of the Architect and the

Contractor are combined into a single Design-Build entity. It is characterized by its single contract with the Owner and overlapping of design and construction services. There are two phases of the Design-Build method; the design and construction of the building, both provided continuously by a single source. There are two primary players; the Owner and the Design-Build entity.

Assuring quality in public sector projects generally requires adding the

Design Criteria Architect to the simplified process. First, the Design Criteria Architect works with the Owner/User to define the project scope and Design Criteria Documents. Second, the Design Criteria Documents are used to solicit competitive bids for the work. Third, the Owner enters into the single Design-Build contract with the selected Design-Build entity.

11.3.3 Contract Relationships: The most simplified approach results in a single contract between the

Owners and the Design-Build entity. There is no contractual relationship



between the Owner and the Architect or the Owner and the Contractor. It is a single point relationship. The Owner must be capable of defining the project requirements and the desired standard of quality. Public sector owners are generally best served by contracting directly with an independent qualified Architect to prepare the scope-of-work documents and continued consultation through construction. The contracting of the independent qualified Architect is known as “bridging”.

11.3.4 Impact on Quality: The Design-Build method has typically been implemented on simple

building type projects where quality is of less concern than time and cost. For application on Law Enforcement type facilities where function, durability, quality as well as time and cost is an issue, “bridging” provides the required assurance that all objectives are met. One of the functions of the Owner’s Design Criteria Architect is to ensure that the scope-of-work documents clearly set a level of quality for the Design-Builder.

11.3.5 Pros and Cons: Generally, the implementation of the Design-Build method, with a single

point contract, is not effective for complex projects like Law Enforcement Facilities without the “bridging” of the Design Criteria Architect. Bridging takes advantage of the best aspects of two other delivery options: Like Design-Build, it provides a single point of responsibility for final design and construction and incorporated its efficiencies of internal operation; and like Design-Bid-Build, Owners can retain an independent Architectural professional, qualified to represent their interests as design direction and standards are set. The “bridging” scenario allows the Design Criteria Architect to interact directly with the facility users to define the functional, aesthetic and building system/material aspects of the building. The Owner obtains a highly enforceable cost for the project early in the process without the capital outlay of 100% complete Construction Documents. Time delays due to scheduling problems and changes in construction can be substantially reduced, as are claims and Change Orders because of the single entity for both design and construction.

The major disadvantages of this approach are that the “bridging” method is

not well understood and that as project complexity increases, management required by the Owner is more extensive than other delivery options. Conflicts between the Owner’s Criteria Architect and the Design-Build Architect can arise, especially if the Owner has failed to define the extent of responsibilities of the Criteria Architect. Unless leading the Design-Build Team, the Architect of Record (Design-Build entity) does not serve directly as the Owner/User’s agent but is employed by the Design-Builder, shifting that Architect’s responsibility away from the Owner. The allegiance of the Architect of Record to the Design-Builder often results in a lack of quality expected by the Owner.

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Chapter 12 Human Factors: Emergency Operations Centers are places of work; in essence, office buildings except for those unique events that transform normal facilities into protected environments. Individuals that work in these structure deserve to experience normal working conditions, including conditioned fresh air, windows and open space, attributes that many would normally take for granted. The response to an emergency event mandates an entirely different set of circumstances. Buildings must be “sealed”, stand-by systems be placed in a prepatory mode and those personnel who will be activated to deal with response be kept within a protected and secure environment. The psychological needs of individuals, during these periods of stress, are both complex and varied. Staff, in addition to dealing with issues of emergency response, also experience anxiety when thinking of the safety of their families, relatives, friends, pets and possessions. They, above all, understand the dynamic forces that are at play and fully comprehend the general inability for “normal” buildings to resist damage and/or destruction. What is necessary is for facilities to offer either the ability to accommodate immediate family or to provide the means of remaining in communication. Some newer facilities, as an example, provide for the staff’s pets to be housed at the facility, understanding the psychological calming effect that pets have upon individuals during periods of stress. It is equally important to incorporate “decompression spaces” where an individual can go to relax and relieve tension, before, during and after sustained periods of response. These spaces should be inviting, comfortable, subdued and relaxing. It should be dimly lit and contain surfaces and furnishings which are comfortable and non-institutional. These type of spaces can be characterized as “time out” areas and generally separated into those in which sound (music, TV, etc.) is permitted and others where activity is passive, such as reading or napping. There are complex and predictable human responses to dynamic events, certainly deserving of greater definition and discussion than briefly noted here. The important consideration is to acknowledge that there are psychological needs that must be addressed if individuals are to continue to function appropriately and in a safe manner. To ignore these needs is to place in jeopardy the ability to provide appropriate levels of response during critical periods. 12.1. The Intelligent use of Color: Color, in the built environment of facilities such as an EOC have the ability to

make a profound impact upon the psychological well being of an individual. This

Chapter 12 Human Factors Page 2

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is particularly important when that individual (s) is responding to an emergency event. In order to provide appropriate levels of response it is important to

understand how the intelligent use of color impacts upon environments and the activity conducted in that space.

Command Centers and break-out rooms, as an example, need to be calming

environments in which high levels of activity can be undertaken without causing undue stress. There are specific colors which, by their nature, calm individuals and, conversely, other colors such as red, which cause actual psychological response such as increased GSA (Galvanic Skin Response) and increased heart rate activity.

Dining areas, in which it is important to stimulate appetite, should utilize specific

colors, generally those in the cool range, such as soft yellow, light green or browns. These colors have been proven to increase an individuals appetite, a positive attribute when that individual has been engaged in high levels of stressful activity.

It is important to maintain the attributes of “alertness, efficiency and cooperation”

in areas in which emergency response is undertaken. Conversely, it is equally important to create environments in which “calmness and tranquility” are the desired attributes in such spaces as dormitories, decompression and break areas.

The paramount criteria is to utilize color in an intelligent manner and in such a

way as it creates or enhances the desired effect upon the individual or individuals that will utilize the space. EOC’s, by their nature, are highly specialized facilities and it is incumbent upon the designer or facility manager to understand the following:

“The intelligent use of color must become a full partner in the

built environment. It is needed for a proper mental, physical and psychological balance and to create a more coherent and intelligent environment”.

Readers of this Guidance Publication who have an interest in this subject are

encouraged to review research on this subject, as identified in the Appendix.

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Chapter 13 Funding Opportunities and Facility Costs One of the factors in the consideration of a new Emergency Operations Center is the necessity to identify a funding source or, as is true in most cases, a variety of funding sources. In essence, it is important to not only identify project spatial need, but to also document appropriate information as to how a project can and will be funded. Assistance, in this regard, can generally be provided by staff, either a Budget or Finance Director, or by your County or City Administration. The more you are able to assist in this endeavor, the greater are your chances to see your prospective project move ahead into design and construction. The following is a summary of potential sources of funding. Clearly, jurisdiction factors are the deciding factor as States vary significantly in how public funds are obtained and utilized. 13.1. Federal Grants “Homeland Security”: While Federal Grants have traditionally been rare for local E.O.C.’s, the events of

September 11th, coupled with the current economic recession, have created an environment which may result in funds becoming available in the near future. Many cities and counties, in that respect, have initiated studies in order to have appropriate documentation assembled for potential future Federal Grants. Additionally, they have contacted their respective legislative delegation members in order “to make their case”. Clearly, time becomes of the essence, as when Federal Funds become available they will go to those entities that are prepared and who are situated in a geographically vulnerable location.

13.2. State Grants: Several States fund Capital Improvement projects based upon a wide variety of

factors, including the political leadership of elected officials from your area. Many States also have specialized grant programs which provide funds for having facilities that will serve as Emergency Operational Facilities. As an example, the State of Florida, in response to the devastation of Hurricane Andrew, created an “Emergency Preparedness Fund” under the oversight of the State Department of Community Affairs. Once a year grant applications are accepted, reviewed, prioritized and funds awarded to counties and cities for Emergency Operations Centers, the “hardening” of existing or new facilities, for spaces within facilities that can serve as an emergency response facility, etc. The key is to be focused in your search of grant programs.

Chapter 13 Facility Costs and Funding Opportunities Page 2


13.3. Development Impact Fees: As communities grow, so does the demand for service with a direct impact upon

Emergency Management Response and facility needs. Many communities have adopted a program of “impact fees”, where permitting fees for new development

include monies for public facilities with these funds utilized to construct new or expanded facilities, as well as other associated improvements. The impact of adopting such fees can be significant as developers typically are politically involved. From their perspective, any additional cost of development is of significance. Conversely, there is the theory that new residents or businesses should be responsible for additional costs of services that are a direct result of new development.

13.4. Voter Referendums/Tax Based: Many governmental entities, either as a political necessity or as a statutory

requirement, require voter referendums to approve the funding of facilities. Generally speaking, voters are asked to approve (or disapprove) additional revenue such as increased property taxes, an increase in sales taxes, adoption of a special fee or tax, or a “one time” assessment. State laws govern permissible sources and the use of funds with a significant difference between what different jurisdiction allow.

It is of merit to note that high levels of public sensitivity to emergency

management and the perceived quality of response has a direct relationship upon voter attitudes. This methodology has the ability to fund your entire project development and has been successful in many jurisdictions for such facilities as EOC’s. The tragic events of September 11th have significantly enhanced the public understanding of the importance of Emergency Management and the need to provide departments with modern, functional facilities. In that respect, it is important to bring issues, such as this, to the voters expeditiously while the focus of our nation’s concerns are of interest to the American people.

13.5. Tax Exemption Programs: Several States that have a State and/or local sales tax will permit governmental

entities, such as Counties and Cities, to exempt their infrastructure improvements from the tax. A State such as Florida, as an example, has a 6% - 7% sales tax, which applies to materials utilized for the construction of a new facility. Being able to “save” this project cost can result in significantly cost savings to the project and can be utilized for expanding the project scope or for purchasing furnishings or equipment.

It is very important that the legal basis for such tax exemptions be reviewed by the

appropriate authority prior to implementation. A potential savings of 3% or 4% of



total construction cost, when equated to a multi-million dollar project, can result in a significant monetary savings for a project.

13.6. Community Redevelopment: Many jurisdictions are adopting tax district programs (Community Redevelopment

Authority) that designate economically disadvantaged areas and whose property tax base is “set aside” for future infra-structure improvements including the construction of new County and City facilities. It is important to review the legal issues related to such programs by checking with State authority. Many communities have adopted similar entities and it would be very beneficial to learn from their experiences if such a program is to be considered.

13.7. Developer “Set Asides”: In those areas of the United States that are experiencing growth, many jurisdictions

have required developers to set aside property for governmental usage or in lieu of property, to contribute toward the cost of future facilities. The recent development of a regional shopping center, located in Central Florida, as an example, resulted in over $500,000 being made available for a new Law Enforcement facility.

Many developers would prefer to provide land in lieu of monetary grants. While

less desirable to the County or City, such an agreement should include the ability or right of the Government to trade or sell this property in order to generate funds. The location of donated property, as well as its zoning and development rights, becomes an important factor if it is considered in terms of its future sale.

13.8. Capital Improvement Bonds: There are a wide variety of bonds that can be used for a funding source. Bonds,

however, require a dedicated revenue source but may be very attractive investments for citizens of your community. Existing bonds, perhaps utilized for previous road improvements, utility systems or similar infrastructure improvements, may be in the final stages of payout. In many cases these dedicated revenue sources can then be utilized to fund a community need, such as an EOC.

A general rule of thumb is that each $100,000 of dedicated bonds revenue can

equate to approximately $1,000,000 in bond funding for improvements. Typically, bond issues are a very attractive funding source and, as such, utilized by many jurisdiction for funding a variety of projects. Additionally, funds can be acquired by the temporary investment of bond proceeds until such time as the funds are needed for construction.

13.9. Capital Improvement Programs: Almost all Counties and Cities adopt long term Capital Improvement Program’s

(C.I.P.) which, in essence, budget for projects and improvements over an extended



time frame, typically five or ten years. This process begins with establishment of facility need, initially providing funding for detailed studies, then fees for design of the facility and subsequently, funds for construction. This “process” may take as long as three or four years with the majority of the funds being required at the later stages during the construction of the facility.

Funds typically come from the general revenue of the County or City and

specifically that portion which is allocated for infrastructure improvements. The important factor is to become a part of this system, recognizing that it is not an overnight process.

13.10. USDA Grants and Loans: The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) both loans and provides grants to

develop essential community facilities in rural areas and towns in which the population is less than 20,000. The Community Facility Loan Program and The Rural Housing Service distribute in excess of $4 billion in loans and grants on an annual basis. In 2000, as an example, over 600 vital community facilities, such as Police Department facilities, Fire Stations, Schools and Libraries were built or expanded.

Information on how to apply for Federal grants can be obtained by contacting the

Rural Housing Service and Community Facility Loans at USDA (202) 720-9928. These are just some of the potential sources of funding with many changes from State to State. The best way in which to determine what is appropriate for you is to undertake research. Check with other jurisdiction to see how they obtained funding, consult with professionals in the private sector, ask local citizens and request assistance from your State and Federal elected officials. Generally speaking there is no “silver bullet” that will provide all of your funding needs. Rather, it is a combination of funding sources that will result in a new facility. 13.11. Facility Costs: The process of establishing reasonable construction/development values for a

facility of this type is both complex and variable. Primarily values increase significantly in proportion to the amount of building area that is “sheltered”, this term being defined as F.E.M.A. approved protected area, capable of resisting major storms as well as man-made events, including those of a nuclear nature as well as acts of terrorism.

This section attempts to provide the financial impact upon building costs defined

in terms of the year 2004. Alternatives could also include consideration of sheltered vs. partially sheltered facilities, relative to emergency vehicle storage areas as an example.



It should be noted that the economy has a direct impact upon construction activity and cost, particularly relative to labor. Interests rates, however, remain at a 25 year low, serving as a further stimulus to the construction industry.

We perceive that construction costs in the year 2004 will continue to increase, but

at a relatively moderate rate as “economic readjustment” continues. This suggests that construction of facilities should be considered for the year 2004 – 2005 if the Government is to achieve maximum benefit of available construction dollars and, most importantly, to provide an appropriate environment in which to accommodate the special needs of an E.O.C.

The accompanying cost information reflects facilities designed to meet current

need, identified as the period 2003 – 2005. The trend for Government, as a point of general information, it to provide needs for the long term, i.e. the next 10 to 13 years. This results in long term savings by developing space with current dollars at a time when interests rates are exceptionally low.

Estimated construction costs do not include funding for communications’

equipment, associated communication towers, or specialized equipment. It is important, however, to develop a comprehensive project budget that identifies

all of the aspects of the project, including the following elements. 13.11.1. Building Construction 13.11.2. Site Development:

Includes grading, subsurface stabilization (if required), vehicle access/egress roads, vehicle parking areas, etc.

13.11.3. Site Landscaping 13.11.4. Site and Building Signage 13.11.5. Building Communications Systems 13.11.6. Computer Cabling Systems 13.11.7. Furnishings: Defined as moveable furnishings (desks, chairs, etc.) 13.11.8. Permitting, Development Review Fees 13.11.9. Impact Fees 13.11.10. Land Acquisition 13.11.11. Site Survey 13.11.12. Site Soils Analysis 13.11.13. Architectural/Engineering Fees 13.11.14. Misc. Project Costs Legal Fees, Cost Estimating, Insurance, etc. Construction values, for a variety of project types, are identified in the following

chart, illustrating the enhanced costs of Emergency Operations Centers as a result of the unique requirements.



Building Type

Qualified Standard

Cost Per Square Foot

City Hall Building

Medium to High

$125 - $165

Courthouse/Judicial

Medium to High

$165 - $265

Standard Office Building

Medium

$113 - $145

Speculative Office Building

Low

$95 - $120

Emergency Operations Center (Category 3 Storm)

Medium

$185


Medium

$200 - $250


Medium

$275 - $350

Development ValuesThis chart reflects estimated construction costs fora variety of facilities as compared to Category 4and 5 Emergency Operation Centers. Please notethat these values equate to actual construction only(11.11.1 thru 11.11.3) and does not include otherproject development costs as illustrated on theprevious page.

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Chapter 14 Psychological Aspects of EOC Environments: Emergency Operations Centers are places of work; in essence, office buildings except for those unique events that transform normal facilities into protected environments. Individuals that work in these structure deserve to experience normal working conditions, including conditioned fresh air, windows and open space, attributes that many would normally take for granted. The response to an emergency event mandates an entirely different set of circumstances. Buildings must be “sealed”, stand-by systems be placed in a prepatory mode and those personnel who will be activated to deal with response be kept within a protected and secure environment. The psychological needs of individuals, during these periods of stress, are both complex and varied. Staff, in addition to dealing with issues of emergency response, also experience anxiety when thinking of the safety of their families, relatives, friends, pets and possessions. They, above all, understand the dynamic forces that are at play and fully comprehend the general inability for “normal” buildings to resist damage and/or destruction. What is necessary is for facilities to offer either the ability to accommodate immediate family or to provide the means of remaining in communication. Some newer facilities, as an example, provide for the staff’s pets to be housed at the facility, understanding the psychological calming effect that pets have upon individuals during periods of stress. It is equally important to incorporate “decompression spaces” where an individual can go to relax and relieve tension, before, during and after sustained periods of response. These spaces should be inviting, comfortable, subdued and relaxing. It should be dimly lit and contain surfaces and furnishings which are comfortable and non-institutional. These type of spaces can be characterized as “time out” areas and generally separated into those in which sound (music, TV, etc.) is permitted and others where activity is passive, such as reading or napping. There are complex and predictable human responses to dynamic events, certainly deserving of greater definition and discussion than briefly noted here. The important consideration is to acknowledge that there are psychological needs that must be addressed if individuals are to continue to function appropriately and in a safe manner. To ignore these needs is to place in jeopardy the ability to provide appropriate levels of response during critical periods. 14.1. The Intelligent use of Color: Color, in the built environment of facilities such as an EOC have the ability to

make a profound impact upon the psychological well being of an individual. This

Chapter 14 Psychological Aspects of EOC Environments Page 2

H:\ADMIN\Space Needs\Jobs\675\12 Psychological Aspects of EOC Environments

is particularly important when that individual (s) is responding to an emergency event. In order to provide appropriate levels of response it is important to

understand how the intelligent use of color impacts upon environments and the activity conducted in that space.

Command Centers and break-out rooms, as an example, need to be calming

environments in which high levels of activity can be undertaken without causing undue stress. There are specific colors which, by their nature, calm individuals and, conversely, other colors such as red, which cause actual psychological response such as increased GSA (Galvanic Skin Response) and increased heart rate activity.

Dining areas, in which it is important to stimulate appetite, should utilize specific

colors, generally those in the cool range, such as soft yellow, light green or browns. These colors have been proven to increase an individuals appetite, a positive attribute when that individual has been engaged in high levels of stressful activity.

It is important to maintain the attributes of “alertness, efficiency and cooperation”

in areas in which emergency response is undertaken. Conversely, it is equally important to create environments in which “calmness and tranquility” are the desired attributes in such spaces as dormitories, decompression and break areas.

The paramount criteria is to utilize color in an intelligent manner and in such a

way as it creates or enhances the desired effect upon the individual or individuals that will utilize the space. EOC’s, by their nature, are highly specialized facilities and it is incumbent upon the designer or facility manager to understand the following:

“The intelligent use of color must become a full partner in the

built environment. It is needed for a proper mental, physical and psychological balance and to create a more coherent and intelligent environment”.

Readers of this Guidance Publication who have an interest in this subject are

encouraged to review research on this subject, as identified in the Appendix.

C:\staging\3F5CB02A-453E-20327E\in\3F5CB02A-453E-20327E.doc

Chapter 15 How to Obtain Professional Services: The R.F.P. (Request For Proposal) Process: The decision to obtain professional Architectural services for a proposed Emergency Operations Center is both complicated and, in some respects, difficult. You, as the professional Emergency Management individual understood the “short comings” of your own facility. In many cases you have spent your career in the same department and in the same facility. You have experienced overcrowding, and the inability to have facilities that respond to new requirements and demands. In essence you know that you need either a new or an expanded facility. What we have learned about government, is in all probability what you have also learned; that the decision making process is slow, deliberate and occasionally frustrating. You understand the need, but as a part of the governmental system, are not always able to afford the attention which is responsive. In order to convince the “system” it is important to document need and to have this accomplished by an independent third party, i.e. a firm that can document your needs, evaluate existing facilities, consider potential alternatives, provide costs, etc. Thus the need to understand the process of an R.F.P. (Request For Proposals). States, Counties and Cities vary as to how professional services are to be solicited and obtained. Generally, the process shares many similarities in what methodology is to be utilized. It includes such criteria as a brief definition of project scope, i.e. what exactly is intended to be accomplished such as a study to determine space needs, or it requests full Architectural/Engineering services for the design of a facility. There are several other criteria which are typically identified, including: insurance requirements, a need for prospective submittals to document previous experience with Emergency Management/EOC facilities, references for previous projects and information of a similar nature that will permit the County or City to evaluate responses and narrow prospective choices to those most qualified. 15.1 Selection Team: Most Counties and Cities will create a selection team, consisting of staff personnel

who are qualified to review R.F.P. submittals and who will, independently or collectively, evaluate each response as to completeness and level of experience. It is extremely important that Emergency Management personnel be participants in such a process and play an active role in the selection of an architectural firm that will be responsible for meeting the department’s needs.

15.2 Formal R.F.P.’s: Contained on the following pages are a series of Request for Proposals (R.F.P.’s)

that have been issued for Emergency Management projects, including space needs studies and those for standard Architectural and Engineering services. These have

Chapter 6 How to Obtain Professional Services: The R.F.P. (Request For Proposal) Process: Page 2


been prepared by the respective Governmental entities and should be beneficial in

serving you as a guide in the preparation of your R.F.P. It has been our experience that you can measurably help move the process along, if

you can provide your purchasing or finance department with a guide, such as is enclosed. You may wish to write the project description or have an Architect assist you. If you have previously retained a professional for the space needs assessment phase, they may be a logical choice to assist you in preparing portions of the document, but always remember that it is your R.F.P. and should be objective and not proprietary.

15.3 Obtaining Qualified Firms: There are several ways in which to attract qualified firms; those that you wish to

be considered for your project. The annual National Hurricane Conference as well as the Governors Hurricane

Conference (Florida) are attended by Architectural and Engineering firms. If you can attend this conference it is an excellent opportunity to meet their staff, see what kind of work they have accomplished and obtain literature that defines experience.

Several States have professional associates such as the Florida Emergency

Preparedness Association (FEPA) which list members who have a specific interest in this specialized field of Architecture.

You can also contact those Counties and or Cities that have recently completed

new EOC facilities and inquire how they went about the process and what suggestions or recommendations that they may have that will assist you.

15.4 Interview Process: Typically, a project such as a new Emergency Operations Center will attract

limited responses as a result of its very specialized nature. Most Governmental entities will narrow these respondents to a “short list” of 3 firms to be interviewed. Traditionally, each firm will be given 30 to 150 minutes to present their qualifications, address issues specific to the project, and then respond to questions posed by members of the selection team.

As a participant of the selection team it is important for you to check the

consultant’s order of preference. The number one ranked firm will then be requested to prepare a detailed Scope of Services and an outline of their proposed professional fee. Normally, professional fees are not discussed until after you have selected the firm that you believe to be the most qualified for your project.

Chapter 6 How to Obtain Professional Services: The R.F.P. (Request For Proposal) Process: Page 3


The qualifications of the Architect and Engineer are a key factor. You do not want to select an Architect who cannot demonstrate specific experience with Emergency Management Architecture. Being experienced in the design of library buildings or commercial facilities is not a qualification for a specialized facility such as an EOC facility. Experience counts and the lessons that they, the A/E team, have learned, can directly benefit your project.

15.5 Summary: To summarize, there are two stages in the process. First, the issuance of an R.F.P.

for a space needs assessment (as defined in Chapter 7) and after completion of that phase, the issuance of an R.F.P. for the required Architectural and Engineering services to design the facility. You also have the option to issue an R.F. P. for both of these services under a singular contract which could result in a significant time savings.

H:\ADMIN\Space Needs\Jobs\675\Chapter 16 Standards and Accreditation

No24.39%

Yes75.61%

Chapter 16 “Standards” and Accreditation: It is a telling commentary that no nationally accepted standards exist specifically for Emergency Operations Centers, nor is there a process by which facilities can achieve accreditation by a recognized professional association or governmental entity. Conversely, for other building types, such as Jails, Police Department facilities, etc. there exist both adapted Standards as well as a clearly defined process by which facilities can achieve accreditation, based upon a thorough and comprehensive review and guidance process. The premise of both “standards” and accreditation is not limited to physical facilities but includes procedures, performance and the adoption of recognized and defensible methodologies. Clearly a contributing factor is that EOC facilities are not as common as those facilities noted above and thus do not command the universal attention of regulatory agencies or the general public. Recent tragic events, however, have began to change this basic premise, as the general public becomes more and more aware of the need to provide appropriate and survivable facilities for those charged with the primary response for events. In a recent questionnaire (2003), sent to Florida Counties and Cities, there was an overwhelming indication to adopt “standards....relative to size, category or survivability, location criteria, redundancy of systems, etc”.

The issue of accreditation also received the support of the majority of the respondents but clearly not as overwhelming as the desire to have adopted and recognized standards. Several respondents indicated that they supported the premise of having “......facilities....subject to a review process and be accredited if there was a process by which funding was available for achieving this goal”.

No9.75%

Yes 90.25%

Standards Accreditation

Chapter 16 “Standards” and Accreditation Page 2


Florida has a state wide organizations; the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association, Inc., which has been operational for several years and which enjoys significant support and participation. It is suggested, by the authors of this publication, that this is an appropriate venue for consideration of the dual premise of “standards” and accreditation of Facilities. 16.1 Facility Standards/Recommend Space Allocation: Generally, EOC facilities have very specific functional needs that equate to space

requirements. These spaces can generally be defined as including the following areas:

16.1.1 Public Lobby 16.1.2 Public Restrooms 16.1.3 Information Officer (Reception) 16.1.4 Incident Command Center 16.1.5 Security Vestibule for 16.1.4 16.1.6 Break-out Rooms (min. 2) 16.1.7 Audio/Visual/Electronic Room (associated with 16.1.4) 16.1.8 Elected Officials Conference Room 16.1.9 Elected Officials Work Area 16.1.10 Media Work Area 16.1.11 Media Broadcast Room 16.1.12 Rumor Control Room 16.1.13 Library/Reference/Conference Room 16.1.14 Computer Equipment Room 16.1.15 Computer/G.I.S. Office 16.1.16 Computer Networking Areas 16.1.17 Staff Restrooms 16.1.18 Staff Shower Rooms 16.1.19 Staff Locker Rooms 16.1.20 Dormitory Spaces 16.1.21 Decompression/Stress Relief Room(s) 16.1.22 Staff Break Areas 16.1.23 Food Preparation Area 16.1.24 Food Storage Rooms 16.1.25 Facility Storage Spaces 16.1.27 Emergency Response Vehicle Spaces (Enclosed) 16.1.28 Vehicle Equipment Storage 16.1.29 Hazardous Material Room 16.1.30 Decontamination Room 16.1.31 Clinic 16.1.32 Patient Rooms 16.1.33 Medical Supply Room 16.1.34 Clinic/Medical Restroom(s) 16.1.35 Clinic Waiting Area 16.1.36 Mechanical Equipment Room

Chapter 16 “Standards” and Accreditation Page 3


16.1.37 Electrical Equipment Room 16.1.38 Emergency Generator Room 16.1.39 Telephone Room 16.1.40 Water Supply Room 16.1.41 M/E/P Storage Room 16.1.42 Facility Maintenance Office 16.1.43 Facility Supply Room(s) 16.1.44 Facility Maintenance Work Areas 16.1.45 Storage Room(s), Exterior Equipment 16.1.46 Communications Room 16.1.47 Communications Equipment Room 16.1.48 Communications Restrooms 16.1.49 Communications Break Area 16.1.50 Communications Food Services 16.1.51 Communications Locker Rooms 16.1.52 Communications Administrative Offices 16.1.53 Communications Printer Room(s) 16.1.54 Communications U.P.S. Room 16.1.55 Mail Intake Room 16.1.56 Mail Distribution Room 16.1.57 Administrative Offices 16.1.58 Multi-Purpose Training Room(s) 16.1.59 Training Offices 16.1.60 Security Offices 16.1.61 Security Control Room

16.2 Efficiency Factor: When determining the square footage allocations for these spaces it is important to

add an “efficiency factor”, i.e. that area that is allocated for corridors, wall thickness, etc. This is generally calculated at 30% of the total allocated for identified spaces and adds significantly to the overall facility square footage.

It’s importance is relative to the total project cost as the generalized costs per

square foot, as reflected in this publication, are substantive and must include all programmed space as well as the areas associated with the efficiency factor.

16.3 Specific Standards and Accreditation Requirements: The intent of this chapter is not to define specific standards or procedures for

potential accreditation. Such a process is the product of a detailed evaluation involving the expertise of Emergency Management professionals and those with expertise in their specialized fields.

Rather, this chapter represents that the vast majority of those associated with

Emergency Management, as reflected in the survey, are in favor of both the establishment of standards (90.25%) as well as a viable process of Accreditation (75.61%).

H:\ADMIN\KEITH\ADG\2003\Installation Force Protection Guide 0610.3

Chapter 18 Bibliography: 18.1 Publications:

Antiterrorism Planning and Design Guidance, ETL 86-10, 13 June 1986 Color and its Effects on Behavior Modification I.S.K. Reeves V, FAIA Architects Design Group, Inc., Winter Park, Florida 1985, 1992, 2001 Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Response Overview Department of Community Affairs Division of Emergency Management Undated Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents ETL 1110-3-498 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers February 24, 1999 Design of DOE Facilities for Wind-Generated Missiles, Kuilanoff, G. and Drake, R.M., Proceedings of the Third DOE natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation Conference, St. Louis, MO, CONF-9110122, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, 1991 Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based Facilities, MIL-HDBK 1013/1A, October 1987 DOD Instruction 4270.1, Planning, Design, Engineering, and Construction of Facilities, (Replaces MIL-HDBK 1190, Facility Planning and Design Guide) August 1997 [draft] Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry: A Step-by-Step Approach to Emergency Planning, Response and Recovery for Companies of all sizes. American Red Cross Undated

Bibliography Page 2


Emergency Operations Centers; Designed to Survive Architects Design Group, Inc., Winter Park, Florida April, 2001 Emergency Operations Centers Handbook Federal Emergency Management Agency CPG 1-20 May, 1984 Emergency Operations Center (EOC): Self-Assessment Guide Science Application International Corporation January, 2003 Guide to Civil Engineer Force Protection, AFH 10-222, Vol 3, 1 June 1997 [draft] Guidelines for Hurricane Evaluation Shelter Selection American Red Cross, ARC 4496, July 1992 Hurricanes...Different Faces In Different Places 17th Annual National Hurricane Conference April 11-14, 1995 Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Suitability Ranking Table ARC 4496 (Draft Revision 5/16/2002) Hurricane Preparedness Study: Structural Behavior Predictions and Improvement Recommendations for Waste Water Facilities. Broward County, Office of Environmental Services January, 1996 Installation Force Protection Guide United States Air Force Undated Model Hurricane Shelter Selection Guidelines; Student Manual Department of Community Affairs/Division of Emergency Management October, 1997 Natural Hazards Risk Profile: Hurricanes, Floods, Tornadoes, Lightning, Earthquakes The American Red Cross 1991 Natural Phenomena Hazards: Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities DOE-STD-1020-2002 U.S. Department of Energy January 2002

Bibliography Page 3


Natural Phenomena Hazards Modeling Project: Extreme Wind/Tornado Hazard Models for Department of Energy Sites, Coats, D.W. and R.C. Murray, UCRL-53526 Rev. 1, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, 1985 Planning and Programming of Facility Construction Projects, AFI 32-1021, May 1994 Procedures for Predicting Wind: Damage to Buildings, Journal of the Structural Division, ASCE, Vol. 107, No. ST11, 2089-2096, 1981 Protecting Buildings and their Occupants From Airborne Hazards U.S. Army Corps of Engineers TI 853-01 October, 2001 Protective Construction: Nuclear Blast Resistant Design Federal Emergency Management Agency TR-20 (Vol. 4) March 1985 Rationale for Wind-Borne Missile Criteria for DOE Facilities, LLNL, McDonald, J.R (UCRL-CR-135687)., Livermore, CA, September, 1999 Security Engineering Concept Design, AFJMAN 32-1071, Vol 2, 12 May 1994 Shelter Design and Analysis: Fallout Radiation Shielding Defense Civil Preparedness Agency TR-20 (Vol. 1) June 1976 Standards for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection American Red Cross ARC 4496 Rev. January, 2002

Bibliography Page 4


Standard Operating Procedures for the Emergency Operations Center (SOP) Pinellas County Undated Survivable Crisis Management: Plan Development Guide Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Department of Energy, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for DOE Nuclear Facilities and Non-nuclear Facilities, DOE G 420.1-2, March 29, 2000 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Structural Engineering Guidelines for New Embassy Office Buildings (Limited official use only), August 1995 Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities U.S. Department of Justice June 28, 1995

18.2 News Publications:

“Experts Say Spores won’t spread in Ventilation Systems” James Glanz and David E. Rosenbaum The New York Times Oct. 18, 2001 (Page B6) HP: Hurricane Protection International Hurricane Protection Association Winter, 2003 “Patents: An invention that sends a beam of light through water to make sure it is still safe to drink” Sabra Chartrand The New York Times March 10, 2003 (Page C4) “What are the Chances?: Computer Tools Refine the ability to understand and the Odds of Catastrophe” Seth Schiesel The New York Times February 6, 2003 (Page E1) 2002 Disaster Resource Guide www.disaster-resource.com 2002

Bibliography Page 5


2003 Disaster Resource Guide: Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, Recover www.disaster-resource.com 2003

18.3 Codes and Design and Construction Standards:

American Concrete Institute, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, ACI 318 99, Farmington Hills, Michigan, 1999 American Institute of Steel Construction, Inc., Allowable Stress Design, 9th edition, 400 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL 60611, 1999 Florida Accessibility Code for Building Construction, Florida Department of Community Affairs, 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100, 1997 edition, 2001 Florida Building Code; First printing, Florida Building Commission 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 April 2001, 2001 Florida Energy Efficiency Code for Building Construction, Florida Department of Community Affairs, 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 2001,2001 edition National Electric Code, National Electric Code Committee, NFPA 70, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, Massachusetts 02269-9101 2002 edition National Fire Protection Association, Life Safety Code, seventh edition, NFPA 101, 1 Battermarch Park, Quincy, Massachusetts, 02269-9101

18.4 Data and Information Sources: The American Institute of Architects Building Security Through Design: A Primer for Architects, Design Professionals, and their Clients

Bibliography Page 6


The American Institute of Architects (book) www.aia.org/security November 2001 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities at Fixed Chemical Sites, Pub. No: G-79 Center for Chemical Process Safety ISBN No: 0-8169-0877-X www.aiche.org/ccpssecurity 2002 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-02, 2002 American Society of Civil Engineers ISBN: 0-7844-0624-3 www.asce.org/publications/dsp_pubdetails.cfm?puburl=http://www.pubs.asce.org/ASCE7.html?9991330 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks Publication No. 2002-139 Cincinnati, Ohio www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/2002-139 May 2002 Central Intelligence Agency Chemical, Biological, Radiological Incident Handbook www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cbr_handbook/cbrbook.htm October 1998 Federal Emergency Management Agency, (FEMA) 277 The Oklahoma City Bombing: Improving Building Performance through Multi-Hazard Mitigation Washington, D.C. www.fema.gov/mit/bpat/bpat009.htm August 1, 1996 FEMA 386-2 Understanding Your Risks, Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses www.fema.gov/fima/planning_toc3.shtm August 2001 FEMA 386-7 Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation, Planning www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/resources/shtm September 2002

Bibliography Page 7


FEMA 403 World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations Washington, D.C. www.fema.gov/library/wtcstudy/shtm May 2002 General Services Administration (GSA) Balancing Security and Openness: A Thematic Summary of a Symposium on Security and the Design of Public Buildings www.hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/gd_files/SecurityOpenness.pdf November 30, 1999 GSA Cost Impact of ISC Security Criteria Bryant L. and Smith J., Vicksburg, Mississippi www.oca.gsa.gov/specialphp/References.php GSA Facility Standards for the Public Building Service (PBS-P100) Chapter 8, Security Design www.hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/facilitiesstandards/ Revised November 2000 GSA Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidelines for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects www.oca.gsa.gov/about_progressive_collaps/progcollapse.php November 2000 Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a release. LBNL/PUB-51959 www.securebuildings.lbl.gov/images/bldgadvice/pdf January 10, 2003 National Capital Planning Commission Designing for Security in the Nation’s Capital www.ncpc.gov/whats_new/ITFreport/pdf October 2001 The National Capital Planning Urban Design and Security Plan www.ncpc.gov/publications/udsp/Final%20UDSP.pdf October 2002

Bibliography Page 8


National Institute of Building Sciences Whole Building Design Guide: Provide Security for Building Occupants and Assets www.wbdg.org/design/index/php?cn=2.7.4&cx=0 Society of American Military Engineers National Symposium of Comprehensive Force Protection Lindbergh & Associates Charleston, South Carolina www.same.org/forceprot/force.htm October 2001 State and Local Guide 101 Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Chapter 6, Attachment G, Terrorism April 2001 Structural Engineering Institute of American Society of Civil Engineers Structural Design for Physical Security: State of the Practice Edward Conrath, etal., Reston, Virginia www.pubs.asce.org/BOOKdisplay.cgi?9990571 1999 U.S. Air Force Installation Entry Control Facilities Design Guide, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/gate/index.html October 2002 U.S. Air Force Installation Force Protection Guide Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/arch/force/pdf 1997 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents, ETL 1110-3-498 www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs February 24, 1999 U.S. Department of Commerce Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1 www.ciao.gov/resource/vulassessframework.pdf October 1998

Bibliography Page 9


U.S. Department of Commerce Practices For Securing Critical Information Assets, www.ciao.gov/resources/Practices_For_Securing_Critical_Information_Assets.pdf January 2000 U.S. Department of Defense DoD Security Engineering Manual This Publication will replace Army Technical Manual 5-853 (Air Force Joint Manual 32-1071) volumes 1, 2, and 3 and Navy Military Handbook 1013/1A U.S. Fire Administration (USFA of FEMA) The Critical Infrastructure Protection Process Job Aid www.usfa.fema.gov/dhtml/fire-service/cipc-jobaid.cfm May 1, 2002 U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Strategy for Homeland Security www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/nat_strat_hls.pdf July 2002 U.S. Department of Homeland Security The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf February 2003 U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf February 2003 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Physical Security Assessment of Veterans Affairs Facilities Recommendations of the National Institute of Building Sciences Task Group to the Department of Veterans Affairs www.va.gov/facmgt/standard/etc/vaphysicalsecurityreport.pdf September 6, 2002